NW 50953 DocId:32337804 Page 1

SECRET

64-211-210. 830-
CLASSI
REC- 88 DECLAS DN: 25X (JFK)
Date: November 21, 1960
To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Attention: Mr. S. H. Morton
Acting Chief, Counterintelligence Staff
From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Subject: SOVIET EMBASSY
HAVANA, CUBA
INTERNAL SECURITY R - CUBA

Liaison 1
1 Mullins
COPIES MACE, DATE 6-9-78 BY
SSS Soviet -Cuba
FOR REVIEW FEC AND/OR DELIVERY
TO HSCARE4-28
(SEE BUELL BY LIAISON

We have received information that a Soviet office
in the United States has ordered ten safes from the (5)
Mosler Safe Company for shipment to the Soviet Embassy
Havana, Cuba. They are to be Shipped by Export Order (S)
Number E 12344, but the exact shipment date is unknown. (5)

The safes are identified as follows: (5)
(Model Number Serial Numbers Combinations) (Dial Key Number

2016CL 14387-11 5-70-40 H-669B
2016CL 14387-81 5-70-40 H-602B
2016CL 14387-55 5-70-40 H-7943
3016CL 14155-54 5-70-40 H-660B
3016CL 14155-19 5-70-40 H-667B
3016CL 14213-13 5-70-40 H-732B
3016CL 14213-60 5-70-40 M-784B CS
4216CL 13905-39 5-70-40 H-749B
4216CL 13905-29 5-70-40 H-800B
4833CL 14483-21 31-75-26 H-6793

The model numbers designate the inside dimensions CS
of the safes, For example, Model Number 2016 has inside
dimensions of twenty inches by sixteen inches. Each Safe is (S)

RAM: jwh
(6) (SEE NOTE PAGE 2)
NW 50953 DocId: 32337804 Page 2

SECRET

COPIES MACE, DATE. BY
RE
Director
Central Intelligence Agency020 HSCA DE REGUENT DATED
FOR REVIED AT FORCE AND/OR DELWERY

equipped with a key locking dial and each has two inside
compartments)
Enclosed for the Central Intelligence_Agency are
La set of dial keys, appropriately labeled, and a set of S
keys for the inside compartments of the safes.(s)

Information concerning the existence of this
material should be handled on a need-to-know basis. It is
requested that no further dissemination of this information
be made without prior clearance from this Bureau.

Enclosures 18
1 Mr. John W. Hanes
Administrator
Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

NOTE:

Classified "Secret" since nature of information requires
that handling be limited and since disclosure could seriously
jeopardize a most delicate source. Information concerning
a purchase of the safes was developed by Washington Field ield and CS3
the keys and combinations were obtained by Cincinnati from an
established source at the company's (factory. The set of keys(S)
for the inside compartments consists of total of 8 keys and
they apparently are interchangeable to some extent. (s)

-2-

SECRET
NW 50953 DocId: 32337804 Page 3
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date: 4/21/201

Agency Information
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-90139-10002
RECORD SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: CR SEE TITLE

Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: PAPICH
TO: BRENNAN
TITLE: [Restricted]
DATE: 10/10/1963
PAGES: 1
SUBJECTS:
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
[Restricted]
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Secret
RESTRICTIONS: 1B
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS: MEMO

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum SECRET
TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr,
FROM : Mr. S. J. Papich
SUBJECT: MANUEL PINEIRO
IS - CUBA
DATE: 10/10/63

We previously have been informed that the subject is a
high-ranking official in the Cuban G-2 organization in Havana. On
10/8/63, Mrs. Anita Potocki, a CIA analyst who has been working
on intercepted Cuban communications intelligence traffic advised
the Liaison Agent that her Agency has come to the tentative conclu-
sion that Pineiro is identical with Petronio, who has been men-
tioned in messages made available to the Bureau and CIA. We have
noted that messages sent to the unidentified Cuban Agent in Panama
referred to as "Roberto" have been signed by "Petronio."

Mrs. Potocki gave the following explanation which led to
CIA's deduction.

Messages emanating from Havana indicated that one of the
recipients was probably located in a small town in Colombia near the
Venezuelan Border. CIA developed a suspect and instituted coverage.
Recently, this individual transmitted a letter to Havana which
communication was intercepted by CIA.. The person had apparently
violated instructions by including some sensitive data in the
communication. Havana then transmitted a radio message castigating
the Cuban Agent in Colombia. An examination of the the radio message
and the intercepted communication sent by the Agent has led CIA
to believe that "Petronio" is identical with Pineiro

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the Nationalities
Intelligence Section. CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
Bufile 105-78656
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION_
IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT FOR THE BRACKETS
- Mr. Wannall
KP 3-19-98
- Mr. Dunn
- 65-67843 ("Roberto)
- Liaison
- Mr. Papich
SJP:chs
Classified by
Declassify on:/OROR
SECRET
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date: 4/17/201

Agency Information

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-90139-10050

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: CR SEE TITLE

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: PAPICH
TO: LALLIER
TITLE: [Restricted]

DATE: 08/17/1961
PAGES: 1

SUBJECTS: CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
[Restricted]

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Secret
RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS: MEMO

---
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
UNITED STATES GOVERN T

Memorandum

TO : MR. L'ALLIER DATE: August 17, 1961

FROM : S.J. PAPICH SECRET

SUBJECT: ISMAEL RODRIGUEZ
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA
(134-9775)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Sullivan
Tavel
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION LO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATIO
IN THIS DOCUMENT EXCEJOT
BRACKETS
KP 5-11-98

The captioned individual is the comptroller of Cubana
Airlines, New York City, and has been utilized as a source of information
by the Bureau. Xon 8-16-61, David Hanlon, Office of Security, Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), advised the Liaison Agent that on occasion
his Agency has utilized Rodriguez as a courier for transmitting
material between the US. and Cuba.7 This material has dealt with
CIA operations in Cuba.

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention
of the Nationalities Intelligence Section.

SJP:jad (5)
1-Donahoe 2-16-94
1-Nasca
1-Liaison
1-Papich

Classified by
Declassify On: QADR
Classified by
Declassify On: OADR

LET TO NY
VHNIDOR
8-22-61

REC-87 8-14-98
CLASSIFIED RY 5668 SLDK AUG 25 1961
DECLACE...

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
WHERE SHOWN DO DIA

85ZCEPT
BEC.0

EX-112

5 COPIES MADE, DATE 6-7-78 BY
RE Papich

FOR REVIEW AT FEITANE DELIVERY
TO HSCA ME DET...
(SEL DETTE VET

SECRET
124-90139-10070 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System Date: 4/17/201
Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-90139-10070
RECORD SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: CR 110-6-210-445

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: HQ
TO: CIA
TITLE:
DATE: 12/11/1961
PAGES: 3
SUBJECTS: CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
HERBERT LEVY
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Secret
RESTRICTIONS: 1B
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS: MEMO

NW 50953 DocId:32337943 Page 1

SECRET

Liaison
Mr. Mullins
17619
110-6210-445
Date: December 11, 1961
To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Attention: Deputy Director, Plans
From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Subject: HERBERT LEVY
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING
(Nationalities Intelligence)

Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum dated
November 28, 1961, at Salt Lake City, Utah, concerning Cuban
economic matters. Copies of the memorandum have been
furnished to the Bureau of International Programs, Department
of Commerce, and to other interested agencies.

The source of the information contained in the
memorandum is Mr. Herbert Levy, Director of Central Operations,
St. Regis Paper Company, Bag Division, 2357 South Eighth West,
Salt Lake City, Utah, telephone Hunter 6-7171. He resides at
2884 Hyland Hills Road, Salt Lake City, and his home telephone
number is Hunter 4-6424.

According to Mr. Levy, he resided at Houston, Texas,
approximately five years ago and was contacted there on several
occasions by [a representative of your Agency's]. Mr. Levy indicated
he was then traveling abroad on occasions and was able to furnish
[your representative] information of interest concerning [India]. He
indicated he recently telephoned your headquarters in Washington, D.C.,
but was unable to obtain any information concerning the identity
of your representative in his section of the United States. He
said he had no objection to his identity being furnished to your
Agency but does not desire that his identity be revealed to any
other Agency. He requested that no action be taken which
would reveal his identity to the business firm mentioned in the
memorandum or to any other commercial firm.

We contemplate no further action in this matter.

Inclosure
Salt Lake City

SECRET SEE NOTE FOR SAC, SALT LAKE CITY
PAGE TWO
SEE NOTE ON YELLOW PAGE TWO

NW 50953 DocId:32337943 Page 2

SECRET

[Director
Central Intelligence Agency]

NOTE FOR SAC, SALT LAKE CITY:

Reurlet 11/28/61 captioned "Large Quantities of
Jute Bags and Hessian Cloth Sought by Cuban Government by
Purchase or Barter Through International Ore and Fertilizer
Company, New York City, New York, and Other Unknown Concerns
November, 1961."

NOTE ON YELLOW:

Classified since we refer to use of
Levy abroad. He furnished information concerning possible
violation of export regulations regarding shipments to Cuba
by International Ore and Fertilizer Company, a large and
reputable firm. Copies of memo have been furnished separately to
Commerce, the military agencies and State Department. Separate
letter also sent Salt Lake City concerning proper caption for
reporting similar data.

NW 50953 DocId:32337943 Page 3

SECRET
-2-
124-90139-10071 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System Date: 4/17/201
Identification Form

Agency Information
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-90139-10071
RECORD SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: CR 110-6-210-445

Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: SU
TO: HQ
TITLE:
DATE: 11/28/1961
PAGES: 2
SUBJECTS: CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
ECONOMIC MATTERS CUBA
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Secret
RESTRICTIONS: 1B
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS: MEMO

Memorandum
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI SECRET DATE: 11/28/61

SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (62-0) -C- Economic Matters
SUBJECT: LARGE QUANTITIES OF JUTE BAGS AND Cuba
HESSIAN CLOTH SOUGHT BY CUBAN
GOVERNMENT BY PURCHASE OR BARTER
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ORE AND
FERTILIZER COMPANY, NEW YORK CITY

CIA HAS NECTION TO NEW YORK, AND OTHER UNKNOWN CONCERNS
PROLAB AND/OR NOVEMBER, 1961.
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATIISCELLANEOUS (DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION)
IN THIS DOCUMENT, EXCEPT BRACKETS

Enclosed herewith to the Bureau are the original
and three copies of a letterhead memorandum captioned as
above. Also enclosed are photostats of two teletypes
(total of four pages) purporting to be copies of teletypes
from International Ore and Fertilizer Company, New York City,
New York, to St. Regis Paper Company, Bag Division, Salt
Lake City, Utah.

The photostats and information set forth in the
letterhead memorandum were furnished to SA JOHN R. PHILIPS,
Jr., by a man identifying himself as HERBERT LEVY, Director
of Central Operations, St. Regis Paper Company, Bag Division,
2357 South Eighth West, Salt Lake City, Utah, telephone
Hunter 6-7171. Mr. LEVY said he resides at 2884 Hyland
Hills Road, Salt Lake City, Utah, residence telephone
Hunter 4-6424. Mr. LEVY stated he resided at Houston,
Texas, about five years ago, and at that time, he traveled
abroad, mostly in India for his company, St. Regis Paper
Company. While living in Houston, Texas, a representative
of Central Intelligence Agency, name and telephone number
not now recalled, contacted LEVY on several occasions and
requested him to obtain various types of information on his
trips to India, The type of information requested and
obtained by LEVY was mainly of an economic nature, or with
respect to some company or individual in India.

Bureau (Enc.
1 Salt Lake City

JRP:ps
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date: 4/21/201

Agency Information
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-90139-10138
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: CR 109-12-210-4315

Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: HQ
TO:
TITLE:
DATE: 05/10/1965
PAGES: 2

SUBJECTS: CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS CUBA
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Secret
RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS: MEMO

SECRET
#4.

1 - Newpher
ト
COPICS MADE AVE WALIBY
LIC RE PAPICA
FOR REVIEW AT FOIKO AND/OR DELIVERY
TO HSCA RE REQUEST DATED
(SEE BUFILE 62-117290)

May 10, 1963
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT
KP 5-26-98 BRACKETS
1963)
A highly confidential informant who has furnished reliable
information in the past recently advised that on on about February 20, 1963,
Raul Roa, Cuban Foreign Minister, commented that the Sino - Indian
conflict continually bothers Cuba and this conflict worked in the favor
of the United States in the Fall of 1962.

Roa's evaluation of the situation in Cuba was highly pessimistic.
Roa stated that the situation has deteriorated; that this was the only thing
that could have happened because talks at the United Nations, New York,
did not find an answer to the problem. Roa also observed that conditions
as of February, 1963, were similar to those just before the crisis in the
Fall of 1962, mentioning pirate boat activities, a campaign in the United
States and a statement by President Kennedy which Roa described as
meaningless.

Roa commented that the United States was the only nation which
benefited from the crisis. The informant understood that it was Roa's
contention that by excluding the Security Council of the United Nations
from considering the Cuban situation and permitting the Organization of
American States (OAS) to take up the matter freely, the United States
is now enjoying a very favorable position in the OAS, the best it has enjoyed
at any time in the Organization. In still referring to what the informant
believed was the OAS, Roa said that the report of the Antisubversive
Committee, now under study by the OAS, contains some definite proposals,
such as a collective breakoff and a breakoff in relations with Cuba including
postal contacts. Roa said it is known officially that Mexico will accept
such resolutions with reservations; Bolivia, Chile and Uruguay will accept
everything; and it is believed that only Brazil will oppose such resolutions.
Cuba, according to Roa, believes that talks between President Kennedy and
President Romulo Betancourt, Venezuela, will establish the action by the
OAS.
JON: rmc
(7)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO
4315

SECRET
TA
SECRET
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

Roa also commented that it would have been much better if the
Cuban situation had been handled by the United Nations Security Council.
Among other things, this would have limited the ability of the OAS.
When it was suggested that time was working in Cuba's favor, Roa
agreed, saying it permitted internal consolidation, and economic and
organizational endeavors. He also mentioned the differences within
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the hope for settlement of
differences in the Soviet Bloc and prospects for general relaxing of
strained relations between all countries.

Although Roa did not mention the Soviet Union at any time, it
appeared that he does not now agree with the Soviet Union's placing
missiles in Cuba in 1962. Roa's comments during the entire conversation
left one with the feeling that he was pessimistic, according to the informant.

NOTE:
Classified "Top Secret" because unauthorized disclosure would
reveal a high-level intelligence operation involving CPRIME, 7 our (5)
extremely sensitive source at the Polish UN Delegations

PROPERTY OF THE FBI
This document contains neither
recommendations nor conclusions of
the FBI. It is the property of the
FBI and is loaned to your agency; it
and its contents are not to be
distributed outside your agency.
SECRET
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date: 4/21/201

Agency Information
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-90140-10004
RECORD SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: CR 100-398547-60

Document Information
ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: HQ
TO: CIA
TITLE:
. DATE: 03/13/1963
PAGES: 1
SUBJECTS: ANGELA PRINCE MOUTSOS
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS: 1B
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS: MEMO

REC-140 (SC) 100-398547-
Date: March 13, 1963
TO: Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Attention: Deputy Director, Plans
From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Subject: ANGELA PRINCE MOUTSOS
SECURITY MATTER - C

Reference is made to prior communications
concerning the captioned individual.

It would be appreciated if you would advise
this Bureau of any information which has come to your
attention indicating continued residence by the
captioned individual in Cuba. Any additional information
which you may have received concerning her activities
in that country would also be appreciated.

2 New York (100-112920) (See note)
ATTENTION SAC. NEW YORK:
Reurlet 3/1/63.
CLASSIFIED BY 5668
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

You will be advised concerning the results
of the above inquiry.

