
3. The President again raised the question of what we were
going to do in Cuba. Bundy advised that a policy meeting was scheduled
for Monday, time not set, to discuss Cuban policy. I pointed out to
the President the statements of President Kennedy on September 5th,
September 13th, and November 20th, 1962 and then I showed the evidence
that proved absolutely that arms had been imported into Venezuela from
Cuba. I stated that most positive efforts should be made immediately
to secure complete OAS agreement on a course of action which would
involve a series of steps ranging from economic denial through blockade
and even to possible invasion, but that it must be OAS action, otherwise
it would involve confrontation with Khrushchev. I stated that if the
action was a Hemispheric action I didn't see that the USSR could do
much about it. The President agreed but decided to await the policy
meeting on Monday.

NOTE: DD/P and WH should prepare full recommendations
for positive actions which might be taken unilaterally with
the Caribbean states or with the OAS. for my use in the
policy meeting.

Утс
14-00000

4. I reviewed the report from Mexico City station, 27 November,
advising the number of Soviets in Cuba, indicating that this report which
we thought was quite responsible more or less verified our own current
estimates.

5. Reference the Oswald matter, reviewed with the President
CAS Mexico City 7127 reporting on the interrogation of Alvarado. We
briefly discussed the composition of the Review Board announced by
the President on the 29th. Discussion of the Oswald situation was
inconclusive and no action required.

6. The President then brought up the question of Pakistan
and I reviewed briefly the intelligence community's feeling of concern
and their view that our Pakistan relationship was of the greatest
importance. Bundy mentioned the forthcoming December meeting
between Ayub and General Taylor. The President made no comment
but seemed to feel that Taylor should remain in the United States
because of serious Defense budget problems. Bundy reviewed the
great number of commitments we have made to Pakistan and that we
would come to their defense if India should use our arms to attack
Pakistan. The President expressed the greatest of confidence in
Ayub and a feeling that we had not been forceful enough with him, had
not given him a feeling of confidence in our motives and that he had
drifted into the thought that we would abandon him in favor of India.
He stated that he wished this corrected in a most positive manner.

7. I reviewed our Cuban overflight program advising the
President of the USIB criteria and the extent to which flights were
being carried on.

8. Reviewed briefly the TACKLE China overflight and stated
these had been stood down since the loss of the last plane but we intended
to resume which the President thought was proper.

ACTION: I wish flight plans to meet COMOR priority in
targets for at least two flights for submission to the
Special Group next Thursday.

9. I advised the President that the ChiCom-India border flights
had been completed and that we now planned to brief the Indians, Thailand
and very possibly Pakistan. I stated the equipment had been withdrawn
from Takhli.

2
3/mc
14-00000

10. [I advised the President that the CORONA mission was up
and would be brought down on Monday. Also suggested that at an
early opportunity I brief him on the CORONA program.

11. Reviewed the Venezuela overflight plan as outlined in
memorandum for the Special Group and President approved.

NOTE: I have communicated this approval to General
Carter and instructed him to proceed.

JAM:mcm

(tape)

3-

Утс
14-00000

29 November 1963

Late developments on the Mexico City investigation of
Oswald's activities

1. Results of the first interrogation of Silvia Duran have been received.
Reveals nothing other than confirmation of Oswald's effort to secure
authority to enter USSR via Havana. His requests were refused.

2. Result of second interrogation of Silvia Duran has not as yet been
received.

3. FBI dispatched a man from Washington to Mexico City at the request
of Ambassador Mann.

4. The Nicaraguan, Alvarado, has been turned over to the Mexican
authorities for questioning, by the CIA station at the specific request
of the FBI.

NOTE: CIA Headquarters refused this turn-over until
FBI request received because FBlis in control of the
investigation.

5.Alvarado's story becoming increasingly questionable because of a
public statement carried by Mexico City radio and press prior to
Alvarado's entering the picture, to the effect that Oswald had
received $5,000 from the Cuban Embassy.

To be used by DCI in meeting with the President at 10:30 on 29 November 1963
with Secty. McNamara and Bundy.
14-00000

Σ
29 November 1963

Naud by DDCD
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Meeting at his residence with President Johnson
10:00 a. m. Thursday November 28th.
for approximately 30 minutes

1. The President reviewed the Checklist and made the following
comments:

a. Are we doing all possible to keep Venezuelan
authorities informed? I reviewed briefly our penetrations
and our activities

b. What is the real future in South Vietnam? The
President expressed the desire for an objective appraisal
and any recommendations that I might have for modification
of policy, changes of personnel and draw up a rough estimate
of what is the outlook. The President continues to be
concerned over public reaction and Congressional reaction
against our activities in South Vietnam. The President is
obviously opposed to Lodge (his opposition goes back to
conflicts in the Senate). He asked for recommendations as
to who would be a good man and who could run the American
team.

He noted Item b. in the Check list and I pointed out
the press exaggeration and distortion which appeared in the
New York Times. He asked that I personally meet with the
head of the Times in New York, pointing out how such distorted
reports seriously damage the American interests. I stated
that I would do this.

We discussed Item 2.f. having to do with the high level of
communications traffic and I stated that this could be considered as an
unfavorable indicator.

The President noted without comment report on Israel, USSR,
India military aid and Burma

c. The President asked what the outlook was with Greece. I told
him that we expected that Karamanlis would eventually be restored to
power. The President stated that he had vigorously opposed our
notes in
17
3/mc
14-00000

withdrawal of assistance to Karamanlis, which he felt had a great deal
to do with his loss of office.

d. I pointed out to the President that we could expect some
trouble in Brazil.

e. The President asked about the future of Prime Minister Inonu
of Turkey. I stated that we expected that his government would fall
and that he would lose office soon after his return.

f. I repeated to the President briefly my meeting with President
Macapagal which is covered in a separate memorandum prepared by
Mr. Colby.

g. Also I raised the question of the importance of our taking
iniative in the Indonesia matter by working with Macapagal. We might bring
Indonesia round and also straighten out the Malayasia problem.

2. The President then turned to Cuba. He asked how effective our
policy was and what was the future of Cuba. He asked how effective the
economic denial program was and how we planned to dispose of Castro.
He said he did not wish any repetition of any fiasco of 1961, but he felt that
the Cuban situation was one that we could not live with and we had to
evolve more aggressive policies. He looks to us for firm recommendations.
In this connection we should prepare a briefing and also we should study
carefully various courses of action.

3. The President then raised the question of the deal between the
Rumanian government and the Ferguson company for the procurement
of a steel mill and asked whether I thought this was a good thing. I
replied affirmatively, stating that in my opinion economic relations with
the satellites would tend to break down the closemess of ties between
the satellites in Moscow and this should be a very definite policy
effort on our part. I noted that Moscow had discouraged the Rumanian
steel mill because it did not fit into their pattern of economic integration
of the satellites and the Soviet Union. The President then stated that he
agreed that we should attempt to pull the satellites away. He then brought
up the question of Tito and asked if I could give him the name of the best
man who could serve as Ambassador to Yugoslavia who would be able to
"win the girl away from Khrushchev." He said that in his opinion this man
should be an experienced, able man, perhaps in his 50's and preferably a
Republican, who could carry the confidence of the Republicans and a
personality who could win Tito's confidence and allegiance. I responded by
stating that I would prepare a list of competent people who I felt could

- 2
14-00000

serve in this capacity and also in others. In this connection, the
President stated that he was not satisfied with the Ambassador-elect
to Yugoslavia and had therefore held up the appointment. His request
for help and the suggestion of names in connection with Yugoslavia and
the satellites is along the same line as to who would be a good
representative in South Vietnam.

4. The President asked concerning our relationships on the Hill.
I said that they were excellent. The only problem was a continual
harangue for a Joint Committee on Intelligence. I said that I felt that if
Senator Russell would expand his Committee to include Fulbright and
Hickenlooper, and Vinson expand his Committee to include two members
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, that the issue would be put to
rest. The President said he thought this was a good idea and that he would
speak to both Fulbright and Russell about it.

5. I then reviewed the brochure on the OXCART by giving the
President a broad picture of this development. I explained that surfacing
of it was a problem which had been under consideration by Defense and
CIA which I had discussed with President Kennedy. I said that McNamara
was pressing for a rather early release but that President Kennedy
felt that the timing of the surfacing was of very great importance. I said
that I felt that the timing was even of greater importance now and I had
some reservations about surfacing this vehicle in the first few days of
President Johnson's administration. The President seemed to agree and
suggested that McNamara, Rusk, Bundy and I meet with him on Friday for
a discussion of this problem.

No arrangements were made as to the time of Friday morning's
briefing.

JAM/mfb (tape)

- 3-

г/тс
14-00000

26 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Meeting with The President 25 November and 26 November

1. On Monday, November 25th, there was no briefing of the President,
although there was a short visit with him at the State reception on Monday
evening. The President then expressed regret that events of the day
prevented a briefing and asked if there was any development requiring his
attention. I replied there was none and would call him if any developments
came to my attention.

2. On Tuesday, the 26th, I briefed the President, reviewing all
items on the Check List and the world reaction summary contained in the
Bulletin. Briefing and discussion on other matters consumed about
15 or 20 minutes.

3. The President asked if our entire applicable resources had been
made available to the FBI in connection with their report, which he had
ordered. I replied affirmatively.

NOTE: I should call J. Edgar Hoover concerning this.
(DCI did this at 11:20 on 11/26/63)

4. The President asked my appraisal of the situation in Vietnam.
I replied that I was less optimistic than was the report received from
Ambassador Lodge.

5. Mr. Bundy stated the first order of business was to assist
State and assign a Deputy Chief of Mission capable of running the Country
Team and the American official community. Bundy recommended
Mr. Sullivan, Harriman's deputy. The President plans to have a man in
position not later than January first.

6. McCone stated that there remained a number of individuals in
Saigon who continued to be troublemakers and should be removed.
Bundy confirmed this and stated actions were to be taken. No names
were mentioned.

NOTE: Apparently the President's appointment
secretary will be a Mr. Moyrs. We
104-10306-10020
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

eneral Carter:
H05
1
Here
your
I have taken
51:
message..
written
ac hous,
Welder

13-00000
URGENT
SECRET
30 October 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Marshall S. Carter

At the Executive Committee meeting this morning, the President
directed as follows:

1. CIA do everything possible to insure no refugee or
emigre provocative actions against Cuba are undertaken with or
without our knowledge during the next several days. The Miami
station and the MONGOOSE Task Force should be alerted to exercize
every precaution to see that no unauthorized attempts are made.
This should be done without discussion or disclosure to the refugee groups.

2. CIA should attempt to estop Alpha 66 actions during the
next several days. The President was informed by DCI we have no
contact with or control over Alpha 66. DCI was instructed to attempt
through every resource available to influence Alpha 66 to stand down
operations during the next several days.

3. The activities of Operation MONGOOSE are to be stopped
during the next several days and therefore all prior approvals for
sabotage, infiltrations, guerrilla activities, caching of arms are to be
temporarily suspended. The direction of Operation MONGOOSE will be
reconsidered after current negotiations are completed.
NOTE: After the meeting McCone, Bundy and the AG
discussed the approved plan of sabotaging Cuban ships
or shipping (Item 2-B of Lansdale's memorandum of 10/26)
and it was the opinion of Bundy, DCI and the AG that these
operations should be suspended for the next several days.
NOTE: General Lansdale was informed by DCI by grey
phone of 1, 2 and 3 above - 10/30 at 11:00 A.M.

4. The President requested that all the principals who are
attending Executive Committee meetings and those in the Departments
who were in intimate contact with the Committee's procedures and
decisions not contact anyone of the Press for the next several days.
Press contacts are to be made by Salinger and Sylvester and a
representative of State. Any necessary Press contacts by CIA, and
these must be kept at a very minimum, perhaps should be made by Col. Grogan.
(This was not mentioned in the Executive Committee meeting.)
SECRET

13-00000

SECRET

The above has been communicated to you by telephone. This
memorandum serves to confirm decisions which require implementa-
tion by you.

isl
JOHN A. MECONE
Director

JAM/mfb
Orig & 3cc to addressee
Icc - DCI chrono
(lec- DCI #5 file
-2-

13-00000

SECRET-EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter, DDCI
November 14, 1962

Attached is a copy of a memorandum for my file outlining
policy decision in connection with the Cuban prisoner transaction.
In your absence this memorandum was discussed with Messrs.
Helms, Houston, Miskovsky and McManus, and upon receiving
final approval from higher authority at 1:45, Mr. Houston was
instructed by me to initiate appropriate actions.

It is exceedingly important that great care be exercised
to minimize the publicity and to emphasize humanitarian interest
on the part of the United States Government in securing the release
of the prisoners. Both the President and the Attorney General are
anxious that the explanations given the Cuban Families Committee
be handled with great care. I agree with this and urge that extreme
caution be taken to avoid attribution or CIA implication in this matter.

SIGNED:
John A. McCone
Director

Attachment
JAM:at
1 cc DCI Chrono
-
cc-DCI Memoranda
1 cc - Memo for the Record.......

A
SEDALT-EYES ONLY

13-00000
PLES COOLY
14 November 1962

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CONCERNING THE NEGOTIATION FOR THE RELEASE OF THE CUBAN
PRISONERS.

The meeting took place at the residence of the Attorney
General at 10:30 a. m., on Thursday, November 14, at the DCI's
request.

McCone explained that he had had dinner the evening before
with Mr. Edward Foley (former Under Secretary of the Treasury,
legal representative and a Director of the Drug Industry Association).

Mr. Foley had questioned DCI concerning the negotiations
for release of Cuban prisoners in exchange for some 50 million
dollars in drugs, and stated that Mr. Donovan had been in touch with
members of the industry (presumably Pfizer and Merck) in the past
few days, that indications were that the transaction was to be worked
out promptly, and the subject would undoubtedly be discussed at
length at the Industry's Board of Trustees meeting in New York on
November 16th.

Mr. Foley stated that the Industry had no clear understanding
of the Government's position, most particularly in view of Cuban
developments of the last three weeks.

After explaining to Foley the background of the transaction
I told him that Mr. Donovan had been told to do absolutely nothing
in this matter and expressed great surprise that the subject was a
topic of current discussion among members of the Industry.

In the meeting with the Attorney General I expressed grave
concern over the situation, pointing out that CIA hao 20 million
dollars on covert deposit in the Bank of Canada and that two Letters
of Credit had been issued by the Bank, one in the amount of 10 million
dollars to Pfizer, and one for even million dollars to Merck. As
long as this money was on deposit and the letters outstanding, there
was a danger of publicity emanating from either Donovan or the drug
industry, or both. Despite the fact that no official government
3/mc

13-00000
SECRET-EYES ONLY
connection had ever been admitted, publicity would implicate the
Administration and CIA in the negotiation because of recent press
stories (most particularly the Herald Tribune articles) identifying
Administration and CIA activities and citing the exact amount of
17 million dollars as representing the Government cost of the drugs.
I pointed out that certain elements of competition between the members
of the drug industry made it almost a certainty that "leaks" would
come from industry sources as long as the letter of credit were
outstanding, regardless of Mr. Donovan's denials.

Furthermore, consummation of the transaction seemed
totally unrealistic in view of current difficulties with Castro and if
an article appeared indicating we were still pursuing this transaction,
the American public and a great many others would be confused and
disenchanted.

For the above reasons, and feeling that damaging publicity
undoubtedly would appear, I strongly recommended that we arrange
for the bank to withdraw the Letters of Credit, and for the withdrawal
of a substantial part of the money from the Bank of Canada Also
advise Mr. Donovan that the pursuit of this effort must await a better
climate although our interest remained constant. I urged that
action be commenced today.

The Attorney General, after some discussion involving an
exploration of possible alternatives, agreed with the course of
action.

We agreed that we should carefully explain to the Families
Committee and possibly to Miro Cardona that we were in no way
abandoning our intention to secure the release of the prisoners but
were forced because of circumstances beyond our control to set the
negotiation aside pending further developments on other important
problems involving our Cuban relationship.

McCone discussed the above with Mr. Bundy who personally
approved the action and, in turn, received approval from higher
authority. The latter was communicated to the DCI by telephone
at 1:45 p. m.

Copy to General Carter w/
covering memo
JOHN A. McCONE
Director
SECRET-EYES ONLY
Утс

13-00000
TOP SECRET
November 6, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Cline, DD (I)
SUBJECT: Castro as a Threat to the Americas.

I think that in analyzing Castro's potential in the Western
Hemisphere as covered by paragraphs 9 through and including 21,
we should consider his posture and potential under various alternatives
of possible United States decisions and probable Soviet policies.

Let us assume for the moment that the United States meets
the exact letter of the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange and no more.
This would mean the withdrawal of IL 28s, the halting of the establish-
ment of a submarine base, and some acceptable form of inspection
verifying the removal and assuring against the reintroduction of
offensive devices, U.S. commits not to invade. At this point U.S.
commitment on propaganda, sabotage, guerrilla activities and other
actions designed to overthrow Castro is not very clear, but I think
that we can assume that such activities if attempted would be no
more successful in the future than they have been in the past, which is
about zero.
TOP SE

13-00000
TOP SECRET
Having reached this point, the Soviets have at least three
alternatives:

One, they can abandon Castro, reduce military and economic
aid, cut their losses, and in such event Castro would soon collapse.
Current intelligence does not support such a probable Soviet course
of action, otherwise they would not be disposed to leave such quantities
of extremely valuable modern military hardware, including the SAM
sites, communications equipment, and extensive Naval and ground
equipment and a large number of technicians.

Second, they could maintain about the same level of economic
and military support as in the past, although I would feel this could not
be a very reasonable assumption from the standpoint of military support
as the presence of large amounts of additional military equipment, in-
cluding those mentioned above, would necessitate a higher level of
military support than before in order to provide operational readiness,
training, maintenance, spare parts, replacements, etc. This does not
mean more economic supportalthough I think Castro could insist upon
it on the grounds that Soviet equipment is a burden to him and of course
Dorticos alluded to this in statements in New York.
- 2 -
TOP SECRET

13-00000
TOP SECRET
Third, the Soviets having accomplished one of their objectives,
that of securing a U.S. guarantee against invasion, will increase their
military and economic aid so that all military materiel will be work-
able at all times and the Castro economy will be reasonably well off.

Under each of these alternatives, Castro's posture and his
effect on the United States and other Western Hemisphere countries
will differ vastly and I would suggest that your paper be oriented so
that it will project for the benefit of policy makers the consequences,
favorable or unfavorable, under these several alternatives.

It is my personal opinion that Mikoyan will return to New York
in a few days and will announce an agreement for some perfunctory
Red Cross ground inspection of the missile sites and nothing else,
will deny any intention of a submarine base, will dismiss the IL 28
issue as wholly beyond the Khrushchev-Kennedy agreement, will
indicate that all Soviets are leaving Cuba except economic and
agricultural advisers, and will state most persuasively that the
Khrushchev-Kennedy agreement has been fulfilled to the letter and
demand our non-invasion commitment.

He will then build Castro up and indicate Soviet intention for
supporting in every way and to go right down the line with him.
- 3
TOP SECRET

13-00000
Castro will feel secure, his political and military structure will be
manageable, and Cuba will be used by Castro and the Soviets more
aggressively in the future than it has in the past in disturbing
Western Hemisphere countries.

This is the situation I fear, and I think our policy makers
whose negotiations are trending toward the establishment of a set
of conditions and commitments which will make the third case
mentioned above a probability, should have the benefit of our
thinking as to the consequences. In doing this, equal attention
should be given to the first two alternatives.

In further reference to the paper, the historical background
is excellent, the country by country annex useful, although if time
permitted we might get the chiefs of station to give the current view
of their contacts as Win Scott did. The inventory of equipment is
useful but I propose that it be broken down into three columns, a
pre-July 1st, 1962, added since July 1962, and the total as of now.
-4-
John A. McCone

13-00000
26 September 1963
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: CIA activities in South Viet Nam

1. Prior to January 1962 the CIA maintained a modest station
in South Viet Nam, the purpose of which was to support the Ambassador
and Headquarters with reports on the internal situation in South Viet
Nam, the activities of the Viet Cong and the Communists and their
threat to the government, and to assist the government in its internal
security problems. Among other things we trained and equipped
Special Forces whose mission was to conduct a variety of unconventional
activities such as the infiltration of V.C. centers, interdiction of
supply routes, interfering with V.C. communications, sabotaging
V.C. efforts, harrassment, etc.

The CIA station created about a dozen training centers
throughout South Viet Nam in which selected nearby villagers would
be trained in community defense and civic action. It issued arms and
thus provided the actual defense of the strategic hamlets created
in the areas. These activities were carried on with the support of
the U.S. Special Forces. As the activities expanded, a determination
was made to shift prime responsibility to the military, with CIA
in support, and the switch has been accomplished successfully.
About 75,000 South Viet Namese have been trained.

13-00000
SECRET
CIA created a South Viet Namese intelligence organisation,
established a civilian intelligence system and trained the personnel.
In addition the Agency assisted in the development of intelligence
apparatus within the SVN military.
In addition a variety of activities were supported designed to
assist the basic objective of winning the war.
Without exception all CIA programs in South Viet Nam were
coordinated with the Ambassador and also in Washington. CIA took
no unilateral actions nor involved itself in designing policy. CIA has
been represented at all policy meetings in Washington, including NSC
and Executive Committee meetings and all of the McNamara-Pearl
Harbor meetings held to review progress. The activities of the
station were examined by all inspection teams such as General
Wheeler's mission, General Krulak's several missions,
Mr. Forrestal's missions, etc. At no time prior to recent surge
of critical publicity have CIA's activities in Saigon been reported
other than cooperative and an integral part of an accepted and agreed
policy.
2. CIA Reporting.
In June 1962 I traveled extensively in South Viet Nam.
I reported upon my return that repressive measures of the Diem/Nhu
regime were causing considerable criticism and that there was
-2-

13-00000
SEGRET
danger of a coup. This situation was watched carefully by our CIA
station and at frequent intervals we reported that the image of the
regime was tarnishing and hence its effectiveness was questionable.
A number of estimates and a great number of reports and appraisals
were issued, each one warning that the deterioration of the regime's
popularity gave rise to serious question concerning the future trend
of the war and CIA warned that unless corrective measures were
taken by the regime to improve its image, it was quite possible
the war would be lost or that a popular uprising would cause the
removal of the regime. For 18 months at frequent intervals rumors
of coups were received by our station and were reported to the
Ambassador and to Washington. Throughout this period our Chief
of Station at the direction of the Ambassador met once every two
weeks with Ngo Dinh Nhu, explored all problems relating to the
situations in which we had a common interest, and reported to the
Ambassador. Contacts were also maintained with many groups in
South Viet Nam, with military leaders and with knowledgeable
citizens.
A review of the reporting over 18 months and resulting
estimates bear out that the Agency consistently warned of the
deteriorating situation and the possible consequences.
-3-

13-00000
During this period we also analyzed the progress of the
war and the thrust of our reporting was to the effect that as the
American advisers were able to exercise their influence on the
South Viet Namese military, and our Embassy and General Harkins
were able to persuade Diem to reorient and redeploy his forces,
gradual but consistent favorable progress was made.

