Chief,
Contrast Employees Accounts Section
Agent Payroll Orench
Compensat agion and Tax Division
Office or l'inance
ATTENTION: Lucile F. Twogood
FROM:
Chief of Support, WE Division
Per conversation with Mr. Thosas Keramessines, ADDP,
there will be no Duty Status Reports (Form 764) submitted
on Terence S. CRABANAC. This should be used as the authority
to continue his pay without these reports.
SECRET
Davis B. Povell
Chief of Support
WE Division
201
nhat.

14-00000
October 18, 1965
Dear Howard,
Your insurance representative has passed along some
information concerning reimbursement to you by means of
deposits to your bank account. So that you will understand
the reason and the source of deposits which show up on your
bank statement, here is the run-down for the present:
Amount of
Deposit
$ 5.00
Approx Date
of Deposit
Sep 9
$216.06
Oct 7
Reason for Payment
Settlement of claim for
son Howard (settlement
sheet enclosed)
Settlement of following
claims:
You...........$
47.68
Lisa...
112.88
Kevan..
24.50
Howard...
31.00
$ 216.06
(Four settlement sheets
are enclosed.)
$505.75
Oct 7
Settlement of following
claims:
Lisa..........$ 112.49
Kevan....
63.75
Kevan...
189.74
...
Lisa....
139.77
$ 505.75
$ 60.00
To be made
Nov 4
(Four settlement sheets
Refund of advance premium
payments made on your life
insurance policy which you
cancelled.
I am also forwarding herewith some bills and receipts
which your insurance representative has returned with
appropriate notations on each. I believe you will want to
retain these for possible future use.
are enclosed.)
Sincerely,
John

14-00000
SECRET
4 October 1965
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division,
Office of Personnel
SUBJECT
:
Terence S. CRABANAC (P), Contract Employee
Request for Contract Amendment
1. It is requested that Subject's contract, which
was effective 4 July 1965, be amended with respect to
living quarters allowances so as to authorize reim-
bursement for 75% of the excess allowable costs up to,
but not in excess of, 60% of the standardized quarters
allowance.
2. The proposal for this 75%/25% sharing basis,
in lieu of the standard 50%/50% basis, has been reviewed
and approved by Mr. Thomas H. Karamessines.
Rinia B. Pavell
Davis B. Powell
Chief, WE Support Staff
しに
SECRET

14-00000
SECRET
15 September 1965
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Thomas H. Karamessines
SUBJECT
: Madrid Housing
:
1. The following is a listing of the GS-13 and above
staff employees and their quarters costs as of April 1965:
Grade & No. of
Dependents
(COS)GS-16 (3)
Allowance
$2,900
2,900
Cost
$4,236
3,132
1,800
Cost to
Individual
All cost paid
$116
1117
GS-15 (1)
GS-15 (0)
2,000
GS-14 (5)
2,900
2,796
0
GS-14 (5)
2,900
3,840
450
GS-13 (3)
GS-13 (3)
2,000
2,000
2,280
2,472
GS-13 (5)
2,000
2,544
140
236
272
2. Mr. Hunt's quarters allowance is $2,900. Using
the same formula as applied to the other staff employees
at the Station, the following would be the figures:
$2,900 + 60% ($1,740) - $4,640
On a 50/50 percent sharing basis of the 60 percent, he
would be out-of-pocket $870 if his costs were $4,6-10.
On a 75/25 percent sharing basis of the 60 percent, he
would be out-of-pocket $435, if his costs were $4,640.
3. I would recommend he be authorized the 75/25 per-
cent sharing basis of the allowable excess costs up to,
but not to exceed, 50 percent above his quarters allowance.
Davin B. Pauer
Davis B. Powell
Chief
WE Support
4640
-435
4205
این
۲
SECRET

14-00000
SECRET
3 September 1965
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division
SUBJECT
REFERENCE
: General - Terrence S. CRABANAC - Supplement
"Offset"
Specific Paragraph Entitled
:
A. OGC Opinion 65-2476a, dated 12 August 1965
B. Our Memo, dated 8 July 1965, Same Subject
1. This office herein recommends an ammendment to CRABANAC's
Supplement dated 4 July 1965, to delete paragraph 7. entitled "Offset."
: 2. This office acknowledges the OGC opinion, Reference A, which
determined CRABANAC may retain without Agency salary offset any future
royalties earned as a result of his literary efforts based on the fact
cover does not include role of a writer.
3. As Subject's cover "activities" have been officially clarified
as being only a light one of a retired Foreign Service Officer for
which the Agency will be making all entitlement payments and actually
he will receive no funds from any cover, this paragraph, which is misleading,
has no meaning in Subject's contract and it is hereby recommended that
it be deleted from CPABANAC's Supplement.
4. Further, in future cases when a cover is so light that Subject
will not be receiving funds from cover it is recommended that no "Offset"
paragraph be included in Supplements or Contracts.
Attachment
Ref. A and B
WILLIAM R. CAULFIELD
Chief, Covert Clains Branch
po action tabiks on
His 내다。
SECT

14-00000
SECRET
OGC 65-2476a
12 AUG 1965
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division
SUBJECT:
Terence S. CRABANAC Retention of
Royalties by a Contract Employee
:
1. You have requested the opinion of this Office in regard to
the retention of future royalties which might be earned by Terence S.
CRABANAC as a result of his literary efforts. We believe that he is
entitled to retain such röyalties without an offset against his Agency
salary.
2. We have been advised by Mr. Gene Stevens, WE/Support, that
CRABANAC's cover does not include the role of a writer; CRABANAC's
cover for status will only be a light one of a retired Foreign Service
Officer. Therefore, paragraph 7 of his contract dated 4 July 1965 may.
remain as written. Royalties from the fictional works that he writes as
a profitable hobby will not be emoluments received from or through his
"cover activities."
cc: Chief, Covert Claims Branch
Mr. Gene Stevens, WE/Support
Normon D. Block
NORMAN D. BLOCK
Office of General Counsel
SECRET

14-00000
MEMORANDUM FOR
:
Office of General Counsel
:
Norman Block
ATTENTION
SUBJECT
:
:
Terence S. Crabanac --
Retention of Royalties by
a Contract Employee
3 AUG 196
1. Reference is made to the telephone conversation
of 26 July 1965 between yourself and Rogers C. Brooks of
this Office wherein bäckground information relating to the
assignment of Terence S. Crabanac was discussed.
:
2. Subject will apparently develop a cover as a writer,
a field wherein he has an already demonstrated talent based
upon several publications. The objective of the cover is to pro-
vide a basis of attribution for some of his income. At the time
of the preparation of Mr. Crabanac's contract, the specific
detail of his cover was unknown.
3. Request your opinion in regard to the retention of
possible royalties earned by Crabanac as a result of his
literary efforts or whether such income should be properly
offset.
Attachments.
Joseph B. Ragan
Chief, Contract Personnel Division
OP/CPD: RCBrooks/cw: 2 August 1965.
Distribution:
Orig & 1-- Addressee
2 - CPD

14-00000
SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIF
ION TOP AND BUTIC
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
1
2
DATE
INITIALS
3
4
5
6
Wire/PT- St
ACTION
Rel
eancering v.. box
APPROVAL
COMMENT
CONCURRENCE
Remarks:
DIRECT REPLY
DISPATCH
FILE
INFORMATION
21554775.
PREPARE REPLY 923
RECOMMENDATION
RETURN
SIGNATURE
with to intet then to
our file is reviously stitics
there is su risson for buin to
Draw sortition allernen.
touch with inebened
pls surse um scene.
I want
Juin to crit a postiffice. Cof
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
wr
UNCLASSIFIED
FORM NO.
2-61
237
Use previous editions
CONFIDENTIAL
DATE
14
SECRET
(40)
US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1980-587281

14-00000
Spor Scurity to which he
ean snad lus ferieneind
accourts. Aus will reduce
contact with station.

14-00000
SEOSET
SABANA
July 1965
PLY ACE AREFING REPORT
DATE
:
7 July 1965
OTTU: Contract Fapleyee
SUBJECT
:
Terence CRABANAC
COVER:
Non-Official - Writer
DESTLATION: Madrid Spain
DEPENDENT: Vite and four chine
14 12. 11 and 21
Subject was adviced tot this briefing vas being hold to redes via bia
the offist finnell business and personajecte creted as resuis of
rest of the briering would be prepared
copy would be foresrand to the KUS RX office reponsible for hi
and tus?
dataiutrition.
ما
:
Subject is proceeding abroad as a retired OD CID officer who is now
pursuin; Career on a writer.
Subject and read his Contr.ct. The persons present at the briering vern
Subject: ni wire Division Budget and Piscal Officer, pastoil representi
nd the undersigned Certifying Officer.
The payroll representative briefed Subject regarding alo empensation,
Headquarters payrolled allowances. tox vitholding and doductions.
posed Forele: Daty Data Sheet and used and an official cap will be tent to
the africe daiaistering Subject upon receipt of s astirication Subject has
arrived in piace. The Tax Committee representative had briefed Subject sa
to the procedure by which he will fulfill his Federal tik reporting re dire-
ness see below Section III pntitled 2 ses." All questions Ised by
bubject during the briefing were answered to his agerent stuction. Faero
were two points watch vere to reloved further by WE, they were:
veciaca did
٢.٨.
п. Review of Supplement reistive to quarters allowance being
rolled and non-sccountable.
b. Determimtion of authorition and unt of & Trausport on allowance,
Plans call for Bubject to eat alish Shrough Monetary Division a per
tional de secount. Tais fund will serve his operationincess mite is
Madrid he is to have no (or limiter) catset with the it to digajoints
of the briesing are discussed belon
SECRET
secur
Exctafed from automalic
dsengracians
declassica

14-00000
STGRET
I. Furding and Accounting
A. Headqua ters
(1) Will payroll Subjo t'e compensation (and allowan.es) authorised
deductions..(Specify allowances at applicable)
(2) Will advene PC travel funds and owiit accounting which is to
be submitted by Subject when as wanting cuplete.
(3) will advance funds and receive as ountings to operational fund.
His first accounting will be upon coring into permanent quarters,
and Initially quarterly thereafter, unless activity wariable
more frequent accounting period.
B. Station
will provide only emergenzy support as needed.
C. Cover
will have
ir come
ne problem.
Subit
No Jesucr
from writing.
for went he
should fat
Rosue
time
}
(1)
(2)
Subject has no ligitisate cover from which through agreement with
KUBARK bo would receive payments.
Poragraph 7 entitled OFFear is in question with contraction office
As to what is intended de Cubject's only fococe from cover
ativities appear to be incam from his writings. Subject is
under tapression Incote from writings not to be refundable.
1. Tersis of Contrast and Additional Items
Jutiure
ricewe (11) Allowances
tover inconel
Subject was informed that allowances were subject to flutuation
as a result of Stonderdized or ¡UBANK regulations changes.
from chet (18.) Subject was advised to notify Headquarters of changes to fantly
source,
would be
offeret.
status as such changes would effect allowan.us being payrolled
vbere rates are deterained by Subject's fealiy status.
(12) Receipts
tulject vas advised that a receipt is required where practicable
or a certification in lieu of receipt should be subcitted for oil
reimburseable expe ses in the amount of $15.00 or more.
(20). Travel
Subject was briefed in general regarding reimburscable incidental
expenses and travel catitlesents in regard to his proposed itinerary.
Among the points overed were the following:
4. Per Dien rats applicable to Subject's proposed itinerary
B. Exreas baggage provisions when ceonomy/tourist flights are used
SECRET
(ここ
Excluded from sctomatic
downgrading s
geclicsit.callos

14-00000
SECRET
C. Use of less than first loss at travel accomodations
D. Use of American atelices
(30) Effects Shiprent
Suljeet vas triefed is general regarding his KUBANK authorfastions
as follows!
A. The combtond shipping and storage of household effects to limited
to 13,500 pounds net fo. Subject.
B. Full shipcent is authorized.
C. Subject vas advised the total of the amount of the effects stored
and shipped shall not exceed the lisitations for shipssut and
storage sel forth as 13,500 pounds net.
(31) Unaccompanied Baggage
300 pounde net per traveller which any be used as followst
When entire Journey is by surface treceportation the 300 pound
authorization is to be shipped by surface transportation, or
can be included with household effects shipats.
(33) FOREIGN CUSTOM DUTIES
As Subject to unde non-offtefal cover he cay be required to pay
foreign impot duty s this regulatory authorization was discussed.
(43) Transportation Allowance
Subject will to taking his personal car and reported ba viil be
authorised a Transportation Allowance tot yet deterated by Division.
The Allowance is to be paid monthly by Headquarte.s.
(51) Temporary Lodging Allowance
Subject was advised be would be entitled to the allowance and he
vas briefed as to its provisions as outlined in the standardized
Regulatione.
(53) Permanent Perecoal Quarters
Subject vos advised that his quarters yould be adattatered in ac-
cordance with FR 45-100D, and then the provisions of this degulation
vere explained to hiu. However, Division Bar offt er tatenda to
review this point for possible contrast samendunt in providing a
quarters allovan e at saxisun Standardized rate si to be non-
gecountable.
SECRET
Exchhote:
Reclasti

14-00000
100000
(60) Leave
1
(618) Subject was inforced of his leave batences as of 3 July 1965:
A/L 37 hours and S/L 633 hours.
(63) Leave Benefite
Subjent was informed of accruals, use, and carry-over for conual
(360 heure) and stek leave while overseas. Also, bu was informed
Headquarters forva de leave belances to the field annually.
(71) Insurance
الا
Subject was info.wed that costs (nurred for insurance protection
of baggage, effects, ar and their shipment are considered personal
and are not roludurscatic by KUBAак.
(74) Edu otion and Educational Travel Allowances
These regulatory provisions were dis.ussed as the ages of Suoject's
children indicate his clligibility. All offista. employees are re-
quired to sond children to U. S. Military school, Subject's allovonces
will be equal to that outhorized for other WE non-offietal personnel
10 arca..
(81) Operational Expenses
Eubject was briefed in general toros egarding advances, control,
safekoeping, accounting, receipts, and other supporting author
tative documentation.
:
(82) Operational Entertainment
A thorough briefing was given Subject regarding this topte i
accordance with current regulations.
(84) Other Operational Considerations
III. Taxes
-
An operational back acount is being opened through the Monetary
Divieton to house an operational advance amount yet undeterained.
Subject vas advised not to co-aingle persona. funds with operational
funds. Subject will submit his first accounting upon occupying
permanent qus:ters and initially quartely thereafter. Fics this
account TLA and Educational allowance paysento vil. be rade and
reported.
Subject was advised be should file overtly only. Subject's 6-2 is to be
forwarded by pouch and his tax retun is to be returned by pou'd for motiing
to U. S.
SECRET
92P1
danceresing 205
Ceclassicala

