a. Reitereted to the Foreign Minister of Perú our
interest in having the facts of the Puerto Maldonado incident
NW 50955 DocId: 32424006 Page 13

brought to the attention of the OAS, and urged that this action
be taken as soon as possible.

b. Urged the Covernment of Guatemala to submit evidence
of communist sctivity to the CAS.

7. Surveillance of Guben Dislomatic, Comoxical and Cultural
Central Intelligency AgeOCT
(To be filled in chay M. Wheeler)
C
NW 50955 DocId:32424006 Page 14

Departuent of State
SECRET
-14-
Instructed Embassy La Pas to follow up closely on
charges of involvement of Cuban mission in internal politics
of Bolivia, and, at the Embassy's discretion, to point out to
Bolivien officials the opportunity for a possible bresk in
relations with Cuba. Embassy Le Paz was not able to press
for a break when the evidence of Cuban intervention did not
prove to be as conclusive as originally reported.

Other Special Actions
Department of State
a. Obtained sction by the COAS on July 3 on the Lavalle
Committee Report trensmitting the document to the governmente
and urging them to implement the specific and general recom-
mendations contained therein as soon as possible.

b. Through Embassy Managua informed the Nicaraguan
Government of the matters which we wanted to have considered
during the informal meeting of the Ministers of Security and
Interior of the Isthmian countries held in Managua, August
26-28 in preparation for the second formal meeting of the
Managua Security Conference countries later this year.
SEGRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32424006 Page 15
ہے

SECRET
Reassured President Schick of Nicaragua in the
most esphatic terms that the Nuclear Test Ban Trenty did not
mean that our attitude toward Castro has altered in the
slightest, and stressed our interest in seeing steady progress
by all the Isthmion countries in implementing the recommenda
tions of the Managua Security Conference to block Cuban
subversive efforts.

d. Explained in detail the nature of the Cuban threat
and the related policy objectives of the U.S., during conversa-
tion in London and in Washington with Mr. Adon Watson, newly
appointed British Ambassador to Cuba.
Doited States Ing

a. The Agency's press service during the reporting
period transmitted 12 articles, commentaries, and backgrounders
on its wireless file service to USIA posts throughout Latin
Anerica for placement in the local newspapers and the Voice of
America Spanish broadcasts to Latin Americs carried a total of
28 commentaries and features on the subject of Cuban-based
subversion in addition to the regular reporting of developments
in the hourly newscasts.
NW 50955 DocId: 32424006 Page 16
SECRET

b. In response to standing Agency instructions to give
special attention to developments related to Cuba-based
subversion, UBIS posts in Latin America were prompt in reporting
incidents and in providing editorial comments from the Latin
American press, all of which was used in the Agency's radio and
press cutput.

The main developments trested in the Agency's radio and
press coverage included Castro's July 26 speech urging revolu-
tions in Latin America, the discovery of terrorist weapons
factories in Guayaquil, the Ecusdorean Vice President's accusion
of Cuban responsibility for terrorism, the statement by State
Department Press Officer Richard Phillips that "potential
subversive agents" from Cuba to the Caribbean area were passing
through Gran Caymen, the expulsion of a Bolivian youth leader
for receiving funds from Cuba, Castro-trained terrorists in
Honduras,/Bolivian protests against weddling by the Coben Embassy
in the miner's strike. A Voice of America roving reporter in
Latin America provided several reports eázfzazies on the
and
Gubversion picture in countries he visited.

c. Ia support of the Agency's effort on Cuban-based
subversion, the publications center in Mexico began work on
NW 50955 DocId: 32424006 Page 17

SECRET
three pamphlets during the period based on Castro's report of
his visit to the Soviet Union (showing that he contradicted
himself in some of bis extravagant claims of Soviet progress).
the losses suffered by Cuban labor under Castro, and the fate
of political prisoners in Cuba. When completed, these pamphlets
will be reproduced and distributed in quantity throughout the
C
NW 50955 DocId:32424006 Page 18
SECRET
198-10007-10021
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date:
6/24/201

Agency Information

AGENCY: ARMY
RECORD NUMBER: 198-10007-10021
RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: ICCA
FROM: CHMN, SUBCMMT ON CUBAN SUBVERSION
TO: MEMBER OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE
TITLE: REPORT FOR JULY-AUGUST ON ACTIONS TAKEN TO COMBAT CASTRO-COMMUNIST
SUBVERSION
DATE: 09/30/1963
PAGES: 23
SUBJECTS: ENHANCEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE ON CUBAN
SUBVERSION
STRENGTHENING OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY
CAPABILITIES
CONTROL OF TRAVEL TO AND FROM CUBA
CONTROL OF TRANSFER OF FUNDS
SURVEILLANCE OF CUBAN DIPLOMATIC, COMMERCIAL
AND CULTURAL MISSIONS
CONTROL OF CLANDESTINE MOVEMENT OF GUERILLAS
AND ARMS
CONTROL OF MOVEMENT OF CUBAN PROPAGANDA
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Secret
RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 04/08/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: Califano Papers, Box 2, Folder 26. Memo from Chairman, Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion to the
members of the Committee re: Report for July-August on Actions Taken to Combat Castro-Communist
Subversion.

JFK RevieJ
Department of the Army EO 13526
Declassify Exclude Exempt
Authority
Refer To
Review Date
10 8/12/2015 BY KES

v9.1
NW 50955 DocId:32424014 Page 1
30

SECRET
#6
File
September 30, 1963
TO:
FROM:
Members of Subcommittee on Castro-Communist
Subversion.

Chairman, Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion
SUBJECT: Report for July August on Actions Taken to
Combat Castro-Communist Subversion.

Attached is a draft of the Subcommittee's report for
July and August on actions taken to counteract Castro-
commumist subversion in the hemisphere. The draft has been
prepared on the basis of the material which you furnished
with certain modification. The CIA members will note that I
have extracted from his submission the items of action taken
and placed these in the body of the report. The intelligence
information contained in the submission I have made into an
annex. I think it is very useful to have the intelligence
data form part of the report, and request that in the future
the CIA member prepare his submisaion in two parts.

May I have your comments on the draft by close of
business October 1, 1963.

Copies to: CIA - Mr. Wheeler (2)
DOD - Col. Haig (2) #6, #7
USIA Mr. Wagley (1)
RAR - Mr. Hart (1)
Justice - Mr. Geogheghan (1)

20763
W/R Called
Bob Fittstrad advised de - stopped of
J-3-Our Staff вид
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
ARA: WGBowdler:jg
9/30/63

NW 50955 DocId: 32424014 Page 2
C
SECRET

DRAFT
SECRET
6 of
9 copies
1. Control of Travel to and from Cuba
Central Intelligence Agency
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatio
downgrading and
declassificatio
a. Developed highly useful information on frequency
of Cuban "chartered" flights to Brazil, names and nationalities
of passengers and crew, and laz measures of control followed
by Brazilian authorities. Transmitted this information to
sation chiefs in the Latin American countries of the non-
Brazilians travelling on these flights.

b. Maintained close watch over travel to and from
Cuba. See Annex B for table of known travel of Latin Americans
during July and August.

c. As a result of information furnished by him by the
CIA Station in Buenos Aires and with the Station's urging, the
Argentine Minister of Interior indicated that he would make
every effort to prevent Argentine delegates from attending the
International Union of Architects Congress in Havana.

d. At the urging of the CIA Station and the Embassy
the Bolivien Minister of Interior issued in mid-July an order
prohibiting the granting of travel permits to Cuba on other
bloc countries to Bolivian nationals.
C
NW 50955 DocId: 32424014 Page 3

SECRET
e. Partly as a result of the efforts of the CIA
etation in Santiago, the Covernment of Chile prohibited the
entry into Chile of organizers of the Cuban sponsored Second
Latin American Youth Congress, which had been scheduled to take
place in Santiago in August. This was one of the factors which
led to postponement of theCongress.

f. After considerable prodding by the CIA Station
and the Embassy the Minister of Public Security of Costa Rica
presented legislative proposals to the Costa Rican Assembly
which will require all persons intending to travel to Communist
countries to have their travel approved by a newly created
Costa Rican security agency.

g. CIA Station in Mexico City developed information
concerning the clandestine arrival of passengers in Vera Cruz
on Cuban merchant ships. Efforts are being made to obtain more
information and to encourage stricter controls by the Nexican
authorities.

Department of State
e. Instructed Embassy Conakry to try to persuade
Guinean authorities to deny use of airport facilities by flights
on Habana-Moscoŭ route. These efforts achieved a temporary
withholding of permission for future regular flights, at least
NW 50955 DocId: 32424014 Page 4

SECRET
until such time as the Soviets develop their own refueling facilities
at Conakry.

b. Instructed Embassy Rio to approach Brazilian
authorities to express cur deep concern at the growing frequency
of Cuban non-scheduled flights to Brazil and request their
cooperation in curbing them. Also instructed our Embassies
in several Latin American countries to work with CIA station
chiefs in furnishing the names of nationals of those countries
travelling on these flights to local authorities and urging
than: (1) to institute tighter controls on their own citizens
travelling to Cuba, and (2) to express their concern to the
AN GOVERNMENT
Brazil over Cuban use of Brazil as a way station
for transporting subversives.

c. As a result of representations made to the British
government about Cuban flights to the Cayman Islands carrying
Latin American subversives, the British developed an administrative
scheme which will effectively prohibit the use of British
Caribbean dependencies by Cubana as transit points for passengers.
The British intend to require transit visas of passengers passing
through their areas, and to reject applications for such visas
except in certain special cases. Persons not possessing visas
would be prevented from leaving their aircraft, or would be
NW 50955 DocId: 32424014 Page 5

SECRET
returned to their point of origin.

4. Instructed Embassy Mexico City on August 29 to
inform the Mexican airline CMA that the United States is
opposed to a proposal that CA operate charter flights to carry
refugees from Havana to Central America, CA, as a result,
stated that they had no intention of proceeding further with
this project.

Instructed U.8. Missions in Curacao and the Ha qua
to investigate a report that KIM was planning to renew sh
scheduled Curacao-Habana flights and to reiterate US opposition
to resumption of air service to Cuba. KIM assured our Embassy
that there is no plan to initiate service, scheduled or non-
scheduled, to Habana,

f. Instructed Embassy Ottawa to express our strong
objections to a proposal that a Cubans charter flight pick up
e second group of U.S. students in Montreal to fly then to Cuba.
The flight was not authorized.

g. Instructed Consulate Georgetown to investigate
Cubana approaches to secure flight facilities. Mission reported
on August 1 that the Governor had no knowledge of any talks
between the B.G. Ministry of Communications and the Cuban Govern-
ment regarding landing rights for Cubana planes. The Covernor
NW 50955 DocId: 32424014 Page 6

SECRET
indicated his intention to inquire further and to keep us
advised. London reported that neither the Cuben nor the British
Cuiana Govermente had raised the issue of landing rights with
H.M.G.

h. Urged the governments of Mexico, Canada, Jamaica
and the Netherlands to refuse to assist the Cuban government
in its efforts to find a short route for returns the 50 American
students who illegally travelled to Cuba. Also informed Pan
American Airways that we were opposed to a Cuban request for
a PAA charter flight to fly the students from Esbana to New York.

1. Instructed our missions et Port of Spain and
Barbados on several occasions to approach these governments to
express the concern of the U.S. at indications of Cuban interest
in the use of their aviation facilities.

Embassy Foxt of Spain discussed with the Foreign Secretary
of Trinidad various legal moves available that would enable
GOTT to control movements of aircraft within their territory,
citing examples of such controle instituted by Mexico, Canada
and Ireland. He indicated receptiveness to the proposal theat
the list of suggestions be made available to the aviation officials
concerned,

J. During a previous reporting period Embassy Santiago
NW 50955 DocId: 32424014 Page 7
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urged the government of Chile to refuse visas to Cuban delegatës
to a preparatory meeting planning for the II Latin American
Youth Congress scheduled for August in the Chilean capital.
Inability of Cuban delegates to obtain Chilean vises for this
meeting is one of the contributing factors to the Cuban sponsors
announcing during August that the meeting had been postponed.

k. Sent general instructions to our missions in countries
which participate in the International Union of Architects asking
them to urge the cooperation of govermental authorities in
preventing or discouraging the attendance of their citizens to
the VII UIA Congress in Habana, September 29-October 4, 1963.
Followed this up with instructions to individual posts to try
where feasible to dissuade architects from free world countries
from serving on the jury for the selection of a Bay of Pige
momment.

1. Urged Canadian Government to block a plan to
commence food parcel shipments to Cuba, on a Comercial basis,
that would have required the establishment of scheduled weekly
charter flights by Canadian planes.
C
NW 50955 DocId:32424014 Page 8
SECRET

SECRET
2. Control of Movement of Cuban Proparanda
Central Intelligence Agency
Responding to the urging of the CIA Station police
of the State of Guanabara seized large quantities of propa-
ganda brought into Brazil by passengers on the special Cubana
flights. For example, some 50 pounds of printed propaganda
vas taken from the various passengers who arrived on the 16
August Cubane flight.

3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms
Department of Defense
a. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba
during the month of July at the same rate and with the same
cuphasis as prior to 1 July 1963.

b. Continued to maintain U.S. Forces, primarily from
within the Atlantic Command, available to assist other Caribbean
governments in the interception of suspicious craft in
territorial waters, as might be requested. No such requests were
received from any other government during the period covered by
this report. However, U.S. Forces did keep track of the
location of the Soviet merchant freighter MITCHURINSK, which
NW 50955 DocId: 32424014 Page 9
ひ

was suspected of carrying subversives and arms from Cuba to
British Guiana in mid-July. MITCHURINSK was under U.8.
surveillance from its departure from Havana until United
Kingdom forces assumed the task of keeping this ship under
surveillance upon its approach to Georgetown, British Guiana.
Subsequently, British police search of MITCHURINSK in British
Guiane waters revealed nothing of a suspicious nature.

Central Intelligence Agency
At the repeated urging of the CIA Station in Lima
the Peruvian Government late in August published a new anti-
terrorists lav providing a penalty of no less than five years
imprisonment for persons who particiate in guerrilla activities
or in the illegal manufacture of weapons or explosives.

The Peruvian National Intelligence Service is working
on a lead furnished by the CIA Station in Lims concerning a
00 ton vessel reportedly involved in arms traffic.

Department of State
Instructed our Consulate General in Georgetown to
investigate reports that commercial cargoes (which could conceal
illicit arms traffic out of Cuba) had developed between British
Quiane and Cuba. Investigations to date have been negative.
SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32424014 Page 10
C

SECRET
4. Control of Transfer of Funds
Department of State
Cooperated with the Foreign Assats Control Office of
the Treasury Department in developing blocking controle with
respect to Cuba which went into effect on July 9, 1963.

5. Strengthening of Counter-Insurgency Capabilities
Department of Defence
a. Continued the installation of military communica
tions facilities in Latin America. Operational dates for the
multi-channel radio stations to be installed in Managua,
Nicaragua aud Tegucigalpa, Honduras have been delayed to 15
October 1963 and 15 December 1963, respectively because of new
engineering and contractual requirements. Negotiations are
continuing with Colombia and Ecuador for installation of U.S.
military radio facilities. Completion of a new commercial trans
isthmian cable in the Panama Canal Zone within the coming month
is expected to improve military communications within the
United States and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command.

b. Continued the surveillance of Cuba by U.S. Forces,
reporting as before to U.S. commanders, organisations and agenetes.
SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32424014 Page 11

SECRET
Reports of surveillance have been disseminated to all who have
a requirement to know.

c. Established a 24 hour per day, 7 days per week duty
watch at the U.S. Military Groups in the Caribbean countries in
conjunction with implementation of the military alerting system.
Continued efforts to staff the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence
Center with properly cleared, trained personnel (this center is
the military focal point for relaying information concerning
the movement of subversives). Filled, partially, the authorized
billets in the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center and
took under consideration the problem of an increase in the billet
structure in the Center. The Cormander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern
Command together with his intelligence officer visited Honduras
and Nicaragua and determined that no significant problems existed
which would interfere with effective operations in those
countries.

d. Action previously initiated by the Comander, U.S.
Naval Forces, Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) to establish a Small
Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT) as a contribution to
the Caribbean Surveillance System is progressing satisfactorily.
SECRET
Ç
NW 50955 DocId: 32424014 Page 12

SECRET
:
Permanent assignment of U.S. Coast Guard personnel to SCIATT
in the Canal Zone has been approved and the U.S. Coast Guard
has taken appropriate implementing actions.

e. During the period of this report, the SCIATT con-
ducted an on-the-job training course at Puntarenas, Costa
Rice. Training was given to 13 members of the Guardia Civil
of Costa Rica who were either newly assigned to the 40 foot
Coast Guard utility boats (CCUBs) or were to be assigned as
replacement crew members.

f. A quarterly inspection and evaluation of the CGUBS
provided other Central American countries was conducted during
the period 17 to 31 August by a mobile training tean (MFT)
made up of SCIATT personnel.
:
g. Continued efforts to improve the internal security
of Latin American armies through the provision of Intelligence
Advisors. Presently there are such advisors assigned to 14
Latin countries, emphasizing counterintelligence and counter-
subversion.

h. During the reporting period MTIs conducted training
in counterinsurgency for the armed forces of Colombia, Bolivie,
Venezuela, Feru and El Salvador.
SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32424014 Page 13
C

SECRET
1. Civic Action MITs were sent to Guatemala, Bolivia,
Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica and Ecuador.

6. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion
Central Intelligence Agency
CIA Stations throughout Latin America continued in a
great majority of countries to furnish to the local internal
security organizations with whom they are in liaison informa-
tion concerning travelers to and from Cuba, as well as such
information as came to CIA's attention concerning the movement
of funds, arme and propagenda material. In meny instances, the
furnishing of information to the internal security service by
the CIA Station was paralleled by the furnishing of similar
information to the foreign office by the Ambassador or his
representative. The response to this information has varied
greatly. The Central American countries, in general, began to
pay attention to the information and take action on it. At the
during the reporting period
other extreme, the Brasilien Government/showed little inclination
to follow up on the information.

Department of State
a. Reiterated to the Foreign Minister of Peru oar
interest in having the facts of the Puerto Maldonado incident
NW 50955 DocId: 32424014 Page 14
C

SECRET
brought to the attention of the OAS, and urged that this action
be taken as soon es possible.

b. Urged the Government of Guatemala to submit evidence
of communist activity to the OAS.

7. Surveillance of Cuban Diplomatic, Commerical and Cultural
Missions.
Central Intelligency Agency
(To che filled in by M. Wheeln)
NW 50955 DocId: 32424014 Page 15

SECRET
Department of State
Instructed Embassy La Paz to follow up closely on
charges of involvement of Cuban mission in internal politics
of Bolivia, and, at the Embassy's discretion, to point out to
Bolivien officials the opportunity for a possible break in
relations with Cuba. Embassy La Paz was not able to press
for a break when the evidence of Cuban intervention did not
prove to be as conclusive as originally reported.

3. Other Special Actions
Department of State
a. Obtained action by the COAS on July 3 on the Lavalle
Committee Report transmitting the document to the governments
and urging them to implement the specific and general recom-
mendations contained therein as soon as possible.
کا
b. Through Embassy Managua informed the Nicaraguan
Covernment of the matters which we wanted to have considered
during the informal meeting of the Ministers of Security and
Interior of the Isthmian countries held in Managua, August
26-28 in preparation for the second formal meeting of the
Managua Security Conference countries later this year.
C
NW 50955 DocId: 32424014 Page 16
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SECRET
-15-
c. Reassured President Schick of Nicaragua in the
most emphatic terms that the Nuclear Test Dan Treaty did not
mean that our attitude toward Castro has altered in the
slightest, and stressed our interest in seeing steady progress
by all the Isthmian countries in implementing the recomenda-
tions of the Managua Security Conference to block Cuban
subversive efforts.

d. Explained in detail the nature of the Cuban threat
and the related policy objectives of the U.S., during conversa-
tion in London and in Washington with Mr. Aden Watson, newly
appointed British Ambassador to Cube.

United States Information Agency
a. The Agency's press service during the reporting
period transmitted 12 articles, commentaries, and backgrounders
on its wireless file service to USIA posts throughout Latin
America for placement in the local newspapers and the Voice of
America Spanish broadcasts to Latin America cerried a total of
28 commentaries and features on the subject of Cuban-based
subversion in addition to the regular reporting of developments
in the hourly newscasts.
C
NW 50955 DocId: 32424014 Page 17
SECRET

b. In response to standing Agency instructions to give
special attention to developments related to Cuba-based
subversion, USIS posts in Latin America were prompt in reporting
incidents and in providing editorial comments from the Latin
American preso, all of which was used in the Agency's radio and
press output.

The main developments trested in the Agency's radio and
press coverage included Castro's July 26 speech urging revolu-
tions in Latin America, the discovery of terrorist weapons
factories in Guayaquil, the Ecuadoréan Vice President's accusion
of Cuben responsibility for terrorion, the statement by State
Department Press Officer Richard Phillips that "potential
subversive agents" from Cuba to the Caribbean area were passing
through Gran Cayman, the expulsion of a Bolivian youth leader
for receiving funds from Cuba, Castro-trained terrorists in
Honduras,/Bolivian protests against meddling by the Cuban Embassy
in the miner's strike. A Voice of America roving reporter in
Latin America provided several reports aiztunztes on the
end
subversion picture in countries he visited.

In support of the Agency's effort on Cuban-based
subversion, the publications center in Mexico began work on
NW 50955 DocId: 32424014 Page 18
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SECRET
-17-
three pamphlets during the period based on Castro's report of
his visit to the Soviet Union (showing that he contradicted
himself in some of his
avagant claims of Soviet progress),
the losses suffered by Cuban labor under Castro, and the fate
of political prisoners in Cuba. When completed, these pamphlets
vill be reproduced and distributed in quantity throughout the
area.
NW 50955 DocId: 32424014 Page 19
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GROUP 1
Excluded from automati
downgrading and
declassification
SECRET
ANNEX A
CIA Intelligence Annex
Travel to and from Cuba
Brazil
Chartered Cubana Airlines flights between Cuba and
Brazil have become a major means of transporting non-Cuban
Latin Americans to and from Cuba. The five such flights since
late July have carried nearly 400 non-Cubans.

