cause there should be more surplus lines. The renovation work has
hampered much of the LIFEAT work, principally because many of the lines
now are underground and we cannot get access to them before they enter
the central. This is particularly true with respect to the Czech Em-
bassy, to whose telephone lines we cannot obtain access from the vantage
point we now occupy.

3. WILSTED said that we try to keep track of the activities of
"Intel" but since they seem to attack "Colonias" at random, we have no
prior warning of their presence in a certain area.

4. In the recent past, Mexico has been using houses for listing
posts for security reasons. We have more control over the access of
phone company inspectors or repairman to houses. Ilowever, under new
regulations, all now apartment buildings must have telephone lines in-
stalled in the building by the phone company during the construction
phase. This means that the lines and their destination are concealed.
WILSTED proposed that this will mean we can again use apartments since
we can siphon off a line destined for use by another tenant in such a
way that the phone company cannot trace its destination without tearing
the building apart and we can then install a separate line to the build-
ing and hook up the subscriber to this line which, if checked, will
belong to a legitimate subscriber.

5. One system which has been used effectively is to take one-half
of two separate pairs which have one faulty line each. These two half
pairs then form one good pair which we can use.

6. WIISTED explained that it cost about 3000 pesos to get a
regular telephone. This entails the purchase of a telephone company
bond, which later can be sold.

SECRET

-2-

SECRET

7. Personnel involved in the tapping of the lines are:
(Rene)- who has access to the centrals. He contacts the fol-
lowing ment
Two brothers
(Jose) does exchange connections.

8. The take from each basehouse is collected early in the morning
before office hours by RAFANELLI. He only enters one basehouse which is
occupied by an elderly couple. All other contacts are in automobiles
made at different spots each day of the week. RAFANELLI then takes the
material to a meeting between him, WILSTED and SECHEN where RAFANELLI
turns the material over to SECHEN and they all discuss the problems and
plans for the day.

9. According to WILSTED there is no live monitoring done by any
of the basehouse keepers.

10. There follows a list of the basehouses and the lines covered
at each bager

a) (Calero 39)
- formerly covered American commies, now
no lines. Being held for future use.

b) (Juanacatlan 179)- Cuban residence
Russian Commercial
E. T. (Nicaraguan)

c) (Atlixco 47)
- 2 Polish
Seborer
Tropete
Bekier

d) (Tenanzingo)
- Cuban military office
Cuban Ambassador's office
Campos (travel agency)
1 spare

e) (Aristoteles 80) UAR
Ejercito Nacional 540 (name of person un-
known)

f) (Suderman & Horacio) - facilities for three lines. Formerly
processed the Czech lines. Now nothing
but being held open.

g) (Cuautla 131)
- 3 Soviet Embassy (tapped in the Central)
1 Soviet propaganda office (tap in box)

DOI JUNE 1

SECRET
14-00000

104-10413-10306 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Page count wrong. 86 page

14-00000
☐ UNCLASSIFIED INTERNAL
USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
EXTENSION NO.

Chief, Latin America Division 1431
DATE
13 July 1978
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and DATE OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
building) INITIALS to whom... Draw a line across column after each comment,)
RECEIVED FORWARDED
1. Mr. Russell Holmes
O/EXO/CI
2.

3.

4. Mr. Scott Breckinridge
Principal Coordinator/HSCA

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.
FORM SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL ☐ UNCLASSIFIED
3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS USE ONLY
EDITIONS

14-00000

13 JUL 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Scott Breckinridge
Principal Coordinator/HSCA
VIA : Mr. Russell Holmes
O/EXO/CI
FROM : Raymond A. Warren
Chief, Latin America Division
SUBJECT : Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV

1. Attached is a file folder titled "Yuri" which contains
informal and preliminary research based on a theory that Yuriy
Ivanovich MOSKALEV might be identifiable with the "unidentified
man" observed entering and departing the Soviet Embassy in
Mexico City, Mexico, in October 1963. Ms. Christine Hopkins
undertook to research the theory that MOSKALEV might be the
unidentified man as a result of the indepth study she conducted
as the Task Force Leader of this Division's efforts to determine
if there could have been Cuban complicity in the John F.
Kennedy assassination.

2. Although the material contained in the attached folder
is entirely theoretical and does not constitute an official
file or position of this Division or Agency it may be of
interest to Mr. Blakey and Mr. Cornwell of the HSCA.

3. It is requested that you review the material contained
in the file folder and, if you consider it appropriate, make
the material available for Messrs. Blakey and Cornwell to
review with the understanding that it is a theoretical
unofficial research undertaking.

1 Attachment as stated
Raymond A. Warren

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 12180

14-00000
☐ UNCLASSIFIED INTERNAL ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET
USE ONLY

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM:
EXTENSION NO.

Chief, Latin America Division 1431
DATE
13 July 1978
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and DATE OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
building) INITIALS to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED FORWARDED
1. O/EXO/CI

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.
FORM SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL ☐ UNCLASSIFIED
3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS USE ONLY
EDITIONS
Dup

14-00000

SECRET
JUL 078
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Scott Breckinridge
Principal Coordinator/HSCA

VIA : Mr. Russell Holmes
O/EXO/CI

FROM : Raymond A. Warren
Chief, Latin America Division
SUBJECT : Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV

1. Attached is a file folder titled "Yuri" which contains
informal and preliminary research based on a theory that Yuriy
Ivanovich MOSKALEV might be identifiable with the "unidentified
man" observed entering and departing the Soviet Embassy in
Mexico City, Mexico, in October 1963. Ms. Christine Hopkins
undertook to research the theory that MOSKALEV might be the
unidentified man as a result of the indepth study she conducted
as the Task Force Leader of this Division's efforts to determine
if there could have been Cuban complicity in the John F.
Kennedy assassination.

2. Although the material contained in the attached folder
is entirely theoretical and does not constitute an official
file or position of this Division or Agency it may be of
interest to Mr. Blakey and Mr. Cornwell of the HSCA.

3. It is requested that you review the material contained
in the file folder and, if you consider it appropriate, make
the material available for Messrs. Blakey and Cornwell to
review with the understanding that it is a theoretical
unofficial research undertaking.

1 Attachment as stated
F.
Raymond A. Warren
DDO/C/LA/STB/WSturbitts: esm (X9127) (13 Jul 78)
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee w/att
1 - O/EXO/CI w/o att
1 - C/LA w/o att
1 - C/LA/STB w/o att
E2 IMPDET
1 - LA/CO/CIOS w/o att CL BY 12180
EGRET

14-00000

SECRET
April 1977

SUBJECT: Theory re MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich and
Unidentified Man

That Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV might be identifiable with
the "unidentified man" going into and coming out of the Soviet
Embassy in Mexico City in October 1963. The "unidentified man"
was recently identified by SLIPSTREAM as a KGB type by name of
"Yuri" whom he knew in Moscow in 1964.
- According to travel records MOSKALEV was in the
USSR in 1964.; in the U.S. in October 1963 .

- MOSKALEV functions officially as a Soviet scientist
and often attends international conferences. He
has been in contact with known GRU Soviet diplomat in
the U.S.

MOSKALEV bears a striking resemblance to composite of
"Saul" in book Appointment in Dallas who claims he was involved
in the assassination of President Kennedy. "Saul" claims:
- he crossed border into U.S. illegally and was in
Dallas on 20 November.

- That he had been to Mexico City, had a contact in
Soviet Embassy there, in 1963, and that he knew the
identity of OSWALD because he (OSWALD) had been
fingered to him in Mexico City.

14-00000

2
- that OSWALD was involved in the Kennedy assassination
plot, but that he, "Saul", fired shots that killed
Kennedy.

- that two hours after the assassination he, "Saul",
was out of the U.S. That he used limp as a
disguise.

QUESTIONS
1. Could MOSKALEV be "Saul"?
2. Could MOSKALEV, therefore, be mystery man who
boarded plane in Mexico City to Havana on 22
November 1963?
3. Was assassination a Soviet comspiracy without
Cuban knowledge?

RECOMMENDATION
1. Can we obtain voice tape of MOSKALEV, since he
has delivered speeches at scientific conferences
in U.S. and abroad?
2. If so, could we arrange to have McDonald (unwittingly)
hear it, to see if he recognizes it as that of "Saul"?

Chris Hopkins
LAD/JFK Task Force

14-00000

1. Can we find ,hote that PENKOVSKY identified of
MOSKALEVSKIY.

2. May I see PENKOVSKIY's 201 file for period 61-63?

3. Get photos and check out MOISEEV and BABKOV.

4. Via CI Staff, find out if we can show photo to DERYABIN
and ROSTVOROFF?

5. Could MOSKALEV be Dept 13? Could OSWALD have met with
him in Mexico City clandestinely in 1963?

14-00000

SECRET
26 March 1977

SUBJECT: Juriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV

DOB: 23 July 1920
POB: Iguamnovo, USSR
HGT: 172 Centimeters

Hair: Brown (medium light)
Eyes: Gray

Wife: Married to Vera Nikolayevna STRELTSOVA

Children:

Education: Unknown
Misc:. Became a Communist Party member in 1951

Was allegedly imprisoned during war because
of his German descent or for black market
dealings.

Occ: As of May 1973 was with Institute of Biophysics
of the Soviet Ministry of Health. (Dr. of
Medical Sciences.) Prof.

1922 - Family moved to Leningrad.

48-70- Lived in Moscow

1958 Became head of Division of Institute of
Biophysics, Soviet Ministry of Public Health

1951-53 Head of Patho physiology Lab, Inst. of
Biophysics.

1952 - Last half of year, had a month's TDY at
Biophysical Lab. in Moscow.

1953 - When source (Dr. Wilhelm MENKE ) STIB, left
as Chief of Pathphysiological Lab. at
Sungol in Oct. 53, MOSKALEV took that position.
He reportedly was not well qualified.

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Personal Misc.
-
1. Very adept diplomat finds it easy to
adopt conversation to group he is with.

2. Excellent chess player, patient with
both adults and children.

3. Has dasha near Moscow.

4. Reads, writes, and conprehends English well,
but speaks it with less proficiency.
Reportedly speaks it much better after few
drinks. (He is careful about drinking, if
he drinks at all, in relation to attending
conferences.)

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26 Dec 62 - CIA-A-3.246.539
Re International Conference on Diagnosis
and Treatment of Radioactive Poisoning,
Vienna, Aust. 15-18 Oct 62. "Most
interesting aspect of meeting was conduct
ad contributions of Prof. MOSKALEV of
USSR Academy of Sciences. His subject was
listed as "Uptake and Retention of
Plutonium in Man"; no abstract was
presented. When he spoke he changed the
title to "Problems of Kenetics of Uptake
and Retention of Radioisotopes." His
paper presented nothing new and can be
described as elementary. He apparently
spoke no English.

19 Jan 63 - ООВ 3,248,156.
Information from another source on the
above conference. Dr. D. J. SEMENOV and
Dr. I.T. TRUGUBENKO ? were invited to
attend. The Soviets sent instead, Prof.
MOSKALEV. He was bright, but not
individual who should have been sent
representing the USSR at this meeting.
Was said to be his first time out
of the USSR. / CDH coment - not so.7

9 July 63 - DF-440
(PENKOVSKY)
Source: AEDAZZLE-1 (doi 1961) identified
photo (not by name, nor was name supplied)
as that of Col. Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEVSKIY
Air Force Col. and GRU officer in
Information Directorate of GRU who attended
ameeting in London in May or June 1961.

21 Aug 63 - OOB 3,271,609
MOSKALEV participated at meeting of IAEA
panel on Toxicity of Incorporated Radio-
nuclides, Vienna, Austria 4-8 June 63.

14-00000

3
18 Oc2 63 - OOB 3,278,069
Re Symposium in Vienna, Austria from
26-31 August 63. The Soviets sant a small
three or four member delegation headed by
MOSKALEV "a very personable and diplomatic
gentleman." At the end of the conference
MOSKALEV voiced his dismay that the
Soviets had misunderstood the exact point
of the meeting and had presented very
minor papers.

3 Dec 63 - OOB 3,283,411
Symposium on Radiological Health and
Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining &
Milling, Vienna, Austria late Aug 63.
"Due to misunderstanding in USSR, topics
covered by symposium were not known
sufficiently in advance for Soviet
scientists to contribute papers on other
than nuclear toxicology." All papers
were given by Dr. L. N. BURYKINA in
the absence of MOSKALEV et al.

10 Dec 63 -

FRI

14-00000

30 Dec 63 - OOB 3,286,351
MOSKALEV atttended Symposium on Radio-
logical Health and Safety, Austria,
26-31 Aug 63.

23 Jan 64 - OOB 3,288,475
IAEA Symposium on Neutron Irradiation,
Brookhaven, Long Island, N.Y. Oct 63.
MOSKALEV, one of the Soviet delegates
was frequent commentator on other people's
work and made a practice of denigrating
their reports with respect to radiation
lethality.
Sources (3 U.S. scientists) were asked
if they thought MOSKALEV's objectives
were motivated from anything more than
genuine scientific position. They
responded - "Who can say?" MOSKALEV,
both from papers he gave and his questions
and comments in discussion, indicated he
was very sharp The paper he gave
presented no new data. His paper said
nothing specific.

24 Oct 66 - ООВ 321,15482-66
About one third of the Soviets expected
at the Third Int'l Congress of Radiation
Research put in appearance. The papers
were disappointing. A paper written by
MOSKALEV and V.A. STRELTSOVA was not
impressive.

16 Oct 67 - OOB 321,30340-67
MOSKALEV attended the Second Int'l
Symposium on Delayed Effects of Bone
Seeking Radio Nuclides, Sun Valley,
Idaho, 12-14 Sept 67. He presented
an interesting paper. He was not expected
at the meeting and came alone, arriving
two days early. He had furnished no brief
and it was a surprise tohear his paper.
He
understands English reasonably well, but
speaks it less well. Therefore, his
appearance alone at the conference was even
more unusual. He became very interested
in visiting a certain US, facility, and
pursued arrangements to visit it. U.S. Gov't

14-00000

16 Oct 67 - OOB 321,27474-67

5
clearance and permission to visit were
obtained, but he "backed-out" (after all
had been arranged) saying it was too much
trouble for U.S. persons and authorities
concerned.

N.. B. MOSKALEV participated in Second Int'l
Symposium on Delayed Effects of Bone
Seeking Radio Nuclides, Sun Valley,
Idaho, arriving two days early. He
had travelled alone to Sun Valley and
apparently was able to use his knowledge
of English language to get along on his
own. However, he complained to Chairman
of conference that he did not know enough
English to read his paper which also
required condensation because it was too
long for the time allowed. A colleague
who had known MOSKALEV from previous meet-
ings said MOSKALEV's knowledge of English
improved greatly after a few drinks.
However, he did not drink at all during
this conference. He did mention that he
had written the English version of the
paper he presented himself. A respected
U.S. scientisi with nore experience
than MOSKALEV said he frankly did not
believe MOSKALEV's findings. (Said this
in private.) MOSKALEV attempted to
make propaganda of a report by a West
German. MOSKALEV left the conference a
little upset. He took copious notes on
all papers, which indicated he understood
what was going on. He also took many
pictures with a 35 mm camera. From questions
he asked in private, it was obvious he
understood English quite well. Considerable
time was spent in arranging visit to a U.S.
lab. in route to his home. He took a
different route, without telling anyone
of plans, and did not visit the Tab
N.B.

14-00000

-6-
1 Feb 70 -
BE
1 Jul 70 - OOB 321/17309-70.
Fnu MOSKALEV and P.V. RAMZAYEV were
scheduled to attend the Biology & Ecology
of Polonium and Radiolead Conf. Sutton,
U.K. 30 Apr to 1 May 70, but apparently
were not permitted by the USSR to attend.

24 Aug 70 - OOB 321/20573-70
MOSKALEV was among Soviet delegation to
Second Int'l Congress on Radiation
Protection, Brighton, U.K. 3-8 May 70.
MOSKALEV personally attended virtually
every session and was very busy asking
many questions. He asked all questions
through an interpreter, but when answers
were given, in English, he always seemed
to understand without benefit of his
interpreter.

13 Nov 70 - OOA(S) 322/33488-70
Sept 70 MOSKALEV visited a U.S. facility
devoted to research in field of nuclear
medicine. "It is obvious that he is a
careful and trustworthy worker."
Visited Brookhaven in Oct 63; Sun Valley
in 67; and Hanford Biology Symposium 69.

14-00000

24 Aug 71 - U.S. Embassy Moscow Airgram

26 Sept 71 - Science Berkeley Lab. 600254
Four Soviet scientists, MOSKALEV, MOISEEV
NENOT and MASSE, participated at the
same Transuranium Biology Symposium at
Hanford during week of Sept 26. They
were in San Francisco by chance at the same
time and desired to visit Berkeley on the
same day. They did not travel to the
conference together. It all seemed to be
coincidental Drs. MOSKALEV and MASSE
reportedly understood more English than
they could speak. Dr. MOSKALEV was the
USSR's rep. on ICRP internal dose committee.

14-00000

- &
23 Dec 71 - ΟΟΕ 324/37776-71
Dr. Yuriy I. MOSKALEV, Inst. of Biophysics,
Min. of Public Health, visited several
U.S. biological and biophysical research
facilities. During that time it was
learned that he was chairman of the USSR
equivalent to the U.S. National Council
on Radiation Protection. In this position
Dr. Aleksey A. MOISEEV (Central Advanced
Institute for Training of Physicians, Moscow)
was MOSKALEV's secretary.

25 Oct 71 - Letter to U.S. Atomic Energy Commission from

U.S. Embassy Moscow files
BATTEFFE
Pacific
Mirac
Jaboratoria
Y

Chris Hopkins

14-00000

SUBJECT: Passports Used by MOSKALEV, Yuriy
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Mikhailovich

1957 PP#
Unknown

1962 S-012960

1963 S-022766
S-012960
1964 S-022766

1965 S-022766

1967 0-113459

1968 T-286915

1970 0-286915
S-201222-

1971 S-201222

1972 0-068765
S-201222

1974 Unknown

MOSKALEV has following birthdates:
23 July 1920

17 January 1920
21 July 1920
1930

14-00000

TRAVEL
NAME DPOB OCC PP# DATE FROM-TO

MOSKALEV, Juriy Ivanovich - Chem [Sept 57] USSR France

MOSKALEV, Yuriy 1920 - S-012960 Oct 62 Aust. USSR
MOSKALEV, Yuriy 1920 - Oct 62 USSR Aust.
MOSKALEV, Yuriy 23/7/20 Biol. S-012960 Oct 62 USSR Aust.

MOSKALEV, Yuriy 23/7/20 Phys. S-022766 May 63 USSR Aust.

MOSKALEV, Yuriy 1920 - S-022766 30/6/63 Poland Aust.
MOSKALEV, Yuriy 1920 - S-022766 8/6/63 Aust USSR

MOSKALEV , Yuriy Ivanovich
23/7/20 Scie. S-012960 Oct 63 USSR USA

MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich 23/7/20 Scie S-012960 Oct 63 USA Denmark
:
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich 23/7/20 Scie S-012960 Oct 63 USSR USA
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich 23/7/20 Scie S-012960 Oct 63 USA Denmark

MOSLAKEV , YuriyIvanovich 23/7/20 Scie. S-- Oct 63 USSR USA

MOSKALEV, Yuriy Mikhailovich
23/7/20 - S-012960 Oct 63 USA Denmark
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Mikhailovich
23/7/20 - S-012960 Oct 63 Denmark USSR

MOSKALEV, Yuriy 23/7/20 Medl. S-022766 9/11/64 - Aust.
MOSKALEV, Yuriy 1920 - S-022766 14/11/64 USSR Aust.

14-00000

NAME DPOB OCC PP# DATE FROM-TO
:
MOSKALEV, Yuriy 1920 - S-022766 15/4/65 Aust USSR

MOSKALEV, Yuriy 1920 - S-022766 10/5/65 Czech Aust

MOSKALEV, Yuriy 1920 - 0-113459 8/9/67 USSR Can
MOSKALEV, Yuriy 1920 - 0-113459 8/9/67 Cam USA
MOSKALEV, Yuriy 1920 - 0-113459 8/9/67 Can USA

MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich 23/7/20 Prof. - 8/9/67 USSR USA
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich 23/7/20 Stu 0-113459 8/9/67 Can USA

MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich 23/7/20 Chem. T-286915 4/4/68 - UK
MOSKAEEE, Yuriy Ivanovich 23/7/20 Chem. T-286915 11/4/68 - UK

MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich - - 1/2/70 - UNNY
:
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich 23/7/20 Biol. 0-286915 2/5/70 - UK
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich 23/7/20 Biol. 0-286915 16/5/70 - UK
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich 23/7/20 - S-201222 11/70 USA Suis
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich 23/7/20 Biol. S-201222 15/4/71 USSR UK

MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich 23/7/20 Biol. S-201222 25/4/71 UK USSR
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich 1930 - 26/9/71 USSR NXXX USA

MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich 23/7/20 - S-201222 10/71 USSR XIXXX USA
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich 23/7/20 - S-201222 17/10/71 USA USSR

MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanoich 23/7/20 Biol. S-201222 25/4/71 UK USSR
MOSKALEV Yuriy Ivanovich 1930 - S-201222 26/9/71 USSR USA

MOSKALVE, Yuriy Ivanovich 23/7/20 - S-201222 10/71 USSR USA

14-00000
:
....

NAME DPOB Οεε PP# DATE FROM TO

MOSKALEE, Yuriy Ivanovich
23/7/20 S-201222 17/10/71 USA USSR

MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich
23/7/20 Prof 0-068765 11/11/72 - UK

MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich
23/7/20 Biol S-201222 15/11/72 UK ==

MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich
23/7/20 [9/3/74] - Suis

14-00000

USSR CONFIDENTIAL CIA-P-312403
1971.
MOSKALEV, YURIY IVANOVICH.
INSTITUTE OF BIOPHYSICS,
MOSCOW.
S

14-00000
SECRET
April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Possible Identity of the "Unidentified Man"
Photographed in Mexico City in October 1963

REFERENCES: A. Photos Taken in Mexico City by Mexico City
Station
B. Paperback Boob "Appointment in Dallas"

C. Soft File, Headquarters Information on
Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV, Possible
"Unidentified Man"

1. Photographs of the unidentified man were taken by
our Mexico City Station on 2,3,4, and 15 October 1963, going
into or coming out of both the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in
Mexico City. Copies were provided to the FBI in Dallas,
Texas on 22 November 1963. Although cropped copies have
appeared in various works, including Volume XX, page 691, of
the Warren Commission Report, and the book "Appointment in
Dallas", to our knowledge the individual has never beeni
identified.