14-00000
IV. Banking Arrangements
SCORET
A. Sutjet has provided Headquarters with his back account for use as his
stateside allottec.
B. An operational bank account is to be established.
Distribution:
Orig. and 1 CCB
1
C&L
1
Registry
1
Payroll
1
- WE/Division
WILLIAM R. CAULFIELD
Chief, Covert Clotno Branch
SECRET
Enote: a ma
beclassicstle:

14-00000
SECRET
8 July 1965
MEMORANDUM FOils Contract Personnel Division, O/P
BUBJECT
: general
specific
Terence S. CRABANAC Supplement
Paragraph Entitled "OFFSET"
1. This office has a question as to the intent of including
paragraph (7.) entitled "OFFSET" es appears in the Contract for
Terence 8. CRABANAC. The paragraph in question reads as follows:
7. OFFSET
Emoluments (including benefite in kind) received
from or through your cover activities are the
property of the U.S. Government. Procedurally,
such emolucents will be offset against amounts
due you under this agreement and are acknowledged
to be payment by the Government hereunder and
for Federal income tax purposes. If cover
emolumenta exceed those due you under thie
contreet, you will dispose of the excess amount
in conformance with Governmental instructions.
2. Subject reportedly is proceeding abroad under the cover of a
retired Foreign Service Officer and in pursuit of his ambitions as a
writer, Subject will receive all his contractual benefits through the
Agency, there is no cover company, so therefore the only apparent
emoluments to be received from or through his cover activities would be
earnings received from articles, stories, or books written by him. Please
inform this office if its interpretation is correct. If not, we would
appreciate your interpretation and reasoning relative to the statezant
"Emoluments received from or through your cover activities are the
property of the U.B. Governcent."
WILLIAM R. CAULFIELD
Chief, Covert Claims Brench
SCORET
Motle
.
11.20
4

14-00000
Mr. Terence S. Crabanac
Dear Mr. Crabanac:
The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting
Officer, hereby contracts with you as a Contract Employee for the use
of your services and the performance of duties of a confidential nature
under the following terms and conditions:
1. Compensation. In full consideration for the use of your services
and the performance of specified confidential duties you will be compen-
sated in an amount calculated at the rate of $19,880 per annum. In addition,
you are herein authorized legislative salary adjustments, within-grade
promotions and, if applicable, a post differential in substantial conformance
with rules and regulations applicable to Government appointed employees.
Payments will be made as requested by you in writing in an approved man-
ner. Taxes will be withheld therefrom and submitted by this organisation.
2. Allowances. You will be entitled to: (a) Living quarters allow-
ances in conformance with regulations of this organization applicable to
its appointed personnel. In the event you are furnished quarters by the
Government you will not be entitled to the living quarters allowances herein
indicated.
(b) Cost-of-living allowances
in conformance with applicable regulations of this organization including,
but not limited to, a post allowance, a transfer allowance and a home ser-
vice transfer allowance.
3. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for travel
and transportation expenses for you, your dependents, your househo!!
effects and your personal automobile to and from your permanent post
of assignment, and for you alone for authorised operational travel. In
addition, you will be entitled to storage of such household and persona!
effects as are not shipped, in conformance with applicable Government
regulations. You may be entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence in
the course of all travel performed hereunder and, when authorized, for
you alone while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of
assignment. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under
this paragraph must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred here-
under are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable
Government regulations.
4. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds
for necessary operational expenses including, but not limited to, entertain-
ment and the purchase of information, as specifically approved by the Gov-
ernment. Such funds will be subject to payment and accounting in commpli-
ance with applicable Government regulations.
5. Repayment. It is recognised that your failure to account for or
refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to
withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from
any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it
deems appropriate.

14-00000
6. Benefits. (a) You will be entitled to death and disabilit, benefits
equal to those authorized under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act,
as amended. Clairns by you, your heirs, or legal representatives under
this paragraph will be processed by this organization in accordance with its
procedures in such manner as not to impair security.
(14-00000
104-10209-10018
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
MATERIAL--REVIEWED AT CIA-HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFE MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: 201-287249
VOL. IⅡ

INCLUSIVE DATES:
CUSTODI AL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:
DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE
RECEIVED
DATE
RETURNED
REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
shee.78 18 Hee 75
Betsy Wolf
Betey hitlf

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000

FBI DOC.
29 Sept. 1962 (Wash.)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
DBA-23746

14-00000
Tes
Jai fects
SECRET
Director
7eferal carem of Investiration
Attention: ir. Sada japich
Lopaty Directer (Place)
Corian PILI, also known
Sacen
Internal curity. kussia

1. Feferencs 16 me to yes Letter dated 12 July 1968,
entitled as above, to ar 13/1275ated 25 Septester 1962,
ant to your fils aber 15-71205.

2. Information or rencontre in Farte indicates that
one doch bra 10 Fay Lal, Larim,, possibly a
Soviet citizen, living at la salse, fra, and a Russian refus, ves
Listed by the fresh finistry of Interior as potentially sangeres
tarios Ve visit of Bikiu anos to France frat 15-20 Farva 1760.
Approximately two thousand other individuale vara aiss listed.

3. da strictal French lisissa servien reverted on 9 averer
1962, tont Jasef Al (sic) had ost attracted their attentia
Jus Tresentative advises thes this is tartsoziat te a ne troc

CSC1 3/773,830
//DL. Lyen à Dec 1962
Distributiqu
Orig and I addressee
1 C/CI
1 CI/Liaison
1 an/t1/7/1
-1-2-1-(201-207219)
1
1 CI/3G/SS
1 Cemeback
1 5/1/20
Based on 0774-66156, 20 N 1952
SECRET
ES COPY
:
Ext
201-259249

14-00000

FBI doc.
29 Nov. 1962 (PHiladelphia)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohonŕlyj
Bufile: 105-93295
DBA 28575

FBI doc.
62 20 November 1962
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorklyj
DBA 28182

14-00000
DISPATCH

TO
Chief,
INFO
Chief, WE
Chief, E
FROM
CLASSIFICATION
PROCESSING
SECRET
シン
POSED I
ACTION
100000
XERS DESA
ΑΕΣΤΡΑΣΤ
Chief of Station, Vienna
Chief of Station, Paris
SUBJECT REDWOOD/CLEPROVE
Jozef KOZAK
ACTION REQUIED REFERENCES
...
ACTION: None; for information only.

REFERENCES: A. OFPW-34223, 25 September 1962
B. OFPA-67615, 16 October 1962 (not sent Vienna.)

In their Memorandum No. D-5054 dated 9 November 1962, USOUND informed
us that Subject had not attracted U20UD's attention. This is tantamount
to a "no trace" reply.

- redirecrayon
Distribution:
2-SR
2- WE
2-EE
2- Vienna
ES COPY
Robert G. LAMPRELL
CROSS REFERENCE TO
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
DATE TYPED
201-289249
16 Nov 62
deforret
DATE DISPATCHED
20 Nov 1967
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OFPA-65186
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-289249

14-00000
TO
INFO
DISPATCH
Chief, SR
Chief, WE
Chief, EE
FROM
Chief of Station, Paris
SUBJECT: REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
F
PROCESSING
POSED
ACTION
P.SHES
XOOX MARKED FOR INGERING
AD INCER NG REQUIRED
CALI QALE
HEADQUARTERE DESK
CAN ACCE DEONG
AESTRACT
M.CROFILW
Josef KOZAK
ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
ACTION: None; FYI only.
REFERENCE: CFFW-34223 of 25 September 1962.20
1. According to Paris Station files:
Joseph KOSAK ARAKIZAK
11-201249
Laict
DPDB: 10 May 1901, Szrdoriben, USSR
Possibly a Soviet citizens
ADDRESS: La Seine, France
Russian Refugee
PRACE REP
was listed by French Ministry of Interior as potentially dangercus during
the visit of Nikita KHRUSHCHEV to France, 15 - 30 March 1960. Approximately
two thousand other individuals were also listed (SOURCE: OFP-8178 of 27 April
1960, page 35).

2. Since Paris Station has terminated AEDOGMA/1, it will not be possible
to obtain further information on Subject from him.

3. We are querying UNBOUND for information on Subject.
Robert J. Lampe
Robert G. LAMPRELL
Distribution:
SR
2- WE
2-EE
CS COPY
INDEX X
CROSS REFERENCE TO
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
DATE TYPED
201-289249
10 Oct 62
DATE DISPATCHED
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OPPA- 67615
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-289249

14-00000

FROM
DISPATCH
CLASSIFICATION
8-E-C-A-B-T
Chief of Station, Paris, COS, Vienna
Cod
POSED
PROCESSING
ACTION
G
CEREQUIRED
ED
MEAGARTERS DESH
CARE INDEXING
ABSTRACT
ACCOM
PISHED
SUELECT
Chief SR, via Chief, WE and Chief, ΕΕ
REDWOOD/LCDIPROVE
Semen Spiridon PCHORILYJ aka Sezen POIORILIM (201-289249) and Jozef KOZAK
ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
ака Обур КUZAK
Action Required: See below

1. Attached for your information is an VBI report on an interview
with Andrij DIDKOWSKYJ, contact of Semen PORORILYJ and correspondent
of Antin MYKYPORUK.

2. The FBI has requested any information available in our files
or through UBARK sources concerning KOZAK's current activities and
contacts with the Sovieta. The information on KUZAK in the last para-
graph on page 3 and the top of page of the attachment, is the latest
inforantion we have on KOZAK. This same information was received fra
Paris in CPPA-55817 of 7 December 1960 and gave KOZAK's address as
rue Caston Jaillon, Vesines Chalette, Loiret.

3. To Parto: We would appreciate any information available on
KOZAK's current activities and contacts. You may query liaison.

4. To Vienna: The interview with DIDKOWSKYJ contains a statement
that KOZAK left the camp in Salzburg for France with NYKYPORUK in 1948
or 1949. Other information indicates that KOZAK came to France in 1946
fros Munich. We would appreciate your checking Station and liaison
files for any information on KCZAK, including biographic data and the
date of his departure for France (or Munich). Please send a copy of
your reply to Paris.

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 Paris /e
2- Visma v/a
CROSS REFERENCE TO
SINK
Doris N. Killgo
AKY
Paul K. Stockwood
201-269249
CATE TYPED
10 Sept. 1962
DATE DISPATCHED
EXSPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
SEP MOZ
ROUTING I
RID/A
2
RJDA
PEEC
R
やら
SP/CI/RED
OFFICE SYMBOL
CLASSICATION
CS CUPY
OFF-34223
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
OFFICER
..Lyon
CRIGINATING
TYPIST
tb
COORDINATING
CATE
OFFICER'S NAME
SP/CI/RED 113 5116 le
S3/2
CI/CPS/SS
15 unt
20
/3
J.Evin
ND
Evant
5A/8/8 15027
DESTROY
53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORN SITE ICH MAY BE USED (40)
RELEASING
OFFICER 55-GHATURE-
DATE
24
ES COPY
EXT.
6991
DISPATCH

14-00000
7瓶风:
SECRET
Strector
Posom baresa of Leatitin
Actection: ... Magica
Deputy Director, (Plars)
Pasen 2
pirmka nkary نعة
Lateral Searity. اشد
25 SEP 1962

1. Asterace la made to your latter dated 12 miy 1958, entitled
as above, and to your fils miser 1
2. to files et sale tey catalanostical intragica ca
so era quas furses
as y
Joser Debt, معنه
abroad for any info
availaule co Barrent Getivities
asi cautoria vita (as čovicts. That will be advised of the resulta ero
car insurice.
:
C1-3/712,123
SR/CI/KED/L.Lyca
Distributions
13 September 12
Addresses. Crig. & 1
1- C/CI
1 - CI/Lieleca
1- CI/A
1-63/CI/P/41
रता-2892419
LAD (201-209249)
ABSTRACT
INDEX
T
1-/3
1-/A
1-C1/20/38
1- Cossback
DATE 13 Sep
1 - SA/CI/MED
Sp
Coord with ES COPY
SECRET
1
ma
Exagtang and
tcciasenicabes

14-00000

FBI doc.
24 Aug. 1962 (Philadelphia)
RS: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
Bufile: 105-93295
DBA 20582
ELB FBL&4008

14-00000
PRIOR TO FILING
(WHEN FILLED IN)
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
INSTRUCTIONS
1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back
flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it
records significant action taken or
comments requiring preservation.
FROM:
RID/1
TO: ACTICH BRANCH
If file no. and title shown are not
proper, insert proper file no. below
and forward document to RID/AN.
PROPER FILE NO
TO ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION I ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE
COMMENTS
100 IDATT
10
TOA
wow/3
ROOM
DATE
TO
NO
RECEIVED FORWARDED'
OFFICER S
INITIALS
1.
SR/KIRED
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
٨٤٠٠٠
5015
gunces 1314
FILE TITLE
RID/FI
ABSTRACT
TRACE
REQUEST
*
INDEX
DATE MICROFILMED
PORM
12-59
6100
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
The repart prousdes
bee kata on Krivenko
Burchart. Thernvestigation
Indicates there is no
parant of contact bitiveen
these persono and
Pahardin
-
Au DBA-23746,
10.00-62 for some
こ
95 10 41
FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201289249
DOCUMENT DATE
3 Aug 62
SECRET
DOCUMENT NUMBER
EAVA
30210
(40)
((

14-00000

TO
FROM
DISPATCH
Chief of station, Paris
Chief, SR; Chief, EE; Chief, WE
Chief of Station, Austria
SUBJECT JILDWOO/LCIFROVE/ALDO/1
Semen POROMILY
ACTION RECURED
"For your information.
REFERENCE:S)
A.
"CLASSIRCATION
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO
EAVA-30210
MEAJATE FE NO
201-289249
29-6-106/3
DATE
X
3 August 1962
RE: 433-(CHECK "X" ONE)
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO NDEXING REQUIRED
INDEJONG CAN BE JUCD
5 QUALIFIED HO DESK ONLY
DOM-10664, 23 May 1961
D. CAS1-5566, 24 November 1961-21
In accordance with a recent request from ODERVY, WO
queriod our liaison in regard to Subject and his contacts in
Austria. A copy of their reply, which has been passed directly
to ODENVY in Bern, is attached for your information.
FORM
Christine R. Kerbe
ATTACIFONT: 1/
Liaison Reply dated 24 July 1962 (in German)
Distribution:
2-COS, Paris w/Att.
2- Chief, E v/o Att.
1- Chief, SR w/Att.
1- Chiof, WE w/o Att.
31 July 1962
10-57 53
1409
emil H/W
USE PREVIOUS EDITION
REPLACES FORMS
51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29-
WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
{
CS COPY
CLASSIFICATION
CONTINUED
201-2812.49.
PAGE NO

14-00000
Subreed
Betr.: PCHORILYI een opiridow,
CHART Vera,
Dr. KRIVANEC Gregor
Hesugi Jo. Anfrage
Fepley in tacationo
AT" IMENT TO EAVA-30210
Dr. Gregor PRIWENKO (Arst, 3.12.10 in law, Udok geb..
seit 1955 durch Einbürgerung Österr. Ethep urolzmünsterco,
Obarlisterr., wh.) war coinerzeit in der Ukraine als Arzt
tätig und kan in Jaro 1943 mit seiner Gett Parla geb.
Kurotschina und seinen beiden Kindern als Fluchtling nach
Österreich. Von 1943 bis 1945 war er als Arzt in Kranken-
haus Ried i. I., später im Allgemeinen Krankenhaus in Ling
und dann bis 1952 als Fluchtlingsarzt in chemaligen Flüch
lingslager Kied 1. I. angestellt. Seit 1952 geht er keiner
geregelten Arbeit mehr nach. Als Befürsorgter übt er noch
fallweise stillschweigend geduldet die Heilpraxis uus. In
Übrigen betätigt er sich als Organist und Chordirigent in
der griechisch-orthod. Kirche in Salzburg. Seine Gattin, die
seinerseit in der Ukraine angeblich Sängerin war, ist gleich-
falls musikalisch tätig. Der Sohn Dr. KRIENTOS studiert
Sprachen, die Tochter ist kränklich und steht in keinen
Arbeitsverhältnis. Ein Bruder Dr. KRITENKOS ist angeblich
noch in der UdSSR als Arst angestellt.
Dr. KRITENKO lebt mit seiner Familie in sehr bescheidenen
Verhältnissen, ist sehr religiös eingestellt und als Antir
kommunist bekannt. Die gange Familie genießt einen guten Ruf.