NOTE ON YELLOW:
Subject is in SI. She traveled to Cuba in
December, 1960, to join her husband, Pedros Moutsos,
who, in the past, has acted as CIA informant, informants New York
Fequested contact with CIA for information of subject's
current residence in Cuba and her activities
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date: 4/21/2011

Agency Information

AGENCY: FBI

RECORD NUMBER: 124-90140-10005

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: CR 100-398547-60

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: FBI

FROM: NY

TO: HQ

TITLE:

DATE: 03/01/1963

PAGES: 1

SUBJECTS: ANGELA PRINCE MOUTSOS
          CIA LIAISON MATERIAL

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION : Secret

RESTRICTIONS: 1B

CURRENT STATUS: Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA: APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS: MEMO

---

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-398547) DATE: MAR 1 - 1963

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-112920)(P)

SUBJECT: ANGELA PRINCE MOUTSOS aka
          SM - C
          (00: NEW YORK)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT
BRACKETS KEYS IN

Rerep of SA JOHN H. SHEEHAN, dated 6/29/62, at NY.

Subject, who is on the SI of the NYO, departed
from NY, 12/31/60, for Havana, Cuba. At that time she
indicated she was to join her husband, PEDROS MOUTSOS, in
Cuba and remain there for two years. It is noted that the
subject's husband, PEDROS MOUTSOS, (Bufile 105-30972), was
a source utilized by the CIA as of June, 1960.

The Bureau is requested to alert CIA sources for
any information concerning subject's activities and residence
in Cuba.

COPIES MADE, DATE 6-6-78 BY

FOR REVIEW AT FBIHO AND/OR DELIVERY
TO HSCA RE REQUEST DATED.

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

2-Bureau (100-398547)(RM)

1-New York (100-112920)()
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date: 4/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-90140-10012
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: CR 100-439769-302

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: PAPICH
TO: BRENNAN
TITLE:
DATE: 09/03/1963
PAGES: 1

SUBJECTS:
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
PERMANENT STUDENT COMMITTEE FOR TRAVEL TO CUBA
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Secret
RESTRICTIONS: 1B
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA: APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS: MEMO

---

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
UNITED STATES GC
Memoran

TO: D. J. BRENNAN

DATE: September 3, 1963

FROM: S. J. PAPICH

SUBJECT: PERMANENT STUDENT COMMITTEE FOR TRAVEL TO CUBA IS-C

Austin Horn, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), advised
the Liaison Agent on August 30, 1963, that a reliable CIA source
in Madrid, Spain, had been in contact with Mark Tischman one of
the American students who accompanied the group which recently
visited Cuba. This contact took place on August 27, 1963, at which
time Tischman volunteered the following information to the CIA
source:

Tischman identified the following students as "fellow
travelers": Joseph Rex, Elena B. Fleming, John Milton, Don Ranmann, and
Albert Maher.

Tischman referred to Levi Laub as a "communist in ideology"
but not a Party member. He stated that Phillip Luce is "a person
of Marxist-Leninist tendencies"; that Michael Brown is a Trotskyite;
that John W. Thomas is a decided partisan of the policy of Mao Tse
Tung; that Eric D. Johnston is "of communist, ideology though not a
Party member, that Clinton M. Jenks is "the son of the number three
ranking communist in California"; and that the only student in the
group who is actually a member of the Party is Allan Sheffield

ACTION: Possible C. P. member

The above information is being directed to the attention
of the Internal Security and Nationalities Intelligence Sections.

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Simpson
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date: 6/9/2015

Agency: FBI
Record Number: 124-90155-10008

Record Series: HQ
Agency File Number: CR 65-68530-116

Originator: FBI
From: WMFO
To: HQ
Title:

Date: 04/07/1964
Pages: 4

Subjects:
NOSENKO 1964 REPORTINGS
YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO

Document Type: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
Classification: Secret
Restrictions: 1B
Current Status: Redact
Date of Last Review: 11/03/1998

Opening Criteria: APPROVAL OF CIA

Comments: AT

Date: 4/7/64

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-68530)
FROM: SAC, WFO (134-5437 Sub

SUBJECT: YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO
ESP - R (KGB)
(00:WFO)

ReWFOairtel 3/6/64

NOSENKO was interviewed 4/2/64, by SAS DONALD E.
WALTER, ALEKSO POPTANICH, and MAURICE A. TAYLOR. A number of
cases which originated with source were discussed with him
for additional data and photographs of Soviet Nationals were
displayed to him. Topics covered included the following:

VAN KRAKOV YUGOV, POSSIBLY YUGOV VAN KRAKOV

(HUGO JOSEPH VON KRAKAU) Suspect for the above
individual was discussed with source who was unable to furnish
additional information or make any conclusion although he
observed it was significant that KRAKAU IS approximately the
same age as subject described by him and has part German
background. Source advised that the contacts with LAWRENCE
ALOYAN in Russia were made by Armenian Officers of KGB and
none of the officers of the Seventh Department (tourist) were
in contact with ALOYAN.

BERNARD FERGUSON MITCHELL
WILLIAM HAMILTON MARTIN

1-New York (RM)
1-WFO

MAT:mal
(5) C.C. Wick

AIRTEL
Approved: Thomas

Special Agent in Charge

UNSUB; AMERICAN TOURIST TO RUSSIA
FROM SOUTH OF SAN DIEGO OF
INTEREST TO 13TH DEPARTMENT, KGB

Source was questioned in this matter in effort to
obtain identifying data. He was unable to recall any additional
info of value and explained that his recollection was based
on brief examination of a paper which came across his desk with
many others. Source repeated there is a possibility that
captioned case is identical with the case involving an American
Whose occupation which was repairing pipes, and stated his
recollections concerning this was also very vague. Source
could not recall the case officer from the Seventh Department
who handled captioned case.

UNSUB; CODE CLERK ALLEGEDLY
RECRUITED BY KGB MOSCOW, SPRING, 1960

Photograph of Sergeant CHARLES BRYANT was displayed
to source who advised the face was familiar especially the char
acteristics twisting of the mouth to one side, but advised he
could not recall any circumstances which made his recollection
of the picture possible. In view of the current status of
NOSENKO he was not furnished with the facts in this case at
this time.

AMERICAN PRIESTS IN MOSCOW
STUDIED BY KGB

Source advised that prior his departure from Moscow
GENNADIY GRYAZNOV, the KGB official, who was then Chief of
Section, had told him that two American priests in Moscow were
being studied and that one was under consideration for approach
on the basis of blackmail. GRYAZNOV told source that a Russian
girl who is employed at American House is on very friendly rela-
tions with this priest and KGB has knowledge that he has
carressed and fondled her and anticipates they may succeed in
catching him having intimate relations with this girl in which
case a recruitment approach will be made.

UNSUB; KGB AGENT ANDREY

Source advised that REINER is the Head of Cosmo's Tours,
New York City, and described him as a very shrewd and foxy
individual. He said he was known to VLADIMIR D. CHELNOKOV,
who was Deputy Chief Seventh Department (tourist), however,
subject was not recruited by the Seventh Department and no
effort was made to recruit him. Source described REINER
talkative and foxy and said he was suspected of being connected
with American intelligence (FBI). Source stated REINER knew
many important people, but he believed work on him was wasted.
He recalled REINER'S firm was the first to book a tour to
Mongolia. He had negotiated with the Mongolian Republic for
additional tours, but did not know whether he was successful.

SERGEANT JAMES MC MILLAN

Source advised he was aware of the MC MILLAN case and
stated although he did not know any details he understood
MC MILLAN had assisted KGB and furnished everything he knew
while at the American Embassy. He advised VADIM V. KOSOLAPOV
visits him regularly and gives KGB funds in the sum of 500 rubles
for a month. Source advised MC MILLAN is still married to the
agent who assisted in his recruitment. Source identified this
woman as VERA (LNU) and described her as a shy and decent girl.
He said she had one son by MC MILLAN and also a child by a previous
marriage. Source mentioned it was the task of the First Section
(American Embassy), First Department (American), Second
Directoriate, to take care of defectors such as MC MILLAN.

ANNABELLE BUCAR

Source advised he also was somewhat familiar with the
case of BUCAR who was recruited on the basis of ideology and
a love affair with KONSTANTIN LAPSHEIN, an actor agent of the
First Department, whom she subsequently married. Source stated
BUCAR has not been happy in her private life since her husband
is a heavy drinker and has weakness for girls, but she is
satisfied otherwise with her life in Moscow where she works for
the Radio Committee as an editor handling foreign broadcasts
and also does translations receiving good money.

Photographs of members of the Bolshoi Ballet which
visited the U.S. in 1962 were displayed to NOSENKO who identified
three individuals, namely:
157-10002-10056
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RECORDS SERIES :
MEMORANDUM

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM: SCHLESINGER, ARTHUR JR
TO: THE PRESIDENT

TITLE :
CIA REORGANIZATION

DATE: 06/10/61
PAGES: 15

SUBJECTS:
CIA
COVERT ACTION
PARAMILITARY WARFARE
CUBA
POLICY CONTROL

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : S
RESTRICTIONS: REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS: P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/30/93

OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS:
Box 244
Folder 7
Exhibit 5 to R. Goodwin testimony on 7/18/75
[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
Date: 09/30/93
Page: 1

SECRET
(8)(1)
(1))
1. Sperations and Folicy

3. Clandestina activitice should be accessed uut caly in the context
of their relationshty to an open cecloty but ales in the context of their
ratatianabip to United States foroign policy.

CIA operations have not been bald effectively enbordinate to U. 8.
foreign policy.

1. Clandestine intelligence collection in, by charter, froo frown
This fact exposes American foreign policy
State Departmane control.
tika multitrds of embarrassinents when CIA la diecovered recruiting
The recent
agente or developing sources in a friendly country.
Singapore case, whon CIA, without notice to the Consul General,
triod to submart a member of the Spacial Eranch of the Singaporo
Pelice provides ac instructiva example. After complications of
ludicrous conglezity, including an attempt to subject the recruit to
a lie-detector test, it turned out that the recruit and long since
Informed bia superiore of the CIA approach and was leading CLA
imo a trep which, when spring, produced consideratio embarrass-
amount to relations between the US and the bingapore government.
There have been treaties of a comparable sort is in Pakistan Rakistan and i
Japan (whoron grote a Calusso Nationele veraferniggled into Sasebo
ohin CLA-NATCO6ration).

CIA bas said that, in such cases, neither the Embassy nor the Depari.
ment in Washington is normally formed of this type of operation.
In abort, no one knows how many potential prebiams for UB foreiga
policy -- and how each potentiel friction with friendly states -- are
being created at this moment by CIA clandestina intelligence operation
Surely there is on argument fex permitting Stats to decide whether the
advantage to be joined by the operation (a.g., the information derivak
from en agent within the Special Branch of the Singapore Police) Qui-
weighn the rick (6.5., arsuperating the local government and shaking
ite confidence buta in our purpoese mod in cer sansa), Clandestine
intelligence operations should plainly be clanzod both with the Doper
ment of State and (cave for enceptlocal instances and cu agzcement of
the Secretary of State) with the local U.S. Ambacsador.

SECRET

(1)(8)
It has meant too that the State Depertment, ates aparicad ed an
operation only in ite later stagen, is under great pressure to
endorse the operation as already mounted because of the alleged
evil consequences of exorcistus a vete. I wall remember Tom
Mann's remark the day the decision was made to go ahead on Cuba:
"I would never have favored initiating this operation, but, olace it
kaz gone as far as it bae, I do not think we can rich cailing it off."
Moreover, Matins when there is lucrancing promiam en activism,
Stats, when it questions CIA oparations or Initiatives, caste taalf in
a prissy, sisey, negativo rele. The advocata of clandestine activitien
seema 'tough' and realistice, the appensat heo te tavoka rath istangibles
sa she reputation of the United Staten, world public opicion, "What
do we say in the United Nations?", etc., and ostma bapalessly
idealistis, legalistic and 'scat'

The result of CIA's initiative in covert political oporations bas boun
to cranto situations which have forced policy on the State Department.
This was not the original idea behind CIA. As Allen Dulles WTCCS
in hie 1947 memorandum to the Sonats Arund Services Committes,
"The Central Intelligence Agency should have anthing to do with policy."
Yot, in the years since, CIA has, in effect, 'made' pelloy in many
parte of the world. A number of governments still in power know
that they have evan bzen targets of CIA attempts a worthrax --
a state of mind calculated to stimuleta friendly feelings toward the
United States. Indonesia, of course, ia a prime example.

This experience suggests that the present system by which CIA notifies
State of a projected covert operatica is inadequate to protect US
bntoroute,
There must be some means by which Skote can be informed
ef such operations at an carly enough otaga to affect the conception
and preliminary planning of the operation. Chhorviss CLA will coa-
tinue to confront State with propositions having potential impact on
foreign policy but at too late a point to subject that impact to reason-
able control.

The Controlled American Source (CAS) repreesnio a particula
Class encroachmard on poitcy-making fanctions. CIA today
egroct of CIA
bas nearly as many people under filciel 00758 evasten Ste
13900 to 3200. Aboat 1500 of time aro nador Etato Department coVOT

Sec 3
DEPARTMENT OF STATسعد س
Retain class'n Change/classify t
With concurrence of
Peclassify In part and excise as shown
JEKAT E1256
FPC/HDR by
Af 16193

SECRET

(1) (8)
(1) (c)
4 Nov 93
(8)
:
8.
Che other 2200 are premamably under military or other nen-State
Oficial cover). Originally the age of Santo Department covorίβε
Mpersoonal was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary.
The Ballco-Correr-Jeckeen report stated in 1943, "The CIA should
tate Department cover as a simple answer to all its problame
bass shouldproceed to develop its own outside cover and eventually in
this way and tirough increased efficiency of its overdoas personnri,
And a way to temper ita demands upon the finta Uppartment." Nong
Choless CLA hoa readily increzood ito requloittane for official cover.

There are several reasons why CLA has alagdoned its original intenti
of developing systemsed privato cover. Yiu easier to arrange
Through State; it is lempensive, it is quicker, it facilitates
acurity of operations sa well as có corpinuntcatious; it insures a
Bleasanter fe for the CIA topics. bu the affect is to further the
GIA encroachment on the tysaltional functions of State.

sont missions, I understand CAS perennel cutaumbors regular
Saste Department personnel. We American Subassy in Vien
out of 20 peraons listed in the October 1960 Foreign Service List 20
being in the Political Secrtant 16 ore CAS personnels d the 3.1 cilicoron
Mated en engaging in soparting activities, Guer ball aro CAS
13 cificare Woted in the Politieel Section in car Eimbaccy in Chile
11 ara CAS On the day of President Kennedy's Inauguration of pescom
Let the politieni foificats sarving in United States Embassies ware Cab
Sometimes the CIAAniseien chief has been ta the country longer, ha
more money at his disposal, wielés more infivanen (and is abler) than
the Ambascador Uiten bo has direct eccese to the local Prime
Minister. Sometimes les during a critical period da Laen) he pursues
a different policy frora that of the Ambassador. Aloo he is generally
Well knownfccally as the CIA representative.