2. On 17 March 1977, a former member of the Cuban General
Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) recognized photographs of
the unidentifid man as Yuri LNU, a KGB officer, whom he met
in Moscow in 1964 while attending an intelligence course
there. He said that Yuri, a fluent English and Spanish
speaker, was acting as a trouble shooter for the Cuban group,
about 15, attending the course. Yuri lived with

14-00000
2
the Cuban and Bulgarian groups quartered in the same building
in Moscow. Any time the Cubans had a problem, Yuri would solve
it for them. Yuri was a good friend of Juan (pseudo) a KGB
officer who taught the Cubans about the Agency (CIA) and the
West German intelligence apparatus. Juan told the DGI member
that he had served in Mexico for about 20 years and in the U.S.
clandestinely for about 10 years (specific dates unknown). Yuri
was entrusted with their welfare only, and did not attend classes
with the Cuban group.

3. SE/X travel records were reviewed in search of an
individual by the name of Yuri who possibly fit the description
of the unidentified man. This lead to an individual by the
name of Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV, a Soviet, reportedly a Doctor
of Medical Sciences, who has participated in international
scientific conferences for the USSR since 1962 or earlier.
Although there is no official 201 file on MOSKALEV, there is a
sizable dossier on him in the Central Reference Service. Many
of the documents in his dossier are 00 reports from U.S.
scientists concerning MOSKALEV's attendance and behavior at
scientific meetings. It is obvious that he has a much greater
knowledge of the English language than he admits. His capability
is said to improve greatly after a few drinks; however, it is
noted that he rarely, if ever, drank at the scientific meetings.
It is also noted that on occasions he reportedly was not
qualified to represent the Soviets at a particular conference.
His papers rarely, if ever, were specific, or presented new data.

14-00000
FBI

3
Following are items of interest from selected documents in
MOSKALEV's CRS dossier:

a. In 1961 PENKOVSKY identified a photo (with no
name provided) as that of Col. Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEVSKIY,
Air Force Col.and GRU officer in the Information Directorate
of the GRU.

b. In In December 1963 the FBI reported

c. In October 1963 MOSKALEV was a delegate to the
IAEA Symposium on Neutron Irradiation, Brookhaven, Long Island,
New York. Described by U.S. scientists as very sharp, MOSKALEV
was a frequent commentator on other people's work and made
a practice of denigrating their reports with respect to
radiation lethality.

d. In October 1967 MOSKALEV participated in the Second
International Symposium on Delayed Effects of Bone Seeking Radio
Nuclides, Sun Valley, Idaho, arriving two days early. He

14-00000
travelled aj o Sun Valley and appare was able to use
his knowledge of the English language to get along on his own.
Although he complained about not nowing much English, he
admitted writing the English version of the paper he presented.
MOSKALEV attempted to make propaganda of a paper by a West
German scientist. A respected U.S. scientist said he fran-ly
did not believe MOSKALEV's findings. MOSKALEV took copious
notes on all papers, which indicated he understood what was
going on. He also took many pictures with a 35 mm camera.
From questions MOSKALEV asked, it was obvious that he new
English quite well1. Although considerable time was spent
arranging for MOSKALEV to visit a U.S. laboratory en route to
his home, he took a different route,
without telling anyone
FBI
of his plans, and did not visit the lat.
FBI
STATE
DEPT

14-00000
STATE

4. On 23 March 1977 several identification experts of
the Disguise and Identification Section of OTS/GAD compared
photos of the unidentified man with photos of M Yuriy
Ivanovich MOSKALEV from the FBI, British Liaison, and CRS.
It was their opinion that MOSKALEV could very likely be
identifiable with the unidentified man.

5. Page 59 of the book "Appointment in Dallas," shows an
Identi-Kit Model composite of an individual who told the
author in London in 1972 that he was involved in the assassination
of President Kennedy. The composite of that individual (code
name "Saul"), whose real name is unknown to the author, bears
a striking resemblance to the photos of Yuriy Ivanovich
MOSKALEV. According to the author "Saul"identified the
picture shown in the Warren Commission Exhibit #237 as
having been taken at the Russian Embassy in Mexico City,
either in the foyer or just outside.

14-00000

6
6. The author of the aforementioned book, Hugh C. McDonald,
is the inventor of the Identi-Kit and at one time was under
contract to CIA in regard to the Identi-Kit. McDonald claims
in his book that he met "Saul" at an office in CIA Headquarters
sometime after the Bay of Pigs invasion, and that a colleague
of McDonald told him that "Saul" was an assassin.

7. There are striking parallels between the backgrounds
of "Saul" as given in McDonald's book, and MOSKALEV. For example:
"Saul"
Pg. 7 CIA allegedly knew
of Saul. McDonald said he first
met Saul in CIA Hqs. CIA took
picture of Saul that started
McDonald's investigation.
AGENCY
INFC.
MOSKALEV
According to Office of Security,
McDonald has been in touch with
FILE
CIA in relation to his Identi-Kit.
His states he was a
cleared source of LAFO/DCS - doi
September 1969. (contract agent)
It is true that Mexico City Station
took photos of "Saul" that McDonald
claimed started his investigation.
Pg. 59 - See Identi-Kit
composite of "Saul".
CDH comment: See photos of
Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV. He
bears striking resemblance to
"Saul."

Pg. 60/61 - McDonald states it
was obvious that FBI and CIA
were compromised at the very
top since both Agencies denied
knowledge of "Saul". Noone wanted
i
to hear anymore about him.
Helms, the DDP testified under oath
that he didn't know "Saul."

14-00000
Pg. 69 MeDoma egan his search
of "Saul" in 1970. It began, he
said, with a call from an uniden
tified woman who arranged a meeting
in London and told him she believed
the Russians had a germ warfare
installation in Vozrozdenya, in
the Aral Sea. licDonald obtained2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

A 76401N TRADE REPRESENTATION 15-10
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SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE E2 IMPDET CL BY 005877

404619 SECRET/NOFORN SOV GIOS FILE
CONT.
B 76401 B TRUBETSKY ANDREY GERASIMOVICH
B 76401 C USSR KRASHINO 04 MAR 48 T
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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Yurily Ivanovich NOSENKO

IDENTIFICATION:
NOSENKO, Yurily Ivanovich, a Soviet
KGB officer who defected in 1964 and
was subsequently involuntarily con-
fined in the U.S. by the Agency for
a period of approximately three years.

BACKGROUND
:
NOSENKO first contacted Agency per-
sonnel in Switzerland in June 1962
and subsequently defected in January
1964. NOSENKO was brought to the U.S.
and after a period of relative freedom
he was involuntarily confined in
April 1964. From April 1964 to
August 1965, he was confined at an
Agency controlled site in Clinton,
Maryland. From August 1965 to
October 1967, NOSENKO was confined
at Camp Peary, Virginia. In October
1967, he was returned to the Washington
area, given increasing amounts of
freedom until he was given total free-
dom in April 1969. NOSENKO became a
U.S. citizen in April 1974. NOSENKO
was employed by the Agency as a
consultant in March 1969 and continues
under contract to date. His present
salary is $23,500 per year.

APPROVAL
:
(1) The legal basis to confine NOSENKO
against his will was discussed by
Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with
the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April
1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the
Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence
Houston, advised the Director of Security
by memorandum that such confinement was
proper (Tab 2).

(2) There are a series of letters from
the DDCI, DCI and others to various
agencies, including the Department of
Justice and the White House, covering
the period 1964 to 1969, evidencing
awareness of these agencies of the
NOSENKO affair (Tab 3).

(3) The conditions of NOSENKO's confine-
ment were established by the Office of
Security (Tabs 4 & 5).

RESULTS
:
By memorandum dated 2 October 1968,
the Director of Security forwarded
two reports to the DDCI summarizing
the results of the NOSENKO case to
that date. The reports are voluminous.
One was prepared by the Office of
Security and the other by the FBI.
Both reports conclude that NOSENKO
was a bona fide defector. A draft
memorandum attached to this file,
dated 21 October 1968 and prepared
by the CI Staff, raises question
regarding NOSENKO's bona fides
and challenges the above two reports.

TERMINATION
:
NOSENKO continues under contract to
the Agency. He is brought to Washington
periodically to consult on matters
germane to his background and experience.
Various reports are available in the
files of the Office of Security which
detail financial aspects of this case.
No final accounting has been made since
the project continues.

COMMENTS
:
(1) While the Office of Security files
do document the rationale for the original
confinement of NOSENKO, they do not
document the rationale for his continued
confinement over so long a period of time.
A memorandum dated 5 August 1969 states
that various congressional staff officers
were briefed on NOSENKO and states that
concern for his safety, as well as con-
cern regarding his bona fides, prompted
the prolonged confinement. (See Tab 6)

(2) Office of Security files document
a period in 1969 during which a mail
cover was placed on NOSENKO.

(3) During the above period, NOSENKO
was allowed a pleasure trip to Florida.
During this trip, Agency personnel, with
apparent Headquarters approval, obtained
the services of prostitutes. This
apparently occurred on at least two
occasions.

FILES
:
Office of Security files on NOSENKO
are maintained in the following
locations:

OS/SSD (Contact - Mr. Charles Phalen)

OS/SAG (Contact - Mr. Bruce Solie)
## SECRET

File

H. D. Stevens

THE LEE HARVEY OSWALD CASE #851164

29 January 1964

1. According to a newspaper column of "Allen and Scott" in the Chicago American of 6 December 1963, on the OSWALD Case, Abram CHAYES, Legal Officer of the State Department, was one of two persons immediately responsible for OSWALD's being permitted to return to the United States from the Soviet Union in June 1962. The other individual named was Llewellyn THOMPSON, the then Ambassador to Russia. Another said to have been involved in the handling of OSWALD's case was Samuel WISE, Counsel of the American Embassy in Moscow.

2. Abram CHAYES, 852234, who as of 16 February 1961 was described as "the new Counsel in State", was granted Security approval for liaison contact with J. Foster COLLINS (in the office of the Chief of the Covert Action Staff) on 6 March 1961. The request for CHAYES' clearance was a "Blanket" request to permit discussion with him of HSC 5412/2 matters on a need-to-know basis.

3. In September 1961 there was a White House namecheck request on CHAYES' wife Antonia (Toni) Leigh CHAYES, aka: HANDLER.

4. In March 1962, CHAYES was granted a renewal of his liaison contact clearance with C/CI on a continuing basis. This time his contact was Archibald ROOSEVELT, Jr.

5. On 10 February 1962, HUMAN EVENTS reported as follows with reference to CHAYES:

   "SOFT ON COMMUNISM: Representative Francis E. Walter (R.-Pa.), Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, has scared the new State Department regulations on passports, claiming they would allow Reds denied passports to "rifle freely the confidential files of the FBI, the CIA and other investigative agencies." The man behind the new regulations, which Walter claims violate the Internal Security Act of 1950, is reportedly State's chief legal officer, Abram Chayes. Chayes, a Kennedy appointee, is an ex-Harvard professor who was Chester Bowles' top legal adviser when Bowles was Governor of Connecticut. Walter has introduced legislation to remedy the new passport regulations."

SECRET

6. Samuel WISE, "Counsel in the American Embassy in Moscow" who is referred to above, may well be Samuel Griffin WISE JR., #974574, GD & SSD, who apparently was once a contract employee on ABRAXINE. The State Department reviewed WISE's file on 2 June 1954; and as of September 1962 a Samuel G. WISE was Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow. At that time WISE advised in a cable to the State Department that it appeared that Bruce Frederick DAVIS, #352267, who defected from the United States Army in Germany on 18 August 1960, had not expatriated himself. DAVIS' case is very similar to that of OSWALD; and he, like OSWALD, lived in the Soviet Union for two years after his defection and prior to making application for return to the United States.

7. WISE was an applicant for CIA employment in early 1953 and was security approved subject to polygraph on 12 August 1953. He did not enter on duty and in September 1953 the office "which had been interested in him was no longer interested". On 13 November 1953, WISE was granted a CHA to permit his use as a contract employee on ABRAXINE in New York City. His CHA was cancelled on 24 March 1958.

8. WISE was named as a friend of William Orville MUNSELL, #61693-DL, during an investigation of the latter for possible CIA employment in 1952. WISE, according to MUNSELL's landlady and social acquaintance in Washington, D.C. during the period of about a year which ended in April 1952, was the only person she knew by name with whom MUNSELL was friendly. According to the informant, WISE was a student at Columbia University whose address was 423 Furnald Hall. MUNSELL was Security disapproved for CIA employment in June 1952 because of his close association on a professional and social basis, while attending Denver University from 1946 to 1951, with persons of questionable loyalty. In November 1954, MUNSELL was of interest to project FJIIVE with reference to assignment to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; however, the interested office withdrew their request and later Security advised of the derogatory information regarding him.

9. WISE from 1951 to 1954 attended Scarsdale High School in Scarsdale, New York, which was attacked by a Citizens Group, which alleged Communist influence in the school system. He had several questionable associates in addition to MUNSELL.

H. D. Stevens

SECRET
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

FIELD DISTRIBUTION - BD #5847

AF DIVISION | FE DIVISION
---|---
Johannesburg | Bangkok
Lagos | Djakarta
Nairobi | Hong Kong
Pretoria | Honolulu
Rabat | Kuala Lumpur
Salisbury | Kuching
 | Manila
 | Medan
 | Melbourne
EUR DIVISION | Okinawa
---|---
Barcelona | Rangoon
Berlin | Saigon
Bern | Seoul
Bonn | Singapore
Brussels | Taipei
Copenhagen | Tokyo
Geneva | Vientiane
The Hague | Surabaya
Hamburg | Wellington
Helsinki | 
Lisbon | WH DIVISION
London | ---
Madrid | Asuncion | San Jose
Milan | Bogota | San Salvador
Munich Liaison Base | Brasilia | Santiago
Munich Ops. Base (Laurion) | Buenos Aires | Santiago de los
Oslo | Caracas | Caballeros
Ottawa | Georgetown | Santo Domingo
Paris | Guatemala City | Sao Paulo
LCPIPIT | Guayaquil | Tegucigalpa
Rome | JMWAVE |
Salzburg | Kingston |
Stockholm | La Paz |
Vienna | Lima |
Zurich | Managua |
 | Mexico City |
NE DIVISION | Monterrey |
---|---
Ankara | Montevideo |
Athens | Norfolk (REPLANT) |
Beirut | Panama City |
Calcutta | Port au Prince |
Colombo | Porto Alegre |
Istanbul | Quito |
New Delhi | Recife |
Rawalpindi | Rio de Janerio |
Teheran |

SECRET

CA STAFF | NE DIVISION
---|---
DC/CA | NE/COPS
CA/COPS | NE/GTI/G
CA/PROP | NE/GTI/T
CA/LO | NE/GTI/I
CA/B1 | NEAA/I
CA/B2 | NEAA/AP
CA/B3 | NEAA/S&L
CA/B4 | NESA/RE
CA/B5 | NESA/C&N
 | NESA/I
 | NESA/P
AF/COPS/CA | WH DIVISION
AF/1 | ---
AF/2 | WH/CA
AF/3 | WH/C
AF/4 | WH/C/CA
AF/5 | WH/1
AF/6 | WH/1/Mexico
 | WH/2
FE/CA 14 | WH/2/G
C/CO/CA | WH/2/P
 | WH/H/S
SB/CA | WH/2/CR/N
 | WH/3
DO/CA 3 | WH/3/B
 | WH/3/CO
CI/R&A 10 | WH/3/E
 | WH/3/P
 | WH/3/V
EUR DIVISION | WH/4
---|---
E/CA | WH/4/AR
E/SC | WH/4/CH
E/BNL | WH/4/P/U
E/F | WH/5
E/I | WH/5/Brazil
E/IB | WH/6
E/G | WH/7
E/AS | WH/T/HT
E/BC | WH/7/GU
 | WH/7/DR
 | WH/7/JTS

SECRET
1000000
104-10423-10337
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

TAL
Commission Fil
DISPATCH

S-E-C-R-E-T
TO: Chiefs of all Stations

FROM: Chief, KUDOVE

SUBJECT: Warren Commission Testimony - Selected Excerpts

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES: FYI

1. The Warren Commission's Report on the assassination of President Kennedy focused attention on the magnitude of the problem involved in the protection of the Chief Executive. As you know, it is our responsibility, overseas and in headquarters, to render every support possible to the Secret Service in the conduct of its statutory responsibilities in the United States, and especially when the President travels abroad.

2. The circumstances confronting the Warren Commission produced discussion and testimony on various aspects of the problem of Presidential protection and on interagency operational cooperation, which normally do not find their way into the public domain. These include the acquisition and dissemination of information, consultation, coordination, and operational interchanges. I believe you will be interested in the attached extracts of testimony given before the Warren Commission by U.S. intelligence and security officials. Pertinent portions have been side lined. I commend these materials for reading by all officers in positions of senior responsibility in headquarters and overseas.

FLETCHER M. KNIGHT

DATE TYPED: 23 Dec. 1964

DATE DISPATCHED: 2 FEB 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: Book Dispatch No. 4726

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 100-300-12

13-00000
S-E-C-R-E-T
Distribution For
Book Dispatch No. 4726

AF Division: Abidjan, Accra, Addis Ababa, Algiers, Bamako, Brazzaville, Bujumbura, Conakry, Dakar, Dar-es-Salaam, Freetown, Kampala, Khartoum, Lagos, Leopoldville, Lome, Lusaka, Mogadiscio, Monrovia, Nairobi, Pretoria, Rabat, Salisbury, Tananarive, Tripoli, Tunis, Yaounde

The above listing has been reviewed in the AF Division.

EE Division: Athens, Bern, Frankfurt, Nicosia, Vienna

The above listing has been reviewed in the EE Division.

FE Division: Bangkok, Djakarta, Hong Kong, Honolulu, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Melbourne, Okinawa, Rangoon, Saigon, Seoul, Taipei, Tokyo, Vientiane, Wellington

The above listing has been reviewed in the FE Division.

13-00000
S-E-C-R-E-T
Distribution For
Book Dispatch No. 4726

NE Division: Aden, Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Colombo, Damascus, Jidda, Kabul, Karachi, Kathmandu, Kuwait, New Delhi, Tehran

The above listing has been reviewed in the NE Division.

WE Division: Brussels, Copenhagen, The Hague, Helsinki, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Madrid, Oslo, Ottawa, Paris, Paris/LCPIPIT, Reykjavik, Rome, Stockholm

The above listing has been reviewed in the WE Division.

13-00000
S-E-C-R-E-T
Distribution For
Book Dispatch No. 4726

WH Division: Asuncion, Bogota, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Georgetown, Guatemala City, Kingston, La Paz, Lima, Managua, Mexico City, Montevideo, Panama City, Paramaribo, Port-au-Prince, Port of Spain, Quito, Rio de Janeiro, San Jose, San Juan, San Salvador, Santiago, Santo Domingo, Tegucigalpa

The above listing has been reviewed in the WH Division.

13-00000
S-E-C-R-E-T

Headquarters Distribution for
Book Dispatch No. 4726

2 DDP, 2 C/WE
1 ADDP, 1 C/WE/1
1 C/OPSER, 1 C/WE/2
1 C/TSD, 1 C/WE/3
1 C/CA, 1 C/WE/4
1 C/CCS, 1 C/WE/5
1 C/SOD, 1 C/WE/BC
1 C/CI
1 C/FI, 2 C/WH
1 C/WH/1
2 C/AF, 1 C/WH/2
1 C/AF/1, 1 C/WH/3
1 C/AF/2, 1 C/WH/4
1 C/AF/3, 1 C/WH/5
1 C/AF/4, 1 WH/COPS
1 C/AF/5, 1 WH/POA
1 C/AF/6, 1 WH/POB
1 WH/Plans
2 C/EE
1 C/EE/G, 2 CI/R&A
1 C/EE/K, 1 CI/LIA
1 C/EE/SA, 1 CI/OPS/AF
1 CI/OPS/EE
2 C/FE, 1 CI/OPS/FE
1 C/FE/CH, 1 CI/OPS/NE
1 C/FE/HULA, 1 CI/OPS/SS
1 C/FE/JKO, 1 CI/OPS/WE
1 C/FE/PMI, 1 CI/OPS/WH
1 C/FE/TBL
1 C/FE/VNC, 1 RID

2 C/NE
1 C/NE/1
1 DC/NE/AA
1 C/NE/4
1 C/NE/5
1 C/NE/6

Originated by: Chief, CI/R&A, Ext. 7468/23 December 1964 and MR.A.E. Dooley, Ext. 6748

S-E-C-R-E-T

13-00000

ALAN H. BELMONT, ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR, FBI
MAY 4, 1964

Mr. STERN. I think he might be able to highlight the answer. We have the
exact answer on the record, and I thought it might-
The CHAIRMAN. Well, highlight it, if there is anything in addition I would
think that would be relevant and pertinent. But to ask him to paraphrase
that which he has done with great meticulousness would seem to me to be
abortive and would take a lot of our time, and I don't see what it would prove.
If you have anything in addition that you want to ask him, if you want to
ask him if there is anything in addition he has not put in there, that is all right.
But to just ask him to paraphrase answers that have been done with great
care would seem to me to be confusing the record, and serve no purpose.
Mr. STERN. I might ask, Mr. Belmont, whether there is anything you would
like to add or amplify in these questions?
Mr. BELMONT. I believe the answers speak for themselves, although in view
of Mr. McCloy's questions a little while ago, I would be very happy to make
clear our approach to this matter. For example, the fact that our interest
in defectors, in this case, is shown by the fact that in early November 1959
we opened a file on Oswald based on the newspaper publicity as to his defection.
And the fact that he had applied to renounce his citizenship. We checked our
files then to see was this a man we had a record on, and found that we had a
fingerprint record solely based on his enlistment in the Marines.
We had no other record on him but we placed a stop or a flash notice in our
fingerprint files, at that time so that if he should come back into the country
unbeknownst to us and get into some sort of trouble we would be immediately
notified. That is our opening interest in the case with the thought in mind
that should he come back to the country we would want to know from him
whether he had been enlisted by Soviet intelligence in some manner.
That is our procedure because of our experience that these things have hap-
pened, and we consider it our responsibility to settle that issue whenever we can.
Mr. STERN. Could you explain, Mr. Belmont, this procedure of placing a
stop in the files that you just referred to?
Mr. BELMONT. We merely notify our identification division to place what we
call a flash notice in the man's fingerprint file, which means that should he
be arrested and the fingerprints be sent to the FBI, that the appropriate division,
in this case the domestic intelligence division, would be notified that the man
had been arrested, for what and where he was arrested, thus enabling us to
center our attention on him.
Our next interest in this man arose as a result of the fact that his mother
had sent, I believe, $25 to him in Moscow, so we went to her in April 1960
and we talked to her. At that time she told us that he had told her that he
would possibly attend the Albert Schweitzer College in Switzerland.
So as a followup, we had our legal attache in Paris make inquiry to see
whether he had enrolled in this college. The resultant check showed that while
they had expected him and a deposit had been placed that he did not show up
at the college.
Mr. STERN. I think that is all covered in quite adequate detail in the answer
to the first question.
Mr. DULLES. I have one question. I would like to put to you on the first ques-
tion and answer in your letter of April 6, in Exhibit 833-the Bureau's letter
of April 6. You refer, first, to the fact that the first news you got about Oswald
was from a news service item, and then later on at the bottom of the second
full paragraph you state, "A file concerning Oswald was prepared and as
communications were received from other U.S. Government agencies those
communications were placed in his file."
The record may show the other communications, I guess our record does
show, but do you feel that you adequately were advised by the State Department
as this case developed or by the CIA or other agencies that might have known
about it?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes. We received a number of communications from other
agencies, and we set up a procedure whereby we periodically checked the State
Department passport file to be kept advised of his activities or his dealings
with the Embassy in Moscow so that on a periodic basis we were sure we had
all information in the State Department file.