Veronika (Vera) BURCHART geb. Chermilewski (17.2.1901
in BAR/Ukraine_ged., seit 1957 durch Einbürgerung Österr.St.,
Untereitzing 32, Bes. Kied 1.I./Oberösterr., wh.) kam nit
ihren Gatten Wilhelm FURCHART (26.4.1887 in Jedenier/Ukr. ed.)
CS COPY
3 ang CHEC
EVELI TO FAVA 30210
201-28924

14-00000
-2-
gleichfalls im Jahre 1943 als Fluchtling von der Ukraine
nach Österreich, Wilhelm BUNCHART war in der Ukraine
Fabrikadirektor. 1961 veratarb er in Ried 1.I. Veronika
BURCHART erhält sine Rente. Sie tritt in keiner Feise nach-
teilig in Erscheinung.

Die bisherigen Erhobungen erbrachten keine Arhalts-
punkte dafür, daß die Vorgenannten Verbindung zu dem in
Philadelphia lebenden Semen Spiridow ORORILii haben.
Sollten die weiteren Erhebungen in dieser Hinsicht Positives
erbringen, wird der do. Stelle davon Mitteilung gemacht
werden.
24.7.1962
:

14-00000

FBI doc.
12 July 1962 (Wash.)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj, aka
Bufile: (E) 105-93295
DBA 13988

14-00000
TO
FROM
DISPATCH
Chief of Station, Paris
INFO
CLASSIFICATION
POSED
SECRET
PROCESSING
ACTION
MARKED FOR DEDUNG
XXX
ROINDEXING
OPLY QUALIFIE
MEADO, ARTERS DESE
CAR FOGE IACING
ABSTRACT
MICROFILM
Chief SR, via Chief WB
SUBJECT
REDWOOD/LCINPROVE
Semen Spiridon POHORILYJ
ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
ACTION: None, FYI
Exck dau
PLISHED
DATE TYPED
201-239249
DATE DISPATCHED
16 May 1962 25 MAY 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OFFW-33472
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-289249
ORIGINATING
fan
TYPIST
aes
COORDINATING
OFFICE
Attached for your information is a copy of an ODENVY report
dated 20 April 1962, on an interview with Subject on 13 April 1962.
IK
Doris M. Killgo
PKY
Hortimer F. Bingham
Distribution:
3 COS Pairs v/att
ROUTING
INITIAL
OFFICE SYMBOL
DATE
EXT
6991
RID/AN
- REDK
1-SR/C SR/CD
C/SR/CI/RED 6/5.
RID/MES WB/3
C/SR/2
RID/PS
FI/SPOG
20
RED/FT
SR/C1/20D the
OFFICE SYMBOL
DATE
C/WE/3
9-60
FORM 53
USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM $100 WHICH MAY BE USED
RELEASING
OFFICER'S NAME
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
2.1 Way out the
DISPATCH

14-00000
SECRET
TO:

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Hr. 8. J. Parich
FRCM:

Deputy Director (Plans)
SUBJECT:

252
Sesen Spiridon PUHURILYJ also known as Semen PCHORILIW
Internal Security - Russia

1. Reference is nede to your memorandum of 5 February 1962
regarding the Subject and to your file muster 105-93295 (Ε).

2. An interviev of Subject by your Dureau, under the condi-
tions outlined in the reference, would not adversely affect any of
this Agency's sources or operations. We would appreciate any in-
formation you may obtain from Subject on his contacts and associates
abroad.

CECI-3/769,591
SR/CI/RED/LLyon:aoh
Distribution:
Orig & 1 Addressee
1- C/CI
1 - CI/Liaison
1 - CI/R&A
1- SR/CI/P/d1
1 - SR/CI/RED
1- Comeback
23 February 1962

RI/Files (201-209249
Reference: DBA-396, 5 February 1962
SECRET
CS COPY
201-289249

14-00000

FBI doc.
20 April 1962
(Philadelphia)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
Bufile: 105-93295
. DBA 7408

FBI doc.
5 Feb. 1962 (Wash.)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj, aka
Bufile: 105-93295 (E)

14-00000
FR
TO:
SECRET
19 1962
TC:
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich
Deputy Director (Plans)
SUBJECT: Semen Spiridon PSORILYJ also known as Senen PURILE
and Andrij LIDIWSKYJ also known as DIALANSKY (fmu)
Internal Security Russia

1. Reference is made to previcus correspondence from this of-
fice regarding the Subjects and to your file number 105-93295.

2. The files of this Agency contain no identifiable informa-
tion on Andrij DIDKOWSKYJ of 731 Forth Beventh Street, Fhiladelphia,
Prinsylvania. We have not checked our sources abroad and will not
do so unless this action is specifically roquested by you.

3. Aemsitive Austrian scurce provided the following inforza-
tion on tamen Spiridon POHORILYJ on 31 October 1961:

هراء
"Semen POHCRILYI - born 2 February 1910 in Czerkassy/
Kiev, married, teacher, Ukrainian citizen, resided at
the refugee camp in Siezamheim, Salzburg, from 13 July
1950 to 23 August 1950. Prior to 13 July 1950 he lived
at the Hellbrunn refugee camp in Salzburg. According
to police records Subject left Salzburg for the United
States on 23 August 1950."

4. Additional information from the same sensitive source, in
the form of a photographic copy of the official police registration
card and a negative of an identification photograph of Subject, both
anted 7 Noveaber 1947, reveals that

"Besen PORILYJ - born 2 February 1910 in Praenyal,
is a Polish citizen, married, teacher, 173 cm tall, sray
eyes, blond bair, oval face, no prominent or identifying
features."
SECRET
1
:
CS COPY
201-289249

14-00000
SECRET
-2-

A copy of the photograph is attached for your information. The date
on the registration card presumably indicates the date on which Sub-
ject vas first officially registered by the Salzburg police.

CSCI-3/769,019
Attachment As stated
SR/CI/RED/LLyon:afo
Distribution:
15 January 1962
Orig & 1 Addressee, w/att.
1-C/CI, w/o att.
1- CI/LSIN, w/o att.
1-CI/RLA, w/o att.
1-SR/CI/P/dl, w/o att.
1SR/CI/RED, w/o att.
1.EE/A, w/o att.
1- Comeback, v/o att.
1 RI/Files, w/o att. (201-289249)

Reference-DEF-96946, 21 December 1961
Based on EASA-05566, 24 November 1961
SECRET

14-00000
SECRET
THIS BLAM CAS6162
SEMAN LETTER AND IN SOMAL CACER)
DIDFSKYJ,
Andrij
2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLINGS, CTC NUMBERS. ETC.
DIALNAWSKY
3. 8147 CATE
30 Νου 1890,
4. Bitin PLACE
Didkowitscze, Ukraine
5. CITIZENSHIP
U.S. in 1958
6: PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION
Retired lives at 631 North 7th St. Philadelphi
Pa.
7. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EL JCATION
Laborer
SPONSE TO GREEN LIST
REQUEST NO 100092
CATE OF DECUEST
REQUEST FROM
5 Jan 62
NAME OF ORIGINATING OFFICER
L. Lyon
OFFICE DESIGNATOUSR/CI/RED
00CM. BuL011501 J
EXTENS18251
2. WAS CONTINUING GEAPC-EQUESTED
S. TAPE OF PEQUEST
FIRST TIME SHEMISTES
ACCITIONAL DATA
INTEREST IN SLEJECT
SPIONAGE OR CE ACTI
OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
MATION RECUIRED
All information
VES
8. MILITARY SERVICE
SERVICE AM, COUNTRY
SPECIALTY
9. PAST OCCUPATIONS
ACTIVITY
1904 to 1920 resided in Pussia.
1920 to 1943
in Poland
1943 to 1951 Salzburg, Austria
1951 to Sept. 1958 - Philadelphia
LOCATION
LOCATION
DATES
CATES
10. DESCRIPTION
(HEIGHT)
611"
11. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)
(WEIGHT)
170
(EYES)
Brown
(1)
(DACE)
Black-grey White
(СТЧЕР)
Wira Sergel, born 1897 in the Ukraine. Resides at Kostppol, Ukraine..
12. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, AND ASSOCIATES
13. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION, ETC)
ATTACH EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED
INSTRUCTIONS:
INSERT CARBON: FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY.
SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D.
SEE CS1-10-7.
FORM
11-54501 USE PREVIOUSITIONS.
SECRET
(9)

14-00000
L. Lyon
4:
FI/D
4.
6.
c.
г.
Ε.
SECRET
11 January 1962
CATE
SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/O BICGFAPHIC FILES.
A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED MERETO.
WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/O IS UNABLE TO
DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.
FLID HAS NO INFORMATION GA SUBJECT. IF A CONTINUING SEARCH WAS
REQUESTED IN SECTION 14, INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT WILL BE REFCFTED TO
YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.
THE SLEJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:
TE TO THE CRIGINATING OFFICE
THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION
ICE COMPLETED. SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

1E4 YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FIND THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT APE NO
GER OF SUFFICIENT INTEPEST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S
ILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS CT REQUIRED.

FI/D
4:
NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION
CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST
SECRET
DATE
104-10209-10025 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
14-00000
MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: DE GOLYER CO.

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODI AL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED | DATE RETURNED | REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME) | SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAI
---|---|---|---
DEC. 18,79 | | SORRELL BRADY | Awell Body
 

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

47

14-00000
-
GU ASI
R 3315237
62185
BT

273 VA

CONFIDENTIAL
VA CITE STCO 8443
CYP STAFF (YOUNG) FROM CSTLER

REUR TWENTY PACH SI TALEEΚΟ - SULJECT: PHOTOGEOLOGICAL MAPPING
OT SPANISH SAHARA

5
OIL COPANIES DEINER SOURCES HAVE DONE FORK FOR IN SPANISH SAPARA
APSA 14691
の
CECPHOTO SETVICES, INC: CHAIPLE OIL AND REFINING CO, SL CAP
ECNIE AVE, FORT WORTH 7, TEYS / uses -14 6911
PAN ANDRICHI ISO 125 FIFAL AVE, NEW YORK 17
DE GOLYER & MAC PAUCHTEN
PAUCHT, 5625 DANIELS AVE, DALLAS, TAS
FOR WORK DOUS FOR VALDEDRO CONNESSICA).
469237
A609 A3440
KHOY-BERGIKAN-SHEARER: COMBINED OPERATION OF THELWATER & SOHIO OIL
COPANIES AND PAN AFRICAN INTERMATICAL.

CONFIDENTIAL
A12650

CEN BA43 YOURIC OFTLER 28 KAP 61 PROTOCOLOGICAL NAPPING

SPANISH SAICASA GEOFICIO SERVICES CHAPLIN OIL AND REFINING CC
5331 CAMP DODIE AVE FORT WORTH
555 FIFTH AVE NE YORK 17
AVE DALLAS TEXAS VELOZERO
AND SOKIO OIL COS. PAN AN. NE
TEXAS PAN AGRICAN HISPANO OIL CO
::
GOLYES AND AC HAUSATO IN SELE
SCAN SHEARER FIDDUATER
مين
all

TOTOT. 12121552
NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE
ICIAI
14-00000
104-10209-10164 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

APROVIZION
Johannesburg
Дедоз
Patrobi
Pretoria
Jabat
Calisbury

ER DIVISION
Barcelona
Lerlia
Fern
Fonn
sela
Copenhagen
Geneva
The Hague
Lamburg
Helsinki
Lisbon
London
Madrid
Milan
Munich Liaison Fase
Manich Ops. Ease (Laurion)
Oslo
Ottava
Paris
LCPIPIT
Rome
Salzburg
Stockholm
Vienna
Zurich

ala Lu
-21-2
Fedorse
Farmora
Cre
Cutpel
ne
Eurabaya
Wellington

THITVISECT
Asuncica
Sogota
Erasilia
Euenos Aires
Сагосез
Georgetom
Guatemala City
Guayaquil
JAJAVE
Kingston
La Paz
Lima
Panerus
Fexico City
Monterrey
Montevideo
Forfolk (FEPLANT)
Panama City
Port ca Frizce
Porto Alegre
Quito
Recife
Rio de Janerio
San Jose
San Salvador
Santiago
Santiago de les
Caballeros
Santo Domingo
Seo Paulo
Tegucigalpa

ME DIVISION
Ankara
Athens
Beirut
Calcutta
Colanto
Istanbul
New Delhi
Ravalpindi
Teheran

SECRET

14-00000
i
:
CA
3
1. COPC/C
12
A:S
13/4
AS
:.:.:
::/1
CA
.../C
!::
VO/0/L!
T/%
9/57
FE/CA
C/C5/CA
SB/CA 14
DO/CA 3

CI/F&A 10

EP DIVISION
E/CA
E/SC
/Mexico
/2
W/2/G
W/2/P
S/F/
/2/CR/N
WE/3
WH/3/3
1/3/CO
WH/3/E
3/3/P
٨/٤/٤٣
1/4
5٧/٦/١٠
THE/3
E/?
Ε/Ι
E/13
E/G
E/AS
E/3C
WE/4/CH
WH/4/P/U
/5
WH/5/Brazil
/6
13/7
13/7/5T
WB/7/GU
W/7/DR
WE/7/JTS

SECRET
14-00000
104-10209-10259 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

Files

H. D. Stevens
THE LEE HARVEY OSWALD CASE 151164
29 January 1964

1. According to a newspaper column of "Allen and Scott" in the Chicago American of 6 December 1963, on the OSWALD Case, Abram CHAYES,
Legal Officer of the State Department, was one of two persons immediately responsible for OSWALD's being permitted to return to the
United States from the Soviet Union in June 1962. The other individual named was Llewellyn THOMPSON, the then Ambassador to Russia. Another
said to have been involved in the handling of OSWALD's case was Samuel WIESE, Counsel of the American Embassy in Moscow.