3. Attitude of the Station and Others
In any difficult situation involving guerrilla warfare where
progress can not be measured in territory won or lost, and in
casualties and prisoners, differences of opinion among observera
arise. Likewise Americans required to work with a stubborn
and authoritarian regime often become exasperated by the
difficulties involved. Furthermore Americamaccustomed to our
civil liberties, freedoms, and the rights of the individual are
shocked by the conduct of a government which deprives the individual
of these privileges. Finally an American community living among
natives, many of whom are visiously critical of the government (and
this is the case in Saigon and Hue), are bound to be influenced
by, and to a degree espouse, these criticisms.

For these reasons there have been serious differences within
the American community.
-4-

13-00000
SECRET
Within the CIA station there are differences of opinion.
Some feel the cause is hopeless with the Diem regime in power.
Others feel it best to go along with the regime until a better one
appears. The reporting has been, however, consistent and has
coincided with the views of Ambassador Nolting.
Within AID and USIA there have been strong differences
of opinion and the same is true of the Embassy staff. On the
other hand, the military which is devoted to the single task of
defeating the Viet Cong, had turned its back on political problems
and concentrated on military problems and have been steadfast
in refusing to be deterred by internal political issues.

Many people have become highly emotional, have talked
too much and have given the impression of very deep splits.
-5-
al Reston firchen - 9/26/63
orig-med by ses s
2 cc-
W.

13-02000
SECRET
Situation in the last several weeks.
The Hue incident on May 8th was a serious setback for the
Diem Government. The agreement with the Buddhists on June 16th was
designed to improve the situation. The agreement was never carried
out. Increasing agitation by the Buddhists culminated in the raids on the
pagodas on August 21. This was carried out apparently at the direction
of Nhu by the Special Forces, some of whom are in the Saigon - Hue
area and by the military. In this connection it is to be noted that neither
MACV nor CIA maintained absolute control over the deployment of the
Special Forces and it is to be noted that substantial units of them were
deployed to the north and engaged in their regular assignments.

The action on August 21 broke the camel's back as far as those
in the United States Government who felt that the cause would be lost if
the Diem regime remained. Therefore, a cable was sent to the Ambassador
instructing him to insist on effective reforms including reducing the influence
and authority of the Nhus and if this could not be accomplished by persuasion
to take such action as would accomplish this objective even though it meant
removing the regime.

The fault in this instruction was that there existed at the time no
firm estimate as to the possibility of successfully reforming the regime
and no plan for a successor regime.
At this point CIA was asked by the Ambassador and General
Harkins to query certain military leaders and to determine whether the
SEORET
- 6
-

13-00000
STOLET
resentment had created a body of opinion among the military, the Security
Forces and the public that would carry off a coup and establish a new
government. CIA reported this condition did not exist. During the week of
August 26 and without taking a position as to whether the regime should or
should not be removed, the Agency urged care and deliberation. It pointed
out that to act precipitously and without assurance of success a civil war
would inevitably result, the war against the Viet Cong would be lost and
the Communists would take over.

This position was highly exasperating to those who wished to
move precipitously. It is for this reason that the advocates of action to
move precipitously without coordination and without intelligence support
are now carrying on a campaign against the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Station.
eu pazi 5

13-0000
#5 file
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter
2 September 1964

You will note from the very brief memorandum of my
discussion with Secretary Rusk that he made two requests
the first, a study of the reasons for lack of action of the
Communists in Southeast Asia. This is a matter I discussed
at this morning's meeting and I hope that we can have an OCI
memorandum on my return.

The second question was concerning clandestine channels
to Castro, the Chinese Communists and Hanoi. This should be
given serious thought by DDP. Each situation differs. I am sure
we could, if we desired, open up a channel to Castro. The
Peiping and Hanoi situations are more difficult. In one respect
there is a channel open to Peiping through Warsaw, but it is not
effective. Perhaps the Taipei Station would have some thoughts
on this. Also, there is a channel to Hanoi through the (Canadian)
representative on the ICC; however this obviously is an "official"
channel and is not very productive. I think it would be well to
go over this matter with Dick Helms when he returns.

Secretary Rusk expects comments on both these points
next week.

JOHN A. MCCONE
Director
Attached:
Copy of MR on Discussion with Secretary Rusk
104-10306-10025
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1998

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New Years Eve Garty art the ff.
365	Thursday, December 31, 1959	0

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9:00 w, Benesch	1:15
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9:30 Staff mty.	1:45
9:45	2:00
10:00	2:15 Visit Bldy Site
10:15	2:30 Col. It hite Gates
10:30	2:45 Mr. E armann Blogt
10:45	3:00
11:00 mts - Ar. Kistiakowski3:15 3
11:15 275508 office 8:30 aldus Chapin) (J07)
11:30	3:45 John Hart 3
11:45	4:00 yalo Thondup DDP
12:00	4:15 Mr. Hart
12:15 Alik Club Mity re	4:30
12:30 Leer Alike
12:45 5:00 John Cace & kdm Kelly
7.3. Min.. Casey 27236
8-
Ainner wid. & Mrs Casey- auct. Beltic 2723
The Kinkaids, The Reales, Ihayne Jackson...

It ill asf, 303 The Binod Friday, October 30, 1959, 62
The ferry Breente. The fuck drive, Longwonth,
Bush,

зк

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11:00 to afternoon of 10/20 3:15
11:15	3:30 Return to thach, AC
11:30	3:45
11:45	4:00
12:00	4:15
12:15	4:30 U JIB. Briefing
12:30	4:45
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8- Hinned at the Bracy Barnce home Inf.
3410 Volta Pl
292	Monday, October 19, 1959	73

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10:45	3:00 Mrs Foster
11:00	3:15 Aulles
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11:45	4:00 Av. Kafka
12:00 Len. Hayden	4:15
12:15 133 403	4:30
12:30 Mr. Sheldon	4:45 Cocktails-
12:45 et af 5:00 Mrs. Ackerman
7:30
7/11: Kinner w/Sen. & Mrs. Buch. (Mr. L. only)
mal
1112:6- Supper w/ Ma. to leanor formal
Baltimore - Mrs. Hulle
192	Sat., July 11, 1959 173 193	Sun., July 12, 1959 172
Brush

Уж

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8:45	1:00 Lunch - An. Herbert Yok
9:00	1:15
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9:30 toff it. 1:45
9:45	2:00 Ben Shuste, Thornet
10:00	2:15 Meek re Dewark"
10:15 Gates Hoyd	2:309 and, Timm,
Fenimore, Harper
10:30 3	2:45 Les Cherne It Homeg
10:45 Robert Reynolds), Cuban 8:00 Air Patrick. I can
11:00	3:15 Briance, Cabell, Bissell
11:15	3:30 Sheldon, Scoville, Paul
11:30 κα	3:45 Barnes, Crams, Kent
11:45 Kenneth Miller,	4:00 Men. Balmer ADDCI
12:00 Award Presentatione 4:155
12:15	4:30 Hovernor Harriman
12:30) Justin O'Donnell	4:45
12:45	5:00

6:30-8:30 Reception - Emb of bunisia 5131 Broad Branched
8 Linnen w/ Mrs. I owlew for Lawrence Lowmant
2903 N. Blk the

79	Friday, March 20, 1959	286
Утс
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shin
10:00 Mr. Bregeson Jolt	2:15 2310-4:00
10:15	2:30 Manpower Discussion
Hart
10:30 ひる18 mtg.	2:45 I&& Deputies
10:45	3:00
11:00	3:15
11:15	3:30 Movie (Braining
11:30	3:45 Angg, Awards thog.
11:45	4:00 Moheentral
12:00	4:00 Ml. Brundage
12:15	4:15
12:30	4:30 NSC Briefing
12:45	4:45
5:00 5:15 OCB Briefing

Dinner at home for the Walter Robertsons
If broye, Sent Mrs Buch,
14 Guests (The Me Me & & broye
174	Tuesday, June 23, 1959
The Lom Gates, The Brocios())。
191
Sen is. Bush

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Reviewed by BOX 10
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5/4/98
Folder 145

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10:00✓ DD/PDDI, ODS Tharner.
Briefing GIA Aranyd
10:15 3140 Servicedfortcom
10:30 Usik mty. (DDCI) 2:15 und 182-26
10:45 3:00 Amb. Aufler (Ce
3:15
(Ceylon)
(Anthum Pacober)
3:30 fl. Brifing
11:00
11:15
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11:45	4:00 o forte Jaytex.
12:00	4:15
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12:45	5:00 Briefing -Kapuk Corp.

6- My Bd of Qrustees, FSEF + SAIS-1830-19th - hold

8-A inner w/ Mie, John Kaylin, Blk tier (at Jong-
DCI mly 181 Tuesday, June 30, 1959 184 Vienna)

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330
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1-Lunch - John Hanes.
2:30 Adm. Martell
3:15 Roy Scout Presentation
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4- Cond meyer
Dinner w/Mro. Margaret Breyan

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10:30
30 M
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329

11 A ity Facy Hertere off
Lunch - Mr Rauhni
2 Ρ. Μ. 2723
nch Q.
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11:30 Mu. Amir-Ibrihimi & Mr. Paul
Press, Cone, Iran Emb.
12. M Parrott

3:00-Amb. Jones, Ajarkarta +DDCI

4:00 Leo Herne & DelIO.
John Richardson, J.;
4:30-Hans Oprecht Robt. Crowell] 3
6 Schilly (home)
6-8. Reception, Japanese & int.
8:00- Denner-Robert Bliss in honor of
Bl. Archduke Otto-(Mr & Mrs D.)

тс

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204	9:30 Staff mtj. 162

10:30 Joint Chiefe of Staff
mul Parasite
as State
11:45 u Par meeting at

1 Chris Herter
3:00 Harvey E. Bumgardners, Debriefing
3:30 Mycoplus
Mooli (fusembourg)"
3:45
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Hyannis Port

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209 9.3s Staff Mi 157
10:151
Lin Patrick Scan.
11-Mtg. Bardget
11. Berard Miller, DDCI, Limm.
12- Azzam Pasha & Mr. Paul

1- OCB Lunchion
2- Leave for Lepas to brief hen.
Johnson

6-8: Cocktack w/ Steve Millett
well Ho
Iracer It ilkins per Mo. A.

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JULY 1960
AUGUST

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263 9:30 Sprague Comm, 103

10:45 Sen. Kennedy Briefing

5:30
-5 Bob Kaben
5:45 MV. Kent-Apea
:::

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266 10:45 Verne Gresham / FE3 100
11:15 Mesers, Mc Co 6] Prettig
12:3 Mitchell] 3
3 Alan
meloy, me lott

11:45 Medal Presentation
me home

1:00 Hassim ity. Bit
3- John fot hitmun

3:30-ban. Bakhtiar, c/ Iranian
DOLI CINE Sec. Service

Amb. Young (The Hague)

5:15 Charles Willia

5/mc

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ОСТОВЕΕΙ
281 Hold-Breakfast-Dr WolFfg 85-

9:30 Staff Wity.

11.30. Frank Holcomb Chief War Plans stoff
Farmer & Quinos Aires)) 27, 21-29

12:00 Dra Cole & Heitgen

1:00 Lunch - Ar. Wolff
3:00 Sicy, Gates, SAP, C/FE
4:00 Dr. Halvard Lange, c/wo
5:00 Atty Hew, Hans Fuerat
6 -Henry Schardt

Hotel
8:00 Reception Bakhtiar Wedding, the when
7.30-880 Nixmedy - debat-

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282 84

7 Α. Μ.
8 Α. Μ.
9 Α. Μ.
10 A. M. Av. Scoville
10:30
30 M ity Facy Hertere off

11 Α. Μ.
12 Noon
1 P. M. Lunch -104-10307-10024
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

D
R
A
F
T

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

27 November 1962

Note: Discussed 27 November
1962 by DD/P with DCI
and approved generally
in principle by DCI.
Fully concurred in
by DD/P.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Deputy Director (Plans)
SUBJECT: Operational Plan for Continuing
Operations Against Cuba

1. Action: This memorandum is for your information
and pursuant to your request. Recommendations for action are
contained in Paragraph V below. The purpose of this memorandum
is to delineate an operational plan for the action which we
believe should be taken by CIA against Cuba for the predictable
future. In summary the plan provides for continuing, even
intensifying, the intelligence effort against Cuba and for
the reorientation of the current effort into a long term
denied area type of operation of the highest priority.

I. ASSUMPTIONS:

A. The United States Government will give public
assurances that, provided no nuclear or offensive weapons are
present or re-introduced into Cuba, and provided Cuba does
not take action to threaten the peace and security of the
Western Hemisphere, the United States does not intend to
invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba.

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

B. These assurances will preclude any meaningful CIA
action on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cuba, since
unless there are major changes in operational and internal con-
ditions in Cuba, such a revolt if provoked would be totally
destroyed by Cuban counteraction in a matter of hours or, at
the most, a few days unless supported by a major United States
Military commitment. In addition, the non-invasion assurances
as a practical matter will preclude invading Cuba on the pretext
of a contrived provocation such as an attack on Guantanamo.

c. CIA operations involving a high noise level and a
distinct element of attributability, particularly paramilitary,
guerrilla, and commando type operations will be unacceptable
as a matter of policy.

D. The Castro-communist regime will remain in power for
the indefinite future with its security and control apparatus
relatively intact and with the capability not only of crushing
unsupported resistance activity, but of making operational
conditions in Cuba increasingly difficult. While it is
possible that recent and future developments including the
Soviet action in removing the offensive weapons from Cuba may
serve to weaken and discredit Castro, there is as yet no hard
indication that the control of the Castro-communist regime over
Cuba has been substantially weakened.

Ε. The United States assurances of no invasion and no
support of an invasion will, in effect, constitute giving to
Castro and his regime a certain degree of sanctuary. This will
-2-

severely damage the morale and motivation of anti-regime Cubans
both inside and outside of Cuba, which will make it increasingly
difficult for us to recruit agents, maintain agents already
recruited, and continue or intensify our intelligence and other
efforts against Cuba and the Castro-communist regime.

F. Despite the above factors, Higher Authority probably
will continue heavy pressure on the CIA for a maximum effort
against Cuba and may even continue to contend that the ultimate
objective is the overthrow of the Castro-communist regime.
This is an unrealistic objective, however, except on a very
long-term basis as the United States Government, we believe,
will be unwilling in the immediate future to commit troops
to support such an overthrow. The United States Government
in its overt dealings with the Cuban exiles probably will not
express the above factors to them in the context or with the
bluntness stated here.

G. In view of these factors, the so-called "Track Two"
course of action, i.e., unlimited support of Cuban exiles
and exile groups with no real control or objective purposes
in the hope that these groups will be able to shake the
Castro regime will, although unrealistic, become increasingly
attractive at various levels in the United States Government.

H. As a matter of policy, political pressures and
economic pressures short of blockade, raids, and aggressive
sabotage against Cuba will be continued.

-3-

I. In view of the above assumptions paramilitary, commando
and sabotage operations, except in rare selective instances
will serve little purpose; also they will be counter-productive
since, if undertaken, they will make the collection of intelli-
gence more difficult and should only be undertaken in those very
few instances where an unusually high return can be demonstrated.
Regardless of what other pressures are placed on CIA for
action against Cuba, it would appear clear that Higher Authority
will insist on a continued, even intensified, intelligence
coverage of Cuba.

J. In view of the policy factors, an increased use of
facilities, real estate and basing outside the United States,
particularly in Latin America, will be both necessary and
desirable.

K. Adequate aerial reconnaissance of Cuba will continue.
(Validity of this assumption is questionable)

II. OBJECTIVES:

Based on the above assumptions, the following objectives
appear to be proper for continuing CIA operations against
Cuba:

A. Take all feasible clandestine action to isolate
and assist in isolating the Castro-communist regime in Cuba
from the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the
Free World.

B. To the maximum extent possible, discredit the Castro-
communist regime in Cuba and in the Western Hemisphere and the
rest of the world.

-4-

с. Maintain through clandestine means, short of commando
and guerrilla type operations, the maximum economic and
political pressures on the Cuban regime and economy not only
for the purpose of hampering the Cuban regime, but for the
additional purpose of insuring the maximum possible drain on
Bloc resources used to support Cuba.

D. Maintain maximum possible intelligence and counter-
intelligence coverage of Cuba, including particular emphasis
on:
1. Capabilities and intentions of the government.
2. Activities of the Cuban G-2 and its other
security organs.
3. Soviet and Bloc activities in Cuba.
4. State of potential resistance, including the
morale and temper of the populace.
5. Militia and military order of battle and equip-
ment.
6. The loci of power and of possible stresses
and strains in the power centers in the Cuban government.
7. Relationships between Cuba, USSR, Red China,
the Bloc, Latin American nations and other Free World
and uncommitted nations.
8. The level of and the weaknesses in the Cuban
economy.

-5-

E. Take maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban
regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately
through clandestine means to the extent possible on any
significant uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regime,
or strains and stresses among Cuban leadership or in Cuban/
Bloc relationships.

III. OPERATIONAL PLAN:

A. Espionage and Intelligence Collection - All feasible
effort should be undertaken to continue and intensify intelli-
gence collection concerning Cuba. The status of our intelli-
gence collection and related operational activity at the
present time and its development during the past six months
is delineated in detail in Attachment A, which was prepared to
serve as the basis for the IG's report on this particular
matter to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign
Intelligence. You will note that this lengthy document
breaks down under numerous sub-headings the intelligence
coverage which has been developed by the Clandestine Service.
Set out below are specifics of operational action it is
proposed to take to continue and, as possible, increase in-
telligence coverage of Cuba.

1. Intelligence Exploitation of Refugees: As you
know, with the quarantine and the cessation of air
travel the heavy flow of Cuban refugees has dwindled
almost to nothing. In view of this and in connection

-6-

with the contingency planning for supporting any possible
military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locka Interrogation
Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel
of the Center have been retained intact. In order to
re-establish the flow of intelligence from refugees,
it is proposed that Pan American Airways and KLM be
induced to reinstitute their regular flights from
Havana to Miami. This should be done as soon as
possible after the settlement of the current negotiations
and UN discussions. Coincident with this, the Opa-Locka
refugee interrogation center will be re-established
with the same personnel.

2. Resident Agents in Cuba: Every effort will be
made to continue to exploit to the fullest, preserve the
viability of and, where necessary, re-establish communica-
tions with the(131) recruited agents now resident in Cuba.
To an extent, the speed and effectiveness of this effort
will of course depend upon the stringency of future
Cuban security and control action, which it is impossible
as yet to accurately forecast.

3. Third Country Operations: The priority on re-
cruiting agents in third countries for dispatch to Cuba
will be reiterated and strengthened and every effort
will be made to increase this coverage, both through
the development of additional resident agents in Cuba

-7-

and through the development of additional legal travellers.

4. Liaison Operations: We will continue to press
the liaison services who are assisting us in the effort
against Cuba for additional coverage, including the
recruiting of agents within their own areas for joint
dispatch to Cuba. The services most effectively co-
operating at this point in this connection are the
(British) Dutch (French (Spanish) (Italian) Greek,
(Norwegian, Danish, West Germany (Mexican) (Argentinian
(Uruguayan (Canadian) Chilean) (and Israeli Direct
approaches to several of these services either by you
personally or in your name, as you prefer, are
being separately recommended. Personal representation
by you to the services underlined above would be useful.
In addition, we will re-survey all other liaison services
with which we are in contact and reiterate to those
appearing to have any assets usable against Cuba our
extreme interest in maximum coverage of this problem.
In connection with the liaison problem generally, we will
endeavor to induce all of the liaison services to make
greater use of their national assets, both inside and
outside of Cuba. Particular attention will be given to
possible utilization of the (Vatican)

5. Maritime Operations: In addition to increasing
efforts to get at seaman agents and other maritime
assets through liaison services, we will continue our
unilateral third country efforts to recruit seamen and

-8-

particularly Cuban seamen, to increase the (twenty)
officers and crew members aboard(six) Cuban vessels we are
now running as controlled agents.

6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad: At
the present time we are running (12) Cuban diplomats
stationed outside Cuba as controlled agents and have viable
operations aimed at an additional (20) Cuban
diplomats.
We propose to continue and intensify the current program
of attempting to recruit or defect every Cuban official
representative abroad to whom we can gain access and
concerning whom we have any reason to believe a
susceptibility to approach exists. These additional
penetrations will be attempted both through unilateral
operations and where appropriate in conjunction with
liaison services.

7. Audio Penetrations of Cuban Installations
Abroad: At the present time we have audio and/or
telephone tap coverage of Cuban official installations
in (Chile), (Italy), (Mexico), (The Netherlands) (England)
(Uruguay, Greece) Spain), (France) and canada) No
major expansion of this coverage is presently
contemplated, but we will continue to survey additional
targets of opportunity and wherever possible install
coverage in those cases where the additional intelli-
gence from this type of source over and above what we
are now receiving would appear to make such installation
worthwhile.

-9-

8. Communications Intelligence: We will continue
our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA
station in Miami at the same level and will continue
to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communica-
tions. As the current situation "normalizes" it should
be possible for NSA to reinstitute and perhaps even
increase their (seaborne) intercept coverage of Cuban
communications.

9. Communist Party Operations: A complete survey
has been made world-wide of all Communist Party
penetration operations and wherever any such penetration
can be directed against Cuba either by dispatching the
agent to Cuba or by pointing the agent against Cuban
targets, this will be done, except in those cases where
such action would result in unacceptableprejudice to
the operations in the area where the agent is now based.
It is believed that the most lucrative field for the
redirection of such operations to the Cuban target will
be Latin America where there are (65) penetrations of
various communist parties. Of this (65) the survey
we have conducted indicates that (23) have some direct
pertinent access to Cuban targets. All of these 23 will
be directed against these targets unless in any case
remaining cases in the total of (65) are bein individually
there are overriding reasons to the contrary. The
examined to see if they can be diverted to Cuban targets.