13-00000

We received communications from the Navy, and from other agencies.
Mr. DULLES. Is there any general procedure with respect to Americans abroad
who get into trouble. Do you get informed so in case they come back you can
take adequate precautionary measures? Is that established SOP?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, Mr. Dulles. We do receive such information, and if we
pick up the information initially as we did here, from press reports or otherwise,
we go to the other agencies and ask them whether they have any information and
establish an interest there so that if they have not voluntarily furnished us the
information they will do so upon our request.
Mr. DULLES. Thank you.
Mr. STERN. On page 3, Mr. Belmont, in the answer to question No. 3, the
second paragraph, could you tell us why the FBI preferred to interview Oswald
after he had established residence and why it was not preferable to interview
him upon his arrival in New York?
Mr. BELMONT. This is a matter of experience. Generally speaking when an
individual such as Oswald arrives back in the country and the press is there,
there is an unusual interest in him. Immigration and Naturalization Service
has a function to perform, and we prefer, unless there is a matter of urgency,
to let the individual become settled in residence. It is a much better atmosphere
to conduct the interview, and to get the information that we seek. If it is
a matter of urgency, we will interview him immediately upon arrival..
Mr. STERN. On page 4, Mr. Belmont, in your answer to question No. 6, was
it ordinary procedure for Agent Fain to re-interview Oswald so soon after his
first interview under the circumstances? Is there anything unusual about that?
Mr. BELMONT. There is nothing unusual whatsoever. Agent Fain interviewed
Oswald on June 26, 1963-1962, I believe it was, was it not?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; 1962.
Mr. BELMONT. And was not satisfied that he had received all the information
he wanted nor that it was a matter that should be closed at that time.
Therefore, he set out a lead to re-interview Oswald, and after an appropriate
period he went back and re-interviewed him. This is within the prerogative of
the investigative agent, and certainly if he was not satisfied with the first
interview it was his duty and responsibility to pursue the matter until he was
satisfied.
Mr. STERN. In your answer to question No. 5, does the response of Oswald to
the question why he went to Russia seem typical to you of the returned defector,
or unusual?
Mr. BELMONT. There is no such thing as a typical response. Each case is an
individual case, and is decided on its merits and on the background of the
individual, and the circumstances surrounding it.
Mr. STERN. Would it be usual for the defector to agree to advise you if he got
a contact? Are they generally that cooperative?
Mr. BELMONT. We ask them because we want to know, and the purpose of our
interview with him was to determine whether he had been recruited by the
Soviet intelligence, and we asked him whether he would tell us if he was con-
tacted here in this country. He replied he would. Whether he meant it is a
question. However, you must bear in mind that this man, I believe it was
when he was interviewed in July of 1961 in the American Embassy, the inter-
viewing official there said it was apparent that he had learned his lesson the
hard way, and that he had a new concept of the American way of life, and
apparently had decided that Russia was not for him.
When we interviewed him likewise he told us that he had not enjoyed his stay
in Russia. He likewise commented that he had not enjoyed his stay in the
Marines. So that in direct answer to your question, it is customary for us in
such a case as this, to ask the man if he will report a contact, and it is customary
for him to say yes, because frankly, he would be putting himself in a rather
bad light if he didn't say yes.
Mr. STERN. Turning to
Mr. DULLES. Could I ask a question there: Do I correctly read your report
and those of your agents to the general effect that you had no evidence that
there was any attempt to recruit Oswald in the United States?

Mr. BELMONT. No evidence whatsoever.

13-00000

in view of the fact that we have practically-we have all the reports, he says
we have all the reports that are in that file, and it just seems like thrashing
old straw to go over it and over it again.
Mr. MCCLOY. Do we have copies of all these telegrams that are in here from
the Embassy?
Mr. BELMONT. You are looking at-
Mr. MCCLOY. Not Embassy; here is one from Mexico. Do we have that?
We don't have these in our files, for example.
Mr. BELMONT. This is subsequent to the assassination. You see your area
of interest at this point is information, all information we had prior to the
assassination. I did not remove from this file the items that started to come
in subsequent to the assassination, you see,
Mr. MCCLOY. My feeling is that somebody on the Commission should examine
that file. I can't come to any other conclusion after reading it all, because I
don't know what is in it, what is in our record, and what is in that file. There
is a good bit of material there that is narrative, which I think would be relevant.
Certainly, I don't believe we can be possibly criticized for deleting or not pro-
ducing a file which contains the type of information that you are speaking of.
We are just as interested in protecting the security of your investigative proс-
esses as you are. But I don't think that when it is on the record that we have
this file, that may contain material that was not in our files, and we are given
the opportunity to examine it, without disclosing these confidential matters that
we ought not to have somebody go through it.
Mr. DULLES. I agree with that but I think we could save time if we checked
off first what we have already and that would cut out about half of that file
probably.
Mr. MCCLOY. I think in a rapid glance through it, I think just about half of it.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, suppose you do that then, get those and let's see. All
right, proceed, Mr. Stern.
Mr. STERN. I think perhaps we ought to leave the entire matter of the file
then until we can give you the information.
The CHAIRMAN. That is right.
Mr. STERN. May we admit for the purposes of the record this list at this time,
Mr. Chief Justice, which has been marked No. 834?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. There are no security matters in this?
Mr. BELMONT. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted as Exhibit No. 834.
(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 834 for
identification, was received in evidence.)
Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, can you identify this letter dated February 6 with
an attached affidavit which has been marked for identification as Commission
Exhibit No. 835?
(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 835, for
identification.)
Mr. BELMONT. Yes; this is a letter dated February 6, 1964, to the Commission
from the FBI to which is attached an affidavit by Director J. Edgar Hoover.
Mr. STERN. What is the subject?
Mr. BELMONT. Stating flatly that Lee Harvey Oswald was never an informant
of the FBI.
Mr. DULLES. Would you define informant. Obviously in the sense he knew
some information as previously indicated from the previous interviews. I mean
for the record, would you just define what you mean by an informant in this
sense?
Mr. BELMONT. An informant in this sense is an individual who has agreed to
cooperate with the FBI and to furnish information to the FBI either for or with-
out payment.
Mr. STERN. Thank you.
Mr. BELMONT. This would not, of course, include the cooperative citizen to
whom we go, and who frequently and frankly discloses any information in his
possession, but rather someone who joins an organization or seeks out informa-
tion at the direction and instance of the FBI relative to subversive or criminal

13-00000

matters. In other words, I want to make it clear we do not regard patriotic
citizens as informants.
Mr. STERN. I take it you also would not have regarded Lee Oswald as an in-
formant from the contacts with him that you have told us about and the other
agents have told us about?
Mr. BELMONT. Indeed not; in no way could he be considered an informant; in
no way.
Mr. STERN. Did you supervise or assist in the preparation of the information
contained here?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
Mr. STERN. And you are familiar with it?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes; I am.
Mr. STERN. And to your knowledge, does it accurately and completely state
the Bureau's practice in recruiting a prospective informant?
Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.
Mr. STERN. Is there anything you would like to add to the information covered
in there with respect to your practices regarding informants?
Mr. BELMONT. No; only in my personal knowledge this is a correct statement
and Lee Harvey Oswald was not an informant of the FBI.
Mr. STERN. Did you ever use the term "agent" to apply to anyone other than
an employee, a special agent employee of the FBI?
1
Mr. BELMONT. No; we do not.
1
Mr. DULLES. Could I ask you, Mr. Belmont, whether Mr. Fain's separation
from the FBI had anything whatever to do with the Oswald case or in his
handling of the Oswald case?
Mr. BELMONT. No; indeed not. Mr. Fain came to the retirement age and de-
cided he wanted to retire, which is his privilege, and he retired and is presently
working in Texas and very happy, I understand.
Mr. DULLES. Thank you.
MT. BELMONT. He retired in good graces, good standing, so far as the FBI is
concerned.
The CHAIRMAN. And a year before the assassination.
Mr. BELMONT. Frankly, I don't recall.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; it was August 1962, he testified.
Mr. STERN. You have already covered this, Mr. Belmont, but just so that the
record is completely clear on this point, was Lee Oswald ever an agent of the
FBI?
Mr. BELMONT. Lee Oswald was never an agent of the FBI.
Mr. STERN. The letter of February 6, 1964, from Mr. Hoover, alludes to testi-
mony furnished the Commission by District Attorney Wade. Have you subse-
quently been advised that Mr. Wade had not testified before the Commission?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes; we received a letter from the Commission advising us
that the incident referred to was an informal discussion rather than actual testi-
mony before the Commission.
Mr. STERN. And also to complete the record, have you been advised that Mr.
Wade was not suggesting that he believed the rumor about Oswald as an in-
formant, but felt obliged to call it to the attention of the Commission?
Mr. BELMONT. The Commission's letter so advised us.
Mr. STERN. Mr. Chairman, may this be admitted with No. 835?
The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted under that number.
(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 835
for identification, was received in evidence.)
Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, I show you a letter dated February 12, 1964, a
number of affidavits by special agents, attached to it. It was identified yester-
day, parts of it were identified yesterday and it therefore carries the number for
identification 825. Can you identify this letter for us?
Mr. BELMONT. In order to be sure I beg your pardon. This is a letter dated
February 12, 1964, to the Commission from the FBI, to which is attached affidavits
of FBI personnel who had reason to contact Lee Harvey Oswald and who were in
a supervisory capacity over the agents who contacted Oswald.
Mr. STERN. Did you supervise the preparation of this material?
Mr. BELMONT. These affidavits were prepared, of course, by the men themselves.
1

13-00000

I have read the affidavits, and they were compiled as an enclosure and sent
over with this letter.
Mr. STERN. You have reviewed them in preparation for your testimony before
the Commission?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
Mr. STERN. To your knowledge, are they accurate?
Mr. BELMONT. They are accurate, to my knowledge, yes.
Mr. STERN. Are they complete?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes.
Mr. STERN. They do not omit any significant fact you know of?
Mr. BELMONT. No.
Mr. STERN. In connection with the material they cover?
Mr. BELMONT. No.
Mr. STERN. Unless there are any questions on that, Mr. Chairman, I suggest
we admit this document.
The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted as No. 825.
(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 825
for identification, was received in evidence.)
Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, I show you a letter dated March 31, 1964, from
Director Hoover to Mr. Rankin, the General Counsel of the Commission, with
a series of attachments. Can you identify this which has been marked. for
identification as No. 836. Can you identify this for the Commission?
(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 836 for
identification.)
Mr. BELMONT. This is a letter dated March 31, 1964, to the Commission from
the FBI to which is attached the instructions contained in our manuals as to the
type of information which should be disseminated to Secret Service and our
relations or liaison with Secret Service.
Mr. STERN. It was prepared in response to a request from the Commission?
Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.
Mr. STERN. Did you supervise or assist in the preparation?
Mr. BELMONT. I did.
Mr. STERN. Have you reviewed it recently?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes.
Mr. STERN. Is it complete with respect to the matters covered?
:
Mr. BELMONT. Yes; it is.
Mr. STERN. Is there anything you would like to add to it with respect to the
matters covered?
Mr. BELMONT. Well
Mr. DULLES. May I just interrupt here a moment. Is this inquiry directed to
the question of whether it is now adequate or whether this is complete as of the
time of the assassination? I think we have two questions there to consider.
Mr. BELMONT. Mr. Dulles, this letter outlines our relations with Secret Serv-
ice and the material that is attached covers both the instructions to our agents
prior to the assassination and the current instructions.
Mr. DULLES. Subsequent to the assassination?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. Yes.

Mr. STERN. What were the criteria you employed and instructed your agents to
employ before the assassination in determining what information should be
reported to the Secret Service regarding threats against the President, members
of his family, the President-elect, and the Vice President?
Mr. BELMONT. These are contained in detail in the attachments which repre-
sent sections of our manual of instructions which are available to all of our
personnel in the field as well as the seat of Government, and also in the FBI
handbook which is in possession of the individual agent in the field. These
instructions require that any information indicating the possibility of an at-
tempt against the person or safety of the persons mentioned by you must be
referred immediately by the most expeditious means of communications to the
nearest office of the Secret Service. Further, that our headquarters in Wash-
ington must be advised by teletype of the information and the fact that it has
been furnished to Secret Service.

13-00000

Mr. STERN. Specifically, the kind of information you were interested in, that
is before the assassination?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes. Specifically the kind?
Mr. STERN. Yes.
Mr. BELMONT. Any information indicating the possibility of a threat against
the President and Vice President and members of the family.
Mr. STERN. Have you broadened-
Mr. BELMONT. I may say, sir-
Mr. STERN. Yes.
Mr. BELMONT. That this practice was assiduously followed, and you will find
that the files of the Secret Service are loaded with information over the years
that we have furnished them. That was a practice religiously followed and a
practice voluntarily followed without request. In other words, we do not have
a written request for this type of information but rather considered it our re-
sponsibility and duty to furnish this information.
Mr. STERN. Did you ever participate in or do you know of any discussion with
the Secret Service before the assassination regarding the kind of information
they were interested in?
Mr. BELMONT. We had close liaison with Secret Service, and I have no doubt
that in oral discussions that the question came up. I wasn't present but I
would assume it has come up, particularly as, we were constantly furnishing
information. We have no written criteria, you might say, as to what should
be furnished.
Mr. STERN. That is, established by the Secret Service.
Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.
Mr. STERN. And you yourself never participated in any discussion of-
Mr. BELMONT. No; I did not.
Mr. STERN. This liaison function.
Mr. BELMONT. This is something we have done for years on the basis that we
consider it our responsibility not only as far as the President goes. As you
know, Mr. Chairman, we have also followed the same policy relative to other
high officials when it appears desirable.
Mr. STERN. Have you subsequent to the assassination augmented your in-
structions to special agents in this respect?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes. On December 26, 1963, we prepared additional instruc-
tions reiterating those already in effect, and adding other dissemination to Secret
Service concerning the security of the President.
The CHAIRMAN. Where do those new ones appear in the exhibit, Mr. Belmont?
Mr. BELMONT. They appear as an attachment-working from the back, I think,
Mr. Chairman, I can help you most.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. BELMONT. Eight pages from the back it starts, it reads, "Manual of In-
structions Section 83."
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I have it.
Mr. BELMONT. The first page is the same information that we previously fur-
nished to Secret Service involving threats.
The CHAIRMAN. The first page is intact, as it was before.
Mr. BELMONT. There may be some slight changes in wording but essentially
it is the same dealing with possible threats.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. DULLES. Mr. Belmont, I wonder if it would be possible for the Commis-
sion's convenience to date each one of these papers as of a certain date. It is
quite difficult going through it now without referring to the letter in each case
to determine whether the instructions are as of the date of the assassination
or as of the present date?
Mr. BELMONT. We can do that without any difficulty. I would be glad to do
it with the staff, or can I help you here?
Mr. DULLES. Well, I think we can do that later but I think it would be useful
when this goes into the record for our later reference in studying this to have
those dates available to us on each one of the attachments.
Mr. BELMONT. Very good.

13-00000

Mr. DULLES. Thank you.
Mr. BELMONT. Coming back to this item you inquired about, sir, the other
dissemination to Secret Service concerning the security of the President is set
forth on pages 2 and 3 of this inclusion in our manual, and it extends the dis-
semination to "subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and fascists, (a) possessing
emotional instability or irrational behavior, (b) who have made threats of
bodily harm against officials or employees of Federal, State or local government
or officials of a foreign government, (c) who express or have expressed strong
or violent anti-U.S. sentiments and who have been involved in bombing or bomb-
making or whose past conduct indicates tendencies toward violence, and (d)
whose prior acts or statements depict propensity for violence and hatred against
organized government." That was prepared in an effort to provide additional,
and a voluntary effort, without request, to provide additional information that
might be helpful to avoid such an incident as happened November 22, 1963.
Mr. STERN. This did not come about, this change did not come about, through
any request from the Secret Service or discussion with the Secret Service?
Mr. BELMONT. No. We made these changes, as I say, in an effort to provide
any additional information in the light of what happened that might be of
assistance to Secret Service and might assist in protecting the President.
Mr. DULLES. I wonder, Mr. Belmont, whether you would consider possibly
changing in section (d) the word "and" to "or" whose prior acts or statements
depict propensity for violence" and then it now reads "and hatred against
organized government". There have been cases, I believe, where the propensity
for violence had not been previously noted but the hatred of organized government
has.
Mr. BELMONT. We will be happy to change that.
Mr. DULLES. I just suggest for your consideration, I don't wish to rewrite it.
Mr. BELMONT. We would be happy to change it, Mr. Dulles.
Mr. STERN. Following Mr. Dulles' thought, in the line above that, Mr Belmont,
should that "and" before (d) be "and" or "or"? Do you mean these-
Mr. BELMONT. We do not mean that all of these items must be coupled together
if that is your thought.
Mr. STERN. That is right.
Mr. BELMONT. We will be happy to change the "and" before (d) to an "or".
Mr. STERN. This means any of the broad classifications of people, subversives,
ultrarightists, racists or fascists who meet any of these four tests.
Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.
Mr. STERN. Can you give the Commission some notion of the increase in volume
which the broadening of your criteria has brought about? By volume, I mean
the volume of your references to the Secret Service.
Mr. BELMONT. I do not have an exact figure, however, I do know that more
than 5,000 additional names have gone over to Secret Service under these criteria.
The CHAIRMAN. In what period of time?
Mr. BELMONT. Since we put them out.
The CHAIRMAN. I see.
Mr. BELMONT. Which was December 26.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. MCCLOY. Have you included defectors in this list?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir; we do include defectors.
Mr. STERN. You mean as of December 26, 1963?
Mr. BELMONT. Correct.
Mr. STERN. Has the expansion of your criteria led to any problem or difficulty
for you or for individuals or do you anticipate any problem or difficulty under
the expanded criteria?
Mr. BELMONT. It seems to me that there is a necessity to balance security
against freedom of the individual. This is a country of laws and a government
of law, and not a government of men. Inevitably the increase in security means
an increase in the control of the individual and a diminishment, therefore, of his
individual liberties. It is a simple matter to increase security. But every time
you increase security you diminish the area of the rights of the individual. In
some countries the problem of a visiting dignitary is met without much difficulty.

13-00000

Persons who are suspect or may be considered dangerous are immediately
rounded up and detained while the individual is in the country. The authorities
have no problem because in those countries there is not a free society such as we
enjoy, and the people who are detained have no redress. The FBI approaches
this whole field of security-I am not boring you with this, am I?
The CHAIRMAN. No, indeed. This is tremendously important.
Mr. BELMONT. The FBI approaches this whole field of security and its tre-
mendous responsibilities to protect the internal security of the country as a
sacred trust. In carrying out our investigations and our work in the security
field, we do it in such a manner under the law that we strengthen rather than
weaken the free society that we enjoy. It is for that reason that our men are
trained carefully, thoroughly, and supervised carefully, to insure that their
approach to the entire security field, which inevitably touches on control of
thought, is handled with extreme care. Our activities are directed to meet the
terrific responsibility we have for the internal security of the country, but to
meet it under the law. We feel that to place security as2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

21 MAY
1982
US/82/71

Dear Anthony,

Regarding your letter 6/705 of 10 May 1982, our
records indicate that Valeriy Vladimirovich Kostikov
traveled to Mexico, France, Spain, the U.S. and Cuba
during the period 1959-61. In 1961, he was assigned
permanently to Mexico City as a consular officer and
served there until August 1965. He was variously
described as a translator, vice-consul, and attache.
During this tour he attempted to cultivate a U.S.
Government employee assigned to our embassy in Mexico
City.

In September/October 1963, Lee Harvey Oswald
approached the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City in an attempt
to get a visa allowing him to return to the USSR.
Kostikov, as a consular officer, handled this visa
request. We have no information which indicates any
relationship between these individuals other than for the
purpose of Oswald's making his visa request.

Kostikov returned to Mexico City for a second tour of
duty in July 1968. During this tour he was again assigned
to the consular section and was a second secretary. It
appeared that he was tasked with following the activities
of the Central American communist parties and left-wing
groups, and he met often with members of these groups,
reportedly providing them with funds and technical
guidance. In July/August 1969, Kostikov made an unusual
TDY trip to Moscow lasting three weeks. (His family
remained in Mexico.) In July 1970 he made a four-day trip
to Havana.

Kostikov's tour in Mexico ended unexpectedly in
September 1971. Our information indicated that he was
not due to leave for another three to four months, and at
the time of his departure, there was some speculation that
the suddenness of his departure was due to the fact that
he was known to Lyalin.