2. Abram CHAYES, 352234, who as of 16 February 1961 was described as "the new Counsel in State," was granted security approval for liaison contact with J. Foster COLLINS (in the office of the Chief of the Covert
Action Staff) on 6 March 1961. The request for CHAYES' clearance was a "Blanket" request to permit discussion with him of FSC 5412/2 matters on a need-to-know basis.

3. In September 1961 there was a White House namecheck request on CHAYES' wife Antonia (Toni) Leigh CHAYES, nee: HANDLER.

4. In March 1962, CHAYES was granted a renewal of his liaison contact clearance with C/CS on a continuing basis. This time his contact was Archibald ROOSEVELT, Jr.

5. On 10 February 1962, HUMAN EVENTS reported as follows with reference to CHAYES:

"SOFT ON COMMIES: Representative Francis F. Walter (R.-Pa.), Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, has scored the new State Department regulations on passports, claim-ing they would allow Reds denied passports to rifle freely the confidential files of the FBI, the CIA and other investigative agencies." The man behind the new regulations, which Walter claims violate the Internal Security Act of 1950, is reportedly
State's chief legal officer, Abram Chayes. Chayes, a Kennedy appointee, is an ex-Harvard professor who was Chester Bowles' top legal adviser when Bowles was Governor of Connecticut.
Walter has introduced legislation to remedy the new passport regulations."

SECRET
21
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Dip J
1271-1029

14-00000
100

-2-

6. Samuel WIESE, Counsel in the American Embassy in Moscow who is referred to above, may well be Samuel Griffin WIESE, Jr., 7-574,
7-1-7-45, who apparently was once a contract employee on ADAPTIVE. The State Department reviewed WIESE's file on 2 June 1954; and as of
September 1962 a Samuel G. WIESE was Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow. At that time WIESE advised in a cable to the State Department that it appeared that Bruce Frederick DAVIS, 352057, who defected from the United States Army in Germany on 13 August 1960, had not expatriated himself. DAVIS case is very similar to that of
OSWALD; and he, like OSWALD, lived in the Soviet Union for two years after his defection and prior to making application for return to the United States. J

7. WIESE was an applicant for CIA employment in early 1953 and was security approved subject to polygraph on 11 August 1953. He did not enter on duty and in September 1953, the office which had been interested in him was "no longer interested". On 13 November 1953, WIESE was granted a CHA to permit his use as a contract employee on ADAPTIVE in New York City. His CHA was cancelled on 25 March 1953.

8. WIESE was named as a friend of William Orville MARCELL, 61693-DL, during an investigation of the latter for possible FI employmant in 1952. WIESE, according to MARCELL's landlady and social acquaintance in Washington, D. C. during the period of about a year which ended in April 1952, was the only person she knew by name with whom MARCELL was friendly. According to the informant, WIESE was a student at Columbia University whose address was 423 Pald Fall. MARCELL was security disapproved for FI employment in June 1952 because of his close association on a professional and social basis, while attending Denver University from 1946 to 1951, with persons of questionable loyalty. In November 1954, MARCELL was of interest to Project QJACTIVE with reference to assignment to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; however, the interested office withdrew their request on him, after Security advised of the derogatory information regarding him.

9. WIESE from 1951 to 1954 attended Scarsdale High School in Scarsdale, New York, which was attacked by a Citizens Group, which alleged Communist influence in the school system. He had several questionable associates in addition to MARCELL.

N. D. Stevens

SECRET
21
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
14-00000
104-10210-100202025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

TOP SECRET
5

1. Attached are the following pages of the Top Secret
study entitled, The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB
Defector - Yuriy I. NOSENKO, dated February 1968 (copy 10).
Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier for
your review.

2. We have deleted certain portions of these pages
containing information which bears on the security of
ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.

3. We request return of the study (copy 10), Annex A
and Attachment when your review has been completed.

Attachment: Pages vi, vii, 20, 46, 47, 49, 50, 266, 277, 278
281, 294, 295, 297, 313, 324, 325, 326, 336 and
357

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340

TOP SECRET

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Top Secret

CONTENTS

PAGE

VIII SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (January 1962-January 1964)
(Cont.)

Deputy Chief of Seventh Department
(July 1962-January 1964) 291
KGB Operations 292
Recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY 292
Investigation of SLESINGER 293
Arrest and Interrogation of KOTEN 295
GRU Agent SHUBIN 296
Arrest of BAKGHOORN 298
Investigation of OSWALD 303
Residence in USSR 303
Request to Return to USSR 305
Post-Assassination Review of KGB File 307
The CHEREPANOV Papers 309
Contents 314
NOSENKO'S Travel Document 315
Return to Geneva (January-February 1964) 316
Purpose of Trip 317
Visits to KGB Legal Residency 318
Availability for Meetings with CIA 318
NOSENKO's Written Notes 319
NOSENKO's Defection 320
The Recall Telegram 324
Knowledge of Other Seventh Department
Operations 325
Operational Activities (July 1962-
January 1964) 326
KGB Counterintelligence Operations Among
American Tourists
i 326
Information Furnished the KGB by
George BLAKE
327
KGB Study of American Intelligence 327
Tourist Operations 330
NOSENKO's Information 331
Summary 331
Summary and Conclusion

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CONTENTS

IX OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMED KGB SERVICE 335
Relationship with General GRIBANOV 335
Communist Party Status 338
Knowledge of KGB Forms and Procedures 342
Awards and Decorations 345
Sourcing 349
Ranks 350

X PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT 355

XI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES 357

Annex A - Statements of Soviet Officials About
NOSENKO 361

Annex B - Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text 399

Index of Personalities 437

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(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)
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Soviet Officials' Statements About NOSENKO

The portrait of NOSENKO which emerges from Soviet
officials' statements about him since his defection coin-
cides markedly with NOSLNKO's self-description. According
to the comments of Soviet officials, principally intelli-
gence officers most likely to be speaking authoritatively,
defector NOSENKO was the son of the deceased Minister, he
served over a decade in the KGB, his personal shortcomings
were overcome through the patronage of KG3 General GRIBANOV,
and in connection with operations against Americans he
occupied positions of progressively greater trust and
responsibility, ultimately becoming Deputy Chief of the
largest department in the key Second (Counterintelligence)
Chief Directorate. According to these sources, his defection
wrought severe damage "for years to come" to the KGB
because of his knowledge of KGB operations against American
targets, and his treachery prompted the expulsion and
disgrace of numerous senior KGB personnel, the recall of
many others from abroad, the virtual suspension of KGB
operations in the United States, and extraordinary plans to
assassinate him.

These statements are related in chronological order in
Annex A.

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Baku), where he finished the Eighth Class in spring, 1943.
In a second version (more probable since entry to the Moscow
Special Naval School required prior completion of the
Seventh Class) NOSENKO said that when the war broke out he
and his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where he
completed the Seventh Class in summer of 1942. They returned
to Moscow afterwards, and NOSENKO was then enrolled in the
Moscow Special Naval School (then in Kuybyshev) where he
completed the Eighth Class in 1943; in the fall of 1943
NOSENKO was enrolled in the Leningrad Naval Preparatory
School (then in Baku).

After just six months in Baku, without completing the
Ninth Class, COSENKO ran away from school and returned to
Moscow.

Comment: KOSENKO has asserted variously that he ran
away and fought on the front at Tuapse, and
that he had finished the Tenth Class in Baku
and then spent the period 1943-1945 at the
Frunze Higher Naval School, the equivalent of
Annapolis. He has retracted both assertions.

NOSENKO completed the Ninth Class in June 1944 at the
Moscow Mining Institute, and when the Leningrad Naval
Preparatory School returned to Leningrad from Baku, he
resumed his studies there. Early in 1945, however, NOSENKO
received a gunshot wound in the hand, and after being
hospitalized for a month, he left the Naval school.

Comment: NOSENKO has claimed both that he was shot by
a jealous naval officer whom he then protected
by stating that the wound was self-inflicted,
and that he actually did accidently shoot him-
to
quoted a KGB officer
a sensitive source self.
the effect that NOSENKO shot himself to avoid
being sent to the front while attending a naval
college in 1942.

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(Continued)
After NOSENKO's defection was publicized,
Soviet Naval defector ARTAMONOV volunteered
to CIA that he had known the son of the
Minister NOSENKO in the naval school in
Leningrad from 1944 to 1946.

NOSENKO completed the Tenth Class at the Leningrad Ship-
building Tekhnikum in June 1945, and he successfully passed
the necessary examinations to qualify him for entrance to
the Moscow Institute of International Relations that summer.

Birth to 1945: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO is virtually the sole source of information on
his early life. However, this portion of his claimed
biography is consistent with the NOSENKO family's where-
abouts as publicized in press accounts at the time of his
father's death in 1956, and with the existence of the
schools he claims to have attended.

Allowing for exaggerated claims of boyhood heroics
(fighting at the front, attending the Frunze Academy, and
formal induction in and discharge from the Navy), all of
which NOSENKO has retracted under interrogation, NOSENKO'S
claimed identity as the son of Minister Ivan I. NOSENKO
and the substance of his claims about his life until 1945
are accepted as true.

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NOSENKO has said at various times that the Institute
course was of four years' duration and that he entered the
Naval RU on graduation in 1949; that it was four years'
duration and that Lecause he failed a state examination he
was graduated later, in 1950; that it was of five years'
duration and he graduated in 1950, on schedule; and that it
was of five years' duration but he failed an examination
which delayed his graduation for three months.

Comment: See p.367 for report that NOSENKO joined the KG3
upon graduation from the Institute in 1947.
The duration of the Institute course and the
date of NOSLIKO's completion are material to
the plausibility of his claimed Naval PU service,
whicis ne said followed almost immediately upon
his departure from the Institute.

Naval RU Service (ca. 1951 - ca. 1953)

NOSENKO claims that upon completion of his studies at
the Institute of International Relations he entered the
Naval RU, serving in the Far East and then in a Baltic post,
finally successfully "transferring" to the KGB through the
intervention of his father's friend, KGB General KOBULOV.
A sensitive source
is the sole source also asserting that NOSENKO
served in the RU. According to, NOSENKO attended this
the Military-Diplomatic Academy and then served in the RU
Information Department for about a year before securing a
transfer to the KGB through his father's influence. NOSENKO
denies having attended the Military-Diplomatic Academy and
has never claimed service in the RU Information (Reports)
Department, although he had on occasion claimed to have held
Reports assignments.
source
;

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(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

A sensitive source two
has quoted/KGB officers
respectively, as stating NOSENKO joined the KGB in 1947
or 1949.

The significance of NOSENKO'S RU service is the fact
that he claims it launched his intelligence.career and
served as the means through which he secured appointment
to the RCB after once having been rejected. The two or more
years he claimed to have served in the RU represent a
significant period of his adult life for which he should
have no difficulty accounting. Finally, the date of his
actual transfer from the Naval EU to the KGB is critical to
determining the time from which his claims about KG3 service
can be judged credible.

NOSEIKO volunteered extensive comment on his Naval RU
service at his first meetings with CIA in 1962. After his
1964 defection, it was the topic on which he made one of
his initial retractions and his first admission that he had
earlier made a false claim. The subject of his Naval RU
service was consequently prominent in interrogations in
1964, 1965 and 1966. However, throughout these interrogations,
challenges of his assertions abcut his RU service prompted
adjustments in his claimed date of graduation from the
Institute or claimed date of entry into the KGB, just as
challenges on those latter topics prompted amended state-
ments with respect to his RU service. The extent of the
still-unreconciled discrepancies and contradictions in
NOSENKO's various accounts is best perceived in comparison
of his statements made in 1962, 1964, 1965 and 1966.

NOSENKO's Information-1982

NOSENKO finished the Institute of International Relations
In
in 1950 and immediately reported for duty with the RU.
[He did not amplify how he drew such an assignment.]
September 1950 he was offered assignments in Leningrad,
Moscow, and in the Far East, and he chose the Far East "so
no one would think he would take advantage of his father's
position". He was assigned to a radio signals interception
unit in Sovetskaya Gavan' (on the Soviet coast opposite
Sakhalin), where he collected Order of Battle information by
monitoring the communications of American units operating in

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FRIPPEL was a weak agen:: "he was afraid and gave practi-
cally acthing." NOSENKO said that although he had recruited
him, "honestly speaking, FRIPPEL was not an agent." The KGD
nevertheless hoped that FRIFPEL would be reassigned to Hos-
cow at some future date. (See p.137 for details of the
FRIFPEL case.)

Comment: FRIPPEL agrees with NOSENKO that they met twice
in the USSR in 1963. However, FRIPPEL asserts
he also met HOSENKO in Odessa in February 1962.
which NOSLIKO flatly denies. FRIPPEL is known
to have planned to travel to the Soviet Union
at that time, and there is no apparent reason
why he would make a false claim on this matter.
a sensitive source Recording :, FRIPPEL, who is now
in New Yo: City. :s a current target of the
Soviet intelligence service,

Johannes PREISFREUND

The KGB considered PREISFREUND compromised to American
Intelligence after GOLITSIN's defection (in December 19611 and
thus unsuitable for further use against Americans at the Em-
bassy in Moscow. For this reason, NOSENKO was told to take
PREISFREUND with him when he transferred to the Seventh De-
partment. As the agent spoke only Finnish and Russian, however,
he was of no use against English-speaking tourists. NOSENKO
met with PREISFREUND on the latter's visits to Moscow in 1962,
but did not use him in any operations.

Comment: PREISFREUND asserts that he was no longer a KGB
agent after the STORSBERG operation (see p.175)
and that although he saw NOSENKO on his frequent
return visits to Moscow, it was only because
NOSENKO sought a companion for wenching and
drinking.