In the Paris ambassy today, there are 123 CLA people.
has long since began to mora isto arens of political reporting normally
occupied by State. The CIA mon doing overt internal political reporting
cutyumber those in the Embassy's political section by 10.2 CLA hap
egen sought to monopoliza contact with certain French, political perasmall-
thos, among them the President of the National Assembly.
the top floor of the Pasta Lanbassy, a fact wall irzowa locally, a
CIAccuies
DEPARTMENT OF STATO
Delete Sex 3 Retain elass'n Change/classify
JPICT
With concurrence of
excise- as shown
Declassify In part and exc nd
FPC/HDR by
C
0587 1246-193

رصة
(198)
4 NOV 23
SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Solite Secs Retain class'n Change/classify to
JFic
ACT
With eencurrence of
Declassify In part and excise as shown
E0 12356, Sec. 15
FC/HDR by
the night of the Generals' reveitto Maria Parasa, hotd
e-by-note
withesmusement that the top floor was ablass with ligias. I am
informed that Ambassador Coeln was able to ascore catrance that
night to the Catoffices only with difficulty.)

CLA is apparently Dywiruly committed to Un CAB approach as a
פתרוןnt solution for itongoblems. t to proming to have CLA
praple given the rank of Counsela Balore State lasne central
прози ані пore of its pratumed overeses pereganal, and hafare CAS
hoecavas permanently integrated Inve the Foreign Service, it would
הם important (a) to assure ovary ambassadorube firın esntrel
over the local CAS atation nominally promised in the New Directive
of Mancory 19, 1961, and (L) to review the currens CAS antics with
aabye to a steady reduction ef CAS personnal.

4. Faramilitary warfare, I gathor, is regarded in some quartora
za a purely technical matter, easily detachable from policy and there-
fore a proper function of the Department of Dafanas. Yet there is
almost no CIA function mere pecullerly dependant on the political
context then pasamilitary warfaro.
0.1.
There are several rossono far this. For can thing, a paramilitary
operation is in its nature a large and attributable perettan and choreby,
no suggested abera, clashes with the presuppositions of our epon
society. (These coerideretiens need not sppiy, hamoves, to tha
traising of, cay, the Bouth Vietnamese in guarrilla tactics or t
cupport of already existing guerrilla activitice. For another, 10
moral and political price of direct paramilitary failuro is scute for
Communists, when they stimulato paramilitary activity, are
dong what the world expects frezan themi when we do it, we appaar
to betray our own professed principles and therefore canact afford to
compound delinquency by defeat Moreover, as the routat Algerien
opicoda chowa, once we convince the world that we era committed to a
paramilitary endsever, we will be blamed fve all sorts of thinga.
as the recent tractors-fer-prizoneza episode edad, when we do and
man to possible death, ma conzat lightly walte them off and claze the
booka. Tha Cemrnuntate, on the other haw, have to acrepics about
Hquidating a lusing aher
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY: SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER: 157-10002-10105
RECORDS SERIES :
TRANSCRIPT
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
ΤΟ :
TITLE :
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM HARVEY
DATE: 06/25/75
PAGES : 62
SUBJECTS :
ZRRIFLE
CASTRO
ROSELLI, JOHNNY
OPERATION MONGOOSE
BISSELL, RICHARD
ASSASSINATION
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
THE PRESIDENT
QJWIN
MAFIA
SILVER, ARNOLD
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS: REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS: P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/30/93
OPENING CRITERIA :
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Folder 13
COMMENTS:
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ITEM IS RESTRICTED
Date: 09/30/93
Page: 1

TOP SECRET
6
1
counterespionage for a brief period against the Japanese and
2
the Italians and the Russians in '41. Then during most of the
3
War, against the Germans, and then beginning in early '45 until
4
the middle of '47 against the Soviet service again.
5
Mr. Schwarz. And then in 1947, did you join the CIA as
6
head of the Soviet Intelligence Branch?
7
Mr. Harvey. That is correct.
8
Mr. Schwarz.
Is that also counterespionage?
9
Mr. Harvey.
Yes, it was.
10
Mr. Schwarz. And then between 1947 and 1952, you worked
11
on Soviet counterespionage and certain special operations in
12
the Department for Plans, is that right?
13
Mr. Harvey. Well, that is correct. It was a particular
14
command and staff responsibility on communications intelligence
15
and for a period of, I would think probably eight to ten
16 months, I headed a planning staff, along with that.
17
Mr. Schwarz. In 1952, did you go to Berlin as chief of
18
Station for the CIA?
19
Mr. Harvey. I did.
20
Mr. Schwarz.
And were you there until 1959?
21
Mr. Harvey.
Until the end of 1959.
22
Mr. Schwarz.
I understand, Mr. Harvey, that you had some
23
rather substantial accomplishments there, such as the Berlin
24 Tunnel
25
Could you just very succinctly describe the Berlin Tunnel

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET
7
1
operation and then move on?
2
Mr. Harvey. Well, very briefly, that is an operation that
3
and I conceived some time before I went to
4 Berlin
Senator Tower. You and who?
5
6
Mr. Harvey. Frank Rollett, who for many years was one of
7
the, if not the most, knowledgeable senior officer in the
8 cryptologic group.
9
And one of the reasons I went to Berlin was to attempt to
10 mount this operation.
11
In substance, what it amounted to was setting up a fairly
12 complex cover within a cover installation in West Berlin and
13 driving a tunnel approximately 500 meters, well underground
14 across the sector boundary, wand Wandtapping into three main
15 telephone, telegraph and teleprinter cables.
16
I think we had a total of around 900 circuits of these
S
17 which were, among other things, the main circuit between the
18 command headquarters of the Soviet Group in Bunsdorf, and the
19% outlying commands in Germany and the headquarters in Moscow
20
We also tapped into a number of Soviet Embassy circuits in
21. Unter den Frund and Unter den Linden in East Berlin, including
22 a number of intelligence circuits which unfortunately were not
23 really readable.
24
Senator Tower. Were not what?
25
Mr. Harvey. Were not readable.

TOP SECRET
8
1
Mr. Schwarz. I have been told, Mr. Harvey
is this not
2
correct
that you not only conceived the program but helped
3
to dig the tunnel?
4
Mr. Harvey. I did.
5
Mr. Schwarz. In 1959, did you become Chief of the Foreign
6
Intelligence Staff Division D?
7
Mr. Harvey.
That is correct.
8
Mr. Schwarz. Now is Division D a division of the CIA which
9
is responsible for communications intelligence?
10
Mr. Harvey. That is also correct.
11
Mr. Schwarz.
But part
12
Mr. Harvey. But I would like to clarify it, if I may,
13 Mr. Schwarz. It was the division of the clandestine services,
14 which was the focal point and was responsible for primarily two
15 things: the procurement of communications intelligence through
16 operational and clandestine sources and the control and utiliza
177 tion of the product of communications intelligence, as it
18 affected the clandestine services
19
We had nothing to do beyond that with the general sort of
20 research and analysis use which was handled in a separate
21 COMINT shop in the what I believe was the DDI, Deputy Director
22 Intelligence.
23
Mr. Schwarz. Did Staff D include within its responsibili-
24 ties the surreptitious obtaining of code information?
:
25
Mr. Harvey. Yes, in two ways:
TOP SECRET
complete control and
TOP SECRET
{
9
1
coordination of any such efforts, approval and assessment of the
2
security risk, and also in the direct procurement through
3
operational means abroad, but not in this country.
4
Mr. Schwarz. And by operational, you mean entering into
5 buildings?
6
Mr. Harvey. Surreptitious entry, intercepting couriers
7 monitoring of communications, monitoring of scatterback from
8 microwave, that type of thing. Clandestine monitoring would
9 be covered as well.
10
Mr. Schwarz. Now, did a man call Justin O'Donnell work
11 for you in Staff D?
12
Mr. Harvey. Yes, he did.
He Plads in Fall
ハ1907.
13
Mr. Schwarz. At some point, did M. O'Donnell recount to
14 you a conversation concerning Patrice Lumumba?
15
Mr. Harvey. Yes.
16
Mr. Schwarz. Would you state what he said to you?
17
Mr. Harvey. Briefly, Mr. Don All came to me and said
18
that he had been approached by Richard Bissell, who was then
19
Deputy Director for Plans, to undertake an operation in the
20
Congo, one of the objectives of which was the elimination of
21
Patrice Lumumba.
He also told me that he had declined to
7
23
22 undertake this assignment.
Mr. Schwarz. Did Mr Bissell subsequently have a conversa-
24
tion with you in which he also recounted the fact that he had
25 requested Mroo Donnell to undertake such an operation?
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET
13
1
of assassination is obviously a two-pronged subject, ours and
2 theirs. We spent countless hours over the years trying to
3
4
determine the parameters of how far the Soviet service was
willing to go. This was partly a question of assessment,...
5 this was partly a question, to put it just as bluntly,
6
of self-protection.
7
I will try to summarize what I think are fair conclusions.
8
In the field of political assassination, although I cannot
9 document this by evidence, I have no question but what the
10 Soviet service has, does, and will continue to use the tool of
11 assassination to accomplish political gains inside and outside
12 of the USSR. In the intelligence field, I think you have to
13 make a distinction, the distinction roughly and I'm over-
simplifying this slightly but a distinction into perhaps
14
15
three classes.
16
One, their own ethnics or nationals. Secondly, indigenous
17 agents of third countries. And thirdly, the recognized official
18 staff officers of other intelligence services.
19
During the seven years that I spent in Berlin, which was
20
the longest continuous period that I was exposed in depth to
21
Soviet Executive Action, we lost a great many Russians, a great
22 many Germans, a certain number of Czechs, Poles and other
nationalities.
23
24
25
Mr. Schwarz. When you say you lost Russians, you mean
Russians who were working with the United States?
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET-
19
1
Mr. Schwarz. Anyway, it exists, as a combination.
2
Mr. Harvey. In other words, if you want to put it in just
3
these blunt terms, it would have been a lot easier for the KGB
4
to assassinate me in West Berlin than it would have been for
5
me to assassinate my opposite number in East Berlin, in the
6
Soviet Embassy across the border.
7
Mr. Schwarz. In describing the Soviets, you distinguish
8
between political assassination, direct agents of the United
9
States, and finally the emigres and foreign nationals.
10
Mr. Harvey. And also -- well, not foreign nationals, but
11 emigres and Soviet nationals.
12
Mr. Schwarz. That's what I meant. Soviet nationals.
13
Mr. Harvey. The most merciless, the field where they are
14
the most merciless are their own defected agents, of course.
15
Mr. Schwarz. Now, to your knowledge, has the United States
16
ever assassinated a defected agent or a third country?
17
Mr. Harvey. You mean an American agent who has defected
18
or doubled?
19
Mr. Schwarz. Yes.
20
Mr. Harvey.
To my personal knowledge, no.
21
Mr. Schwarz. What about persons who are third country
22
enemies of the United States?
23
Mr. Harvey. No.
24
Mr. Schwarz. You don't know any instance of the United
25 States assassinating any person who is in the non-political
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
49
1
2
Eyes Only basis, and the first part of this was the necessary
documentation for the authority which was later signed off on
14
3
by Dick Helms as Deputy Director.
4
Beginning on my page 4, your middle of page 3.--
5
Mr. Schwarz. Well, just a moment. Page 1 is a cover story,
6
not the real story, the objectives --
7
Mr. Harvey. It is both.
8
Mr. Schwarz. But it does not recite as an objective,
9
assassination or assassination capability.
10
Mr. Harvey. No, it does not.
11
Mr. Schwarz.
Instead, it cites the obtaining of code
12 and cypher materials.
13
Mr. Harvey. Which, I would like to point out, was a
14
perfectly legitimate objective and was not in a sense, a cover
15
story except that if this project had gone so far as to the
16
actual recruitment of any agent for assassination or the target-
17
ting of any target or the mounting of any operation, it would
18
have been under this as a cover. But, those assets that were
19
spotted by QJWINN, for instance, under ZRRIFLE were also
20
honestly considered for possible clandestine procurement of
21
communications intelligence outside the U.S.
So it's --
maybe I'm not making this clear, it's a cover
22
in a sense, but it's not a phony cover, in other words.
23
24
Mr. Schwarz. Dual purpose.
Mr. Harvey.
25
It was a dual purpose.
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET
50
1
2
Mr. Schwarz.
You mentioned QJWINN. Was QJWIN / an agent
who you did hold in reserve for possible use in connection.
3
with the Executive Action program?
4
Mr. Harvey. No, QJWIN is an agent that I considered for
5
possible use and used for a limited period through Arnold Silver
6
for the spotting of individuals with criminal and underworld
7
connections in Europe for possible multi-purpose use, none of
8
whom were ever advised of the use, none of whom, as far as I
9
personally know, were. ever used.
10
Mr. Schwarz. But the multi-purpose use included as one
11 purpose the possible use in assassination?
12
Mr. Harvey. Only the sense that had we ever been saddled
with a flat, if you will, command performance on assassination.
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
I might have considered the people spotted by WIN as possibil-
ities.
But, you see, before anybody that is ever spotted is
approached for any operation and particularly
and please, I
don't mean to sound pedantic on this, I don't mean to is
should be
actually approached, there is a long period of assessment,
crosschecks, so on and so forth. This particular spotting
mechanism never actually went that far, as far as I know.
I only know of one use made by QJWIN until we terminated
It was
him some months later, I don't remember the exact date.
before I went to Rome. I know it was in connection with an
operation in the Congo that was not an assassination operation
TOP SECRET Follo
TOP SECRET
51
1
and had, as far as I know, personally, at least, nothing to do
2
with assassination.
15
3
I have checked pages 1 and 2 and 3 and my page 4.
4
Mr. Schwarz. Are pages 4 through 7, in your judgment,
5
pages that were written by Mr. Arnold Silver?
6
Mr. Harvey. As a guess, I'd say they appear to be in the
7
same writing as these first three pages.
8
Mr. Schwarz.
Are pages 8 and 9 pages that are written by
9
you?
10
11
Mr. Harvey. Well, just a moment, let me get to those.
I would also like to point out that from page 4 that
12 that is page 4, as long as it continues in the same handwriting
13
was not a part of this so-called Project Outline, these I
14 would guess were probably Arnold Silver's notes and probably
15 based, at least to an extent, on discussions he had with me,
16
and certain sort of problems and questions and principles that
17
I tossed out to be considered and cares to be exercised.
18
Mr. Schwarz.
Then pages 8 and 9 are in your handwriting,
19
is that right?
20
Mr. Harvey. Pages 8 and 9 are in my handwriting.
21
Mr. Schwarz... And at the bottom of page 8, does that
22
indicate that you had a conversation with Mr. Silver on January
26th?
23
24
Mr. Harvey. Yes, it does.
25
Mr. Schwarz. And is it your judgment that that is January
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET-
1
26, 1961 and is about the subject of Executive Action?
2
52
3
4
Mr. Harvey. Yes, it is.
Mr. Schwarz. And it followed your conversation with Mr.
5
Bissell that you have recounted?
6
Mr. Harvey. I think probably that might be well, when
7
I first looked at this, I thought this, well, this has got to
8
be '62, but I am almost certain now that it is not. If this
9 Dick Bissell In early January and this is difficult to pinpoint
10 because there were several such discussions in varying degrees
11 of detail during the period in the spring, and very early in
12
13
'61 to the fall of '61 period, but I did find out fairly early
on that Silver had or that Bissell had discussed the question
14
of assassination with Arnold Silver, and this discussion at
15
17
18
16
the very least, had to take place after I know Bissell already
had discussed the matter with Silver X
Now, these two pieces of paper, well, I say two pieces of
It's
19
paper, what they are from they are in my handwriting.
from a yellow pad, probably the duplicate of this that I used
20
21
to keep on my desk and just make rough notes of conversations
that I had, telephone and otherwise, with various people.
22
23
Once a week I would go through them and either destroy them
classified: trash,
dictate from them, or occasionally save
24
them. There is no relationship between the material that
25 appears after the line two-thirds of the way down the page, just
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
53
1
before the 26/1-AS,
and the material which appears above
2
it which is tabbed SID G, tab 21.
15
3
Mr. Schwarz.
That would be Sid Gottlieb?
4
Mr. Harvey.
Sid Gottlieb.
5
Mr. Schwarz.
Doesn't the conversation with Sid Gottlieb
6
on the 25th of January indicate you had discussion which included
7
the word bankruptcy and you felt assassination was
8
Mr. Harvey. There was a general philosophic discussion of
9
assassination and assassination techniques. There was also a
10 discussion on a number of other things that were of particular
11 and specific interest to the communications intelligence field
12 and the clandestine service's responsibilities aspects, if you
13 will, and as best I can recall this conversation, this was a
14
sort of an exchange of ideas and briefing session, probably
15 held at the request of Sid Gottlieb in my office shortly after
16
17
he either took over a new job in TSD or took over as actual
Chief of TSD, which was the Technical Services Division of the
18 clandestine services.
19
Mr. Schwarz. Now the reference in the middle of that
20 conversation with Mr. Gottlieb to "Last resort beyond last
21 resort and a confession of weakness." That's referring to
22 assassination?
23
Mr. Harvey. That's obviously referring to assassination.
24 That's probably what I told Sid Gottlieb my opinion on the
:
!
25 use and propriety of assassination as a technique was.
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET
55
1
of operational philosophy which I expressed to Gottlieb, that
2
3
4
5
the question then came in pure theory as to as in such cases
as, now assumptions, the example of 3 wrong, I am not really
sure. But the closest that I can come is that the assumptions
it might be desirable in a purely theoretical discussion and in
6
my opinion we were wrong.
Whether I said that to Gottlieb in
7
the words that are here, I just don't know.
8
Mr. Schwarz. Who were the two besides Mr. Trujillo that
9
make up the examples of 3?
10
Mr. Harvey. I presume
I have no idea, but I presume
11
that the logical candidates at that point would have been
12
Lumumba and Castro. By: logical candidates, I mean not that
14
15
16
tape 2b
17
18
19
13
we were considering them in this discussion as logical targets
for assassination, but that these were sort of the three
people that would come to mind; if you are going to go into this,
these are three to be considered.
C
But you will notice, if I may,. Mr. Schwarz, "Framework of
Sid's job. ELINT R&D Memo." Ludford is the name of the staff
officer who worked for me in Division D at that time.
20
21
22
This "translating machine" was an experimental device,
done under -- hoped for development by GE that I was most
interested in, because of the serious translation problem that
23
we had and particularly in communications intelligence.
24
So you see this was not a discussion strictly within the
25
framework of either assassination as a specific, or assassination
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
56
1
as a general problem.
2
Mr. Schwarz. Now, the material commencing on handwritten
3
15
page 4 and commencing in the middle of page 3 of the Senator's
4
notes, reflects in your judgment the conversation that you had
5
6
with Mr. Silver and it is his notes about that conversation, is
that right?
7
Mr. Harvey. That is my best guess.
8
It may also, however, include his own thinking and so forth.
9
I doubt if it includes it certainly would not include any
12
13
10 specific discussions, I don't think, with other officers,
11
because Arnold Silver was under specific instructions not to
discuss this as such with anybody else, at least without clearing
it with me first.
14
Mr. Schwarz.
And he starts, for example, by talking about
15
"Legal, ethical, morale, operational problems" and so forth,
16
17
and that reflects the conversation you had with Mr. Silver?
Mr. Harvey. Yes, it does.
18
Mr. Schwarz. Down toward the end of entry 3b and 3 has
19
the heading "Maximum security"
do you see that on page
4?
20
21
Mr. Harvey. Yes, I see it.
Mr. Schwarz. There is a sentence which reads as follows
22
23 two sentences, which I should read into the record, three
sentences.
24
"Within Kubark"
25
now, is that the CIA?
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
60
1
crossed in this document.
2
Mr. Schwarz. One way or the other?
3
Mr. Harvey.
That's right. One way or the other.
Mr. Schwarz.
Your note has a report to the DCI, the
4
5
January 26th reference, which reads in the first line AS.
6
That is Arnold Silver, I take it?..
7
8
9 matter.
Mr. Harvey.. Yes, I'm sure that's Arnold Silver.
Mr. Schwarz. Then it appears to say f-a-n-f-o-r-n DCI
What does that mean?
10
Mr. Harvey. I am not sure. The closest I could come to
11 that is a fairly illogical Fanfani,, and Fanfani was never
12
even dreamed of, as far as I know, in any such context.
13 Fanforn Burton Wides raised that with me, and I just had to
14
15
16
17
throw up my hands. I just don't know.
Mr. Schwarz. And you don't know what the reference to DCI
in the notes means?
Mr. Harvey. No, I am sorry, I do not, at this point, Mr.
18 Schwarz.
19
Mr. Schwarz. Okay.
Mr. Harvey. Are you asking me to try to interpret the
20
21 portion of this that is in my handwriting, or are you satisified
at this point?
Mr. Schwarz. Well, the other items, it seems to me, are
22
23
24
either not important or are understandable.
Maybe some of the
25 members have questions.
TOP SECRET
SECRET
Bed - 25/1
Eryer Estioi
"The Magic button
sarcaties kiire
"for a hung".
AIS 201 cover
Caubois Bankruptcy
no Stor
nat ITSO Je contrachstruct
eixes - Jum
Frailes fromй 0-2
apply brakes...
Lost resort beyoud last reiod يه
Ce confession of wakuces.
- El Benefactor assumptions-
Example or 3 "Meray"
Meno
Hear
RECE
JAN 24 1975
CIA
Anathesia.
26/1 Farform-200/- Matter
nofil Rese
1. Select proper ofern to ress-
2
3. Security Rules
4. uie leves
Resort-Brakes
3
B-WRN-AS-
sid Reseiv.
licet-v-ko