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-289248
DO NOT DESTROY

RECORD COPY

SECRET

Form 5478 Processed

XAE-09222
21MAY82

While in Mexico he was considered by some to be the
most effective and dangerous of intelligence officers in
Mexico. He has been described as being without morals,
education, and manners. Shortly after his arrival in
Mexico in 1968, he was arrested in front of a house of
prostitution after becoming involved in a fist fight with
some locals. It appears this incident did not affect his
position in Mexico City, despite the fact that it
received a good deal of press coverage.

We are aware only that Kostikov arrived in Beirut in
June 1978. We are unable to confirm his presence there
now.

Although our file indicates that Kostikov may have
been a member of Department 13 (Executive Action)
(Department V's predecessor), we have been unable to
confirm this. Also, to the best of our knowledge the KGB
has not engaged in such executive action since 1959.

Sincerely,

/s/ David

David H. Blee

Mr. Anthony C. M. DeVere

PHOTO ATTACHED

DDO/CI/RA/Joan Paxson (21 May 1982)

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig & 1 Adse
1 CI/RA Chrono
1 100-2-95
1 Reading Board
1 Paxson

SECRET
104-10431-10102
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

1 UNCLASSIFIED
INTERNAL+
USE ONLY
SUBJECT (Optional)
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
FROM E/BC
4C 20 Hqs
building
DATE APR 1978
EXTENSION NO
1413
7220 PAE
OFFICER'S INITIALS APR 1978
COMMENTS INUmber cach comment to show from whom
to whom Diawra line across column after each comment.)
This is the ACTION/INFO copy of a communication received on
from MI- in Washington.
Another copy is being held in-E/BC
Any reply should be directed to E/BC cfor for forwarding to Liaison.
Processing by IP is to be determined by
Coordination with E/BC is required prior to any
dissemination of this information outside the DDO.
NB: Richard A. SPRAGUE, Chief
Counsel and Director of HSCA, saw a copy of attached document. See
his attached letter to Sergyj CZORNONOH 04 December 1976.

USE PREVIOUS FORM 610 USE
3-62 EDITIONS SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL USE ONLY
INTERNAL
UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000
CONFIDENTIAL
Our ref: GEN 1

Dear Art, 30 March 1978

Please find attached correspondence
received from one Sergyj CZORNONOH who
claims that he provided information about
Lee Harvey OSWALD to the American Vice
Consul (presumably Tom Blackshear) in
Sofia, Bulgaria, in August 1963.

I have sent copies of these letters
to the FBI and to my Head Office in London.

Mr H Stimson

DH Jones
for GML Blackburne-Kane
Enc.

CONFIDENTIAL

13-00000
SERGYJ CZORNONOH
STREET
SACRAMENTO CALIFORNIA
REGISTERED
95814
M. Walla

SIT TO ASSEMBLE
LSAGC
1976
STATE
15
1978
STATE

15
CAPITOL
PLAYWRIGHT
15
STATE
CAPITOL ST
TO BRITISH EMBASSY

3100 MASSACHUSETTS AVE, N. W.
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
• WASHINGTON, D. C.
NO.257254
201-289248
)
13-00000

SERGYJ CZORNONDH
1106-11TH STREET,
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA, 95814
TOBRAASTI SEM BAMBA
TO BRITISH AMBASSADOR
BRITISH EMBASSY
CHUSETTS
MARCH 15, 1978
3100 MASSACHUSETTS AVE, N. W...
WASHINGTON, D. Ci
DEAR SIR.

i WROTE LETTER ON FEBRUARY 15, 1978
TO MR. JAMES CALLAGHAN PRIME MINISTER
I ENCLOSED REGISTERED MAIL NO. 251067.

MAIL
ON JULY 18, 1963 I WAS IN LONDON ENGLAND
AT THE AIRPORT IMMIGRATION OFFICER NO. 175
I HAD NO VISA VISA IMMIGRATION PLACE ME UNDER
HOUSE ARREST, MR. SMITH IN POLICE UNIFERAI
SECRET SERVICE BROUGHT ME STEAK DINNER
AND POLICE OFFICER INTERROGATED ME, HE
ASKED ME WHAT THE EMBASSY OF US,S,R, SAY
WHAT DID YOU HEARD IN VIENNA, AUSTRIA,
I SAID I HAVE HEARD THAT ONE AMERICAN
DEFECTOR (MR. LEE HARVEY OSWALD) TO RUSSIA
STATES OF
ANFERERETURNED HARVENSEWALD'S
AMERICA THIS MAN HE PREPARING TO KILL
TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY,
MR. SMITH POLICE OFFICER ASKED ME
Do you KNOW HIS NAME, I SAID HIS NAME
PSTART KONOHISHIS NAME WAS PUBLISHED
ONE TIME IN NEWS PAPER IN WASHINGTON
POFT EASYRTO SMEIND
MR. SMITH. POLICE OFFICER SAID
"
13-00000

I DO SEARCHING FOR THIS FILE IN BA
POLICE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE AND
BLICE BRITISH
IMMIGRATION, JASKING YOUR EMBASSY TO
HELP TO FIND THE TRUTH AND I ASK!
GOVERNMENT TO FORWARD My RECORL
JULY 181 1963 TO PRESIDENT JIMMY C.
AND SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUYE CHI
21. SI SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON IN
GENCE I ENCLOSE HIS Copy LETTER TO
ALSO I ENCLOSE YOU copy LETTERI
ON FEBRUARY 17, 1978 TO RUSSIAN ANI
YOUR JUSTICE ALWAYS WILL BE APP
MY INCOMING MAIL iS CONTROL BY
1. AGENTS SOME OF THE MAIL i
GET NOT FORWARD TO ME FIBI, Supi
My INFORMATION AND TORTURE ME..
B.I. AGE
FB
/
RESPECTFULLY
"21.S. PASSPORT NO.D0.2.7000 Sergyj (zorn...
13-00000

Sergyj Czornonoh
Regis Hotel
1106 11th Street
Sacramento, CA 95814

Mr. John M. Price
District Attorney
Sacramento, California
!
Dear Mr. Price:

GITY MANAGERS
ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS
BRITISH EMBASSY
February 6, 1978
-

This is a retyped letter. I visited Mr. Ferry , Deputy District
Attorney, on August 16, 1977. I told in the office that F.B.I. agents and
Secret Service use police department to harass me. Police department do
supply pencil of anesthesia gas to the manager of the building I live. The
manager door use certain people, to freeze me by anesthesia gas - then push
drugs, poison in my mouth to torture me to take my sleep away - or bleed
by rectal and they use many other chemicals to brainwash me to use me in
political assassination which I refused. On January 20, 1976 in Sacramento on
8th and I Streets, man came to me from police or post office, U.S. Department
of Justice and freeze me by gas and told me to take gun, pistol and we will
tell you where to go to shoot - to kill - Mr. Sargent Shriver. I refused.
Manager, Mr. Sisel, of Marshall Hotel, call on the man to tell me this on
the street. In February 1976, police intelligence told me that assassination
will not happen here. How about to move to Maryland state.
-

In this letter I ask you to get report from Dr. Frederick S. Baker, M.D.
colon and rectal surgery on January 31, 1978. His phone - 452-4095. I do
bleed today very much and I am weak, In this letter I ask you to give re-
strain order or respond to me what could be done. The right wing in America
made record to use me in assassination. I refuse. I am human and I like to
be treated as human. Police put frame up on me - just to take advantages on
me. Police use lie, police use mental case to take advantages on me and teli
me that right wing do use such people like me. To prove I enclose copy mid-
night June 14, 1976. Also I enclose copy letter I sent. to Mr. Ted Sheedy,
Supervisor, on January 26, 1978 and copy of his reply to me.

Please respond to me. Thank you.
:
Very truly vours
:
Sergys zornonon
Sergyj Czornonoh

Mr. Sargent Shriver was run for President in 1976.
Sergys zorno...
13-00000
March, 1978

Legal Center
For The Disabled
1722 J STREET, SUITE 19 SACRAMENTO, CA 95814
Telephone: 446-4851
26

Sergyj Czornonoh
1106 11th Street
Sacramento, CA 95814
Dear Mr. Czornonoh:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter regarding
difficulties you have encountered with the police and the
FBI.

In the event that there is legal action taken by the police
or the FBI to institutionalize you this office will provide
you with legal representation.

office.
If you have any further legal problems please contact this'
Sincerely,
Lesie Kay
LESLIE KAY
Paralegal

CATHERINE HUGHES
Staff Attorney
LK: ab
10.2.51067
$

$32
REGISTERED NO.
Value
SNU
Special
Reg. Fee $210
Return
Receipt
Handling $
Charge
Restricted $
Delivery
Postage $ 93

POSTMARK OF
FEB
15
1978
STATE
CAPITOL STA
1973
-399-283
POSTMASTER (BY)
---
AIRMAIL
MAILING OFFICE
85 1124 95814
FROM zrgyj-zone.
110600
--
TO MR. JAMES CALLAGHAN
TO TOM
TOLN To Jar CoWagon
ff of
Wedely OFFICE OF MINISTRY
London Onylord
LONDON ENGLAND
C
13-00000
D027000
Extensions, amendments, limitationss
and restrictions.
SOFIA BULGARIA
cricon LEGATION
BULGARIA
SOFIA, BULO
enced to AUG. 15-1963
THIS PASSPORT VALID
FOR DIRECT TRAVEL
TO THE UNITED STATES
ONLY

VICE CONSUL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
IMM. & NAIZ SERVICE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 14
ADMITTED
LASS
AUG 171031963

CO-2-34, 897
Mr. Sergyj Czornonoh
5
13-00000

copy. 10
BRITISH AMBASSAD

Sergyj Czornonoh
110611th Street
Sacramento, California 95814
To Russian Ambassador
Embassy of U.S.S.R.
1125 16th Street
Washington, D. C.
Dear Sir:
This is retyped letter from hand written

Mr. Wasilev Consul gave me order to transmit this information to U. S. Government,
on August 9, 1963 in Sofia, Bulgaria. Mr. Wasilev, Consul of Embassy of U.S.S.R.,
gave me this information about Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald on August 14, 1963. Mrs.
Besera Asenova, girl friend of Russian Consul came to my room and repeated that
Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald is assassin. He will kill President Kennedy.

On August 15, 1963 in Sofia, Bulgaria, at the airport in embassy car, I told to
Mr. Blackshire, American Vice Consul, that Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald is assissin.
He has a weapon or has ordered one. Mr. Blackshire said it seems like he will
kill someone. I said that Mr. Lee H. Oswald is preparing to kill President
of the United States, John F. Kennedy. Mr. Blackshire said where will it happen.
I said they (right wing) will invite President, criticize him in the newspaper,
then kill him. Mr. Blackshire told me he will give the telegram to Department
of State and he gave me the address where to report.

At 9 a.m. on August 19, 1963 in Washington, D. C., I went to see (Mr. Kippingan)
Director of Special Counselor Service Department of State at 1901 Pennsylvania
Avenue-11th floor. I told the Director that I have information about President
Kennedy. The Director said do not mention name of President Kennedy, only
respond to the questions. The Director said tell us what will happen to Mr.
Lee Harvey Oswald then. I said Mr. Lee H. Oswald will be killed after kill
Kennedy. I said I will take the truth drug to tell the truth. Director tell
us who else get killed in this country. I said as I heard, that Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. will be killed. Who will kill Dr. King, Jr. Negro leader?
I said a man who is in prison at this time. (Mr. James Earl Ray was in prison
at that time.) Director asked where assassination will happen. I said in Dallas,
Texas. Director said if someone gave this information here I would expel the
man. Director did call on F.B.I. agents after F.B.I. use anesthesia gas to
freeze me to drub me to keep amnesia.

I told Director Department of State that Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald have a weapon.
Go see him. Director told me you too can have weapon--so what if Oswald got
weapon.
Sincerely,

U.S House of Representatives
Sergyj Czornопов
Sergy) Csornonoh
U.S. Passport 0027000

Select Committee on Assassinations told me to write letter to Embassy in early 1977.
*
Sergyj czornon:
3/15/78
13-00000
८
Sergyj Czernonoh
1106 11th Street
Bacramento, CA 99814
Holmes 5F6
Registered letter No. 251254
March 15, 1978
Retyped letter from handwritten
of March 15, 1978, which I sent

To British Ambassador
British Embassy
31.00 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C.
Phone 462-1340
Dear Sir:

I wrote letter on February 15, 1978, to Mr. James Callaghan, Prime
Minister. I enclosed registerd mail No. 251067.

On July 18, 1963, I was in London, England at the airport. Immigration
officer No. 175 - I had no visa - immigration place me under house arrest.
Mr. Smith in police uniform, secret service, bought me steak dinner and
police officer interrogated me. He asked me what the Embassy of U.S.S.R.
sey. What did you heard in Vienna, Austria. I said I have heard that one
American Defector (Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald) to Russia and he returned to
United States of America. This man he preparing to kill
President John F. Kennedy.
-
to assassinate

Mr. Smith, police officer, asked me do you know his name. I said his
nome start on "0". His name was published one time in newspaper in Wash-
ington Post. Mr. Smith, police officer, said it easy to find.

I do searching for this file in British police, British intelligence
and British immigration. I asking your Embassy to help to find the truth
and I ask your government to forward my record of July 18, 1963, to
President Jimmy Carter and Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman U.S. Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence. I enclose his copy letter to me.
I enclose you copy letter I sent on February 17, 1978 to Russian Ambassador.
Aleo

Your justice always will be appreciated. My incoming meil is control
by the F.B.I. agents. Some of the mail I don't get. Not forward to me.
F.B.I. suppress me my information and torture me by drugs. 27 years
anesthesia gas and freeze me push drug in my mouth.

My U.S. passport No. D027000.
No251254
REGISTERED NO
Value
$10
$219
R$
Special
Delivery S
Return
Receipt
Restricted $
$25
Handling $
Charge
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$24
AIRMAIL
Respectfully yours,
POSTMARK OF
CALIS
Sergyj Czornonoh
Sou
ENTO.
MAR
15
1978
• STR
STATE CAPITOL
ALLINGOPFICE
POSTMASTER (By)
FROM S. czarnonon
11006211at 95814
237.-902
Вердуј сзочнопов
MARCH 20,1978
13-00000

Room 316
TH
1106-11 TH STREET
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA
95814
PM
Hux G
1975/
WASHINGTON
PROCLAIM UBERTY
USA 13C
TO BRITISH EMBASSY
3100 MASSACHUSETTS AVE.
N. W.
WASHINGTON, D, C.
13-00000

United States Senate
650 CAPITOL MALL
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95814
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
316
PM
Shayakawa
1978
Mr. Sergyj Czornonoh
1106 11th Street, Room 316
Sacramento, CA 95814
U.S.S..
i104-10433-10050
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DISPATCH
CLASSIFICATION

TO
Chief
INFO.
Chief
FROM
Chief
SUBJECT
O Transmittal of Memo to Legal Attache
ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESX
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

Please transmit to the Legal Attache the attached memo
which is in response to his inquiry-of 17 March 1966.

Attachment:
Memo re Martin Luther King, Jr.
Distribution:
2
2- Chief,

201-760966

COPY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 9 Mar 1976

7176046
CROSS REFERENCE TO
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
DATE
30 March 1966
59
CLASSIFICATION
HOS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

We have no information that Subject appeared at a
rally in to date, nor does the Embassy have knowledge
of a future visit of KING to

Any future information which becomes available will
be forwarded to you. We have also taken due note of your
desire that the authorities not know of your
interest in Subject's activities.

COPY

Tart #14

(59

13-00000

DISPATCH
CLASSIFICATION

TO
INFO.
FROM
SUBJECT
0 Transmittal of Memo to Legal Attache,
ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

COORDINATE
COORDINATE LAST SENTENCE
OF ATTACHMENT WITH FBI
MARNED FOR INDEXIMO
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

Please transmit to the Legal Attache the attached wero
which is in response to his inquiry of 17 March 1966.

Attachment:
Neno re Martin Luther King, Jr.
Distribution:

1288
CROSS REFERENCE TO
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
DOCUMENT AS REFERRED TO FBL
DATE
30 March 1966
CLASSIFICATION
HOS FILE NUMBER
59

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

We have no information that Subject appeared at a
rally in Oslo to date, nor does the Embassy have knowledge
of a future visit of KING to Norway.

Any future information which becomes available will.
be forwarded to you. We have also taken due note of your
desire that the Norwegian authorities not know of your
interest in Subject's activities.]

13-00000

DISPATCH
CONFIDENTIAL
TO
Chief of Station, London
INFO.
Chief, WE
Chief of Station, Oslo
SUBJECT
1) Transmittal of Nomo to legal Attache, London
ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

Please transmit to the Legal Attache the attached memo
which is in response to his inquiry of 17 March 1966.

Attachment:
Memo re Martin Luther King, Jr.
Distribution:
2-COS, London w/att
2- Chief, WE w/att

Leon S. TOZALL
21.767966

CS COPY
Downgraded to
by authority of
date

CONFIDENTIAL
001829
28 tot 1976
FULL_TEXT COPY = DO NOT RELEASE
CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 287241978
EZ IMPDET CL BY 001849
14th
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OWOA-19623
CLASSIFICATION
DATE

100-00
901760460
30 March 1966 (59
HOS FILE NUMBER

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
We have no information that Subject appeared at a
rally in Oslo to date, nor does the Embassy have knowledge
of a future visit of KING to Norway.

Any future information which becomes available will
be forwarded. to you. We have also taken due note of your
desire that the Norwegian authorities not know of your
interest in Subject's activities.

CS COPY,
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
alt El 3
100-002-015
## 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS
ACT OF 1992'

SE IDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL  SECRET

## OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

| TO | NAME AND ADDRESS | DATE | INITIALS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Hou Dube, DDYPIAGG |  |  |
| 2 | IO-4127-4gs. |  |  |
| 3 | HT-1 |  |  |
| 4 |  |  |  |
| 5 |  |  |  |
| 6 |  |  |  |

| ACTION | DIRECT REPLY | PREPARE REPLY |
|---|---|---|
| APPROVAL | DISPATCH | RECOMMENDATION |
| COMMENT | FILE | RETURN |
| CONCURRENCE | INFORMATION | SIGNATURE |

**Remarks:**

The first time the Bureau
Sent these, they combined
King-Ray docs with
Kennedy assassination docs.
After discussion with you,
they were sent back to
the Bureau asking them to
segregate King-Ray docs. Here

_FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER_

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. DATE

Karen W. J7015 11/3
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions (40)

---

13-00000

INCLASSIFIED INTERNAL FOIA REQUEST
USE ONLY CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

**PRIORITY HANDLING**

SUBJECT: (Optional) REQUEST NUMBER

MARTIN Luther JUN, 18 2:00 PM*73 76-382
FROM SWEET MARY JUN KING (WEISBERG-REQUEST EXTENSION DATE SENT
O/DDO/FIO OPS 18 JUNE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and DATE SUSPENSE DATE
building)

|  | RECEIVED | FORWARDED | OFFICER'S INITIALS | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. OPS/ITG com C 18 JUN 1976  |  |  |  | |
| ATTN: Mary Moran  |  |  | |  |
| Tube ES-2 |  |  |  |  |
| 2. BT  |  | 21/1 dan Batt |  |
| 3.  |  |  |  | H|
| 4. GH |  | 22/7 4 |  |
| 5.  |  |  |  |  JPK- |
|  |  |  |  | need to |
|  |  |  |  | Copy some 1/2 |
|  |  |  |  | steps that |
|  |  |  |  | are in here as |
|  |  |  |  | for some |
| 6. C/OPS/ITG |  | 27 JUL 1976 | JR |  |
| 7.  |  |  |  |  |
| 8.  |  |  |  |  |
| 9. DDO/FIO att: Annette  |  |  |  | ☒ No record of subject |
| tube: CT-5, 2B1415 |  |  |  | ☒ No info identifiable |
|  |  |  |  | with subject |
| 10. |  |  |  | ☑ See attached memorandum |
|  |  |  |  | Part I & II |
| 11. |  |  |  |  |
| 12. |  |  |  |  |

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 3749 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL UNCLA
1-75 OP-12 USE ONLY

---

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

27 JUL 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Privacy and Information Officer, DDO

SUBJECT: Weisberg Request (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
Part I

REFERENCE: 76-F-382

1. This office maintains a three volume sensitive
(unofficial) file on the Subject. We no longer maintain
201 file (201-760966); Dr. King's files and documents
were closed out on 6 November 1974 and forwarded to IP
files on 25 May 1976. A further check of other records
in this office revealed the following information relevant
to the Subject. While a large number of documents are
available which mention King, the majority are dated after
his death and in some way are related to world reaction to
his assassination which was on 4 April 1968, prior to the
implementation of the MHCHAOS program, 4 July 1968.

a. The following overt items (excerpts from books
published) are considered releasable to the requestor.
There are no exemptions. Black Power/White Resistance,
(EX-3283) by Fred Powledge; The Negro Revolt, (EX-3267)
by Louis E. Lomax; Ghetto Rebellion to Black Liberation,
(EX-3212) by Claude M. Lightfoot; Is Anybody Listening
to Black America, (EX-3573) by C. Eric Lincoln; Martin
Luther King, Jr., (EX-3670) by William Robert Miller;
SNCC - The New Abolitionists, (EX-2108) by Howard Zinn;
The Black Muslims in America, (EX-2109) by C. Eric
Lincoln; Negro and Jew, (EX-3573) by Shloma Katz;
Chronicles of Black Protest, (EX-3439) by Dr. C. Eric
Lincoln; The Black Messiah, (EX-3669), by Albert B.
Cleage, Jr.; Black Power and White Protestants, (EX-3211),
by Joseph C. Hough, Jr.; The Negro Mood, (EX-2127) by
Lerome Bennett, Jr.; Black Man's Burden, (EX-3571) by
John Oliver Killens; When Negros March, (EX-3577) by

Docs 1-23

CONFIDENTIAL

CIMPOC CLEV 058723

---

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

Herbert Garfinkel; Black Man's America, (EX-3208) by
Simeon Booker; Staff Study by The Committee on Internal
Security, (EX-4866) dated 1970; Testimony of Gerald
Wayne Kirk, Hearings of the Committee on the Judiciary,
(EX-7044): 1970; Hearings Before the Committee on Un-
American Activities, (EX-2131) 1968; Riots, Civil and
Criminal Disorders, Hearings before the Sub-Committee
on Investigations, (EX-2169) June 20 and 21, 1968;
The New Left, Memorandum prepared for the Committee
on the Judiciary, (EX-3535), 9 October 1968; National
Review, 3 May 1967; The Rebel (published in Exile),
May-June 1967; The New World of Negro Americans,
(EX-3571) by Harold R. Isaacs.

b. The following overt items which mention the
Subject and/or his activities are not available in this
office.