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who was [erroneously).considered to be a CIA officer.
SHAKHOV 'maybe" had some contact with MARK in 1960 or 1951,
but NOSENKO did not know the substance of it. A counter-
intelligence officer of the First Chief Directorate, S.H.
GOLUBEV, had once been on a delegation with. SHAKIHOV and he
had noted "little details". While SHAKHOV was in the United
States, earlier, he had been terminated (as an agent) by
KGB officers who had submitted a report stating that SHAKHOV
liked life in the Unites States, American products, and
money. In that KGB report he was depicted as "not good"
and 'not wanting to work as an agent".

NOSENKO stated that SHAKHOV had served with the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in the United States and that during that
service he acted as an agent-recruiter for the KGB. SHAKHOV
was permitted to travel abroad even though suspected of being
an American agent, because he belonged to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and "the KGB could do nothing about his
trips abroad'. "There was no proof, only suspicions, and
furthermore, SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of
the head of the Soviet delegation, S.K. Tsarapkin." According
to NOSENKO, SHAKHOV was not and never had been a KGB officer.

Comment: SHAKHOV has served in and visited the United
States since 1942, when he was assigned to the
Soviet Consulate General in New York. He at-
tended the 1945 Conference on International
Organization in San Francisco, and he had at-
tended a number of sessions of the UN General
Assembly. Most recently SHAKHOV was assigned
to the U.S. in 1963 as a member of the Soviet
Mission to the UN. KGB officer RASTVOROV Gen-
tified him as an MVD (KGB) officer whom he is
certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in Moscow,
a sensitive source identified him as "an employee of the
KGB and KGB defectors PETROV and DERYABIN
have reported that from a photograph, SHAKHOV'S
face was familiar". An FBI source, however,
in 1964 said that SHAKHOV was a "pure diplomat"
and that to his knowledge, SHAKHOV had engaged
in no Soviet intelligence activity until that
time.

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NOSENKO described the various ways he had tested suspicions
of SHAKHOV in Geneva. He gave SHAKHOV disinformation and then
watched for an indication that he passed it on to his American
contacts. SHAKHOV was told to perform countersurveillance
tasks. during a meeting by NOSENKO with an imaginary agent,
while other KGB officers checked for signs that SHAKHOV had
forewarned the Americans about the meeting. Finally NOSENKO
revealed to SHAKHOV the location of a KGB dead drop and
checked five days later to see whether the specially prepared
materials emplaced had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's
conclusion was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of suspicion,
and it was his intention to report this finding when he re-
turned to KG3 Headquarters from Geneva.

Comment: Currently in the United States, SHAKEC is still
"under suspicion", according to a sensitive source,

Security Escort Officer for Soviet Disarmament Delegation

NOSENKO said that he was the sole KGB officer with the 94-
man Soviet delegation to the Disarmament. Conference and as..
such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the
entire delegation. (KGB officers I.S. MAYOROV and M.S.
TSYMBAL came with the delegation to Geneva, but they had left
Geneva before NOSENKO made the foregoing statement to CIA.)
To assist him in carrying out his security functions, NOSENKO
had the services of a number of coopted informants of the KGB
who were serving in the delegation. [NOSENKO has rever re-
ported what, if any, security checks he ran on the delegates
in his charge, or what, if any, information his informants
provided him.]

NOSENKO has never been precise about how he spent his days
and nights in Geneva, but he has indicated that he disposed
of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little
to do. He explained in 1962 that he could come and go as he
pleased because Ambassador Zorin knew who he was, as did most
of the delegation. No one paid him any attention. It was
known that he was not really a Ministry of Foreign Affairs
officer, and he could absent himself from conference meetings.
at any time.
:

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Yu.I. GUK
:
Implying that their friendship was of long standing,
NOSENKO related in 1962 that he and GUK were together nearly
every day in Geneva, where they went out to chat and have a
few drinks. As a consequence, NOSENKO was granted access to
the residency and was able to elicit information about sore
of GUK's operations in Geneva. lie described his "big, big
friend" GUK as the Deputy Legal Rezident in Geneva and the
only "strong officer" in the residency.

Comment: In 1964 NOSENKO attributed his gaining access
to the residency in 1962 to TSYMBAL, not to
GUK. According to several sources (see Annex A.
because of his friendship with ROSENKO, GUK was
dismisscd from the KG3.

M.S. TSYMBAL

In 1962 NOSENKO reported TSYMBAL's presence in Geneva and
identified him as Chief of the Illegals Directorate of the
KGB First Chief Directorate. He alluded to having spoken with
him, but placed no particular emphasis on their relationship.

In 1964 NOSENKO claimed that he had been dealing with
TSYMBAL since 1960 or 1961, when he was looking for some
candidates for recruitment and came across some whose back-
ground would have made them suitable for the Special (Illegalsi
Directorate. NOSENKO met TSYMBAL in Moscow in the KGB Head-
quarters and TSYMBAL had asked him several times to transfer
to the First Chief Directorate and suggested that he might be
assigned to the United States. In Geneva, he and TSYMBAL had
dinner together several times a week, sometimes accompanied
by KISLOV and sometimes alone. It was TSYMBAL's influence,
NOSENKO said, which secured NOSENKO access to the residency
in 1962 and established the precedent from which he was
granted access in 1964.

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NOSENKO'S Information
The
SLESINGER came under suspicion by the KGB First
Chief Directorate because of his business transactions
with a number of Soviets who visited his store and in
whom he seemed to show more than casual interest.
First Chief Directorate was of the opinion that
SLESINGER was trying to become closely acquainted with
some Soviets, to study them. SLESINGER had visited the
Soviet Union several times. Learning SLESINGER planned
another trip to the USSR, the KGB suspected that "he
might make some contacts or do something interesting"
while visiting the Soviet Union. The KGB wanted to
resolve its suspicions that SLESINGER was possibly an
agent or operational contact of the FBI. The KGB had
a file on SLESINGER, nd a senior case officer in the
American Section of the Seventh Department, Yu. M.
DVORKIN, was the responsible case officer. An agent
of the Seventh Department who was director of a photo-
graphic shop in Moscow was instructed to become friendly
with SLESINGER while the latter was visiting the Soviet
Union, and the two men later exchanged correspondence..
SLESINGER went to Odessa to visit relatives, and DVORKIN.
directed the Odessa KGB to "surround" him with agents. who.
could watch his behavior. If there had been any indication
of intelligence activities, the KGB would have attempted...
to recruit SLESINGER, but since no evidence was developed,
no approach was made. SLESINGER had travelled to the
Soviet Union before, several times.
L

Comment: A sensitive source
had reported to the
FBI that the KCB suspected SLESINGER to
be an FBI "plant" and that KGB officer
"might be trying to develop
SLESINGER to act as a courier or in some
other agent capacity."
NOSENKO's information was substantially
correct. Alfred Lazarevich SLESINGER,
reported to the FBI in July 1962 of his
June 1962 visit to Moscow and Odessa.
In Odessa SLESINGER was contacted by a
Soviet official who exhibited "intimate
knowledge" of his business in New York
City and had asked whether SLESINGER had
"ever been bothered by the FBI."

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Comment: (Continued)
In 1966 SLESI GFR reported to the FBI that.
he was in touch with a Moscow photographic
shop proprietor, and he described evidence
of KGB interest in him during his visit to
Odessa in 1962. Previous to visiting the
Soviet Union in 1962, SLESINGER had been in
contact with a number of Soviet officials
from the United Nations.
:

NOSENKO was not specific in describing how he learned
of SLESINGER, who may represent a First Chief Directorate
case.

KOTEN'S Arrest and the KGB Agent

NOSENKO was asked in Geneva in 1964 whether he was
involved in the arrest of an American tourist in the
USSR in the fall of 1963. Almost at once, NOSENKO
identified the case as that of Bernard KOTEN, a guide for
Afton Tours in New York City (and hence an employee of
Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, see above) who had been arrested
on homosexual charges in Kiev. NOSENKO said that KOTEN
was involved with an American agent of the KGB Scientific
and Technical (S&T) Directorate. NOSENKO did not know the
agent's name, but from the description he provided he is
believeà identical with a KGB S&T
agent identified earlier on the basis of a May 1962 report
from. a sensitive source.

NOSENKO's Information

KOTEN was a longtime member of the American Communist
Party and a frequent visitor after the Second World War
to the Soviet Union, where he had extensive contacts among
dissident literary figures and other Soviet citizens,
particularly among Russian Jews. [NOSENKO explained in
another context that the KGB is wary of foreigners' contacts
with Soviet Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service
has frequently inspired such contacts.) Because of these
many suspicious contacts, both the KGB First and Second
Directorates had concluded that KOTEN might be a "provocation
agent" planted in or recruited from the ranks of the
Communist Party in the United States.

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NOSENKO's Information

SHUBIN was a native of California of Russian ex-
traction, a Russian speaker, and a university professor
in New York City. SHUBIN, who had visited the Soviet
Union twice before, visited the Soviet Union in 1958
or 1959, while NOSENKO was serving his first tour of
duty in the Seventh Department. At that time, SHUBIN
was the target of Seventh Department case officer
A.A. VETLITSKIY, NOSENKO heard later that SHUBIN was
placed under surveillance, and when the KGB surveillance
observed SHUBIN as a passenger in a Ministry of Defense
automobile, the GRU was asked about the American. "They
very furtively said that they were interested in him,"
from which the KGB concluded that SHUBIN was a GRU agent.

In 1962 (sic) NOSENKO was reviewing a list of foreign
visitors to the Soviet Union and he noted SHUBIN's name
and recalled his earlier identification as a GRU agent.
NOSENKO himself telephoned GRJ General SOKOLOV's office
and informed SOKOLOV of SHUBIN's presence (or, according
to another version, SOKOLOV'S office was advised by
others). SOKOLOV'S office eventually apologized for
having failed earlier to notify the KGB of the GRU'S
interest in SHUBIN".
Σ

Comment: a sensitive source
Earlier, C
identified an
agent apparently identical with SHUBIN
and FBI sources reported SHUBIN's travel
to the USSR in summer 1961 and in
September 1963.
SHUBIN had no valid U.S. passport
between 1940 and June 1961; if he visited
the Soviet Union during that period it was
not as an American tourist under his true
name. Consequently, he could not then have
been the tourist target of the Seventh
Department case officer, as NOSENKO claimed.
If NOSENKO erred, and actually was referring
to SHUBIN's visit in 1961, there is a further
contradiction: NOSENKO could not have
noticed his name while reviewing tourist
lists in the Seventh Department, because
he claims he was in the American Department.
at the time.

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NOSENKO went to Gorkiy on the fourth day after CHFRE-
PANOV's disappearance. The area was covered with very deep
woods, "where a person could los: himself for life". On the
seventh day CHEREPANOV was located and arrested in Baku,
where he was on his way to the Iranian border.

A special plane was inmediately sent to Baku, carrying
S.M. FEDOSEYEV and several other American Department offi-
cers. They brought CHEREPANOV immediately back to Moscow,
interrogating him on the plane. He immediately confessed
to having given the documents to the Americans. When asked
why, he said he was "angry at the KGB, very angry", and
besides, he thought he might ask the Americans for some
money in return for the documents. He confessed that on
4 November he had passed the documents to an American tourist
who was a librarian interested in Russian bocks. He said he
had given the documents to the American in the entrance
hallway in the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the building in which the Ministry of Foreign Trade was also
housed.

Because CHEREPANOV had eluded the KGB between the two
fixed surveillance posts which had been established, the
Second Chief Directorate suffered considerable criticism
for not putting CHEREPANOV under full, round-the-clock.
surveillance. CHEREPANOV himself, however, told the KGB
that if he had detected his surveillants he would have
written to the government and newspapers a letter of protest
against "such an indignity, such persecution", and then
would have committed suicide, leaving the KGB without proof
of his guilt.

Comment: sensitive sources,
on
Other sources, including
have also reported various aspects of the
CHEREPANOV incident.
NOSENKO's assertions with respect to the
CHEREPANOV case, however, are not material to
his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the
Seventh Department at the time.

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The Recall Telegran

KOSEIKO's Information

On 3 February 1964, NOSEIKO claimed, he visited the KGB
Legal Residency once during the morning before he ret with
CHA and again that evening after 1300; there were at those
times no KGB telegrams concerning him. On the morning of
4 February he again stopped in at the Residency, but there
were again no such messages for him. Later in the morning
of 4 February, however, after attending a session of the
Disarmament Conference, he returned to the Residency and
found that a telegram from KGB Headquarters had arrived,
instructing him to return to Moscow immediately to partici-
pate in the KGB conference on tourism. After relating the
substance of the telegram, NOSENKO defected and was thence-
forth in CIA custody.

Comment: Special Intelligence does not confirm NOSENKO'S
assertion regarding the existence of the recall
telegram. According to Special Intelligence,
there were enciphered communications from Moscow
to the Soviet Mission in Geneva earlier and
later, lut there was none from 1815 on 3
February until 1730 on 4 February, several hours
after NOSENKO was in custody of CIA.

324
Top Secret TS No. 197124-
Copy

14-00000
Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964)

NOSEMO'S Eventual Retraction Regarding Recall Telegram

NOSEIKO maintained throughout ais interrogations
ir. 1964 and 1965 that there was the recall telegram and that
it prompted his defection. In October 1966, however, while
being questioned again, NOSENKO stated that there had bee::
no telegram recalling him to Moscow from Geneva, and he
signed the following statement:

"On 4 February 1964, I told my CIA contact
I
in Geneva that a telegram from Headquarters in
Moscow had been received in the KGE Residency 11
Geneva recalling me immediately to Moscow. I said
at the time that this telegram said that I was
recalled to participate in a conference to plan KGB
activity against tourists for the 1964 season.
maintained this story as fact throughout subsequent
interviews and interrogations by American authorities
in 1964 and 1965. No such telegram ever existed.
No telegram was received in Geneva. I admit that
the story was a lie. I myself invented this tele-
gram in order to hasten my defection. I was rervcus
and afraid that my contacts with American Intelli-
gence might be noticed."

Knowledge of Other Seventh Department Operations

The notes NOSENKO brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964
(see p.319) included brief reference to thirteen other KGB
operations conducted, against what NOSENKO described as
tourists during the 1962-1963 period. For reasons cited
in the description of these operations in Annex B, these
opcrations are not material to NOSEIKO's claim to service
an 1962-1963 as either Chief of the American-British
Commonwealth Section or as Deputy Chief of the Seventh
Department.

325
Top Secret
1
TS No... 197124
10
Copy

14-00000
Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT Jaruary 1962-January 1964)

Operational Activities July 1962-January 1964: Summary

To substantiate his claims to having served as Deputy
Chief of the Seventh Department during this period, NOSENKO
describes KGB involvement in the recruitment of# SECRET

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION:

*   MARKED FOR ANALYSIS:
*   INDEXING REQUIRED: No
*   ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAR ACCESS INDEXING:

TO: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: PBQ Part I - Alfonso Dabilodox Torres
ACTION REQUIRED: REFERENCES:

Attached herewith is PBQ Part I on Subject. Provisional Operational Approval is requested, along with 201 number. Subject's cryptonym, assigned 15 October 1963 by the Station, follows under separate cover.