SECRET
6. No
7. no. project
9
or popen
except fer соле
8. Principal agent-
Acelet
Projel Chaft RCH-
1500- From MB.
mach sfat normal
project-br Phátke
9. Disposal -
10.70igits who iвело
ilist know before
me con par
11. Case officering
7d list - Remember
RECLINED FROM
JUN 24 1975
CIA
157-10002-10106
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Date:09/30/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER: 157-10002-10106

RECORDS SERIES:
TRANSCRIPT

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: R-398

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: SSCIA
FROM:
TO:

TITLE:
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM K. HARVEY

DATE: 06/25/75
PAGES: 96104

SUBJECTS:
OPERATION MONGOOSE
ROSELLI, JOHNNY
CASTRO
ASSASSINATION
POISON PILLS
CUBA
MCCONE, JOHN
CIA
BISSELL, RICHARD
WHITE HOUSE
MAFIA
ROWAN, DAN
GIANCANA, SAM

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: T
RESTRICTIONS: REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS: P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/30/93

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:
Box 245
Folder 14

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

NW 50955 DocId: 32281946 Page 1

SECRET
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSTION AND/OR
RELEASE THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

HARVEY EX! R371
6/25/75

21 JUN 94 Project ZRRIFLE

1. Identifications: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is
to spot, develop, and use force agent assets for Divisie D...
po operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas
micluding this Huited States, buit die poster for operatisual
security masous will probably not be used in there
countries of residence. Present developmental activity is
bening conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it
is muticipated that this will be extended to otties divisioй
areas. The project will be operated against third-country.
mistallationce and personnel.

2. Objectivce: The objective of this propet is the
Accor and in accordance with
requirements levied on the Clandective Semuasر
The Male hince these requirenients are
subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would
be valid for the duration of the project. Specific
operations will be mounted on the basis of nied and
opportunity. The profect will be conducted by Division
D with assistance from area divisions and stations as
needed.
RECE
JUN 24 1975
CIA

3. Background: Au response to the increasing requirements.
torie, Drvision D in 1960 begon the spotting of
Id: 32281946 Pagtut arests as a developmental activity. During the same

SECRET

2
-period requirements for A became more
many respects more sensitics
refined and in
Because most statisus ampl
not equipped to conduct this type of operatise and because
of the desirability of completely centralized control over this.
entine effort, it was determined that Division D
best conduct the activity. The first spotting activity.
has now advanced for ensugh to fustify removing from
Ahe ODA category,
4 operational assets :
could

(1) Personnel: QJWIN is under writter
contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of
spotting agent candidates. Juin was first contacted in
Chi
Bateriile in connectione riothe
an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For
a period of a year and a half half he was contracted some to
sporadically in behalf of the
Bureau of Narcoties Files of this Bureau reflect
an cellent performance by Jivin One 1960,
October
d:32281946 age-3-
RECEN
JUN 24 1975
CIA

SECRET

3
fumin annual salavy... 7,200
Travel & ops expenses for
Quin & other agents & agerit candidates : 2,000
Pees for servies by and
standley of agents and
agent candidates 2,000
Travel of staff employees
engaged in Zorifle activity :
Hive of safehouses, automobiles
2,000
and other operationed expenses: 1,000
$14,700
Pay for agents on completion of jobs?
REC
JIN 24-1975
CIA
d: 32281946 Page 4

SECRET

4
1). Liyal, ethical morale, operational problems; pstitical: non-attribute-
belite,
2) Our som experience) (+efleston DDP) and expernicie
W/KGB (require miset
prosfisusual, proven operationally competent, reittilene, stalile,
CE-experienced ope officers (feur available), able to conduct patient
search & ufguts to pull back if mistist or knowledge tetlis lire
ows from high regood for operational security.
he should & Assessments are all-important.
3) Maximum security:

d:32281946 Page 5
a. Rubark only (s. g., wlist does
herow?); no approach to other sont agencies
b. Within Kubak, one focal point for coutral,
search, tracing, case officerung i eto - DDParthority
in this focal ponit mandatory. Dei officially, admind?
c. Max. security cable commo for iimocuous
caliter ouly; no restrictions on travel; possibilots
of one-man overcess (Europe) control base witte.
own (non-station) common word of mouth t
no backfulness ve tortis
(except for search)
d. No PA's or intermediaries; rigid case-officering,
from start to finish.
e. No approach to officials of foreign
gaut
buy
JUN 24 1975
f. no use of anytes any agent who
LTA
worked for a A. Hort. agency Tracing.
by opposition would reved.
g. Use af already tested assets (eng.).
Markel in the searchs
le. Stand-by list of barbers who can

SECRET

5
pass as foreigners.
seavel; this estetilishe des. Pred
i. Pretut slavel.;
:
f. two discursus in stations. th. No tengistall.
4. Blackmail.
a. Ho American citizens or residents or
people who wer ditenied vis. venas
b. No chain of convestisic: strictly person to
percong singleton opt...
e. No matting any candidato in liome tantory.
d. Exclude organizations as, thore
wpecard of averts, those of metebility of purpire
as eximinals..
e. Ataffers mučalued-selictisis.
5. Cover: planning should miclude provision for
Ailelaning Pleaning Sous or sechs in case
of bilsv
following directione...
of nominees essentialime
& Vesting of
security, blackmail.
7. Former resistance personnel a possibility.
8. Wie nobody who has never death of criminals; otherwise
anill pust be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such
as folllom to traud, wanted lists, itd...
Id:32281946 Page 6
ancholile
10. Possibili use of staffers for the action.
Silve thorne
Keeping of files.
RECEIVED FROM
JUN 24 1975
CIA

SECRET
freeld in to travel 6
Legal; operationial + ethical morale problen proklos.
mstrecura.enough.
esce
1) Maximum security + within Rubarf only (1.9, how much
downow-kuoro?). Primitation on number code
Sluise of objective..
2) one forest pouit for resoch, control, tracing care officer+PA
selection. Complete DDP authority in this focal point ricedstory.
Overseas one-man control base witts own fonon-thtion) commo
3) Every operation to fie nigibly case-officered; no silk-sert
PAR.
Non-attributability:
4) ho American citizen or flimovican residents for dvect actione;
pocally for approach to foreign elements. No criminal.
who taunted by use by another American agency fee of
esse officers who com pass os foreigners and limited
official referencks.
5) no chain of prenections permitting blackmail.
6) Don't meet any selectie in houve territory.

7) Avard discursion of foreign officials mitet all possibility,
of search through private citizens (e-g. Oferin) hos
:32281946 Page 7
billy Waled.
! RECEIVED FROM
01 24 1975
blaming
CIA
8) Planning should include provision for ble
Novieto (or Gechs) in case of blow is 4 above essential.
9) Exclude organization Orminals, there witts record of
arvests, those neko have lugaged in several tippes of crime.

SECRET

11) Former recitance personnel offer possibilities, (OSS
archuries
12) Period of testing, furveillance, ito. for each
seloster.
fuel involved should have some CE
13) All Ruberh
all Ruberk peresfuel
experrerice.
14) stable
15) What are limits on team or individuals sob
selected? Mo "tam until ready to go.
16/ Danger of stardlys,
Id:32281946
Page 8
7
RECEIVED THOM
JUN 24 1975
CIA

ied マー25/1
SECRET
yee @ction
8
"The Magic button
parcotics Büro
"fora lung".....
Canon
eyes- Jum. A..
nat Tso em
AIS 201 cover..
Burity to Stor
From 0-ج
apply brakes...
Last resort beyout last resol &
Ce confessions in wakuees:
El Benefactor
acsumptious-
Exampься 3 "мощ"
Frank of Joh
Sear

Anathesia -
-
Merno
26/1
Fame 200/- matter
no-fil Reser
RECU
JAM 24 1975
CIA
1. Select proper ofern to ren -
2
3. Security Rules
4. leves
3
B-WINN-AS-
Resew.
d: 32281946 Rage
Resort Bikes - Sub
7.