-10-

10. Illegally Infiltrated Agents: The two
successful black infiltrated teams (COBRA and AMTORRID)
which have produced substantial intelligence will be
continued, resupplied, and reinforced but pointed
primarily at continued intelligence collection and at
the recruitment for intelligence collection purposes of
other Cubans who already are legally resident in Cuba
in the areas where the teams are operating (Pinar del 24
Rio and Oriente). In addition, on the most carefully
selected basis, where it appears feasible, additional
agents and teams will be infiltrated black into Cuba
in an effort to duplicate the performance of the COBRA
and AMTORRID teams and particularly to recruit and, as
possible, train additional agents legally resident in
Cuba.

11. Exfiltration: As feasible, agents and potential
recruits now in Cuba will be exfiltrated for
training, indoctrination, supplying with communications,
and motivation. They will then be re-infiltrated into
Cuba, primarily on intelligence missions. Where possible,
this will be done through legal travel channels, but
where this is not possible, it will be done wherever
feasible through our black infiltration-exfiltration
facilities, primarily our maritime assets.

-11-

SPLITTING THE REGIME

B. Much of the above effort as noted will be primarily
directed towards developing all possible evidences of stress
or strain within the regime and between the regime and other
nations, particularly the Bloc. An intensive program will
be continued to take advantage of any possible opportunity
to weaken, subvert, or split the regime in any possible
fashion. This is basically a long term effort. A great deal
of work already has gone into this and the current
status of this program and the proposed further explitation
of the numerous leads we have developed is being made, in
the interests of brevity in this memorandum, the subject of
a separate compilation. The effectiveness of assets aimed at
actually splitting the regime, i.e., a palace revolt, will of
course depend, to an extent, on the willingness of the United
States Government to support them and it is entirely possible
that any such effort might fail unless supported with military
forces which on the basis of the assumptions in Paragraph I
above would appear unlikely.

c. Sabotage: On the basis of the assumptions set out
above, commando type sabotage, minor sabotage, and other
acts of sabotage inside Cuba would appear to serve little
purpose and should not be undertaken except in the rare
instances where an opportunity is presented with acceptable
risk to do major damage to the Cuban economy. It is proposed
to continue searching for such limited opportunities, but
no active or wide scale program is contemplated.

-12-

D. Paramilitary, Commando, and Guerrilla Type Operations:
Given the assumptions in Paragraph I above, no wide scale
program of such activity should be undertaken. However, we
propose to maintain in being our present facilities and
the capability of undertaking such operations in order to
fully exploit any substantial change in internal Cuban con-
ditions or any substantial revolt or uprising which might occur.

E. Economic Warfare: It is proposed to continue and
intensify the program already undertaken to deny through
clandestine and covert means critical materials to the Cuban
economy. This consists primarily of denial operations, possibly
some preclusive buying and inducing friendly U.S. and allied
firms and governments to prevent the shipments of strategic
materials to Cuba.

F. Counterintelligence: The current counterintelligence
and counterespionage program against the Cuban G-2 and
related services will be continued and as possible intensified.
This program has developed substantially and it should be
possible within the coming months to increase its effectiveness
considerably in countering not only Cuban but Bloc intelli-
gence operations mounted against United States interests
from Cuba.

G. Political Action, Propaganda, Psychological Warfare:
In this field the following tasks will be continued and where
appropriate intensified:

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action.

-13-

to develop and exploit current OAS and Latin American
attitudes favorable to the containment and/or overthrow
of the Castro-communist regime.

2, Assist State in the development of post-Castro
concepts, leaders, and political groups.

3. Stimulate, support and guide covertly the
propaganda and political action activities of the CRC
and other Cuban political groups and individuals, as
appropriate, who offer a potential for impact inside
Cuba.

4. Develop, maintain and exploit the will of the
Cuban people to resist Castro-communism, making maximum
use of the downgrading of Castro and his regime during
the missile crisis.

5. Discredit and ridicule Castro and his regime
in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere, with emphasis
on the theme the missile crisis demonstrated con-
clusively that Castro is nothing but a mere pawn of
Soviet imperialism.

6. Continue "Radio Americas" and other CIA-
sponsored Cuban exile radio broadcasts as appropriate.

7. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational
capability has been established and policy authority is
granted to conduct propaganda balloon operations.

8. Continue the infiltration of propaganda material
into Cuba via open mails, legal travellers and couriers,
with special emphasis on selective black operations.

-14-

H. Exploitation of Exile Groups: We will continue
the clandestine exploitation of exile groups for Intelligence
collection, psychological warfare and other approved missions.
As feasible, we will act to mount as much of this effort as
possible from areas outside the continental United States, and
particularly from Latin America. If Higher Authority decides
on a "Track Two" concept or on any similar concept which
contemplates heavy uncontrolled and only generally directed
action operations of Cuban groups against Cuba, it is believed
that efforts should be made to transfer as much as possible
of the responsibility for this non-clandestine, non-intelligence
type operation into the political field, which is the province
of the Department of State. In this connection, it is believed
it would be advisable to press for the creation within the
Department of State of an office of Cuban Exile Affairs to
handle the overt government relationships with Cuban exile
groups.

IV. ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES:

Maximum implementation of the above plan which provides
for the most intensive feasible collection of intelligence,
the implementation of related programs as outlined, and the
maintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity
as well as take advantage of any future substantial changes
in internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit
and make advisable the following:

-15-

A. A gradual but substantial reduction in the expenditures
and personnel of Task Force W.

B. Consideration of the re-positioning of Task Force W
within the Clandestine Service, possibly as a major component
of the WH Division under different direction.

C. The abolition of the operational Mongoose mechanism.

D. The removal of the past framework which required
detailed consideration by the Special Group (Augmented) of
even minor operational details and decision by committee on
points which it is believed are completely within the purview
of the DCI and those officers to whom he delegates decision.

V. RECOMMENDED ACTION:

A. Your concurrence in the above general operational plan
is recommended.

B. It is recommended that you discuss this plan with
the Special Group (Augmented) and secure its concurrence.

c. It is recommended that you secure from the Special
Group (Augmented) policy approval to attempt to induce Pan
American Airways and KLM to resume their flights between Miami
and Havana at the appropriate time.

D. It is recommended that if any "Track Two" concept
is proposed, you endeavor to transfer to the Department of
State all possible overt aspects of this type of uncontrolled

-16-

subsidy and support of Cuban exile groups.

E. It is recommended that the Mongoose operational
mechanism be abolished.

F. If you concur in this concept, specific recommendations
will be made to you concerning the re-positioning of Task Force
W within the DD/P.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

-17-
# 1104-10308-10023
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING:
* PRO-
POSED ACTION
* ACCOM
PLISHED
* MARKED FOR INDEXING
* MICROFILMED
* DOC? NHO
* NO INDEXING REQUIRED
* ONLY QUALIFIED
* HEADQUARTERS DESK

TO: Chief, Task Force

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: Operational/GYROSE
Operational Debriefings

ACTION REQUIRED: None.

REFERENCE: UFGA-4088.

During the month of May 1962 the following persons, processing through the CAC, were considered to be of operational importance to JMWAVE.

1. Rafael ARRIBAS Rodriguez (A 12 895 148). Subject, a former Medical Products Salesman, had contacts with two employees of the Post Office in Cuba. The leads he provided were considered marginal and dropped for further operational exploitation.
2. Jose Francisco *AZOR Ores (A 12 911 733). Subject, a rural census taker for the INRA, is undergoing a thorough debriefing on OB and cartographic information by the AMOTS.
3. Manuel CABRERA Rodriguez (A 12 911 477). Subject, a former railroad worker in Camaguey and ex-Rebel Army Battalion Commander, was debriefed on positive intelligence information. The results of this debriefing were forwarded to Reports for dissemination.
4. (Dr). Jaime CARBONELL Rivero (A.12 907 852). Subject, a former night club owner in Havana, submitted two plans to assassinate Fidel Castro. The results of this debriefing were forwarded to Headquarters in UFCA-4176, dated 31 May 1962, all.
5. Abel Julio COLINOPIO Vasquez (A 12 971 774). Subject, a former Naval Chauffeur and member of the FND, is being debriefed on operational leads and positive intelligence.
6. Rafael Rinaldo DIAZ Veira (A 12 444 465). Subject, a Pharmacist) and co-owner of a medical testing clinic in Pinar del Rio, was recruited, trained in SW before he returned to Cuba. JMWAVE plans to start a new collection network centered

Distribution:
3-Headquarters

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DATE TYPED: 25 June 62
DATE DISPATCHED:
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-4543
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 92 19-170-33

# CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-4543

around this agent into the medical profession) in Havana and Pinar del Rio. Subject had come to PBPRIME to visit his son who had been injured in an automobile accident.

7. Carlos Fernando GALBAN Perez (A 12 895 062). Subject, a former theatre employee in Havana, was contacted by fnu ELLANO) a private detective in Havana who was his neighbor, just prior to his departure and asked that, when Subject arrived in Miami, he contact Freyre JORGE in the Catholic Bureau in Miami. Allegedly LLAN had information concerning airfields, pilots and radar installations which he wanted to send to Freyre JORGE. Upon contacting the Catholic Welfare Bureau, Freyre JORGE was unknown to them. At the request of JMWAVE, Subject wrote to (LLANO's potential. JMWAVE is waiting for an answer to this letter.

8. Antonio GOICOCHEA Cosculluela. Subject, a former member of the Legal Department of Cubana, was debriefed on positive intelligence and on the activities of ANWARM-1. The result of the intelligence portion of the debriefing is being disseminated.

9. Antonio *GOMEZ Hernandez) (A 12 419 493). Subject, a medical doctor, returned to Cuba without giving any indication of his plans to CAC, consequently JMWAVE was too late in recruiting him; however, he is scheduled to return to PBPRIME about November. It is possible that Subject will return again to Cuba at that time. If this proves to be the case, serious consideration will be given to recruiting him.

10. Ruben Arturo *HERNANDEZ Garcia (A 12 911 621). Subject was an MRAC coordinator in Santa Fe, Isle of Pines. Several leads of marginal value were provided.

11. Jose MONTALVO Urruti (A 12 911 895). Subject, a(pediatrician, came to PBPRIME to visit his daughter who is in a Miami high school and to visit a patient. Subject has an invalid wife and one son currently serving in the Isle of Pines prison after he was captured at Playa Giron. Although he originally expressed an interest in working as an ODYOKE singleton in PBPRIME once he returned, he later changed his mind.

12. Tomas *OLIVERA Gandoa (A 11 266 803). Subject, a former Naval Chauffeur and member of the FND, is being debriefed on operational leads and on positive intelligence concerning the Cuban micro-wave system.

13. Valentin PADRON (A 12 900 229). Subject, a former grocer in Las Villas, was debriefed on operational leads and positive intelligence. The leads which subject provided were considered marginal for further exploitation. Subject had planned to return to Cuba legally but was prevented from doing so for family reasons.

14. Jesus Gregorio *PEREZ, CKA 183. Subject, working an independent resistance network in Cuba, specialized in exfiltration of friends and members of his group. He offered to exfiltrate any technicians and professional people. After debriefing him, Subject was turned over to the PM Branch for exploitation.

15. Federico Gaspar SALVADOR Rodriguez. Subject, a dentist from Camaguey came to PBPRIME to attend the funeral of his father. He was recruited and trained in SW before he returned to Cuba. He will be used as a communications link for the AMTAUP Net.

16. Gumercindo SIMON Sanchez (A 12 911 019). Subject, a former chauffeur in Las Villas, offered to provide bona fides for contacting "Titi" MARTINEZ, a communicator for Capt. Felix TORRES, a militia commander in Remedios, Las Villas. Subject

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PAGE NO: 2

# CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-4543

also offered to re-infiltrate to contact (MARTINEZ). Subject could not provide sufficient detailed biographic data on CHARTINEZ with which to risk using a KUBARK internal asset to contact him. An investigation was initiated through the AMOTS to determine more biographic data so serious consideration could be given for contacting (MARTINEZ).

17. Manuel Felix SUAREZ Pozo (A 12 903 186). Subject, a lawyer and a former underground member in Havana, was debriefed further on operational leads. Letters to the more important members of his group have been written in an effort to establish communications and to exploit their operational potential.

18. Miguel Archangel *SUAREZ Valdez (A 12 895 991). Subject, a former resistance group member, was debriefed further on operational leads and is currently expecting a courier from the resistance group leader in Havana, who allegedly has agents who have access to a Soviet COMINT station.

19. Miguel Angel YANES Garcia (A 12 903 525). Subject, a former employee in the Ministry of Public Works and a member of the END, was debriefed for operational leads and positive intelligence. Subject refused to reveal any FND assets in Cuba and he had only margianl intelligence to provide.

END OF DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PAGE NO: 3
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: AMCANOE

Job # 65-535/28
File # 19-6-91
Dates included:
Volumes: 11

1. Description:

This project concerns U.S. contacts for a resistance
group in Cuba. Support of the Unidad de Liberacion Nacional
(ULN) and their plans and efforts to overthrow CASTRO.

Principle players are:

AMCANOE-1 (201-0283570) Eduardo GARCIA Molina
AMCANOE-2 (201-0726572) Enrique Alfredo GARCIA Molina
AMCANOE-3 (201-0727185) Antonio Jose RAMIREZ Mendez,
captured and executed in Jan 64;
AMCANOE-4 (201-0729621) Armando SOSA Rodriguez
AMCANOE-5(201-0727186) Marcelino PEREZ Diez
AMCANOE-6 (201-0729610) Orlando OROPESA Perez
AMCANOE-7 (201-0729080) Benjamin ACOSTA Valdes, captures
tried and killed by firing squad
15 Sept 63.
AMCANOE-9 (201-
:
) Juan AMESTOY Dominguez, killed
29 Sept 63 in a gun battle.

- 2 -

2. Review of these files turned up the following documents:

TDCSDB-3/654-571, dated 9 May 63: Concerns efforts of
Cuban lawyer Paulino A SIERRA of Chicago to unify exiles and
an offer by Chicago businessmen to support the overthrow of CASTRO.

Memo for the Record dated 3 March 1964: a friend of
AMCANOE-1 who is a businessman and ship owner, with interests
in a slot machine business (placing them in gambling houses),
placed him in contact with elements of the underwrold, through
a former St. Louis police officer. Through the police officer
there was reportedly a tie-in with the Cosa Nostra. The latter
reportedly offered to assassinate CASTRO at a price of
$150,000 dollars.

UFGA-15233, dated 15 April 1964: Report on a Byron
CAMERON who said that he represented an unidentified group of
persons who had made contact with two Cuban gangsters who were
willing to kill Fidel CASTRO. CAMERON reportedly was associated
with a Mr. S.W. TYLER (no identifiable traces) of Caribbean
Producer, Inc., Miami Springs, Fla., and Herbert F. JENNE (no
traces) with the firm F.A. Johnson, Inc., Fort Lauderdale, Fla.

UFGA-15954, dated 11 May 1964: CAMERON mentioned
contact with unidentified group willing to assassinate selected
Cuban leaders: Fidel CASTRO, Raul CASTRO and Che GUEVARA.
CAMERON made fairly clear that the MAFIA was involved.