Willard C. Curtis

Distribution:

*   3 - MMD, w/att. h/w and w/s/o
*   2 - Files

SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: EOA-22488

DATE: 13 November 1963

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

MCS FILE NUMBER: 201-104-10211-10326 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DISPATCH
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City
FROM: Chief, WE Division
SUBJECT: LIENVOY-8
ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

PROCESSING TION
MARKED FOR INDEXING

DO NOING REAS
OLY QUALIFIED DESA
CAR DE MOSING

MICROFILE

1. As a result of the recent review done of the LIFEAT
and LIENVOY Project, it came to Headquarters attention that
LIENVOY-8, who was believed to have been terminated, was still
covered by the LIEKVOY Project.

2. According to HMA-14876, LIENVOY-8 was the cause of
a security problem for LIENVOY in February 1960 when he requested
release from LIENVOY and a transfer to his parent organization, the
General Staff of the Presidency. LIENVOY-8 was described as a
"scur" nationalist who disapproved of ODTOKE's sharing of the
LIENVOY take.

3. Headquarters now notes that LIENVOY-8's clearance has
never been cancelled and there is no Agent Service Record or
termination report in his file. LIENVOY-8 was included in the
LIENVOY Project renewal request for the 1961/62 project year, but
not for the 1962/63 year. The field project renewal request for
the 1963/64 year included him again.

4. It is requested that the Station inform Headquarters of
the present status of LIENVOY-8 (201-118406). If he has been
terminated, please forward an Agent Service Record. If he is
still being used, please provide a current analysis of his relia-
bility and comments on any security probelas present in light of
his actions and reputation in 1960.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
081 - COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

HLHB-12027
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

31 Octos
DATE
23 October 1963
HQS FILE NUMBER
201-118406

ORIGINATING
14-00000
104-10213-10002-
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DO/P 11244

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)
SUBJECT : Related Mission Directive for Mexico

1. Attached is the revised Releted Mission Directive for Mexico.

2. Your approval is requested.

A. R. King
Chief, WH Division

CONCUR:

Chief, WH/PD

Chief, CA

O. Calder, CI

APPROVED:

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)
3 JAN 1961
Date Approved

24 January 1961
Distribution:
Orig & 2 - WHD
1 - PD
1 - CA
1 - CI
1 - SR
1 - FI/Plans
1 - FI/INT
1 - RI

COPY

14-00000

RELATED MISSION DIRECTIVE FOR MEXICO

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

A. National Policy. The long-range national policy objectives of the U.S. Government toward Mexico are to reduce to an ineffectual level the influence of international Communism, to encourage democratic government, and to keep the Mexican government friendly and favorably inclined toward U. S. policies. Further guidance is given in the current CCB Regional Operations Plan for Latin America.

B. Operational Emphasis. The Station's primary emphasis will continue to be placed on clandestine collection operations and covert action operations against the Sino-Soviet bloc, Cuban, and Communist elements in Mexico.

C. Changes in the MAD. This basic policy instruction for activities in Mexico has been revised in light of the Station's last Annual Assessment of Progress Report and to reflect more accurately operational conditions, capabilities and direction. In view of the importance and threat presented by Communist Cuba to U. S. interests in Latin America, coverage of Cuban revolutionary activities in Mexico has been made a specific requirement under Priority A. Priority B objectives and tasks include refinements of desired efforts and also provide for covert action operations against Cuban targets in Mexico. The former task for production of action pictures and their distribution has been deleted, as it is no longer a valid requirement; the former tasks pertaining to the possible use of foreign diplomats have been combined; a task to develop young potential political leaders (ZREAGER) has been added. Two previous Priority C objectives have been eliminated, as there is no established Mexican intelli-gence service, and the Station regularly reports on activities of the security services. Coverage of Chinese Communists has been raised to Priority B coincident with the elimination of the former Priority C section.

D. Contingency Reporting. In addition to the specific objectives set forth in Section II, the Station will from time to time be called on to attempt to satisfy Intelligence

14-00000

3

Guides and Intelligence Directives, but it is expected that these requirements be satisfied utilizing existing assets. Of particular interest on a continuing basis is information on: (a) any indications that Mexico may be used as a base for clandestine activity directed against the U. S. (CI Book Messages 23 and 115); (b) activities of non-bloc intelligence services, especially those that are potentially harmful to U. S. interests; (c) the plotting of revolutionary groups according to their current importance in attempts to overthrow the regimes of their respective Latin American countries; (d) the current alignment and activities of political forces with the potential for assuming control of the Mexican Government; (e) U. S. Communists residing in Mexico; and (f) the Spanish Communist group.

It will be noted that certain previous contingency reporting requirements have been amended as follows: The former levy for reporting on the stability of the Mexican Government has been changed to a more realistic and meaningful statement as reflected by (d) above. This modification is appropriate, as political changes in Mexico are most likely to occur within the framework of constitutionality. The previous charge for reporting on secret shipments of strategic materials from Mexico to bloc countries is no longer specifically required and has been deleted.

II. OBJECTIVES

PRIORITY A

1. Obtain information on Sino-Soviet bloc plans and activities in Mexico, including those of bloc intelligence services.

a. Continue and, where possible, increase physical and technical surveillance of bloc installations and residences.

b. Through controlled agent assets, identify and monitor the activities of bloc personnel, if conditions warrant, attempt recruitment or defection of bloc personnel.

2

14-00000

4

c. Continue CI operations against bloc intelligence personnel.

2. Seek to reduce and, if possible, eliminate Communist and leftist control or influence in key governmental and non-governmental organizations, political parties, mass media outlets, and other elements that influence public or official opinion and policies.

a. Develop political action penetration agents in key functional groups, such as students, teachers and organized labor, in order to disrupt and reduce their capacity for carrying out action harmful to U. S. objectives and interests.

b. Expose and discredit illegal or subversive Sino- Soviet bloc activities and representatives in Mexico, as well as the activities and personnel of International and local Communist front organizations.

c. Identify, discredit, and if possible eliminate Communists and pro-Communists from strategic positions in government, educational institutions, state- controlled industrial and agricultural enterprises, labor unions, and student organizations.

d. Provide support and give guidance to individuals and organizations that can be induced to produce and disseminate anti-Communist, pro-Free World propaganda via radio, television, newspapers, or other media, and carry out political action operations against Communist or other anti-U. S. elements.

e. Identify, develop, and utilize important non-Communist political, business or civic leaders to carry out propaganda, economic or political actions against Communist influence and induce them to support views coinciding with U. S. Government policy interests.

f. Continue to support and guide anti-Communist youth and student organizations, publications or agents, and when necessary, develop additional assets in key schools in Mexico City and selected provinces.

3

14-00000

5

g. Develop and support covert press assets in the staffs of influential newspapers.

h. Develop access to individuals and organizations in the labor field and support non-Communist leaders and groups in key unions.

3. Obtain information on the organizational structure, key personnel, financing, covert plans and activities of the Communist Party of Mexico (PCM), Communist front organizations and groups, especially the Partido Popular Socialista (PPS), and non-Communist and/or anti-U. S. groups that may be susceptible to exploitation by International Communism.

a. Exploit and extend existing penetrations in the PCM and the PPS.

b. Maintain penetrations of the PCM and seek to penetrate the anti-EXCINA wing of the PCM.

c. Develop and, if conditions warrant, recruit a key source in the workers' University capable of monitoring cultural contacts between the University and bloc diplomatic installations.

d. Continue to monitor the activities of selected Communist-influenced labor unions and front groups through the penetration in the PPS) if conditions warrant, make selected recruitments in the unions or groups.

4. Continue to obtain information on Cuban Revolutionary activities in Mexico and support U. S. Government efforts against the CASTRO regime.

a. Continue to conduct penetration operations of Cuban Embassy and induce defections of Cuban diplomats.

b. Recruit agents in Mexico for operational use in Cuba.

c. Secure support of high Mexican Government officials for the conduct of operations against Cuba.

d. Continue to provide operational support for activities

14-00000

e. directed against the CASTRO regime in Cuba.

Utilize propaganda media, political action assets, and other covert means to combat the influence of Cuban revolutionary ideologies in Mexico.

PRIORITY B

1. Combat ultra-nationalistic and anti-U. S. activities in Mexico, and propagandize the dangers of Communism.

a. Utilize existing media and political action assets to combat anti-U. S. propaganda or activities.

b. Utilize existing media and political action assets to prevent or negate collaboration between ultra-nationalists and Communists.

c. Utilize media and political action assets to prevent or negate the socio-economic and cultural penetration plans or activities of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

d. Spot and develop for future covert collaboration young local figures who show potential for political leader- ship and who may be influenced to become generally favorable to U. S. interests.

2. Obtain information on the secret intentions and activities of the Mexican Government in foreign affairs, particularly toward the U. S., the Sino-Soviet bloc, and Cuba.

a. Continue to develop and influence high level contacts in the Mexican Government, particularly the Office of the President and the Foreign Ministry.

3. Collect information on the Sino-Soviet bloc.

a. Continue penetration of airline and steamship offices and official government agencies to obtain advance information on travellers.

b. Recruit or obtain the willing collaboration of selected travellers to bloc countries, especially those who will remain in bloc countries for an extended period and who may be on scientific missions.

5

14-00000

7

c. Recruit third nationals and Latin American diplomats to be assigned or transferred to bloc countries.

d. Obtain communications intelligence on bloc diplomatic traffic.

4. Obtain information on the Chinese Communists in Mexico.

a. Spot, assess and recruit or develop sources in the Chinese community.

b. Exploit the Gobernacion files on Chinese living in Mexico and effect penetration of the SHACP.
14-00000
104-10213-10202

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III

15 November 1974

ANNEX B

THE 201 SYSTEM

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific in-
terest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent
information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying
subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for
producing lists of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a rela-
tively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify
opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and
CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organi-
zations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of corre-
spondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. The 201 Number: a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each
individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that
individual

b. The 201 Dossier: the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form
831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., per-
sonal history, current status, and prospects.

c. The Master 201 Record: a machine record generated by the opening of
a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and
stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. Main Index Master 201 Reference: this reference, printed in reply to an
Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent
within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the ref-
erence consolidated

23

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

15 November 1974

0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON
SEX M DOB 12 APR 26
CIT GERM
POB GERM, BERLIN
OCC PHARMACIST
REF R\&CD-12345, 20 JM 53 OCC CODE CHEM
SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS
AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH
29 OCTOBER.

201-0032671
TYPE NAME T
OI CODES AA XX
REC DATE 53

30 NOV 70

24
SECRET

00833555

Information About Subject

1. Sequence Number and Name

2. Sex and Date of Birth

3. Citizenship

4. Place of Birth

5. Occupation

6. Occupation Code

7. Text

Document Reference Data Group

8. 201 Number

9. Name Type Indicator

10. OI Codes

11. Record Date (year only)

12. Reference

ISC Control Information

13. Date of latest update of the record

14. STAR Index Record Number

14-00000
SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

15 November 1974

e. Ol Code: a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 per-
sonality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual
with organizations or activities of operational interest. Ol codes cover intelli-
gence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or
suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of Ol
codes for use by components:

(1) general Ol codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services
or other specific organizations.

A component may request an Ol code be established by submitting a mem-
orandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management
Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An Ol code may be assigned
when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see
paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added
at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201
personalities by Ol codes. For example, if an Ol code has been opened for the
security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members
of that service.

f. 201 Machine Lists: produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on
names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers
exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. General

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational com-
ponent, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates
a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing
of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be
opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this
handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information
will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on
persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and per-
sons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those
persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals
are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff
employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

25

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

15 November 1974

persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk
and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO
records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy require-
ments on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose
names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201
dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational ap-
proval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested
for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of opera-
tional interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than
denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five
or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/
ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. Requesting a 201 File Opening

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting
a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Main-
tenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the
master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assign-
ment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample
201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field
station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201 in the Head-
quarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the
subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening
is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by
placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN
will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsi-
bility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of
201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.

26

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

DOIIB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

15 November 1974

4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into
his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through
a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must
be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation
procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and
handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

l. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the
subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which
have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which
have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles
on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

26.1

SECRET

14-00000
SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

15 November 1974

a. Purging

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires
discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the
simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take
place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done
periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should
be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for
the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if
a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number
then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch
cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information
contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is
by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier
forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention
in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized
officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction
over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification
authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained
at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained
in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a
cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location
of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. Maintenance Procedures

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order.
In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201

26.2

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

15 November 1974

dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash
number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are
to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification
into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may
be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards
should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff
employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to
the ISG/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be
closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true
name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest
should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material
has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified
to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an
OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and
Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing
to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number)
containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201
should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document
for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic
document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document
remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document
in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L,
or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will
automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may con-
tain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the
file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-
tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

26.3

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

15 November 1974

Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be
handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201
dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a
Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.

UNCLASSIFIED
INTERAM
USE ONLY
SUBJECT
FROM:
TO:
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS

See CSHB 70-1-1,
Chapter III, Annex B.)

Volume(s) 1 of volume(s)
of 201- .

Restricted Dossier
(Attach Form 2021 to
Dossier)
Non-Restricted Dossier

For Split Charge Dossiers:
All documents prior to

(date)

forwarded to IP/Files. All
documents after
(date)
retained at desk.

SIGNATURE
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED

26.4

SECRET

14-00000
SECRET

DOIIB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

15 November 1974

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any
period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk
officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer.
Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Account-
ability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.

TO:

CONFIDENTIAL

(When Prepared -- Strike Out)

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY

This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited
below has been transferred to you by:

Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files,
Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.

FILE No.

FORM No.

DATE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

FILE No.

FORM No.

DATE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

(Use Reverse for Listing Additional Documents or Files)
ACTION OFFICER SIGNATURE
CONFIDENTIAL

CL 87: 907677

64. Se.

The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action
Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the
201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings
for his component.

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the
desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201
Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

26.5

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SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

15 November 1974

(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge
from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being
returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form
2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by sub-
mitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).

IP/Files
OC-52 T3 DT-6
IP/DCU
00-40 T3
CONFIDENTIAL
FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
ACTION DESK: 1. To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not
necessary).
2. To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature
necessary).
STANIGLA
FILE No.
RESTRICT TO: (Use country or com-country code number. See CSI 12-23)
AUTHORIZED BY:
Date:
COMPONENT:
REMOTE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY)
COMPONENT:
R.O. No.
Date:
FORM
2021
CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT
b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the
personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request
for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier
held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-
routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file
to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The
desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted
dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that
desk by Central Files.