Washington Star, dated 14 August 1968
Washington Star, dated 4 February 1969
Washington Star, dated 8 May 1968
Washington Star, dated 14 April 1968.
Washington Star, dated 20 January 1969
Washington Star, dated 10 November 1968
Washington Star, dated 29 March 1969
Soul Newspaper (EX-3653), 1 December 1969
New York Times, dated 13 April 1967
New York Times, dated 18 August 1968
New York Times, dated 5 October 1969
Time, dated 12 April 1968
Liberation News, dated November 1967
Committee Newsletter dated May 1967
D.C. Catholic Standard, dated 18 July 1968
Militant (pg. 5), dated 22 November 1968
Ottawa Citizen, dated 17 December 1968
Sepia (pg. 66) (EX-3592), December 1969-destroyed
Jet Magazine (pg. 17) (EX-3594), 7 August 1967-
destroyed
The Black Panther (pg. 10) dated 1969
Washington Post, dated 1 September 1967
Washington Post, dated 15 November 1968
Washington Post, dated 28 June 1988
Washington Post, dated 26 May 1968\
Washington Post, dated 24 December 1968

2
CONFIDENTIAL

---

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

Washington Post, dated 14 December 1968
Washington Post, dated 19 November 1968
Washington Post, dated 22 September 1968
Washington Post, dated 17 August 1968
Washington Post, dated 29 March 1968
Washington Post dated 20 March 1968
Washington Post, dated 24 May 1968
Washington Post, dated 17 November 1968
Washington Post, dated 5 April 1968
Washington Post, dated 12 May 1968
Washington Post, dated 1 April
68
1969
Washington Post, dated 14 March 1969

c. The following overt items pertaining to the
Assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. are
releasable to the requestor. There are no exemptions.
Look, 15 April 1969; Washington Star, 24 April 1968;
12 March 1969; 13 March 1969; 17 March 1969; 20 March
1969; 23 March 1969; 24 March 1969; 1 April 1969;
2 April 1969; 4 April 1969; 13 April 1969; 24 April
1969; 27 May 1969; 16 July 1969; 31 May 1969; New
York Times, 10 March 1969; 7 March 1969; 8 March 1969;
14 March 1969; 16 April 1969; 23 May 1969; 24 May 1969;
26 May 1969; 1 June 1969; UPI-108, 3 January 1969;
Washington Post, 3 January 1969; 18 January 1969;
28 January 1969; 31 January 1969; 8 February 1969;
8 March 1969; 11 March 1969; Tass International Service,
11 March 1969; Daily World, 12 March 1969; Washington
Post, 12 March 1969; 13 March 1969; 17 March 1969;
18 March 1969; 20 March 1969; 22 March 1969; 23 March
1969; 26 March 1969; 8 April 1969; 12 April 1969;
Item from News Dispatches, 1969; The Sunday Star, 16
March 1969; Item from Associated Press, 8 April 1969;
Associated Press, 14 June 1969; Associated Press item,
13 May 1969; Associated Press item, 14 May 1969;
Washington Post, 21 May 1969; 23 May 1969; 2 May 1969;
27 May 1969; 26 May 1969; 25 May 1969; 16 July 1969;
30 May 1969; 16 March 1969; 27 June 1969; 20 June 1969;
26 June 1969; Washington Star 4 May 1968; Washington
Star, 29 May 1968; Time, 13 September 1968; Washington
Post, 19 September 1968; Chicago Daily News Service,
undated; Washington Star, 18 September 1968; Washington
Star, 23 September 1968; Los Angeles Times, 7 August 1968;

125-341 Docs 24-151
S
See separate list from OPS/ITG - above is
not acclass

3
CONFIDENTIAL

---

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

Washington Post, 16 August 1968; Washington Star,
6 July 1968; Reuters, London, 6 July 1968; Washington
Post, 22 July 1968; Time, 26 July 1968; Washington
Star, 12 April 1968; Washington Star, 13 April 1968;
Washington Post, 13 April 1968; Washington Star,
14 April 1968; Washington Post, 14 April 1968;
Washington Post, 16 April 1968; Delta Democrat
Times, 16 April 1968; Washington Star, 17 April 1968;
Washington Star, 18 April 1968; Washington Star, 19
April 1968; undated item; undated item; Washington
Star, 23 April 1968; Washington Star, 23 April 1968;
Washi
Washington Star, 24 April 1968; Washington Post, 6
May 1968; Reuters, London, undated; Reuters, undated;
Reuters, 16 July 1968; Associated Press, 9 July 1968;
16 July 1968; Reuters, 16 July 1968; Reuters, 9 July
1968; UPI-122, 9 July 1968; UPI-48, 10 July 1968;
UPI-129, 15 July 1968; UPI-48, 12 July 1968; Associated
Press, 17 July 1968; Reuters, 2 July 1968; Associated
Press, 2 July 1968; Reuters, undated; London, 2 July
1968; UPI-30, 2 July 1968; Reuters, 8 July 1968;
UPI-21A, 2 July 1968; UPI-125, 2 July 1968; London,
2 July 1968; London, 2 July 1968; Associated Press,
2 July 1968; UPI-8, 2 July 1968; London, 2 July 1968;
London, 2 July 1968; Reuters, undated; Reuters,
undated, Reuters, 2 July 1968; Associated Press, 18
July 1968; London, 18 July 1968; Reuters, 18 July 1968;
Associated Press, 18 July 1968; Associated Press,
18 July 1968; Reuters, 17 July 1968; Reuters, 17 July
1968; London, 17 July 1968; Associated Press, 17 July
1968; Reuters, undated; London, undated; Associated
Press, July 1968; Reuters, 17 July 1968; Associated
Press, 17 July 1968.

d. The following documents are releasable in
sanitized form to the requestor under the provisions
of the Freedom of Information Act. Excised portions
are exempt as noted. OIRT-06733, 23 September 1964,
exempt under (b) (3) (a); (b)(3)(b); OIRT-06733, 16
October 1964, exempt under (b) (3) (a); (b) (3) (b);
CSCI-315/02051-64, exempt under (b) (3) (a); (b) (3) (b);
S-19, 5 October 1967, exempt under (b) (3) (a), (b) (6);
S-20, 5 October 1967, exempt under (b) (3) (a), (b)(6);
UWCA-3510, 11 October 1967, exempt under (b) (3) (a),
(b) (6); EX-01655, 5 November 1967, exempt under
(b) (3) (a), (b) (6); JMWAVE-1417, 26 February 1968,
exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b) (3) (b); Georgetown-5024,
A
05 referral also
4
CONFIDENTIAL

---

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

26 February 1968, exempt under (b) (6); EX-895, 7
March 1968; exempt under (b)(6); Kingston-4004,
6 April 1968, exempt under (b) (3) (a), (b) (3) (b),
(b) (1) 5(B) (1); Mexico City-5143, 7 April 1968,
exempt under (b) (3) (a), (b)(3)(b); Tokyo-9443,
10 April 1968, exempt under (b) (3) (a), (b) (3) (b);
Dir-90530, 10 April 1968, exempt under (b) (3) (a), Raíj
(b)(3)(b), (b) (6); Mexico-5188, 10 April 1968, exempt
under (b)(3)(b); JMWAVE-2022, 12 April 1968; exempt
under (b) (3) (b); Berlin-2149, 15 April 1968, exempt
under (b) (3) (b), (b) (6); Dir-92664, 18 April 1968 Ray
exempt under (b)(3)(b), (b) (6); Memo draft, dated
26 April 1968, exempt under (b) (3) (a) (if USIB concurs);
inst records FHIIT-6444, 7 May 1968, exempt under (b) (3) (a), (b)(6);
Stockholm-9024, 7 June 1968, exempt under (b) (3) (a),
(b) (3) (b), (b) (6); B-173, 19 September 1968, exempt
under (b) (3)(b); RL-188, 13 November 1968, (b) (3) (a) not rcod
Budapest-017, 19 May 1971, (b) (3) (b), (b) (6); EX-8726,- nota
B-2628, 21 May 1971, (b) (3) (a), (b) (3) (b), (b) (6);
27 September 1971, exempt under (b)(3)(b), (b)(6);
Memorandum, 28 November 1975, exempt under (b) (3) (b).

e. The following Top Secret (SI) documents
which mention either Dr. or Mrs. King are held in
OPS/ITG (SI) vault:

3/0/QOY/T-68-68
3/0/QOF/T151-67
3/0/QOY/T-58-68
3/0/GOUT/T269-68
3/0/GOUT/T88-69
3/0/GOUT/T92-69
3/0/QOY/T57-67
3/0/COUT/T415-69
3/0/QOF/T95-67
3/0/QOF/T106-67
3/0/GOUT/T177-69

2. The following documents are exempt from release;
exemptions are as cited.

5
CONFIDENTIAL

---

13-00000

Cables:

CONFIDENTIAL

63 (a) Kingston-4005, dated 8 April 1968; according
to (RUABBE/1) a Jamattan service four groups are trying
to get demonstrations going against the Amembassy, but
without success; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

64 (b) Bogota-0654, dated 10 April 1968; (GISOY/GIJAY)
unit intercepted propaganda items from Cuban mail pouch.
Disclosure to the requestor would ide identify a clandestine
method of the station for obtaining information; exempt
under (b) (3) (a) and (b)(6).

(c) Mexico City-5210, dated 15 April 1968; Para. 3
of this cable mentions an intercepted letter addressed to
65 President Johnson protesting the King assassination.
(LITEMPO/12) a member of a Mexican service provided the
information; exempt under (b) (1) (5)B(1).

(d) Mexico City-5249, dated 17 April 1968; the
6 Legal Attache provided composite photos of suspect in
connection with King assassination and asked for check
of visitors to Soviet and Cuban embassies; exempt
under (b) (3) (a).
370
(e) Bogota-0703, dated 20 April 1968 (GISOY)
surveillance team followed an American National with
a striking resemblance to Galt, exempt under (b) (3) (a)
and (b) (6).
Quy
(f) Paris-9506, dated 22 April 1968; concerns
Forman's arrival in Paris, incidental reference to
the Subject; exempt under (b) (3) (a) and (b)(6).

(g) Nairobi-3000, dated 14 June 1968; source
(TGFLER/1) stated he had an interview with Robert F.
Williams. Incidental reference to the Subject; exempt
under (b) (3) (a) and (b)(6).

(h) Director-48988, dated 7 November 1968;
concerns a Richard George Perrin, incidental reference
to the Subject in a record pertaining to another subject
and should not be considered a document responsive to
the requestor; exempt under (b) (3) (a) and (b) (6).

6
CONFIDENTIAL

---

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

(i) Addis Ababa-27, dated 18 August 1971;
source (JEPYX-1) entertained Hosea Williams in his
home during latter's visit to Ethiopia. Incidental
reference to the Subject; exempt under (b) (3) (a)
and (b) (6).

Dispatches; uF67-16828, 15 que 66-05 Referral bl (OGAI)

62 (a) OELA-48626, dated 19 January 1968; forwards
a memorandum prepared by (Rufus F. Rodigast) which deals
with MHALPHA-related individuals; incidental reference
to the Subject; exempt under (b) (3) (a) and (b) (6).

67 (b) FJTA-53902, dated 29 January 1968; forwards
a pamphlet (which also contains an article mentioning
Dr. King's name) from BEHEIREN Hqs. in Tokyo, obtained
by (POFRAGRANCE) a unilateral source still active and
sensitive; exempt under (b) (3) (a) and (b) (6).

(c) OEPA-982, dated 15 March 1968; forwards a
copy of recent correspondence dence between (QRPHONE/1) and
(QRPEONY/1). Incidental reference to the Subject;
exempt under (b) (3) (a) and (b) (6)

(d) OEPA-1058, dated 17 April 1968; contains
operational information submitted by the Station
concerning (RODIGAST); contains an incidental mention
of the name Dr. Martin Luther King; exempt under
(b) (3) (a) and (b)(6).

68 (e) OЕРА-1097, dated 29 April 1968; is a report
by (RODIGAST) on SNCC activities in Paris in the aftermath
of the Dr. King assassination; exempt under (b) (3) (a)
and (b) (6).

(f) HMMA-34688, dated 20 May 1968; contains items
69 from (LIBIGHT/LIMUD) a sensitive teletap and mail intercept
operation coverage; exempt under (b) (3) (a) and (b) (6).

(g) FJTA-54934, dated 31 July 1968; Americans
Invited to Leftist Conference in Japan. (POFRAGRANCE/1)
a unilateral source still active and sensitive provided
the information; exempt under (b) (3) (a) and (b) (6).
Note: An extensive search has failed to locate the
attachment for this document. The covering dispatch
makes no mention of Dr. King or his assassination.

7
CONFIDENTIAL

---

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

70 (h) OCOA-13493, dated 27 September 1968; is a
report forwarded by (SMABOVE) a Canadian service;
exempt under (b) (1) (5)B(1).

(i) OELA-51949, dated 10 February 1970; (JAGUAR)
a British service forwarded press clippings (they
contained an incidental mention of the name Dr. King)
by or about a Jonathan Power; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

(j) FZWA-2412, dated 8 September 1970; Subject:
Activities of Andrew Pulley in New Zealand; contain
an incidental mention of the name Dr. King; (MLDUST)
a New Zealand servvice provided the information;
exempt under (b) (1) (5)B(1).

(k) ANLA-4097, dated 16 December 1970; concerns
a memorandum passed to (KRHOLLY) à Nigerian security
service requesting information on and watchlisting of
the MHCHAOS group who were destined for Africa; contain
an incidental mention of the name Dr. King; exempt
under (b) (3) (a).

(1) OCOA-17031, dated 27 June 1972; (SMABOVE)
☐☐ a Canadian service provided a report on the Day of
African Solidarity; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

Memoranda:

(a) EX-1239, dated 22 August 1967; is a Biographic
Summary on Kunstler, William Moses, incidental refernce
to the Subject; exempt under (b) (3) (a) and (b)(6).

(b) Memorandum S-13, dated 5 October 1967;
Subject: Views of the Reverend Daniel Mallette on
the Black Militant Situation in Chicago; incidental
reference to the Subject; the information was obtained
by QRPHONE/1, a sensitive unilateral source in a personal
interview with Father Mallette; exempt under (b) (3) (a)
and (b) (6).

(c) B-35, dated 8 February 1968; Black Nationalist
Writers in Paris; incidental reference to the Subject;
exempt under (b) (3) (a) and (b) (6)

8
CONFIDENTIAL

---

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

(d) B-75, dated 9 April 1968; Subject: Attempted
Anti U.S.-Demonstrations in Kingston, according to the
72 Special Branch of the Jamaican security service; exempt
under (b) (1) (5)B(1).

(e) Memorandum, dated 16 April 1968; Subject:
Tentative Plans of Senator Robert Kennedy to Visit
West Berlin on 1 May. Incidental referenc to the
Subject; exempt under (b) (3) (a) and (b) (6).

(f) EX-1623, (rewritten) dated 17 April 1968;
Subject: Biographic Summary on Hayden, Thomas Emmett,
incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under
(b) (3) (a) and (b) (6).

(g) B-88, dated 18 April 1968; FBI provided our
73 representative in Mexico with composite photos of
suspected killer; exempt under (b) (3) (a).

(h) B-89, dated 22 April 1968; Subject: Radio
Messages for Stokely Carmichael during April 1968
riots in Washington, D.C. Incidental reference to the
Subject; exempt under (b) (3) (a) and (b) (6).

(i) B-92, dated 23 April 1968; Subject: Arrival
of James Rufus Forman in Paris, incidental reference to
the Subject; exempt under (b) (3) (a) and (b) (6).

(j) B-97, dated 25 April 1968; Subject:
74 Investigation of Death of Martin Luther King, Jr.;
concerns a subject who did not appear to be identical
with FBI's suspect; exempt under (b) (3) (a).

(k) EX-1183 (rewrite of 19 July 1967), dated
26 April 1968; is a Biographic Sketch of Howard Zinn;
incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under
(b) (3) (a) and (b) (6).

(1) EX-1490, dated 14 June 1968; is a Biographic
Summary on Mark William Rudd, incidental reference to
the Subject; exempt under (b) (3) (a) and (b) (6).

(m) EX-2148, dated 4 September 1968; is a Biographic
Summary on Szymanski, Albert John Jr, incidental
reference to the Subject; exempt under (b) (3) (a) and (b) (6).

9
CONFIDENTIAL

---

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

75 (n) B-191, dated 9 October 1968; Subject:
Jamaican Special Branch Report - Jamaica/ United
States Black Power Ties; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

(o) B-308, dated 17 February 1969; Subject:
Bahamas/United States Black Power Ties; report of
a British service; exempt under (b) (b (1) (5)B(1).
Lexempt
75L-134-69, 19 Fel-169-05-refernal 01, 2, 3, b

74.

(p) B-618, dated 8 September 1969; Subject:
World Council of Peace planned delegates to Paris;
a sensitive reliable source revealed a Clarence
Fielden Jones as being in contact with Martin Luther
King; exempt under (b) (3) (a) and (b) (6).

(q) EX-9272, dated 21 November 1972; is a summary
about Ralph Henry, incidental reference to the Subject;
exempt under (b) (3) (a) and (b) (6).

(r) EX-10198, dated 29 May 1972, concerns
VB#5 and miscellaneous comments by (MHRUPEE);
incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under
(b) (3) (a) and (b) (6).

(s) CSCI-1763, dated 14 May 1968 (201-760966);
378 this file has been closed. - Record on Ray

3. Thirty FBI reports which mention the Subject and/or
his activities. Excluded under 1900.3(g)(4). See Attachment I.

4. The cited documents are available in this office
if needed.

Attachment: a/s
John J. Reagan
Chief, Internationl Terrorism Group
Operations Staff

10
CONFIDENTIAL

---

13-00000

TRANSMITTAL SLIP
TO: DATE
OPS/ITG

ROOM NO. BUILDING
REMARKS

Pls note120404333
104-10433-10212
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
A
1319
13-00000
319
APPEALS REVIEW FORM
Tab 1-52 contains Dispatch UFGA-29877 dated 11 Agr. 1968.
() Previously denied in toto under exemption(s)
of recommended but not regret fy IPS
Segregable portions previously released, excised portions exempted
under (6)(1) (6) (2) (1)(3) of FOIA
() Located during the DDO appeals review.
() Referred to DDO for review by
Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

I RECOMMEND:
( ) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s)
() ADD exemption(s)
() DROP exemption(s)
of
() Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions
exempted under
() ADD exemption(s)
() DROP exemption(s)
of
Release additional information with excised portions exempted under
(b) (1) (5) (3) of FoiA
() Deny document in toto under exemption(s)
:
of
(Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under
of
The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:
() Information from a foreign liaison service
() Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
() Information which would/could identify the source
() Information pertaining to a source
() Information pertaining to intelligence methods
Location of CIA overseas installation
Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
Name of CIA employee
) File number
Pseudonym
Cryptonyms
Internal organizational data
() Name of FBI agent
) FBI file number
) Privacy of other individual
() OTHER

COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked
SECRET
IS
1) maintained
(classified to
}
declassified
desensitized
was:
A downgraded to confidential

E2 INPDE
CL. BY O
13-00000

TELEPOUCH
DISP NO
FILE NO - NONE

وتو
DATE - QQ APRIL 1968

INDEXING - NONE

MICROFILM - NONE
MICROFILMED
APR 15 1968
DOC. MICPO, SER.
TO - CHIEF

INFO - CHIEF CHIEF,

FROM - CHIEF
SUBJECT - SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA TREATMENT OF THE DEATH OF
MARTIN LUTHER KING, TAI APRIL 1968

THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE MARTIN
LUTHER KING ASSASSINATION-DURING THE PERIOD 5-8 APRIL HAS BEEN
PREPARED BY THE

AM GRANMA HAVANA DAILY NEWSPAPER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
5
CUBA, APRIL 68, FRONT PAGE "LAST MINUTE NEWS - MARTIN LUTHER
KING ASSASSINATED IN MEMPHIS, U.S.A. ACCORDING TO FIRST REPORTS,
LUTHER KING HAS BEEN SHOT BY A 'WHITE WELL-DRESSED YOUNG MALE..

2. WAT

Y GRANMA, I APRIL, FRONT PAGE **TWENTY-SEVEN PERSONS HAVE
BEEN KILLED IN THE U.S. AS A RESULT OF THE FIGHTING WHICH HAS BEEN
GOING ON SINCE THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING. IN WASHING-
TON ALONE THERE ARE 750 WOUNDED AND 4,186 PERSONS ARRESTED. SNIPERS
CONTINUE TO BE ACTIVE IN DIFFERENT CITIES IN THE U.S. THE WHITE
HOUSE AND THE CAPITOL ARE UNDER HEAVY GUARD.