Jane Zerance
Researcher
```markdown
104-10308-10044 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: AMBRUSH Organization

Job # 63-345/6

File # 19-5-6

Dated included: Apr 61 - Jan 62

Volumes: 1

1. Description:

Revolutionary Council Anti-Castro Security and
Counter-Intelligence Team.

2. Findings:

No findings in relation to the terms of reference.

Of possible interest: A document dated 19 August
1961 source: AMPAL-1, hand carried to Hqs. from WAVE
in August 1961. The document mentions "Cuban Communist
penetration agents in all branches of importance of the
U.S. Government" ... Mentions a possible "Castro
penetration into the Frente (FRD - Revolutionary
Democratic Front) and U.S. activities".

3. Other Agencies with Knowledge of this Activity:

Apparently, none.

(Barbara Boyle)
Researcher

CDH comment: Check out Eugenio MARTINEZ again.

(SI)IPSTREAM-1 said in 1976 that one Eugenio MARTINEZ was working
for the Cubans. A Eugenio MARTINEZ was involved in the Watergate;
a former JMWAVE Station agent.

13-00000

frone WAVE to th
for wallen, Dec. 1981 Societ Ampuit-1

August 19/61
Enclosed find an approximate list of expenses that (Armando Munero)
gave me for consideration. However, he would like to talk it over
as to the rest of his stay in the U. S.

(Armando Munero)enclosed a note he asked to have sent over, "La Voz d
las Americas" (onda corta--m ort wave). This is supposed to be some
sort of signal to his O. P. C. group in Cuba to get behind and
cooperate with information and sabotage.-------

-I did not talk to him as yet since I am awaiting word from you as t
this Monday's meetings with him.-----

August 19/61
Jacinto Luzarraga, a friend from Cuba and former sugar mill owner,
and father-in-law of Lino Fernandez (MRR, now in jail at the Isle
Pines), told me that Dr.(Antonio Valdes Rodriguez)(30th of Noviembre
Movimiento) was taken to jail after returning to Cuba from Miami
last time here, and not es yet released. Jacinto arrived here wit
his wife and 3 grandchildren about 5 days ago. He was formerly a
member of the famous old Cuban ABC group. It should be rememb
that Dr. (Valdes received training in S/W, his last trip here.-----

August 19/61
Ben Volpe, now working at Holiday Tours, Biscayne Blvd., Miami, t
me that his father, having come from Cuba a few days ago, told hir
that Federico Claramont, 1100 10th St., Miami Beach(living close
them), is a suspected member of Castro's G-2 and known as such si
being in Cuba. He arrived in the U. S., Miami, as a political ex
which is a cover for his true mission here, and status.------

August 19/61
Jacinto Luzarraga and his relative told me that it is being rumor
that since only men are taken to Opa Locka by Immigration for 48
Fidel Castro is sending in many G-2 women instead of men for his
clandestine operations here, between here and Cuba. I also heard
rumored that some of these agents are sent to tie in with Communi
in the U. S., various regions of the U. S. I have no other info.
this as could not find out more since it was told to me as a runc

August 19/61
Armando Munero told me that he gets information from his uncle
Guillermo Rojas, a long time Cuban Communist who is presently wor
in the Imprenta Nacional at Havana. He helped(supposed to be one

13-00000

Cont'd.6.-- the main) organize the library of the Communist throughout Cuba
his uncle told him that Kruschev promised Fidel Castro that he
have missles in Cuba(this was a few months ago). Also, his unc.
that the Russians have spies in the Pentagon that pull for Fidel
Castro, and they have already plenty of agents bel nging to the
Communists in all branches of importance of the U. S. Gov't.,
even in the CIA. He said that all people in Cuba that worked vi
the CIA were picked up through their agents and those presently
working with same are being watched closely. (Munerd told me thi
he is kind of suspicious of Eugenio, his being Cuban and because
a sort of sixth sense, as he calls it.-----------

August 19/61 :
-Bart told me last week that Juez Garceran was the one that sent
letter you received to Carlos Prio as he recognized the handwrit
on both envelopes. The above judge bold Bart that some have bee
given Salvo Conductos to Mexico and that the Italian Embassy is
emptying out same. This judge is the one that made the list of
people held up in the Italian Embassy, that you received from Bar
-Bart told me that he thought that Alberto Del Junco (MDC), that I
in touch, with is getting aid from someone from the U. S. Gov't.
Del Junco's sister saw him this past Friday night at his home and
gave him $5,000.00 in U. S. Dollars(money) to send through the Po
to Cuba to be given to her brother down there. She didn't want t
disclose to Bart where and from whom she received the money, and
only said that it was from his group (HDC) here. Bart thinks that
this is not true. He sent the money down already.
-Enclosed(marked in pencil, #7) find photostatic copies of letters
sent to Oscar Diaz from former F.Castro Pres. Urrutia and from a
Macaroni that Bart kno ws. It is self explanatory in Spanish and
Bart says that he knows that the air strips shown on enclosed map
are truely in existence. Part received these photostatic copies
to his suggesting same to Oscar Diaz upon delivery. I couldn't to
this letter to you a few nights ago as he had to deliver same in
hour of the time I visited him. However, I suggested his trying t
stand by when the letter was opened. Oscar Diaz liked Part's ider
making photostatic copies of same and Bert asked for one for himse
(GUER)

13-00000

Cont'd. 3.-- It seems that Captain Despain wants to break up the Intell.Servi
of the Frente due to lack of funds, says Dr. F'dez. However, d
having tried to find out whether this Captain Dospain was Ernest
we were not sure. Having been introduced upon our 2nd visit las
Friday, 9:30 A. M. (first visit was 2 days previously at 9:30 A.!
we were presented to. Ernesto Despain, the person we were looking
some time now(due to his relations with Ceferino Alvarez (G-2) en:
Josefina Socarras (Ceferino's girl friend, of whom I have been wri
about for some time now). We started to get places, with all fu
cooperation, the first time there as we spoke only to Dr. F'dez.:
second time, with Despain present, we felt that we should not
many details. Dr. F'dez. told us that Despain was planning on s
him with a delegation to Puerto Rico. I feel, as well as Frank,
this Dr. F'dez.(around 60 yrs. old) is a person that could very e
organize his office to be of very valuable service against Castro
his Communists here in the States, as well as in Latin America wh
they already have their own agents operating. It is felt that De
is trying to get Dr. F'dez. out of the way because he recognizes
importance of the planned Intelligence Service the Frente thro!!
Fidez., Ean which could produce a very strong arm against Castro.

Dr. F'dez. says that they are now working on the ABC form as used
against a former president of Cuba known as Machado. Enclosed is
an idea of how this group functions and are placed into many walks
life of importance to this cause.. Their work is mainly of Intell
Service and in a form of cooperating with the U.S.Gov't. in all we
possible without trying to get monies, if possible, to function. I
presently trying to get donations to $300.00 to keep his office o
for a month. Upstairs in the same building, they have radio operat
(very well experienced) continuously monitoring all phases of impo
ance in Cuba(sugar mills, etc.). Frank asked Despain if the file:
had in his hands was for us. Despain was caught a little off bounds
as he became somewhat unnerved, but soon rallied and opened the fil
showing data on boats, but taking great pains to keep us from seein
the contents. I didn't went to press the point arousing any suspic
Dr. Fidez. introduced me as a Joe Anderson, FBI man. I had formerl
cautioned him against referring to me as anything special, which he

13-00000

Cont'd.8-----did anyway. I let it go at that to see the developments as it w
no use to refute him again. However, when we parted, I did menti
him again that he should not do so at random as I did not think i
necessary nor what we had agreed upon. Dr. F'dez. did say so es
introduced us to Despain as his Jefe (chief) and wanted to show hi

loyalty at the same time explaining to him that he was cooperatin
with us in all ways possible against Castro and Communism, which
plainly seen that Despain didn't like at all. Despain sat silent
no questions asked, hard, eyeing us as if waiting to see how far
FBI had gotten into matters of the Frente. I did not ask the Dr.
questions I wanted to and only said that I would like to be in to
with him at all times. Enclosed you will find photostatic copies
letters sent by Cubans here to Prague and the answers of same.. Y
told me to ask him how he got this information. Idid not feel th
should have done so at the moment. However, I will be in touch w
Dr. Fidez. again soon as I said I would. I will not go to the of
of this Intell. again as I was almost seen by a Frank Paez, Pepe
Aguero's friend. Pepe Aguero is Paula Grau's husband, now here.
turned my head away, I think, in time. Dr. Fdez. says that he ha
of more information to give me and that loads of stuff reaches hi
daily, all of which he can turn over to me for study. He said th
will get for me Cia files that the Frente has hidden and want to
with him. I feel, if Despain, is out of the way, I could do much
getting what is needed of them. I do not feel safe with him arou
I may be wrong, but that is the way I feel am ut security with h
I promised to return the enclosed photostatic copies but feel thai
of the files can be taken over for copy for the asking, as Dr. Fl
said he would cooperate to the fullest.

Dr. Jose Julio Fernandez: Office (9 to 11 A.M.): FR-1-5133
Home(from 8 P.li. to 8 A.M.):II-4-1853
Frente (from 11:30 A.. to 1 P.M.):
FR-4-2630-38-39
He holds a Frente Carnet No. 102, Frente Revolucionario Democratic
(F.R.D.), Delegacion de: El Salvador (Rescate) and receives $200.00
monthly as a salary from the Frente.

13-00000

August 19/61
Frank Arias has given me the following information About DESPAN).

Captain(Lieutenant, known formerly as) Ernesto Despain, head of t
Frente Intelligence Service at 174 14th Lane, Miami, with entranc
in back of building at 15th Street, off Brickell Ave., worked for
with Ceferino Alvarez (G-2, known as) in Government Insurance(Sem
Gobierno) and formerly in the now non-existent BANSECO (branch of
National Bank of Cuba). Josefina Socarras worked with them also:
Seguro del Gobierno I have written of Josefina before through!
findings of Frank, who knew them all in Cuba(not Despain directly:
only his family). This Captain Despain is an intimate friend of
Ceferino and Josefina(planning to go to New York soon). She has
trying to get something started here, as reported before. It is
strongly urged that this Josefina be surveilled constantly as І,
as well as Frank, think that she is affiliated with Castro's cland
activities here in the States. She received monthly checks from ti
Centro Refugiado Cap tain Despain is planning on going to join t
U. S. Army. He is definitely strongly suspected of giving everyth
of Intelligence to Castro and is tied in with the Communist and Cas
groups here. He may even soon plan to disappear from the scene and
should not be allowed to get off easily. He has been keeping Dr.
Jose Julio Fernandez from organizing his anti-Castro and Anti-Comuni
files due to lack of funds (says Despain). It seems that this was ju
an excuse before and was done to keep the ball functioning as shoul
bę. I think that this Dr. Jose Julio Fernandez is very sincere an
is innocently giving everything into the hands of Despain without
knowing. How Despain got into this position is not known by us yet.

As far as we are concerned he is a Castro penetration into the Frent
and U. S. activities.

The above is the result of being sent to see Dr. Jose Julio Fernande
head of Intelligence Servence of the Frente (as told us by Former
Cuban Grl. Socallanes, friend of Franktx I went with Frank to try t
find out about a woman whose son(one of two of them) had taken data
(MOST)
and pictures for Castro of all military and naval installations in t'
State of Florida.
Cautioned in against referring to me us anything special, which ne

13-00000

Cont'd.8--- Enclosed find the groups belonging to the Frente that was writte
for me by this Dr. F'dez.
Enclosed find(#8 marked) "Reporte and Informe" (2 sheets) given me
Dr. F'dez. to show what they are doing now.
Dr. D'dez. informed me of the following:
(a). A Communist militant; Alberto Iglesias, 425 Cedar Lane,
Meadow, New York(Phones: IV-1-4368 and IV-6-4547). He is a
Resident of the U. S. for more than 20 years. He has his
business, "American Welding and Boiler Works Co.". This i
man to be watched as he even uses his business as a front.
(b). Mario Garcia, Miami Ventilated Awning Co., Inc.(works at):
presently asking Immigration permission to go to Cuba and
considered as one of Fidel Castro's heads here with a gre
many ties.
Enclosed find a break down of expenses of the Frente Intell. Offi
given me by Dr. F'dez., my asking him for same. Frank Aries is
helping the Dr. get funds for the maintenance of this office for
least another month. I think that this set up should be taken in
study.

August 21/61
Enclosed find marked #9, 2 documents, given me by Emanuel Carvaja
last night which are self-explanatory in Spanish. One is a list
exiles in their Costa Rican Embassy in Havana, and the other is a
cocument(copy) signed and given today to the Minister of Foreim
Relations of Cuba in Havana. It seems that there was very much
discussions concerning some amongst the foreign diplomats in Cuba
The Egyptian Embassador (RAU:Syria, etc.) went to the first meetin
the diplomats had in Habane concerning the new monetary exchanges
He first agreed strongly with the rest and promised to sign the
enclosed type document concerning the new exchange in Cuba.
first meeting was held last Monday, Aug.13th, and they met again

a second time on Thursday in order to sign. He (name not known by
Carvajal) then refused to sign and did not even show up which ind
ted to the remainder of the diplomats that his money must have ber
exchanged in the full amount to keep him off the list of simature
The Swiss Charge D' Affairs informed at the same meeting, to the
Diplomats, that he received information from his Government that t
Swiss Gov't. was checking all present Cuban bank accountants exist
in Switzerland and were readying themselves to act accordingly in
case the Cuban Gov't. should not reach any agreement in regards to
the exchange with the Diplomats.

13-00000

Contra.
- The Japanese Embassador said he informed his Gov't. about these
difficulties as a protest against the behavior of the Cuban Gov'
This he told at the Diplomatic meeting.

About a week ago, there was a hunger strike at the Brazilian ph
by the exiles there. However, they gave up as a gesture to only
obedience to the Embassador. They protested against not reccivi
salvo conductos and other things.

This coming week, Monday or Tuesday, the Diplomats again are cet
together at a meeting to protest before the Cuban Gov't. about t
lax and Arposeful designing ways of handling this affair, and
remind the Gov't. of their obligations in extending the courtesy
according International agreements.

Carvajal asked me not to mention this, but later said that he
informed us about Embassador Quiros leaving Havana this Thursday
as he was being recalled by the Costa Rican Gov't. for consultati
Carvajal will be in charge of the Embassy for the time, but said
he didn't expect the Embassador to return as he is taking his fa
and house hold items.

He also told me again that Eduardo Odio, Costa Rican Consul in
Havana, was a person not to be trusted by many experiences they h
already had with him.
DO NOT MENTION CROWN NOW!

(ARMANDO MORALES) WIFE CALLED LAST NIGHT dirigin
LEE ENTERED CUBA Theouch AllPERT without Any
Hishta. HE FIND THE
ME OF SAME!
WHLE TOLO TO INFINI

I have money for hin
you want to gent it to hon

- Thurs or Sat, 20php
```1104-10308-10053 (2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ACTION: C/ME 2 (WE NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED 1400 22 APR 63 UK)
INFO DDP, ADDP, C/SOD 4, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 3, C/EE 3, C/SAS 5, S/CI 2

SECRET 2214527
OPIN DIR INFO PRIUTY HAND FRAN CITE HAGU 3698 N22804
RYBAT KEYWAY PERUMEN AMLEG
22 APR 1963
REF DIR 33866

1. REF DISCUSSED BY STA WITH EDMENT AND WARMBOLD. DUE INABILITY
AND UNDESIRABILITY USING LIAISON AND LACK OF INDEPENDENT ASSETS
WITH ACCESS TO CUBAN SHIPS, ONLY POSSIBILITY IMPLEMENT REF AT THIS
TIME BY USE OF AMLEGS. IF SUCCESSFUL OP MOUNTED, ASSUME FOLL
POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES ALREADY CONSIDERED BY HOS:
A. UNLESS ACTION TAKEN ON NUMBER OF CUBAN VESSELS AT ROUGHLY
SAME TIME AMLEGS USED FOR ANY SPORADIC ACTIONS ON ONLY SOME SHIPS
WILL PROBABLY BE RELUCTANT CONTINUE ACTIVITIES FOR KUBARK. IN
GENERAL BELIEVE ANLEGS WILLING COOPERATE THIS EFFORT ONLY IF THEY
CONVINCED IT PART OF FINAL EFFORT OVERTHROW CASTRO. (AMLEGS
12 AND 29 EXPRESSED GENERAL DISILLUSIONMENT OVER ODYOKE RESTRICTIONS
SIMILAR ACTION BY EMIGREES IN PBPRIME AND FOUND IT DIFFICULT RE-
CONCILE OUR REQUEST FOR THEIR ASSISTANCE THIS OP WITH APPARENT
ODYOKE POLICY STOP OTHERS FROM CARRYING OUT SIMILAR ACTIVITY.)
B. IF CASTRO GOVT SUSPECTS SABOTAGE, LIKELY HE WILL ATTEMPT
REPRISALS IN SIMILAR KIND AGAINST WESTERN CARRIERS, SUCH AS PAA
FLIGHTS. ALSO, CUBAN G-2 LIKELY ATTEMPT MAJOR EFFORT BREAK ANLEG
COMPLEX (WHICH WILL BE SUSPECTED) AND MAY TAKE REPRISALS AGAINST KUBARKERS
PODACID INSTALLATIONS THEREBY IDENTIFIED.

SECRET
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWN-
GRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

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PAGE 2

C. IF (DUTCH) AUTHORITIES SUSPECT SABOTAGE OPS ORIGINATED (ROTTERDAM),
IN SINGLE INSTANCE POSSIBILITY EXISTS CONVINCE THEN CUBAN EPIGREE
GROUP AND NOT KUBARK INVOLVED, BUT AS SIMILAR ACTIONS CARRIED
OUT IN FUTURE HIGHLY UNLIKELY THEY WOULD ACCEPT THIS PLOY. ALSO,
ALMOST CERTAIN (DUTCH) AUTHORITIES WOULD DRASTICALLY INCREASE SECURITY
IN PORT AREA WHEN CUBAN VESSELS HERE, THUS MAKING FUTURE CONTACT
ANY AMLEGS VERY DIFFICULT. SIMILAR SITUATION MIGHT OBTAIN BELGIAN
AND GERMAN PORTS AS CONSEQUENCE. DUTCH INTEL AND SECURITY SERVICES
HIGHLY AWARE KUBARK KEEN INTEREST DUE TO THEIR HEAVY INVOLVERENI
OTHER ACTIONS AGAINST CUBAN TARGET.

2. RE SPECIFIFIC ACTION AGAINST HAVANA (WHICH ARRIVED ROTTERDAM
19 APR AND DEPARTING DIRECT TO HAVA 26 APR), SABOTAGE RAISED BY
WARMEOLD AND EDMENT WITH AMELESS 12 AND 29 WITH FOLL RESULTS:

A. ANLEG 12 IS OBVIOUSLY RELUCTANT TAKE PART SABOTAGE ACTION
UNLESS ASSURED MANY OTHER COUNTRYMEN CARRYING OUT SAME TYPE ACTION
OTHER AREAS. HE NOT VILLING TAKE ANY ACTION WHICH MIGHT CAUSE
DEATH ANY CREW MEMBER. HE DISTURBED BY RECENT NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS
ODYOKE POLICY AND WANTS CLARIFICATION PURPOSE SABOTAGE ACTION.
HE NOT INTERESTED ACTION IF IT PART OF GENERAL HARASSMENT CAMPAIGN
NOT CONNECTED TO MAJOR ODYOKE PLAN OF ACTION. BELIEVE POSSIBLE
HE WOULD BE MORE AMENABLE IF SOME INDICATIONS SUCH A PLAN OCCURRED
PRIOR HIS NEXT VOYAGE.

B. ANLEG 29 APPEARED GENUINELY INTERESTED PERFORMING INTERNAL
SABOTAGE ON SHIP BUT (AS CHIEF ENGINEER VOULD REQUIRE COLLABORATOR
24
IN ENGINE ROOM SINCE HE DOES NOT TAKE (REGULAR ENGINE ROOM DUTY AND
HIS PRESENCE THERE ALWAYS FOR SPECIFIC INSPECTION WHICH OBSERVED
BY MEN WHO ARE ON DUTY. HIS MOTHER IN PBRUMEN ON VERGE NERVOUS
BREAKDOWN AND ACTION HIS PAR NOW WOULD REQUIRE HIS IMMEDIATE

13-00000

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PAGE 3

DEFECTION WHICH HE NOT VILLING DO BECAUSE OF MOTHER. IF ANOTHER
ENGINE ROOM ANLEG TRANSFERRED HIS SHIP PRIOR NEXT VOYAGE IN SOLD
BE WILLING CAUSE SERIOUS DAMAGE WHICH COULD PLAUSIBLY BE EXPLAINED
AS NATURAL ACCIDENT OR BREAKDOWN.

BELIEVE ANLEG 29 WOULD POSSIBLY BE VILLING TO PLANT FOUR-
YOUR DELAY EXPLOSIVE "CLAN" TO ONE OF 34 DRUMS OF "TETRAHYDROFURAN
WHICH TO BE LOADED ON DECK. MANIFEST LISTS SUBSTANCE AS HAVING
FLASH POINT OF MINUS 20 DEGREES CENTIGRADE. CLAN VOULD BE PLANTED
AFTER SHIP ARRIVES HOME PORT. HAVE NOT DISCUSSSED THIS ACTION
WITH AMLEGS 29 YET. PLS ADVISE OPIN PRIOR NEXT MEETING WITH AMLEG
20 WHICH SCHEDULED EVENING 23 APRIL. ANLEG 9 SHIP WILL DEPART
FOR HAVANA 26 APRIL.)

5. EDMENT REMAINING (HAGU) PENDING REPLY.

6. SINCE OBVIOUS UNPREDICTABLE, SERIOUS AND FAR REACHING LOCAL
CONSEQUENCES CAN FLOW FROM ANY STAGE IMPLEMENTATION REF ACTION
REQUEST COMMENT RE ANY INSTRUCTIONS SENT TO CHIEF OF HISSION RE
THIS MATTER OR GUIDANCE TO BE FOLLOWED IN BRIEFING HIN BY STA PRIOR
ENGAGING IN REF TYPE PROGRAM.

SECRET
C/S COMMENT: APPROVAL HAD BEEN GRANTED FOR SABOTAGE OF CUBAN SHIPS.
104-10308-10054
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ACTION: J (SAS NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT: 10
INFO: CDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, 2/ 3, CNE 2, 8/с а

SECRET 2211522
OPIN DIF INFO PRETY HAVE PRAH WAHD ФАТДИХА90 8012
RYBAT TYPIC CALL
122657
1. AHLEB 29 MET (IN ROTT BY VAREBOLD AND ARLES 1 OF 20 AFR.
WE EXPLAINED THAT HE DID NOT RECRUIT IDEN A AS PLAWNED BECAUSE
IDEN B TOLD HIM IDEN A IS NOW BEING HATCHED CLOSELY DUE HIS RECENT
ATTEMPTS TO RESIGN FROM AILITARY. A 29 HAD NO FREE TINE TO GRE
AND FAKE OVU ASSESSMENT IDEN A SITUATION DUE SERIOUS ILLHESS FOTHER
AND HIS REQUIRED PRESENCE ABOARD SHIP DURING REPAIRS
2. TUFO IN REF OBTAINED BY AHLEB 29 FRON IDEN C. REQUEST
TRACES. SHE IS FORMER BIRL FRIEND OF AFLEB 29 AND PARENTS ARE
HEIGHBORS. SHE VERY ACTIVE IN RESISTANCE BROUP WHOSE NARE SOUNDS
LIKE "FRENTE LIBERACION NACIONAL FRENTE LIBERACION ESCAMBRAY.
A 29 SEES HER IN HAVANA EACH TIME HOME ALTHOUGH SHE SPENDS CIRCA
TUO OF EVERY THREE VEEKS WITH GRANDPARENT IN FATANZAS
3. A 29 CERTAIN IDEN C VOULD ACCEPT RECRUITHENT BY HIM TO
WORK WITH ODYOKE. WARKBOLD SEEING HIN AGAIN EVENING 23 AFR
REQUEST OPIE PERMISSION PRIOR NEXT MEETING WITH A 29 TO INSTRUCT
HIN TO RECRUIT IDEN C. TRAIN AND GIVE HER SVAND ACCOWNODATION
ADDRESS PREVIOUSLY FLANHED FOR IDEN A
SECRET
GROUP

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET

ACTION: /SAS (SAS NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT: 1035, 22 APR LIG)
INFO: DOP ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/E 2, S/C 2

BECRET 2211522
PIE DIR INFO PRITY WAVE FRAN HARS CITE HABU 3695
RYBAT TYPIC CALL
MAGU 3695.
N22624
YDEN A: ANTONIO CONCEPCION.
IDEN B: RANUEL JUSTO HUINOS, BROTHER-IN-LAW OF ANTONIO
CONCEPCION. SEE PREVIOUS INFO ON KUINOS FROM ANLEB 29.
IDEN C: NORMA FLORES DOB CIRCA 39, RESIDES WITH MOTHER AND
FATHER AT CALLE NO. 18332, ENTRE PRIMERA Y SEGUNDA, RESIDENCIAL
FONTERREY, SAN MIGUEL DEL PADRON, GUARABACOA, HABANA RESIGNED
FRON JOB AS TEACHER IN UNIVERSITY OF VILLANOVA IN HAVANA IN 62)
MAD PBPRIME VISA PRIOR BLOCKADE BUT BLOCKADE NULLIFIED CHANCE TO
LEAVE. FATHER FORMER SERGEANT IN BATISTA ARMY NOW GARDENER.
SISTER, NANCY FLORES, DOB CIRCA 36, IS OFFICE CLERK IN LA ISLA DE
CUBA DEPARTMENT STORE, HAS APPLIED FOR PBPRIME VISA. GRANDFATHER
AND UNCLE LIVE IN HATARZAS.
SECRE

GROUP 1
EXCI UDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWN-
DISPATCH

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.
FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE 
SUBJECT Operational/TYPIC/AMLEO
Unsuccessful Exfiltration Attempt by M/V ADA, 9-12 May 1964
ACTION REQUIRED. REFERENCES
Action Required: None, FYI

References:
A. BARR-1606, dated 13 May 1964
B. BARR-1607, dated 13 May 1964
C. WAVE-6458, dated 13 May 1964
D. WAVE-6433, dated 13 May 1964
E. WAVE-6463, dated 13 May 1964
F. BARR-1612, dated 14 May 1964
G. BARR-1614, dated 14 May 1964
H. BARR-1619, dated 15 May 1964
I. UFGA-15986, dated 20 May 1964
J. WAVE-6844, dated 21 May 1964
K. UFKA- 130, dated 14 May 1964

GENERAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION
1. During the past year and a half AMLEO-3 has been placated,
and kept under control, by the continuous effort of KUBARK to assist
him in obtaining asylum for his wife and family in a third country
diplomatic installation in Cuba. Since the failure of the last
asylum attempt for Mrs. AMLEO-3 in March 1964, as reported in refer-
ence I, and the refusal of Mrs. AMLEO-3 to even consider taking asylum
without advance guarantees of a salvo conducto; AMLEO-3 lost what
little optimism he had remaining for a safe method of bringing his
wife and children out of Cuba. After the failure of the asylum
attempt in March 1964, Mrs. AMLEO-3 again renewed her attack upon
AMLEO-3 by phone and letter, urging him to rescue her by any means
at his disposal, and by her efforts she has successfully convinced him
that his family will escape only if she can arrange an exfiltration
mounted from inside the island, or if AMLEO-3 sends someone to get her
or comes himself to exfiltrate her and their children. Up until
recently the C/O has been able to persuade AMLEO-3 that undertakings
of this nature were foolhardy unless carried out by trained maritime
assets skilled in clandestine infiltration and exfiltration, and
equipped with the proper vessels and support to carry out the mission
successfully. Now that the KUBARK asylum efforts have been discon-
tinued, and AMLEO-3 is aware that KUBARK will not sponsor any maritime

CONTINUATION OF
DISPATCH
exfiltration attempts to rescue his family, he has decided that he
would prefer to terminate his relationship with KUBARK so that he can
carry out such exfiltration attempts on his own in a completely
independent manner.

2. Since November 1963, JMWAVE has noted in all AMLEO progress
reports that Mrs. AMLEO-3 was dabbling in exfiltration attempts in-
side Cuba, and has also successfully managed to pry funds out of
AMLEO-3 in attempts to buy her way into such efforts. As a result
AMLEO-3 has borrowed money from AMSHED-1 and family relatives in the
U.S. attempting to support his wife in these attempts, and is now in
debt to these individuals to the tune of $4-$5,000.00, On 5 May 1964,
AMLEO-3 informed his C/Outhat he had recently heard from his wife via
the Japanese diplomatic Courier channel and in her letter she had
told him that she planned to participate in an exfiltration attempt
from inside the Island the weekend of 10 May 1964. AMLEO-3 requested
the C/O to alert QKMAGNET to this attempt, and said that he expected
to have confirmation of the attempt by 1900 hours on 10 May 1964.
Nothing was heard from AMLEO-3 the night of 10 May 1964, but the fol-
lowing morning, at 0840 hours 11 May 1964, AMLEO-3 contacted the C/O
and gave him the following information:
"The exfiltration of my family will begin on the night
of 11 May 1964, and the group will consist of some 11
adults and children. They plan to depart from Playa
de Guanabo, between Havana and Matanzas, during the
night of 11 May 1964 and expect to arrive in Key West,
Florida sometime on 12 May 1964."