26.6

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

15 November 1974

8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the validity of the
subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the
requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201
file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should
supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by
telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the
information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge
Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent
by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after
appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will
destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and
number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder
will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit
(IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names
and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of
interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its
alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening
the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request
(Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16)
blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate
permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the
201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are
categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

a. Standard Listings

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's
interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

26.7

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14-00000

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

15 November 1974

Desk blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The
standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.

DATE
02APR74
LAST NAME

CHEN, LING 1 171105/11181/
FIRST, MIDDLE INTL
SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY
BIRTH
PLACE
GIVFN HINT MISTI. HAF
ACTION
MATF
201
NUM
DATE
CHINT 0163401
REC
ACT
CHIN, CHI
CHIR,
91/1158/432
201479
٢٠٥/٩/٩/09077/
21APR15
Chen, LIXIA
CHEN. TASTING PROV.
2734925
22921
CNEN, TAH
COEP
CHIN 03-3758

0107839
441502
31JANGI
32-1931
CHEA, M
30-1126
CHEN, RACING
COIN, ANOW
0000000
201479
CHINA
0253575
27JUN15
4
T
CHINA
03-3758
CHEN, RAFIING 119/410/8/
CHING CASI
T
CHEN, CASI
124 10701/1143/1927
0253576
242711
CHINA
CHEN, CASI
02SEP26
2771971
22FEB69
CHEMI
0158714
CHEN, TATING PROV.
5234518
CHEN, CHIS
CSIA. PAKINDIA, KAT ARTH
41502
04APR69
CHEN, RA
0201344
CLIT
CHEN, SHU CHIA. PFILEU
٢٠٩/٢٠٢/01/21-KIS
03-11
BLACE
0143610
112661
BLACE

050714
CHEN, PFILEU
0253219
09077
23-1196
CSAP
COIN 0211830
T
CHAN, WANG
CO. AR14
208 12615/2005/1757/
23FEROT
CHIR,
CHEN. SHU-15
71158/208/5301/
0732584
1127355
CHEN. MENC
0997836
03APR31
CHINA
CHNPH? 0340249

0352634
Chen. SING-CHINESE
Chen. Su-14 17/1512095/1795/
0579453
33753
COMN
0124340
7839735
COIM 0280253
249789
4
CHINA
CHINA, 1008-2110
CNP10, 117
CHIR, ETE.
0568112
CTAT
0174620
CHEN. MEIFENG
4115077
CLIRSA CHIR
1349507
19277
CUIR CHIN
CSUS
0436725
CHIR PHIM
2603383
10079
8421582
8711541
503475
9411626
0019479
7631327

CHEN
0271972
CN, DEPING
CHINO 0221142
CHIN? 0790654
CHIR 15/2835/2710/
CHIN CHIN
2705230
CNIN 0179426
CHIN, HELE TING SICK, NY CHAT
33758
216
19231291
CHIR DFOR
CITFS, SIJ TER S
HSO47/4439
CHEN, MING
CNIN DISPLA
2401825
MS051/75/2/2/14
CNIN 000000
MS091/322
CNN 0015759
CNN 0052638
CTIS, 376/15/2805/5361/4
CHIR? 0144602
26.8
SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET
14-00000
SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

15 November 1974

All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions must be destroyed
upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely
sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.

b. Non-Standard Listings

Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:

(1) Country of location

(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)

(3) Citizenship

(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)

(5) Occupation.

These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example,
a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the
Ol code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be
produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915
and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the
United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the Ol code AA.
Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an
Ol code AA. Those personalities with an Ol code other than AA and those
with no Ol code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that
persons who have not been assigned an Ol code also be included. Note also
that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific
as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier
covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one
occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice
some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics
and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category
will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted
(arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:

(a) Surname

(b) Given name

(c) Date of birth

(d) Country of birth

(e) Citizenship

(f) OI code

(g) Location

26.9

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14-00000

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

15 November 1974

Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted
alphabetically by surname within Ol codes for given countries of location.
Because two Ol codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two
Of codes would be listed twice.

c. Scheduled Listings

Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.

d. Special Listings

Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis
in response to special operational requirements.

e. Request for Listings

All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201
listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for
information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component
Records Management Officer.

26.10

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14-00000

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DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER HI, ANNEX B
Attachment 2
15 November 1974

AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS

Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following cate-
gories of people.

1. Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)

a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.

b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches.

c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID).

(Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling
of name and additional biographic data.)

2. British Commonwealth

a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence
Services.

b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service
(IMIS).

c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and
officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open
unless there is at least a date of birth given.

d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police (RCMP-SS).

3. Cuba

Intelligence service employees (DSE, DCI).

4. Israel

a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating
office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.

b. Military attaches.

c. Assistant military attaches.

d. Identified intelligence officers. --

26.15

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DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
Attachment 2
15 November 1974

5. North Vietnam

All diplomats and NFLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.

6. USSR

a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e,
embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot)
office, news media office.

b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva,
and Vienna.

c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.

d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions
of higher learning.

26.16

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14-00000
CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. 43-1-1
SECRET
ANNEX B
70-1-1
CSHB 43-1-1
CHAPTER III

15 February 1960
PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS

1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personali-
ties indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given
point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and
CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of
groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these
personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.

2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on
these personalities into the CS records system. A single number,
e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled
by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced
to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current
status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in
future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of
other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published
periodically to help field stations14-00000
104-10213-10209
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

RET
DOI 50-10

OPERATIONS-GENERAL
DDO INSTRUCTION
ΝΟ. 50-10
4 September 1973

RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE OF CERTAIN
CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUALS

Rescission: CSI 50-10, 13 July 1970

1. GENERAL

a. Elemental in the conduct of clandestine operations is the use of human
agents to accomplish the missions of the Operations Directorate. In gen-
eral, it is DDO policy to select agent_assets with primary regard to the
agents' abilities, target access, and security, and with few restrictions as
to their origins, professions or status as members of particular groups. The
basic rule is that any consenting adult may be used by the Operations
Directorate. There are, however, certain sensitive categories of individuals
or groups whose operational use by the Operations Directorate is prohibited
or in some way restricted for reasons not necessarily related to security
considerations.

b. These prohibitions or restrictions stem from one of the following:

(1) The Agency has been directed by U.S. Governmental authority to
sestrict or avoid the operational use of a particular category of in-
dividuals.

(2) The Agency has entered into a special restrictive agreement with an
organization, government, corporation, or official responsible for a
category of individuals.

(3) The Director or the Deputy Director for Operations has imposed
restrictions on the operational use of a certain category of individuals
due to the extreme risk or sensitivity of such exploitation.

2. PURPOSE

The purpose of this instruction is to set forth the prohibitions and policy
restrictions (as distinguished from security restrictions) which currently per-
tain to the operational use of various categories of individuals, together with
the special approval procedures to be followed in certain cases. Where ap-
propriate, reference has been made to another publication which provides
more detailed guidance than has been attempted in this instruction. The
special approval procedures set forth in this instruction do not supersede or
alter in any way the requirements for covert approvals contained in DOI
and DOI-F 105.

1
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DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10
SECRET
DOI 50-10
OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973
.
3. DEFINITIONS

Within the context of this instruction, the definitions listed below will apply.
Special note must be taken of the fact that the key term "operational use"
employed throughout this instruction has been defined in the most succinct
manner consistent with clarity. It has not been feasible, however, to cover in
a definition the entire scope of possible variations in operational circumstances
which may be encountered in DDO activities. The definition of "operational
use" is intended to provide guidance for the majority of cases, and must be
employed with responsible operational judgment. Issues involving a deter-
mination of "operational use" which cannot be resolved with reasonable as-
surance by the responsible operating components will be referred to the
Deputy Director for Operations for decision.

a. Operational Use
Operational use is interpreted to mean the recruitment, utilization, or train-
ing of any individual or group for DDO purposes on either a witting or
unwitting basis by or on the behalf of an element of the Operations Direc
torate. Utilization is made of an individual or group whenever that in-
dividual or group, responding to the direction or solicitation of a DDO
element, provides information, performs services, provides cover, or supplies
financial, material, or other support necessary for the accomplishment of
DDO operational objectives either directly or indirectly, to or for an ele
ment of the Operations Directorate.

b. DDO Element
Any person or group who or which is responsible to, owned or controlled
either directly or indirectly by the Operations Directorate. Included under
this definition are employees or members of Agency proprietary mech-
anisms.

c. Operational Contact
Any association having as its purpose the initiation or furtherance of DDO
operations.

4. RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE

a. Restrictions on the operational use of individuals or groups are of four types
and cover twenty five separate categories as outlined below and as described
in greater detail in paragraphs 5 through 8 of this instruction:

(1) Operational Use is Prohibited (sec paragraph 5):

(a) Members and trainees of ACTION;
(b) Fulbright grantees;

2
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DDO INSTRUCTION
ΝΟ. 50-10
OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

(c) Officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural
Freedom;

(d) Officials, employees, or grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and
Carnegie Foundations;

(e) Employees of U.S. private detective investigative agencies.
(2) Operational Use Requires Special Extra-Agency Concurrence (see
paragraph 6): AND APPROVAL OF SA/ADDO.

(a) Employees of other U.S. Government agencies;
(b) DDO agents or assets in the United States;
(c) Agents and human sources of foreign intelligence registered by
other U.S. agencies;

(d) Citizens (or persons documented as citizens) of Australia, Canada,
the United Kingdom (including its overseas dependent territories)
and New Zealand;

(e) Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands;
(f) Merchant seamen on ships of certain countries.
(3) Operational Use Requires Special Approval by the DDO (see para-
graph 7):

(a) Publishers, producers, journalists or employees of public infor-
mation media;

(b) CARE employees;
(c) Individuals engaged in public relations activities;
(d) Officials, representatives, or employees of Communist countries
in the United States;

(e) Foreign delegates or employees of the United Nations assigned
in the U.S. and U.S. citizen delegates or employees wherever
assigned;

(f) Staff members or officials of Red Cross societies;
(g) Officials of the Vatican State;
(h) U.S. Government-funded professors, lecturers, students or grantees;
(i) Members of educational or private voluntary organizations;
(j) Officials or employees of the African-American Institute;
(k) Volunteers to America.
(4) Operational Use Requires Approval by Chief of Area Division (see
paragraph 8):

(a) Citizens or alien residents of the U.S. in denied areas;
(b) Non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of United Nations or-
ganizations not assigned in the U.S.;
(c) Members of the academic community.

b. Operational use of an individual who comes under more than one type of
restriction will be controlled by the highest type of restriction applicable
in his particular case.
L
3
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DDO INSTRUCTION
ΝΟ. 50-10
SECRET
DOI 50-10
OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

5. OPERATIONAL USE PROHIBITED

a. Members and Trainees of ACTION

(1) It is Agency policy that members and trainees of ACTION will not be
used in any capacity, with or without remuneration, by the Agency
or by organizations under its jurisdiction. (The term "members of AC
TION will be understood to mean anyone employed by or associated
with ACTION except trainees.)

(2) It is Agency policy that former members of ACTION may be em-
ployed or used by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction
only in accordance with the following:

(a) Except as stated in (b) below, a former member of ACTION
may be employed or used operationally by any element of the
Agency only if a period of five full years has elapsed since his
separation from ACTION.

(b) An Agency-controlled organization may hire a former member of
ACTION, but only for duties related to the overt purposes of such
organization, if a period of at least twenty-four months has elapsed
since his separation from ACTION.

(c) The employment or use of a former member of ACTION under
the provisions of subparagraph (a) or (b) above must have the
specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations.

(3) Former trainees whose ACTION service included duty or training over-
seas are subject to the rules governing employment or use of former
members of ACTION (subparagraph (2) above). Former trainees who
did not serve at any time as members of ACTION and whose ACTION
service did not include duty or training overseas may be employed or
used operationally by DDO elements provided the specific prior ap-
proval of the Deputy Director for Operations is obtained.

(4) A former member or trainee of ACTION whose employment or use
is permitted by subparagraph (2) or (3) above may not be assigned
to or used in a country for which he had been trained or to which
he had been assigned while with ACTION.

(5) Information may be received by the Domestic Collection Division
from private corporations and other organizations employing former
ACTION personnel, notwithstanding the fact that the information may
originate with former ACTION personnel However, any direct brief-
ing or debriefing of or contact with former members or trainees of
ACTION is subject to the following:

(a) The specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations
must be obtained.

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DOI 50-10
OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

(b) If the individual is a former member of ACTION, or a former
trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training over-
seas, five years must have elapsed since his separation from
ACTION.

If contact with a former ACTION member or a former trainee whose
ACTION service included duty or training overseas should be un-
avoidable during the required five year waiting period, the Deputy
Director for Operations may request an exception from the Director
of Central Intelligence. Among the possible reasons for such unavoid-
able contact would be the designation of a former member or trainee
as the liaison officer to the Domestic Collection Division.

b. Fulbright Grantees
DDO policy prohibits the operational use of individuals who are receiving
U.S. Government support under certain provisions (see below) of the
Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, as amended,
commonly known as the Fulbright-Hays Act. Falling under this prohibi-
tion are teachers, research scholars, lecturers and students (including stu-
dent artists and student musicians) who have been selected to receive
scholarships er grants by the Board of Foreign Scholarships appointed
by the President of the United States. Operational use of such individuals
is prohibited only during the period when they are participating in the
educational and cultural exchange program. This prohibition specifically
does not apply to the several other categories of grantees supported by
other provisions of the Fulbright-Hays Act such as artists, athletes, leaders,
specialists or participants at international trade fairs or expositions who
do not come under the aegis of the President's Board of Foreign Scholar-
ships (see 7.j., below).

c. Officials or Employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom
DDO policy prohibits the operational use of the officials or employees
of the International Association for Cultural Freedom. Contacts with such
individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover ca-
pacities must be limited to their cover assignments.

d. Officials, Employees, or Grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie
Foundations
DDO policy prohibits the operational use of grantees of the Ford Founda-
tion, the Rockefeller Foundation or the Carnegie Foundation or of other
persons actively participating in programs which are wholly sponsored
and controlled by any of these foundations. Additionally, there will be
no operational use made of the officials or employees of these organiza-
tions. In general, however, there is no restriction on nouoperational con-
tacts or consultations with such individuals.

5
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SECRET
DOI 50-10

DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10
OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

e. Employees of U.S Private Detective Investigative Agencies
DDO policy prohibits the operational use either in the United States
or overseas of the employees of any U.S.-owned or -controlled private
detective investigative agency. This policy does not apply to operational
use of employees of organizations which are engaged strictly in commercial
or credit investigations.