The first of the recent series -- on 25 July -- brought
71 Latin American passengers to Havana for the 26 July celebra-
tions. The other four flights -- on 15, 22, 28 and 29 August -
transported over 200 Latin Americans to Brazil from Havana.
Some of the aircraft involved returned to Cuba with smaller
numbers of passengers. Many of the 200 Latin American passengers
had been delegates to the 26 July ceremonies, but others had
apparently been in Cuba for longer periods and some had probably
received training there. Of the passengers on these four flights
to Brazil, 75 were natives of Caribbean area countries. Their
circuitous travel through Brazil was evidently designed to help
conceal the fact that they had been in Cube.
Costa Rica
Two Costa Ricans were among the passengers on a
chartered Cubana plane which was turned back to Havana at Grand
Cayman on 11 July 1963. One was Luz Marina Hernandez Salazar,
the only Costa Rican woman known to have been sent to Cuba for
training as a guerrilla varfere instructor. She had been in
Cuba since September 1962. The other Costa Rican passenger was
Carlos Guillen, former head of the Costa Rican Society of
Friends of the Cuban Revolution, who had been in Cuba since
November 1962.
Ecuador
The CIA Station in Quito reports that the military
junte, which assumed power in Ecuador on 11 July, can be expected
SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32424014 Page 20
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SECRET
to follow the guidance of the Embassy and the Station in
controlling travel to and from Cuba and the Soviet bloc, The
activities of Cuban subversives in Ecuador, at least for the
present, have been greatly inhibited by the nass arrests of
Communists and pro-Cubans and by the outlawing of the Communist
Party by the junta.

Honduras
It is reported that the Honduran Communist Party has
issued orders to its members not to attempt to travel to Cuba
at the present time. This action is apparently the result of
the increasing vigilance of the Honduran government and the
greater implementation of stricter travel controls.

2. Movement of Cuban Propaganda
Guatemala
According to an unconfirmed report received in July,
a Bureau of Information of the Communist Party of Guatemala is
being formed in collaboration with Prensa Latina and is to be
managed clandestinely. It expects to receive news by shortwave
radio from Cuba and print bulletins for distribution by radio
stations. This may indicate a pattern by which Prensa Latina
will attempt to distribute on a more clandestine basis in other
areas in Latin Americe.

Honduras
It was reliably reported that in mid-July 1963, a
small coastal freighter landed 14 large boxes of Communist
propagande on the northern coast of Honduras, Hondur the boxes having
been transferred at sea from a larger vessel.

3. Movement of Guerrillas and Arus
Argentina
Extremist members of the Peronist Party, apparently
under the leadership of such figures as Hector Villalon and
John William Cooke, are apparently receiving encouragement and
promises of large suns of money from Cuba in support of their
efforts to train and organize subversive groups in Argentina.
C
NW 50955 DocId:32424014 Page 21

SECRET
Villalon has stated that his plan calls for expanding and
accellerating subversive sctivities in Argentine culminating
in a complete take over within two years. There is no indica-
tion that Peron himself has agreed to this plan. It has been
reported that leaders of the Communist Party of Argentina have
been greatly annoyed by the tendency of the Castro regime to
support the revolutionary Peronists without having consulted
the Communist Party of Argentina.
:
It is reported that the so-called Army of National
Liberation (ANL) of Argentina, which is a relatively small
Castroist organization directed from Cuba by John William Cooke,
bas in recent weeks been negotiating for the purchase of arms
and has been offered submachine guns, bazookas and other weapons
by two or three private suppliers. It was reported, however,
that the ANL was having difficulty getting enough dollars from
Cuba to make significant purchases possible.
Bolivia
The Bolivian Ministry of Foreiga Relations on 23
August protested formally to the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires in
La Paz against the Cuban Embassy support to the miners during
the recent crisis. Subsequently, however, Foreign Minister
Fellman informed the Cuban Charge that he need not fear that
the Government of Bolivia would break diplomatic relations with
Cuba. There has, in fact, been no hard information linking the
Cuban Embassy with the present mining crisis in spite of some
unconfixmad reports of Cuban support.

Brazil
Cuban Ambassador to Brazil, Raul Roa Kouri, is reported
to have attempted to encourage peasant league leader Francisco
Julieo to revitalize the leagues in northern Brazil. According
to some reports efforts are being made to unify the leadership
and bring dissident elements under the general direction of
Juliso. Other reports indicate that, although the Cuban Embassy
is providing guidance and possibly financial support to the
movement, it had not yet resolved the internal dissension in
the leagues.
Colombia
NW 50955 DocId: 32424014 Page 22
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Colombia
From Colombia reports have been received of increasing
Cuban assistance, primarily in the form of training courses by
instructors who have been trained in Cuba, to the Worker-Student-
Peasant Movement (MOEC). A small guerrilla band encountered
by the Colombian army in July 1963 was broken up when five
members of the band were killed and two others captured. A
small quantity of arms and a considerable amount of books and
pamphlets on revolutionary warfare, photographs of Fidel Castro,
Camilo Cienfuegos and Mao Tse-tung, and bulletins of the MOEC
were found at the camp site. Recent reports have indicated an
increase in the terrorist efforts of the MOEC and increased
promises of assistance from Che Guevara with regard to the
training of additional MOEC members.
Costa Rica
In mid-July an increased number of guerrillas were
reportedly being trained in Costa Rica by Adolfo Garcia Barberena,
well-known Nicaraguan revolutionary leader and member of the
FLN (National Liberation Front -- a Communist-dominated, Cuban-
supported, anti-Nicaragua revolutionary group). In early
August, Alberto Serrato, leader of the FLN in Costa Rica, left
with a group of Nicaraguans for the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan
border. The purchase of arms and supplies and the recruitment
of Nicaraguans for a movement against Nicaragua are also reportedly
undervay in Costa Rica,

Hector Bogantes Zamora, Costa Rican agitator, left San Jose
in mid-August for the Nicaraguan border to supervise the passage
of Nicaraguan guerrillas fron Costa Rica into Nicaragua.
Bogentes, who recently returned from attending the May Day
celebrations in Cuba, was assigned this responsibility by the
Costa Rican Communist Party.

Hondures
The Honduran azmed forces began to move against a group
of pro-Castro guerrillas operating against the Nicaraguan Govern-
ment and active in the vicinity of the Nicaraguan-Honduran border.
The Nicaraguan National Guard has been conducting opérations
on its side of the border against the insurgents since July.
The dense jungle and difficult terrain, however, will impede the
efforts of both forces to eliminate the guerrillas.
(
C
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Information on the guerrilla force is scanty and
conflicting. It is apparently composed of members of the National
Liberation Front (FLN), a Commmmist-dominated and Cuban-supported
revolutionary organization active primarily in Honduras and
Nicaragua since the fall of 1962. The strength of the force
is not knorm.
Nicaragua
A captured guerrilla of the FLN (National Liberation
Front - a Comunist-dominated, Cuban-supported, anti-Nicaraguan
group) confessed that he was a member of a group of 46 who
entered Nicaragua from Honduras on 22 July. He said that their
mission was to establish a base camp in the Isabella mountains,
Department of Jinotega, in order to indoctrainate the peasante
and to train them in guerrilla tactics. He admitted that he
hed received six months guerrilla warfare training in Cüba and
that other FLN leaders had received similar training. He also
said that the FLN training camp in Honduras was near El Lagarto,
on the Patuca River.

4. Trenefer of Funds
British Culana
Gulana, Guiana Import-Export Corporation
(Gimpex) received a one In British Guaniolent deposited
million
by the Cuban Alimpex Corporation for goods to be delivered to
Cuba in the future. Gimpex has, in turn, loaned this money to
the Government of British Guiana. Cheddi Jagan's People's
Progressive Party is the major stockholder in Gimpex. Mohammed
Kassim, Manager of Gimpen, has indicated that Gimpex will be
able to secure additional loans from Cuba in amounts sufficient
to tide the Jagan government over any foreseeable crisis. It
was also reported that Cimpex plans to buy aircraft, spare parts
and other machinery in the United States for reshipment to Cuba.

General
Reports continue to be received from many places indicating
that the suitcase full of currency is still one of the most
common methods used by the Cubans for transmitting funds for
use in supporting subversive activities throughout the hemisphere.
Instances where such funds have been confiscated by the police
have occurred recently in El Salvador, Panama and Ecuador.
C
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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System Identification Form Date: 6/24/201
Agency Information
AGENCY: ARMY
RECORD NUMBER: 198-10007-10022
RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Information
ORIGINATOR: ARMY
FROM: JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.
TO: ICCCA
TITLE: ICCCA: REPORT ON STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS DESIGNED TO COUNTER SUBVERSION
DATE: 07/18/1963
PAGES: 17
SUBJECTS: CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Secret
RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 04/08/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: Califano Papers, Box 2, Folder 26. Memo from Califano to ICCCA re: the Report on the Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion. Also appears in Califano Box 6, Folder 11.

JFK Review
Department of the Army EO 13526
Declassify Exclude Exempt
Authority
Refer To
Review Date 08/12/2015 BY KES
By
v9.1
31
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July 12, 1963

MEMORANDUM NO. 53 FOR GENERAL EARLE G. WHEELER (JCS)
CAPTAIN E. R. ZUMWALT, JR., USN (OSD)
MAJOR GENERAL J. D. ALGER, USA
REAR ADMIRAL W. WENDT, USN
MAJOR GENERAL J. V. CARPENTER, III, USAF
BRIGADIER GENERAL H. M. ELWOOD, USMC

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs
Report on Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion (U)

Reference: a. SecArmy memo, subj: ICCCA: Movement of Subversives and Subversive Trainees, dated 15 Mar 63.
b. Spec Asst to SecArmy memo, subj: ICCCA: Report on the Status of Implementation of Actions Approved by The President, dated 20 Mar 63.
c. Spec Asst to Sec Army memo, subj: ICCCA: Report on the Status of Actions Approved by the President, dated 29 Apr 63.
d. Spec Asst to SecArmy memo, subj: ICCCA: Report on Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion, 27 Jun 63.

Attached herewith is a final draft of the Report to the President of the Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion on Progress Made During the April- June Period in Curbing Cuban Subversion in Latin America.

It is requested that comments, if any, be provided this office by 1200 hours, 22 July 1963. The Department of Defense portion of subject report is based on submissions furnished in response to reference d.

OSA, ASG Control No.16736

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EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY
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Future Subcommittee Progress Reports will be prepared on a monthly basis for the previous month's activities and will follow the format utilized in the attached draft. It is requested that appro- priate points of contact provide this office (Room ZE-614) by 1600 hours on I August 1963 and each month thereafter, a report, in duplicate, on the status of those actions approved by the President and assigned to their respective organizations. Additionally, this report should include any other actions taken to counter Castro subversion.

Signed Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr. General Counsel

cc: Mr. Yarmolinsky (OSD)

Mr. Califano
Lt Col Haig
ASG

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REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION

ON PROGRESS MADE DURING APRIL-JUNE PERIOD

IN CURBING CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

SECRET
USA, ASG Control No. 16736
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1. The Department of State:
A. Participated in the preparations for and the holding of the Managua meeting on subversion, which was held April 3-4.
B. Headed an inter-departmental team which visited the Isthmian countries to encourage implementation of the recommendations for curbing subversion which were agreed on at the Managua meeting.
C. Prepared a report on the inter-departmental team's survey of the Central American countries, containing recommendations for further action in this field, and advised affected U. S. agencies and foreign service posts of the guidelines for operation of the military alerting system.
D. Worked in the OAS in drafting a report containing practical recommendations to counteract Castro/communist subversion in the fields of the movement of travel, propaganda and funds, and prepared the ground for a COAS decision to transmit the report to member Governments urging them to implement the recommendations contained therein.
E. Drew official and public attention in Latin American countries to the capture of Peruvians who were returning from Habana by an overland route through Bolivia, and urged the Peruvian Government to make details of this case known to the OAS.
F. Helped publicize the capture of an Ecuadoran subversive who was returning to Ecuador from Cuba by way of Prague with $25,000 in cash on his person, and requested the Ecuadoran Government to make an official report of this matter to the OAS.
G. Sent a U.S. Consul to Gran Cayman to investigate Cuban flights to that island, and secured the cooperation of the Costa Rican Government in preventing the use of LACSA aircraft to transport subversives to San Jose off-landed in Gran Cayman.
H. Approached the British Government various times to seek its cooperation in preventing the use of Gran

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Cayman and its other Caribbean possessions as traffic refueling or transit stops for planes flying to and from Cuba.
I. Continued pressure on the Dutch Government and KLM airline officials not to resume KLM flights to Cuba, thus limiting the access to Cuba by Free World airlines.
J. Obtained the cooperation of CMA airline (Mexico) to keep its mail and cargo flights to Cuba on an unscheduled basis and to avoid carrying passenger's on the Habana-Mexico City leg of its service.
K. Continued efforts with the Canadian and Mexican Governments to secure their cooperation in preventing Cubans from introducing Russian IL- 18's on flights between Habana and their countries.
L. Urged the Brazilian Government not to grant landing rights for Soviet Bloc or Cuban planes servicing Cuba, and continued efforts to keep Brazil from signing a civil air agreement with Cuba.
M. Sought cooperation of various African Govern- ments in preventing the use of African airports as transit points for regular USSR-Cuba air service with TU-114's or as refueling stops for ferrying IL-18's to Cuba.
N. Initiated action to request US-owned and controlled oil companies in the Caribbean and Latin America to refuse bunkers voluntarily to vessels and aircraft in the Cuba trade.
0. Requested the Spanish Government to limit or eliminate service to Cuba by Iberia airlines and Spanish shipping companies.
P. Blocked initiation of an ocean ferry service between Habana and Florida by employing various delaying and obstructing tactics.
Q. Ordered, as of April 1, that all U.S. passports be marked anot valid for travel to Cuba to insure that ban on travel to Cuba would be more effectively enforced.

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R. Informed the Mexican Government that Americans. were not permitted to travel to Cuba without authorization and requested their assistance in preventing U.S. citizens from transiting Mexico en route to Cuba.
S. Instructed posts in Latin America to encourage host governments to take appropriate measures to dis- courage participation of their nationals in Cuba's May Day celebrations, and to prevent charter flights from their country to Cuba for the celebration.
T. Informed affected governments of the names of their nationals who had returned from Cuba on the Cuban plane which flew the new Cuban Ambassador and his party to Brazil, and suggested that they take this matter up with Brazil. Also called this Cuban action to the attention of the Brazilian Government.
U. Worked through Chilean Government and university circles to block the holding of the Communist-inspired II Latin American Youth Congress scheduled for Santiago, Chile in August 1963.
V. Encouraged the President of Honduras to have his immigration officials request clearance from our Embassy in Tegucigalpa before granting visas to Cubans wishing to enter Honduras from Cuba.
W. Encouraged the Benelux and Italian Governments to maintain visa requirements for Cubans travelling to their countries despite Cuba's having done away with visa requirements for their nationals who visit Cuba.

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2. The Department of Defense:
A. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba at the same rate and with the same emphasis as existed prior to that date. Between 25 April and 23 May 1963 additional sea surveillance was realized between Cuba and Haiti, due to the stationing of the Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron at the entrance of the Gulf of Gonaives occasioned by the deterioration of internal conditions in Haiti.
B. Continued the installation of military communications facilities in Latin America. Due to noncommunication difficulties, the multi-channel radio station scheduled for installation at Managua, Nicaragua by 1 July 1963 will be completed on or about 27 July 1963. Entry negotiations have been completed with Honduras, with the military radio facilities installation scheduled for completion on or about 10 October 1963. Negotiations are continuing in Colombia and Ecuador for the installation of military radio facilities.
C. Continued the surveillance of Cuba by U. S. forces, reporting as before, to U. S. commanders, organizations and agencies. Reports of subversive movement, obtained by U.S. surveillance have been made available for immediate transmittal through U. S. military alerting system.
D. Reached agreement with CIA on steps to be taken to prevent duplication of effort in operating a U.S. military alerting system and furnished guidance on this matter to USCINCSO and CINCLANT. After clarification of the role of the U. S. Military Groups by USCINCSO the military alerting system was again placed in operation effective 15 June 1963.
E. Maintained U. S. forces, for the most part from within the Atlantic Command, available to respond to assist in the final interception of suspicious craft in territorial waters, upon the request of the country concerned. Currently, forces are assigned by the United Commander involved to meet the singular problem encountered. In somewhat similar circumstances, U. S. forces of Atlantic Command have responded to this requirement in the cases of the Venezuelan ship ANZOATEGUI and the Italian ship CANNA REGIA.
F. Had the U. S. Coast Guard Mobile Training Team (MTT) report for duty in the Canal Zone on 15 May 1963 to perform as a Small

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Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT). Members of the SCIATT accompanied by a representative from the staff of Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) have completed an in- country evaluation of 40-foot Coast Guard Utility Boats (CGUBs) in five Central American countries and a detailed program through mid-November has been prepared for improving the material readiness and handling of the CGUBs provided by MAP. Action is underway to expedite delivery of spare parts required for maintenance of the boats.
COMUSNAVSO has now initiated a request to establish SCIATT billets with permanent personnel for an initial period of three years in order to fully develop the Central American CGUB program. The success of this program would be a major contribution to the Caribbean Surveillance System. U. S. Commander in Chief, Southern Command (USCINCSO) has recommended approval of COMUSNAVSO's request to CNO and action is being coordinated with OSD/ISA, JCS and USCG to obtain approval and appropriate funding for permanent billets.
The 40-foot CGUB permanently assigned to the U. S. Naval Station, Rodman, Canal Zone, for use by the SCIATT has been delivered and is in the process of being activated.
G. Continued efforts to improve the internal security of Latin American armies through the provision of Intelligence Advisors. Presently there are such advisors assigned to 14 Latin countries, emphasizing counterintelligence and counter- subversion.
H. Continued, through its intelligence agencies, work on studies concerning Castro/Communist subversion directed against Latin America.
I. Increased to 12 the number of Latin American countries in which there are intelligence exchange arrangements between U. S. and local military services.

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3. The Central Intelligence Agency:
A. Completed efforts to improve U.S. government communica- tions in Latin America by the installation of the remaining two commercial leased circuits into Guatemala City and Managua, and the stationing on a permanent basis of 35 CIA radio operators in Latin America in replacement of temporary duty personnel. In November 1962, CIA's active radio facilities in 20 Latin American capitals were augmented with on-line cryptographic facilities and temporary personnel to handle the bulk of all U.S. government communications in the area. These facilities, known as Joint Communications Centers, are now being operated by CIA on a 24-hour basis, as a service to all U.S. government agencies. Latin American traffic handled by the CIA base radio station near Washington has increased from 3,000,000 groups handled in October 1962 to 15,000,000 groups handled in March 1963.
B. Increased its efforts designed to control the movement of persons, arms and propaganda materials to and from Cuba. A summary of actions by country follows:
1. Argentina Station, in conjunction with the Embassy, has continued to press the Argentine government to enact effective travel control legislation and to adopt measures recommended by the Special Consultative Committee on Security of the OAS. Information on Argentines travelling to Cuba is being furnished to the Argentine government by the station. Several potential travellers to Cuba have been spotted and are being assessed by the station. Information from three recent returnees from Cuba is being obtained through debriefings. Station reports that because of increased Mexican controls, all truly clandestine travel to Cuba from Argentina is now via Prague. The Argentine Security Service has informed the station that mail censorship and customs controls at the docks and airports are 95% effective in preventing the entrance of Cuban propaganda through these channels. Local dissemination of propaganda is regulated by an Argentine inter-agency committee, which reviews any new propaganda items and takes action to stop dissemination of any item judged to be pro-Cuban or pro-Communist. During May the Argentine government issued a new decree which restricts Communist activities within Argentina. The station has continued to press the Security Service to urge regulation of travel to Cuba, but the adoption of such measures has been delayed pending government receipt on an official basis of the OAS recommendations. Through several assets the station is working on leads which it is hoped will reveal the basic sources of illegal arms sales in Argentina.

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2. Bolivia Station has been urging Bolivian government to adopt stricter travel controls, without apparent results so far. Names of travellers known to have returned from Cuba are being furnished to the Bolivian government. Thus far, no action is known to have been taken by the Bolivian government on the strength of such information. Station comments that problem with Bolivia is not in lack of information available to government on Cuban subversion, but in getting Bolivia to do something about it. The station has also furnished considerable information, including some surreptitiously acquired documents, ents, to the Ambassador for his use in urging Bolivian government action against Cuba. Considerable information is also being obtained through the interrogation of Peruvian guerrillas captured attempting to cross into Peru early in June.
3. Brazil Information on Brazilians who have received subversive training in Cuba has been made available to the National Security Council through CIA liaison with the NSC's Security Service. While the Brazilians have stated that the information is "of interest," there is no firm indication to date that they have the capability or desire to really follow up on the information furnished.
An asset of the CIA station in Rio is in a position to harass and delay Cuba-bound travellers in those instances where the station is able to tip him off regarding their destination. He can also harass returnees when informed in advance. The station is taking steps to get appropriate information to him promptly. The station has indicated that in spite of its increased efforts, there are no indications of any basic change in the Brazilian attitude toward Cuba, and it is unlikely that the Brazilian government will take adequate steps to combat Cuban subversion.
4. Chile Chilean internal security authorities, at urging of station, are trying to impede and harass travellers to and from Cuba. Government is now requiring passport applicants to state destination, and passports must be turned in after travel. The Foreign Minister has stated much progress is being made, with cooperation of the Mexican government, and that travel of Chileans to Cuba has been dramatically reduced in recent weeks. Station and Embassy are continuing pressure on Cuban government in this regard. Names of travellers to Cuba are being passed to the Ambassador, who furnishes them to President Alessandri (who has asked that this collaboration be kept secret). Information from CIA unilateral operations

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against Cuban Embassy is being used by a newly created Chilean surveillance team in checking out purpose of travel projected and in following up on returnees from Cuba. The station has an agent in daily contact with leaders of the extreme militant left and is exploring the possibilities of sending three station assets to Cuba for training and intelligence missions. A Cuban First Secretary was declared persona non grata during April for using false identity documents, and the Cuban charge d'affaires was subsequently recalled by his own government. Two new sources have recently been recruited by the station who are in a position to furnish valuable information concerning not only certain aspects of the situation within Cuba, but details concerning travel to and from Cuba by both legal and illegal means. The station is now in the process of debriefing an asset who recently returned to Santiago after spending one month in Cuba as a trainee. Efforts are being made to have other station assets included in future training programs.
5. Colombia Chief of Customs has indicated to station his willingness to institute an improved travel control system. Station believes it has identified a courier operating between Colombia and Cuba and has mounted an operation to uncover his Colombian contacts. One station asset is now in Cuba attending guerrilla warfare training, another is being debriefed after his recent return from Cuba, and a third expects to depart soon for two months training in Cuba. The station is continuing to develop leads provided by one recent returnee, and thus far this investigation has involved members of both the Colombian Congress and the Bogota municipal government. A Colombian Civic Action Group, composed of influential local businessmen, which is subsidized and directed by the station, has established an anti-Castro propaganda unit. This group is actively collecting evidence of Cuban subversion in Colombia to support its propaganda campaign.
6 Costa Rica Local authorities appear to be inclined to cooperate in a program of harassing travellers to Cuba. A station asset in the Costa Rican Security Service has been confiscating the passports of persons returning from Cuba and has cooperated in other ways. One station asset is expected to travel to Cuba soon for training. The "Kennedy Groups," which were organized at the time of the President's visit to Costa Rica, are being encouraged to collect information of all sorts concerning Cuban subversive activities, and to participate in propaganda activities aimed at Cuban subversion. Other station propaganda assets have kept up a

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steady campaign against Cuban activities, and the Costa Rican Security Service, at the urging of the CIA station, has destroyed tons of propaganda brought into the country from Cuba.
7. Dominican Republic Efforts to get Juan Bosch to take active steps against Communists and travellers to and from Cuba have been fruitless to date, as have been efforts to establish a new and effective internal security organiza- tion in the Dominican Republic. Bosch appears to have lost his previously stated enthusiasm for such a service, but efforts to persuade him to approve a proposed budget for the service are continuing.
8. Ecuador Station reports that, largely as a result of both overt and covert propaganda activities of U.S. agencies in Ecuador, the public awareness of Cuban subversion has changed from apathy to genuine concern. The government, however, is no more inclined to take action than before. The National Director of Immigration has stated that he personally would like to do whatever he can to stop travel to Cuba, which he realizes is for subversive purposes, but present laws do not permit him to impede travel via third countries. He is exploring possibilities of reprisals against citizens who return from Cuba. He has checked a list of names and passport numbers obtained by CIA from airline manifests in Mexico, and reports that not one name or passport number corresponds with official Ecuadoran records, indicating the possibility of fabrication of passports by Cuba.
A recent Ecuadoran returnee from Cuba, recruited by the station, lost his hand in testing a homemade bomb made in accordance with instructions received in Cuba. He made a public statement and wide publicity was arranged by the station and USIS. Plans are to keep this incident alive as proof of revolutionary training given in Cuba for terrorist activity in Ecuador.
The station chief has accompanied the American Ambassador on visits to the Ecuadoran Ministers of Defense and Government to stress the threat of Cuban backed subversion.
Approximately 7,000 pounds of Communist propaganda are being destroyed monthly as a result of a unilateral operation of the CIA Base in Guayaquil.