AMLEO-3 claimed he knew nothing about what type of boat the group
planned to use, nor the exact time of departure, route the boat would
follow, etc. It was not until 13 May 1964, that AMLEO-3 mentioned
to Bruce P. VEDDER and Leon C. FLUTEO, during a routine operational
meeting, that he had sponsored and masterminded the aborted exfiltratio
operation, and that the operation had been mounted from the U.S., and
not from inside the island, as he had previously claimed to the C/O.

3. On 14 May 1964, the C/O contacted AMLEO-3 and requested an
explanation of his sponsorship of the exfiltration operation. AMLEO-3
claimed he no longer felt bound to confide these activities on his
part to KUBARK, since KUBARK had refused to continue_its effort to
rescue his wife and family from Cuba, and furthermore that he would
continue such unilateral exfiltration efforts with or without KUBARK
help until he either rescued his family from Cuba, or died in his
attempts to do so. AMLEO-3 claims he organized the trip of the M/V
ADA by passing himself off as a PBPRIMER, and utilized the following
individuals in the operation.

A. Mario REMIS, probably identical with Mario REMIS-
CAMEJO, A-12 834 780; PDOB, Havana, Cuba on 6/20/23; who formerly
resided at Calle 130A, #36506, Wajay, Marianao, Havana, Cuba; came
to the U.S. from Cuba in August 1962 departing from Guanabo by small
boat with five other Cuban refugees. AMLEO-3_claims he used this
individual as his principal organizer in the expedition, and REMIS
had agreed to go into Cuba acting as a guide and leader of the group.
REMIS had previously resided in an area close to AMLEO-3's home in
Wajay, Cuba and had agreed to go to A-3's home and bring his family
out. REMIS did recruit and organize the boat crew, but at the last
minute supposedly was unable to make the trip because of other
committments_and instead turned his responsibilities over to the next
individual Daniel (RODRIGUEZ) Santos.

B. Daniel (RODRIGUEZ) Santos is the owner of the M/V
ADA, and brought the boat out from Cuba in his escape in November 1963
Since REMIS could not make the trip, he and A-3 reportedly briefed
RODRIGUEZ on the location of A-3's home in Wajay, and supplied him
with a recent photograph of Mrs. AMLEO-3 and her children, and AMLEO-3
wrote a bona fides message in his own handwriting on the back of the
photograph and also listed his home address without revealing (he says

CONTINUATION OF
DISPATCH
the true name of his wife. (This photograph was brought back by
RODRIGUEZ and returned to AMLEO-3). RODRIGUEZ then reportedly agreed
to lead the infiltration mission, and personally contact AMLEO-3's
family and the family of Jesus GOMEZ Calzadilla in Guines, Cuba and
take them to the exfiltration point. RODRIGUEZ also planned to bring
out his fiancee, and the other boat crew members had agreed to bring
out one or two relatives each, the total number of passengers was not
supposed to exceed 15 persons.

c. Armando BLANCO Lorenzo, Romelio LOPEZ Sosa, and
AMBIG-4 were recruited by RODRIGUEZ for the mission, and supposedly
AMLEO-3 did not have contact with them prior to the mission, nor were
they witting that he was one of the sponsors of the mission. AMBIG-4
was to bring out his father, mother, sister, younger brother, and his
own and LOPEZ's fiancees; BLANCO his wife and daughter; RODRIGUEZ,
his fiancee, and the wives and children of AMLEO-3 and Jesus GOMEZ
Calzadilla. AMLEO-3 has never been informed by his C/O that AMBIG-4
was a KUBARK asset, and AMLEO-3 has never indicated in any way that he
knew AMBIG-4 was a KUBARK asset. Since the boat in question, the M/V
ADA, was not equipped with a radio set, AMBIG-4 was obviously not
desired for use as a radio operator by the group.

4. AMLEO-3 informed the C/O that he had previously warned his
wife that something was to happen the weekend of 10 May 1964, and that
someone would be coming to see her with bona fides from him. Mrs.
AMLEO-3 also was instructed to supply this contact man with all the
pesos she had at her disposal, since the infiltrees reportedly were
able to take in only $170.00 worth of pesos with them. Since_the
abort of the mission, Mrs. AMLEO-3 has talked to A-3 by phone at least
three times, and she claims no one ever contacted her; that no one
has bothered her since the failure of the mission; and that she is
reportedly not under control or surveillance by the Cuban Intelligence
Services.

CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF UNSUCCESSFUL EXFILTRATION MISSION OF M/V ADA
4 May-8. May 1964
5. During this period the gasoline, food, and other necessities
were purchased along with four sets of green fatigues which the group
bought in a local Army/Navy store. They were also equipped with two
Colt .45 Cal pistols, one P-38 pistol, one Browning automatic 38 Cal
pistol, and 250 rounds of ammunition for the four weapons. These
weapons were taken on the mission for self defense purposes only.
The boat, the M/V ADA, was located at Sunset Harbor Marina, Stock
Island, Key West, Florida.

9 May 1964
6. On 9 May 1964, at approximately 1800 hours, the M/V ADA
departed from Sunset Harbor Marina, Stock Island, Key West, Fla for
Cuba. The crew was made up of Daniel RODRIGUEZ Santos, Rogelio LOPEZ
Sosa, Armando BLANCO Lorenzo, and AMBIG-4, The M/V ADA was enroute
to Cuba during the remainder of 9 May 1964, and nothing unusual
reportedly occurred during the voyage.

10 May 1964
7. The infiltration crew arrived in Cuba at a point approxi-
mately mile east of Playa Guanabo on 10 May 1964 at 1625 hours.
There was no beach per se at this spot but reefs from 6 to 9 feet high
They had difficulty mooring the boat because the water was turbulent
at the base of the reefs. In broad daylight, all four went ashore and
walked across the highway 'Via Blanca'. There were several empty
trenches between the highway and the coast line, but the group could
detect no vigilance in the area. LOPEZ was left hidden in the bushes
near the highway, while the other three proceeded into Guanabo to
o meet RODRIGUEZ contact. (in the CAC debriefing LOPEZ named one
Paulo MARTINEZ as RODRIGUEZ' contact in Guanabo. AMLABEL-1 states he
asked the name of this contact several times, but each time LOPEZ

CONTINUATION OF
DISPATCH
maintained that he did not know. AMLEO-3 also refused to tell the
C/O who the inside contact man in Guanabo was for the group. LOPEZ
may have let the name slip during his CAC debriefing, or else fabri-
cated a name.)
8. LOPEZ began to count cars to while away the time. During
the period 1630-1900 hours LOPEZ counted 38 6X6 type trucks with
approximately 50 militia each, all travelling in the direction of
Matanzas. One other truck, containing about 15 negroes and 6 whites,
who LOPEZ states were not Cubans, was observed going in the same
easterly direction. LOPEZ states that the traffic was unusually heavy
in both directions. RODRIGUEZ returned about 1900 and he and LOPEZ
went back to the boat. RODRIGUEZ told LOPEZ that he had been able to
get transportation for both AMBIG-4 and BLANCO; AMBIG-4 to Quivican and
BLANCO to Artemisa where their respective families are located.
RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ took the boat out about a mile, shut off the
engine and went to sleep. (The above information in para 8 is the
version AMLABEL-1 obtained from LOPEZ.)

9. In the AMLEO-3 version of this period, again acquired from
LOPEZ, AMLEO-3 reported the following activity: Upon his return to
the boat about 1900 hours, RODRIGUEZ saw LOPEZ and told him to wait
and then RODRIGUEZ returned to Guanabo to see his fiance and reportedly
to establish contact with friends of A-3 in the GOC. A-3 would_not
say how these contacts were carried out, but due to the time factor
it-is assumed they could only have been done by phone. A-3 claims
the contacts were as follows:

A. A high level civilian official of the GOC, with the
rank of Comandante probably in MINCONS, who is willing to collaborate
with the Rebel Army in exile, and willing to furnish their infiltrated
agents with official GOC vehicles to travel anywhere in the provinces
of Havana, Pinar del Rio, or Matanzas in order to carry out their
missions.

B. Some unnamed high level Cuban military officers.

A-3 claims that these officials are willing to listen to the Rebel Army
exiles, but do not intend to do anything positive with them unless they
demonstrate their power by eliminating AMTHUG-1, or carrying out
some type of pe of strong action that would prove they had strong outside
backing. AMLEO-3 stated that he would be more than willing to collab-
orate with KUBARK in furthering contact with these unnamed individuals
if KUBARK would support him in a future exfiltration to rescue his
family from Cuba. AMLEO-3 refused to provide any further information
relative to these supposed inside contacts of his. AMLEO-3 states
that RODRIGUEZ returned to the boat about 2330 hours on 10 May 1964,
and then he and LOPEZ boarded the boat and went out to sea for the
night. A-3 also stated that LOPEZ told him that at least eight local
fisherman dropped by to look at the boat while it remained at the reef,
and nothing was done to insure the cooperation of the fishermen nor
did LOPEZ attempt to hold them at the spot to prevent their informing
on the infiltration to local security authorities.

11 May 1964
10. After putting out to sea, RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ slept during
the night and awoke the next morning, 11 May, at about 1130 hours to
find themselves directly across from the city of Matanzas. They
returned to the Guanabo area about 2030 hours. (LOPEZ said the boat
would only do about 4 to 6 knots). They took the boat back close to
the original landing place, waited to see some light signals indi-
cating all was clear, and when they didn't see them they decided to
go in anyway and investigate. When approximately_20 yards off shore,
they were fired upon by automatic weapons and a spotlight came on
searching for them. The boat party was not hit by the fire and re-
treated to the open sea.

CONTINUATION OF
DISPATCH
11. The boat then travelled east for approximately two to three
miles down the coast from Guanabo, and they attempted to land on the
beach again. Due to large rocks and heavy surf they decided not to
attempt a landing and instead anchored the boat beyond the surf line
(about 30 yards out) and both RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ swam into the beach.
RODRIGUEZ went inland and caught a bus to Guanabo, and they went back
to the safehouse of Paulo MARTINEZ 06 At the safehouse he found the
pickup team of BLANCO and AMBIG-4, and some 28 people whom they had
acquired as passengers. These passengers were all relatives of BLANCO
and AMBIG-4, and BLANCO and AMBIG-4 told RODRIGUEZ they had been unable
to locate the homes of Jesus_GOMEZ_Calzadilla and AMLEO-3 and therefore
had not been able to contact these families. They then returned the
bona fides photos and messages to RODRIGUEZ to take back to AMLEO-3
and GOMEZ. (AMLEO-3 commented bitterly on this point stating that
AMBIG-4 and BLANCO probably went to their own homes first, and after
seeing the number of their relatives who wanted to come, never even
tried to find his home nor that of GOMEZ.) RODRIGUEZ, AMBIG-4, and
BLANCO agreed upon another exfiltration point to the east of Guanabo,
and arranged recognition signals. RODRIGUEZ then returned to the boat,
leaving AMBIG-4 and BLANCO to convoy the passengers in three cars to
the exfiltration point.
12. RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ arrived at the exfiltration point about
20 minutes after the appointed our of 2300, and halted the boat about
100 meters offshore.
They saw a light on top of the reef at which
point RODRIGUEZ told LOPEZ that the light was the proper signal,
(When asked about the recognition signals, LOPEZ stated that he did not
know what the exact signals were, but that they involved 2 or 3 lights
and an exchange of names. He maintains that RODRIGUEZ handled all
these details). They brought the boat right up to the reef at which
point they were fired upon from the top of the cliffs from the directio
of the highway. (AMLABEL-1 asked LOPEZ how they had planned to get
women and children down these steep cliffs. LOPEZ replied that the
difficulties-involved had not occurred to them. By the same token,
they had no extra food on board the boat to feed the families.)

13. RODRIGUEZ shouted to LOPEZ to jump overboard to use the
boat as protection against the rifle fire. LOPEZ states that RODRIGUE:
was hit as he jumped overboard. RODRIGUEZ could not swim because of
his shoulder wound. On RODRIGUEZ' command, LOPEZ (who by this time
had RODRIGUEZ around his neck) started to swim toward shore. LOPEZ
decided this avenue of escape was foolish, and turned back toward the
boat. LOPEZ pulled RODRIGUEZ aboard. He then claims that the rifle
(FAL) and machine gun fire was redirected, at this point, in toward
land rather than out to sea toward their boat. LOPEZ states that
this diversion was the only thing which saved them.

14. LOPEZ started the motor and was proceeding north when he
saw the signal lights of 6 or 7 small boats ringed in a semi-circle
in front of his boat. LOPEZ apprised RODRIGUEZ (laid out flat on the
deck) of this new development. Even though bleeding and barely con-
scious RODRIGUEZ asked LOPEZ if he could see the lights of Matanzas
City. LOPEZ said he could. RODRIGUEZ advised him to head toward
Matanzas hugging the coastline. The patrol craft (or fishing boats)
had since extinguished their lights. LOPEZ followed his advice and
several hours later arrived off Matanzas City having eluded the patrol
craft. RODRIGUEZ then told LOPEZ to turn the boat to the left until
the compass showed "N", straighten out and follow that course to Key
West. Three or four of the gas tanks had been pierced by the barrage,
and there was barely enough gas left to make it to Key West.
last remaining water tank was also shot up. They arrived at approxi-
mately 1730 hours at Sunset Harbor Marina, Stock Island, Key West,
Fla. on 12 May 1964.

Their
15. Upon arrival in Key West, Fla, RODRIGUEZ was hospitalized
and X-Ray pictures disclosed that the bullet had entered above his
right shouder blade and came out on his right side and penetrated thro
his arm. He had four cracked ribs, and it appeared that his right
lung was not punctured, but there was some blood between his lung and
the pleura and the Subject was operated on successfully the morning

CONTINUATION OF
DISPATCH
of 13 May 1964.
now hospitalized at Mount Sinai hospital, Miami, Florida. His con-
dition is now_satisfactory.
RODRIGUEZ has since been moved to Miami, and is

AFTER ACTION REPORTS
16. After the abortive exfiltration attempt by the M/V ADA,
various relatives of people involved began to receive telephone calls
and telegrams from Cuba reporting on the arrest or safety of various
individuals. The following excerpts were taken from various BARR cable
and debriefings of Romelio LOPEZ Sosa and AMLEO-3:

A. On 13 May 1964, AMSWIRL-1 visited Tomas RODRIGUEZ
Fuentes, of 1021 Margaret Street, Key West, former Captain with the
National Police in Havana who had received a telegram from his daughte
Elsa OLIVERA, at 0920 hours 13 May 1964. (She was supposed to have con
out with BLANCO and AMBIG-4 in the exfiltration). The telegram stated
(English translation) "Congratulations, we are well, love to all,
embrace. Your daughter.", and supposedly indicated the daughter was
safe.

B. On 14 May 1964, AMSWIRL-1 was told by Daniel RODRIGUE
Santos that Valentin BLANCO, relative of Armando BLANCO Lorenzo, had
received three telegrams from Cuba: the first on 10 May stated
"Armando arrived all is well"; the second on 11 May stated, "Armando
departed, all is well"; and the third on 13 May stated, "Yesterday's
cable no good, Armando admitted or hospitalized", meaning Armando
BLANCO had been picked up by Cuban authorities.

c. On 14 May 1964, AMLEO-3 called the C/O and informed
him that the 14 year old son of Mario REMIS (see para 3 A above) had
called his father in Miami at 1130 hours that same date, and told him
he had been arrested along with his mother and some other people while
trying to leave Cuba, and that the police had let the children free,
but continued to hold the adults under arrest. Reportedly only
one car had been picked up near the exfiltration point, and the people
in the other two cars had supposedly escaped arrest for the time being
As of 23 May 1964, no other information has been reported to KUBARK
on the fate of BLANCO, AMBIG-4, or the passengers who were at the
exfiltration point.

GENERAL COMMENTS ON TRIP OF THE M/V ADA
17. As noted in paragraph 8 of reference J, various operational
inconsistencies still exist in the account submitted above re the
exfiltration trip of the M/V ADA to Cuba. WAVE is of the opinion
that some of these inconsistencies can be attributed to genuine con-
fusion of facts by the principal source of information, Rogelio LOPEZ
Sosa, (who did not see the infiltration team of BLANCO and AMBIG-4
again after their infiltration inland), and the withholding of facts
by AMLEO-3 who considers this activity was his own personal būsiness
and had nothing to do with KUBARK. Daniel RODRIGUEZ Santos is
probably more knowledgeable of exactly what occurred during the infil-
tration, but due to his illness AMSWIRL-1 was not able to interrogate
him in Key West, and reportedly RODRIGUEZ is still very ill and
KUBARK does not consider it worthwhile to attempt an interrogation
of him at this time. It is also believed that RODRIGUEZ will withhold
information he considers privileged, and it has been noted that
AMLEO-3's principal organizer of the expedition, Mario REMIS, has
been visiting RODRIGUEZ daily in Mount Sinai hospital in Miami, Fla.
Since the two infiltrees, BLANCO and AMBIG-4, are either under arrest
or in hiding it is doubtful that their inside activities relative to
AMLEO-3's family etc., will ever be completely clarified.'
18. As noted in paragraph 9 of reference J, AMLEO-3 continues
to look for methods whereby he may exfiltrate his family from Cuba,
and has reached the point where he is no longer rational in his
reasoning re the risk factors to himself or his family. AMLEO-3 is

CONTINUATION OF
DISPATCH
definitely acting out of dosperation, and although he does not desire
to burn all his KUBARK bridges behind him, he feels that he must since
KUBARK will not permit him to undertake such activities while under our
control. WAVE's position on the matter has been fully stated in
paragraph 9 of reference J. On 22 May 1964 WAVE requested BARR to con-
tact AMSWIRL-1 and inform him that KUBARK was desirous of having him
insure that the M/V ADA was not permitted to carry out further family
rescue missions to Cuba at this time.

Anthony K. Reuteman
Andrew K. REUTEMAN
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

Deputy Chief, WH/SA

Chief of Station, JMWAVE
RYBAT/TYPIC/AMWORLD/AMLILAC
Report on Activities of AMWORLD

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE: NONE.

1. AMLILAC/33 obtained the following information from
IDEN A and IDEN B, former members of the AMWORLD Group. The
date of the information is mid-july 1964.

    a. IDEN A was an instructor in a commando section
    headed by IDEN C, in a camp located near IDEN D. He was
    given the job of instruction in the AR-15 and AR-10 rifles.
    Since no manuals were available he had to use the book,
    Small Arms of the World. The men in IDEN C's command are
    unhappy because they do not trust the planning judgement of
    IDEN C. The second in command, IDEN E, is so hated by the
    men that when IDEN C leaves the camp he has to take IDEN E
    with him.

    b. The Intelligence Chief of AMWORLD is IDEN F. He
    maintains that the prerequisate for men in the INTEL section
    is personal loyalty to AMBIDY/1. At one time a PBPRIMER,
    who works with AMBIDDY/1, presented IDEN F with a list of
    men for duty in the Intel section. IDEN F accepted the
    list and the men but after the PBPRIMER left he transferred
    the men to other sections. Recently IDEN F arrested a man
    in the Group and charged him as a spy for AMBANG/1. The
    man was physically beaten and jailed. Later IDEN F admitted
    he made a mistake, released the man, gave him several hundred
    dollars and told him to forget the incident.

CONTINUED

Attachment: U/S/C
3 cys, IDENS

Distribution:
Orig & 2 Addressee- w/att U/S/C

DATE TYPED
3 Sept 64

DATE DISPATCHED
SEP 10 1964

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-17603

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-27/4

CONTINUATION OF
DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-17603

c. The Navy section is composed of a Chief, IDEN G,
Chief of Operations, IDEN H, and Assistant Chief of Opera-
tions, IDEN I. The morale of the ship's crews is low and
many of them state that they will jump ship at the first
port of call. A large powered barge is anchored at the Navy
Base and contains all the arms, and ammunition. There is a
staging base in IDEN J. A new base of ships is being set up
in IDEN K along with an airstrip. Teams for operations will
be flown to this base from IDEN J, go by ship on the opera-
tion, return to this base, and then fly back to IDEN J.

d. For operational briefings AMWORLD uses the same
photos KUBARK uses (The men who have worked for KUBARK and
AMWORLD are aware of this.).

e. AMBIDDY/1 spends most of his time flying around
Central America in a light plane. He has hired IDEN L, a
free lance PBRUMEN photographer, to, film the camps and
activities and to publicize AMWORLD.

f. IDEN M stated that AMBIDDY/1 acknowledged that he
planned one operation per month for the next 3 months and
then make an all out push with the guerrilla teams. IDEN M
commented that if things did not improve AMWORLD would not
be in existence 3 months from now.

g. AMWORLD has 3 large houses in the capital of IDEN J
for recreation. Small groups are escorted to these houses
from the camps. There is no limit to expenses for drinking
and eating.

h. The chief engineer for the group is IDEN N. He is
in charge of building the airstrips.

i. The infiltration team with the mission of assassin-
ating AMTHUG/1 is headed by IDEN M. Date of the operation
is unknown.

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO:
UFGA-17603, 3 September 1964

IDEN A: Humberto CASAS

IDEN B: Tulio LEISECA

IDEN C: FNU ACEBO

IDEN D: "Puerto CABEZAS"

IDEN E: Reynaldo GARCIA

IDEN F: "Chino" MOLE

IDEN G: Manoline GUTIERREZ

IDEN H: Ricardo "The Mexican", ex-crewman of the BEE

IDEN I: Generoso BRINGA

IDEN J: Nicaragua

IDEN K: Dominican Republic

IDEN L: Guayo HERNANDEZ

IDEN M: Marco ULLOA

IDEN N: "Juan Jose" ABREU

SECRET
1104-10308-10127 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DISPATCH
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MICROFILMED JAN 20 1964
TO: Chief, Special Affairs Staff
FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE (AKR
SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL/TYPIC/AMFAUNA
AMFAUNA-26 Progress Report for October, November and December 1963

Action Required: For Your Information
Reference: UFGA-11700, dated 14 October 1963

Operational Developments:

1. Seven SW messages were received from AMFAUNA-26 during the period, and two were sent to her. Two SW messages written by AMFAUNA-2 no. 34 and no. 36, have not been received and it is not known what has happened to them. It has been observed that mail to and from Cienfuegos is very slow and uncertain; SW message no. 10 sent to AMFAUNA-26 on 6 November did not reach her until 22 December.