SECRET

6. 20
7. no project
or popen
except per cover.
8. Principal agent.
Profil chaft FCH-
Aicbel 1500-proση
B.
mach fata del a
project-be Phake
A. Disposeel -
10. Targets ruborilers
Mlist Brow before
we can pay -
11. Case officering

15-
7d Jest - Remember
Id:32281946 Page 10
RECLAVE FROM
JUN 24 1975
CIA
157-10002-10165
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
:
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY: SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002-10165
RECORDS SERIES :
TRANSCRIPT
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R-696
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
ΤΟ :
TITLE :
TESTIMONY OF DAVID ATLEE PHILLIPS
DATE: 07/31/75
PAGES: 178
!
SUBJECTS :
CIA
CUBA
CASTRO
LANSKY, MEYER
BAY OF PIGS
ASSASSINATION
TRAFFICANTE, SANTOS
RUBY, JACK
CHILE
ALLENDE
OPERATION MONGOOSE
1
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS: REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS: P.
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/30/93
OPENING CRITERIA:
Box 256
Folder 14
COMMENTS:
NW 50955 DocId: 32282005 Page 1
[R]
ITEM IS RESTRICTED
Date: 10/05/93
Page:1

TOP SECRET
10
1
Mr. Phillips. I did not.
2
Mr. Schwarz.
Did you know Jack Ruby?
3
Mr. Phillips. No, I did not.
4
Mr. Schwarz.
Do youknow him under the name of Ruben-
5
stein?
6
Mr. Phillips. I did not.
7
Mr. Schwarz. What did you do between your work in Cuba
8
and the Chile matter which you were going to spend most of your
9
time on?
10
Mr. Phillips.
After the Bay of Pigs business I went to
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Mexico in late in 1961, and remained in Mexico until the very
early part of 1965, when I was assigned to the Dominican
Republic as chief of Station
Mr. Schwarz. And then
Mr. Phillips. I stayed in the Dominican Republic until
the summer of 1967.
And after that I returned to Washington and became
the Chief of Cuban Operations through 1969.
In 1970 I went to Rio de JanierodaseStation Chief And
20
21
in 1971, I suffered the traumatic shock of being moved to
Brasilia from Rio de Janiero.
22
In 1972 I went to Venezuela as the Chief of Station
23
And in the summer of 1973 I was asked to return as Chief of
24
the then Western Hemisphere Division.
25
Mr. Schwarz.
And is that the position you held until
TOP SECRET
NW 50955 DocId:32282005 Page 2

TOP SECRET
14
1
or the other which would enable you to form a judgment as
2
3
4
5
to his attitude toward either the subject of assassination or
the question as to what kind of an explicit order would be
necessary in order to justify Agency actions to actually
assassinate some one.
6
Mr. Phillips. No, because I never heard Mr. Helms even
7
8
get that close to the edge of such talk about such and such an
option or possibility, I never heard him talk that way.
9
10
Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever hear anybody in the Agency
talk that way?
11
Mr. Phillips.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Under traumatic conditions I have heard
human beings maybe with a few drinks or something like that
saying, my God, we would be better off if so and so were
bumped off or something.
But I have never heard two officers sit down and
seriously talk about such an option. And if anyone has ever
said that, it is the same way some people might get out of line
and say almost anything.
19
Mr. Schwarz.
Did you ever hear, in connection with
20
21
22
the Chile operation, that certain Chilean officers, specifi-
cally a Major Marshall, report reported to the CIA that they intended
to assassinate Allende?
23
Mr. Phillips. It was five years ago. But as I recall,
24
Major Marshall said a number of things. He was what I think
25
of as a wild man.
I seem to recall something about, yes, a
TOP SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32282005 Page 3

TOP SECRET
30
1
Mr. Schwarz.
And you offered through Colonel Wimert,
2 whom we will come to in a moment, $50,000 if they could
Mr. Phillips. That is true.
Mr. Schwarz. And subsequently you provided to the Val-
3
accomplish it, didn't you?
4
Mr. Phillips. I think that was the correct sum, yes.
5
mr. Schwarz. And you gave them prior to their attempt
6
on the 19th of October some tear gas and some gas masks to
7
help accomplish the kidnapping?
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
enzuela group some machine guns, didn't you?
Mr. Phillips. That is ture.
Mr. Schwarz. And those were going to be used in a
kidnapping effort by the Valenzuela group, and you knew that,
didn't you?
Mr. Phillips. I recall that they were going to be
used by the group, and that kidnapping was a part of their
plans. I can't recall that they said they needed them spe-
cifically for the kidnapping. I do recall that the reason was
the automatic reaction from Latin America is, why do people
need arms when they have got arms everywhere all over Latin
America.
And they said something about, their own arms could be
identified, and they needed some that couldn't be identified.
I don't recall if it was specifically mentioned that it was
just for that. It was certainly understood that they might
TOP SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32282005 Page 4

44
Consequently, I personally made this proposal, that we
establish what I called a false flag base of people that would
go from outside, and should there be any sort of flap, the
chances of linking it to the U.S. Government would be much
less, because they would appear to be from another nationality.
is
Mr. Schwarz. I would like to read to you a cable
this cable of 27 September in the Senator's book? I know that
he asked for it after I came over.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Mr. Treverton.
It is not.
10
Mr. Schwarz. I am going to read from a cable which
11
unfortunately is not in your book, but the key part is
12
relatively simple.
13
This is a cable, Mr. Phillips, dated September 27, 1970,
14
and it is signed by yourself and Mr. Broe. And it is sent to
15
16
17
18
the Station in Chile, and it contains the following about the
purposes of setting up the false flag office
Mr. Phillips. We call it a base.
Mr. Schwarz. False flag bases: "Each member of base
19
will enter and leave Chile with falst documents and operate as
20
a representative of his country rather than as anAmerican".
21
That is right, isn't it?
22
Mr. Phillips. That is true.
23
Mr. Schwarz. Continue:
24
"Having at least one key Brazilian and one key Argentinian
25 would be vital, and we have candidates."
NW 50955 DocId: 32282005 Page 5
TOP SECRET

IUP SECRET
45
1
And you did that.
2
Mr. Phillips.
Yes.
3
Mr. Schwarz.
And then it goes on as follows:
"These
4
officers will perform the delicate shows with great flap
5
6
potential which cannot be done by Station personnel or any
Chilean."
7
8
That is right, isn't it?
Mr. Phillips. That is true.
9
Mr.Schwarz. And by flap potential you meant exposure?
10
Mr. Phillips. Contacting screwballs such as Marshall,
11 that sort of thing.
12
Mr. Schwarz.
But generally pursuing the Track II
13
activities?
14
Mr. Phillips. That is right.
15
Mr. Schwarz. Continuing: "An example. We have can-
16
17
18
19
20
21
didates who can successfully pose as Brazilian intelligence
officers." You did that, didn't you?
Mr. Phillips. Yes.
Mr. Schwarz. And this goes on: "If he approached, funded
and ran a Chilean General, any flap would be a Brazilian one".
Mr. Phillips. Yes.
22
Mr. Schwarz. So the scheme was that not only would
23
the U.S. not be blamed, but other countries like Brazil would
24
be blamed if something went wrong.
25
Mr. Phillips. Yes, this is particularly sensitive to me,
:
TOP SECRET
NW 50955 DocId:32282005 Page 6

TOP SECRET
46
1
because my daughter happens to be married to a Brazilian
2
foreign service officer! However, that was it. It was a
3
devious move. It was the final result
the idea being that
4
if such a flap did occur, someone would think it was someone
5
other than the U.S.
The idea of false flag operations is
6
not a new one. The idea I had of going to someone and saying,
7
8
why don't you be a spy for us, I don't work for the Soviets,
is not true.
9
But this is sort of new, the fact that action agents
10
should pose as others.
And yes, it is devious, but that
11
was the idea.
12
Senator Hart of Colorado.
Mr. Phillips, what were
13
14
their instructions if they were to be caught? Were they to go
to their death swearing they were Brazilians or whatever?
15
16
17
18
19
20
Mr. Phillips. I don't think it was quite that dramatic,
Senator. They came to Washington before they went down. And
I briefed them,and I think what I said to them was, this
is going to be a tough and sensitive one, and you don't have
to go if you don't want to, because you culd get in real trouble.
And if you get in trouble, I am not sure we can help
21
you.
22
So, they shrugged their shoulders and went.
23
Mr. Schwarz. Did you tell the Brazilians that you were
24
sending someone down to pose as a Brazilian, and his instruc-
25
tions were that if he were caught he was to continue to pose
NW 50955 DocId:32282005 Page 7
TOP SECRET

47
1
as a Brazilian and the Brazilians were approached?
2
Mr. Phillips.
It never occurred to us in our wildest
15
dreams to do that.
4
Mr. Schwarz.
I suppose the relationships between con-
5
6
7
8
9
tinuing intelligence services were things that were
very important to preserve, and that we had very close and
delicate relationships with the otherfintelligence services.
Mr. Phillips. We do. And if there had been such a
man the Brazilians would be quite unhappy with us. But I
thought that was better than letting the world know that was
11 a U.S. Citizen down there.
10
12
Mr. Schwarz. You go on in the cable of September 27
to say this:
"Headquarters believes this false flag was manned by
officers who have repeatedly proved their ability to operate
and recruit under false colors, will give Station great flexi-
bility in handling delicate and fast-moving situations secure-
ly."
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
So, the use of false flag persons, at least judging
20
from this cable, is something repeatedly done by the CIA?
21
22
23
Mr. Phillips. Yes, and by all intelligence services
not all, but all major intelligence services. If you are living
overseas and a man comes up to you and says, hey, I see you
24
are a Marxist, and a man comes up and says, I am from Havana
25
and we would like you to work with the Cuban intelligence
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1
service, he might not be from Havana, he might be from the
2
Soviets, from us, or from the Brazilians.
13
4
Mr. Schwarz.
So, it is not an unusual practice.
Incidentally, you just let drop one thing
5
6
in your testimony a moment ago. You said that in your 25-year
involvement with intelligence matters you had been bothered
7
8
by your activities on only two occasions, one of which was
Chile.
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
And then you said what the other one was. What was that?
Mr. Phillips. I was in Washington attending the Chiefs
of Station course, which is a training course for people who
are going out on their first assignment as Chief of Station.
When President Johnson decided to send 22,000 Marines
to the Dominican Republic, it occurred to me that in order to
protect and evacuate American citizens, that that job might
have been done with 400 Marines. I was scheduled to go there
17
18
wanted to be associated with something like that. But I de-
19
20
as the Chief of Station. And I just wasn't sure that I
cided, well, I suppose President Johnson knows what he is
doing, I will go I am going to go along. So, I did go
21
along.
22
Senator Schweiker.
One question on your differentiation
23
between where you drew a personal commitment line on assassin-
24
ations, but not overthrow. I have trouble quite understanding
25
it, because as I understand Chile, the plot was to overthrow
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10P SECRET
55
1
Mr. Phillips.
There is no question that I could under-
2
3
stand why anyone concerned with world affairs, looking at
Chile and what was happening there, would be concerned.
4
Salvadore Allende made his first statement saying that
5
6
he was a Socialist and wanted to change the order some 32
years beforehe was elected.
7
8
Over the years he made it quite clear that he was an ar-
dent socialist.
Before this decision was made I believe that
9
10
11
we had a visit from a man who had the code name of Ariel, he
was a Cuban intelligence officer. The Cubans were moving in
rapidly.
The influence was great. I think that they saw a lot
12
13
14
at stake, another Cuba in Latin America type of thing, the
same thing perhaps that motivated President Johnson to send
22,000 rather than 400.
15
So, I can understand why they
thought this was going,
16
in the long strategic sense, in the
long range against our
17
interests.
But that is an assumption.
18
19
It is true that Allende very definitely made it clear
that he wanted to turn Chile into a Marxist state. The differ-
20
21
22
23
ence was that Allende refused to take Fidel Castro's advice
and use violence. As I understand it, Fidel Castro went to
Chile and said, if you want your revolution to last you are
going to have to use violence.
24
I found it interesting to read in this morning's paper
25 where someone from Portugal came back from Cuba and said,
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1
2
activities?
Mr. Phillips. No, sir. I was the Station Chief in
59
3
4
Rio de Janiero in Brazil, and was called back in 1970 for
six or seven weeks for what we are referring to as Track II.
5
6
7
8
Senator Mondale. Now, in that position you familiarized
yourself with the Chilean government, Allende and so on,
and tried to become as expert as you could in the political
forces and so on?
9
Mr. Phillips.
Yes. And in addition to that, Senator,
10
11
one of the reasons I was called back was that I had lived
for many years in Chile, so I knew something about it.
12
Senator Mondale. And it is your judgment as I think I
14
15
16
.17
13 just heard, that although Allende was a Marxist, and espoused
Marxism, he also said he wanted to achieve this through the
democratic process, and although there was some rough stuff
on the press, and so on, essentially that was the course he
was pursuing, is that correct?
18
Mr. Phillips.
I don't recall that he said it, but
19
he indeed acted that way.
20
Senator Mondale. But in fact the course he was pur-
21
suing was an attempt to achieve the Marxist philosophy with
22
the population support under constitutional system?
23
Mr. Phillips.
Yes, essentially that is true, sir.
24
Senator Mondale.
Thank you.
25
Mr. Schwarz.
I would like to read to you in connection
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1
assignment by the President and by the White House?
2
3
4
5
6
Mr. Phillips. Senator, it doesn't make any difference
today. On the contrary, since Watergate the people say, why h
should we? Before Watergate it was another ball game.
The President was the Commander in Chief in every sense of the
word.
7
8
And you said, who am I, a GS-15 bureaucrat, to say that
we shouldn't do this? But that has changed since Watergate.
9
Senator Hart of Colorado.
10
One other question.
I call your attention in our briefing books to what is
11
12
13
Tab C, a cable which has your name at the end of it dated 21
September 1970, page 3 of 7. Are you an author or co-author
of that cable?
14
Mr. Phillips. I believe I was the authenticating
15
officer, yes.
16
Senator Hart of Colorado.
What does that mean?
17
Mr. Phillips. That meant that the signature on the
18
right of those cables is someone that is the authenticating
19
20
officer in a sense, here is a fellow that is supposed to know
the situation.
21
22
23
Senator Hart of Colorado. But who wrote it, I guess
is what I am after.
Mr. Phillips. I would guess that this cable was probably
24
written by Mr. Poinzio, and perhaps myself, perhaps it was
25
joint. But Mr. Poinzio wrote an awful lot of them. But by
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:
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IP SCUREI
66
1
putting my signature on the authenticating part I said I was
2
a part of it. And then, of course, the releasing officer is
3
the one that accepts the responsibility.
4
Senator Hart of Colorado.
Page 3 of 7 which has
5
the paragraph identified as the paragraph F contains the follow-
6
ing sentence or part of a sentence: You suggest sending
7
us cables outlining objectives and course of events, et
8
cetera, and he said, always conditioned by the fact that we have
9
10
to keep our feet in the mud of practicality, and our eyes
on the stars.
11
12
Mr. Phillips.
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
What does that mean in Agency talk?
Senator, I want to assure you with real
seriousness that I am not the author of that phrase.
Senator Hart of Colorado. It must have caught your eye,
however.
Mr. Phillips. It did catch my eye. If this was indeed
a joint venture, I can promise that that was Dino Poinzio's
contribution, and if you ever meet him you will understand
why. He was addicted to picturesque speech. And looking
back, all I can say is that it probably went out at four
o'clock in the morning, and we were very tired, and I just
didn't want to argue about that phrase, and I let it go. I
21
22
23
am not sure what it means even now.
24
SEnator Hart of Colorado.
Neither am I. But it seems
25
to describe a lot of what we have heard around here for the
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76
1
Now, I read that as Helms' position being that the
2
3
4
5
assassination of Schneider was something which presented the
opportunity for the very thing that the U.S. wished to have
done.
Do you agree with me?
6
Mr. Phillips. No, I can't agree with you on that. I am
7
8
9
10.
11
12
13
14
not sure about the suggestion from the language. But I will
tell you the immediate reaction in our little task force when
the word came that Schneider was dead, that is it, it is finished
Knowing Chileans, the moment that that violence occurred,
Chileans, with the possible exception of a nut such as
Marshall, immediately said, this is it, that is enough. There
was still that tradition over the years. And I think that the
moment we heard of it and we discussed it we said, that is
15
it, there will be no more. In many countries in Latin America
16
17
18
that would have been the signal for further action, weakness,
and so forth. But in this case it was the end of the
business.
19
20
Mr. Schwarz. I want to run through with you the activi
ties which were being undertaken with the Valenzuela group
21
and with the Viaux group. In the case of Viaux, was that one
22
23
of the assignments that the false flag officers had?
Mr. Phillips. Yes.
24
Mr. Schwarz. And in the case of Valenzuela, was that
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25 one of the assignments that Colonel Wimert had?
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77
1
Mr. Phillips.
Wimert Yes, I believe it was Colonel
2
Wimert that was in touch with that group.
15
3
Mr. Schwarz.
And the two teams worked in tandem,
4
didn't they?
5
Mr. Phillips.
Are you referring to Chilean teams?
6
Mr. Schwarz.
No, the false flag team and colonel
7
Wimert.
8
Mr. Phillips. Only in the sense that there might have
9
10
11
been some central direction from the office or from headquar-
ters. I don't believe that anyone of the false flaggers had
the slightest idea that Colonel Wimert was working with us.
12
13
And I don't believe that Colonel Wilmert -- I don't know that
Colonel Wimert knew about them.
14
15
So, no, they didn't work in tandem, except in sense of
direction from the Station.
16
Mr. Schwarz.
Headquarters down there, and you in
17
Washington, were working with both the Valenzuela groupand
18
the Viaux group?
19
Mr. Phillips. Yes, sir.
20
21
Senator Hart of Colorado. Are you in a chain here,
counsel?
22
Mr. Schwarz. I am in a chain, but it is easily interrup-
23
tible.
24
Senator Hart of Colorado.
Mr. Phillips, did we
25
chronologically
maybe the staff can answer that, I am just
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92
1
2
Viaux group was really acting in order to carry out step one
of the Valenzuela group's plan?
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Mr. Phillips. Yes, to address this point specifically.
Obviously when the guns were passed through colonel Wimert
and the death occurred so soon after, immediately we
thought they probably used those guns. It was then when we
read the press reports that General Schneider died from hand-
gun wounds. And that was the first time we thought we could
really be sure in our own mind that it wasn't directly
the Valenzuela group using those guns.
Mr. Schwarz. What about the gas masks that had
been furnished earlier? WAsn't there evidence that there
were gas masks in the care of the persons who attempted to
abduct General Schneider?
Mr. Phillips. I don't recall. There may very well have
been, but I am not real sure about that.
Mr. Schwarz. I am going to go to another area, which
is the relationship with Colonel Wimert. If there are any
questions on the relationship between the two groups.
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
these various conspirators, it says:
"Valenzuela meets with
25
US Army attache and gives him a 15 point plan for coup to be
TOP SECRET
Senator Hart of Colorado. Concerning the October 19
attempts, under Tab 4 on page 7 of the longer memorandum
by Dianne LaVoy under October 18 there is reference to a cable
A66 dated October 19. And concerning the connection of
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93
1
2
3
15
4
5
6
7
8
9
carried out on October 19. The Huerth, who was head of the
Carabineros, witting of the above plan, has promised to keep
the Carabineros away from the Schneier houseto assure that the
abduction will not be interferred with. General Viaux is
knowledgeable of the above operation, but is not directly
involved."
What do you think "not directly involved" refers to?
Why not just not involved?
Mr. Phillips. I think that probably referred to what
10
11
I was saying before, that in these situations it is not very
unusual that there is not some talk that everybody has a cousin
12
that works with some group type of thing.
13
And I believe that it must refer to that.
14
Mr. Schwarz. Taking the actual cable, is the actual
15
cable in the Senator's books?
16
Mr. Inderfurther.
No.
17
Mr. Schwarz. Let me read the full text of that para-
18
19
graph from the cable. It is a cable apparently dated 19
October on the subject of General Viaux:
20
21
directly involved.
"General Viaux, knowledgeable of above operation, but not
He has been sent to Vina to stay with
22
prominent physician.
Will be seen in public places during 19
23
and 20 October to demonstrate fact that above operation is
24
25
not his doing. Will be allowed to return to Santiago at end of
week."
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94
1
2
15
3
4
Now, I can't read that language any way other than
meaning that the Valenzuela group and the Viaux group were in
close cooperation, that was part of the abduction plan, it
was agreed between the two that Viaux would appear would
5
be out of town so that he would not appear to be involved.
6
7
8
And you have to read that, do you not, as meaning that there
was a close cooperation on this effort between the two groups.
Mr. Phillips. Yes, I think you do have to read it that
9
way.
10
Miss Culbreth.
Would you identify that paper more
11
than just the statement?
12
Mr. Phillips. Cable sent to headquarters A66.
13
Mr. Schwarz. No. A66, eyes only to
14
Mr. Inderfurth.
DCOS, which was Becksher.
15
Mr. Treverton. It is Tab M, it is in the book.
16
Mr. Schwarz. I think we ought to mark that as an ex-
17
hibit.
18
19
(The document referred to was
marked Phillips Exhibit No. 2
20
for identification.)
21
22
23
24
25
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101
1
As for the narrow part of your question, by all means
2
it is a bad way to do business.
3
מו
Senator Schweiker.
Go ahead.
4
Mr. Schwarz.
Picking up on Senator Schweiker's line
5
6
of quesioning, would you show the witness Tab A, the docu-
ment Tab A.
7
8
9
10
It is a memorandum for the record by Mr. Broe dated 17
September, and then that is crossed out and it says 16 Sep-
tember, "Subject, Genesis of Project".
Incidentally, what was the code name for this project?
11 Was it FU Belt?
12
Mr. Phillips. Beltway or FU Belt, one of the two.
13
14
Mr. Schwarz. Does FU stnd for anything in particular?
Mr. Phillips. Chile. So it would be FU. The first two
15
letters there indicate a geographical araa. So it would beba
16 lot of different ones, but that would mean Chile. FU Belt
17 means Chile. Belt means nothing.
18
Mr. Schwarz.
Everybody keeps saying that so many of
19
these things mean nothing. Who is responsible for these
20
names?
21
Mr. Phillips.
There is somebody who is supposed to have
22
a big liest to make sure that they were not duplicated.
23
And I think sometimes there is a pixie-like quality that comes
24
out in those things.
25
Senator Schweiker. That is an understatement, to call
NW 50955 DocId:32282005 Page 19