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There have been at least two recent cases of Ecuadoran returnees from Cuba being arrested upon their arrival, one of them having been found in possession of a large sum of U.S. dollars, and another allegedly having a plan of revolutionary action found on his person. In both cases the Ecuadoran authorities had been informed of the pending arrivals of these individuals by the CIA station.
9. El Salvador The station has called to the attention of the Chief of the Salvadoran Security Service the fact that the stamping of passports "not valid for travel to Cuba" is not being done on a regular basis, and received assurance that the Foreign Office and Immigration Police would be reminded of their obligation to do this. The station is embarking on an expanded program of assistance to Department 2 of the Ministry of Defense, which is in fact the Salvadoran Clandestine Internal Security Service. That service has indicated a willingness and desire to combat Cuban subversion, but so far it has lacked both know-how and equipment to do so.
10. Guatemala The CIA station in Guatemala City has found its efforts in this field hampered considerably by the apathy and disorganization of the Guatemalan government. Early this year the only effective Internal Security Service in Guatemala was disbanded by President Ydigoras, and no adequate organization has been established since the Peralta government came into power. Through unilateral assets the station has been able to keep itself reasonably well informed concerning guerrilla activities and travel to and from Cuba. However, it has been unable to bring about any effective counter Cuban activity on the part of the Guatemalan government.
11. Jamaica New and more stringent regulations concerning travel to Cuba were adopted by the Jamaican government during May, partially as a result of the urging of the CIA station. The Jamaican Internal Security authorities have shown a willingness to do everything they can to control such travel, and have indicated a high degree of cooperation with the CIA station.
12. Haiti Because of the continued political crisis in Haiti, the CIA station activities there with regard to Cuban activities have been severely limited and have consisted primarily of checks made by unilateral station

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assets who have reported from Cape Haitien, Port de Paix and La Gonave and La Tortue Islands that they were unable to uncover any evidence of travel to or from Cuba. No cooperation between the station and Haitian authorities can be expected under the present political circumstances.
13. Honduras The CIA station in Tegucigalpa has persistently prodded security elements of the Honduran government in an effort to persuade that government to undertake the actions agreed to at Managua. The govern- ment has now begun stamping most new passports "invalid for travel to Cuba." However, revalidated passports are not being so stamped. Station assets have succeeded in publicizing some Cuban subversive activities, including the return of eight leftist labor leaders from a trip to Cuba and the sabotage of a fishing vessel which was being used by anti-Castro Cuban exiles to surveil the northern coast of Honduras. Several alleged Cuban agents are now being held in jail pending legal proceedings against them.
14. Mexico A CIA source states the Cuban Embassy has continued to issue visas on pieces of paper separate from the passport, but the government's practice of stamping all passports to show travel to or from Cuba has largely nullified this effort by travellers to avoid the stigma of travel to Cuba. All Cubans arriving in Mexico, whether in transit or otherwise must have Mexican visas. This is not true of other nationalities, who need no visa if in transit. The government continues to confiscate propaganda material from Cuba sporadically at the airport. The government recently refused visas to five Cuban doctors who wished to attend a Urology Congress in Mexico. Several station assets have recently travelled to Cuba for intelligence purposes. Through unilateral penetrations of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, the CIA station continues to acquire information on types of Cuban visas granted to travellers, as well as some advance travel data.
15. Panama At the urging of station, the Guardia Nacional has been ordered to increase its vigilance concerning returnees from Cuba and to prevent them from establishing an effective organization. Several recent returnees from Cuba are being debriefed regarding their training and contacts, and several CIA assets are

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expecting to leave for Cuba in the near future for training. CIA has increased its personnel assigned to travel control functions at the Panama City airport, now permitting a three- man detail for each eight-hour shift. Station is continuing its pressure on Panamanian officials to tighten travel controls.
16. Nicaragua The Nicaraguan Security Services with whom the CIA station is in liaison have been cooperative in their efforts to take suitable action based on the Managua resolutions. Cuban activity in Nicaragua appears to be at a minimum, and the government has the will and ability to control it.
The
17. Peru Through the cooperation of a Peruvian intelligence organization, CIA officers have been able to participate in the interrogation of several Cuba-trained guerrillas who were recently captured when they attempted to enter Peru near Puerto Maldonado. The interrogation should provide additional data on guerrilla training, Soviet activities in Cuba, and particularly on Cuban support to guerrilla activities in Peru. Further infor- mation has been obtained through a unilateral asset of the station who is active in guerrilla activities of the MIR. An investigation of small arms manufacture in a machine shop in Lima is underway at the urging of the station. station has furnished additional technical equipment to the Peruvian Naval Intelligence Service to increase its capability to intercept clandestine radio communications from Cuba, and partly as a result of CIA station urging, that organization has been able to obtain 12 investigators assigned by another Peruvian internal security service to assist in the investigation of subversive activities in the port areas of Peru. A Communist penetration agent, who is being run jointly by the Peruvian Internal Security Service and the CIA station, has been offered an opportunity to go to Cuba for training. Considerable information concerning the Peruvian MIR plans for financing the acquisition of arms, communications equipment and other information concerning MIR guerrilla activities has been acquired through a unilateral asset of the station.
18. Uruguay Station has made arrangements with local service to pigeonhole or "lose" applications for good conduct certificates which are needed to secure passports, and must be renewed every six months in cases where information from the CIA station or from the Uruguayans'

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own sources indicated intention of travelling to Cuba. Pertinent information from CIA unilateral operations is being passed regularly to cooperating Uruguayan officials. Station has a further check in that the Mexican Ambassador to Uruguay is now checking all applicants for Mexican visas with the station. On the basis of information furnished to him, he held up visa applications of Uruguayan Communist Labor delegates who planned to attend May Day celebrations in Havana. Creation of this bottleneck may force some travellers to abandon the Mexican route to Cuba and turn to the longer and far more expensive route via Prague. Information on past travel to Cuba by Uruguayans, furnished by the station, was included in a study of Cuban subversion prepared by Uruguayan Military Intelligence Service for the National Council of Government.
19. Venezuela Travel information from the Caracas Airport is now being received on a daily basis by the CIA station. Venezuelan internal security officials have indicated a strong disposition to take all possible steps to repress Cuban subversive activities. The station has been passing pertinent information from unilateral sources to appropriate Venezuelan officials and, in some instances, action has been taken in accordance with the stations's request. Four Venezuelan officials have been trained in covert mail intercept techniques by a CIA technician and one additional Venezuelan security official is now undergoing training in the United States in the field of police administration, clandestine operations and audio surveillance. Venezuelan student teams, operating under the control of the CIA station, are intensifying their efforts to spot and recruit members of extremist youth groups who are likely to be sent to Cuba for training purposes.

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4. The U.S. Information Agency:
A. Issued a detailed information policy guidance to all its Washington media divisions on March 28 setting forth the basic themes to be followed and types of materials to be developed in exposing Castro-Communist subversive activities in the hemisphere. This was followed on April 3 by a circular instruction (USIA CA-2819) to all USIS field posts in Latin America urging each to stimulate local press and radio atten- tion to evidence of Cuban-based subversion and to report promptly local developments, official comment, and editorials, for cross- play to other countries.
B. Broadcast over Voice of America a total of 26 features and commentaries on the subject of Cuban-based subversion in its Spanish-language transmissions to Latin America during the three month period. This was in addition to regular reporting of developments on the subject in the Voice's hourly newscasts. Prominent attention was given to the Managua Ministers Meeting, the OAS reports of the Special Consultative Committee on Security and the Lavalle Committee, the capture in Bolivia and Peru of Cuban-trained guerrillas, the discovery of a subversive plot in Ecuador, and terrorism and counter-measures in Venezuela. Special features included editorial round-ups from the Latin American press on subversion, a dramatization of an incident in Ecuador, a chronology of subversive acts involving Cuban diplomats, and a history of subversion. In the usual Voice of America practice, these features and commentaries were sent to USIS field posts in tape recordings after short-wave broadcast for placement on the hundreds of local medium-wave stations in the area.
C. Transmitted by teletype through its press service a total of 33 articles on Cuban-based subversion during the three- month period to USIS posts throughout Latin America for placement in the local press. These included news stories, commentaries, and backgrounders on essentially the same developments which were treated by the Voice of America. The Agency's Information Officers in each country were provided with copies of the OAS reports for use in their personal contacts with press and radio personnel. A pamphlet based on the letters from the Guatemalan ex-communist leader Carlos Manuel Pellecer to Castro and Khrushchev in which he revealed communist subversive tactics was developed by the Agency's publications center in Mexico for reproduction and distribution throughout the area. Work was completed also on a cartoon book, The Despoiler, the story of two young Cubans who tour the communist bloc encountering oppression and food shortages and return home to find the same conditions developing in their own country. The cartoon book is being distributed in over a million copies throughout Latin America.
NW 50955 DocId:32424015 Page 18
SECRET
198-10007-10029
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date: 6/24/201

Agency Information
AGENCY: ARMY
RECORD NUMBER: 198-10007-10029
RECORD SERIES: CALIFANO PAPERS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Information
ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM: C. TRACY BARNES
TO :
TITLE: REPORT ON THE COLD WAR USE OF RADIO BROADCASTING BY CIA
DATE: 06/25/1953
PAGES: 15
SUBJECTS: RADIO BROADCASTING - CIA
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Secret
RESTRICTIONS: 1A; IB
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 04/03/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS Califano Papers, Box 1, Folder 2. Memo from Barnes re: Report on the Cold War Use of Radio
Broadcasting by CIA.

JFK Roview
Department of the Army EO 13526
Declassify Exclude Exempt
Authority
Refer To
Review Date 2015 By
38

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Security Information
25 June 1953
5
MEMORANDUM FOR: (See distribution below)
SUBJECT Report On The Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting by CIA

1. We have made a complete survey of the use of radio broadcast-
ing in the cold war mission of CIA. The essential parts of the report
and recommendations are contained in the attached memorandum dated
15 May 1953 and entitled "Report On the Cold War Use of Radio Broadcast-
ing by CIA". (Operational information and other sensitive matter con-
tained in the original, but deleted from the attached, will be sep-
arately supplied where appropriate to the interested area divisions.)

2. The policy outlined in the attached memorandum has been approved
by the Deputy Director for Plans, who has directed the following actions:

a. Undertake, in collaboration with each area division, a
country by country analysis of all indigenous broadcasting and
television systems for the purpose of devising plans for their
penetration, where feasible, or an explanation where it appears
not to be feasible.

b. Develop and submit, in collaboration with the appropriate
personnel and training offices, a plan for the recruitment and
training of officers qualified for covert broadcasting operations.

c. Explore with the State Department the possibilities of a
joint undertaking to exploit fully, in the interest of efficiency
and economy, material derived from escapee interrogations and other
intelligence sources, covert as well as overt, to support all U.S.
propaganda efforts.

d. Develop and recommend, in collaboration with area divisions,
an improved method for the issuance and dissemination of policy
guidance to the field.

e. Prepare and submit, in collaboration with General McClelland,
a project to produce broadcasting devices capable of electronic
intrusion into Communist broadcasts; to develop special techniques
for their use; and to continue research and development of other
unconventional methods of broadcasting suitable to our mission.
0
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3. Chief of Op rations,

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3. Chief of Operations, DD/P, has authorized the circulation of
the attached material with the request that you cooperate in the carrying
out of the DD/P's directive. Particular attention is called to item 2. a.
above.

4. Mr. C. Lloyd Egneur, assisted by Mr. Stanley P. Richardson, have
been assigned the responsibility for staff coordination of these matters
on behalf of CPP and will be available to you for assistance in planning
and sunnorting broadcasting onerations。

/s/ C. Tracy Barnes
C. TRACY LARMS
Chief
Political and Psychological
Werfare
1
Attachment
As stated above
Distribution
D/P - 1
ADCO - 1
Chiefs, All Areas - 1 ea.
Chief's, Senior Staffs - 1 ea.
/1-1
PF/C/OPS - 1
PF/CFY - 1
FT/C/PAD-1
/Mr. Eener - 2
RI -1

2
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15 May 1953
MEMORANDUM FCR: CHILF, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
SUBJECT Report On The Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting by CIA

Attached hereto is our report on CIA radio broadcasting as a cold
war weapon. It is grouped into the following sections:

1. Section 1, Page 1, deals with RADIO AS A MEDIUM IN THE COLD WAR.
It shows in the main that the countries having the most to fear from
Communism are doing the least to counter its radio propaganda.

2. Section 2, Page 2, deals with CAPABILITIES. It embraces a.
discussion of the techniques available to CIA.

3. Section 3, Page 3, discusses broad TARGETS and appraises our
current and planned activities against them.

4. Section li, Page 4, deals with the principal PROBLEMS peculiar
to covertly directed broadcasting, and their solution.

5. Section 5, Page 10, contains RECOMMENDATIONS for a body of
principles to govern over-all CIA policy in its present and future
activities in this field.

(For a detailed statement of present CIA radio broadcasting
assets, reference is made to CPY to CPP memorandum of 25 February 1953,
entitled "Preliminary Survey of Radio Broadcasting Media", TS 86089.)

(The original "Report On The Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting
By CIA," from which this document is excerpted, was dated 15 May 1953,
TS 88465.)

(The data on broadcasting hours by countries was obtained from
FBID and VOA, that on available receivers from OSI/ORR and VOA, and that
on Soviet jamming transmitters from ONE.)
1
Attachment, as stated.
PP/CLE:ha
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/s/ C. Lloyd Egner
C. LLOYD EGNER
1

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15. May 1953
REPORT ON THE COLD WAR USE OF RADIO BROADCASTING BY CIA
1. Radio As a Medium in the Cold War

a. The USSR and its satellites, including China, broadcast
to countries outside the Orbit 1,395 hours per week of aggressive psych-
ological warfare.

b. The free world responds with 1,015 hours per week.

Co This gives the enemy a numerical advantage of approximately
seven to five. In reality, the Communist advantage is much greater
because of their successful interference with free world broadcasts to the
Orbit through jamming and the penalties they impose on their own peoples
for listening to foreign broadcasts. It is estimated that these measures
reduce the effectiveness of free world broadcasts to the Orbit by as much,
if not more than, 50 percent. An illustration is that the Communists
devote an estimated 900 transmitters to the jamming of free world broad-
casts. There is no jamming of Orbit broadcasts to the Western world, nor
any restrictions on listening to them.

d. Only the English speaking world holds its own numerically in
the over-all radio war with the Orbit. VOA, BRC and Canada together
broadcast 238 hours per week against the Orbit; whereas the Orbit countries
combined direct 222 hours per week to English language audiences in North
America, the United Kingdom, and the Pacific area.

Θο In the rest of the world, the balance is drastically in
favor of the Communists. They broadcast 1, 173 jam-free hours to all
other countries around the world in multiple languages, compared with a
mere 264 hours broadcast to all Orbit countries by non-English speaking
nations of the free world,

f. Of the total of 1,015 broadcast hours beamed by all the free
world to the Orbit, CIA, through TPTONIC and other quasi-clandestine
stations, broadcasts 513 hours, or more than half, in the name of exiles
from Communist dominated areas.

g. The greatest disparity in effort is most noticeable in
Western Europe. France, which receives 89 hours of broadcasts per week
from the Orbit as a whole, responds with only 35 to the Orbit. Italy
receives 97 hours from the Orbit but broadcasts only 44 to it, Spain 94
to 12, Grecce 89 to 9, Turkey 34 to 7. Even relatively aggressive
Yugoslavia receives 194 broadcast hours from the Orbit against its output
to the Orbit of only 89 hours.

h. The one-sided
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h. The one-sided contest is even more marked in a comparison
of the broadcast output of the USER alone, without the satellites,
against Europe. It subjects Spain, Greece and Italy together, for
instance, to 140 hours of broadcasts per week. The combined broadcasts
of these three countries to the USSR, however, number only 19 hours per
week. France and Turkey who, together, receive 64 hours per week from
the USSR, make no broadcasts at all to the USSR.

1. Appendix I gives a compilation by country or area of the
international broadcasts to and from USSR and the satellites. It shows
that the Communists are outslugging the free world, and that Western
Europe, in particular, is doing far less than it should in the radio
propaganda battle with the Orbit.
2. Capabilities

Several techniques are available to CIA for the use of radio
broadcasting in its covert psychological warfare mission.

a. Overt international broadcasting on fixed frequencies under
cover of covertly controlled emigre groups. This technique normally
would be calculated to reach wide audiences by means of high power and
the use of multiple frequencies; but it invites heavy jamming, is costly
and presents security, control and political problems in the acquisition
and maintenance of suitable bases and frequency allocations.

*********
:
b. Quasi-clandestine broadcasts in the name of notional or
"captive" resistance movements using relatively low power and employing
a frequency switching technique to evade jamming. This technique presents
more manageable security and control problems, delivers a signal in spite
of jamming and costs less than high power, but it places a burden on
listeners and presents special problems in avoiding interference with
broadcasts of friendly countries.

********
Co Subsidization of overt nonpolitical, but anti-Communist,
religious broadcasts.
***

d. Through covert penetration and/or support, the manipulation
of free world domestic broadcasting systems for the purpose (1) streng-
thening their anti-Communist broadcasts to the Orbit and/or (2) influenc-
ing them to more aggressive anti-Communist, pro Western attitudes in their
domestic services.

This technique lends itself naturally to clandestine
operations. It requires a minimum of U.S. personnel, presents no
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problems concerning

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:
problems concerning bases and management, and requires relatively
small investments and expense. It would be advantageous beyond the
immediate PP field. In such a post an agent could observe communist
infiltration, spot forthcoming political changes by observing changes
in government propaganda directives, recruit agents with reliable
cover for other covert undertakings and cooperate in planning for
denial of the facilities to an enemy in the event of hostilities.

We believe it should be the agency's established policy
to carry out such penetrations wherever opportunities offer or can
be created. A glance at the world map is sufficient to indicate the
immensity of this field of potentialities, both as concerns the
countries on the peripheries of the USSR and Communist China in
Europe, the Near East and Far East; and in Latin America as well.
We propose that an immediate start be made, in cooperation with Ares
Divisions, on a country-by-country survey of possibilities in this
area and that action be taken to achieve penetration wherever this
study indicates it may be feasible.
**
Use of purchased or free time through covert channels
on existing radio systems in friendly countries. ***

f. Electronic penetration of enemy broadcasts. Example-
the "Ghost" Voice operations of World War II. This technique is
discussed in para 5.c.(6) below.

g. To exploit the amateur than 7 broadcasters, large
mumbers of whom exist in Russia. * ** A project is being drafted
to explore the possibilities of this technique,

h. Broadcasting from airplanes. This has been carried out
experimentally in two areas with disappointing results due primarily
to operational and equipment limitations which make for limited aud-
ience coverage at best. It is, moreover, very costly and also pre-
sents special security problems. It is not recomended, except for
possible hit-and-run operations. Airborne transmitters might be used
on occasion to simulate messages from agents inside the USSR or sat
ellites. This is a deception technique rather than broadcasting but
should, we believe, be explored.
3. Targets in order of importance, with estimate of Adequacy
of present Projects

a. USSR. Radio is the only consistent medium for pierc-
ing the Soviet iron curtain. It is estimated that there are approxi-
mately 4,000,000 receiving sets in the USSR, of which 75 to 80 per
cent are believed to be equipped with frequency bands capable of
receiving foreign shortwave broadcasts. Virtually all of them readily
receive long and medium wave signals. Not all of these receivers are
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in the hands of private individuals, however; and the number of those
having access to shortwave receivers is estimated to be constantly
decreasing due to Soviet efforts to increase group listening by means
of wired networks. Nevertheless, it would appear that there will be a
sizeable potential audience for foreign broadcasts in all three
ware bands for some time to come. One indication of this is the
fact that at present the USSR is broadcasting approximately 900 hours
per day over 160 transmitters in 26 or more languages to its own people.
Many of these transmissions are to areas and over frequencies which lie
within our transmitting capabilities.

Our assets for exploiting this potential audience,
including projects still in the planning stage, are far from adequate.

b. Communist China.--Like the USSR, the Communist government
of China relies heavily on radio broadcasting for communication with
the people. It utilizes more than 50 national and regional stations
for this purpose, operating chiefly on medium and long wave but to
some extent, also, on shortwave. *
**

c. European Satellites. The preponderance of CIA broad-
casting efforts are centered on this area. * * *

d. The Free World.--Many countries afford opportunities
for relatively inexpensive exploitation by covert penetration of
indigenous broadcasting systems and use of free or purchased time. * * *
(See Para. 2.d.)
4. Problems of Covert Broadcasting
கீக Cover

(1) a radio transmitter that can be heard cannot be
hidden. Put another way, there are no known methods for concealing
from technical monitors the geographical source of broadcasts, although
the non-technical listening public can be and often is deceived.
Cover for broadcasting operations, therefore, presents a formidable
problem. Autonomous emigre organizations, which offer the most
credible cover, generate factionalism as well as control, security
and management problems. These difficulties could, however, be
minimized by positive agency control through a compartmentalization
which separates the cover organization from program and transmitting
operations and lays down strict requirements on security, budget
control, and high professional standards 7 See Chart, Annex II.