2. A continuing effort was made during the period to activate AMFAUNA-26's OWVL and medium speed radio systems. OWVL transmissions were begun on 16 October with message no. 1 warning AMFAUNA-26 of the arrest of AMFAUNA-14 the week before (see AMFAUNA-1 Progress Report for October, November and December 1963) and the fact that AMCUTLER-2 was under surveillance. AMFAUNA-26 was unable to receive this message. In her SW message no. 35 of 25 October, she reported that her radio set is calibrated in meters instead of kilocycles and she had been unable to find the correct frequency. JMWAVE then sent AMFAUNA-26 instructions for converting kilocycles to meters, and began transmitting dummy messages, giving AMFAUNA-26 a simple code for reporting by commercial telegram whether she was receiving them, and whether and with what books she was able to decipher.

3. Two sets of deciphering materials had been sent to AMFAUNA-26. One package was buried by AMGLEN-9 in Pinar del Rio Province (see WAVE-5887 of 16 October 1963), and AMFAUNA-26 was informed of its location in OWVL message no. 1 of 16 October and SW message no. 10 of 6 November. A previous set of number groups had been sent to her by SW early in

Distribution

3 - Hqs

INDEX

Continued....

DATE TYPED: 9 Jan 1964
DATE DISPATCHED: JAN 15 1964

CS COPY

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
UFGA-13428
19-6-50/3
19-6-50/3

13-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-13428

October. It now appears that AMFAUNA-26 never received either of these sets of groups. As of 22 November when AMFAUNA-26's sister Olga arrived in Mexico (see paragraph 5), AMFAUNA-26 already had in her possession: the letter containing the groups written in SW, but either had tried and failed to develop it, or had hesitated to try to do so, not knowing in what strength to use the reagent and erroneously thinking that this was a critical factor. As mentioned previously, AMFAUNA-26 did not receive SW message no. 10 until 22 December; on the following day she sent an open telegram to the son of AMFAUNA-32 in Miami, confirming her willing-ness to travel to Pinar del Rio and recover the material. It is not known whether she actually did so.

4. It had been planned, once AMFAUNA-26 was receiving OWVL and her ability to recover caches confirmed, to have AMWEE-1 cache AMFAUNA-1' radio and to inform AMFAUNA-26 of its location by OWVL. Events did not permit this.

5. AMFLORA-1 sent a telegram to his JMWAVE area accommodation address on 16 November 1963, reporting that his wife, the sister of AMFAUNA-26, was due to arrive in Mexico City on 20 November. Mexico City Station was so informed on 18 November (see WAVE-7762), but by the time confirmation arrived (MEXI-7031 of 23 November) the lady had already departed for Caracas. The oral messages which she brought from AMFAUNA-26 therefore did not reach JMWAVE until 20 December when HVCA- 10780 was received. This dispatch transmitted a typewritten note from AMFLORA-1's wife containing the following information:

a. AMFAUNA-26 had run out of developer pills. (In retrospect, this does not seem to be true, because AMFAUNA-26 was evidently able to develop SW message no. 10 which she received on 22 December (see paragraph 3). What AMFAUNA-26 had probably been trying to convey was that she was running very short of pills. AMFAUNA-1-does not remember how many he gave her, but the most probable number appears to be twelve.)

b. AMFAUNA-26 had been unable to develop the SW message containing her cipher groups, because she had not been told how to mix her reagent.

c. AMCUTLER-2 was very worried by the fact that AMFAUNA-14 had been telephoning her frequently, and was afraid that AMFAUNA-14 was betraying her to the DSE.

d. AMFAUNA-26 was uneasy about being left in Cuba without a responsible leader to report to.

e. AMFAUNA-26's cover was wearing very thin, due to indiscretions by AMFAUNA-31.

6. In her SW message no. 29, which was received at JMWAVE on 21 October, AMFAUNA-26 reported that AMFAUNA-38 had been arrested on 7 September and taken to Santa Clara. At 0200 hours on the following morning, fourteen policemen came to AMFAUNA-26's house and searched it on the pretext of looking for a burglar. However, the only part of the house which they searched was the part inhabited by AMFAUNA-26.

7. In her SW message no. 30, AMFAUNA-26 reported the full names of two individuals who had approached her sub-agents AMFAUNA-29 and AMFAUNA-31, claiming to be doing underground work against CASTRO. These persons are one Amable SANCHEZ Borroto and one Raul SIMON Delgado. While neither JMWAVE nor Headquarters (DIR-78835 of 30 October 1963) had any traces on these persons, JMWAVE has a carded reference to a sensitive source document which carries the full name of Amable SANCHEZ Borroto and the implication that he enjoys the confidence of the Cuban Government. Unfortunately, an error was made in typing the card, and the document is unrecoverable. In SW message no. 10, AMFAUNA-26 was told to be careful with the person.

FORM 5-60530 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

13-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-13428

8. On 12 October 1963, AMFAUNA-26 was in Havana where she saw AMCUTLER-2. About 23 or 24 October she was again in Havana and again saw AMCUTLER-2. On both occasions the problems posed by the arrest of AMFAUNA-14 were the prime topic of discussion.

9. In outgoing SW message no. 9 of 30 September, AMFAUNA-26 had been asked to investigate a Cuban naval officer named Carlos *LOPEZ Avalos with a view to forming an opinion as to his political attitude. She reported in SW message no. 37 of 3 November that all reports on this individual were derogatory except for one given by AMLAME-5. This report reached AMFAUNA-26 via AMFAUNA-31 who got it from a man identified only as Ramon PEREZ who said that AMLAME-5 had told him that he had a contact to the Swiss Embassy, and that LOPEZ was already connected with people outside of Cuba and had recently performed a great service for the counterrevolution.

10. When the arrest of AMCUTLER-2 became known to JMWAVE (see AMFAUNA-1 Progress Report for October, November and December 1963) the son of AMFAUNA-32 was asked to phone his mother in Cienfuegos and instruc her to tell AMFAUNA-26 to go into hiding. On 3 January the son reported completion of the call and said that his mother had told him that AMFAUNA-26 had been arrested on 29 December and taken to the Santa Clara prison.

11. The reason for AMFAUNA-26's arrest remains obscure, or rather there are so many acceptable explanations that the problem is to select the right one. She could have been implicated by AMFAUNA-38, as would seem to be suggested by the fact that her house was searched immediately following AMFAUNA-38's arrest; if so, however, it is hard to explain why AMFAUNA-26 herself was not arrested until three and one-half months later. She could have been denounced by AMCUTLER-2 who was herself arrested two or three days before AMFAUNA-26's arrest; this seems unlikel in view of the fact that AMCUTLER-2 and AMFAUNA-26 are friends, that when AMCUTLER-2 reaches the point where she is ready to implicate other members of the AMFAUNA net she could be expected to begin with people who are not her friends, and that at least one such person (AMFAUNA-25) was known to be at liberty as recently as 4 January 1964, as were two of the cutouts between AMFAUNA-26 and AMCUTLER-2 (AMFAUNA-32 and AMFAUNA-33). AMCUTLER-2 is believed to have been under surveillance by the DSE, at least sporadically, between 12 and 24 October (see AMFAUNA-1 Progress Report for October, November, and December 1963), and AMFAUNA-26 could have been observed and identified when she visited AMCUTLER-2 during this period and marked for subsequent arrest and interrogation in connection with AMCUTLER-2's activities. AMFAUNA-26 could have made an attempt between 22 and 29 December to recover the cached cipher groups (see paragraph 3), and either been detected in the act or arrested while trying to contact AMCUTLER-2 on the same trip; in this case, however, it would seem that the DSE would not have transported her all the way back to Santa Clara but would have kept her in Havana for concurrent interrogation with AMCUTLER-2. The open telegram sent to the son of AMFAUNA-32 on 23 December was rather indiscreet and could have caused difficulties for the sender, but some of these difficulties ought in this case to have brushed off on AMFAUNA-32 herself, and as of 3 January 1964 she was still at liberty.

12. Information received from HULAKE-1 on 8 January 1964 indicates that a general roundup began in Cienfuegos on 26 December, possibly in connection with a suspected plot against the life of Fidel CASTRO, and that at least seventeen persons had been taken. One of these persons appears to be AMLAME-5. To the best of JMWAVE's knowledge, neither AMFAUNA-26 nor AMLAME-5 had been involved in any plot against the life of Fidel CASTRO, but both could have been high on a general suspect list. The only known factor common to both AMLAME-5 and AMFAUNA-26 is the Ramon *PEREZ mentioned in paragraph 9. AMLAME-5 evidently was extraordinarily indiscreet when he talked with this man. ANFAUNA-31 has also spoken with him, and according to the oral message brought out by AMFAUNA-26's sister (see paragraph 5-e) AMFAUNA-31 has been habitually indiscreet. Ramon PEREZ was thus in a position to denounce both AMLAME-5 and AMFAUNA-26. If so, AMFAUNA-31 also ought to have been implicated, and it is perhaps significant in this connection that, of all of

FORM 5-60 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

13-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-13428

AMFAUNA-26's sub-agents, AMFAUNA-31 is the only one believed to be in hiding as of 3 January (see WAVE-9940 of 4 January).

13. There has been no previous mention of Ramon PEREZ in the AMFAUNA operational reporting, and JMWAVE has no identifiable traces on him. AMFAUNA-1 was asked about him on 6 January, and produced the following information which he had obtained from Antonio Remigio *ESTRADA Diaz (born October 1939, Cienfuegos now residing at 1425 S.W. 5th St., Apt. 10, Miami and a former collaborator of the AMFAUNA net in Cienfuegos. Ramon PEREZ is an employee of the Consolidado de Transporte, lives on Calle Arguelles in Cienfuegos between Prado and Gacel, and has a son, name unknown, who drives a taxi.

14. On 5 and 6 January 1964, warning messages were sent to AMFAUNAS 29, 30, 31 and 33 by Antonio Remigio ESTRADA Diaz and by AMFAUNA-1 (see WAVE-0045 of 7 January 1964).

Production:

15. The following reports were made:

UFG-3918 Loading of a Ship at La Isabela with trailers Carrying 40- foot Long Covered Objects

UFG-3941 Relocation of Radar Installations & Other Activities at the Cienfuegos Surface-to-Air Missile Site, Las Villas Province

UFG-3947 Installation of an unusual Light at Cifuentes SAM Missile Assembly Base, Las Villas Province; Dress, Habits, & Expected Departure of Soviets at Cifuentes

UFG-3948 Increase in the Number of Tanks & Soviet Personnel at the Sagua la Grande SAM Missile Site; Relocation of a Sagua la Grande Soviet Headquarters

UFG-3974 Departure of Soviets from the Remedios Area; Movement of Trucks, Guns, & Soviet Personnel in Las Villas Province

UFG-3998 Military Defense Measures at Cayo Loco, Las Villas Province

UFG-4088 Arrival of Unexplained Vehicles at Las Auras, Cienfuegos & Dismantling of that Base

UFG-4141 Cuban Military Occupation of Former Soviet Camps Near Yaguaja & at Fincas La Puntilla, La Bajada, & Rojas

UFG-4180 Removal of Some Equipment & Personnel from the Soviet Base at Itabo, Las Villas Province

UFG-4266 Field Comment Only

UFG-4272 Alleged Transfer of all Cuban Militiamen to the Central Army. New Defense Measures Along the Southern Coast of Las Villas Province

Expenses:

16. Three separate remittances each of $270.00 or a total of $810.00 were sent to AMFAUNA-26 during this period. By previous agree- ment one quarter of the money was to be given to AMFAUNA-32 and three-quarters was to be retained by AMFAUNA-26. The first two remittances were sent to AMFAUNA-32 by her son, and each was acknowledged by telegram. The third remittance, at the telegraphed request of AMFAUNA-26, was sent to AMFLORA-1 in Caracas. Evidently his wife came to some arrangement with AMFAUNA-26 before she left Cuba.

Future Plans:

17. Communication will be maintained with AMFAUNA-33, first by telephone and later if possible by clandestine means, for the purpose of

FORM 5-60 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

13-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-13428

learning the status and whereabouts of affected members of the AMFAUNA- 26 group. As soon as the situation has crystallized the whereabouts of burned agents learned, and secure communications established, an attempt will be made to exfiltrate endangered personnel.

End of Dispatch

FORM 5-60 530 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

10 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Requirements Briefing to FBI Informant Going to Cuba

1. In accordance with arrangements previously made with the FBI by SAS/CI/Liaison, the undersigned went to New York on 8 July to brief an FBI informant who is going to Cuba for two weeks. I had a short session at the FBI office in NYC with Dale Schwant, the case officer, and we then met with the informant for about two hours in a room at the Prince George Hotel. The informant had been told that I would be at the meeting and that I represented the Agency, but I was not introduced to him by name.

2. The FBI informant - Victor Thomas * Vicente is an American- born Puerto Rican born in NYC in 1930. He has been under FBI control for nearly 3 years penetrating the three pro-Castro organizations in NYC: the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC); the Casa Cuba, and the Jose Marti Club. Through the first two years Subject was only a marginal asset, in the last six months he has become a valuable penetration for the FBI into the above 3 organizations as well as the Cuban UN delegation, having apparently won the complete confidence of the pro-Castro leaders and Cuban officials in NYC. Recently he was asked to join the CPUSA. Subject works as a shipping clerk in a coffee plant in Brooklyn. He has the appearance and other attributes, according to Dale Schwant, for the role of pro-Castro revolutionary. The Cubans have expressed an interest in his moving to Cuba to work. He is willing to go but his wife is against it, but idea is still alive.

Cuban Sponsorship

3. Subject is leaving NYC for Mexico City on 13 July and he expects to go on to Cuba illegally on 15 July. The Cuban Ambassador to the UN, Raul Primellas, has arranged for a Cuban visa to be ready at the embassy in Mexico City, and also passage to Habana on a Cubana flight. Subject is also

SECRET

- 2 -

armed with a letter of introduction from the National Director of the FPCC, Vicent Theodore Lee. On 6 July the 3 pro-Castro organizations named above held a party for Subject and raised $100.00 for his trip.

Informant's Contacts in Cuba

4. Subject will contact several friends in Cuba who are milicianos, one of them in Santiago, Oriente Province. They were fellow activists in pro- Castro organizations in NYC who have returned to Cuba. He also has been given (by his Cuban friends) the address of a family whose son is the chauf- feur of Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. Arrangements have also been made for Subject to talk to the American Communist in Habana, Robert Williams. Subject, who will be accompanied by his wife on this trip, has been instructed by his Cuban superiors to take a camera with him to take pictures of Cuba for showing at organizational meetings in NYC. Something similar had been done previously by the head of the FPCC on his trip to Cuba in December 1962. The note-taking in connection with the photos will be a device enabling Subject to record intel information difficult to remember.

5. I briefed Subject during a two hour period using as a guide the attached requirements outline, prepared with Henry Kitchens) SAS/Intel/Requirements, and Antia Potocki, SAS/CI/Sov-Sat. I had also discussed Subject's mission to Cuba with SAS/SO/Rodriguez and DC/SAS/EOB. I stressed, as did the FBI case officer, that while fully exploiting his militia and other contacts for the desired information, he must always be guided by security considerations. After an agent role for three years, Subject expressed confidence in his ability in carrying out his mission successfully.

6. I should add that I was very cordially received at the NYC FBI office and that Mr. Schwant was most cooperative. I referred to our memorandum to his headquarters indicating that the Agency had a world-wide program to send controlled CP and front penetrations on missions to Cuba, and I expressed the hope that this might be only our first joint effort. He agreed wholeheartedly, adding that he personally would be particularly happy to cooperate if Subject informant should move permanently to Cuba and play the role of resident agent. As soon as Subject returns from Cuba Mr. Schwant will let us know and arrange for the debriefing.

Louis De Santi

SAS/CI/CP

Attachment: Herewith

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SUBJECT: AMSANTA Project

Job # 65-427/38 Box 7

File # 19-6-73/3

Volumes: 5

1. Description:

Coverage of Castro Communist regime through use of existing Communist Party and front penetration assets. File was opened in December 1962.

2. Findings:

Memo for the Record dated 10 July 1963 by Louis

De Santi SAS/CI/CP

FBI informant Victor Thomas VICENTE, Puerto Rican
citizen, who penetrated CP's in NY City left NY for Cuba via Mexico as guest of ICAP. Was debriefed by CIA staffer Lou
DeSanti upon return to U.S. in July-Aug 63. VICENTE stated
he had interviews with CASTRO and Che GUEVARA. VICENTE
penetrated the FPCC, the Casa Cuba, and Jose Marti Club in New York City. Page 127 of IG 1967 report mentions unnamed Puerto Rican who claims he participated in Castro inspired assassination plot in Dallas. Don't know if VICENTE could be that individual.

Attachment: LAD/JFK Task Force

Researcher: KGB

3. Checked/VICENTE 201-731222.

SECRET

Requirements Outline

1. Details of Cuban-Soviet agreements and Castro-Khrushchev under- standings re:

a. Soviet economic aid

b. Soviet military presence

c. Cuban rapprochement and posture vis-a-vis U. S.

d. Training of Cubans in Soviet bloc to man weapon systems under Soviet command; question of whether Cubans to acquire command control over these weapons systems.

e. How far and how fast is Castro to go in exporting violent revolution in Latin America.

2. Demobilization of regular militia and what relation it has (if any) to the take-over by Soviets of some internal security functions.

a. What part or percent of militia has been demobilized.

b. To what extent has civilian militia been disarmed of automatic weapons.

c. Have Soviets actually taken over control of police stations in certain cities or towns. Which cities.

d. Purposes behind demobilization and disarming of militia.

(1) To minimize resistance potential?

(2) Are Soviets telling Castro to put more people to work on the farms and they will take care of internal security?

e. Reaction of milicianos to demobilization and disarming.

3. Hard information on missiles (all types) and Soviet troops. (Differentiate between facts and propaganda for foreign and/or domestic con- sumption.)

SECRET

- 2 -

4. Communism:

a. Secret existence of PSP

b. PURS when First Congress to be held

c. Reactions of rank and file party members - and general public - toward Fidel and Soviet Union.

d. Economic conditions, popular support of regime especially in provinces and outlying areas

e. Pro-Soviet or pro-Chicom alignments of party leaders or rank and file.

5. Addresses of places where Subject is taken to attend meetings, lectures, get instructions, etc. also, of his contacts and Communist leaders.

6. ICAP, its role in this trip

a. Contacts and methods of arranging illegal trip in Mexico

- person in charge

- financing

- route

b. Arrival in Habana

(1) Who there to receive him

(2) Entry formalities; what papers or forms to fill out, etc.

(3) Guided tour or free to go any place on his own; lodging arrangements, etc.

c. What Soviets, Sats, or foreign Communists does he meet

d. Take note of, and bring back if possible, any materials printed in Soviet Bloc or Red China,

e. What use are Soviets/Cubans making of American defectors in Cuba; what role are they playing.
104-10308-10165
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET
ROUTING
DIRECTOR
RIO DE JANEIRO
ACTION C/SAS 3
INFO : DOP, VR

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET 0 181969Z
DIR TO WAVE CITE RIOD 2944
GRYBAI TYPIC YORITE ANSTRUT
1. ANSTRUT-1 VISITED 13 DECEMBER BY MARIO ROGERIO MESTRINHO DE
MELLO OFFICIAL IN BRAZILIAN EMBASSY HAVANA NOW ON LEAVE(RIOD.)

REPORTED FOLL

BRAZILIAN END BASTIGO PINTO INTOXICATED NOTE FREQUENTLY
HD FOR EXTENDED PERIODS OF TINE.
B. WIDE RUMOR ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT FIDEL CASTRO AFTER HIS
APPEARANCE ON 6 DECEMBER RESULTED KILLING MAN NEXT TO HIM.
CASTRO UNINJURED. WOULD BE KILLER STILL AT LARGE.
C. RECENT BRAZILIAN FOREIGN TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS RESULTING
DIFFICULTIES BRAZIL CORNIES DESIRING VISIT CURA. NO DETAILS GIVEN.
(ALSO KLEO)
D. WIDE RUMOR CUBAN JOSE "POPE" GLANUZAKHET LEE OSWALD IN
MEXICO BEFORE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION.

E. (MESTRINHO) RETURNING CUBA LATE JANUARY 1964. AGREED TAKE
PERSONAL ITEMS REQUESTED BY A-1'S FRIENDS.
2. (MESTRINHO) ALSO DELIVERED TO A-1 LETTER FROM MARIANNA ARGUELLES
WHO WROTE:

COMOTE ELIGERO ALENJIRA, FORMED
HAS NOT YET RETURNED FROMALGIERS WITH GROUP CUBANS
COUTE OF
TOD IN HAVANA
THERE
SECRET
13-00000.

FOR TRAVIING MISSION.

NOUL DIAZ ARGUFIES, WHO STILL STRONG TROITE,
WILL SOON GO WITH CLASS TO KOSCOW FOR SIX MONTHS ADDITIONAL TRAINING
AFTER FINISHING COURSE SUPERIOR WAR SCHOOOL CN CUBA.

WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW SHE CAN AGAIN WRITE TO
"PANCHO." COMMENTS A-1 SAYS THIS INDICATION MARIANNA WANTS TO
COOPOΛΑΤΗ WITH ANTI-COMMUNISTS ΑΞΛΙΝ.
IN ANOTHER LETTER, AMSTRUT-2 WROTE A-1 FOLL:

SHE HAD HEARD FROM "FRIENDS" AND HAS FURNISHED REQUESTED
DATA TO OBTAIN THEIR (TRAVEL) DOCUMENTATION, BUT TO DATE NO ACTYON.
B. HER SITUATION VERY DIFFICULT, BUT VOICED STRONG. HOPE
CUBA WOULD EVENTUALLY OVERCOME ITS CURRENT PROBLEMS. SAID A-1
WAS RIGHT ARHIT THAT WOULD HAPPEN AFTER MOTHER DIED. LETTER
OTHERVISE HOLIDAY FREETING.