TISON
:
/FULL INFORMATION
AFP

ER CRANKA, XAPRIL, LAST PAGE TO RICHMOND TO LIBERATE RAP
BROWN
/WASHINGTON, APRIL, ASSOCIATED FRENCH PRESS-
FRENCH NEWS AGENCY AYNX LEAFLETS WERE DISTRIBUTED HERE THIS MORNING,
AFP
URGING THE WEGRO PEOPLE OF WASHINGTON TO GO TO RICHMOND TO LIBERATE
RAP BROWN. JITHE LEAFLETS CALLED ON THE NEGROES TO FORM A MOTOR-
CADE AND LEAVE FOR RICHMOND TOMORROW, MONDAY
TELE POUCH
PAGE ONE
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Dald 6 or 78
319
F

13-00000
As
TELE POUCH PAGE TWO
an
GRANMA, I APRIL, LAST PAGE ARTICLE ENTITLED "PRINCIPAL
JEGRO ORGANIZATIONS IN THE U.S.'', BY JUANA CARRASCO. THE ARTICLE
DAYS THAT NEGRO ORGANIZATIONS ARE DIVIDED INTO TWO GROUPS - THE
'IOLENT ONES AND THE NON-VIOLENT ONES. IT MENTIONS THE FOLLOWING
MONG THOSE WHICH ADVOCATE THE USE OF VIOLENCE CONGRESS OF RACIAL
QUALITY/CORE/, STUDENT NON-VIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE /SNCC/,
BLACK MUSLIMS, BLACK PANTHER PARTY, BLACKSTONE RANGERS, THE ALERT
PATROL, REVOLUTIONARY ACTION MOVEMENT /RAM/, THE BLACK GUARDS, THE
EACONS, AND THE U.S.. THE FOLLOWING NEGRO ORGANIZATIONS ARE
ENTIONED AMONG THOSE WHICH ADVOCATE NON-VIOLENCE NATIONAL ASSO-
IATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE NAACP/, NATIONAL
URBAN LEAGUE, AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE
SCLC/.
8
IM GRANMA, I APRIL, LAST PAGE JJATTEMPTS ARE BING MADE TO
:
LAME CARMICHAEL FOR THE OUTBREAK OF RACIAL VIOLENCE IN THE U.S.."
८,
K
XM GRANMA, I APRIL, LAST PAGE RACIAL CLASHES BETWEEN NEGRO
ND WHITE AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN JAPAN.**
7.
8
GRANMA, ΓAPRIL, LAST PAGE THE AMERICAN NEGRO PEOPLE...
IN GRANMA, I APRIL, LAST PAGE ''MARTYRS OF THE NEGRO
TRUGGLE.
१.
732
OM RADIO LIBERACION AND RADIO PROGRESO HAVANA RADIO STATIONS/,
APRIL, UWP A.M. AND 12 NOON THE CHIEF OF THE MISSION TO CUBA
F THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT HAS SENT A MESSAGE
O AFRO-AMERICANS ON THE ASSASSINATION OF THE LEADER, MARTIN LUTHER
ING. THIS MESSAGE SAYS THAT THE CRIME WHICH WAS COMMITTED AGAINST
ARTIN LUTHER KING UNMASKS THE EVIL FACE OF THE RULERS AND RACISTS
F THE UNITED STATES. THE MESSAGE OF THE VIETNAMESE MISSION IN
AVANA ENDS BY SAYING THAT, WITH THE ASSASSINATION OF LUTHER KING,
LE THAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY THE RULERS OF THE UNITED STATES
'S TO POUR OIL ONTO THE FLAMES OF THE STRUGGLE OF AFRO-AMERICANS,
TELE POUCH
PAGE TWO
13-00000

TELEPOUCH PAGE THREE

ID THAT THESE FLAMES ARE RISING VIOLENTLY TO PUT AN END TO ALL THE
PPRESSION AND INJUSTICE WHICH IS FOUND IN THE UNITED STATES, WHICH
INDERS THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE MILLIONS OF PEOPLE IN THE ENTIRE
JUNTRY.**

10. 5
OP RADIO LIBERACION, TAPRIL, REP P.M. STOKELY CARMICHAEL,
EADER OF BLACK POWER, SAID SWE NEGROES MUST ARM OURSELVES WITH
IFLES AND PISTOLS AND LAUNCH AN ASSAULT ON THE STREETS OF THE
ITIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN REPRISAL FOR KING'S ASSASSINATION.
ARMICHAEL PREDICTED THAT THERE WILL BE EXECUTIONS IN THE STREETS AS
RESULT OF KING'S ASSASSINATION. HE ALSO PREDICTED THAT THE
IOLENCE WHICH HAS BEEN UNLEASHED BY NEGROES AS A RESULT OF KING'S
EATH WILL BE PALE AS COMPARED TO WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN AMERICAN
ITIES.''

11、 5
DOM RADIO HABANA, I APRIL, P.M.A JOHIS KING'S DEATH SHOWS
:
NCE AGAIN THAT THE EXPLOITED MASSES CAN ONLY ANSWER REACTIONARY
IOLENCE WITH REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE.

12. 550.
QWM RADIO PROGRESO, I APRIL, TIP P.M. A JICARMICHAEL SAID
URING A TELEPHONE INTERVIEW THAT A SERIOUS MISTAKE HAS BEEN MADE
NASSASSINAT ING DR, KING BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN THE LEADER OF A MOVE.....
ENT WHICH URGED THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES NOT TO BURN
HE CITIES, NOT TO COMMIT ACTS OF VIOLENCE. THIS MEANS THAT IT WILL
::
E NECESSARY TO START AN ALL-OUT REVOLUTION, CARMICHAEL ADDED
SERIOUS INCIDENTS HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN 35 CITIES WHERE THERE HAVE
EEN FIRES, SHOOTING, FIGHTING, AND DEATHS AS A RESULT OF THE CRIME
COMMITTED AGAINST DR. KING. NATURALLY, OTHER SIMILAR THINGS WILL
AKE PLACE. GUERRILLA WARFARE WILL RAPIDLY SPREAD THROUGH THE CITIES.
ECAUSE IT IS ALREADY EVIDENT THAT WE CANNOT OPENLY REBEL AGAINST
THE POLICE..
STOKELY CARMICHAEL ENDED THE INTERVIEW BY SENDING
AFFECTIONATE REGARDS TO THE REVOLUTIONARY CUBAN PEOPLE AND THEIR
EADER, FIDEL CASTRO RUZ."
TELE POUCH
PAGE THREE
}
13-00000

TELE POUCH رت
PAGE FOUR
7
13. RADIO HABANA, APRIL, P.M.JJJUAN MARI/ BRAS,
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE MOVEMENT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF PUERTO
RICO, MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS IN A LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
INTERVIEW - ADR. LUTHER KING'S ASSASSINATION WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PRE-
CIPITATE THE REBELLION OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES
AGAINST ALL THE ABUSES OF WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN THE OBJECT.

14.
7.
ORM RADIO HABANA, 5 APRIL, P.M. A SITHE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
OF THE ASIAN, AFRICAN, AND LATIN AMERICAN PEOPLES SOLIDARITY ORGANI-
CATION /AALAPSO/ SENT A MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE TO THE SNCC ON THE
ASSASSINATION OF LUTHER KING.

''THE AALAPSO'S MESSAGE TO THE
AMERICAN PACIFIST ORGANIZATION ENDS AS FOLLOWS A SWE BEG YOU TO
EXPRESS TO THE FAMILY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING AND TO ALL AFRO-AMERICANS
:
DUR DEEPEST SORROW OVER HIS DEATH, OUR DECISION TO SUPPORT YOUR
STRUGGLE, AND OUR DEEP CONVICTION THAT THIS TERRIBLE CRIME--WHICH
SHOWS US THAT ARMED REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE IS THE ONLY WAY OF ACHIEV-
ING GENUINE LIBERATION--WILL HELP. STRENGTHEN THE STRUGGLE OF THE
FRO-AMERICAN PEOPLE WHICH IS ALREADY AIMED IN THE DIRECTION OF A
OTAL CONFRONTATION...

15.
۱۱
QFM RADIO HABANA, T'APRIL, P.M. A JJAGUSTIN. /GONZALEZ/
:
ARTINEZ, BISHOP OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF CUBA, MADE THE FOLLOWING
STATEMENTS IN A SPECIAL INTERVIEW - MAY THE TRAGIC DISAPPEARANCE
F THIS GREAT LEADER AT LEAST HELP TO SPEED UP THE ARRIVAL OF THE DAY
HEN EVERY MAN IN HIS NATION AND IN ALL OTHER NATIONS WILL BE TREATED
ITH THE RESPECT WHICH IS DUE TO THEM AS HUMAN BEINGS.
16-
!!
QXM RADIO HABANA, APRIL, P.M. A JJREVEREND RAFAEL PASTOR,
FTHE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN LUYANO, HAVANA, MADE THE FOLLOWING
TATEMENTS IN A SPECIAL INTERVIEW - THIS BROTHERS, THE AMERICAN
EGROES, WILL LEARN MUCH FROM HIS DEATH. WE CAN ALMOST ASSURE THAT
HEY, THE AMERICAN NEGROES WHOSE DIGNITY AND DECORUM HAS BEEN
RUSHED, WILL COME BACK TO LIFE AFTER CENTURIES OF LETHARGY AND
TELE POUCH PAGE FOUR
)
13-00000

TELE POUCH
PAGE FIVE

WILL RISE FROM THE IR GRAVES AND FORM AN INVINCIBLE ARMY۰۰
17. 5
い
QUN RADIO LIBERACION, APRIL, YP.M. A EDITORIAL COMMENTS
CRITICIZING THE NON-VIOLENT LINE WHICH WAS ADVOCATED BY LUTHER KING,
11
SAYING THAT THIS LINE WAS INOPERATIVE. JOMARTIN LUTHER KING DID NOT
PREACH VIOLENCE BUT HE WAS THE VICTIM OF VIOLENCE. HE DID NOT
JNLEASH VIOLENCE BUT VIOLENCE MOWED HIM DOWN...
is.
530
کا
OIN RADIO HABANA, APRIL 68, TP P.M. & JOHNSON POSTPONED
IIS TRIP. HE CALLED THE CIVIL RIGHTS LEADERS--WHO WERE MORE OR
LESS UNDER CONTROL--TO GO TO THE WHITE HOUSE. JOHNSON APPEARED ON
ELEVISION. HE EXPRESSED HIS ANGUISH AND HIS SORROW. HE MADE
INSPIRED COMMENTS ABOUT MARTIN LUTHER KING... THESE ACTIONS AND THESE
JORDS HIDE FEAR OVER THE WAVE OF JUST. VIOLENCE WHICH IS STARTING TO
:
J
SPREAD THROUGH THE UNITED STATES.." JAT A TIME WHEN COMPLEX INTER-
NATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE UNDERWAY, UNDER DIFFICULT CONDITIONS,
THIS NEW CRIME WIDENS THE CHASM WHICH DIVIDES THE PEOPLE OF THE
UNITED STATES AND INCITES THE PEOPLE TO PROMOTE DISTURBANCES WHOSE
FAR-REACHING EFFECTS ARE HARD TO PREDICT.* JSTHE ASSASSINATION OF
MARTIN LUTHER KING CONFIRMS THAT THE VIOLENCE OF IMPERIALIST RACISTS
IS ONLY ANSWERED EFFECT IVELY WITH THE VIOLENCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY
STRUGGLE...

DISTRIBUTION
JIA TELEPOUCH

3 A

A
2 A

TELEPOUCH PAGE FIVE

3T
13-00000
TELE POUCH
DISP NO
FILE NO - NONE
وتو
DATE - GO APRIL 1968

TO -

INFO -

FROM -
MICROFILMED
APR 15 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.
SUBJECT - SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA TREATMENT OF THE DEATH OF
MARTIN LUTHER KING, TAI APRIL 1968

THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE MARTIN
LUTHER KING ASSASSINATION DURING THE PERIOD 5-8 APRIL HAS BEEN
PREPARED

"GM GRANMA HAVANA DAILY NEWSPAPER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
5
CUBA, APRIL 68, FRONT PAGE - "LAST MINUTE NEWS - MARTIN LUTHER
KING ASSASSINATED IN MEMPHIS, U.S.A. ACCORDING TO FIRST REPORTS,
LUTHER KING HAS BEEN SHOT BY A 'WHITE WELL-DRESSED YOUNG MALE.
2.
४
en
WAY GRANMA, I APRIL, FRONT PAGE **TWENTY-SEVEN PERSONS HAVE
BEEN KILLED IN THE U.S. AS A RESULT OF THE FIGHTING WHICH HAS BEEN
GOING ON SINCE THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING. IN WASHING-
TON ALONE THERE ARE 750 WOUNDED AND 4,186 PERSONS ARRESTED. SNIPERS
CONTINUE TO BE ACTIVE IN DIFFERENT CITIES IN THE U.S. THE WHITE
HOUSE AND THE CAPITOL ARE UNDER HEAVY GUARD.'' /FULL INFORMATION
GIVEN./

3
EM GRANYA, I APRIL, LAST PAGE ''TO RICHMOND TO LIBERATE RAP
7.
BROWN. **/WASHINGTON, APRIL, ASSOCIATED FRENCH PRESS AFP,
FRENCH NEWS AGENCY AMX LEAFLETS WERE DISTRIBUTED HERE THIS MORNING,
URGING THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF WASHINGTON TO GO TO RICHMOND TO LIBERATE
RAP BROWN." //THE LEAFLETS CALLED ON THE NEGROES TO FORM A MOTOR -
CADE AND LEAVE FOR RICHMOND TOMORROW, MONDAY.””
TELE POUCH
PAGE ONE

Previserslag
A APPOGAED FOR PEO
Date
570
:
13-00000
TELE POUCH PAGE TWO
4. GRANMA, APRIL, LAST PAGE ARTICLE ENTITLED "PRINCIPAL
NEGRO ORGANIZATIONS IN THE U.S.'', BY JUANA CARRASCO. THE ARTICLE
SAYS THAT NEGRO ORGANIZATIONS ARE DIVIDED INTO TWO GROUPS THE
VIOLENT ONES AND THE NON-VIOLENT ONES. IT MENTIONS THE FOLLOWING
AMONG THOSE WHICH ADVOCATE THE USE OF VIOLENCE CONGRESS OF RACIAL
EQUALITY/CORE/, STUDENT NON-VIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE /SNCC/,
BLACK MUSLIMS, BLACK PANTHER PARTY, BLACKSTONE RANGERS, THE ALERT
PATROL, REVOLUTIONARY ACTION MOVEMENT /RAM/, THE BLACK GUARDS, THE
DEACONS, AND THE U.S.''. THE FOLLOWING NEGRO ORGANIZATIONS ARE
MENTIONED ANONG THOSE WHICH ADVOCATE NON-VIOLENCE NATIONAL ASSO-
CIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE/NAACP, NATIONAL
URBAN LEAGUE, AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE
/SCLC/.

5. ४
IN GRANMA, I APRIL, LAST PAGE SATTEMPTS ARE BING MADE TO
BLAME CARMICHAEL FOR THE OUTBREAK OF RACIAL VIOLENCE IN THE U.S.
با

5
IT GRAMMA, APRIL, LAST PAGE RACIAL CLASHES BETWEEN NEGRO
AND WHITE AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN JAPAN.."
7.
8
JU GRANMA, I APRIL, LAST PAGE THE AMERICAN NEGRO PEOPLE.**
8
IW GRANMA, I APRIL, LAST PAGE ''MARTYRS OF THE NEGRO
STRUGGLE...

9.

11
RADIO LIBERACION AND RADIO PROGRESO /HAVANA RADIO STATIONS/,
720
6 APRIL, UWP A.N. AND 12 NOON **THE CHIEF OF THE MISSION TO CUBA
OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT HAS SENT A MESSAGE
TO AFRO-AMERICANS ON THE ASSASSINATION OF THE LEADER, MARTIN LUTHER
KING. THIS MESSAGE SAYS THAT THE CRIME WHICH WAS COMMITTED AGAINST
MARTIN LUTHER KING UNMASKS THE EVIL FACE OF THE RULERS AND RACISTS
OF THE UNITED STATES.*" **THE MESSAGE OF THE VIETNAMESE MISSION IN
HAVANA ENDS BY SAYING THAT, WITH THE ASSASSINATION OF LUTHER KING,
ALL THAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY THE RULERS OF THE UNITED STATES
IS TO POUR OIL ONTO THE FLAMES OF THE STRUGGLE OF AFRO-AMERICANS,
TELEPOUCH
PAGE TWO
13-00000

TELEPOUCH PAGE THREE

AND THAT THESE FLAXES ARE RISING VIOLENTLY TO PUT AN END TO ALL THE
OPPRESSION AND INJUSTICE WHICH IS FOUND IN THE UNITED STATES, WHICH
HINDERS THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE MILLIONS OF PEOPLE IN THE ENTIRE
COUNTRY...

100 5
PRADIO LIBERACION, X APRIL, REP P.M. ℵ STOKELY CARMICHAEL,
LEADER OF BLACK POWER, SAID AWE NEGROES MUST ARM OURSELVES WITH
RIFLES AND PISTOLS AND LAUNCH AN ASSAULT ON THE STREETS OF THE
CITIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN REPRISAL FOR KING'S ASSASSINATION."
CARMICHAEL PREDICTED THAT THERE WILL BE EXECUTIONS IN THE STREETS AS
A RESULT OF KING'S ASSASSINATION. HE ALSO PREDICTED THAT THE
VIOLENCE WHICH HAS BEEN UNLEASHED BY NEGROES AS A RESULT OF KING'S
DEATH WILL BE PALE AS COMPARED TO WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN AMERICAN
CITIES.'

11、 5
کی
11
AGM RADIO HABANA, X APRIL, XP.M. A JOHIS KING'S/ DEATH SHOWS
:
ONCE AGAIN THAT THE EXPLOITED MASSES CAN ONLY ANSWER REACTIONARY
VIOLENCE WITH REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE.."

12, 5
550
QPIT RADIO PROGRESO, X APRIL, I P.M. A JICARMICHAEL SAID
DURING A TELEPHONE INTERVIEW THAT A SERIOUS MISTAKE HAS BEEN MADE
IN ASSASSINATING DR. KING BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN THE LEADER OF A MOVE-
MENT WHICH URGED THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES NOT TO BURN
THE CITIES, NOT TO COMMIT ACTS OF VIOLENCE. THIS MEANS THAT IT WILL
:
:
BE NECESSARY TO START AN ALL-CUT REVOLUTION." CARMICHAEL ADDED
SERIOUS INCIDENTS HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN 35 CITIES WHERE THERE HAVE
BEEN FIRES, SHOOTING, FIGHTING, AND DEATHS AS A RESULT OF THE CRIME
COMMITTED AGAINST DR. KING. NATURALLY, OTHER SIMILAR THINGS WILL
TAKE PLACE. GUERRILLA WARFARE WILL RAPIDLY SPREAD THROUGH THE CITIES
BECAUSE IT IS ALREADY EVIDENT THAT WE CANNOT OPENLY REBEL AGAINST
THE POLICE.
STOKELY CARMICHAEL ENDED THE INTERVIEW BY SENDING
AFFECTIONATE REGARDS TO THE REVOLUTIONARY CUBAN PEOPLE AND THEIR
EADER, FIDEL CASTRO RUZ.**
TELEPOUCH
PAGE THREE
13-00000

TELE POUCH PAGE FOUR

13. RADIO HABANA, X APRIL, P.M.کو کم کر JUAN MARI/ BRAS,
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE MOVEMENT. FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF PUERTO
RICO, MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS IN A LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
INTERVIEW ADR. LUTHER KING'S ASSASSINATION WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PRE-
CIPITATE THE REBELLION OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES
AGAINST ALL THE ABUSES OF WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN THE OBJECT.

14.
7
ORM RADIO HABANA, 5 APRIL, P.M. A THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
OF THE ASIAN, AFRICAN, AND LATIN AMERICAN PEOPLES SOLIDARITY ORGANI-
ZATION /AALAPSO/ SENT A MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE TO THE SNCC ON THE
SSASSINATION OF LUTHER KING.." **THE AALAPSO'S MESSAGE TO THE
MERICAN PACIFIST ORGANIZATION ENDS AS FOLLOWS A SWE BEG YOU TO
XPRESS TO THE FAMILY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING AND TO ALL AFRO-AMERICANS
OUR DEEPEST SORROW OVER HIS DEATH OUR DECISION TO SUPPORT YOUR
STRUGGLE, AND OUR DEEP CONVICTION THAT THIS TERRIBLE CRIME--WHICH
SHOWS US THAT ARMED REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE IS THE ONLY WAY OF ACHIEV-
:
ING GENUINE LIBERATION--WILL HELP STRENGTHEN THE STRUGGLE OF THE
FRO-AMERICAN PEOPLE WHICH IS ALREADY AIMED IN THE DIRECTION OF A
TOTAL CONFRONTATION.

15.
"
5
7.
1
QPIT RADIO HABANA, APRIL, P.M. A JJAGUSTIN /GONZALEZ /
• MARTINEZ, BISHOP OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF CUBA, MADE THE FOLLOWING
STATEMENTS IN A SPECIAL INTERVIEW MAY THE TRAGIC DISAPPEARANCE
F THIS GREAT LEADER AT LEAST HELP TO SPEED UP THE ARRIVAL OF THE DAY
HEN EVERY MAN IN HIS NATION AND IN ALL OTHER NATIONS WILL BE TREATED
ITH THE RESPECT WHICH IS DUE TO THEM AS HUNAN BEINGS. J

16
7
11.
RADIO HABANA, Y APRIL, P.M. A JJREVEREND RAFAEL PASTOR,
• OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN LUYANO, HAVANA, MADE THE FOLLOWING
TATEMENTS IN A SPECIAL INTERVIEW SHIS BROTHERS, THE AMERICAN
EGROES, WILL LEARN MUCH FRON HIS DEATH. WE CAN ALMOST ASSURE THAT
HEY, THE AMERICAN NEGROES WHOSE DIGNITY AND DECORUM HAS BEEN
RUSHE WILL COME BACK TO LIFE AFTER CENTURIES OF LETHARGY AND
TELEPOUCH
PAGE FOUR
13-00000

TELE POUCH PAGE FIVE
WILL RISE FROM THEIR CRAVES AND FORM AN INVINCIBLE ARMY
17. 5
AUM RADIO LIBERACION, APRIL, P.M. A EDITORIAL COMMENTS
CRITICIZING THE NON-VIOLENT LINE WHICH WAS ADVOCATED BY LUTHER KING,
SAYING THAT THIS LINE WAS INOPERATIVE. MARTIN LUTHER KING DID NOT
11
PREACH VIOLENCE BUT HE WAS THE VICTIM OF VIOLENCE. HE DID NOT
UNLEASH VIOLENCE BUT VIOLENCE MOWED HIM DOWN.."
१४.
کیا
530
GIM RADIO HABANA, APRIL 68, TEP P.M. A "JOHNSON POSTPONED
HIS TRIP. HE CALLED THE CIVIL RIGHTS LEADERS--WHO WERE MORE OR
LESS UNDER CONTROL--TO GO TO THE WHITE HOUSE. JOHNSON APPEARED ON
TELEVISION. HE EXPRESSED HIS ANGUISH AND HIS SORROW. HE MADE
11
INSPIRED COMMENTS ABOUT MARTIN LUTHER KING. THESE ACTIONS AND THESE
WORDS HIDE FEAR OVER THE WAVE OF JUST VIOLENCE WHICH IS STARTING TO
SPREAD THROUGH THE UNITED STATES. AT A TIME WHEN COMPLEX INTER-
NATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE UNDERWAY, UNDER DIFFICULT CONDITIONS,
THIS NEW CRIME WIDENS THE CHASM WHICH DIVIDES THE PEOPLE OF THE
UNITED STATES AND INCITES THE PEOPLE TO PROMOTE DISTURBANCES WHOSE
FAR-REACHING EFFECTS ARE HARD TO PREDICT." THE ASSASSINATION OF
MARTIN LUTHER KING CONFIRMS THAT THE VIOLENCE OF IMPERIALIST RACISTS
IS ONLY ANSWERED EFFECTIVELY WITH THE VIOLENCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY
STRUGGLE.**

DISTRIBUTION
VIA TELEPOUCH

3 A

A
2 A

TELEPOUCH PAGE FIVE
3T
13-00000

وتو
CANFIDENTIAL
SECRET TELEPOUCH
DISP NO UFGA-29877

FILE NO NONE
MICROFILMED
APR 15 1968
DOC. MICPO, SER.
//
DATE QQ APRIL 1968

INDEXING NONE

MICR OF ILM NONE

TO CHIEF, WH DIVISION

INFO CHIEF, WH/COG CHIEF, WOLIME

FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE
SUBJECT - O SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA TREATMENT OF THE DEATH OF
MARTIN LUTHER KING, TAI APRIL 1968.

THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE MARTIN
LUTHER KING ASSASSINATION DURING THE PERIOD 5-8 APRIL HAS BEEN
PREPARED BY THE AM OT S-
:
OM GRANMA HAVANA DAILY NEWSPAPER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
CUBA, APRIL 68, FRONT PAGE '"LAST MINUTE NEWS MARTIN LUTHER
KING ASSASSINATED IN MEMPHIS, U.S.A. ACCORDING TO FIRST REPORTS,
LUTHER KING HAS BEEN SHOT BY A 'WHITE WELL-DRESSED YOUNG MALE.**

2.
WM GRANMA, I APRIL, FRONT PAGE
**TWENTY-SEVEN PERSONS HAVE
BEEN KILLED IN THE U.S. AS A RESULT OF THE FIGHTING WHICH HAS BEEN
GOING ON SINCE THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING. IN WASHING-
TON ALONE THERE ARE 750 WOUNDED AND 4,186 PERSONS ARRESTED.
SNIPERS
CONTINUE TO BE ACTIVE IN DIFFERENT CITIES IN THE U.S. THE WHITE
HOUSE AND THE CAPITOL ARE. UNDER HEAVY GUARD. /FULL INFORMATION

3 TIICI

EM GRANMA, X APRIL, LAST PAGE **TO RICHMOND TO LIBERATE RAP
7.
AFP,
BROWN. **/WASHINGTON, APRIL, ASSOCIATED FRENCH PRESS
FRENCH NEWS AGENCY AMX LEAFLETS WERE DISTRIBUTED HERE THIS MORNING,
URGING THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF WASHINGTON TO GO TO RICHMOND TO LIBERATE
RAP BROWN." // THE LEAFLETS CALLED ON THE NEGROES TO FORM A MOTOR-
CADE AND LEAVE FOR RICHMOND TOMORROW, MONDAY...
TELE POUCH
PAGE ONE

CONFIDENTIAL
Downgraded to
by authority of 20226000/2913
date
CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 3 mar 78
2 INPDET CL BY 075604
FULL TEXT COPY -- DO NOT RELEASE
13-00000

ONFIDENTIAL
TELE POUCH UFGA-29877 PAGE TWO
کم
GRANMA I APRIL, LAST PAGE ARTICLE ENTITLED "PRINCIPAL
EGRO ORGANIZATIONS IN THE U.S., BY JUANA CARRASCO. THE ARTICLE
AYS THAT NEGRO ORGANIZATIONS ARE DIVIDED INTO TWO GROUPS THE
IOLENT ONES AND THE NON-VIOLENT ONES. IT MENTIONS THE FOLLOWING
TONG THOSE WHICH ADVOCATE THE USE OF VIOLENCE CONGRESS OF RACIAL
QUALITY/CORE/, STUDENT NON-VIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE /SNCC/,
LACK MUSLIMS, BLACK PANTHER PARTY, BLACKSTONE RANGERS, THE ALERT
ATROL, REVOLUTIONARY ACTION MOVEMENT /RAM/, THE BLACK GUARDS, THE
EACONS, AND THE U.S.''. THE FOLLOWING NEGRO ORGANIZATIONS ARE
ENTIONED AMONG THOSE WHICH ADVOCATE NON-VIOLENCE NATIONAL ASSO-
IATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE/NAACP/, NATIONAL
RBAN LEAGUE, AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE
SCLC/.

IM GRANMA, I APRIL, LAST PAGE SATTEMPTS ARE BING MADE TO
:
LAME CARMICHAEL FOR THE OUTBREAK OF RACIAL VIOLENCE IN THE U.S...
८.

YM GRANMA, I APRIL, LAST PAGE RACIAL CLASHES BETWEEN NEGRO
ND WHITE AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN JAPAN.**
7.
8
UM GRANMA, ΓAPRIL, LAST PAGE THE AMERICAN NEGRO PEOPLE...
IPT GRANMA, I APRIL, LAST PAGE ''MARTYRS OF THE NEGRO
STRUGGLE.

9.

11
RADIO LIBERACION AND RADIO PROGRESO /HAVANA RADIO STATIONS/,
702
APRIL, UWP A.N. AND 12 NOON - THE CHIEF OF THE MISSION TO CUBA
IF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT HAS SENT A MESSAGE
O AFRO-AMERICANS ON THE ASSASSINATION OF THE LEADER, MARTIN LUTHER
(ING. THIS MESSAGE SAYS THAT THE CRIME WHICH WAS COMMITTED AGAINST
ARTIN LUTHER KING UNMASKS THE EVIL FACE OF THE RULERS AND RACISTS
OF THE UNITED STATES."" **THE MESSAGE OF THE VIETNAMESE MISSION IN
(AVANA ENDS BY SAYING THAT, WITH THE ASSASSINATION OF LUTHER KING,
ALL THAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY THE RULERS OF THE UNITED STATES
'S TO POUR OIL ONTO THE FLAMES OF THE STRUGGLE OF AFRO-AMERICANS,
CT TELEPOUCH UFGA-29877 PAGE TWO
CONFIDENTIAL
13-00000
ECRET TELEPOUCH UFGA-29877 PAGE THREE
AND THAT THESE FLAMES ARE RISING VIOLENTLY TO PUT AN END TO ALL THE
OPPRESSION AND INJUSTICE WHICH IS FOUND IN THE UNITED STATES, WHICH
HINDERS THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE MILLIONS OF PEOPLE IN THE ENTIRE
COUNTRY.

10. 5
QP RADIO LIBERACION, APRIL, REP P.M. JOSTOKELY CARMICHAEL,
LEADER OF BLACK POWER, SAID WE NEGROES MUST ARM OURSELVES WITH
RIFLES AND PISTOLS AND LAUNCH AN ASSAULT ON THE STREETS OF THE
CITIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN REPRISAL FOR KING'S ASSASSINATION."
CARMICHAEL PREDICTED THAT THERE WILL BE EXECUTIONS IN THE STREETS AS
A RESULT OF KING'S ASSASSINATION. HE ALSO PREDICTED THAT THE
VIOLENCE WHICH HAS BEEN UNLEASHED BY NEGROES AS A RESULT OF KING'S
DEATH WILL BE PALE AS COMPARED TO WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN AMERICAN
CITIES.'

11、 5
کی
11
GEM RADIO HABANA, X APRIL, P.M. A JÓHIS KING'S/ DEATH SHOWS
:
ONCE AGAIN THAT THE EXPLOITED MASSES CAN ONLY ANSWER REACTIONARY
VIOLENCE WITH REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE.

12, 550

QWM RADIO PROGRESO, I APRIL, P.M. A JICARMICHAEL SAID
DURING A TELEPHONE INTERVIEW THAT A SERIOUS MISTAKE HAS BEEN MADE
IN ASSASSINATING DR. KING BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN THE LEADER OF A MOVE-
TENT WHICH URGED THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES NOT TO BURN
THE CITIES, NOT TO COMMIT ACTS OF VIOLENCE. THIS MEANS THAT IT WILL
:
:
BE NECESSARY TO START AN ALL-OUT REVOLUTION. CARMICHAEL ADDED
SERIOUS INCIDENTS HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN 35 CITIES WHERE THERE HAVE
BEEN FIRES, SHOOTING, FIGHTING, AND DEATHS AS A RESULT OF THE CRIME
COMMITTED AGAINST DR. KING. NATURALLY, OTHER SIMILAR THINGS WILL
AKE PLACE. GUERRILLA WARFARE WILL RAPIDLY SPREAD THROUGH THE CITIES
BECAUSE IT IS ALREADY EVIDENT THAT WE CANNOT OPENLY REBEL AGAINST
HE POLICE.
STOKELY CARMICHAEL ENDED THE INTERVIEW BY SENDING
AFFECTIONATE REGARDS TO THE REVOLUTIONARY CUBAN PEOPLE AND THEIR
EADER, FIDEL CASTRO RUZ...
TELEPOUCH UFGA-29877 PAGE THREE
13-00000

TELE POUCH UFGA-29877 PAGE FOUR

13. RADIO HABANA, I APRIL, P.M. A JJJUAN MARI/ BRAS,
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE MOVEMENT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF PUERTO
ICO, MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS IN A LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
INTERVIEW ADR. LUTHER KING'S ASSASSINATION WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PRE-
CIPITATE THE REBELLION OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES
GAINST ALL THE ABUSES OF WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN THE OBJECT.

14.
7
ORM RADIO HABANA, 5 APRIL, UP.M. A SATHE EXECUTIVE. SECRETARIAT
OF THE ASIAN, AFRICAN, AND LATIN AMERICAN PEOPLES SOLIDARITY ORGANI-
CATION /AALAPSO/ SENT A MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE TO THE SNCC ON THE
SSASSINATION OF LUTHER KING.." **THE AALAPSO'S MESSAGE TO THE
MERICAN PACIFIST ORGANIZATION ENDS AS FOLLOWS A SWE BEG YOU TO
XPRESS TO THE FAMILY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING AND TO ALL AFRO-AMERICANS
OUR DEEPEST SORROW OVER HIS DEATH OUR DECISION TO SUPPORT YOUR
STRUGGLE, AND OUR DEEP CONVICTION THAT THIS TERRIBLE CRIME--WHICH
SHOWS US THAT ARMED REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE IS THE ONLY WAY OF ACHIEV-
:
ING GENUINE LIBERATION--WILL HELP STRENGTHEN THE STRUGGLE OF THE
FRO-AMERICAN PEOPLE WHICH IS ALREADY AIMED IN THE DIRECTION OF A
"
OTAL CONFRONTATION. df

15.
"
5
7.
1
QPIT RADIO HABANA, APRIL, P.M. A JJAGUSTIN /GONZALEZ /
• MARTINEZ, BISHOP OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF CUBA, MADE THE FOLLOWING
TATEMENTS IN A SPECIAL INTERVIEW MAY THE TRAGIC DISAPPEARANCE
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVI MENT
Memorandum

TO : Files

FROM : M. D. Stevens

SUBJECT: THE LEE HARVEY OSWALD CASE #351.164
DATE: 29 January 1964

1. According to a newspaper column of "Allen and Scott" in the
Chicago American of 6 December 1963, on the OSWALD Case, Abram CHAYES,
Legal Officer of the State Department, was one of two persons im-
mediately responsible for OSWALD's being permitted to return to the
United States from the Soviet Union in June 1962. The other individuel
named was Llewellyn THOMPSON, the then Ambassador to Russia. Another
said to have been involved in the handling of OSWALD's case was Samuel
WISE, Counsel of the American Embassy in Moscow.

2. Abram CHAYES, #352234, who as of 16 February 1961 was described
as "the new Counsel in State", was granted Security approval for liaison
contact with J. Foster COLLINS (in the office of the Chief of the Covert
Action Staff) on 6 March 1951. The request for CHAYES' clearance was a
"Blanket" request to permit discussion with him of NSC 5412/2 matters.cn
a need-to-know-basis.

3. In September 1961 there was a White House namecheck request on
CHAYES' wife Antonia (Toni) Leigh CHAYES, nee: HANDLER.

4. In March 1962, CHAYES was granted a renewal of his liaison
contact clearance with C/CA on a continuing basis. This time his contact
was Archibald ROOSEVELT, Jr.

5. On 10 February 1962, HUMAN EVENTS reported as follows with
reference to CHAYES:

"SOFT ON COMMUNISM: Representative Francis E. Walter (R.-Pa.),
Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, has
scored the new State Department regulations on passports, claim-
ing they would allow Reds denied passports to "rifle freely the
confidential files of the FBI, the CIA and other investigative
agencies." The man behind the new regulations, which Walter
claims violate the Internal Security Act of 1950, is reportedly
State's chief legal officer, Abram Chayes. Chayes, a Kennedy
appointee, is an ex-Harvard professor wino was Chester Bowles'
top legal adviser when Bowles was Governor of Connecticut.
Walter has introduced legislation to remedy the new passport
regulations."

SECRET
Document Number 1029
FED 1977
for FOIA Review on

-2-

6. Samuel WISE, "Counsel in the American Embassy in Moscow" who
is referred to above, may well be Samuel. Griffin WISE Jr., #74574,
SD & SSD, who apparently was once a contract employée on AEACTIVE.
The State Department reviewed WISE's file on 2 June 1954; and as of
September 1962 a Samuel G. WISE was Second Secretary of the American
Embassy in Moscow. At that time WISE advised in a cable to the State
Department
DAVIS' case is very similar to that of
OSWALD; and he, like OSWALD, lived in the Soviet Union for two years
after his defection and prior to making application for return to the
United States.7

7. WISE was an applicant for CIA employment in early 1953 and
was security approved subject to polygraph on 11 August 1953. He did
not enter on duty and in September 1953 the office which had been
interested in him was "no longer interested". On 13 November 1953,
WISE was granted a CSA to permit his use as a contract employee on
AEACTIVE in New York City. His CSA was cancelled on 24 March 1958.

8. WISE was named as a friend of William Orville MUNSELL, #61693--DL,
during an investigation of the latter for possible CIA employment in 1952.
WISE, according to MUNSELL's landlady and social acquaintance in Washington,
D.C. during the period of about a year which ended in April 1952, was the
only person she knew by name with whom MUNSELL was friendly. According
to the informant, WISE was a student at Columbia University whose address
was 423 Furnald Hall. MUNSELL was Security disapproved for CIA employment
in June 1952 because of his close association on a professional and social
basis, while attending Denver University from 1946 to 1951, with persons
of questionable loyality. In November 1954, MUNSELL was of interest to
project FJALIVE with reference to assignment to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia;
however, the interested office withdrew their request on him, after
Security advised of the derogatory information regarding him.

9. WISE from 1951 to 1954 attended Scarsdale High School in Scarsdale,
New York, which was attacked by a Citizen's Group, which alleged Communist
influence in the school system. He had several questionable associates in
addition to MUNSELL.

M. D. Stevens
104-10439-10113
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

re: HCSA Request of 9 March, 1978, item #2:

"A statement, including any written regulations,
which establishes the criteria utilized by the
CIA in classifying its relationships with individuals
with whom it has had contact...."

Attached are:

1. DEFINITIONS OF: AGENT, ASSET, SOURCE, COLLABORATOR,
WITTING & UNWITTING

2. Hqs Regulations on Management of Nonstaff Personnel

 20-53 on Contract Personnel to define
Contract Employees and
20-54 Independent Contractors and
Agents (& clearly distinguish between
agents and contract personnel)
3. DOI 50-10 on Restrictions on Operational Use of
Certain Categories of Individuals
(a primer on do's & don'ts)

4. DOI (CSI) 10-5 on Covert Approvals and Related Matters
(processes required before an
individual may be used in any way)

13-00000

From Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary

AGENT: 1) A power that acts; a moving force; as by some human AGENT.

2) One who acts or performs an act or who has power to act;
as, a free moral AGENT.

3) That which produces or will produce a certain effect;
an active cause; also, esp. chem., a substance or
element capable of producing a reaction.

4) A means or instrument.

5) One who acts for, or in the place of, another, by
authority for him.

ASSET: 2) That which is a resource; as, character is an asset.

SOURCE: 2) The origin; the first or ultimate cause.

3) A person, book, document, etc. that supplies information.

COLLABORATOR: n.
COLLABORATE: 1) To work or act jointly, esp. to share in
literary, scientific, or other intellectual production.

2) To cooperate voluntarily as a nation with another or
other nations in international political or economic
adjustment.

3) To comply with, cooperate with, or assist willingly
the conquerors occupying one's country; --usually
with an implication of traitorous dealing
in distinction from passive acquiescence; also,
sometimes to give to an enemy nation aid of nonmilitary
kind, as by radio propaganda in enemy service.

WITTING: Done with the knowledge of the doer, or knowingly;
not unintentional.

UNWITTING: 1) Not knowing; unconscious; unaware.

2) Unintentional.

13-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

HQ. INSTRUCTION SHEET 733

REG. REMOVE INSERT EXPLANATION
NOS. PAGE DATE PAGE DATE
NOS. REG.
NOS.

HR 20 111 2/6/73 HR 20 111 2/23/73 Paragraph 53 is revised
125- 125- to redefine categories of
127 3/9/64 127 2/23/73 contract personnel. Minor
revisions are made to up-
date the paragraph.

 128 6/16/70 128- 2/23/73 Former paragraph 54, Pro-
 131 curement Contracts for the
 Services of Individuals,
 is renumbered 55 with no
 change in text.

 New paragraph 54, Agents,
 is added to establish
 authorities and responsi-
 bilities for the manage-
 ment of agents and to
 clearly distinguish
 between agents and contract
 personnel.
HR 20- 3/9/64 Rescinded.
129

Arrows in the page margin show the locations of the changes
described above.

DISTRIBUTION: AB

E2 IMPDET
S-E-C-R-E-T CL BY: 0022.30

13-00000

SECRET

PERSONNEL HR 20

CONTENTS-Continued

Paragraph Title Page

i. VOLUNTARY RETIREMENT 118.10
k. DISCONTINUED SERVICE BENEFITS 118.10
1. Not used.
m. INVOLUNTARY RETIREMENT 118.10
n. MANDATORY RETIREMENT FOR AGE 118.11
0. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FUND 118.11
p. PERIOD OF SERVICE FOR ANNUITIES 118.13
q. COMPUTATION OF ANNUITIES 118.16
r. RECALL OF RETIRED PARTICIPANT 118.19
S. REEMPLOYMENT OF RETIRED PARTICIPANT 118.19
t. MONIES 118.19
น. LIMITATION ON NUMBER OF RETIREMENTS 118.20

SECTION VIII: MANAGEMENT OF NONSTAFF PERSONNEL

51. PERSONNEL DETAILED TO OR FROM THE AGENCY 119
52. CONSULTANTS 123
53. CONTRACT PERSONNEL 125
54. AGENTS 128
55. PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS FOR THE SERVICES OF
 INDIVIDUALS 130
56-59. Reserved

SECTION IX: RECORDS AND REPORTS

60. PERSONNEL RECORDS AND REPORTS 155

Figure Title Page

1. DISTINGUISHED INTELLIGENCE CROSS 94.1
2. DISTINGUISHED INTELLIGENCE MEDAL 94.1
3. INTELLIGENCE STAR 94.1
4. INTELLIGENCE MEDAL OF MÉRIT 94.1
4a. CAREER INTELLIGENCE MEDAL 94.1
5. EXCEPTIONAL SERVICE MEDALLION 94.1
6. RETIREMENT MEDALLION 94.1
7. FORM 600, RECOMMENDATION FOR HONOR OR MERIT
 AWARD 95
8. Reserved
9. OFFICIAL SEAL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 100.2
10. AGENCY FLAG 100.2
11. AGENCY PLAQUE 100.2
12. TABLE OF PERMISSIBLE CHANGES IN ENROLLMENT OF
 EMPLOYEES 106

Attachment Title Page

1. BIOGRAPHIC DATA TO BE SUBMITTED BY AN EMPLOYEE
 UNDER COVER ON AN INTENDED SPOUSE 29
2. FORM 3154, SERVICE ABROAD AGREEMENT 52.1

Revised: 23 February 1973 (733) lii
E2 IMPDET
SECRET CL BY: 002230

13-00000

PERSONNEL SECRET HR 20-53

53. CONTRACT PERSONNEL. This paragraph sets forth policy, authorities,
and responsibilities concerning the management of contract personnel. It does
not apply to consultants (see HR 20-52), to personal services acquired through
industrial or procurement contracts (see HR 20-55), to personnel employed by
proprietary projects (see HR 230-8), or to agents (see HR 20-54).

a. GENERAL. There are two categories of contract personnel: contract employees
and independent contractors.

(1) CONTRACT EMPLOYEES. Although they are not appointed employees,
contract employees are employees of the U.S. Government. They have all
the rights and privileges granted by law to U.S. Government employees
in accordance with their citizenship status as well as those rights and
privileges specified in their contracts. They work under supervised con-
ditions and are compensated on a salary basis. Contract employees are
grouped into three categories:

(a) Career Associate (Type C) Contract Employees: Contract employees
who perform duties, usually of a clandestine and operational nature,
on a career basis. They are normally required to demonstrate their
operational value to the Agency for not less than three years, in the
case of U.S. citizens, or not less than five years, in the case of foreign
nationals, to qualify for career associate status. When it is necessary
for a career associate to have the staff-type access to an Agency instal-
lation or classified information, he must meet the same security ap-
proval criteria as a staff employee.

(b) Internal (Type I) Contract Employees: Contract employees, engaged
for a specific period of time, who normally work inside Agency instal-
lations. They are required to meet the same security approval criteria
as staff employees, but are permitted only such access to classified
information as is authorized in their security approval and is required
in the performance of their duties.

(c) External (Type E) Contract Employees: Contract employees, engaged
for a specific period of time, who normally work outside Agency in-
stallations. They are not required to meet the same security approval
criteria as staff employees and are not permitted the same access
to Agency installations as staff employees or internal contract em-
ployees. They are permitted only such access to classified information
as is authorized in their security approval and is required in the per-
formance of their duties.