(2) Religious broadcasting presents few cover head-
aches, but is of doubtful propaganda value.
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(3) The best cover
:

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:
(3) The best cover is afforded by covert penetration
of friendly systems, (a Western European nation talking back to USSR,
etc., as discussed in 2.d. above).

(4) Commercial broadcasting cover presents some possi-
bilities in the free world but none for broadcasting to the Soviet
Orbit.
b. Bases

(1) Because governments object to providing bases for
aggressive psychological warfare which they do not influence or control,
it is difficult to find bases in areas suitable for broadcasting to the
Orbit. Furthermore, adequate broadcasting facilities take time to
plan, build, and staff and long tenure is therefore important. How-
ever, the political climate of a country can change abruptly, with
resulting uncertainty as to length of tenure. Munich, for instance,
which once furnished an excellent base for a variety of broadcasts
targeted to the Orbit, appears to be becoming less and less satisfactory.

Cover and control problems are closely related to
this. A base for a secure and competently managed operation should be
less difficult to obtain than for a loosely organized one.
t

(2) Seaborne transmitters offer much in mobility but,
antenna limitations restrict their effective power. As in the case
of the VOA COURIER, stationary antennas on land are required for
maximum effectiveness. Thus, the political problem becomes the same
as for land transmitter bases, and costs in investment and maintennance
are considerably higher than land based operations. Moreover, the
difficulties of providing credible cover for a covert seaborne operation
are manifest. While this office will continue to study VOA experience
in this field, it sees no prospect of any agency use for it.

(3) The VOA presently controls numerous broadcasting
bases and are developing additional bases, in areas of the world
suitable for our purposes. The necessary agreements with host
countries have already been negotiated; power, housing, transporta-
tion and other logistics have been provided. The present manage-
ment of VOA are sympathetic to sharing these bases with CIA.
In addition to the saving in cost, this would furnish us secure
areas for transmitters with the minimum of housekeeping problems.
If the difficult but not insurmountable problem of cover can be
resolved, such locations would be ideal for our purposes.
:

c. Information Support

(1) To supplement available normal news sources,
broadcasting to Orbit countries is dependent for program material
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upon intelligence
:

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upon intelligence reports, interrogation of defectors, escapees
and exiles, indigenous newspapers and a regular flow of intercepts
from enemy broadcasts. These are indispensable to credible, inter-
esting, and timely broadcasts. Despite our vast potential resources
and large U.S. expenditures in these fields, the effective "take" is
far from adequate, rarely timely, and unnecessarily costly. FBID, VOA,
and several others monitor the same foreign broadcasts to extract the
same or similar information. Several U.S. agencies interrogate the
same exiles for PW information, whereas a single interrogator, trained
in PW needs, could supply most, if not all, the requirements not only
for all radio but all other PW activities better and faster. A cleared
consultant, on behalf of one of our more successful operations, pro-
duced on abundance of excellent support information and evaluation
data. The same data, properly sterilized and speedily disseminated,
could equally serve the VOA and any other covert or overt PW effort
targeted to the same area.

This complex problem needs a high level decision
by State and CIA and the appointment of a small team of officers
experienced in both PW and interrogation work with power to devise
an effective and efficient program to exploit our rich resources.

d. To Deliver a Signal That Can Be Heard

(1) Soviet jamming of propaganda broadcasts raises
serious questions concerning our ability to deliver a signal that
can be heard above the jamming. To be sure, some of our broadcasts
get through because they are unable simultaneously to jam broadcasts
in all areas nor do they in practice jam a given broadcast trans-
mission at all hours.
seem clear:
on the increase.

For future planning purposes, however, these factors

(a) Soviet capabilities for jamming are large and
(b) The degree of their jamming seems to be re-
lated to their estimate of the harmful effect of the broadcasts on
their interests. Hence, the more effective parts of our propaganda
are likely to be jammed even though other parts get through.

(c) We have no present capabilities to monitor
their jamming if they use as they probably do in congested areas-
low-powered local jammerse

(2) Prudent planning would, therefore, require that
any substantial future investments by CIA in radio broadcasting
transmitters include provision for all possible techniques to ensure
our broadcasts being heard to the maximum in spite of jamming.

(3) What techniques
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(3) What techniques are available to meet this require-
ment?

(a) To deliver a signal of such power as to be
heard above the jarming. Here we are at a disadvantage in that a
low-powered and inexpensive local jammer is capable of rendering
unintelligible a signal of substantially higher power from a distant
point. The greater the power of our transmitter the more complicated
the installation and the more expensive the investment. And the more
difficult becomes the cover and security problems as well as the
political considerations involved in base negotiations. Since the
enemy is not required to equal our power with his jammers, we would
therefore be fighting a losing battle if we attempted to "slug it out"
on a power basis only.

(b) Jamming evasion through the device of vary-
ing the frequency has so far proven to be an effective means of lay-
ing down a signal that can be heard clearly despite jarming. This
method requires constant dial changing by the listener and must
assume therefore a desire on his part to hear the program sufficient
to overcome the annoyance of dial twisting. When used in combination
with appropriate programming techniques and the use of two or more
frequencies simultaneously this has so far proven to be the most
effective means of jamming avoidance.

Such frequency shiftings cannot be accomplished
within the legal rules laid down for international broadcasting.
These must, therefore, be "black" broadcasts in the sense that they
can be credibly denied by our Government as well as the government
of the host country. The movement at will through various frequencies
produces an annoying interference for the listeners to broadcasters to
whom those frequencies are legally assigned. This interference, while
fully justified in the case of USSR and satellite assigned frequencies,
must be avoided in the case of frequencies assigned to our friends.
:
Our broadcasts using this technique have so
far avoided annoyance to friendly countries by the use of very low
power. This limits us to a small part of the total Soviet Orbit
target and that only on the periphery. The same techniques can be
used with higher power and at greater distances from the target.
To avoid interference with friendly nations' broadcasts the base
must be located in an area which, with the proper antenna adjust-
ments, permits our signal to "skip" over the territory of friendly
countries in its path. An example would be that, given a transmitting
bass in Saudi Arabia for broadcasts to the USSR, the facility would
have to be engineered so that its signal would not interfere with
local broadcast reception in Turkey and other friendly countries in
between.

(c) The development of unconventional broadcasting
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techniques for
1

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techniques for the penetration of enemy domestic radio broadcasting
services might well enable us to overcome the handicaps imposed by
the jamming of our conventional broadcasts to the Soviet orbit and
seize the cold war initiative in the radio sphere. It is a field
which has been neglected thus far.

Some possibilities in this area are described
in the "Project Troy" report of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (Vol. IV, Annex 26) of 1 February, 1951.

Among them is the "intrusion," or "side-band
injection," technique which was used successfully by the Russians
against Germany during World War II. It would enable us to intrude
our own propaganda messages into radio programs being broadcast on
enemy home channels. It would enable us in effect to talk to the
Soviet, satellite and neutral radio audiences over enemy facilities
or compel the enemy to disrupt his own broadcast service in an effort
to prevent it. It could also be used in turning Soviet propaganda
broadcasts to Western Europe to the advantage of our friends. The Troy
report observes as to the technique itself:

"This would be an effective and annoying
technique which would be extremely difficult to counter."
/
Utilization of this technique appears to be
within our capabilities at the moment. It has been field tested
and is ready for use as soon as the necessary technical adaptations
can be made to conventional transmitters. The time and cost involved
in mounting a facility for utilizing this technique is now being
explored by ADCO at the suggestion of this office.

Another unconventional technique being devel-
oped by an agency consultant and now almost ready for field testing
is the so-called "cuddling" device. This operates on the theory that
we can transmit an interfering signal into an orbit domestic radio
service which will cause the listening audience to shift to our
nearby program in endeavoring to tune out the interference on his
own home program.

Other unconventional means of carrying the
cold war to the Orbit by means of clandestine radio might be cap-
able of invention and development, and the scientific and practical
potentialities in this field should be explored to the utmost.

This office is convinced that emphasis must
be placed more and more on unconventional radio broadcasting tech-
niques if the cold war of the air waves is not to become more one-
sided than it already is in favor of the Communists. Properly devel-
oped and utilized, those techniques already perfected or in the pro-
cess of perfection and those which might be invented might even be
the means of
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the means of shifting the whole radio propaganda war balance in our
favor. They would be indispensable in the event of hot war. We,
therefore, are impressed with the necessity of developing our capaci-
ties in this direction to the utmost and proceeding immediately with
the covert procurement of bases and equipment needed for the task.
:
To recapitulate, it would seen desirable for
CIA to limit its present and future conventional radio broadcasting
acitvities to the absolute minimum and that any new undertakings.
should provide:
1 A maximum transmitter power of
100,000 watts capable of accommodating:

ties; and
capabilities.
2 Built in jamming evasion capabili-
3 Built in unconventional broadcasting
Bases in secure and protected areas
which permit the use of the jamming evasion technique without inter
ference with friendly countries. A study of base possibilities is
now being made by this office.
。
Lead Time
(1) (a) Radio broadcasting facilities cannot be created
over night. From the time that plans are finally approved, it takes
12 to 18 months to design, construct and install a transmitter.
Prior to such approval time is required for the planning cycle, negotia-
tion for bases, the staffing problem, etc.

(b) Deep cover penetration of existing radio sta-
tions or systems likewise require time for development.
1
(2) All in all, it would be prudent to estimate that
upwards of two years are required from the conception of a project
for broadcasting and its implementation. Hence, the planning must
be long-range. It is not possible to improvise broadcasting capabil-
ities for targets of opportunity, such as Stalin's death.

f. Control and Management

(1) Control by CIA of the substance of broadcast and
the management of broadcasting operations should be absolute and through
officers directly responsible to agency control.

(2) The doctrine of compartmentalization should be
strictly enforced. No one, excepting the handful of technicians required
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to operate a transmitter, should be allowed near the transmitter
site. The delivery of tapes, etc., should be through a cutout. Like-
wise, the studio and programming activity should be separated from the
operation of the transmitter as well as from any other activities of
the cover organization. If two or more language groups use the same
facilities they should be compartmented from each other.****
(See Para. 4.8.(1))
g. Evaluation.
:
(1) In the Preliminary Survey of Radio Broadcasting
(25 February 1953-TS 86889) attention was called to the need for a
continuing evaluation of all radio broadcasting operations with partic-
ular reference to coverage and impact, and sources for the essential
information were outlined.

(2) PP/OPS, in collaboration with this office, has
initiated this much-needed undertaking.
h. Personnel

(1) There is a shortage of professional and technical
personnel qualified for covert radio broadcasting. A program of
selective recruitment should be undertaken in coordination with any
plans for new radio projects.

(2) A training program in covert broadcasting techniques
should also be initiated. This training should be undertaken in safe
houses by detail of qualified instructors from covert training for basic
indoctrination; to be supplemented by area instruction by the area desks
and specialized radio training by Commo. and this office.

5. Recommendations
Pending clarification of CIA's future responsibility in the
cold war we have made certain assumptions as to the criteria which
should govern agency activities in radio broadcasting.

Our thesis is that CIA should use radio broadcasting in
covert Psychological Warfare only under the following conditions:

a. That the task cannot be performed by VOA or other
overt media.

b. That any contemplated operation follow strict con-
cepts for clandestine operations, including

(1) Positive and direct agency control of both
management and policy.
:.. (2) Strict security requirements including com-
partmentation of all elements of broadcasting operations.
(3) Maintenance of
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(3) Maintenance of sufficient cover to permit
credible denial of official connection by U.S. or host country govern-
ment.

c. That no direct broadcast operation be undertaken by
CIA until every possibility has been exhausted to have the task under-
taken by another country (or countries) through penetration, manipula-
tion and/or control of, or covert purchase of time on, indigenous radio
facilities.

Our foremost objective should be to exploit the
broadcasting; systems of friendly and neutral countries. This generally
is possible in two wys:

(1) To stimulate our friends to greater aggressive
effort in their international broadcasts to the Soviet orbit; and

(2) To influence the output of the domestic ser-
vices of friendly and neutral states in the interests of the Western
cause.
recommendations:
Within this frane of reference we made the following
:
(1) Proceed to exploit the many possibilities to
us indigenous racio systems in friendly and noutral nations with the
objectives of (a) increasing the amount and effectiveness of their
propaganda efforts against USSR and the satellites, (b) exposing and
inhibiting Communist fifth column activities and (c) the maintenance
ef pro-U.S. and pro-Western attitudes.

These missions should be undertaken in closest
collaboration with the USIS missions to the end that all that can be
accomplished overbly.

(2) Undertake a recruitment and training program to
make available highly qualified and thoroughly indoctrinated officers
preferably with natural cover to undertake and to support such missions.

(3) In coopera ion with State, develop a positive
program for information support of all propaganda activities through
maximum use of intelligence and defector sources.

(4) Strengthen and streamline the machinery for
policy guidance, with Washington headquarters responsible for broad
policy only and the field missions to be given the widest possible
latitude in the application of those policies to local requirements
and the exploitation of targets of opportunity. A mature staff officer
experienced in P.W. should be available in the mission to (a) feed
propaganda lines, (o) expedite P.W. support (c) coordinate with USIS
and (d) generally
-11-
S-E-C-R-E-T
ز

S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information
and (d) generally backstop the operation.
:
(5) Establish machinery for evaluating the substance,
coverage, impact and management of radio operations.

(6) Proceed with the development of capabilities to
electronically intrude upon and otherwise exploit the Communist radio
broadcasting to their own and foreign audiences. It is important to
have these facilities reacy at the earliest possible date for possible
use in the cold war-Fot to have them available at the outbreak of
hot war would be a tragic mistake.

Note: Recommendations with respect to specific
targets have been transmitted to the appropriate
divisione

(10) A small staff element should be created to
supervise CIA planning and operations in covert radio broadcasting.
This staff should be Instructed to expedite the implementation of
the above recommendations and provide a continuing review of CIA
Policy and Program for the use of this Media.
15 May 1953

-12-
S-E-C-R-E-T
/s/C. Lloyd Egner
C. LLOYD EGNER
198-10008-10119
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date: 6/24/201

Agency Information
AGENCY: ARMY
RECORD NUMBER: 198-10008-10119
RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Information
ORIGINATOR: ARMY
FROM: JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.
TO: CAPT. ZUMWALT ET AL
TITLE: ICCCA: ACTIONS TAKEN DURING JULY-AUGUST 1963 IN CURBING CUBAN SUBVERSION
DATE: 10/14/1963
PAGES: 20
SUBJECTS:
COUNTERSUBVERSION PROGRAM
TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO CUBA
CUBAN SUBVERSION

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Secret
RESTRICTIONS: 1A; 4
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 06/01/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: Califano Papers, Box 2, Folder 25. Memo No. 71 from Joseph Califano with attached report of Subcommittee on Subversion.

JFK Raview
Department of the Army E0 13326
Declassify Exclude Exempt
Authority
Refer To
Review Date 1SAUGIS Вульста

NO STATE OBJECTION
TO DECLASSIFICATION CATION
BY DATE 01/15/16

SECRET
14 OCT 1963

MEMORANDUM NO. 71 FOR CAPTAIN E. R. ZUMWALT, JR., USN (OSD)
MAJOR GENERAL J. D. ALGER, USA
REAR ADMIRAL W. WENDT, USN
MAJOR GENERAL J. W. CARPENTER, III, USAF
BRIGADIER GENERAL W. K. JONES, USMC
SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs:
Actions Taken During July-August 1963 in Curbing Cuban
Subversion in Latin America

Attached is the final report of the Subcommittee on Subversion on
Actions Taken During July-August 1963 in Curbing Cuban Subversion in
Latin America.
Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Attachment
As Stated

cc: Mr. Yarmelinsky (OSD)
DIA (Col Nigra)
Mr. Califano
Mt Col Haig
ASG

23866
SECRET
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED
FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

SECRET
File
pages
This document consists of 18
No 13 of 44 Copies, Series A

REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION:
ACTIONS TAKEN DURING JULY-AUGUST 1963
IN CURBING CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA
SECRET
DSA, ASG Control No.23866
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
1. Control of Travel to and from Cuba
Central Intelligence Agency

a. Developed highly useful information on frequency
of Cuban "chartered" flights to Brazil, names and nationali-
ties of passengers and crew, and lax measures of control
followed by Brazilian authorities. Transmitted this informa-
tion to station chiefs in the Latin American countries of the
non-Brazilians travelling on those flights.

b. Maintained close watch over travel to and from
Cuba. See Annex B for table of known travel of Latin
Americans during July and August.

c. As a result of information furnished to him by
the CIA Station in Buenos Aires and with the Station's urging,
the Argentine Minister of Interior indicated that he would
make every effort to prevent Argentine delegates from attend-
ing the International Union of Architects Congress in Havana.

d. At the urging of the CIA Station and the Embassy,
the Bolivian Minister of Interior issued in mid-July an
order prohibiting the granting of travel permits to Cuba or
other bloc countries to Bolivian nationals.

e. Partly as a result of the efforts of the CIA
station in Santiago, the Government of Chile prohibited the
entry into Chile of organizers of the Cuban-sponsored Second
Latin American Youth Congress, which had been scheduled to
take place in Santiago in August. This was one of the
factors which led to postponement of the Congress.

f. After considerable prodding by the CIA Station
and the Embassy the Minister of Public Security of Costa
Rica presented legislative proposals to the Costa Rican
Assembly which will require all persons intending to travel
to Communist countries to have their travel approved by a
newly created Costa Rican security agency.

g. CIA Station in Mexico City developed information
concerning the clandestine arrival of passengers in Vera Cruz
GROUP 1
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-2-

on Cuban merchant ships. Efforts are being made to obtain
more information and to encourage stricter controls by the
Mexican authorities.

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Conakry to try to persuade
Guinean authorities to deny use of airport facilities by
flights on Habana-Moscow route. These efforts achieved a
temporary withholding of permission for future regular flights,
at least until such time as the Soviets develop their own
refueling facilities at Conakry.

b. Instructed Embassy Rio to approach Brazilian
authorities to express our deep concern at the growing
frequency of Cuban non-scheduled flights to Brazil and request
their cooperation in curbing them. Also instructed our
Embassies in several Latin American countries to work with CIA
station chiefs in furnishing the names of nationals of those
countries travelling on these flights to local authorities
and urging them: (1) to institute tighter controls on their
own citizens travelling to Cuba, and (2) to express their
concern to the Brazilian Government over Cuban use of Brazil
as a way station for transporting subversives.

c. As a result of representations made to the
British Government about Cuban flights to the Cayman Islands
carrying Latin American subversives, the British developed
an administrative scheme which will effectively prohibit the
use of British Caribbean dependencies by Cubana as transit
points for passengers. The British intend to require transit
visas of passengers passing through their areas, and to
reject applications for such visas except in certain special
cases. Persons not possessing visas would be prevented from
leaving their aircraft, or would be returned to their point
of origin.

d. Instructed Embassy Mexico City on August 29 to
inform the Mexican airline CMA that the United States is
opposed to a proposal that CMA operate charter flights to
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SECRET
-3-

carry refugees from Habana to Central America. CMA, as a
result, stated that they had no intention of proceeding
further with this project.

e. Instructed our missions in Curacao and the Hague
to investigate a report that KLM was planning to renew
scheduled Curacao-Habana flights and to reiterate US
opposition to resumption of air service to Cuba.
our Embassy that there is no plan to initiate service,
scheduled or non-scheduled, to Habana.

KLM assured

f. Instructed Embassy Ottawa to express our strong
objections to a proposal that a Cubana charter flight pick
up a second group of U.S. students in Montreal to fly them
to Cuba. The flight was not authorized.

g. Instructed Consulate Georgetown to investigate
Cubana approaches to secure flight facilities. Mission
reported on August 1 that the Governor had no knowledge of
any talks between the B.G. Ministry of Communications and
the Cuban Government regarding landing rights for Cubana
planes. The Governor indicated his intention to inquire
further and to keep us advised. London reported that neither
the Cuban nor the British Guiana Governments had raised the
issue of landing rights with H.M.G.

h. Urged the governments of Mexico, Canada, Jamaica
and the Netherlands to refuse to assist the Cuban Government
in its efforts to find a short route for return of the 58
American students who illegally travelled to Cuba. Also
informed Pan American Airways that we were opposed to a Cuban
request for a PAA charter flight to fly the students from
Habana to New York.

i. Instructed our missions at Port of Spain and
Barbados on several occasions to approach these governments
to express the concern of the U.S. at indications of Cuban
interest in the use of their aviation facilities.

Embassy Port of Spain discussed with the Foreign Secretary
of Trinidad various legal moves available that would enable
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-4-

GOTT to control movements of aircraft within their territory,
citing examples of such controls instituted by Mexico, Canada
and Ireland. He indicated receptiveness to the proposal that
the list of suggestions be made available to the aviation
officials concerned.

j. During a previous reporting period Embassy
Santiago urged the government of Chile to refuse visas to
Cuban delegated to a preparatory meeting for the II Latin
American Youth Congress scheduled for August in the Chilean
capital. Inability of Cuban delegates to obtain Chilean
visas for this meeting is one of the contributing factors to
the Cuban sponsors announcing during August that the meeting
had been postponed.

k. Sent general instructions to our missions in
countries which participate in the International Union of
Architects asking them to urge the cooperation of governmental
authorities in preventing or discouraging the attendance of
their nationals to the VII UIA Congress in Habana, September
29 October 4, 1963. Followed this up with instructions to
individual posts to try where feasible to dissuade
architects from free world countries from serving on the jury
for the selection of a Bay of Pigs monument.

l. Urged Canadian Government to block a plan to
commence food parcel shipments to Cuba on a commercial basis
that would have required the establishment of scheduled
weekly charter flights by Canadian planes.

2. Control of Movement of Cuban Propaganda
Central Intelligence Agency

Responding to the urging of the CIA Station, police
of the State of Guanabara seized large quantities of
propaganda brought into Brazil by passengers on the special
Cubana flights. For example, some 50 pounds of printed
propaganda was taken from the various passengers who arrived
on the 16 August Cubana flight.
SECRET

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-5-

3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms
Department of Defense

a. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding
Cuba during the months of July and August at the same rate
and with the same emphasis as prior to 1 July 1963.

b. Continued to maintain U.S. Forces, primarily from
within the Atlantic Command, available to assist other
Caribbean governments in the interception of suspicious craft
in territorial waters, as might be requested. No such
requests were received from any other government during the
period covered by this report. However, U.S. Forces did keep
track of the location of the Soviet merchant freighter
MITCHURINSK, which was suspected of carrying subversives and
arms from Cuba to British Guiana in mid-July.
MITCHURINSK
was under U.S. surveillance from its departure from Habana
until United Kingdom forces assumed the task of keeping this
ship under surveillance upon its approach to Georgetown,
British Guiana. Subsequently, British police search of
MITCHURINSK in British Guiana waters revealed nothing of a
suspicious nature.