A-1 SAID MESTRINHO WHO HAD RIGHT LETTERS WITHOUT ENCULSEDGE
FINTO, DID NOT KNOW CONTENTS, NOR BELIEVED TO HAVE KNOWN
ASADOR PINTO
RIGINATORS OTHER THAN MARIANNA ALEMJEIRA A-1 HAS CONFIDENCE (MESTRINHO
AS BEING TRUSTED COURIER) A-1 HOWEVER ADVISED (MESTRINHO) ACTED VOUNT-
ARILY UPON RESOEST FROM HER FRIENDS, SINCE A-1 HAS WRITTEN... NO LOITERS A
PER KÜBARK INSTRUCTIONS.
5. SINCE A-1 INTENDED TO PURCHASE LOCALLY SHOES, SAOP, SHAMPOO,
ROLL FILM, ETC.. GEQUESTED BY MARIANNA ALEMJEIRA STATION OFFERED TO
SUPPLY SAME AS FAVOR A-1
6. OTHER THAN NOTED ABOVE DOES HEADQUARTERS HAVE ANY INTEREST
IN GOSTKINHO AS COORIER RUN RIOD,
SECRET
SECRET
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

11 OCTOBER 1964

MGE 27. RECEIVED YOUR RM 44 AND 45. WHEN WE SAID THAT JUAN MANUE
FERNANDEZ (A-27) COULD NOT BE INSTRUCTED IT WAS BECAUSE HE EXPEC
TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY. IN THE SAME MGE, WE ASKED YOU THAT HE BE
SEPARATED FROM THE JAGUAR GROUP. HE WANTS TO LEAVE CUBA BECAU
HE THINKS THAT CUBAN COMMUNISM WILL LAST A LONG TIME BEFORE
BEING ELIMINATED FROM POWER AND THAT LIFE IN CUBA IS DIFFICULT
FOR ALL MEN WHO DO NOT SUBMIT TO ITS DOCTRINE. THAT'S WHAT HE TO
US. WHEN WE TOLD YOU OF OUR DESIRE TO TAKE LUIS RODRIGUEZ INTO οι
JAGUAR GROUP, WE DID SO ASKING YOUR PERMISSION. AFTERWARD WE WII
TELL HIM YOUR DECISION IN THIS CASE. WE FURTHER PROPOSED THAT
HE (RODRIGUEZ) BE GIVEN NUMBER A-27 WHICH WAS ABANDONED BY
FERNANDEZ. WE REMEMBER. WE ARE AWAITING YOUR AUTHORIZATION TO
INSTRUCT A-35 IN SW. WE KNOW OF NO CASES OF OFFICIALS WHO ARE IN
PRISON FOR AFFECTING THE ECONOMY. ON THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT
AGAINST FIDEL, WE KNOW THEY TOOK TWO CIVILIANS WOUNDED BY
SHOOTING TO THE CALIXTO GARCIA HOSPITAL. MOMENTS LATER, TWO
XXIXIXIX SOLDIERS FROM FIDEL'S GUARDS PRESENTED THEMSELVES IN SAID
HOSPITAL TAKING AWAY THE WOUNDED. WE DO NOT KNOW MORE DETAILS..
IN THE LAST DAYS OF LAST MONTH, 70 TRACKED TANKS ENTERED A CAMP
LOCATED BETWEEN SANTA MARIA DEL ROSARIO AND EL COTORRO. THE TA
WERE TRANSPORTED ON TRAILERS FROM WHERE WE DO NOT KNOW. (A-24)
THE 4TH OF OCTOBER, THE RUSSIAN SHIP "SIRHOTE ALIN" ENTERED THE
MARIEL PIER COMING FROM THE USSR WITH TOTAL CARGO OF CHEMICAL
lust
FERTILIZER IN BULK. REPORT JULIO CAMBAS WHOSE SECOND NAME IS
luct
TEXCIDO. XE REPEAT. SECOND NAME OF JULIO (TEXCIDO). A-7 = A-9.

THE CREW OF THE SHIP IS SOVIET AND NORMAL. THE NEWS OF THE FLEEΙΝΟ
OF COMMANDANT "CONTRERAS", CHIEF OF THE CUARENTENARIO BASE,
TOGETHER WITH A GROUP OF OFFICERS AND FRIENDS HAS BEEN CONFIRMED.
THERE ARE NUMEROUS PERSONS UNDER ARREST IN SAID BASE FOR NOT
HAVING PREVENTED THEIR FLIGHT. ANOTHER SIMILAR GROUP FLED
FROM THE GRAMMA BASE. ALL THE DESERTERS FLED IN CUBAN NAVY
LAUNCHES. WE SUSPECT THAT AT THIS MOMENT, THEY ARE IN U.S.
TERRIROTY. IF IT IS SO, WE ARE VERY HAPPY BECAUSE OF THE GREAT
DEAL THESE REPENTANT ONES KNOW. A-7= A-9 = A-15. TO BE
CONTINUED IN 28. ALSO REPORT ON NATIONAL BANK. GREETINGS. JUAN.
END END END
# UNCLASSIFIED
104-10308-10189 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
OUTGOING

SECRET

Charge: Classification Control: ROUTINE
Date: 11 JULY 63
DIST: 1 - SIG
CHIRON
1- INDEVCUT 3 OPS

20-18 20-10 20-11
ZURC INFO BERN CITE ENVA] CN

DOMARK FROM MIDDAUGH

RYBAT INDEVOUT 301

1. AS PART OF NEW G-2 COOPTED STATUS SUBJ MUST PROVIDE BOOKS
ON ESPIONAGE. HE HAS SENT SUCH AS HE AND WE HAVE ACCESS TO IN LOCAL
SHOPS AND HAS URGENT NEED TO SEND MORE VERY SOON. WE PLANNING ASK
LONDON MAKE EXHAUSTIVE PURCHASE BUT IN MEANTIME HAVE NEED PASS HIM
CIRCA TEN FOR IMMEDIATE POSTING TO

2. CAN YOU AT EARLY POINT RANSACK ZURC BOOKSTORES FOR ANY TYPE
OF WORK ON ESPIONAGE OR COUNTER ESPIONAGE OF LITERALLY ANY COUNTRY.
WORKS CAN INCIADE HISTORIC ITEMS LIKE WORLD WAR I BLACK ROOM, WORLD
WAR II LIKE BREAKING OF JAPANESE CODE, OPERATION NORTH POLE IN
HOLLAND, AND WHAT HAVE YOU, AS WELL AS WORKS BY COMMUNIST DEFECTORS
AND THE NEWER CROP OF ESPIONAGE STUDIES. THEY MUST BE IN ENGLISH
BOR FRENCH.

3. BOOKS HE HAS ALREADY SENT INCLUDE: RESEAU DE SPIONS,
L'HISTOIRE DE GESTAPO, CIA, MI 5, SECRET WAR, MANUEL DE ESPIONS, HER
MAJESTY'S SECRET SERVICE, TREASON IN TWENTIETH CENTURY, AND SEVERAL
UNIDENTIFIED BOOKS ON FASCISM.

4. WOULD APPRECIATE PHONE CALL AS SOON AS YOU KNOW HOW MANY BOOKS
YOU CAN GET. MAIL BOOKS COMMERCIALLY TO MIDDAUGH PRIVATE ADDRESS.
ORIG: MIDDAUGH RELEASEDON FUMARDS COPY IS

Classification PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".
Exclufar Single-address messages to the Department can be diverted to rouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without
retyping Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouchs in envelope marked "For DC/T".
COLATE 200
declassification
68.6.17

8/BR
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
UNCLASSIFIED
ONLY
CONFT VITAL
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEL
SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
WH/4/EXO
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
NO.

DATE
5 July 1960
SECRET
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

C/Prop
2.	(TOOMEY)
3.	(MANEY)
4.
5.	PROP
6.	Alice
7.	Kay
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

FILE Tempo
KHRUSHCHEL
visit
shumay
Couve up
onlons (his)
nest hip,

File Gindame

FORM
1 DEC 56
610
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958476731

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA:	Deputy Director (Plans)
SUBJECT:	Operational Exploitation of Khrushchev Visit to Cuba

: 1. This memorandum is for the Director's information only and does
not require action.

2. An invitation by the Government of Cuba to Khrushchev to visit
that country has been officially accepted, but as yet no definite time has
been set. There has been speculation that Khrushchev would arrive in
Habana for the 26th of July celebrations, while a press report, confirming
a statement of the Soviet Ambassador in Mexico, predicts the arrival for
August. Earlier reports had suggested December 1960 or January 1961
as possible dates.

3. It is felt that a successful visit by Khrushchev to Cuba would assist
further in the establishment of a solid Soviet understanding with that country,
with disturbing overtones on the possible establishment of closer Soviet
relationships in other parts of Latin America. For this reason it is
desirable to prevent the visit or to counteract it by a show of massive
opposition by the Cuban people.

4. On 21 June the Habana Station was asked for its views on possitie
plans. In the exchange of cables that has followed, the Station and Headquartert
are now in agreement that the best course of action lies in two operations.
First, a massive church manifestation or rally to be called for some other
purpose would afford the people of Cuba an obvious way to express their
protest. Second, the instigation of rumors that Khrushchev's life will be
in danger while in Cuba from a well-planned assassination attempt would
be propagated from other Latin American countries.

5. Because of the need of avolding action in Cuba in this matter th
would imperil Station assets, it has been determined that such assets would
be used only as a means of iustigating the church to hold the rally.

6. The latest report from Habana indicates that plans are going
satisfactorily. Bishop Boza Masvidalis described as enthused about the

-2
6
Idea.
ith Rose Lavastida, a prominent lay leader, he is now visiting
Camaguey to solicit the support of the local Bisanp. (Lavastide wi
will will seek
Bimilar support in Santiago. Tentative plans call for a congress or rally
on Assumption Day, 15 July.

7. The Station has asked that the entire effort begin with Guba,
without initial outside support from Cuban exile groups or the sponsors of
the anti-Castro programs on Station WRUL. A cable has been sent to 16-11
Bogotato have the CELAM) Spark similar rallies throughout Latin America.
WH press assets will be called upon to support these and the Cuban asso
when plans are firmer.
24
8. The (Argentine liaison service) will be asked to send one of its
contacts in the field of journalism to Habana to contact officials and to
visit the offices of the New China News Agency. He will be instructed to
ask Communist stall members there what substance there might be to
rumors he has heard that an assassination attempt on Khrushchev will take
place. The sante technique is being used through three Cubans living in
Miami who are in constant contact with Cuba. Speculation on such attempte
will be surfaced on the WRULL program and in certain controlled Latin
prees media.
J. C. Eing
Chief
Western Hemisphere Olvision
EHHinkle:Irh
5 July 1930
Distribution:
Original and 1 - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - DDP
1 - C/WHD
1 - C/WH/4
I
1 - Originator
WH/4/Crono

TO	: C/WH/4	
2 July 1960

Subject:	Khrushchev Visit to Cuba

1. Bäckground. An invitation to visit Cuba has been extended
to Khrushchev by the Government of Cuba. The invitation has been
accepted, but do definite time has been set. There has been some
speculation that Khrushchev would arrive in Havana in time for the
celebrations of the 26th of July. The press has reported that he
will arrive in August (a date confirmed by a statement of the Soviet
Ambassador in Mexico). Other reports say the visit will not take
place for several months, probably in December or January. In any
event we must plan for the possibility of the July visit.

It has been stated from several sanguine quarters that we
should "do the same thing to Khrushchev that the Japs did to Eisen-
hower". This is a completely unrealistic dream.

It is true that a successful Khrushchev visit to Cuba
would be the final stone in the construction of a solid Soviet
base in Cuba, with disturbing overtones for the possible construction
for more Soviet ideoligical bases in all of Latin America. For that
reason we are trying to do what we can to prevent the visit, or at
least to show a massive s opposition to it.

2. ExploitationPlans. On 21 June Hqs sent a cable to Havana
asking for views on possibility of a major effort to force cancellation
of the visit. A resulting series of cables shows that the station and
headquarters are now in agreement that our best hope lies in

a. A massive Church manifestation or rally, which
though called for some other purpose, would be to the people
of Cuba an obvious way to express their protest. And

b. from outside Cuba, instigating of rumors that
Khrushcher's life will be in danger from a well-planned
assassination attempt.

3. Mr. Helms has told us that he wants CIA to undertake no
action that will imperil Station assets. This injunction was placed
on us while we were exchanging cables with Havana. The result is that
station assets are actively instigating the church to hold the rally.
A cable from Headquarters has instructed the station to
continue this course of action as long as there is "safety in numbers",
i.c., as long as it is a church action rather that an AMPALM one.

4. The latest cable from the field (IN 18883) reports that
:
that plans are going satisfactorily Bishop Boza Masvidelis M
Em "enthused" about the idea. With Jose Lavastida a pá prominent
lay leader, he is now visiting Camaqusy to solicit the support of
the local ER Bishop. Jose Lavastida a promient lay leader, is
ting Camaguey
in Santiago to seek the help k of the Santiago Bishop. Tentative
plans call for a congress or rally on Assumption Day, 15 July.

The station has asked that the entire effort at least
begin within Cuba, without cuside support from FRD or WRUL.
29
5. Hemisphere Plans. A cable has gone out to CELAM, (in 16-11
Bogota, asking this Church organization to spark similar rallies
throughout Latin America. JMRAKE assets will be called upon to
support these and the Cuban meeting when a plans are firmer.
이
a
On the assassination E angle: (BIOGENISIS)
controlled agent (in B.A), is soon to visit high officials in
16-29
Havana. He has been instructed to ask these leaders what sub-
stance there might be to the rumors he has heard that an attempt
will take place..... Rivas, a friend of Rudy Gomez, is using the
same gx technique through three Cubans living in Miami
who are constant contact with Cuba.

Speculation on the assassination attempts will be surfaced
on the WRUL program, in AMPACA'S paper, etc.

David A. Phillips
104-10308-10269
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET
ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6
Relay to Paris (FMM) INFO
ATTHONTOKH

(EE NOTIFIED AND COPY ISSUED AT:1145, 30 OCT 63 )
ADOP, C/SOD 4, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/ME 2, C/SAS 5, RF, VR
EOB
30 DCT 63 IN 5047
INFO FRAN LOND BRUS HAGU MADR WAVE CITE HAMB 3880
ZPYAGON CASAILOR MHAPRON
33 36797 50361
IDENTITYA ISIDRO CONTRERAS) COMMANDING OFFICER OF PINAR DEL
TO NUAL DISTRICT WITH HOS IN BAHIA HONDA CLASSMATE AND VERY
FRIENDLYCHIEF OF NAVAL OPS AZTERAIN WHO APPEALED TO HIM TO
ASSUME PRESENT POSITION.
IDENTITY BFNU IGNARRA MATARRAN COMMANDING OFFICER OF EASTERN
SOUGE DISTRICT (ORIENTE)

JOSE PONCE FORMER COMMANDER OF TARMY OF THE CENTER
SANTA CLARA. BEGAN SIX MONTH GUIDED MISSILE COURSE IN
JULY 63 WHICH BEING CONDUCTED BY HIGH
CLASS OFFICERS. PONCE TOOK PART IN GRAMMA LANDING AND IS BROTHER
IN LAF OF RASIMO VALDEZ) (MINISTER OF INTERIOR.)

DENTITY DORLANDO FERNANDEZ REFERRED TO AS SABORIT
BY FRIENDS, COMMANDER IN NAVY NOW EMPLOYED AS EXECUTIVE IN MAMBISAS
HAVANA

IDENTITY EFNU JOMARON, BORN CIRCA 31, CAPTAIN) IN NAVY EMPLOYED
AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER TO IDEN BABOVE. WIFE, WHOSE BROTHER KILLED
THEREBELS AT BAY OF PIGS, NOW IN US WITH TWO CHILDREN

SECRET

13-00000

SECRET
IN 50+10
PAGE

CENTITY - JOSE CASTANERA BOT CIRCA 39, COMMANDER WHO
COLD COFIXED TITLE IN HAVANA ARMY HAS.
LOCITYG-ROMAN ALVAREZ, MA BISAS DIRECTOR

JOENTITY NO-TENRIQUE CAMARA BORN CIRCA 31, CHIEF OF POLICE
SANTA CLARA MULATIO MONCADO VETERAN AND LANDED WITH
GRAMMA.

ENU SAURET, BORN CIRCA 33, CAPTAIN IN ARMY
EMPLOYED IN HAVANA POLICE HOS. FORMER MEMBER CASTRO ARMY IN
SIERRA MASSTRA DURING BATISTA REGIME.
IDENTITYAJA-JOSE SUAREZ BORN CIRCA 25, NICKNAME PEPE NOW
COMMANDER SERVING WITH WESTERN ARMY IN PINAR DEL RIO MONCADA
VETERAN ORGANIZED RESISTANCE IN HAVANA DURING BATISTA REGIME.

IDENTITY K- ENRIQUE SANTANA, BORN CIRCA 28, CHIEF OF POLICE
WESTERN CUBA MONCADA VETERAN. MARRIED WITH FIVE CHILDREN IN
LFNU

ENTITY, BENTURA, SORN CIRCA 26, MEDICAL DOCTOR
NA HOSPITAL WHICH TREATS POLICEMEN AND THEIR FAMILIES
EXCLUSIVELY ALSO WORKS AS HAVANA PORT DOCTOR WHO BOARDS EACH
VISITING VESSEL WIFE, NAME UNKNOWN TO SURCE, IS ALSO MEDICAL DOCTOR
IN NAVANA. HE VETERAN OF ESCAMBRAY ACTION AGAINST BATISTA.
IDENTITY - PEPIN ARRUTI SEE HAMB 3320
IDENTITY NORLANDO MIRRET BORN CIRCA 33, FORMER FIRST
LIE TENANT IN ARMY, FOUGHT WITH UNIDENTIFIED RESISTANCE GROUP IN
ESCAMBRAYAGAINST CASTRO FORCES DURING FIRST HALF 63 NOW IN
CHIDING IN HAVANA.
IDENTITY OFNU OJEDA, BORN CIRCA 23, FORMER LIEUTENANTIN

CASTRO ARMY, FORMERLY FOUGHT AGAINST BATISTA IN SIERRA MAESTRA

SECRET

1.3-00000

SEGRED
15
PAGE
IQEN NABOVE FOUGHT DURING FIRST HALF 63 IN ESCAMBRAY AGAINST
STRO FORCES AND NOW HIDING IN HAVANA.
IDENTITYP FNULLANERAS, BORN CIRCA 28, FORMER CAPTAIN OR
IEUTENANT IN CASTRO NAVY NOW UNEMPLOYED IN HAVANA. MONCADA VETERAN
WORKED IN UNDERGROUND IN HAVANA AGAINST BATISTA. ARCHITECT BY
PROFESSION

IDENTITY Q- ROBERTO ROQUE NUNEZ, BORN CIRCA 18, LT COMMANDER
ISSNAVY SERVING NOW AS CHIEF OF COMMANDOS (NOT FURTHER
IDENTIFIED). GRAMMAR VETERAN.

IDENTITYR - PEDRO MIRET, BORN CIRCA 25, COMMANDER IN ARMY AND
CHIEFLOF CHIEF OF CABANA FORTRESS MONCADA VETERAN. FORMER MINISTER IN
CASTRO GOVT
IDENTITYS - FAUSTINO PEREZ BORN CIRCA 23, COMMANDER IN CASTRO
ARMY IN HAVANA HQS. GRAMMA VETERAN AND FORMER MINISTER IN CASTRO
GOVIC

SECRET
104-10310-10020

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

TRANSMITTAL SLIP |

TO: DDCI
1-

ROOM NO.
BUILDING

REMARKS:

FROM:

ROOM NO.
BUILDING
EXTENSION
55 FOREB-241
REPLACES FORM 36-6
WHICH MAY BE USED.
GPO 1957-0-439445
(0)

13-00000-

(CLASSIFICATION)
...

65-1507/2

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

In reply refer to
Action Memorandum No. A-450

Date 7 April 1965

ACTION

TO Deputy Director for Plans
Dopaty Director for Intelligence
: Deputy Director for Science & Technology
Deputy Director for support

Agreement Between the United states Secret Service
and the Central Intelligence Agency Concerning
SUBJECT : Presidential Protection in the United States

REFERENCE: Aecorandum from: DDCI to DD/L DD/F, and DD/S,
dated 8 June 1963, subject: The CIA Role in Support
of Presidential Trips Abroad

1. Attached for the information of addressees is a copy of subject
agreement developed by the Chief of the secret service and re, in accordance
with the recommendations of the Warren Commission and the actions of the
President's Committee on the Warren Report.

2. The Deputy Director for Plans la responsible for insuring
Agency con.pliance with this agreement and for maintaining the active liaison
with the Secret Service. The staff function in this regard is being performed
in the Counter Intelligence Staff of the DD/P. All Agency components in
liaison with the Secret Service are to keep the Counter Intelligence staff
inforned of their dealings with the jocret Service, The Counter Intelligence
Staff will provide advice to other Agency components who receive requests
for support from the Secret Service.

3. This agreement does not amend or alter current Agency policy
as expressed in my memorandum of 8 June 1963 concerning support of
Presidential cripe abroad. An additional agreement with the secret service,
involving CIA and other Government agencies dealing with Presidential travel
abroad, is in process of developzest.

SUSPENSE DATE:
Attachn.ent

Cc: CGC
nis

(Signed), Marshall S. Carter
raball 3, Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

(CLASSIFICATION)

MEMORANDUM

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

nee Registry
65-1567

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE AND
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CONCERNING PRESIDENTIAL
PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES

I. Purpose of Agreement

A. The purpose of this Agreement is to define the types of infor-
mation, administrative assistance and support to be furnished by the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to the United States Secret Service so
that the Service may best fulfill its responsibilities to protect the person
of the President of the United States while he is in the United States. The
CIA role in support of Presidential trips abroad is the subject of a
separate Agreement with the Secret Service.

B. The terms of this Agreement shall be applied to the protection
of members of the President's immediate family, the President-elect,
the Vice President or other officer nest in the order of succession to
the office of President, the Vice President-elect and former Presidents.

II. General Responsibilities

A. The Secret Service has the responsibility for protecting the
person of the President. It undertakes to identify individuals who, brause
of their individual propensities or characteristics, are dangerous or who
may pose a threat to the person of the President. It arranges whatever
action is required to counteract any th eat to the person of the President
posed by such individuals.

CONFIDENTIAL
E...
C

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
1.