1
it pixie-like.
2
Mr. Phillips.
IUP SECRET
But many times the cryptonums mean ab-
solutely nothing, they have no meaning at all.
4
Senator Schweiker.
SRRIFLE, ROGUE ELEPHANT
5
Mr. Phillips. I am sorry, sir.
6
Senator Schweiker.
We have come across a few other good
7
ones.
8
9
10
11
Mr. Schwarz. I don't know if you have ever seen that
document, and it doesn't matter. But the end of paragraph 2
indicates that the instructions from the President concluded:
"The Agency is to carry out this mission without
12 coordination with the Department of State or Defense".
13
Mr. Phillips.
Yes.
14
Mr. Schwarz.
And that was your instruction?
15
Mr. Phillips.
That is correct.
16
Mr. Schwarz. Now, in fact, of course, you did use in
17
Chile a man called Colonel Wimert.
18
Mr. Phillips. Yes.
19
Mr. Schwarz.
And he was in the Defense Department?
20
Mr. Phillips.
That is correct.
21
Mr. Schwarz.
And he was assigned
he was instructed
22
23
to take his instructions only from the CIA inChile, is that
right?
24
Mr. Phillips. Yes.
25
Mr. Schwarz. And he was instructed indeed not to tell
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102

4
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103
1
his superior in Chile, the man who was in charge of the
2
defense attache system down there?
3
Mr. Phillips. That is true, sir.
Mr. Schwarz. Wimert was the man from the Army and then
5
6
there was someone else in the Air Force, the Navy, and there
was a boss?
7
Mr. Phillips. That is right.
8
Mr. Schwarz.
And Wimert was told not to tell that boss?
9
Mr. Phillips.
I believe that is true, yes.
10
Mr. Schwarz.
Now, how did it happen that Colonel Wimert
11 came to work for and under the direction of the CIA?
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Mr.157-10004-10095
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Date: 06/08/94
Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER: 157-10004-10095

RECORDS SERIES :
REPORT
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
ALLEGED CUBAN PLAN TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT OF PANAMA

DATE: 03/17/64
PAGES: 1

SUBJECTS:
CUBAN PLOT TO ASSASSANATE PRESIDENT OF PANAMA
PANAMA

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS: 1A, DONOR REST., REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS: X
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/09/94

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NW 50955 DocId:32201984 Page 1

---

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New Orleans, Louisiana
March 17, 1964

ALLEGED CUBAN PLAN TO
ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT OF
PANAMA

At 4:55 PM, March 17, 1964, Orlando Piedra,
formerly connected with Federal Police in Cuba and
presently residing New Orleans, Louisiana, advised
that about one week ago he received information from
a source in Cuba whom he considers reliable that Castro
is not satisfied with the way things are going in Panama
and for that reason plans to have the President of Panama
assassinated to create additional uprisings in that
country. Piedra advised that he furnished the above
information by letter to Colonel Bolivar Ballarino,
Chief of the National Guard of Panama whom he has known
for years. Piedra declines to identify the source and
has no additional information to report.

This document contains neither recommendations
nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not
to be distributed outside your agency.

This will confirm information orally furnished
Mr. J. J. Kelly, State Department, and Mr. Jones Merriman,
Central Intelligence Agency on March 17, 1964, by
A. J. Decker of this Bureau. This will also confirm data
furnished orally to Colonel Graham E. Schmid, Department
of the Army; Major William Boya, Department of the
Air Force; and Mr. Don Gorham, Department of the Navy,
on March 19, 1964, by G. A. Day of this Bureau.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-
nation outside your Committee. Use is limited to official proceedings by
your Committee and the contents cannot be warranted or disclosed to unauthorized person-
nel without the express approval of the FBI.

NW 50955 DocId:32201984 Page 2
157-10004-10144

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER: 157-10004-10144

RECORDS SERIES :
MEMORANDUM

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
ΤΟ :

TITLE :
MEETING WITH THE WARREN COMMISSION ON 12 MARCH 1964

DATE: 03/12/64
PAGES: 5

SUBJECTS :
CIA MEETING WITH WARREN COMMISSION
HELMS, RICHARD
ROCCA, RAYMOND
WARREN COMMISSION
OSWALD, LEE HARVEY

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS: 1A, 1B, 1C, DONOR REST., REFERRED
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DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/14/94

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Date: 07/14/94
Page:1

daily movements while in Mexico City nor could they confirm the date
of his departure or his mode of travel. The original assumption that
he had returned by bus could not be proven. Several possibilities were
discussed whereby the Commission could fill in the gaps of its investi-
gation of the Mexican phase. The suggestion was made that the most
effective way of resolving the questions they had would be to have a
member of the Commission visit Mexico City and discuss the issues on
the spot with those American and Mexican officials directly concerned.
Mr. Helms noted that it would be possible for a member of the Com-
mission to visit our Chief of Station who would then be able to work out
with the Warren Commission staff member the best way to handle inter-
views with Mexican police officials, particularly if it is desired that
these interviews be informal in nature. Our Chief of Station would also
be able to put the Warren Commission staff member in contact with the
FBI officials and Immigration and Naturalization Service officers stationed
in Mexico City. Mr. Helms cautioned that our Chief of Station would be
under State Department cover and that it would be proper to advise the
Department of the planned visit and upon arrival to meet briefly with the
Ambassador or Minister Counselor before proceeding to work out details
with the CIA Chief of Station.

8. In connection with the Mexican phase of the investigation, mem-
bers of Mr. Rankin's staff questioned Mr. Helms and Mr. Rocca regarding
the extent of the CIA file on Oswald for the period 8 October to 22 November
1963. They questioned the sanitized extracts which they had been shown
and wondered if there were not more. Mr. Rocca summarized the ma-
terials that had come to the attention of the Secret Service, or had been
disseminated to the Secret Service, immediately after the assassination.
Mr. Rocca said there was not additional substantive information and that
the sanitized version seen by the Commission constituted the sum of our
holdings. Mr. Helms then explained that as a matter of practice we did
not release actual copies of our messages because they contained code-
words and digraphs which would be unintelligible to a person not familiar
with them. He added, however, that he would be happy to show the file
with the original messages to any staff member of the Warren Commission
who might come to visit him at Langley.

9. The question of why no action was taken by other agencies of
the government after their receipt of CIA information that Oswald was
in contact with the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City was next
discussed. Mr. Rankin and members of his staff clearly felt that this
was a crucial question which needed careful review. They appeared to

believe that the information on Oswald was unusual enough to have
caused recipients to take special measures which might conceivably
have led to a closer scrutiny of Lee Harvey Oswald and his movements.
Mr. Helms pointed out that the information on Oswald's visit to the
Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City came from telephone inter-
cepts which were placed on both embassies. These intercepts were
recorded on tape and reviewed by persons at our Station for any infor-
mation affecting U. S. security. Such information is routinely passed
to other agencies and entered in CIA files. Given the enormous bulk
which is involved, the tapes are not kept on file but erased after a brief
period of time. Thus the information on Oswald was similar to that
provided on other American citizens who might have made contacts of
this type. In Oswald's case, it was the combination of visits to both
Cuban and Soviet Embassies which caused the Mexico City Station to
report this to Headquarters and Oswald's record of defection to the
Soviet Union which prompted the Headquarters dissemination. At the
conclusion of his remarks on this subject, Mr. Helms specified that
the information he had given Mr. Rarkin was extremely sensitive and
that the very existence of these telephone intercepts had to be very
carefully protected.

10. The Commission, Mr. Rankin said, would be interested in
any information held by CIA on Jack Ruby. Mr. Rankin said the Com-
mission staff had prepared a roundup on Ruby, a copy of which he handed
Mr. Helms. He said he would appreciate any file reflections or comments
that CIA analysts might make on this material. Mr. Rankin and members.
of his staff then discussed Ruby's confirmed trip to Havana in 1959. The
Commission has received information from an unspecified source that
Ruby was in Havana again in 1963 under a Czech passport. Mr. Rankin
asked whether CIA could provide any assistance in verifying this story.
Mr. Helms replied that CIA would be limited in its possibility of assist-
ing, to air manifest checks in Mexico, These would be carried out he
said.

11. Mr. Helms was then asked if CLA had done any follow up to
its original telegraphic dissemination of the information on Oswald's
visits to the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City. Mr. Helms
replied that there had been no CIA action following our initial dissemi-
nation. Mr. Willems then asked if there were any liaison problems
faced by CIA in its efforts to deal with other agencies in matters affect-
ing internal security. Mr. Helms replied that there were always under-
standable human problems in conducting any liaison on any subject but
157-10004-10270
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AGENCY: SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10004-10270

RECORDS SERIES :
MEMORANDUM

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
ΤΟ :

TITLE :
ROBERT MAHEU

DATE: 00/00/00
PAGES: 2

SUBJECTS:
MAHEU, ROBERT
OFFICE OF SECURITY
CIA

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS: 1A, 1B, DONOR REST., REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS: X
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/01/94

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(TD)

SUBJECT: Robert Maheu Foreign Head of State

1. In connection with the official State visit of
the
a foreign Head of State in 1959
Office of Security arity was requested to render special support
during the Los Angeles zad New York phases of the tour.
According to personnel,
the foreign official was especially desirous of
fonale companionshis during his Los Angeles visit and it
was requested that appropriate arrangezents be made tarough
a controlled source of the Office in order to assurema
Satisfied visit.

2. On 3 April 1959 Mr. Robort Maheu a cleared Office
of Security contact, was asked to arrange a party for the foreign
official at Los Angeles, California. This was done by
Mr. Nabeul through ir. Gregson Bautzer. Mr. Dautzer is a
proninent hos Angeles азголям аnd Hollywood žigure pre
viously granted a covert security approval for use by FB
Division. By pre-arrangement, during the course of this party
the foreign officialvas Introduced to
appare
tino screen and stage actress.. For the duration of the foreign
official's stay in Los Angeles, 3 through 7 April 1959,
and the actress became intiaate &riends. It was indicated
by a CIA employee who was integrated into tho State party,shat
the foreign official desired to continue his friendship vich
the actress and that no ho wished wished to to meet meet with her during his
stay in New York City frou 14 through 18 April 1959.

3. On 13 April 1959 arrangements were made to rent the
home of
an Office of Security source,
at Long Beach, Long Island, for the period 14 through 13
April 1959. Tac nous, was to be used as a confidencial aeegiaz
place for the actress and the foreign-official. At the same ti
the actress was registered at the Hotol Barclay, Ill cast
13th Street, New York City, under an assumed name.