Central Intelligence Agency
At the repeated urging of the CIA Station in Lima,
the Peruvian Government late in August published a new anti-
terrorists law providing a penalty of no less than five
years imprisonment for persons who participate in guerrilla
activities or in the illegal manufacture of weapons or
explosives.

The Peruvian National Intelligence Service is working
on a lead furnished by the CIA Station in Lima concerning a
200 ton vessel reportedly involved in arms traffic.

Department of State
Instructed our Consulate General in Georgetown to
investigate reports that commercial cargoes (which could
SECRET

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-6-

conceal illicit arms traffic out of Cuba) had developed
between British Guiana and Cuba. Investigations to date
have been negative.

4. Control of Transfer of Funds
Department of State

Cooperated with the Foreign Assets Control Office
of the Treasury Department in developing blocking controls
with respect to Cuba which went into effect on July 9, 1963.

5. Strengthening of Counter-Insurgency Capabilities
Department of Defense

a. Continued the installation of military communica-
tions facilities in Latin America. Operational dates for
the multi-channel radio stations to be installed in Managua,
Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa, Honduras have been delayed to 15
October 1963 and 15 December 1963, respectively because of
new engineering and contractual requirements. Negotiations
are continuing with Colombia and Ecuador for installation
of U.S. military radio facilities. Completion of a new
commercial trans-isthmian cable in the Panama Canal Zone
within the coming month is expected to improve military
communications within the United States and the Commander-
in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command.

b. Continued the surveillance of Cuba by U.S.
Forces, reporting as before to U.S. commanders, organiza-
tions and agencies. Reports of surveillance have been
disseminated to all who have a requirement to know.

c. Established a 24 hour per day, 7 day per week
duty watch at the U.S. Military Groups in the Caribbean
countries in conjunction with implementation of the military
alerting system. Continued efforts to staff the U.S.
Southern Command Intelligence Center with properly cleared,
trained personnel (this center is the military focal point
for relaying information concerning the movement of
subversives). Filled, partially, the authorized billets in
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SECRET
-7-

the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center and took
under consideration the problem of an increase in the billet
tructure in the Center. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S.
Southern Command together with his intelligence officer
visited Honduras and Nicaragua and determined that no
significant problems existed which would interfere with
effective operations in those countries.

d. Action previously initiated by the Commander,
U.S. Naval Forces, Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) to establish
a Small Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT) as a
contribution to the Caribbean Surveillance System is progress-
ing satisfactorily. Permanent assignment of U.S. Coast Guard
personnel to SCIATT in the Canal Zone has been approved and
the U.S. Coast Guard has taken appropriate implementing
actions.

e. During the period of this report, the SCIATT con-
ducted an on-the-job training course at Puntarenas, Costa
Rica. Training was given to 13 members of the Guardia Civil
of Costa Rica who were either newly assigned to the 40 foot
Coast Guard utility boats (CGUBS) or were to be assigned as
replacement crew members.

f. A quarterly inspection and evaluation of the CGUBS
provided other Central American countries was conducted
during the period 17 to 31 August by a mobile training team
(MTT) made up of SCIATT personnel.

g. Continued efforts to improve the internal security
of Latin American armies through the provision of Intelligence
Advisors. Presently there are such advisors assigned to 14
Latin countries, emphasizing counterintelligence and counter-
subversion.

h. During the reporting period MTTS conducted train-
ing in counterinsurgency for the armed forces of Colombia,
Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru and El Salvador.

i. Civic Action MTTs were sent to Guatemala, Bolivia,
Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica and Ecuador.
SECRET

SECRET
-8-

6. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion
Central Intelligence Agency

CIA Stations throughout Latin America continued in
a great majority of countries to furnish to the local internal
security organizations with whom they are in liaison informa-
tion concerning travelers to and from Cuba, as well as such
information as came to CIA's attention concerning the movement
of funds, arms and propaganda material. In many instances,
the furnishing of information to the internal security
service by the CIA Station was paralleled by the furnishing of
similar information to the Foreign Office by the Ambassador
or his representative. The response to this information has
varied greatly. The Central American countries, in general,
began to pay greater attention to the information and act on
it. At the other extreme, the Brazilian Government during
the reporting period showed little inclination to follow up
on the information.

Department of State

a. Reiterated to the Foreign Minister of Peru our
interest in having the facts of the Puerto Maldonado incident
brought to the attention of the OAS, and urged that this
action be taken as soon as possible.

b. Urged the Government of Guatemala to submit
evidence of communist activity to the OAS.

7. Surveillance of Cuban Diplomatic, Commercial and Cultural
Missions
Department of State

Instructed Embassy La Paz to follow up closely on
charges of involvement by the Cuban mission in internal
policies of Bolivia, and, at the Embassy's discretion, to
point out to Bolivian officials the opportunity for a possible
break in relations with Cuba. Embassy La Paz was not able to
SECRET

SECRET
-9-

press for a break when the evidence of Cuban intervention
did not prove to be as conclusive as originally reported.

8. Other Special Actions
Department of State

a. Obtained action by the COAS on July 3 on the
Lavalle Committee Report transmitting the document to the
governments and urging them to implement the specific and
general recommendations contained therein as soon as
possible.

b. Through Embassy Managua informed the Nicaraguan
Government of the matters which we wanted to have considered
during the informal meeting of the Ministers of Security and
Interior of the Isthmian countries held in Managua, August
26-28 in preparation for the second formal meeting of the
Managua Security Conference countries later this year.

c. Explained in detail the nature of the Cuban
threat and the related policy objectives of the U.S., during
conversation in London and in Washington with Mr. Adam Watson,
newly appointed British Ambassador to Cuba.

United States Information Agency
a. The Agency's press service during the reporting
period transmitted 12 articles, commentaries, and back-
grounders on its wireless file service to USIA posts through-
out Latin America for placement in the local newspapers and
the Voice of America Spanish broadcasts to Latin America
carried a total of 28 commentaries and features on the subject
of Cuban-based subversion. These stories were designed to
alert people in Latin America to the dangers of this
subversion.

b. In response to standing Agency instructions to
give special attention to developments related to Cuba-based
subversion, USIA posts in Latin America were prompt in
reporting incidents and in providing editorial comments from
SECRET

SECRET
-10-

the Latin American press, all of which was used in the
Agency's radio and press output.

The main developments treated in the Agency's radio
and press coverage included Castro's July 26 speech urging
revolutions in Latin America, the discovery of terrorist
weapons factories in Guayaquil, the Ecuadorean Vice
President's accusation of Cuban responsibility for terrorism,
the Cuban use of Grand Cayman as a way station for subversive
elements from Cuba, the expulsion from the University of a
Bolivian youth leader for receiving funds from Cuba,
Castro-trained guerrillas in Honduras, and Bolivian protests
against meddling by the Cuban Embassy in the miner's strike.
A Voice of American roving reporter in Latin America
provided several reports on the subversion picture in coun-
tries he visited.

c. In support of the Agency's effort on Cuban-based
subversion, the publications center in Mexico began work on
three pamphlets during the period based on Castro's report
of his visit to the Soviet Union (showing that he contradicted
himself in some of his extravagant claims of Soviet progress),
the losses suffered by Cuban labor under Castro, and the
fate of political prisoners in Cuba. When completed, these
pamphlets will be reproduced and distributed in quantity
throughout the area.
SECRET

SECRET
ANNEX A

CIA Intelligence Annex
1. Travel to and from Cuba
Brazil

Chartered Cubana airlines flights between Cuba and
Brazil have become a major means of transporting non-Cuban
Latin Americans to and from Cuba. The five such flights
since late July have carried nearly 400 non-Cubans.

The first of the recent series on 25 July
brought 71 Latin American passengers to Havana for the
26 July celebrations. The other four flights on 15,
22, 28 and 29 August transported over 200 Latin
Americans to Brazil from Havana. Some of the aircraft
involved returned to Cuba with smaller numbers of passen-
gers. Many of the 200 Latin American passengers had
been delegates to the 26 July ceremonies, but others had
apparently been in Cuba for longer periods and some had
probably received training there. Of the passengers on
these four flights to Brazil, 75 were natives of
Caribbean area countries. Their circuitous travel through
Brazil was evident vidently designed to help conceal the fact
that they had been in Cuba.
Costa Rica

Two Costa Ricans were among the passengers on a
chartered Cubana plane which was turned back to Havana
at Grand Cayman on 11 July 1963. One was Luz Marina
Hernandez Salazar, the only Costa Rican woman known to
have been sent to Cuba for training as a guerrilla
warfare instructor. She had been in Cuba since September
1962. The other Costa Rican passenger was Carlos Guillen,
former head of the Costa Rican Society of Friends of
the Cuban Revolution, who had been in Cuba since November
1962.
SECRET

Ecuador
SECRET

The CIA Station in Quito reports that the military
junta, which assumed power in Ecuador on 11 July, can
be expected to follow the guidance of the Embassy and
the Station in controlling travel to and from Cuba and
the Soviet bloc. The activities of Cuban subversives
in Ecuador, at least for the present, have been greatly
inhibited by the mass arrests of Communists and pro-
Cubans and by the outlawing of the Communist Party by
the junta.

Honduras
It is reported that the Honduran Communist Party
has issued orders to its members not to attempt to
travel to Cuba at the present time. This action is
apparently the result of the increasing vigilance of
the Honduran government and the greater implementation
of stricter travel controls.

2. Movement of Cuban Propaganda
Guatemala

According to an unconfirmed report received in July,
It expects
a Bureau of Information of the Communist Party of
Guatemala is being formed in collaboration with Prensa
Latina and is to be managed clandestinely.
to receive news by shortwave radio from Cuba and print
bulletins for distribution by radio stations. This may
indicate a pattern by which Prensa Latina will attempt
to distribute on a more clandestine basis in other areas
in Latin America.

Honduras

It was reliably reported that in mid-July 1963, a
small coastal freighter landed 14 large boxes of Communist
propaganda on the northern coast of Honduras, the boxes
having been transferred at sea from a larger vessel. The
report has not been confirmed.
SECRET

Argentina
SECRET

Extremist members of the Peronist Party, apparently
under the leadership of such figures as Hector Villalon
and John William Cooke, were reported to be receiving
encouragément and promises of large sums of money from
Cuba in support of their efforts to train and organize
subversive groups in Argentina. Villalon has stated
that his plan calls for expanding and accellerating
subversive activities in Argentina culminating in a
complete take over within two years. There is no indica-
tion that Peron himself has agreed to this plan.
been reported that leaders of the Communist Party of
Argentina have been greatly annoyed by the tendency of
the Castro regime to support the revolutionary Peronists
without having consulted the Communist Party of Argentina.

It has
It is reported that the so-called Army of National
Liberation (ANL) of Argentina, which is a relatively
small Castroist organization directed from Cuba by
John William Cooke, has in recent weeks been negotiating
for the purchase of arms and has been offered submachine
guns, bazookas and other weapons by two or three private
suppliers. It was reported, however, that the ANL was
having difficulty getting enough dollars from Cuba to
make significant purchases possible.

Bolivia

The Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Relations on 23
August protested formally to the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires
in La Paz against the Cuban Embassy support to the miners
during the recent crisis. Subsequently, however, Foreign
Minister Fellman informed the Cuban Charge that he need
not fear that the Government of Bolivia would break
diplomatic relations with Cuba. There has, in fact, been
no hard information linking the Cuban Embassy with the
present mining crisis in spite of some unconfirmed
reports of Cuban support.
SECRET

Brazil
SECRET

Cuban Ambassador to Brazil, Raul Roa Kouri, is
reported to have attempted to encourage peasant league
leader Francisco Julio to revitalize the leagues in
northern Brazil. According to some reports efforts are
being made to unify the leadership and bring dissident
elements under the general direction of Juliao.
reports indicate that, although the Cuban Embassy is
providing guidance and possibly financial support to the
movement, it had not yet resolved the internal dissension
in the leagues.
Colombia

Other
From Colombia reports have been received of incre-
asing Cuban assistance, primarily in the form of training
courses by instructors who have been trained in Cuba,
to the Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC). A small
guerrilla band encountered by the Colombian army in
July 1963 was broken up when five members of the band
were killed and two others captured. A small quantity
of arms and a considerable amount of books and pamphlets
on revolutionary warfare, photographs of Fidel Castro,
Camilo Cienfuegos and Mao Tse-tung, and bulletins of
the MOEC were found at the camp site. Recent reports
have indicated an increase in the terrorist efforts of
the MOEC and increased promises of assistance from Che
Guevara with regard to the training of additional MOEC
members.

Costa Rica
There have been a number of unconfirmed reports
alleging small-scale training of revolutionaries on
Costa Rican territory for guerrilla activity in
Nicaragua. For example, in mid-July an increased number
of guerrillas were reportedly being trained in Costa Rica
by Adolfo Garcia Barberena, well-known Nicaraguan
revolutionary leader and member of the FLN (National
Liberation Front a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported,
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SECRET

anti-Nicaragua revolutionary group). In early August,
Alberto Serrato, leader of the FLN in Costa Rica,
(reportedly left with a group of Nicaraguans for the
Costa Rican-Nicaraguan border. Another report indicated
that Hector Bogantes Zamora, Costa Rican agitator was
supposed to have left San Jose in mid-August for the
Nicaraguan border to supervise the passage of Nicaraguan
guerrillas from Costa Rica into Nicaragua. Bogantes,
who recently returned from attending the May Day celebra-
tions in Cuba, is said to have been assigned this
responsibility by the Costa Rican Communist Party.

So far as we know, the GON, which is normally well-
informed and highly sensitive to such activities on its
borders, has not made any complaints or otherwise signified
concern or awareness of these reported activities.

Honduras

The Honduran armed forces began to move against a
group of pro-Castro guerrillas operating against the
Nicaraguan Government and active in the vicinity of the
Nicaraguan-Honduran border. The Nicaraguan National Guard
has been conducting operations on its side of the border
against the insurgents since July. The dense jungle and
difficult terrain, however, will impede the efforts of
both forces to eliminate the guerrillas.

Information on the guerrilla force is scanty and
conflicting. It is apparently composed of members of the
National Liberation Front (FLN), a Communist-dominated
and Cuban-supported revolutionary organization active
primarily in Honduras and Nicaragua since the fall of
1962. The strength of the force is not known.

Nicaragua
A captured guerrilla of the FLN (National Liberation
Front a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported, anti-
Nicaraguan group) confessed that he was a member of a
group of 46 who entered Nicaragua from Honduras on 22 July.

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SECRET

He said that their mission was to establish a base camp
in the Isabella mountains, Department of Jinotega, in
order to indoctrinate the peasants and to train them in
guerrilla tactics. He admitted that he had received six
months' guerrilla warfare training in Cuba and that other
FLN leaders had received similar training. He also said
that the FLN training camp in Honduras was near El Lagarto,
on the Patuca River.

4. Transfer of Funds
British Guiana
In British Guiana, Guiana Import-Export Corporation
(Gimpex) received a one million dollar advance payment
deposited by the Cuban Alimpex Corporation for goods to
be delivered to Cuba in the future. Gimpex has, in turn,
loaned this money to the Government of British Guiana.
Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party is the major
stockholder in Gimpex. Mohammed Kassim, Manager of Gimpex,
has indicated that Gimpex will be able to secure additional
loans from Cuba in amounts sufficient to tide the Jagan
government over any foreseeable crisis. It was also
reported that Gimpex plans to buy aircraft, spare parts
and other machinery in the United States for reshipment
to Cuba.

General
Reports continue to be received from many places
indicating that the suitcase full of currency is still one
of the most common methods used by the Cubans for trans-
mitting funds for use in supporting subversive activities
throughout the hemisphere. Instances where such funds
have been confiscated by the police have occurred recently
in El Salvador, Panama and Ecuador.
SECRET

SECRET
ANNEX B

KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA JULY 1963
NATIONALITY JULY PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
TO FROM
ARGENTINA 6 0 26th of July Celebrations.
BOLIVIA 14 0 26th of July Celebrations.
BRAZIL 25 0 26th of July Celebrations.
BR, GUIANA 0 0
CHILE 20 1 26th of July Celebrations. A returning Chilean Diplomat
COLOMBIA 29 1 26th of July Celebrations.
COSTA RICA 12 0 26th of July Celebrations.
DOM. REP. 37 0 26th of July Celebrations.
ECUADOR 2 0 26th of July Celebrations.
EL SALVADOR 4 1 26th of July Celebrations.
GUATEMALA 6 0
HAITI 0 0
HONDURAS 0 0
JAMAICA 33 1 30-Football team. 3-to 26th of July Celebrations.
MEXICO 65 28 26th of July Celebrations.
NICARAGUA 5 0 26th of July Celebrations.
PANAMA 15 0 26th of July Celebrations.
PARAGUAY 3 0 26th of July Celebrations.
PERU 4 0
TRINIDAD 0 0
URUGUAY Most attending will remain
17 15 26th of July Celebrations. to work
VENEZUELA. 22 0 26th of July Celebrations.
TOTALS 319. 47
SECRET

SECRET
KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA AUGUST 1963
NATIONALITY AUGUST PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
TO FROM
ARGENTINA 4 0 26th July Celebrations.
BOLIVIA 5 3
BRAZIL 0 24 22-Returning from 26th July Celebrations.
BR. GUIANA 7 10 Herder Institute in Leipzig.
CHILE 22 47 8-Physical Ed. Seminar 1-Seeking funds 10-Returning
from 26 July Celebrations.
COLOMBIA 6 14
COSTA RICA 0 8 26th July Celebrations..
DOM, REP. 1 8
ECUADOR 0 2
EL SALVADOR 1 0
GUATEMALA 3 0 1-Study at University of Sofia.
HAITI 0 0
HONDURAS 0 8
JAMAICA 0 2
MEXICO 34 63 26th July Celebrations.
NICARAGUA 0 0
PANAMA 6 0. 26th July Celebrations.
PARAGUAY 0 0
PERU 2 9 9-Returning were members of (MIR) who received
guerrilla training.
TRINIDAD 0 0
URUGUAY 10 16 26th July Celebrations.
VENEZUELA 3 0 26th July Celebrations.
TOTALS 104 214198-10009-10098 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System Date: 6/24/201
Identification Form

Agency Information
AGENCY: ARMY
RECORD NUMBER: 198-10009-10098
RECORD SERIES: CALIFANO PAPERS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Information
ORIGINATOR: ARMY
FROM: JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.
TO: MULTIPLE
TITLE: ICCCA: REPORT ON STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS DESIGNED TO COUNTER
SUBVERSION

DATE: 11/26/1963
PAGES: 19
SUBJECTS:
ICCCA - SUBCOMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION
CUBAN SUBVERSION
RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL TO AND FROM CUBA
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Secret
RESTRICTIONS: IB
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 05/15/1998
OPENING CRITERIA:
COMMENTS: Califano Papers, Box 2, Folder 25. Memo from Califano to Wheeler, Sloan, Alger, Wendt, Carpenter,
Quilter re: attached paper concerning status of implementation of actions designed to counter Cuban
subversion.

v9.1
NW 50955 DocId:32424708 Page 1
JFK Review
Department of the Army EO 13526
Declassify Exclude Exempt
Authority
Refer To:
Review Date 5/19/2415 By Kar
21

+
SECRET
26 NOV 1963

MEMORANDUM NO. 81 FOR GENERAL EARLE G. WHEELER (JCS)
MR. FRANK K. SLOAN, Dep Asst Sec/Def ISA
(Regional Affairs)
MAJOR GENERAL J. D. ALGER, USA
REAR ADMIRAL W. F. A. WENDT, USN
MAJOR GENERAL J. W. CARPENTER, HI, USAF
BRIGADIER GENERAL C. J. QUILTER, USMC
SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs:
Report on Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to
Counter Subversion (U)
Reference: DA Memo 464, subject as above, dated September 19, 1963

Attached herewith is a final draft of the Report to the President of
the Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion on Progress Made During September
1963 in Curbing Cuban Subversion in Latin America

It is requested that comments, if any, be provided this office by
1200 hours, 2 December 1963. The Department of Defense portion of
subject report is based on submissions provided in response to referenced
memorandum.

Enclosure
As Stated
Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

cc: Mr. Yarmolinsky (OSD)
Lt Col Haig
Mr. Califano
ASG
OSA, ASC Control No.2074 SECRET
ww
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY
NW 50955 DocId: 32424708 Page 2

DRAFT
11/13/63

REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE
on CUBAN SUBVERSION
ACTION TAKEN DURING SEPTEMBER 1963 IN CURBING
CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

OSA, ASC, Control No. 2707H
32424708 Page (3
SECRET

SECRET
DRAFT
11/13/63

I. Control of Travel to and From Cuba

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Tunis to call to the attention
of the Foreign Ministry our concern at increased evidence
:
of Aeroflot attempts to establish North Africa routes to
Cuba, especially through Algeria, and our conviction that
Tunisia has a valid case in thwarting any Bloc civil air
penetration of Africa.

b. Instructed Embassy Conakry to contact Guinean Govern-
ment officials, reminding them of their past assurances
that no Aeroflot flights to Cuba would be permitted to
use Conakry facilities, and to express our concern at
recent indications that Aeroflot was preparing to establish
service to Cuba via Conakry.

c. Instructed Consulate Fort au France to investigate
and report on alleged landing and refuelling of Cubana
aircraft at Guadeloupe. Also double-checked directly
with the Shell Company, the supplier of the fuel.
Instructed Embassy Paris to query the French Government
about alleged Cubana use of the Guadeloupe facility, and
to express our concern at this evidence of Cuba's attempt
to use French Caribbean dependencies for flights to and
NW 50955 DocId: 32424708 Page 4
SECRET
From

SECRET
- 2 -

from Latin America.

d. Instructed Embassy Rio to make a new approach to
the Brazilian Foreign Ministry to express our concern
at Cuba's continuing use of "charter" flights to Brazil
and the laxity of Brazilian officials in the control of
passengers. During the course of the month the Brazilian
Government began tightening controls against Cubana
flights. Specifically, all requests for landing permission
were henceforth to be processed by the Foreign Office,
with appropriate delays. Also tighter passenger, crew
and cargo controls were to be instituted when a Cubana
flight is permitted to use Brazilian facilities.

e. Determined that the U.K. had specifically warned
Cubana that no aviation fuel was available in Barbados and
that H.M.G. would, in the future, respect Shell Company's
decision to deny fueling to Cubana planes.

f. Continued inter-Departmental efforts to prevent
resumption of ferry service between Cuba and the U.S.
which a British citizen, Harold Derber, has been attempt-
ing to establish during the past several month.
g.

NW 50955 DocId:32424708 Page 5
SECRET

SECRET
- 3 -

g. Instructed Consul Georgetown to investigate and
report on evidence the Department received which indicates
that Cuba is planning to sell merchant vessels to British
Guiana in order to facilitate the establishment of
regular service for passengers and cargo.