B. The CIA has primary responsibility for the clandestine collection
of foreign intelligence information, and for the correlation, evaluation
and dissemination within the Government of foreign positive and counter
intelligence. It gathers and maintains biographic and other data on
organizations and individuals, official and non-official, for the purpose of
performing its statutory functions. It also originates, and receives from
other sources, reports on organizations and individuals. However, the
Agency has no police, subpoena or law-enforcement powers or internal-
security functions.

III. Information to be Reported by CIA

A. The CIA will furnish to the Secret Service information that comes
into its possession of the type set forth in Appendix A to this Agreement
concerning individuals coming to its attention of the classes set forth in
Appendix B to this Agreement. The information may be furnished in more
than one report, and in emergency situations priority attention will be
given to its preparation and delivery.
-

B. After reporting an individual to the Secret Service, the CIA
will thereafter--unless the Secret Service otherwise requests--report to
the Secret Service additional information which it thereafter receives or
obtains concerning such individual.

C. The CIA will furnish to the Secret Service intelligence and
intelligence information that becomes available concerning:

CONFIDENTIAL

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
i

(1) Groups outside the United States which advocate
assassination of government officials as a political weapon
and which appear to constitute an existing threat to the
President or any persons named in Article I, Paragraph B.
above;

(2) Sabotage and assassination training by hostile
intelligence services or groups and the identity of persons
so trained who appear to constitute an existing threat to
the President or any person named in Article I, Para-
graph B. above;

(3) Plots in the United States or abroad to assassinate
a Chief of State or other high official.

D. This agreement shall be reviewed by representatives of the CIA
and the Secret Service annually, or at such more frequent occasions as
either the CIA or the Secret Service may request, to make certain that
the system of reporting is both practicable and productive. Revisions
may be made on the authority of the Deputy Director of the CIA and the
Chief of the Secret Service.

IV. Provision of CIA Personnel to Protect the President

A. On occasion the use of a large number of armed officers is
required to carry out the protective functions of the Secret Service due to
such factors as the size of the crowds, the number of persons to be pro-
tected or the existence of a national emergency. At such times CIA may,
at the request of the Secret Service, detail some of its security officers

CONFIDENTIAL

13-00000

CONDENTIAL
i
.:
to the Secret Service in order to augment the Service's capacity to carry
out its protective functiors in the most secure manner.

B. Such officers detailed by the CIA will be designated officers of
the Secret Service under the direction and operational control of the Chief
of the United States Secret Service. No person shall be so detailed unless
he has qualified in the use of firearms either in accordance with standards
established by the Chief of the United States Secret Service, or in accord-
ance with standards established by the Director of Security of the CIA.
Persons so detailed will be authorized to carry firearms and to perform
such other protective functions and duties as are authorized by law, as
provided by section 3056 of title 18, United States Code, as amended.

V. Implementation of Agreement

A. The Secret Service and the CIA undertake to maintain an active
liaison to insure the prompt passage of available information concerning
individuals reported to the Secret Service by the CIA and evaluated by
the Secret Service as dangerous to the President or any person named in
Article I, Paragraph B. Furthermore, in order to effect the best possible
security of such persons, the Secret Service and the CIA will take such
steps as are necessary to insure that the terms of this Agreement are
fully carried out.

Central Intelligence Agency

!!
Dated: 27 March 1965.
By Marshall S. Carter
Deputy Director

United States Secr. Service
Dated: B
By James J. Rowiey
CONFIDENTIAL Chief

13-00000
:
||
1.
2.
3.
CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX A

Information to Be Furnished on Individuals Reported by the Central
Intelligence Agency to the Secret Service

Identification Data. to the extent available to CIA, name or names of
individual (including prior legal names, aliases and pseudonyms),
address, photograph (or statement as to availability of such), physical
description, date and place of birth, employment and marital status;

Reason or Reasons for Reporting - statement of the class or classes
in Appendix B, which the individual reported fits;

A summary or excerpts, as appropriate, of such portions of any
CLA file on an individual reported which cause him to fit any class
or classes in Appendix B.

CONFIDENTIAL

13-00000
i
1.

2.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX B

Types of Individuals to Be Reported by the Central Intelligence Agency
to the Secret Service

Individuals who have made threats of bodily harm against, or have
attempted to cause bodily harm to, officials or employees of Federal,
state or local Governments or foreign government officials while
they are residing in or planning an imminent visit to this country;
provided that such threats or acts are made against the Government
official or employee because of his official status;

Individuals who threaten or attempt to redress a real or imaginary
grievance against Federal, state or local Governments or any
employee or official thereof by other than legal means;

13.
United States citizens who defect or indicate a desire to defect;
4.

5.
Nationals of any country in the Sino-Soviet Bloc (including the USSR
and Communist China) located in the United States, and who have
escaped from the control of any such country, or who, being outside
such jurisdiction and control, are unwilling to return thereto, and
who have been of pecial interest or value to the United States, and
who cannot be eliminated as a possible source of danger to the
President or any person named in Article I, Paragraph B;

Subversives, com nunists, racists and fascists in the United States
who meet one or more of the following criteria:

CONFIDENTIAL
!

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

(a) Evidence of emotional instability or irrational or
suicidal behavior, particularly in persons who have a record
of transitory residence or employment;

(b) Expressions of strong or violent anti-United States
sentiment;

(c) Prior acts (including arrest or convictions) or conduct
or statements indicating a propensity for violence and antip-
athy toward good order and government.

The term "subversives" shall mean persons (including members of
the Communist Party and Communist front organizations) who
knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise or teach the duty,
necessity or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the Govern-
ment of the United States or the government of any state, district
or possession thereof or the government of any political subdivision
therein by force or violence or by the assassination of any officer
of any such government.

CONFIDENTIAL

13-00000.

LAST MONTH
1963 ОСТОBER 1963
SMTWTFS
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11 12
13 14 15 16 17 18 19
20 21 22 23 24 25 26
27 28 29 30 31
1963 NOVEMBER 1963
SMTWTF S
12
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21 22 23
24 25 26 27 28 29 30
NEXT MONTH
1963 DECEMBER 1963
SMTWTFS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11 12 13 14
15 16 17 18 19 20 21
22 23 24 25 26 27 28
29 30 31

Friday 22 November

A.M. FPM
8:45 1:00
9:00 Intelligence Briefing 1:15
9:15 1:30
9:30 1:45
9:45 2:00
10:00 2:15
10:15 2:30
10:30 2:45
10:45 3:00
11:00 3:15
11:15 3:30
11:30 3:45 Cement Cark
11:45 4:00 returned from Iso
12:00 4:15
nents of
12:15 4:30 renneisy
12:30 4:45
12:45 5:00

MEMORANDA

326 Friday, November 22, 1963 39

13-00000

LAST MONTH
1963 ОСТОBER 1963
SMTWTFS
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11 12
13 14 15 16 17 18 19
1963 NOVEMBER 1963
SMTWT
3 4 5 6
10 11 12 13
F S
12
7 8 9
14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21 22 23
NEX: MONTH
1963 DECEMBER 1963
SMTWTFS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11 12 13 14
15 16 17 18 19 20 21
20 21 22 23 24 25 26
27 28 29 30 31
24 25 26 27 28 29 30
22 23 24 25 26 27 28
29 30 31

Sat.-Sun. 23-24 November

A.M.
P.M.
DCI, Helms, cline, R. Jask
8:45h, col. White Dr. 1:00
Jhal Mr.Kirkpatrick
9:00 at EAST 1:15
9:15
whit, welms.cline, LBK- 1:30
atfost
9:30 1:45
9:45 2:00
SAI
10:00
SA
2:15 Mr. Bros: meretric
10:15met w/whatin Kirkpatrick 2:30
F
at Langley. Colned white
joined for a while
Mr Elter Mr Vivo co
10:30 2:45
10:45 3:00
11:00 3:15
11:15 3:30
11:30 3:45
11:45 4:00
12:00 4:15
12:15 4:30
12:30 to white sense to 4:45
repicts to presinant
12:45
Hidro by w/Mr Kimpatrick 5:00

MEMORANDA
SUNDAY-8:30 Meeting at East Bldg w/ CI #Intell Brictin
briefers, Generel canter left at 1dico for 18:15 mating
at DCI's house, then he was to go home
16
(w/cline (wlby, Elder)
327 Sat, Nov. 23, 1963 38 328 Sun., Nov. 24, 1963 37

13-00000

LAST MONTH
1963 ОСТOBER 1963
SMTWTFS
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11 12
13 14 15 16 17 18 19
20 21 22 23 24 25 26
27 28 29 30 31
Monday
1963 NOVEMBER 1963
SMTWT
F S
12
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21 22 23
24 25 26 27 28 29 30
NEXT MONTH
1963 DECEMBER 1963
SMTWTFS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11 12 13 14
15 16 17 18 19 20 21
22 23 24 25 26 27 28.
29 30 31
November
25

A.M.
P.M.
8:30 DEL
anessing: PiSmith
8:45 clinc at East 1:00
9:00 1:15
9:15 1:30
9:30 1:45
9:45 2:00
10:00 Left pick up Mrs Carter 2:15
and mos me come to go to
10:15 Stmatthew's 2:30
10:30 2:45 Returned from Funent
after going to Quarters
10:45 3:00
11:00 3:15
3:25 Mr. Heties
11:15 3:30
11:30 3:45
11:45 4:00
12:00 Preside it kennedy's funeral 4:15
at St. Marthel's
12:15 4:30
1
12:30 4:45
12:45 5:00

MEMORANDA 6:30 51
St
D.I will
• Eneral Barnes
01-Dinner -Dinnerd by
Fring Navy club (lied Room) in honor
format
(
drina
of visiting Britin sic prach
will : 1 by
Comcille Monday, November Monday, November 25, 1963
329
36
deal of Fred Kennedy
-

13-00000

14 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Special Group (5412) Meeting at 1600 on 13 February
1

1. Present were Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. McCone,
Mr. Vance, General Taylor, Mr. Alexis Johnson, Mr. Mann,
General Carter, Mr. FitzGerald, and Peter Jessup. General
Taylor and Mr. FitzGerald were present only for the Cuban
item.

2. Prior to the arrival of Mr. Bundy, General Taylor
mentioned to Mr. Alexis Johnson an upcoming trip of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to Norfolk, Fort Bragg, and Panama. After
some jocular bantering, Mr. Johnson vetoed the Panama portion
of the trip, with General Taylor hoping that this denial was
purely for the physical protection of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. Mr. McCone mentioned the possibility that he might
go to Saigon next week to see what was going on out there. He
stated that we were not getting sufficient timely information
from the Ambassador and that while he and Mr. McNamara
might be going out later as a follow-up to their December trip,
he felt the need to go now. General Taylor pointed out that
there have been a great many visitors to Saigon in recent months
and perhaps we should give them a rest out there for a while.
In any event, he thought perhaps the newly-created NSAM com -
mittee headed by Sullivan would want to make such a trip. General
Taylor seemed reluctant to have Mr. McCone go at this time.
Mr. Johnson said he would take a look at it and be in touch with
Mr. McCone early next week.

4. The first item on the agenda was a discussion of
the Vance memo of 10 February on "Clandestine and Covert
Activities Against Cuba." Mr. Vance stated that he was strongly
for this course of action, that the risks were minimal, and that

13-00000

- 2
-

the JCS and Secretary McNamara also strongly supported it.
Mr. Johnson pointed out that he would be much happier if the
paper had been sent to the Cuban Coordinating Committee in
accordance with usual procedures. Mr. Vance stated that the
committee knows all about it and are for it. Mr. McCone
stated that he was disturbed over the trend of events in Cuba
and that this particular paper really does not go far enough.
He pointed out that our economic denial program was eroding
away and that the courses of action proposed by Mr. Vance's
memo gave Castro maximum grounds for righteous indignation
without really accomplishing anything. Mr. Vance stated that
prior activities in this regard had created great consternation
in Cuba, and Bundy challenged this and asked for proof. Mr.
McCone pointed out the many times that we have had to stand
down actions of this type in order to avoid raising the noise
level. General Taylor said that what we really must do is to
reaffirm the belief of the senior policy makers to the President
that a program of this type must be continued. Mr. Bundy
pointed out that the Secretary of Defense had previously stated
to the President, along with Secretary Rusk, that they were
not enthusiastic for this type of activity but he noted now that
Mr. McNamara had reversed his position. Bundy pointed out
that we have been somewhat hesitant to go ahead full force on
these actions because we did not want to prejudice our position
before the OAS in connection with the Venezuelan arms cache.
Mann stated that our entire program as regards Cuba was
ineffective insofar as it could result in any overthrow of Castro.
At about this point both Mr. Mann and Mr. McCone stated that
we should do everything possible to create provocations and
distressing actions against Castro. Bundy stated that the low
risk actions appear unrewarding and that rewarding actions have
too high a risk. Mann stated that we need to do a lot more
homework before the next OAS meeting (presently unscheduled)
and Bundy said in any event we must have a top-level Cabinet
Meeting with the President to discuss this whole matter. The
agenda item was left as follows:

a. Mann is to get the Crimmins staff hard at work
on the Vance paper and on other alternative courses
of action to include pros and cons, noise levels,
estimated results, etc.

13-00000

- 3
-

b. Mann is to send around a draft OAS resolution
which was prepared during Martin's time.

c. As to the specific paragraphs of the Vance
memo, Bundy indicated his personal views (not an
Administration commitment) that items 1 and 2a were
OK; 2b for Cuban ships only; 3a should be intensified;
3b and 3c were directly connected to a separate black-
list enterprise; 4 was OK. As for actions against
Cuban subversion in Latin America, on paragraph 1 we
should see just what our opportunities are, and on para-
graph 2 CIA should determine just what we think the
local traffic will bear and just what our capabilities
might be.

Finally, after a very short discussion on low-level reconnaissance
requirements for Cuba, General Taylor and Mr. McCone decided
to pay close attention to high-level results on Friday, Saturday,
and Sunday, and to take a fresh reading on the matter on Monday.
Action: DD/I to cover the low-level matter over the weekend,
DD/P to ride herd on the activities generated by the Vance memo.

5. The next item was a very cursory review of the
covert action programs for Japan, France, Tibet, Taiwan, and
China. Mr. Vance asked how we could measure the effectiveness
of such actions and Mr. McCone pointed out to him that this could
not be really adequately measured and gave all the reasons therefor.
Mr. Vance stated that he was just getting broken into this type of
activity and he would appreciate some briefings by the action
officers. (It was subsequently arranged through Pete Jessup to
have Colby and Bill O'Ryan make appointments with Secretary Vance
specifically to discuss French operations and our Far Eastern
operations.

6. Mr. McCone then brought up the matter of the SAC U-2
aircraft in Manila as covered in his memorandum of 13 February
which was not given any distribution. Mr. McCone said that ever
since 1954 it had been established policy that all reconnaissance
flights over denied and unfriendly territory or covert flights over

13-00000

-4-

friendly territory were a responsibility of the Director of
Central Intelligence with the customary approvals of the Special
Group and that he wished this policy reaffirmed and proper
direction be given so that the DCI would designate the organiza -
tion and resources to be used, either SAC or CIA. Mr. Vance
stated that NRO was involved and that upon receiving the urgent
requirement from CINCPAC for this single flight and upon
learning that the Taiwan assets were stood down because of fuel
control problems, the JCS, Mr. McNamara, and he had agreed
that SAC should fly the flight. He stated that Mr. McAfee of the
State Department had been informed on Sunday night and that
the Base Commander in the Philippines also knew about it. He
stated that there were only two targets concerned and that with
luck they could be obtained with a single flight. Mr. McCone
pointed out that the question had not been raised with him by
Steakley as to military aircraft or sanitized aircraft nor was he
aware of the cover plan that might be utilized in the event of
difficulties. Mr. Vance stated it would be the regular cover
plan of a weather ship off course. Vance said this was a one-
shot problem only and that as soon as it was completed, the
planes and crews would be withdrawn. He said both he and
McNamara were greatly surprised when they learned that SAC
had sent three airplanes and seven crews to perform this single
mission. He said they could understand the need for two air-
planes in case one aborted but certainly not this large contingent.
He said this had no connection with the South Vietnam broad
coverage mapping and that the Taiwan assets should be used for
this.

7. It was apparent that all were in agreement that the
Director of Central Intelligence had the responsibility for
approving requirements for photo coverage and for determining
the appropriate resources to be used for this coverage whenever
it required overflights of denied or hostile territory or whenever
it required covert flights over friendly territory. Mr. Bundy
stated that the DCI should prepare the necessary directive to
this effect and circulate it to the other members of the Special
Group for their approval at the next meeting. Action: DD/S&T

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to prepare for me by no later than noon Monday the simplest,
most concise, directive along the foregoing lines.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

Distribution:
Original - DDCI
1 - Elder/Enright
Paras 1-5 to Mr. Paul Eckel DDP/SGO
Paras 6 & 7 - DD/S&T

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18 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Disarmament Meeting on 18 January 1964
at the White House

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1. At 2:45 this date Mr. Alexis Johnson informed me that
there would be a meeting with the President at 3:15 p.m., in
the White House to discuss the most recent revision of his
proposed statement to the Geneva Conference, and that I was
expected to be there. Upon arriving at the meeting place I was
handed a draft by Adrian Fisher. It subsequently developed
that McNamara, Rusk, Taylor, and the President must have
had this draft for at least long enough to have thoroughly reviewed
and considered it. In any event, I read it immediately and was
struck by the fact that in those areas of the original draft as
given to Mr. McCone by Dr. Scoville in which the DCI had taken
exception, ameliorating language had been inserted in the new
draft to considerably temper and meet objections of Mr. McCone.
The draft was now much more a speech by the President as to
what he hoped might develop as a result of mutual give and take
rather than a statement of U. S. policy and definite intentions.

2. The President entered the room shortly, accompanied
by Bill Moyer and Jack Valenti. Others present were Rusk,
McNamara, General Taylor, Dr. Seaborg, Adrian Fisher, and
myself. Alexis Johnson was not present.

3. The President opened by stating that he had read the
revised draft and wanted to know if there were any objections to
it. Dr. Seaborg pointed out that he had some hesitancy about
opening totally his closed-down plants for international inspection
(paragraph 3, page 3) but that there were many ways of deter-
mining whether or not the reactor was in fact shut down
he
simply did not want to give carte blanche to inspectors overrunning
the entire plant. This position was adopted. Dr. Seaborg then

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said that he wanted it understood that the closing down of the
plants was not necessarily a permanent commitment and that
whenever it became necessary or desirable, in the absence
of international agreement to the contrary, we should retain
complete freedom of action to reopen a reactor any time we
chose. This position was agreed.

4. Mr. McNamara pointed out that he had been working
steadily the last few days to get agreement in the Pentagon on
a paper substantially in accord with this draft and that the only
thing that now gave them a problem was subparagraph (c) on
page 4 as to the establishment of nuclear-free zones. He said
if this could be deleted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Department of Defense would buy the paper. Their concern
was that we would get so involved in these zones that we would
lose freedom of action to shift nuclear weapons through the
Canal Zone, for example, or by air through overflights.
Secretary Rusk pointed out that they had discussed this a num-
ber of times before, that it was nothing new, and that he would
hope we could establish nuclear-free zones in Latin America
and Africa for example. The President said that when the
crunch came he depended on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that
he must have them on his side. Accordingly the paragraph on
nuclear-free zones was eliminated.
A

5. I then stated that the President should know that there
was on record a letter from Mr. McCone pointing out some
problem areas that could develop in a number of these points,
particularly as to our getting back into a position of letting up
on the need for full and adequate verification. I further said
that aside from the intelligence aspects of the problem, there
were certain policy matters as regards reaction of West Germany,
and particularly France, that should be considered. The President
then asked for Mr. McCone's letter and glanced through it rather
hurriedly. General Taylor asked to see the letter and he did the
same. I then gave a copy to Secretary Rusk, particularly pointing
out those portions of DCI's letter concerning his membership on
the Committee of Principals and his reservations at the policy

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level. Mr. Rusk indicated he had seen Mr. McCone's letter.
(Subsequently Mr. Adrian Fisher stated that they had worked
all afternoon and most of the night in revising the original
draft to meet the objections raised by the DCI and he thought
that they had moderated their language and weasel-worded the
statement adequately to meet DCI's objections.) The President
then asked me if I had any specific, further objections to the
statement now that the nuclear-free zone problem had been
eliminated and that the DCI's letter was on record. I stated
that depending upon what was actually finally determined as an
international agreement, we might be in serious trouble on
verification but that this problem would come later. I felt that
as a statement by the President there was adequate protection
in future negotiations to ensure the best interests of the United
States. (I subsequently checked with Adrian Fisher who assured
me that there was no backoff in ACDA and State from the require-
ment for adequate verification and that the additional words
inserted in the latest draft were specifically to meet DCI's prior
objections. In other words, DCI's letter of comment is a matter
of record with the President and the other principals at the
meeting, and the President commented that the Central Intel-
ligence Agency was certainly a smooth-operating outfit. It was
obvious that he had his tongue in his cheek in this regard to
indicate that we not only covered our rear but our flanks as well.)
The President then directed a number of actions as regards
Congressional briefings, preparation of a talk for him to make
to the American public in explanation of his Geneva Conference
statement. In connection with this speech for American con-
sumption, he directed that it be prepared so that any tenant
farmer could understand it ten words per sentence, four sen-
tences per paragraph, and four-letter words throughout.
:
6. This ended discussion of the Geneva Conference statement.

7. New subjects:

a. There was then a discussion of a letter to Khrushchev
but I was not aware of the contents nor were the contents
mentioned. The discussion revolved around the date at which
such a letter would be made public.

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b. The President then expressed his great concern
over the emergent situation in Panama. He said that he
had proposed injecting himself directly into the problem
yesterday with a public statement and approaches to the
OAS specifically to lay down publicly exactly what the facts
were as regards Panamian aggression, intrusions into the
Zone, killing of American soldiers with rifle bullets by
snipers while they were armed only with bird shot, etc.,
etc. He said that he had been dissuaded from this course
by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State and
others. He said he was shocked to read in this morning's
New York Times a story (presumably the Tad Szulc article)
that pretty well covered exactly what his proposals were.
He said he still felt it was a good idea and that he thought
Harriman, Rusk, McNamara, Johnson, and others should
assemble small groups of Latin American Ambassadors and
tell them what he, the President, wanted to tell them. He
thought it was an even better idea if he did it himself. I did
not get the impression that a decision was made in this
regard nor do I think any action will be taken as a result of
this meeting. Unfortunately the discussion centered then
on the security aspects of leaks2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