The publicity touching on the
relationship and become more pointed since some publicity
mention had been been made of the Jewish b background of the actress.
On 14 April 1959 a CIA employee and the actress were transport.ed
to tac
home on Long Island which was taken over is
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01469 PROPERTY OF
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---

SECRET
:
the meeting place for the foreign a official and the actress. Later
the same day, by pre-arrangement, stro Department of State
Security Agents, a New York City police lieutenant and
hired chauffeur arrived with the foreign official. The actress
remained at the site through 18 April 1959, and the foreign official
and his party arty visited each evening and remained for about
four to five hours

4. During the stay at the Long Beach site, the actress
discussed the publicity in the case at some length with the
Security representatives. She speculated about the possible
Sources of certain personal information that she felt had
boen leaked to the presso Additionally she spoke of ber
deep feeling for the foreign official & commented on on how how Gregson
Bautzer initially sought her out to serve as a party companion
for the foreign official. At the tine she said she was unclear
as to just what part 5. Bautzer wanted her to play. In
attempting to clarify his case Mr. Bautzer said
employed by the CIA. We want you to go to bed with为运
The actress said she rejected the proposal but finally wont
to the party. She became quite taken with the foreign official and
found him to be most charming.

-5. All personal contacts by Security representatives
in this case were under alias and implied State Department
vaffiliatica There is no record or indication in any of the
files in this case that involves Robert Maheu by name of.
reference. It is believed that Mr. Mahou was never intro-
duced to the actress and as far as can be determinei
Bautzer fronted" for all arrangements. Office of Security
investigation conducted variously frea 25 May through
17 September 1959 of the actress reflected no substantive
derogatory information regarding hero

01470

NW 50955 DocId:32202159 Page 3
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RECORD NUMBER : 157-10004-10280

RECORDS SERIES :
CABLE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

TITLE :
ROBERT MAHEU'S TRANSPORTATION OF PROSTITUTES

DATE: 10/10/57
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
MAHEU, ROBERT
ROBERT A. MAHEU AND ASSOCIATES (RAMA)
PROSTITUTES
FOREIGN LEADERS

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS: 1A, 1B, DONOR REST., REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS: X
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/01/94

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SECRET

Clean Copy of IN 20362
10 October 1957
IN 20362
CITE TRUJ 272
DIRECTOR
CIUDAD TRUJILLO
RE: HDCW 119

1. CIA source called COS urgently 9 Oct and turned over two
documents charging that Robert M. Maheu violated Mann Act in
procuring and transporting prostitutes for a foreign leader during
state visit U. S. 1956, that this done with tacit approval State.
Also charge Maheu with wire tapping OPS against Onassis Shipping
Co in 55, that this done with tacit approval U. S. Government and
known to CIA, State and FBI.

2. COS expressed low interest info but agreed pouch to
CIA.

3. On 8 Oct EMCREEP gave identical documents to DCM who
pouched same 9 Oct to State for action AMB Farland. Told DCM a
high foreign official desires wide distribution U. S. Government
agencies.

4. CIA source believes only possible source above documents
is John Joseph Frank who formerly close to Maheu.

5. FC: DOM objective possibly blackmail U. S. Government,
kill Frank Trial.
END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO KAPOK CABLES.

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SECRET
-2-

H: Would you make that please -- Do you mind my
interrupting?

B: Sure -- go ahead.

H: Make that Soviet Intelligence Branch.

B: -- and he was in charge of the Soviet Intelligence
Branch of the Agency --

H: --which is a lesser position than the other reads
like.

B: All right. He went to Berlin in the Fall of 1952
He came
where he was Station Chief until 1959.
back to Washington in the Fall of 1959 where he stayed until
June of 1963, except for possible short periods of temporary
duty --

H: -- except for several periods of temporary duty.

B: -- except for several periods of temporary duty
abroad. He went to Rome in June 1963 where he
He came back to the Agency
was Station Chief until 1966.
in Washington in 1966 and he retired from the Agency in 1967.
on December 31. Now, Mr. Harvey, does that summarize basically
part of your background, at least that we discussed?

H: That is correct. I would like to add one thing, if I
may. During both the Berlin and Rome periods and for a considerable
period of time in Washington after I returned from Berlin I
was on the roles of the Foreign Service of State, which raises
a little question of propriety. But I want you to know that
in the handling of this.

B: All right. I first asked you with regard to any
knowledge of any assassination plans or plots within
the Agency concerning Patrice Lumumba and you might indicate
what your response was to that, Mr. Harvey.

H: I have no personal knowledge of any such plan or
operation within or on the part of the Agency.

B: I also asked you apart from the question of Fidel
Castro whether or not you had any knowledge of
any assassination plans or plots in the Agency that involved
any other foreign leader.
157-10011-10048 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
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Agency Information
AGENCY: SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER: 157-10011-10048
1
RECORD SERIES : TRANSCRIPT
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Information
ORIGINATOR: SSCIA
FROM:
TO:
TITLE: TESTIMONY OF ROBERT MAHEU
DATE: 07/30/1975
PAGES: 95
SUBJECTS: ACCOMPANIED BY COUNSEL: GALANE, MORTON R.
GIANCANA, SAM
WIRETAPS
MAHEU, ROBERT
ROSELLI, JOHNNY
MAFIA CONNECTION

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: Consulted; 1A; 1B; IC; 3; Donor Restricted
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/19/1994
OPENING CRITERIA :
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v9.1
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157-10011-
10048

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tape b
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
19
1 am not too far off in what I am about to tell you. The contract
2 was structured in such a way that as the bottoms of other
3 companies became obsolete, they could only be replaced with
4 Onassis' tankers. Even ARAMCO had to, by attrition, within a
5 period of four-and-a-half to five-and-a-half years, would have,
6 if their tankers became obsolete, they could only be replaced
7 by Onassis tankers.
8 Our statistics, after having studied the contract and
9 making what we considered to be proper projections, indicated
10 that at the completion of approximately five-and-a-half years,
11 Mr. Onassis would control more dead weight tonnage than the
WARD & PAUL
12 United States controlled in its entirety, that he would control
13 on the high seas annually more oil by tens of thousands of
14 gallons more than were used by all of the Allied nations during
15 the most severe year of the Korean War, that in the first year
16 his profit would be approximately $17 million dollars, that
17 after five-and-a-half years his annual profit would be in the
18 area of $200 million.
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
19 While this analysis is going on, we also found that a
20 million dollar pay-off had been made to one of the top ministers
21 in Saudi Arabia and we had the evidence
22 accounts, in other words, contrary to what a lot of people
23 believe that they can't be broken, even in those days, they were
24 broken and we had the evidence waltth all off the documentation.
25 We then prepared our inputs and presented them to the
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Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
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20
1 National Security Council
2 Senator Huddleston. Of the United States?
3 Mr. Maheu. of the United States, and within a matter,
4 I believe, of forty-eight hours, our State Department
5 denounced the agreement. It was the first time that anyone
6 had actually seen what this meant, and frankly, there was an
7 innate fear that with the initial $17 million, then there would
8 be no way of stopping, I mean, he might go to Venezuela and
9 do the same thing, and there were also other inputs about the
10 background of Mr. Onassis that I would just as soon not make
11 a matter of record, but they were not too favorable, that we
12 presented to the National Security Council verbally but not
13 in writing.
14 Mr. Madigan. Who made the presentation?
15 Senator Schweiker. What subsequently happened then with
16 the Security Council denunciation, et cetera?
17 Mr. Madigan. The State Department denounced the agreement
18 and that same evening we were told that two fof the top-CIA
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
19 officials were on their way to Saudi Arabia.
20 Then I proceeded to dig up the gentleman by the name of
21 Carl Twitchell by virtue of reading about the country, because
22 I'm not about ready to go there and not know about the customs
23 and the formation of the country. I dug up a man by the name
24 of Carl Twitchell who was living in Connecticut who turned out
25 to be the first American who had ever really been accepted by
NW 50955 DocId: 32203816 Page 4
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20
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
1 National Security Council
2 Senator Huddleston. Of the United States?
3 Mr. Maheu. of the United States, and within a matter,
4 I believe, of forty-eight hours, our State Department
5 denounced the agreement. It was the first time that anyone
6 had actually seen what this meant, and frankly, there was an
7 innate fear that with the initial $17 million, then there would
8 be no way of stopping, I mean, he might go to Venezuela and
9 do the same thing, and there were also other inputs about the
10 background of Mr. Onassis that I would just as soon not make
11 a matter of record, but they were not too favorable, that we
WARD & PAUL
12 presented to the National Security Council verbally but not
13 in writing.
14 Mr. Madigan. Who made the presentation?
15 Senator Schweiker. What subsequently happened then with
16 the Security Council denunciation, et cetera?
17 Mr. Madigan. The State Department denounced the agreement
18 and that same evening we were told that two
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
19 officials were on their way to Saudi Arabia.
20 Then I proceeded to dig up the gentleman by the name of
21 Carl Twitchelloby virtue of reading about the country, because
22 I'm not about ready to go there and not know about the customs
23 and the formation of the country. I dug up a man by the name
24 of Carl Twitchell who was living in Connecticut who turned out
25 to be the first American who had ever really been accepted by
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410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
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Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
TOP SECRET
21
1 old King Saud. Mr. Twitchell had spent time in the country
2 as a mining engineer to help them in the exploitation of
3 mines. It was in fact to Carl Twitchell that the old king gave
4 the power of attorney to come to the United States government
5 or come back to the United States and try to form a consortium
6 for the exploitation of oil from which emanated ARAMCO.
7 Carl was the type of man who was only reimbursed for his
8 expenses. I think his total expenses were slightly in excess
9 of $8,000. He didn't even keep the banking and percentage
10 for himself, or a piece of the action, so to speak, and he was
11 highly, highly loved by the Saudis and although the old king
12 was then gone and King Saud, the son, was in power, Mry
13 Twitchell had the same respect and reverence from the present
14 leaders as he did from the father and I convinced Mr. Twitchell
15 that he already had a clearance, a satisfactory clearance,
16 and I convinced him to precede me to Saudi Arabia to try to
17 lay the groundwork.
18 Senator Schweiker. What year was this, roughly?
i
19 Mr. Maheu. This, I believe, was in '54 or '55, yes.
20 Anyway, I finally ended up going to Saudi Arabia, having
21 a meeting with the King's confidential assistant, presenting all
22 of this evidence, frankly at the time not knowing if the King
23 himself had a piece of the action
24 Senator Huddleston. Had some of this evidence come from
25 the wiretap?
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410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
WARD & PAUL
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
TOP SECRET
22
1 Mr. Maheu. That tap was entirely unproductive, entirely
2 unproductive.
3 Senator Schweiker. What happened then at your meeting?
4 Mr. Maheu. Well, it's very interesting, if we could take
5 a little time, I mean, I was scheduled to have the meeting
6 "with the King," but he doesn't show, he stays somewhere else.
7 and the confidential assistant shows up and one trusted
8 minister that he had with Carl Twitchell present.
9 And my meeting was scheduled for 8:00p.m. one night, and
10 this happaned to be the last day that the King was supposed to
11 be in Jidda, he was then leaving for the capital further
12 inland, Jidda being the only major port in Saudi where he
:
13 spends his summers, and they were having a big parade for him,
14 and from the balcony of the hotel, I'm watching the parade go
15 by, and finally the King's car comes and he is arm and arm with
16 the nan on whom I'm going to give the evidence that night, and
17 I frankly was not too comfortable, particularly in view of the
18 fact that in those days and I don't know whether it has
19 changed, but in Saudi, the same document did not give you
20 permission to enter and leave; you had to make application for
21 an exit visa after you arrived, and I was in constant contact
22 with the then-United States Ambassador. He made it very clear
23 that the government approved of everything I was doing, but if
24 something went wrong they could not come to my rescue, I would
25 have to be the fall guy, and I was prepared to do it. That was
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410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
WARD & PAUL
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
TOP SECRET
25
1 Saudi Arabian government would have its flag flying the high
2 seas, and at the time that all of this is going on they are
3 building what then, upon completion of production, had been
4 the biggest tanker in the world at that time, a ship named
5 after the old King, a tanker which was scheduled to go and take
6 a maiden flight and take off, and it turned out the biggest
7 :
problem that we had was to find a save-face gimmick. But
8 finally the whole thing was accomplished, and it took two and
9 a half years to do it.
10 Senator Schweiker. I didn't mean to get you off the
11 track.
12 Mr. Maheu. Well, I'm sorry I am so verbose.
13 Senator Huddleston. You said you bought a paper in
14 Athens? You mean by that you actually bought the paper or just
15 paid them to run the story?
16 Mr. Maheu. We bought a newspaper.
17 You'll have to understand, Senator, that in Rome, in those
18 days, there were fifty newspapers. I mean, the big circulation
19 in those days, big circulation in Rome was 20,000. It's hard
20 for us to visualize that.
21 Senator Huddleston. The CIA supplied the money to buy
22 the newspaper?
23 Mr. Maheu. Yes.
24 Can we go off the record?
25 Senator Schweiker. Yes.
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Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
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30
1 Mr. Liebengood. Was this listening post that you referred
2 to, was that a project that was related to work for the Central
3 Intelligence Agency?
4 Mr. Maheu. I don't believe it was.
5 Mr. Madigan. Did you have any New York assignments other
6 than Onassis that you gave to Frank?
7 Mr. Maheu. I don't remember any.
8 Mr. Madigan. How about Thomas Evans? I may have asked
9 you that yesterday. Do you recall whether he had any relation-
10 ship with your company during the 1950's?
11 Mr. Maheu. I don't remember a Thomas Evans Thomas
12 Evans?
13 Mr. Madigan. A CIA employee.
14 Mr. Maheu. I don't recall his name.
15 Mr. Madigan. I got sidetracked off of my question of
16 whether you recall a prosecution or an investigation of the
17 Onassis wiretap. You may have already have answered that.
18 Mr. Maheu. I think I did, yes.
19 Mr. Madigan. What did you say?
20. Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that I appeared before a
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
21 Grand Jury that was investigating Mr. Frank on another
22 matter.
23 Mr. Madigan. On another matter, but you had no recollection
24 of any investigation of that particular tap?
25 Mr. Maheu. No, I don't.
....
NW 50955 DocId: 32203816 Page 9
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Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
1 Mr. Madigan. Either an investigation of you or Frank or
2 Leone or anyone?
TOP SECRET
31
3 Mr. Maheu. No, I don't.
4 Mr. Madigan. No interviews by the FBI?
5 Mr. Maheu. It's conceivable, but I don't remember it.
6 Mr. Madigan. You don't remember it?
7 Mr. Maheu. No.
8 Mr. Madigan. Let's go off the record.
9 (Discussion off the record.)
tape 2a
10 Mr. Madigan. Did there come a time when you were asked
11 by the Central Intelligence Agency to be involved in a
WARD, & PAUL
12 project which would involve sending a woman by the name of
13 Florence Horn over to a foreign country?
14 Mr. Maheu. Yes, sir.
15 Mr. Madigan. And what were you asked to do with regard
16 to that?
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
17 Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that I was asked to find
18 a woman, preferably from Los Angeles, who would agree to go to
19 a foreign country and under some pretext try to meet the
20. leader of the country and hopefully change his basic philosophies
21 which at the time were thought to be detrimental to the United
22 States, and that they were very, as a result, very seriously
23 jeopardizing the national security of the government of the
24 United States.
25 Mr. Madigan. Did you find such a woman? I
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Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
32
1 Mr. Maheu. Yes, I did.
2 Mr. Madigan. And did the Agency sponsor her trip overseas,
3 that is the CIA?
4 Mr. Maheu. I placed her in touch with a representative
:-
5 of the CIA. He made certain commitments, Financial commitments
6 to her. At the completion of the assignment, she claimed that
7 she had additional funds coming to her which I paid out of my
8 zona pocket, so that I guess a more accurate way of saying it is
9 that the Agency and I sponsored her trip.
10 Mr. Madigan. Did she ever get to meet the foreign leader
11 whom we will call A?
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12 Mr. Maheu. I do not have any recollection.
13 Mr. Madigan. You don't know whether she did or she
14 didn't?
15 Mr. Maheu. I don't have any recollection.
16 Mr. Madigan. Do you know how long she was gone?
17 Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that she was gone for
18 several months:
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
19 Mr. Madigan. And this person is the woman I referred tox
20. earlier by the name of Florence Horn, is that right??
21 Mr. Maheu. That is correct.
22 Mr. Madigan. Now can you date that assignment as sometime
23 in 1956 or '57, does that sound about right, or do you have
24 any recollection of what year it was?
25 Mr. Maheu. I don't have any recollection. It was before
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33
1 1960.
2 Mr. Madigan. It was sometime after you had begun in '54
3 with your Agency operation?
4 Mr. Maheu. That is correct.
5 Mr. Madigan. Or your sponsorship?
6 Mr. Maheu. That is correct.
7 Mr. Madigan. Subsequently, did this Leader "A" come to
8 the United States to your knowledge after this?
9 Mr. Maheu. I don't recall whether he came subsequently or
10 prior to.
11 Mr. Madigan. When the same leader did come to the United
WARD & PAUL
12 States, were you involved in any assignment for the CIA with
13 regard to his presence in the country?
14 Mr. Maheu. Yes, I was.
15 Mr. Madigan. And what was that assignment?
16 Mr. Maheu. I was told by the State Department and the
17 CIA that this leader would be in need of female companions and
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
18 that the government was very much concerned that the type of
19 women that would be secured for him might eventually be very
20. destructive to the national security of the United Statep
21 government unless said women had been cleared by local police
22 departments in several of the cities in which he was scheduled
23 to travel?
24 Mr. Madigan. Who was the Agency representative that gave
25 you this assignment? Did you go through Mr. O'Connell, or was
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34
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
:
1 it someone different?
2 Mr. Maheu. This request emanated from, directly from the
3 State Department.
4 Mr. Madigan. Who in the State Department?
5 Mr. Maheu. Mr. Scott McCloud, who was then Director of
6 the Office of Security and Consular Affairs.
7 Mr. Madigan. Was it coordinated with the CIA, or was this
8 strictly between yourself and the State Department?
9 Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that the CIA was kept
10 apprised, however that the coordination was with the State
11 Department, in connection with the security that was being
WARD & PAUL
12 provided for this leader during his visit to the United States.
13 Mr. Madigan. Did you meet with the State Department or
14 CIA people or both in New York City when the leader arrived
15 there?
16 Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that I met with Security
17 Personnel of the State Department.
18 Mr. Madigan. What did you do in New York for this
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
assignment?
19 (Pause)
20. Mr. Maheu. I don't recall.
21 Mr. Madigan. And did you meet with the New York police
22
23 with regard to the assignment?
24 Mr. Maheu. I don't recall.
25 Mr. Madigan. Did you obtain or send over any females over
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/