Central Intelligence Agency
a. In connection with the Seventh Congress of the
International Union (UIA) held in Habana September 29 -
October 3, 1963 the Buenos Aires Station:
(1) encouraged the Argentine National Federation
of Architects to oppose Argentine attendance at the
Habana meeting, with the result that 25 of the 39
practicing architects who had planned to attend can-
celled their participation;

(2) arranged to prevent the attendance of any
officially authorized Argentine delegation at the Habana
meeting, but encouraged the attendance of an official
Argentine delegation of anti-Communist coloration at an
international architects meeting to be held in Mexico
in October;

NW 50955 DocId:32424708 Page 6
(3)

SECRET

(3) delivered a memorandum to the Minister of
Interior concerning Cuban charter flights to Brazil which
supported the Ambassador's request that the Argentine
government express concern over such flights.

b. Rio de Janeiro Station continued to furnish
the Embassy with data on Cubana flights to Brazil used
in representations to the Brazilian Foreign Office.
Also induced Rio airport officials to impose stringent
*
passport control and baggage efforts. These efforts
:
were
contributed to the Brazilian Government's failing to
issue landing permits for Cubana flights on September
21, 24 and 25, 1963 forcing their cancellation. When
Cubana, because of harassment at Rio, began using the
landing facilities in Sao Paulo where controls were
non existent, CIA initiated and obtained a local liaison
agreement for similar harassment in the event of future
Cubana flights to Sao Paulo.

c. Mexico City station inspired a press campaign
of hoof and mouth and smallpox epidemics in Cuba, prior
to the Architects Congress to discourage participation
in the Habana meeting. The resulting quarantines and
SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32424708 Page 7
innoculations

Innoculations were a factor in discouraging 52 of the
60 Mexican professional architects who were expected to
go to Habana from attending the Congress.

II. Control of Movement of Propaganda
Measures to contact.

NW 50955 DocId:32424708 Page 8

III. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas
and arms

Department of State

Made the necessary arrangements through Embassy
Tegucigalpa with the Government of Honduras for the
dispatch of three U.S. helicopters to give logistical
assistance to the Honduran Army in its effort to locate
and eliminate the band of guerrillas allegedly operating
in the Patuca River area along the Honduran-Nicaraguan
border.

Department of Defense
Three OH-13 helicopters from USSOUTHCOM supported
:
Honduran armed forces conducting counter-insurgency
operations in the Patuca River area. A total of 27 sorties
were flown resulting in delivery of 3928 pounds of supplies,
evacuation of 12 sick Hondoran soldiers, airlift of 19
passengers to points in the operational area, and
recovery of 400 pounds of supplies from the operational
area.

NW 50955 DocId: 32424708 Page 9
SECRET
IV.

SECRET
- 7 -

IV. Control of Transfer of Funds

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Mexico City to inform the
Mexican airline SAESA that their proposal to purchase
surplus Cuban aircraft would in fact result in the
accrual to Cuba of a significant amount of hard currency,
and the U.S. would have to oppose the transaction.
Further, if dollars were involved in the purchase,
it would be a violation of the Cuban Assets Control
Regulations.

b. Informed Department of Treasury, Foreign Assets
Control Office, of the activities of Sowondelp Enterprises,
a Miami firm engaged in sending remittances to persons
in Cuba in violation of the Cuban Assets Control
Regulations.

c. Instructed Consulate, Belize to inform
Mr. Richard Joyce, an American national, that his
commercial transactions with Cuba were in violation
of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations and that he
• is prohibited from engaging in such trade.

SECRET
NW 50955. DocId: 32424708 Page 10

Strengthening of Counter-Insurgency Capabilities

Department of Defense

a. Thirteen Latin American officers graduated from
:
the counter-insurgency Operations Course of the U.S.
Army School for Latin America in the Panama Canal Zone
on 20 September. During the month, a total of 91 Latin
American officers enrolled in courses stressing counter-
insurgency at the Army Canal Zone school.

b. Eight U.S. Army counter-insurgency mobile
training teams were providing training to the Armed
Forces of five Latin American countries during the period.
U.S. Air Force counter-insurgency training teams were
in two countries.

c. In the Canal Zone, 15 students from five countries
were under instruction in the operation of coast guard
utility patrol craft used for coastal surveillance.
Six students from two countries were undergoing similar
training in the United States

d. A U.S. Navy counter-insurgency training team
is in Venezuela to assist in improving the security
of oil installations in Lake Maracaibo,

NW 50955 DocId: 32424708 Page 11

- 9 -
e. Costa Rica and Honduras were provided one
Cessna 185 aircraft each for medical civic action and
internal security purposes.

f. On May 25, 1963, three M-43B KAMAN helicopters
were provided to the government of Colombia on a 90-day
loan. The Colombian Government requested an extension
of the loan and a 90-day extension has been approved.

Central Intelligence Agency

a. Ba City Station has recruited, on a
trial basis, a former member of the 13 November guerrilla
group and debriefings are in process. Negotiations
continue with the Government of Guatemala for the
formation of a new internal security service.

b. Lima Station has agreed to furnish the Peruvian
Investigations Police (PIP) with an outboard motor
to increase their patrol capability on rivers crossing
the Bolivian frontier. Our information is that the
rivers crossing this frontier have provided the primary
avenues for recent attempts to gain clandestine entry
of personnel and weapons into Peru.

NW 50955 DocId: 32424708 Page 12
VI.

VI. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion

Department of Defense
Engineering installation work continued on radio
stations for Managua, Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa,
Honduras. No further progress has been made in reaching
agreements with Colombia and Ecuador for rights to
establish radio stations in those countries. Installation
of the new trans-istimian comercial cable in Panama
is nearing completion.

Central Intelligence Agency
CIA Stations continued their exchange of intelligence
:
information with local intelligence Agencies. The
following actions are of special significance:
a. The CIA Station in Buenos Aires furnished the
Argentine State Intelligence Service (SIDE) with
information on the travel of Argentines to Cuba, and re-
quested that SIDE provide name traces and debrief these
travellers on their return whenever feasible. SIDE
provided the traces, but did not conduct any debriefings.
The Station has not felt it feasible to try to remedy
this omission in view of the personnel changes expected
within SIDE after the new government is installed on
NW 50955 DocId: 32424708 Page 13
SECRET
b.

- 11 -

b. As a result of information passed by the Bogota
Station to the Administrative Department of Security
(DAS) concerning Colombian travellers to Cuba, a number
of passport violations have been discovered in which
travellers to Cuba are using passports issued to other
persons. There is a reluctance, however, on the part
of the Colombian Government to prosecute this type
of violation.
:
were
c. At the urging of the CIA Station in Lima, the
National Intelligence Service (SIN) instructed one of
its penetrations of leftist groups to campaign for a trif
to Cuba in order to receive guerrilla warfare training.
This asset has been offered, and has accepted, an opportunity
to make the trip by the Leftist Revolutionary Movement
(MIR), primary vehicle of Cuban subversive activities
in Peru. Briefing and debriefing of the asset will be
done by the SIN.

The Peruvian Naval Intelligence Service (PNIS) has,
in response to the efforts of the Station in Lima, sent
one of its agents to Chile where he will sign aboard a
Chilean freighter calling at Habana. The asset has been
given specific intelligence requirements to fulfill.
The
NW 50955 DocId: 32424708 Page 14
SECRET

- 12 -

d. The Prime Minister and Minister of Government and
Police has requested from the CIA representative in
Lima any information that he might supply on subversive
elements posing a threat to the Government of Peru.
This request has opened an additional channel to the
highest level of the Government with a concomitent
prospect for effective action when needed.
:

d. Through regular liaison channels, the Venezuelan
General Directorate of Police (DIGEPOL) has been provided
by CIA with the names of all Venezuelans known to have
travelled to Cuba from February through August 1963.
This activity will be carried out on a continuing basis;
the names are now being integrated into the regular
watch list kept at international airports in Venezuela.
Thus far, at least three returnees have been arrested
on the basis of the information supplied to DIGEPOL,
DIGEPOL has indicated its appreciation of the data
being supplied and desires that the arrangement be
continued.

VII. Surveillance of Cuban Diplomatic, Commercial and Cultural

No special actions to report.
NW 50955 DocId: 32424708 Page 15
VII.

- 13 -
VIII. Other Special Actions

United States Information Agency
2. The Agency's press service transmitted seven
articles relating to Cuban subversion on its wireless
file service to USIS offices throughout Latin America
for placement in the local newspapers. Developments
reported in these articles included demands by the Bolivian
Senate for the ouster of the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires,
terrorism and government counteraction in Venezuela,
the seizure in Ecuador of an arms and explosives cache
reportedly received from Cuba, several articles on the
International Union of Architects Congress in Habana
(emphasizing the intent of the Castro regime to use the
Congress as a forum for its propaganda claims), and
Assistant Secretary Martin's Los Angeles speech in which
he pointed out the regime's affinity for Chinese communist
doctrine and its continued emphasis on violent revolution
and subversion. In all, the press service transmitted
27 articles and commentaries during September on the
subject of Cuba, the other articles dealing for the most
part with economic and political conditions inside the
country as evidenced by the regime's own admissions and
the reports of refugees.
NW 50955 DocId: 32424708 Page 16:
SECRET
3

SECRET
:
B. The Voice of America Spanish broadcasts to Latin
America during September carried a total of 20 news
analyses, commentaries, press round-ups, and interviews
related to the subject of Cuban subversion. Some of
the developments treated included the following:
A commentary on communist embassies as channels for
subversion; a news analysis on the U.S. students who
visited Cuba; Assistant Secretary Martin's Los Angeles
speech, a news analysis on Cuban subversion as an obstacle
in the normalization of U.S.-Soviet relations; a three-
part series on university autonomy in Latin America;
a feature on the letter of a Colombian student who
went to Cuba on a scholarship and was disillusioned by
the communist indoctrination; a commentary on Che Guevara's
recent article on revolutionary strategy; and a commentary
on guerrilla training in Cuba. Many of these items were
repeated several times in the broadcasts. The "Rendezvous
with Cuba" hour carried four or five commentaries similar
topics and interviews nightly on economic and political
developments inside Cuba. Of special note, the Cuban
radio and Castro himself reacted angrily to Voice of
America broadcasts about Che Guevara's article and to com-
:
mentaries that Cuba had accepted an agricultural role in
NW 50955 DocId: 32424708 Page 17
SECRET
the

SECRET
- 15 -
the communist bloc and had postponed its plans to
industrialize.

c. On September 27, the Agency issued a circular
Instruction to all its Latin American posts urging
greater attention to opportunities for publicizing Cuban-
stimulated subversion, suggesting the various types of
information activities to support this effort, and requesting
monthly reports of field actions taken to implement the
Instruction. This was done as a follow-up to the original
instruction on Cuban subversion which was issued April 3,
1963.

Central Intelligence Agency
a. CIA in Brazil assisted in the defection and
exploitation of a Cuban athlete Roberto Perez Ondarse
in Porto Alegre on 4 September 1963. Perez was a member
of the Cuban basket-ball team which participated in the
World University Games (FISU) held in Forto Alegre
Brazil in early September 1963.

b. Assistance was given to the Government of
Guatemala in the interrogation of some of those who
were arrested in connection with the Communist Party
documents that were confiscated in late May 1963.
SECRET
Only
NW 50955 DocId: 32424708 Page 18

- 16 -
Only one of those interrogated admitted to any involvement
with the captured documents, the Communist Party,
guerrillas, or anything else that could be construed
as incriminating. The one who did admit knowledge
denied that he was involved in any way. The Government
of Guatemala wants to interrogate this person again at
a later date.

c. CIA Station in Montevideo arranged for an
interview between an Uruguayan military intelligence
officer and a recent defector from the Montevideo
Cuban Embassy during which extensive information regarding
Cuban subversive activities was revealed. The Uruguayan
officer prepared a report containing this data and
presented it to the National Council of Government which
has been slow to indicate concern over communist sub-
versive activity in Uruguay. As a result of this report,
the NCG has directed the Minister of Interior to appoint
a special commission to study the problem of Communist
subversion and to make recommendations as to what course
of action should be taken by the Uruguayan Government..
Should the Government wish to press for passage of
stronger
NW 50955 DocId:32424708 Page 19

- 17 -
stronger anti-subversive legislation the Station has taken
steps to prepare Uruguayan public opinion by planning
simultaneous local press releases of the salient
features of the defector report with similar press
reporting in the United States where the defector will be
brought to light.

NW 50955 DocId: 32424708 Page 20
198-10009-10099
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date: 6/24/201

Agency Information
AGENCY: ARMY
RECORD NUMBER: 198-10009-10099
RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Information
ORIGINATOR: MULTIPLE
FROM:
TO:
TITLE:
DATE: 02/00/1963
PAGES: 153
SUBJECTS:
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
SITUATION IN LATIN AMERICA
PRESIDENT'S REPORT - SOVIET OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN
CUBA1962
CUBAN SUBVERSION
SOVIET MILITARY FORCES IN CUBA
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Secret
RESTRICTIONS: IB
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/15/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: Califano Papers, Box 1, Folder 9. Multiple papers re: classified/secret Congressional testimony
concerning Cuban subversion in Latin America, Cuban military buildup, Soviet military weapons in
Cuba, etc.

JFK Review
Department of the Army EO 13526
Declassify Exclude Exempt
Authority
Review Date 5/11/2015 By Kmen

22
CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY - PART II

NO. SUBJECT: DATE:
1. Statement by LtGen Joseph F. Carroll, DirDIA Undated
before the Cmte on Foreign Affairs, HR, WashDC
2. Statement by the DirCIA for use of the staff of the 7 Jan 63
Preparedness Investigating Subcmte of Senator
Stennis
3. SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte 11 Feb 63
4. SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte 12 Feb 63
5. SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte 13 Feb 63.
:. 6. SecNav testimony before HASC 18. Feb 63
7. Ltr to SecArmy from Mr. Martin, AsstSecState 19 Feb 63
with attached statement by Mr. Martin before
the Latin American Subcomte of HFAC on subject
of communist subversion of the hemisphere
8. SecDef testimony before SASC (Vol. I-A.M.) 19 Feb 63
9. SecNav testimony before HASC 19 Feb 63
10. Statement of SecDef accompanied by General Maxwell 20 Feb 63
D. Taylor, ChJCS
11. Excerpts of Navy testimony before HASC 20 Feb 63
12. SecDef testimony before SASC 21 Feb 63
13. Excerpt of SecAirForce testimony before HASC 21 Feb 63
14. SecDef testimony before SASC (Cuba) 22 Feb 63
15. Statement by the Dir CIA for use of the staff of the 26 Feb 63
Preparedness Investigating Subcmte of Senator (Transmittal
Stennis (Cuban Subversion in LA) Slip)
16. Statement by Secretary of Defense to the Permanent 13 March 63
Subcmte on Investigations of the Committee on Govern-
ment Operations - U.S. Senate
CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY - PART II (Cont'd)

NO. SUBJECT: DATE:
17. Memo for Mr. Bromley Smith from Mr. McGiffert 8 Mar 63
Subj: Cuba with Items 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13 and 14 included as attachments
18. Study on Cuba as a Base for --------prepared by Bob Undated
Mandelstam and LtCol Patchell for use by Sec McNamara
at Stennis Comm hearings, in the form of Memo to Sec/Def
19. Memo for Mr. Robt A. Hurwitch, Subj: Missile Crisis 29 Mar 63
Section of the President's Draft Rept to Congress on US
Participation in the UN During 1963, fr Mr. Califano
w/draft of President's message atchd
Sub
20. Interim Report by Preparedness Inves/Comm of the Comm Undtd
on Armed Services US Senate, on the Cuban Military
Buildup, OATSD(LA) Control # 5812(8)
DATE
MANSMITTAL SLIP 26 Feb 6

TO: Mr. Califano for Secy. Vance
ROOM NO. BUILDING
3E985 Pentagon
REMARKS:

FROM: CIA William A. Tidwell
ROOM NO. BUILDING EXTENSION
Code143 6614
REPLACES FORM 36-8 GPO: 1957-0-439445 (47)
WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET
35
286

STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR FOR USE OF THE
STAFF OF THE PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING
SUBCOMMITTEE OF SENATOR STENNIS

OSA, ASG Control No.519 SECRET
SECRET
25 February 1963

CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

I. Introduction
The public pronouncements of Cuban leaders, the
daily record of events in Latin America, and reports
from our intelligence sources within Communist and
other left-extremist elements throughout this hemis-
phere all agree on one salient conclusion: that Fidel
Castro is spurring and supporting the efforts of Com-
munists and other revolutionary elements to overthrow
and seize control of the governments in Latin America.

Even before the October missile crisis--and with
increasing rancor since then--Cuban leaders have been
exhorting revolutionary movements to violence and
terrorism, and supporting their activities. Cuban
support takes many different forms, but its main thrust
is in the supply of the inspiration, the guidance, the
training, and the communications and technical assist-
ance that revolutionary groups in Latin America require.

In essence, Castro tells revolutionaries from
other Latin American countries: "Come to Cuba; we
will pay your way, we will train you in underground
organization techniques, in guerrilla warfare, in sab-
otage and in terrorism. We will see to it that you
get back to your homeland. Once you are there, we
will keep in touch with you, give you propaganda sup-
port, send you propaganda materials for your movement,
training aids to expand your guerrilla forces, secret
communications methods, and perhaps funds and special-
ized demolition equipment." Castro is not, as far as
we know, promising these other Latin Americans any Cu-
ban weapons or Cuban personnel--either leaders, ad-
visers, or cadres. But he probably does tell them:
"If you succeed in establishing something effective
by way of a revolutionary movement in your homeland,
if your guerrillas come down out of the hills and con-
front regular armed forces, then we may consider more
concrete forms of assistance."

So far, it should be noted, none of the movements
in South America has reached this final stage--and in
fact even Castro's Sierra Maestra guerrillas never had

SECRET
to fight a pitched battle with regular military for-
mations which might have required more advanced weap-
ons than small arms, grenades, mines, and machineguns.
In many ways, Cuba under Castro is the Latin version
of the old Comintern, inciting, abetting, and sustain-
ing revolution wherever it flourishes.

We have occasional evidence of more concrete Cu-
ban support. Cuban nationals, for example, took part
in the La Oroya disorders in Peru in December. We
know that some funds move, generally in cash by courier,
from Cuba to the revolutionaries in other countries. We
know that Cuba furnishes money to buy weapons, and that
some guerrilla forces in Peru, for instance, are equipped
with Czech weapons which most probably came from Cuba.

Venezuela is apparently number one on Cuba's pri-
ority list for revolution. Fidel Castro said so to the
recent meeting of Communist front organizations for
Latin American women. Che Guevara and Blas Roca both
emphasized the outlook for revolution in Venezuela in
speeches in January. One of our established sources
of proven reliability, high in the ranks of the Vene-
zuelan Communist Party says the Central Committee
agreed in January that a "peaceful solution to the pres-
ent situation in Venezuela is out of the question."

This same source reported that Communist guerrilla
and terrorist operations in Venezuela were placed un-
der a unified command in late 1962, which coordinates
activities with the other militant extremist groups in
Venezuela. The result has been the creation of the
Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). This or-
ganization is currently trying to publicize its exist-
ence by such acts as the hijacking of the freighter
ANZOATEGUI, and by acts of sabotage and indiscriminate
shootings. These were also designed to dissuade Pres-
ident Betancourt from his trip to Washington. In this,
of course, they failed.

The violence in Venezuela should not be minimized.
The sabotage is the work of experts, and is being done
with advanced types of explosives. The shooting has
reached the point in Caracas where it is not safe to go
out at night in some sections of the capital. But it
is the opinion both of our people and the embassy that

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this level of activity is not the sort of thing that
will bring down the government unless the president
or other high officials are assassinated. The FALN
has not reached a point where it stands up to the
armed forces, or seizes and holds government build-
ings.

We believe that Cuba has given guerrilla train-
ing to more nationals from Venezuela than from any
other country. Our estimate is that more than 200
Venezuelans received such training in 1962. Many of
these are engaged in terrorism in the cities, and
others were rounded up and given long prison sentences
when they committed themselves prematurely last spring
in a countryside where the rural population strongly
supports the Betancourt administration. One of our
best penetrations of the Communist Party in Venezuela
tells us that at present the unified command has less
than 150 guerrillas in the field, in widely separated
groups of 15 to 25 men each.

II. The Cuban Plan

For the past year Cuban spokesmen have been push-
ing the line that Cuba provides the example for Latin
American revolution, with the implication that nothing
more than guidance needs to be exported. Castro ac-
tually sounded the keynotes for Cuban subversion on
July 26, 1960, when he said, "We promise to continue
making Cuba the example that can convert the Cordillera
of the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the American
continent." In his speech on 15 January 1963 Castro
said that if "Socialism" in Cuba had waited to over-
turn Batista by peaceful means, Castro would still be
in the Sierra Maestra. For the past three months,
Che Guevara and Education Minister Armando Hart, both
in public speeches and in remarks to visiting Com-
munists which have been repeated to us, have been in-
sisting that what they call "Socialism" can achieve
power in Latin America only by force.

The Cuban effort at present is far more serious
than the hastily organized and ill-conceived raids that
the bearded veterans of the Sierra Maestra led into
such Central American countries as Panama, Haiti, Nic-
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eight or nine months Castro was in power. Today
the Cuban effort is far more sophisticated, more
covert, and more deadly. In its professional trade-
craft, it shows guidance and training by experienced
Communist advisers from the Soviet bloc, including
veteran Spanish Communists.

The ideas move fairly openly in a massive propa-
ganda effort. The inflammatory broadcasts from Ha-
vana and the work of Prensa Latina are matters of
public record. It may be worth noting that the postal
and customs authorities in Panama are destroying on
the average of 12 tons a month of Cuban propaganda
coming into their land. Another 10 tons a month comes
into Costa Rica; most of it is spotted either at the
airport or in the post office and destroyed.

The know-how is not only imparted to the guerrilla
trainees who come to Cuba, but is exported in the form
of booklets. There are thousands of copies of the
texts on guerrilla warfare by Mao Tse-tung and by Che
Guevara scattered over all of Latin America. Our agents
have brought us, for example, a little pocket booklet,
about two and a half by four inches, called "150 ques-
tions on guerrilla warfare," written by a Spanish Civil
War veteran, Alberto Bayo. This was printed in Cuba,
and turned up first in Peru. Another version, with
100 questions and answers, based on Guevara's and Bayo's
books, has been written especially for Peruvian use and
mimeographed in Peru. This is about 5 x 8, and in-
cludes drawings on how to place demolition charges as
well as charts for calculating the force of various
explosives. There is a Portuguese text of Guevara's
book in Brazil, and a mimeographed abridgement of
Bayo's 150 questions has been prepared by a terrorist-
guerrilla organization in Colombia.