(2) INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS are not employees of the U.S. Government..
They are self-employed individuals who are engaged under contract to
provide specific services. They receive only the compensation and benefits
considered necessary to retain their services. In the Operations Directorate,
their duties are normally limited to historical research and analysis and
to the direction, utilization, spotting, or support of agents. They normally
do not carry out espionage or covert action tasks. (Care must be taken
to distinguish between independent contractors, defined herein, and agents,
defined in HR 20-54.)

jb. POLICY

(1) Contract personnel may be engaged when

(a) it is necessary to provide for operational or support needs which can-
not be met through the use of available staff personnel;
:
(b) services are required of particularly well-qualified individuals who
cannot meet all requirements for staff employment;
!
Revised: 23 February 1973 (733) 125
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HR 20-53b(2) PERSONNEL P

(c) there is a requirement to meet operational needs without obligating
the Agency to long-term employment;

(d) the nature of the mission for which the individual is being engaged
precludes his being subject to administrative control or working spe-
cifically defined hours;

(e) the individual's primary employer or interest is not the Agency and
the services the Agency desires from him are supplementary to his
primary interest or vocation; or

(f) there is a long term requirement for personal services which, for op-
perational or security reasons, cannot be performed by Agency staff
personnel.

(2) The engaging of contract personnel is subject to the following restrictions:

(a) New contracts, contract renewals, and contract amendments for in-
dividuals under current or anticipated nonofficial cover, must have
prior approval of the appropriate component of the Operations Direc-
torate.

(b) Contract personnel may be engaged only for approved activities for
which funds have been made available. Funds for these activities will
be budgeted annually and will not exceed limitations imposed by the
head of the component concerned.

(c) Contract employees are subject to directorate manpower controls and
ceilings established by the Director of Central Intelligence during the
annual budgetary review cycle. Independent contractors are excluded
from ceiling controls.

(d) Contracts will, whenever possible, be written and signed. However,
when special security or operational factors prevent the execution of
a formal written contract, a memorandum in lieu of such a contract
may be prepared to document the commitments and obligations of the
Agency and the individual.

(d) Appropriate security or operational approvals will be obtained before
any contractual commitments are made to individuals and before any
disclosure to them of classified information.

(f) No commitments relating to the use of the services of an employee of
another Government agency will be made without prior approval of
the Operating Official or Head of Independent Office concerned and
the Director of Personnel.

(g) No commitments will be made to contract personnel that appointed
employment status will be offered at the conclusion of or during any
period of their contract service, without prior approval of the Director
of Personnel and the Director of Security.

(h) Contract employees must meet Agency medical standards prior to the
approval and authentication of their contracts. A psychological assess-
ment and psychiatric evaluation of those contract employees in whom
the Agency may have more than a short-term interest will be carried
out whenever feasible.

(i) Independent contractors are normally not required to meet Agency
medical standards; however, if their contract contains any provision
which obligates the Agency to provide medical or disability benefits.
a satisfactory medical examination is required, to include a psycho-
logical assessment and psychiatric evaluation, if necessary..
с.
:
126
→Revised: 23 February 1973 (733)
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SONNEL PERSONNEL SECRET HR 20-53c
obligating
; engaged
king spe- (j) Contract personnel candidates whose employment with the Agency
cannot be acknowledged must be provided adequate cover and an ap-
ency and propriate cover legend. This requires that legal entitlements and other
.ry to his contractual benefits be provided and tax liabilities satisfied in a
manner consistent with the character of the cover and cover legend.
, for op-
ency staff (k) Although staff employees are expected to sever active connections with
the Agency upon retirement, there may be instances in which continua-
strictions: tion in service under contract after retirement is necessary or clearly
ts for in- in the best interests of the Agency. The use of retired annuitants under
aust have contract is governed by policies specified in HR 20-13.
ons Direc-
(1) Not used.

ivities for (m) Contracts providing for basic compensation at a rate which, if pro-
vities will jected on an annual basis, would exceed the maximum annual rate
ed by the for a GS-15, will not be executed without the approval of the Director
of Central Intelligence. All such requests will be forwarded through
ontrols and the Director of Personnel for his recommendation.
luring the
c. RESPONSIBILITIES
excluded
(1) THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL will
However,
ecution of (a) formulate contract personnel management policies and procedures and
a contract provide guidance in improving the effectiveness and flexibility of the
ons of the program within the Agency;
(b) monitor contract personnel management to assure consistency among
ned before the directorates while giving due regard to their differing needs;
before any (c) provide a repository for sensitive suitability information using the
guidelines for special files set forth in HR 20-60b(4);

mployee of (d) approve and authenticate contracts;
pproval of (e) monitor contract employee ceiling authorizations established by the
erned and Director of Central Intelligence;
(f) maintain computer-based records on contract personnel and ensure
appointed currency and accuracy of input and output data.
luring any
(2) THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY will
ne Director
(a) establish standards and procedures for granting security approvals
rior to the which meet the Agency's contract personnel requirements;
ical assess- (b) grant security approvals for the use of contract personnel including
s in whom their access to classified information and Agency installations;
be carried (c) ensure currency and adequacy of security approvals by making periodic
reviews and reevaluations;

eet Agency (d) provide a repository for all security information pertaining to con-
tract personnel.
y provision (3) THE CHIEF, CENTRAL COVER STAFF will
y benefits,
a psycho- (a) provide cover and cover legends for contract personnel whose em-
ployment by the Agency cannot be publicly acknowledged;
(b) ensure currency of such cover and cover legends by making periodic
L reviews and reevaluations;
(c) ensure that the methods of providing legal entitlements and con-
tractual benefits and satisfying tax liabilities are consistent with as-
signed cover and cover legends.
(4) THE DIRECTOR OF MEDICAL SERVICES will
(a) establish standards and procedures for medical and psychiatric evalua-
tions and for psychological assessment of contract personnel;

1973 (733) Revised: 23 February 1973 (733) 127
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PERSONNEL SECRET
HR 20-54
(b) make periodic reviews and medical reevaluations of contract personnel
when requested to do so.
(5) DEPUTY DIRECTORS AND HEADS OF INDEPENDENT OFFICES will en-
sure directorate uniformity of contract administration in matters such as
qualifications determination, compensation, allowances and other benefits,
personnel record keeping, systematic cost accounting, performance evalua-
tions, cover determination and training, terminations, and security and
medical approval processing requirements.
(6) THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING will provide appropriate training courses
and facilities for contract personnel.
(7) THE DIRECTOR OF FINANCE will

(a) administer pay, leave, and allowance entitlements of contract person-
nel consistent with contract provisions and cover requirements;
(b) in coordination with the Covert Taҳ Board, administer a secure system
for the settlement of Federal income tax and social security tax ob-
ligations.
d. AUTHORITIES
(1) The Director of Personnel, his Deputy, and the Special Contracting Officer
(Chief, Contract Personnel Division) are, upon request of a Deputy Director,
an Operating Official, Head of Independent Office, or a duly appointed
contract approving officer, authorized to execute, amend, renew, and
terminate contracts with contract personnel.
(2) Deputy Directors and Heads of Independent Offices may designate Con-
:
tract Approving Officers to approve contracts when payment is to be
charged against funds under their control.
(3) Authority delegated to Chiefs of Station and Base under the provisions of
FR 20-31 is subject to the following limitations:

(a) All contracts executed in the field will be subject to review by the
Director of Personnel.
(b) Deputy Directors may limit the exercise of the authority granted to
chiefs of field installations to any extent they deem desirable.
(c) Contracts prepared by headquarters will be amended only by, or with
the prior approval of, headquarters. Contracts executed in the field
may be amended in the field, but all such amendments must be for-
warded to headquarters.
(4). All contracts written under the authority of this regulation will be subject
to legal review by the General Counsel under such conditions as he may
prescribe.
e. PROCEDURES. Requirements and procedures concerning personnel records,
personnel actions, security approvals, cover, cover salary, medical evaluations,
compensation, qualifications determination, training, and processing of con-
tracts, are set forth in HHB 20-12.

54. AGENTS. This paragraph sets forth policy, responsibilities, and authorities
concerning the engagement and the management of agents.

a. GENERAL. Agents are witting manpower assets, unique to the Operations
Directorate, who carry out espionage and covert action tasks on behalf of the
Agency. Agents are not employees of the U.S. Government. They are self-
employed individuals whose services may be acquired or terminated at any
time. Care must be taken to distinguish between agents, defined herein, and
independent contractors, defined in HR 20-53a(2).
128 →Revised: 23 February 1973 (733)
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PERSONNEL
b. POLICY L

(1) Agents cannot
 Government em
 with normal pe
 (a) Initial appro
 commitmen
 an agent.
 (b) Agents will
 and a manı
 and control
 (1) No com
 pensatio
 at a rat
 maximı
 This lir
 does no
 (2) No com
 fits, wit
 benefit:
 normal
 expens
 (3) No com
 will be
 mitmer
 Operat
 Securit
 (c) Engagemer
 controls.
 (d) In general
 ards. Howe
 to provide
 be carried
 (e) Agents wh
 the United:
 their assoc
 tax liabilit
 20-35.)
 (f) The use of
 will be go

(2) All commitme
 Formal Agreer!

 (a) A Formal
 an author:
 tiated wh
 (b) A Memora
 ment, sign
 agent. Use
 those case
 agent's si
 (c). An agent:
 randumo

→Revised: 23 Februa

PERSONNEL SECRET HR 20-54b

b. POLICY
(1) Agents cannot claim rights and privileges normally granted to U.S.
Government employees; therefore, they will not be managed in accordance
with normal personnel and administrative standards.

(a) Initial approval of the Counter Intelligence Staff is required before any
commitments are made or any classified information is disclosed to
an agent.

(b) Agents will receive compensation, benefits, and emoluments in amounts
and a manner deemed best by the Operations Directorate to motivate
and control them, subject to the following limitations:

(1) No commitment may be made to an agent to provide gross com-
pensation (basic compensation, additional compensation, fees, etc.)
at a rate which, if projected on an annual basis, would exceed the
maximum rate for a GS-15, without prior approval of the Director.
This limitation applies only to payments made by the Agency. It
does not apply to bona fide cover income.

(2) No commitment may be made to an agent to provide special bene-
fits, without the prior approval of the Director of Personnel. Special
benefits are Agency obligations other than basic compensation,
normal overseas cost of living payments, and travel or operational
expenses.

(3) No commitment may be made to an agent that appointed status
will be offered at the conclusion of his service unless such com-
mitment has been recommended by the Deputy Director for
Operations or his designee, with the concurrence of the Director of
Security, and has been approved by the Director of Personnel.

(c) Engagement of agents will not be subject to Agency personnel ceiling
controls.

(d) In general, agents will not be required to meet Agency medical stand-
ards. However, if an agreement with an agent obligates the Agency
to provide medical or disability benefits, a medical examination will
be carried out, unless precluded by security considerations.

(e) Agents who are U.S. citizens, resident aliens, or foreign nationals in
the United States, must pay Federal tax on all income derived from
their association with the Agency. Procedures for satisfying Federal
tax liability will be determined by the Covert Tax Board. (See HR
20-35.)

(f) The use of retired civilian annuitants of the U.S. Government as agents
will be governed by policy set forth in HR 20-13.

(2) All commitments made or implied to agents will be recorded in either a
Formal Agreement or a Memorandum of Oral Commitment.
:
(a) A Formal Agreement is a written agreement, signed by the agent and
an authorized Agency representative. Formal Agreements will be nego-
tiated whenever operationally feasible.

(b) A Memorandum of Oral Commitment is a written record of an agree-
ment, signed by an authorized Agency representative but not by the
agent. Use of Memorandums of Oral Commitment will be limited to
those cases when it is in the Agency's best interest not to solicit an
agent's signature on a Formal Agreement.

(c) An agent will never be given a copy of the Formal Agreement or Memo-
randum of Oral Commitment.

→Revised: 23 February 1973 (733) 129
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HR 20-55 PERSONNEL

C. RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES

(1) The Deputy Director for Operations is authorized to

(a) formulate procedures for the engagement and management of agents
and to issue operating directives and special instructions, as necessary,
to control the use of agents by headquarters and field units;

(b) execute, amend, renew, and terminate Formal Agreements and Memo-
randums of Oral Commitment with agents; and to review Formal
Agreements and Memorandums of Oral Commitment executed in the
field;

(c) suspend procedures implied in this regulation upon his personal deter-
mination that operational and security aspects of an agent's manage-
ment are so sensitive as to require processing through special channels.

(2) The Director of Personnel is authorized to

(a) approve, after coordinating with affected Agency components, the
commitment to an agent that he will receive special benefits;

(b) approve the commitment to an agent that he will be offered appointed
status at the conclusion of his service, when such commitment has
been recommended by the Deputy Director for Operations or his des-
ignee, with the concurrence of the Director of Security;

(c) execute, amend, renew, and terminate Formal Agreements and Memo-
randums of Oral Commitment when requested to do so by the appro-
priate Operations Directorate approving officer. This authority may also
be exercised by the Deputy Director of Personnel and the Special Con-
tracting Officer, Office of Personnel.

(3) All Formal Agreements and Memorandums of Oral Commitment written
under the authority of this paragraph will be subject to legal review by
the General Counsel under such conditions as he may prescribe.

55. PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS FOR THE SERVICES OF
INDIVIDUALS

a. POLICY. Procurement contracts whose basic purpose is to obtain the services
of one or more individuals, negotiated with profit and nonprofit institutions,
associations, partnerships, proprietorships, and other organizations, are per-
mitted only when the particular services sought cannot be obtained in any
other practicable way.

b. PROCEDURES

(1) Except as provided in subparagraph b(3) below, all proposals for such
procurement contracts and their renewal must be justified in writing by
the component seeking the services and be submitted to the Director of
Personnel for his approval before commitments are made or negotiations
started. These proposals will describe in some detail the services to be ren-
dered, the qualifications required, the proposed duration of the task, and
the reason or reasons why a procurement contract is judged to be the
best method of acquiring the needed services.
130 →Revised: 23 February 1973. (733)
SECRET
PERSONNEL

(2) The Direct
personnel a
examine th
sonnel. If t
rector of P
Office of L
tract reque
are written
HR 45-2.

(3) The approv

 (a) for pro
 dental
 reports,
 task pe
 time (F
 (b) for pro
 requires
 testing,
 follow-
 tion-r
 above.

C. RESTRICTIONS

(1) Operating (
 through the
 erly briefed
 Agency infc
 Operating(
 the relatior
 affects the
 curity clear

(2) Technical 1
 procuremen
 employer-en
 organization
 istrative au
 the Agency
 cies, private

56-59. Reserved.
Revised: 23 Febru

PERSONNEL SECRET HR 20-55c

(2) The Director of Personnel will ascertain whether any staff or nonstaff
personnel are available to perform the needed services. If not, he will
examine the feasibility of satisfying the requirement by hiring new per-
sonnel. If this latter course of action also proves impracticable, the Di-
rector of Personnel will approve the proposal and return it either to the
Office of Logistics or to the originator for subsequent submission of a con-
tract request to the appropriate procurement unit. Procurement contracts
are written under the authority of the Director of Logistics as stated in
HR 45-2.

(3) The approval of the Director of Personnel is not required

(a) for procurement contracts involving the services of individuals inci-
dental to research and development or the preparation of studies or
reports, where the fee reflects an end product (a report written, a
task performed, etc.) rather than a computation based mainly on
time (per hour, per man year);

(b) for procurement contracts involving the purchase of equipment which
requires the services of experts or technicians in delivery, installation,
testing, initial operation or maintenance, training, etc. However, any
follow-on contract for services only-such as maintenance or opera-
tion-requires the Director of Personnel's prior approval as set forth
above.

c. RESTRICTIONS

(1) Operating Officials are responsible for monitoring all personnel acquired
through these procedures. They will ensure that such personnel are prop-
erly briefed and thoroughly understand any limitations on their access to
Agency information and buildings and other pertinent security restrictions.
Operating Officials are required to advise appropriate offices at any time
the relationship or use of such individuals is subject to a change. which
affects the terms of their contractual arrangements, their status, or se-
curity clearances.

(2) Technical representatives and other types of personnel engaged under
procurement contracts or other agreements which do not create a direct
employer-employee relationship are prohibited by law from holding formal
organizational positions or positions requiring the exercise of any admin-
istrative authority. They are also prohibited from formally representing
the Agency in meetings with representatives of other Government agen-
cies, private industry, or foreign governments or industries.

56-59. Reserved.

Revised: 23 February 1973 (733) 131
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DOI 50-10

DDO INSTRUCTION OPERATIONS-GENERAL
NO. 50-10 4 September 1973

RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE OF CERTAIN
CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUALS

Rescission: CSI 50-10, 13 July 1970
G
1. GENERAL
a. Elemental in the conduct of clandestine operations is the use of human
agents to accomplish the missions of the Operations Directorate. In gen-
eral, it is DDO policy to select agent assets with primary regard to the
agents' abilities, target access, and security, and with few restrictions as
to their origins, professions or status as members of particular groups. The
basic rule is that any consenting adult may be used by the Operations
Directorate. There are, however, certain sensitive categories of individuals
or groups whose operational use by the Operations Directorate is prohibited
or in some way restricted for reasons not necessarily related to security
considerations.

b. These prohibitions or restrictions stem from one of the following:

(1) The Agency has been directed by U.S. Governmental authority to
restrict or avoid the operational use of a particular category of in-
dividuals.

(2) The Agency has entered into a special restrictive agreement with an
organization, government, corporation, or official responsible for a
category of individuals.

(3) The Director or the Deputy Director for Operations has imposed
restrictions on the operational use of a certain category of individuals
due to the extreme risk or sensitivity of such exploitation.

2. PURPOSE.

The purpose of this instruction is to set forth the prohibitions and policy
restrictions (as distinguished from security restrictions) which currently per-
tain to the operational use of various categories of individuals, together with
the special approval procedures to be followed in certain cases. Where ap-
propriate, reference has been made to another publication which provides
more detailed guidance than has been attempted in this instruction. The
special approval procedures set forth in this instruction do not supersede or
alter in any way the requirements for covert approvals contained in DOI
and DOI-F 10-5. (attached)

1
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13-00000

DDO INSTRUCTION SECRET DOI 50-10
NO. 50-10 OPERATIONS-GENERAL
 4 September 1973
D
3. DEFINITIONS
Within the context of this instruction, the definitions listed below will apply.
Special note must be taken of the fact that the key term "operational use"
employed throughout this instruction has been defined in the most succinct
manner consistent with clarity. It has not been feasible, however, to cover in
a definition the entire scope of possible variations in operational circumstances
which may be encountered in DDO activities. The definition of "operational
use" is intended to provide guidance for the majority of cases, and must be
employed with responsible operational judgment. Issues involving a deter-
mination of "operational use" which cannot be resolved with reasonable as-
surance by the responsible operating components will be referred to the
Deputy Director for Operations for decision.

a. Operational Use
Operational use is interpreted to mean the recruitment, utilization, or train-
ing of any individual or group for DDO purposes on either a witting or
unwitting basis by or on the behalf of an element of the Operations Direc-
torate. Utilization is made of an individual or group whenever that in-
dividual or group, responding to the direction or solicitation of a DDO
element, provides information, performs services, provides cover, or supplies
financial, material, or other support necessary for the accomplishment of
DDO operational objectives either directly or indirectly, to or for an ele-
ment of the Operations Directorate.

b. DDO Element
Any person or group who or which is responsible to, owned or controlled
either directly or indirectly by the Operations Directorate. Included under
this definition are employees or members of Agency proprietary mech-
anisms.

c. Operational Contact
Any association having as its purpose the initiation or furtherance of DDO
operations.

4. RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE

a. Restrictions on the operational use of individuals or groups are of four types
and cover twenty five separate categories as outlined below and as described
in greater detail in paragraphs 5 through 8 of this instruction:

(1) Operational Use is Prohibited (see paragraph 5):

(a) Members and trainees of ACTION;

(b) Fulbright grantees;
2
D
D
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SECRET DOI 50-10
(?
DDO INSTRUCTION OPERATIONS-GENERAL
ΝΟ. 50-10 4 September 1973

(c) Officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural
Freedom;

(d) Officials, employees, or grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and
Carnegie Foundations;

(e) Employees of U.S. private detective investigative agencies.

(2) Operational Use Requires Special Extra-Agency Concurrence (see
paragraph 6): AND APPROVAL OF SA/ADDO,

(a) Employees of other U.S. Government agencies;

(b) DDO agents or assets in the United States; -

(c) Agents and human sources of foreign intelligence registered by
other U.S. agencies;

(d) Citizens (or persons documented as citizens) of Australia, Canada,
the United Kingdom (including its overseas dependent territories)
and New Zealand;

(e) Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands;

(f) Merchant seamen on ships of certain countries.

(3) Operational Use Requires Special Approval by the DDO (see para-
graph 7):

(a) Publishers, producers, journalists or employees of public infor-
mation media;

(b) CARE employees;

(c) Individuals engaged in public relations activities;

(d) Officials, representatives, or employees of Communist countries
in the United States;

(e) Foreign delegates or employees of the United Nations assigned
in the U.S. and U.S. citizen delegates or employees wherever
assigned;

(f) Staff members or officials of Red Cross societies;

(g) Officials of the Vatican State;

(h) U.S. Government-funded professors, lecturers, students or grantees;

(i) Members of educational or private voluntary organizations;

(j) Officials or employees of the African-American Institute;

(k) Volunteers to America.

(4) Operational Use Requires Approval by Chief of Area Division (see
paragraph 8):

(a) Citizens or alien residents of the U.S. in denied areas;

(b) Non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of United Nations or-
ganizations not assigned in the U.S.;

(c) Members of the academic community.

b. Operational use of an individual who comes under more than one type of
restriction will be controlled by the highest type of restriction applicable
in his particular case.
3
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13-00000

DDO INSTRUCTION SECRET DOI 50-10
NO. 50-10 ) OPERATIONS-GENERAL
 4 September 1973

5. OPERATIONAL USE PROHIBITED104-10506-10028
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

FBI.info
REVIEWED BY FBVJFK TASK FORCE
ON 9/27/98
RELEASE IN FULL
RELEASE IN PART
TOTAL DENIAL

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Centrai intelligence Agency
Date: 2003