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21
22
23
24
25
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Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
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35
1 to the hotel that person. A was staying at??
2 Mr. Maheu. I don't recall.
15
3 Mr. Madigan. Do you recall telling me yesterday that you
4 did send girls over there?
5 Mr. Maheu. No, I don't.
6 Mr. Madigan. Did you travel from New York to any other
7 city with this leader?
8 Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that I did.
9 Mr. Madigan. What occurred when you arrived at the other
cities?
10
11 Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that I contacted the
12 security representatives of the State Department.
13 Mr. Madigan. And after you contacted the security
14 representatives, what were you supposed to do in these other
cities?
15 Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that I, through local
16
17 Police Department officials or law enforcement officials made
18 certain that the women who would gain access to the leader's
19 suite were such that they would not be a security risk insofar
20. as the national security of our government was concerned.
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Mr. Madigan. Were these women that would not be a securit
risk be women who the Police Department had some relationship
with?
Mr. Maheu. I don't know what you mean by relationship,
Mr. Madigan.

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Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
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36
1 Mr. Madigan. You indicated in our discussion yesterday
2 that the women that were allowed access, as you put it to this
3 Leader "A" were to be women that the police would have some
4 control over so that they would not be a possibility of a later
5 blackmail problem with the United States government, is that
6 not correct?
7 Mr. Maheu. That is my recollection, yes.
8 Mr. Madigan. Did you participate in sending these women
9 or providing these women over to the hotel where the leader
10 was staying?
11 Mr. Maheu. I don't recall.
12 Mr. Madigan. Do you recall telling me yesterday that you
13 did?
14 Mr. Maheu. No, I do not.
15 Mr. Madigan. Do you recall telling me yesterday when I
16 asked you whether someone had travelled from city to city, you
17 indicated that you thought maybe one did, but you weren't sure
18 about how many others.
19 Mr. Maheu. That is correct.
20. Mr. Madigan. How many cities did you visit during the
21 trip that this Leader "A" made?
22 Mr. Maheu. Several cities.
23 Mr. Madigan. Now were the women that were provided known
24 to you or represented to you as prostitutes in any of these
25 cities?
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1 Mr. Maheu. I don't recall.
2 Mr. Madigan. Do you recall telling me yesterday that they
3 were?
4 Mr. Maheu. Do you recall yesterday identifying the
5 leader?
6 Mr. Madigan. I do..
7 Let's go off the record.
8 (Discussion off the record.)
9 Mr. Madigan. According to your understanding, Mr. Maheu
10 of the project that you were involved in with the State
11 Department in providing the women to this foreign leader in the
12 various cities starting from New York and going through the
13 other cities he stayed at, do you believe the women that were
14 sent over to his hotel were prostitutes?
15 Mr. Maheu. That they may have been, yes.
16 Mr. Madigan. And you did particpate under instructions
17 of the government, to send these women over to his hotel or to
18 make them available to him at his hotel, not knowing what
19 happened after they got to the hotel?
20. Mr. Maheu. That is correct.
21 Mr. Madigan. And that occurred in New York and the other
22 cities that he stayed at while he was in the United States?
23 Mr.Maheu. That is correct.
24 Mr. Madigan. And as far as these women travelling with
25 you from city to city, your recollection is that one may haver--
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1 Mr. Maheu. No.
2 Mr. Madigan. But, you did not bring a crowd of six or
3 seven.
4 Mr. Maheu. I have no recollection that any woman trave
5 with me, may have travelled independently, but I have no
6 recollection of being on the same plane with any of these
travelled
7 people.
8 Mr. Madigan. You think may have traveled from city to
9 city, or four or five?
10 Mr. Maheu. One may have gone to one further city. That
11 is the best of my recollection.
WARD & PAUL
12 Mr. Madigan. And the others that were provided in each
13 city were sort of local, so that they could be controlled
14 more or less, by the local police?
15 Mr. Maheu. That's my recollection.
16 Mr. Madigan. Is that the theory of the project?
17 Mr. Maheu. That's my recollection.
18 Mr. Madigan. Now with regard to this same leader, did
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
19 you ever receive an assignment from the CIA to produce any
20. film with regard to him?
21 Mr. Maheu. Yes, I did.
22 Mr. Madigan. Do you remember when that assignment was
23 in terms of whether it was before or after this visit to the
24 United States?
25 Mr. Maheu. Subsequent to his visit to the United States
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1 he made a trip to Russia. Our inputs were to the effect that
2 he brought back from Russia with him an attractive, Russian
3 agent, and that his philosophies relative to the United States
4 began to change appreciably and that the security of the United
5 States was in great jeopardy as a result of whatever influence
6 this female agent was able to have upon him.
7 Mr. Madigan. As a result of that, what assignment did you
8 receive, if any, from the CIA?
9 Mr. Maheu. As a result, I was asked if well, as a
10 result I was provided with pictures reflecting the quarters
11 allegedly reflected the quarters to which she was assigned
12 during his trip to Russia, photographs of the female agent
13 and I was asked if I could find some contacts in Los Angeles
14 who could produce a set resembling the headquarters reflected
15 ron the pictures, a woman who looked like the female agent, a
16 male who looked like the leader, and taker some pictures.
17 subsequently showing them together within the confines of the
18 alleged headquarters.
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19 Mr. Madigan. Did you recruit anybody to be in this
20. film?
21 Mr. Maheu. Yes, I did.
22 Mr. Madigan. Who was that?
23 Mr.Maheu. I recruited a man who was working for me in
24 Tucson, Arizona by the name of Charles Kays, a female agent
25 who was known to - I mean a female who was known to the law
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1 Fenforcement authorities in Los Angeles, and who resembled the
40
2 Russian female agent.
3 Mr. Madigan. Did you ever advertise in the newspaper for
4 that film?
5 Mr. Maheu. I have no recollection. I can't believe that
6 where you would find the proper subjects, I don't believe so
7 no.
8 Mr. Madigan. Did the CIA provide the set for that,
9 did you do the backdrop and all that business making it looks
10 like it was in Moscow?
11 Mr. Maheu. The CIA provided me with photographs, and I
12 secured the services of a person in Los Angeles who was in the
13 industry on behalf of the CIA,
14 Mr. Madigan. Was that Bautzer?
15 Mr. Maheu. No, sir.
16 Mr. Madigan. Who was that?
17 Mr. Maheu. 'First I discussed the matter with Howard
18 Hughes and he recommended that I contact Mr. Larry Crosby, which
19 I did.
20. Mr. Madigan. Did Hughes have to approve your being
21 involved in this?
22 Mr. Maheu. I am not sure he had to approve. I was just
23 seeking his advice.
24 Mr. Madigan. You were more or less just telling him about
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25 it?
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Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
1 Mr. Maheu. I beg your pardon?
3 2 Mr. Madigan. You were just telling him about it?
Mr. Maheu. No, Mr. Hughes had been in the industry, he
4 had been in movie studios, I thought he could be helpful to
5 this contract.
6 Mr. Madigan. Did you deal with O'Connell with regard to
7 this contract or with somebody else?
8 Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that I dealt with Mr.
9 O'Connell and Colonel Edwards.
10 Mr. Madigan. Colonel Edwards?
11 Who was this person, the female who was known
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12 to
13 Mr. Maheu... I really don't remember. The one and only
14 time I have seen her in my life.
15 Mr. Madigan... could this film have been described as a
16 pornographic film, or was it something less than that?
17 Mr. Maheu. By today's technology, I would say definitely
18 no.
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19 Mr. Madigan. You say this woman was known to the law
20 enforcement authorities: Was she suspected by yourself to be
21 La prostitute?
22 Mr. Maheu. Not at all
23 Mr.. Madigan. Not at all?
24 Mr. Maheu. Not at all.
25 Mr. Madigan. She was just an actress of some kind?
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1 Mr. Maheu. I don't recall, but my recollection is sho
42
2 was highly respected by the law enforcement authorities.
3 Whether she was an informant for them or what the relationship
4 was, I don't know.
5 Mr. Madigan. So you produced one film? One film
6 7 cannister as a result of this, movie film?
Mr. Maheu. Very short.
8 Mr. Madigan. Did you make any still photographs or
9 anything like that?
10 Mr. Maheu. No, I did not.
11 Mr. Madigan. And then you turned the film over to the
12 CIA?
13 Mr. Maheu. That is correct.
14 Mr. Madigan. And thereafter do you know what happened
15 to it?
16 Mr. Maheu. No, I do not.
17 Mr. Madigan. Were you told what was going to be done
18 with it?
19 Mr. Maheu. I was told that the stills would be distributed
20 in the country of the leader in an attempt to embarrass him
21 and hopefully as a157-10011-10083

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER: 157-10011-10083

RECORDS SERIES :
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION
FROM :
TO :
TITLE :
DESPOSITION/TRANSCRIPT OF STURBITTS, WILLIAM C.

DATE: 04/16/75
PAGES: 114

SUBJECTS :
DEPOSITION OF STURBITTS, WILLIAM C.

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : S
RESTRICTIONS: REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS: P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93

OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS:
SSCI Box 292, Folder 1

Date: 10/06/93
Page:1

NW 50955 DocId: 32203851 Page 1

AS SANITIZED
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
6 APR
1--262
5-7
ORIGINAL

(AIE)
SSCI Box 292, Folder 1
Record Number 157-10011-10083

Deportion of
SU
OF

Wed:sday 16, 1975
Langley, Virginia
WASHINGTON, D.C.
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Phone
DocF999
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Spoken
volant-words fly-
scripta
manent
written
words endure
TM
FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA
4055 Chain Bridge Rd., 22030
Phone
(703) 273-2400

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SECRET
CONTESTS

Deposicion of
William C. Sturbitts
Examination by Counsel
For the Commission

(AFTERNOON SESSION Page 58)
William C. Sturbitts (Resumed)
7
0
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1.
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A

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CLENNING
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E
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...ا

SECRET
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

ON CIA ACTIVITIES
Langley, Virginia
Wednesday, April 16, 1975

Deposition of WILLIAM C. STURBITTS, called for
7
3
9
10
examination by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities,
the witness being duly sworn by Thomas C. Hogan, a Notary
Public in and for the State of Virginia, in the offices of the
Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia, at 9:50
11
12
13
o'clock a.m., on Wednesday, April 16, 1975, the proceedings
being taken down in stenotype by Ruth G. McClenning, and
transcribed under her direction.
14
APPEARANCES:
15
On behalf of the Commission:
16
GEORGE MANFREDI, ESQ.,
17
ROBERT B. OLSEN, ESQ.
1.3
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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1

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7
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Thereupon,

SECRET
PROCEEDINGS
WILLIAM C. STURBITTS,
called as a witness by Counsel for the Commission on CIA
Activities, and having been first duly sworn by the Notary
Public, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE COMISSION
BY MR. MANFREDI:
9
Q
Mr. Sturbitts, will you state your full name for the
10
record?
11
A
William C. Sturbitts.
12
Q
Mr. Sturbitts, do you recall when we spoke coに
13
weeks ago you signed a document entitled, "Advice ard
14
Waiver"?
15
A
Right.
16
Q
You understand that document is still in effec
17
A
Sure.
18
Ω
Mr. Sturbitts, by whom are you currently emp!!?
19
A
You mean the Agency or
20
Q
That is right.
21
A
Central Intelligence Agency.
11
22
Q
And what is your current position with the Agency?
23
A
I am a Special Assistant, Latin America, for
24
Economic Intelligence Collection and Operations.
25
Q
And would you briefly review for me the history o
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your employment with the Agency?
A
When I first came in I was in the Intelligence
Directorate for approximately ten years and I was put on special
detail, special indefinite detail, in the Deputy Director, Plans,
5
which is now the Directorate of Operations.
6
Ω
What year were you put on that detail?
7
A
I guess it was 1964, January, I believe.
8
Q
And what did that detail involve?
9
A
Cuban operations, economic warfare.
10
Q
And how long were you on that detail?
11
A
12
Q
13
A
I was in the Cuban operations for nine years.
Between 1964 and 19732
(Nods in affirmative.)
14
Q
And in 1973 did you assume your current position?
15
A
16
Q
Yes, January.
Now, while you were on special detail to the DO?
17
A
Yes.
18
Q
19
A
Were you stationed in Washington?
Yes.
20
Q
And did you commute with some frequency to !!iami?
21
A
Yes.
22
2
Were your activities in Miami in any way connected
23
with the operations of the Miami Station?
24
A
In some way. My responsibilities were worldwide.
25
I took temporary duty predominantly in Europe, and then Miari.
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Most of my operations were run out of Europe.
2
Q
Run out of
5
A
Europe. Some were run out of Miami but the big ones
were run out of Europe.
5
Q
Well, in the course of your activities with respect
5
7
to Cuba did you have occasion to become familiar with the
operations of the Miami base?