All of these textbooks stress that the guerrilla
must be self-sustaining. They not only tell him how
to make Molotov cocktails, explosives, and incendiary
preparations from materials that he can obtain easily
and sometimes even openly at home. They stress that
his weapons, his equipment, and supplies should come
from "the enemy"--that is, from the security forces
in his homeland.

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III. Training

We estimate that at least 1,000, and perhaps
as many as 1,500 persons came to Cuba during 1962,
from all the other Latin American countries with
the possible exception of Uruguay, to receive ideo-
logical indoctrination or guerrilla warfare train-
ing or both. More have gone in 1963 despite the
limited facilities for reaching Cuba at present.

The largest contingents have come from Vene-
zuela, Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, and Bolivia. Some
of the courses are as short as four weeks, designed
to let it appear that the trainees had merely at-
tended some conference or celebration and done a
little sightseeing. Other courses last as long as
a year, and may include intensive training in such
things as sabotage, espionage, and psychological
warfare.

We have devoted a great deal of effort to
monitoring Latin American travel to Cuba at the
main jump-off points such as Mexico and Curacao.
(Curacao has not been used since October, but KLM
may soon resume flights.) The Cubans go to great
lengths to conceal the fact that some of these
trainees have ever been to Cuba, and how long they
stayed. However, we know a great deal about this
travel from our penetrations of the Communist par-
ties, from controlled agents we have been able to
maneuver into the training courses in Cuba, and
from cooperative travel control authorities in
Latin American countries. The Cuban Embassy in
Mexico City gives the trainee a visa on a separate
piece of paper, so that his passport, when he goes
home, will only show that he has been in Mexico.
We have a record, however, of those who fly on to
Cuba. In other cases, particularly in the case of
travel through Montevideo before the quarantine,
the Cubans furnished passports under other names
for travel by way of Curacao.

We derive some of our figures from travel con-
trol points, and another set from the information
we receive from penetration agents of established
reliability in the Communist parties. Some of the
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Latin American governments are also able to maintain
fairly accurate lists of their nationals known to
have been in Cuba. We get a certain amount of cross-
checking from lists of names furnished us by several
of our agents who have undergone training, and in
confessions of captured guerrillas who had been in
Cuba. Thus in the case of Peru, for instance, we
come up with a list of 235 names of individuals known
to have made extended stays in Cuba in 1961 and 1962.
We have to make allowance for some who did not re-
ceive guerrilla training, and allowance in the op-
posite direction for those whose names have escaped
our surveillance. But we are guided in these adjust-
ments by the cross-checking information mentioned
above.

Some of the trainees arrive, and many go home,
by way of the Iron Curtain and Western Europe, using
Soviet, Czech, or Cuban aircraft--and probably ships
as well--for the trip between Cuba and the Bloc. This
is another attempt to conceal their movements, and in
some cases permits further indoctrination and train-
ing in Bloc countries.

Under the circumstances we consider that our
estimate of 1,000 to 1,500 guerrilla warfare trainees
in 1962 is reasonably accurate. We also believe that
the scope and volume of this training is being stepped
up, just as we know that it incresed in 1962 over 1961.
An
The basic training covers cross-country movement:
of guerrillas, firing, care of weapons, and general
guerrilla tactics. One of our Brazilian agents took
such a four-week course more than a year ago, under
cover of going to Cuba for a convention. He returned
to his Havana hotel every few days during the course
to spread the word that he had been sightseeing.
Argentine trainee who took a longer course and then
was sent home by way of Europe has given us a great
deal of detail on the type of training. He reports
that some of the trainees remain indefinitely. The
Cubans sometimes refer to these men as their Interna-
tional Brigade. Sometimes they are formed into na-
tional units from a particular country, in effect
forming a packaged cadre which can be returned to
the homeland to lead a "Liberation Army."

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A trainee who recently returned to Peru after
several months of training in Cuba, said that all
his fellow trainees were asked to mark bridges and
other similar demolition targets on detailed maps
of Peru. They were also required to fill out
lengthy questionnaires on sabotage targets, possibil-
ities for subversion of police, methods for illegal
entry and travel, suitable drop zones for air sup-
ply, possible points of attack against police and
military posts, and similar information necessary
for directing subversion and insurrection.

Numerous reports come to us indicating that in
such countries as Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru,
where there are indigenous guerrilla forces either
in action or in being in the hills, there are Cu-
bans among the bands acting as leaders, instructors
or advisors for these forces. These reports are in-
variably second-hand, and we have not been able to
confirm any of them. In some cases, it has turned
out that a reference to "a Cuban" with the guerrillas
referred to someone who has been trained in Cuba and
was training others, rather than a Cuban national.
However, we know positively that three Cuban nationals
were involved in the strike violence at La Oroya,
Peru, last December, which culminated in several
million dollars worth of damage to the smelter of
the American-owned Cerro de Pasco mining company.
One of these Cubans has also been directing the armed
invasions of big ranches in the Andean highlands by
land-hungry Indians. Information of this nature con-
tributed to the decision of the Peruvian junta to
crack down on Communists in January. In Brazil, the
complaint of guerrillas in training camps was that
they had been recruited by a promise of Cuban in-
structors, but found there were none. This came to
light when the report of a Cuban intelligence agent,
relaying their complaints to Havana, turned up in
the wreckage of the Varig airliner which crashed in
Peru in November.

IV. Weapons

In general, the Cubans appear to be following
the textbook for guerrillas in regard to provision
of arms. We have strong evidence, from numerous
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sources, that they are telling the guerrilla warfare
students and their leaders to obtain their own weap-
ons at home.

One of our agents who was in the original group
of Brazilian trainees said he was trained exclusively
in the use and maintenance of the Garand M-1 rifle
and M-3, Browning and Hotchkiss machineguns. His
group was told that these were the weapons Brazilian
guerrillas would be able to buy, steal, or capture
from the security forces at home. Similarly, an Ar-
gentine trainee, an agent, said their instructors
told them Cuba would not be sending weapons because
there was a plentiful source of supply for any de-
termined guerrilla movement in its own homeland.
Leaders of militant groups in Venezuela, Brazil, and
Peru who have gone to Cuba seeking assistance have
been told by the Cuban leaders that Cuba is willing
to furnish funds, training, and technical assistance.
Reference to weapons is pointedly omitted. This is
reported to us by our agents in these same groups.

We have recently again checked with all of our
stations in Latin America to review what evidence we
have of military shipments from Cuba. In Peru, radio
transmitters were admittedly brought in from Cuba.
(In Venezuela so much radio equipment was stolen
last fall that this was unnecessary)) In 1962, Cuba
furnished cash to buy weapons in Mexico to be smug-
gled into Guatemala. In Peru, the guerrilla trainees
who were rounded up in the Huampani-Satipo incident
last March had been issued kits containing a Czech
rifle with a pistol grip, apparently of bloc origin.
Otherwise, however, in case after case guerrilla
hardware turned out to have been bought or stolen
locally, or smuggled in from the adjoining country.
We do not have a single case where we are certain
of the Cuban origin of captured arms.

This is not to say that we are positive weapons
have not been sent from Cuba. Latin America has a
long tradition of smuggling, a long coastline, in-
numerable isolated landing fields and drop zones,
and inadequate security forces to control all such
channels. A Venezuelan Communist leader has been
telling guerrilla leaders that Cuba will soon send

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them mortars. It is always possible, of course, that
he is fabricating to build up the morale of his units,
but we must also conclude that if he is indeed making
this up, he risks inevitable disillusionment.

In summary, we have evidence that in principle
Cuba is not sending identifiable quantities of weapons
to Latin American insurgents at present. But we have
no reason to believe that they will not or cannot do
so, when so doing serves their stated purpose of creat-
ing uprisings in Latin American Countries. Needless
to say, this is a matter that we consider of most ser-
ious concern and we intensively trace every rumor that
comes to us of the importation of arms from Cuba to
Latin American countries.

V. Funding

Cuban financing of subversive operations in Latin
America is easy to ascertain and hard to document. Our
evidence shows that it is generally effected by couriers
carrying cash. The following are a few examples of
these operations.

A Venezuelan politician, Fabricio Ojeda, returned
from Cuba in March of 1962, and was seen by several
witnesses to have large quantities of US currency
stuffed in a false-bottomed compartment of his suit-
case. There is no law against bringing currency into
Venezuela, so that authorities could not even deter-
mine how much he had brought in. Ojeda later was cap-
tured, tried, and sentenced for guerrilla activity.

A Nicaraguan exile, Julio Cesar Mayorga Porto-
carrera, was flying from Mexico to Honduras in Sep-
tember, 1961, when weather forced the plane to over-
fly Honduras and land in Nicaragua. He was found to
be carrying $3,600 in cash, which he admitted he was
bringing from Cuba for Nicaraguan rebels in Honduras.

Last March Ecuadorean troops raided a guerrilla
training camp in the mountains west of Quito and ar-
rested some 48 members of the Union of Revolutionary
Ecuadorean Youth. The leaders of the group admitted
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having received guerrilla training in Cuba, together
with funds to support their activities. One item
of $44,000 was publicized in the press.

A highly placed Guatemalan Communist who defected
last November has given us a specific account of pro-
cedures by which Cuba sent cash to Mexico to buy weap-
ons which were then smuggled into Guatemala. We also
have considerable evidence of involved bank transfers
by which Cuban money eventually reached Latin American
front groups to pay for political and propaganda ac-
tivity. In some countries where the Cubans still have
diplomatic missions, we have obtained photostats show-
ing that Cuban diplomats paid for printing of front-
group propaganda.

In January 1963 one of the first Brazilians to
receive guerrilla warfare training in 1961 was picked
up with a suitcase full of ammunition he was carrying
to some of those same guerrilla training camps ex-
posed when the Varig plane crashed in Peru. The man
admitted that a woman attorney in Rio had given him
the money to buy a large hacienda as a new guerrilla
camp. We know that this woman is a cut-out in the
communications between the pro-Communist Peasant Leagues,
which have run the camps, and the Cuban embassy.

The principle that guerrillas must be self-sus-
taining has obviously been applied to finances as well.
Communist guerrillas have staged numerous bank rob-
beries in Peru, Venezuela, and Argentina. The most
spectacular hold-up was that of a bank in a Lima sub-
urb last year which netted almost $100,000. From
the participants, who have been caught, we know that
the hold-up was carried out by a combination of guer-
rillas and ordinary criminals, who divided the loot
fifty-fifty. Some of the share of the common criminals
has been recovered, but the Communist half is believed
to have reached the sizeable guerrilla forces of Hugo
Blanco in the Cuzco Valley. In February 1963 a bank
in an outlying Venezuelan town was robbed of $25,000
by men wearing FALN armbands.

VI. Cuban Propaganda Broadcasts

International broadcasts by Cuban radio stations
maintain a relatively constant propaganda level at all
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times, with regularly scheduled and special broad-
casts to specific countries as well as general trans-
missions to all Latin America. The general theme
of these broadcasts is that the "Cuban example" is
awakening the "people" of Latin America to the op-
portunity for revolutionary action against the "cor-
rupt" regimes in power and against "Yankee imperialism"
which allegedly supports them. Within the last two
months there has been an increase in the aggressive-
ness with which the broadcasts incite revolt.

The official Cuban international service called
*Radio Havana Cuba is the chief radio propaganda out-
let. More commonly known as Radio Havana, this sta-
tion broadcasts weekly a total of 187 hours and 50
minutes of propaganda in languages which include
Spanish, English, French, Arabic, Portuguese, and
Haitian Creole, to listeners in Europe, the Mediter-
ranean area, and the Western Hemisphere.

Radio Havana's international service was in-
augurated on May Day in 1961. It has grown rapidly
since that time and is now Latin America's first in-
ternational broadcaster in terms of program hours.
Its time on the air is as follows, in hours per week:

Haitian Creole to Haiti 7 hr

Arabic to the Mediterranean area 5 hr 15 min

English to Europe 9 hr 20 min

English to the Western Hemis- 17 hr 30 min
phere
French to Europe 9 hr 20 min

French to Canada 3 hr 20 min

French to Mediterranean 3 hr 30 min

Portuguese to Brazil 7 hr

Spanish to Europe 16 hr 55 min

Spanish to the Americas. 108 hr 30 min
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In addition to the regularly scheduled inter-
national service, Radio Havana has been known to
broadcast special programs in order to take advan-
tage of unique political situations. When serious
disorders broke out in the Dominican Republic in
late 1961, for example, broadcasts emanating from a
self-styled "clandestine" station which said it was
located inside the Dominican Republic demanded the
overthrow of the Dominican government. The station
went off after about a week, but not before direc-
tion finder bearings and other technical clues in-
dicated that it had been transmitting from Radio
Havana's transmitting facilities in Cuba.

Radio Havana states that it makes its facilities
available to political groups from other Latin Ameri-
can countries so they can beam programs to their home-
lands. These programs, which have the evident intent
of encouraging subversion and inciting revolt, are
presently beamed on regular weekly or twice a week
schedule to Guatemala, Peru, and the Dominican Re-
public. Similar programs were beamed to Nicaragua
and Honduras until last September when they were
replaced by a single program with wider targets now
programmed nightly. These special programs are ex-
emplified by the programs transmitted to the Domini-
can Republic on 28 January. One was a "manifesto"
by Dominican Communists (who are based in Cuba) on
the recent election of the "demagogic imperialist
agent" Juan Bosch as President of the Dominican Re-
public. Another was allegedly by a pro-Communist
group of Dominicans in Cuba called the "National
Liberation Movement." It appealed to Dominican
university students to demonstrate against the Con-
stituent Assembly meeting in Santo Domingo.
:
There are also two special programs beamed to
the United States. "Radio Free Dixie" is a one
hour a week transmission in English aimed at US
Negroes. The other program, "The Friendly Voice
of Cuba," is somewhat more subtle and aimed at a
wider audience. Both programs can be heard well in
Florida and also in many parts of southern United
States.

The technical facilities of Radio Havana are
at a transmitter site at Bauta, some 23 miles
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southwest of Havana. At present, no more than four
shortwave transmitters are being used, but in the
past as many as five have been observed on the air
at the same time. These transmitters range in power
from 10 to 100 kilowatts, enabling Radio Havana to
be heard all over the world. Programs are being
sent from studios to the transmitter site by means
of microwave relays.

VII. Rival Forces in Latin American Subversion

Since the October crisis, Fidel Castro has ob-
viously been trying to straddle the rift between Mos-
cow and Peiping over global Communist strategy. It
has been aptly put that Castro's heart is in Peiping
but his stomach is in Moscow. This same split be-
tween all-out militancy and a more cautious policy--
call it coexistence or "two steps forward, one step
back"--is reflected on the extreme left in many Latin
American countries. Thus Cuba at present not only
seeks to serve two masters, but to choose among rival
servants in its Latin American subversion.

Castro's views on what is good for socialism
and revolution in Latin America are more in line with
those of the Chinese Communists than the Soviets.
Only the Cuban and Venezuelan Communist parties are
totally committed to terror and revolution. In spite
of differences over tactics and timing between var-
ious Communist groups, all intend eventually to de-
liver the Latin American countries into the Commu-
nists-socialist bloc. The so-called Soviet "conser-
vative" view, as it is now espoused, is more intent
on trying to achieve power by legal means if possible
and by subversion rather than by force.

Direct Soviet interest in Latin America is clearly
increasing. An excellent example of this was the set-
ting up early in 1962 of a Latin American Institute in
the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. The avowed purpose
of this institute is to raise the study of the prob-
lems of Latin America, which in their own statements
the Soviets claim they have neglected, to the highest
possible level. Teaching of Spanish and Portuguese
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==End of OCR for page 129==202-10001-10203
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

Date: 08/04/98
Page : 1

AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY : JCS
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10203
RECORDS SERIES: FOIA SERIES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: DOC 204

DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR : OSD
FROM :
TO:
TITLE: THE CUBA PROJECT
DATE: 01/24/62
PAGES:6
SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE
DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS: 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS: RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/30/98
OPENING CRITERIA
COMMENTS : Reviewed by OSD, CIA and State.

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION
TO DECLASSIFICATION
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF
CIF
DATE: MAR 2016

[R] ITEM IS RESTRICTED

NW 50955 DocId:32424934 Page 1

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248
TA 'A'

SUBJECT: Tasks Assigned to CIA in General Lansdale's Program
Review

A. TASKS

Part V. pp. 5-8, of General Lansdale's program review of
the Cuba Project, dated 18 January 1962, assigns 32 specific tasks
to elements of the U.S. Government. Of these, 16 are assigned
to CIA solely or jointly. The tasks have been reviewed by this
Agency, and it has been determined that substantially all reporting
and planning deadlines can be met. Work on all tasks, with and
without assigned dates for completion, is in progress. The
following detailed observations are keyed to General Lansdale's
paper.

1. Task 1, p.5. The intelligence community is hard at
work on NIE 85-62 and is attempting to meet the deadline of
7 February. As was agreed in a conversation of 23 January 1962
with General Lansdale, a short extension may be necessary..

2. Task 2, p.5. The Opa-Locka Interrogation Center in
Florida will be in operation on 15 February the deadline date.

3. Task 3, p.5 The survey is in progress and will be
completed on the stipulated date On the basis of the information
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED 6/23/98
OSD: NO OBJECTION
25 JUN98

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DISA(DFOISR) TS ICY

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obtained the possibility of establishing additional interrogation
points will be determined.

4. Task 4, p. 5. An operational assessment of the stay-
behind net in Cuba will be completed and reported by the deadline
of 15 February. Because communication with singleton agents is
by SW, not W/T. it is unlikely that assessment can be completed
by the date stipulated; an extension to 28 February may be
necessary, although every effort is being made to complete the work
before that date
An intensive program aimed at the acquisition
CIA
of third country assets through the cooperation of liaison services
is also under way, particularly in Spain, Belgium, France,
Uruguay, and Costa Rica. A progress report on the status of
this program will be made by 15 February, although this Agency
cannot be sure that the cooperation of all intended participants will
have been obtained by that date. CIA has also taken the follow-
ing additional steps in respect to Task 4.

a. A cable has been sent to field stations to give added
impetus to the search for assets and the development of both
unilateral and joint operations. Progress reports have been
required by 1 March.

b. A survey of the Cuban Chinese community and of

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operational access to it is under way. Target date: end of
February.

c. An assessment of more than one hundred persons to
determine their suitability for return to Cuba as agents tin in
the guise of studentis studentsis also being conducted. Target date:
end of February.

5. Task 5, p.5. The 1 February deadline will be met, and
by that date we shall also have begun the search for suitable inter-
mediaries. Analysis to date has not uncovered a top-level official
of the Cuban regime whose personal characteristics indicate he
would accept recruitment or agree to defection now. Although
some targets of opportunity will appear outside Cuba, most planning
will necessarily be based upon an appeal made inside the island by
intermediaries selected from the ranks of journalists, foreign
officials, international businessmen, foreign lawyers, crime
syndicates, international detectives and foreign police officials.
Additionally, plans for the defection of lower-level Cuban officials
abroad have been completed, and the search for targets and access
abroad is under way.
呵

6. Task 6, p. 5. By the assigned date we shall complete
and submit a coordinated plan. We shall also have begun action on

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cover and deception operations by that date.

7. Task 7, p. 5. Byl February CIA will submit an opera-
tional schedule for the initiation of an organized resistance move-
ment inside Cuba. The schedule will include the localities selected
and the assessment of some candidates. A full assessment will
be completed in accordance with the schedule listed in para. 4,
above, in conformance with Task 4. It should be noted, however,
that this operational schedule (like the schedules called for in
Tasks 10, 26, and 30) will necessarily be tentative and subject
to later revision as the number of assets inside Cuba increases
and as the flow of intelligence is augmented. Moreover, the
development of a resistance movement will not remain controllable,
so that operational timetables produced during the next four weeks
can serve only as guides for a proposed sequence of actions.

8. Task 10, p. 5. CIA has on hand both propaganda and
political action assets in the Caribbean area and elsewhere in
Latin America. It is planned to use those assets both to support
the Project inside Cuba and to generate and mobilize public and
official opinion against Castro outside Cuba. The operational
schedule will be submitted on the stated date.

9. Task 18, p. 6.) 6.) Discussions with the appropriate AFL-CIO

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officials have been donducted and a feport of developments will be
submitted by 15 February.

10. Task 21, p. 7. Plans for inducing the failure of crops
will be submitted by 15 February. These plans will envisage both
the use of controlled assets who can be infiltrated and exfiltrated
and the provision of encouragement and guidance to the resistance,
so that it will undertake acts of sabotage, some of which are to
be directed against crops, particularly rice.

11 Task 24, p. 7. This deadline will also be met. Primary
methods of disrupting the supply of Cuban nickel to the USSR could,
if approved, include (1) the sinking of Cuban or Bloc ships by open
attack; (2) the use of "frogman" or UDT tactics in harbors for the
same purpose; (3) the employment of torpedos and mines toward
this end; and (4) the sabotaging of primary or secondary sources
of Cuban nickel, such as the Nicaro and Moa plants. CIA now has no
proven internal assets capable of carrying out any of these actions.
The Agency does have external assets capable of undertaking actions
(2) and (3). It also has an external group capable of undertaking
(4) upon the completion of specialized training All studies,
including a plan for using overt or covert means to prevent re-
institution of the Canadian supply to the USSR, will be submitted
by 15 February. It is suggested that consideration be given to

NW 50955 DocId: 32424934 Page 6

-5-
S-E-C-R-E-T
CIA
EYES ONLY

S-E-C-R-E-T
EYES ONLY
assigning to the economic action group, chaired by the Department
of State, responsibility for overt action designed to deny Canadian
nickel to the USSR.
CHA

12. Task 26, p. 7. Together with Tasks 27 and 28, Task 26
constitutes an outline of a plan for a psychological warfare operation.
These tasks are so closely interrelated that CIA proposes to submit
by 15 February a single plan dealing with all three tasks.

13. Task 27, p.7. See preceding paragraph.

14 Task 28, p. 7. See paragraph 12.

15. Task 30, p. 7. By 15 February CIA will submit an opera-
tional schedule dealing with the sabotage of (1) shipping in Cuban
waters and harbors, (2) Cuban transport facilities, (3) communications
facilities, (4) equipment for the refining of petroleum, (5) facili-
ties for producing and distributing power, (6) industry. (7) food
supplies, (8) key military and police installations and materiel.
The schedule will also include the disruption of military and police
communications and harassment of military and police training and
personnel.

16 Task 31, p. 8. This deadline will be met.

5. ADDITIONAL UNDERTAKINGS
The following comments are keyed to Sections D through K.
Part IV (pp. 3 and 4) of the program review.
-6-
S-S-C-R2-E-T
EYES ONLY
NW 50955 DocId:32424934 Page 7

S-E-C-R-E-T
EYES ONLY

17. Section D, p. 3. Six men, to form the initial nucleus,
have been assessed in depth. Further assessment of candidates
inside and outside Cuba is in progress, and it is expected that ten
of these will be recruited by February.

18. Section E, p. 3 To date fifteen locations have been
selected as suitable centre of resistance because of (1) the presence
there of groups among which there is patent or incipient unrest,
(2) the presence of strategic and tactical targets for use or deacti-
vation, and (3) proximity to potential unconventional warfare areas.
In order of priority, the fifteen centers are Havana, Camaguey,
Santa Clara, Cienfuegos, Matanzas, Cardenas, Sancti Spiritus, the
Escambray Mountains, Holguin, Siantago de Cuba, Ciego de Avila,
Baracoa, Pinar del Rio, Manzanillo, and Colon

19 Section F. p. 3. In support of State's efforts CIA has
conducted propaganda operations, including a number of mass
demonstration in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guaternala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay,
and Venezuela.

20 Section H. p
One TV intrusion operation has been
One
conducted, on 16 January. Plans for an intrusion during the scheduled
parade and demonstration in Havana are being formulated

NW 50955 DocId: 32424934 Page 8

7-
S-E-C-P-E-T
EYES ONLY

S-E-C-R-E-T
EYS ONLY

21. Section K, p. 4 Groups with which CIA has exploitable
access or entree includ wonen, labor, students, teachers,
with labor organizations and members of the Catholic Church will
jurists, and other professional classes. International contacts
also be utilized.

NW 50955 DocId: 32424934 Page 9

-8-
S-E-C-R-E-T
✓ EYES ONLY
202-10002-10124
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Date: 09/14/98
Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: JCS
RECORD NUMBER: 202-10002-10124
RECORDS SERIES: JCS CENTRAL FILES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: OSD
FROM: CYRUS R. VANCE
TO: MULTIPLE RECIPIENTS
TITLE: CUBAN AFFAIRS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DATE: 06/26/65
PAGES: 27
SUBJECTS: ICCCA, ADMINISTRATION
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAMS - CUBA
SECOND LATIN AMERICAN YOUTH CONGRESS
POSSIBLE RETALIATORY ACTIONS BY CUBAN GOVERNMENT

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTIONS: 1A, 1C
CURRENT STATUS: RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 05/15/98
OPENING CRITERIA:
COMMENTS: JCS Central File, Box 3, 4 of 15. Memo from Vance to
SecArm, SecNav, SecAir, CJCS, and ASD(ISA) re: Cuban
Affairs in the Dept. of Defense. ICCCA report on
Possible Retaliatory Actions by the Castro Government.

EXEMPT PER E.O. 13526
SEC 3.3(b) 50x5/8
DATE EXEMPTED: MAR 2016
JS RE-REVIEW DATE: 31DEC 2438
OKAY TO RELEASE AS REDACTED W/CIA CONCURRENCE
[R] ITEM IS RESTRICTED

NW 50955 DocId:32425002 Page 1

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAIG 31 December 1963
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, DA
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

Subject: Psychological Programs Subcommittee Cuba

1. An informal meeting of the Interdepartmental Subcommittee
(Psychological Programs) on Cuban Affairs was convened in
Room 7519, New State at 1430 hours, 30 December 1963. The
agenda for the meeting was not pre-announced. Present from
State were Chairman Bowdler, Sylvester, and Montenegro;
from CIA, Tilton and Holloway, from USIA, Murphy; and the
undersigned.

2. The following topics were discussed:
a. CUTAL (Unified Labor Federation for Latin America)
meeting scheduled for Rio de Janeiro, 24 28 January 1964.
Mr. Montenegro, State labor advisor for Latin America,
described the anticipated meeting as a "founding" assemblage
of left-wing labor leaders, socialists, and communists who
will attempt to resolve their differences. State believes
that there will be a concerted effort by the communists
to wrest the leadership of the fledgling federation from
Mexican socialist elements. Following actions were
discussed:

(1) State to cable US Ambassador to Brazil to
ascertain the degree to which local (not national)
governmental elements will support disruptive and
harassing actions before and during the meeting.

(2) State to circularize Latin American posts
with the suggestion that local influences be brought
to bear in order to discourage country delegates
from attending the meeting.

(3) USIA to consider VOA broadcasts to Latin
America in order to exploit exposes of Cuban,
East German, and Chinese Communist labor conditions.

(4) CIA to continue black propaganda operations
in Brazil which suggest postponement of the meeting.

OSA, ASG Control No.3.00%

NW 50955 DocId: 32425002 Page 2
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL den Wheeler, CIS
Partially
EXEMPTEDATION
BY JOINT STA
EXEMPTION: 6(1)(c) September 21, 1963
DATE: MAY15 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Department of State 9/23/3100 (8 JAN 63) W/JCS 2304/704-1

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban
Affairs: Possible Retaliatory Actions by the Castro
Government (U)
Reference: Memorandum from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Dept of State, subject as above, 13 Sep 63

In response to reference memorandum, outlined below is the
status of existing contingency plans for those priority situations agreed
upon at our meeting of September 12, 1963. The numbering of the para-
graphs below corresponds to the format utilized in the attachment to
reference memorandum and includes those actions for which Department
of Defense specific or related military contingency plans exist.

"A. Actions Against U. S. Targets in Cuba

"4. Harassment of Guantanamo

(a) Cutting off of the water supply"
COMMENT: A minimum of approximately 20 days supply of water is
maintained in reserve storage at the naval base. Provision is made
for the emergency resupply of water by tanker, which would require
a maximum of eighteen days and which would be implemented on order
of CINCLANTFLT. In addition, evacuation of non-essential personnel
in 24 hours or less can be accomplished if directed.

"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers
who commute"

108A, ASC Control No.1/S 0228.

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
COPY CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED CONFIDENTIAL

NW 50955 DocId:32425002 Page 3
DOWNGRADED AT: 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10
OCOFSA 721/684

CONFIDENTIAL 

purpose of substantially reducing the time required for the U. S.
fighter aircraft to reach the scene. Such overflights may be author-
ized only by specifically designated commanders.

"5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the
Caribbean"

COMMENT: With regard to Castro attacks on areas in Latin America,
plans exist for the U. S. military to respond to requests for assistance
by Latin American governments subject to U. S. Governmental approval
There is also an arrangement for the interchange of information between
the U. S. Coast Guard and British naval forces with regard to possible
staging areas which may be used by exiles in the Bahamas.

"E. Actions Against Targets in the US

"1. Sabotage or terroristic bombings"

COMMENT: The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within
the context of the paper is not considered to exceed the capabilities of
law enforcement agencies to control. There are military contingency
plans to protect against this type of activity at a much higher level of
intensity.

"2. Jamming of US radio stations"

COMMENT: There are standing operating procedures to overcome
interference and jamming methods employed against military communi-
cations.

The summaries of actions set forth above are essentially defensive
reactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, of course, existing and related
military plans, retaliatory in nature, which range up to and include a full
scale military invasion of Cuba.

It was generally agreed at the September 13, 1963 meeting of
the Committee that the most likely actions of the Cuban government are
those which would not provoke United States retaliation seriously and
immediately endangering the Castro regime. It appears more likely
that Castro might intensify his support of subversive forces in Latin

NW 50955 DocId: 32425002 Page 4
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT CONCERNING POSSIBLE RETALIATORY
ACTIONS BY THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT

1. The numbering of the subparagraphs below corresponds
to the numbering of those actions for which specific or
related military contingency plans exist. A brief summary
of the action contemplated by those plans is also provided.

"A. Actions Against U.S. Targets in Cuba

"4. Harassment of Guantanamo

"(a) Cutting off of the water supply"
COMMENT A minimum of approximately 20 days supply of
water is maintained in reserve storage at the
naval base. Provision is made for the emergency
resupply of water by tanker, which would require
a maximum of eighteen days and which would
be implemented on order of CINCLANTFLT. Evacuation
of non-essential personnel in 24 hours or less if
directed and consistent with national policy.

"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who
commute"

COMMENT Provision is made for the introduction of a
tailored Naval Construction Battalion unit
containing necessary skills, the requisite labor
force, and the possible stationing of a repair
ship at Guantanamo Bay aboard which are personnel
with appropriate skills. Critical personnel
would be transported by air, to arrive within
48 hours, when ordered by CINCLANTFLT.

"(c) Staging demonstration and riots at the gates"

COMMENT Execution of measures appropriate to the
degree, kind, and exact location of the disturb -
ance, ranging from no.action through such measures
as the use of fire hoses and lachrymating agents
may be ordered by the Commander, U.S. Naval Base,
Guantanamo.

"(d) Sniping at base sentries resulting in injury
or death"

COMMENT Measures may be taken appropriate to the
CONFIDENTIAL
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.
Enclosure
NW 50955 DocId: 32425002 Page 5

CONFIDENTIAL

circumstance and situation ranging from no action,
through action taken in self defense by a wounded
sentry or those assisting him, through increased
defense conditions, placing personnel in positions
protected from fire, and return of fire if appro-
priate and required as determined by the Commander
Naval Base, Guantanamo. The precise nature of
the U.S. response cannot be determined in advance.
A single shot from an unseen sniper resulting in
injury or death to a sentry is one thing, a continued
sniping fusillade from a number of persons is another

"(e) Sabotaging of base facilities".

COMMENT Extensive security measures are taken to
prevent such sabotage by the Commander U.S.
Naval Base, Guantanamo. The nature of the action
taken would depend upon the nature of the
sabotage and be designed to assure the continued
functioning of the Base.

"B. Actions Against U.S. Aircraft and Shipping

"1. Harassment of U.S. Shipping using Yucatan Channel,
Florida Straits, Windward Passage"

COMMENT The rules of engagement, which have been
approved by the highest national authority
provide that ships or aircraft ordered to the
area may take immediate protective measures_
Including pursuit to, but not into, Cuban air
space or territorial waters. Commanders are
not authorized to organize deliberately a
pursuing force. U.S. pilots are not authorized
to attack unless either they or the ship they
are defending is endangered by Cuban attack.
In the event Cuban aircraft limit their action
to harassment, U.S. pilots are limited to making
their presençe known by flying close aboard the
Cuban plane.

"C. Actions Against Cuban Exiles

"1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US
registry.

"2. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding planes over
the high seas or another country's territory.
CONFIDENTIAL

NW 50955 DocId: 32425002 Page 6
2
Enclosure

CONFIDENTIAL

"3. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding boats on the
high seas or another country's territorial waters

"4. Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the
high seas or in another country's territorial waters

COMMENT It is noted that it is contrary to national
policy to permit raids on Cuba originating from
U.S. territory, however, at the time a ship or
aircraft is discovered to be under Cuban attack
it may be difficult to identify it as a "pirate"
"raider", "mother ship" or "exile raider", even
though this, in fact, may be the case. All the
situations, set forth above, are covered, at
least in part, by the rules of engagement which
have been approved by the highest national
authority. However, the action summarized below
is authorized only in the case of U.S. ships and
aircraft and those not clearly identified as
being of foreign registry.

"5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in
the Caribbean

COMMENT With regard to Castro attacks on areas in Latin
America, plans exist for the U.S. military to
respond to requests for assistance by Latin
American governments subject to US governmental
approval. There is also an arrangement for the
CONFIDENTIAL 3 Enclosure
NW 50955 DocId: 32425002 Page 7

CONFIDENTIAL

interchange of information between the U.S.
Coast Guard and British naval forces with
regard to possible staging areas which may be
used by exiles in the Bahamas.

"E. Actions Against Targets in the US

"1. Sabotage or terroristic bombings"

COMMENT The level of intensity of such actions contemplated
within the context of the paper is not considered
to exceed the capabilities of law enforcement
agencies to control. There are military contingency
plans to protect against this type of activity
at a much higher level of intensity.

"2. Jamming of US radio stations"

COMMENT There are standing operating procedures to
overcome interference and jamming methods
employed against military communications.

2. "Any additional pertinent information on existing
or related plans" and "recommendations, if any, on other
likely actions which might be taken by the Castro govern-
ment in retaliation for Cuban exile raids" was also
requested. The furnished list of possible retaliatory
actions by the Castro government were of "the level of
intensity which the committee agreed to be in the most
likely category." It is inferred that what the committee
had in mind by the most likely "level of intensity"
was that level which would not provoke the United States
into taking extensive countermeasures which might seriously
endanger the Castro regime. The summaries of actions,
set forth above, which might be taken under existing
military contingency plans are essentially defensive
reactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, however, existing
and related military plans, retaliatory in nature, which
range up to and include a full scale military invasion of
Cuba.

3. If it is assumed that the most likely actions of the
Cuban government are those which would not provoke United
States retaliation seriously and immediately endangering
the Castro regime, it appears more likely that Castro might
intensify his support of subversive forces in Latin America
CONFIDENTIAL
NW 50955 DocId: 32425002 Page 8
4
Enclosure

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAIG 31 December 1963
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, DA
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

Subject: Psychological Programs Subcommittee Cuba

1. An informal meeting of the Interdepartmental Subcommittee
(Psychological Programs) on Cuban Affairs was convened in
Room 7519, New State at 1430 hours, 30 December 1963. The
agenda for the meeting was not pre-announced. Present from
State were Chairman Bowdler, Sylvester, and Montenegro;
from CIA, Tilton and from USIA, Murphy, and the
undersigned.

2. The following topics were discussed:
a. CUTAL (Unified Labor Federation for Latin America)
meeting scheduled for Rio de Janeiro, 24 28 January 1964.
Mr. Montenegro, State labor advisor for Latin America,
described the anticipated meeting as a "founding" assemblage
of left-wing labor leaders, socialists, and communists who
will attempt to resolve their differences. State believes
that there will be a concerted effort by the communists
to wrest the leadership of the fledgling federation from
Mexican socialist elements. Following actions were
discussed:
(1) State to cable US Ambassador to Brazil to
ascertain the degree to which local (not national)
governmental elements will support disruptive and
harassing actions before and during the meeting.

(2) State to circularize Latin American posts
with the suggestion that local influences be brought
to bear in order to discourage country delegates
from attending the meeting.

(3) USIA to consider VOA broadcasts to Latin
America in order to exploit exposes of Cuban,
East German, and Chinese Communist labor conditions.

(4) CIA to continue black propaganda operations
in which suggest postponement of the meeting.

OSA, ASG Control No.300%
NW 50955 DocId: 32425002 Page 9
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL den Wheeler, CIS
Partially ASFICATION
EXEMPTED FROM DECLA
BY JOINT STAFF
EXEMPTION: 6(1) (c) September 21, 1963
DATE: MAY15 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Department of State
SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban
Affairs: Possible Retaliatory Actions by the Castro
Government (U)
Reference: Memorandum from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Dept of State, subject as above, 13 Sep 63 9/23/3100 (8JAN 63) W/JCS 2304/704-1

In response to reference memorandum, outlined below is the
status of existing contingency plans for those priority situations agreed
upon at our meeting of September 12, 1963. The numbering of the para-
graphs below corresponds to the format utilized in the attachment to
reference memorandum and includes those actions for which Department
of Defense specific or related military contingency plans exist.

"A. Actions Against U. S. Targets in Cuba

"4. Harassment of Guantanamo

"(a) Cutting off of the water supply"
COMMENT:
In addition, evacuation of non-essential personnel
in 24 hours or less can be accomplished if directed.

"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers
who commute"
OSA, ASC Control No.1/S 0228.

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
COPY CASION99-cores CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED CONFIDENTIAL

NW 50955 DocId: 32425002 Page 10
DOWNGRADED AT: 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10
OCOFSA 721/684

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMENT: Provision is made for the introduction of

"(c) Staging demonstration and riots at the gates"
Execution of measures appropriate to the degree, kind,
COMMENT:
and exact location of the disturbance, ranging from no action

"(d) Sniping at base sentries resulting in injury or
death"

COMMENT: Measures may be taken appropriate to the circumstances
and situation ranging from no action, through action taken in self defense
by a wounded sentry or those assisting him,

"(e) Sabotaging of base facilities"

COMMENT: Extensive security measures are taken to prevent such
sabotage by the Commander U. S. Naval Base, Guantanamo. The nature
of the action taken would depend upon the nature of the sabotage and be
designed to assure the continued functioning of the Base.

"B. Actions Against U. S., Aircraft and Shipping

"1. Harassment of U. S. Shipping using Ucatan Channel,
Florida Straits, Windward Passage"

COMMENT: The rules of engagement, which have been approved by
the highest national authority provide that ships or aircraft ordered to
NW 50955 DocId: 32425002 Page 11
2
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

the area may take immediate protective measure

"C. Actions Against Cuban Exiles

"1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US registry.

"2. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding planes over the high
seas or another country's territory.

"3. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding boats on the high seas
or another country's territorial waters.

"4. Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the high seas
or in another country's territorial waters."

COMMENT: It is noted that it is contrary to national policy to permit
raids on Cuba originating from U. S. territory, however, at the time
a Chip or aircraft is discovered to be under Cuban attack it may be diffi-
cult to identify it as a "pirate," "raider," "mother ship" or "exile raider,"
even though this, in fact, may be the case. All the situations, set forth
above, are covered, at least in part, by the rules of engagement which
have been approved by the highest national authority. However, the action
summarized below is authorized only in the case of U. S. ships and air-
craft and those not clearly identified as being of foreign registry.

NW 50955 DocId: 32425002 Page 12
3
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

"5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the
Caribbean"

COMMENT:

"E. Actions Against Targets in the US

"1. Sabotage or terroristic bombings"

COMMENT: The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within
the context of the paper is not considered to exceed the capabilities of
law enforcement agencies to control. There are military contingency
plans to protect against this type of activity at a much higher level of
intensity.

"2. Jamming of US radio stations"

COMMENT: There are standing operating procedures to overcome
interference and jamming methods employed against military communi-
cations.

The summaries of actions set forth above are essentially defensive
reactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, of course, existing and related
military plans, retaliatory in nature, which range up to and include a full
scale military invasion of Cuba.

It was generally agreed at the September 13, 1963 meeting of
the Committee that the most likely actions of the Cuban government are
those which would not provoke United States retaliation seriously and
immediately endangering the Castro regime. It appears more likely
that Castro might intensify his support of subversive forces in Latin

NW 50955 DocId: 32425002 Page 13
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT CONCERNING POSSIBLE RETALIATORY
ACTIONS BY THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT

1. The numbering of the subparagraphs below corresponds
to the numbering of those actions for which specific or
related military contingency plans exist. A brief summary
of the action contemplated by those plans is also provided.

"A. Actions Against U.S. Targets in Cuba

"4. Harassment of Guantanamo

"(a) Cutting off of the water supply"

COMMENT
Evacuation
of non-essential personnel in 24 hours or less if
directed and consistent with national policy.

"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who
commute"

COMMENT Provision is made for the introduction of

"(c) Staging demonstration and riots at the gates"

COMMENT Execution of measures appropriate to the
degree, kind, and exact location of the disturb-
ance, ranging from no action

"(d) Sniping at base sentries resulting in injury
or death"

COMMENT Measures may be taken appropriate to the
CONFIDENTIAL
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.
Enclosure
NW 50955 DocId: 32425002 Page 14

CONFIDENTIAL

circumstance and situation ranging from no action,
through action taken in self defense by a wounded
sentry or those assisting him,

"(e) Sabotaging of base facilities.

COMMENT Extensive security measures are taken to
prevent such sabotage by the Commander U.S.
Naval Base, Guantanamo. The nature of the action
taken would depend upon the nature of the
sabotage and be designed to assure the continued
functioning of the Base.

"B. Actions Against U.S. Aircraft and Shipping

"1. Harassment of U.S. Shipping using Yucatan Channel,
Florida Straits, Windward Passage"

COMMENT The rules of engagement, which have been
approved by the highest national authority
provide that ships or aircraft ordered to the
area may take immediate protective measures,

"C. Actions Against Cuban Exiles

"1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US
registry.

"2. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding planes over
the high seas or another country's territory.
NW 50955 DocId: 32425002 Page 15
CONFIDENTIAL
2
Enclosure

CONFIDENTIAL

"3. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding boats on the
high seas or another country's territorial waters

"4. Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the
high seas or in another country's territorial waters

COMMENT It is noted that it is contrary to national
policy to permit raids on Cuba originating from
U.S. territory, however, at the time a ship or
aircraft is discovered to be under Cuban attack
it may be difficult to identify it as a "pirate"
"raider", "mother ship" or "exile raider", even
though this, in fact, may be the case. All the
situations, set forth above, are covered, at
least in part, by the rules of engagement which
have been approved by the highest national
authority. However, the action summarized below
is authorized only in the case of U.S. ships and
aircraft and those not clearly identified as
being of foreign registry.

"5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in
the Caribbean

COMMENT

CONFIDENTIAL
NW 50955 DocId: 32425002 Page 16
3
Enclosure

CONFIDENTIAL

"E. Actions Against Targets in the US

"1. Sabotage or terroristic bombings"

COMMENT The level of intensity of such actions contemplated
within the context of the paper is not considered
to exceed the capabilities of law enforcement
agencies to control. There are military contingency
plans to protect against this type of activity
at a much higher level of intensity.

"2. Jamming of US radio stations"

COMMENT There are standing operating procedures to
overcome interference and jamming methods
employed against military communications.

2. "Any additional pertinent information on existing
or related plans" and "recommendations, if any, on other
likely actions which might be taken by the Castro govern-
ment in retaliation for Cuban exile raids" was also
requested. The furnished list of possible retaliatory
actions by the Castro government were of "the level of
intensity which the committee agreed to be in the most
likely category." It is inferred that what the committee
had in mind by the most likely "level of intensity"
was that level which would not provoke the United States
into taking extensive countermeasures which might seriously
endanger the Castro regime. The summaries of actions,
set forth above, which might be taken under existing
military contingency plans are essentially defensive
reactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, however, existing
and related military plans, retaliatory in nature, which
range up to and include a full scale military invasion of
Cuba.

3. If it is assumed that the most likely actions of the
Cuban government are those which would not provoke United
States retaliation seriously and immediately endangering
the Castro regime, it appears more likely that Castro might
intensify his support of subversive forces in Latin America

NW 50955 DocId: 32425002 Page 17
CONFIDENTIAL
4
Enclosure

TOP SECRET CONFIDENTIAL

than risk direct confrontation with the United States. In
the long run, such action is more dangerous and difficult
to combat, and in the short run is less likely to provoke
immediate and effective United States retaliation. Such
actions would be in keeping with Castro's repeated declara-
tions that Cuba is the main source of guidance inspiration
for the "inevitable" Latin American revolution. Whereas an
inflamed American public opinion over the killing of even a
few sentries might require strong countermeasures, the
training of a greater number of Latin American guerrillas
than the 1500 or more trained in fiscal year 1962, probably
would not. Nor is it likely that the return of those trainees
to Latin American countries, their establishment of guerrilla
training bases, recruitment of additional personnel, and
engagement in insurgency actions would be as immediately