6. EXTRA-AGENCY CONCURRENCE REQUIRED

a. Employees of Other U.S. Government Agencies
Approval for the operational use of staff or contract (including foreign)
employees of other U.S. Government agencies will be granted only in
cases where the employee's parent agency in Washington has been notified
of and has approved of the intended operational use in accordance with
the provisions of DOI 10-5.

b. DDO Agents or Assets in the United States
In accordance with the agreement existing between the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and this Agency, the restrictions listed below apply to
the operational activity of the Operations Directorate conducted in the
United States. Coordination with the FBI of appropriate inforination on
DDO operational activities in the United States is the responsibility of
the Chief, Liaison Group, Operations Staff.

(1) All investigations by this Agency of foreign officials in the United
States require the prior concurrence of the FBI. In this context, the
term investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or pro-
cedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood
inquiries) aimed at developing information concerning an individual's
activities or background; "investigation" does not include the ac
ceptance or the development of information through social contacts
or contacts normally made by Agency officials in discharging their
cover functions.

(2) Any approach in the United States by a DDO element for recruit-
ment of any foreign official or of any visitor from a Communist country
requires the prior concurrence of the FBI.

(3) Any planned meeting in the United States for assessment and social
development between a DDO element and a foreign official of known
or presumed interest to the FBI or between a DDO element and an
official or visitor from a Communist country requires that prior noti-
fication be provided to the FBI.

(4) Whenever domestic DDO operations involve matters pertaining to
the national security of the United States, appropriate identification
of persons engaged in the operations in the United States will be
0
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DDO INSTRUCTION
ΝΟ. 50-10
OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

provided to the FBI. In accordance with this policy, the following
categories of DDO assets will be identified to the FBI: DDO per-
sonnel, agents of the Operations Directorate who are either U.S. citizens
or alien residents, and foreign agents of the Operations Directorate
recruited abroad who come to the United States for operational
purposes.

c. Agents and Human Sources of Foreign Intelligence Registered by Other
U.S. Agencies
The Interagency Source Register (ISR) has been established at head-
quarters to provide for United States Intelligence Board (USIB) agencies
a centralized record of agents and human sources of foreign intelligence.
A principal purpose of the ISR is to register primacy of interest and
prevent multiple recruitment or unintentional duplicate operational use
of such agents and human sources. It is USIB policy that no individual
registered in the ISR by one USIB agency will be used for operational pur-
poses by any other USIB agency without the specific prior approval of the
agency having primacy of interest. If a DDO element desires to arrange the
transfer or joint operational use of a registered individual, the ISR will con-
tact the agency having primacy of interest to determine whether there is a
willingness to discuss this matter.

d. Citizens (or Persons Documented as Citizens) of Australia, Canada, the
United Kingdom (including its Overseas Dependent Territories) and
New Zealand

(1) The operational use of citizens of the above-named countries (includ-
ing the overseas dependencies of the United Kingdom) is restricted
by agreements with the intelligence or security authorities of such
countries, which require the prior approval of the appropriate liaison
authority. Such approval will be obtained at the earliest feasible stage
of development through the European Division (in the case of citizens
of Canada or the United Kingdom), or through the East Asia Division
(in the case of Australian or New Zealand citizens)."

(2) The above restriction also governs the use of false documentation
representing DDO staff or agent personnel as citizens of the above-
named countries. Approval for the use of such documentation will
be sought through the same channels as stated in subparagraph (1)
above.

(3) Authority to make operational use of the persons or documentation
described in the above subparagraphs without obtaining the prior
approval of the liaison authority concerned may be granted only
by the Deputy Director for Operations or by the Director.

7
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4 September 1973

e. Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands
The operational use of any citizen of Norway, West Germany or The
Netherlands is, under certain conditions, contingent on prior approval
of the national intelligence service concerned. These countries are par-
ticularly sensitive in cases involving the operational use of their citizens
who are merchant seamen and who are serving on ships carrying their
flags. Each case involving the proposed operational use of a citizen of
one of these countries will be reviewed by the Chief of the European
Division in the light of the agreements existing between this Agency and
the national intelligence service concerned. After weighing all of the
equities, the Chief of the European Division will decide whether approval
is required from the national intelligence service concerned. When re-
quired, approvals for the operational use of such individuals will be
obtained from the appropriate national intelligence services by the Euro-
pean Division.

f. Merchant Seamen on Ships of Certain Countries
The operational use of merchant seamen, regardless of their citizenship,
who are serving on ships carrying the flags of Australia, Canada, the
United Kingdom (or its overseas dependencies), New Zealand, Norway,
West Germany or The Netherlands is, under certain conditions, subject
to provisions of the agreements existing between this Agency and the
national intelligence service concerned. Each case involving the proposed
operational use of such a merchant seaman will be reviewed by the Chief
of the European Division or the Chief of the East Asia Division, as ap-
propriate, in the light of the pertinent interservice agreements. After
weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European Division or the
Chief of the East Asia Division will determine the course of action to
be taken with regard to the national intelligence service concerned.

7. APPROVAL BY THE DDO REQUIRED
Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations for the operational use
of any individual who falls into one of the categories described in this para-
graph will be requested by memorandum. The individual's covert approval
status will be described in the memorandum to the Deputy Director for
Operations, together with a concise explanation of the intended operational
use. (In connection with this paragraph, contacts by the Domestic Collection
Division with individuals or firms do not require approval by the Deputy
Director for Operations provided they constitute merely briefing or de-
briefing for the purpose of obtaining information acquired by an individual
or representative of a firm in the course of his normal activities. If, however,
in any case the contact is on behalf of another element of the Operations
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Directorate or another agency; or if an individual or firm will be requested
to perform an operational task or to deviate from his or its normal pattern
of activity; or if the activity, even though consistent with the individual's
or firm's normal pattern of activity, will take place because requested or
funded by the Domestic Collection Division; that case will be subject to
the requirement for approval by the Deputy Director for Operations.)

a. Publishers, Producers, Journalists, or Employees of Public Information
Media (see DOI 240-6)

(1) Operational use of publishers or producers of public information media
requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations whenever
there is danger that such activity might serve in any way to influence
U.S. public opinion. Such activities include but are not limited to the
publishing of books, newspapers, or magazines, the making of films,
the production of TV or radio programs or the issuance in the United
States_of_any public opinion influencing information media. The op-
erational use abroad of publishers or producers of public information
media for non-U.S. audiences does not require approval by the Deputy
Director for Operations even though such activities may have some
unintended and unsolicited fallout in the United States.

(2) Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is also required prior
to the operational use of journalists, newspaper, TV, radio, or news
service correspondents or stringers, and employees of news media
including TV and radio stations, whenever the individual is a U.S.
citizen or when the news medium involved is under U.S. ownership
or control.

b. CARE Employees
It is DDO policy to avoid operational use of employees of the CARE
organization including indigenous employees. Exceptional individual cases
involving priority operational objectives will be considered on their merits.
Prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations will be required
in all cases.

c. Individuals Engaged in Public Relations Activities (see DOI 50-18)
Individuals engaged in public relations activities which in any way have
or seek to have an influence on public opinions in the United States are
considered to be in a separate sensitive category. In view of the peculiar
aspects of public relations activity, including the special requirements of
the Foreign Agents Registration Act, approval by the Deputy Director
for Operations is required prior to the operational use in a public relations
capacity of any individual who is engaged in public relations activities
and who is located in or operating into the United States.

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d. Officials, Representatives, or Employees of Communist Countries in the
United States (see DOI 60-11)
Prior approval of the Director or the Deputy Director for Operations is
required for operational contact in the United States with or operational
use of officials, representatives, or employees of the USSR, its satellite
countries, Communist China, or any other country under Communist
control. If, while in the United States, such individual is to be investigated,
approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior
concurrence of the FBI will also be required in accordance with para-
graph 6.b., above.
RATIONS
e. Delegates or Employees of the United States
It is DDO policy that the operational use of delegates or employees of
the United Nations, including those of its various main organs and of
its related intergovernmental agencies, is of such sensitivity as to require
special consideration by the Deputy Director for Operations. In especially
worthwhile cases wherein operational use of a particular UN individual
is deemed essential for the accomplishment of the DDO mission, approval
may be obtained. In each case involving a non-U.S. citizen assigned in
the U.S. or a U.S. citizen wherever assigned, the prior approval of the
Deputy Director for Operations will be required. (See paragraph 8.b.
regarding use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees not assigned
in the U.S.) If, while in the United States, the UN individual is to be
investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational pur-
poses, the prior concurrence of the FBI may also be required as outlined
in paragraph 6.b., above.

f. Staff Members or Officials of Red Cross Societies
The operational use of staff members or officials of the International Red
Cross or its affiliated national Red Cross, Red Crescent, or other equivalent
societies requires special consideration and prior approval by the Deputy
Director for Operations. DDO elements should make every effort to avoid
the operational use of staff members or officials of Red Cross societies. How-
ever, when especially high priority objectives are at stake and alternative
agent assets are not available, approval for the use of such individuals may
be granted by the Deputy Director for Operations.

&. Officials of the Vatican State
Operational contact with officials of the Vatican State will be made only
with the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Operational
use of Vatican officials will be contingent on prior approval by the Deputy
Director for Operations.

h. U.S. Government Funded Professors, Lecturers, Students or Grantees
U.S. or foreign professors, lecturers or students and other persons partici-
pating in U.S. Government-sponsored academic, cultural, athletic or other
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exchange programs (except certain Fulbright grantees-see paragraph 5.b.,
above) are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. Operational
use of such individuals while they are actively participating in an exchange
program funded by the U.S. Government requires special consideration
and approval by the Deputy Director for Operations prior to such use. In
certain especially worthwhile cases wherein the operational use of a par-
ticular U.S. Government supported exchangee is considered essential to
the accomplishment of the DDO mission, the Deputy Director for Opera-
tions may grant approval Memoranda requesting such approval will be
forwarded through the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. In such cases the
Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek the
concurrence of the U.S. Government sponsor.

1. Members of Educational or Private Voluntary Organizations

(1) It is U.S. Government policy that no federal agency shall provide any
covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the
nation's educational or private voluntary organizations. This policy
applies to all foreign as well as domestic activities of such organiza-
tions. In compliance with the above proscription, DDO policy requires
the most careful scrutiny of all cases involving operational contact with
U.S. educational or private voluntary organizations including trade and
professional organizations. The operational use of any employee, staff
member or official of such an organization requires prior approval by
the Deputy Director for Operations. The Deputy Director for Opera-
tions will determine whether or not to seek extra-Agency approval for
the conduct of such operations.

(2) Operational use including covert funding abroad of foreign-based
international voluntary organizations and the personnel thereof is per-
mitted even if the organization is also funded by U.S. private voluntary
organizations.

1. Officials or Employees of the African-American Institute
Operational use of the officials or employees of the African-American
Institute requires prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations.
Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in
their cover capacities will not involve operational matters until the approval
of the Deputy Director for Operations has been secured.

k. Volunteers to America
Operational use of or operational contact with members of Volunteers to
America while they are on assignment in the United States will not be
made without the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations.
Volunteers to America are participants in programs established by various
foreign countries in collaboration with the Department of State as a
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counterpart to the U.S. Peace Corps. Such volunteers are sent to the U.S.
for a period of service in schools and community development programs.
The name of the organization may vary by country.

& OPERATIONAL USE REQUIRES APPROVAL BY CHIEF OF AREA
DIVISION
Operational use of any individual in the categories listed in this paragraph
is considered of such sensitivity as to require special consideration and ap-
proval by the appropriate Area Division Chief. This authority may not be
delegated. The request for approval will be by memorandum in which the
individual's covert approval status will be described, together with a concise
explanation of the intended operational use.

a. Citizens or Alien Residents of the U.S. Used in Denied Areas (see
DOI 50-19)
The opr.ational use in denied areas of U.S. citizens, or of aliens who have
been admitted for permanent residence or have resided for a prolonged
period in the U.S., requires the prior approval of the Chief of the Area
Division under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place,

b. Non-U.S. Citizen Delegates or Employees of the United Nations not As-
signed in the U.S.
The operational use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of the
United Nations who are not assigned in the U.S. requires the prior ap-
proval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the in-
tended use is to take place.

c. Members of the Academic Community

(1) Within the context of this instruction a member of the academic com-
munity is defined as: any student, faculty member, administrative
officer or staff official of a college, university or similar institution of
higher learning including their associated research centers. Persons
associated with institutions such as police or military training centers
(except the four college-level military service academies) or under-
going specialized technical training with business or commercial firms
are not considered to be members of the academic community.

(2) Operational use of members of the academic community, especially
those cases wherein an individual is to be made witting of Agency
interest, will be on a highly selective basis. Each case will be examined
to ascertain its essentiality to the DDO mission in terms of the price
of possible disclosure, and to ensure that proper security procedures
can be observed. When it has been determined that the operational
use of a member of the academic community as defined above is
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operationally feasible and without suitable alternative, prior approval
in the following cases will be obtained as indicated below:

(a) Any U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community
and who is associated in any way with any U.S. or foreign college,
university or similar institution of higher learning;

(b) Any non-U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community
and who is associated in any way with any U.S.-owned or U.S.-
affiliated college, university or similar institution of higher leam DDO
ing which is located either in the United States or abroad.
re-Offroa
If the individual is located in the United States, approval will be re-C
quested by memorandum to the Chief, Foreign Resources Division.
The memorandum will include a statement that the individual is, or
is not, a DCD asset or contact, and in the event he is will include
the concurrence of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division. If the in-
dividual is located outside the United States, approval will be requested
by memorandum to the Chief of the Area Division who has jurisdiction
over the area concerned.) Operational use of foreign members of the
academic community who are not associated in any way with U.S.-
owned or U.S.-affiliated institutions of higher learning is also con-
sidered sensitive. The operational use of such individuals also requires
the approval of the Chief of the Area Division In any case involving
a well known person or having special security implications, the
Division Chief to whom the request is referred under the above pro-
visions will consult with the DDO and obtain the latter's approval.

(3) The provisions of paragraph (2) do not apply to Domestic Collection
Division contacts with members of the academic community, but such
contacts are subject to the following requirements:

(a) If a member of the academic community would be asked to per-
form an operational task or to alter his normal pattern of activity
in order to serve Agency purposes, prior approval of the Chief,
Domestic Collection Division is required. Additionally, if such an
individual will be in a foreign area, the concurrence of the Chief
of the Area Division concerned will be obtained.

(b) Prior concurrence will be obtained from the appropriate Area
Division Chief if an individual is to be utilized in a politically
sensitive area where his presence or activities could potentially
embarrass the interests of the U.S. Government.

(c) The requirements of paragraph 8.a. apply if a citizen or alien
resident of the United States would be used in a denied area.

(4) At the end of each calendar year, Chiefs of Divisions will submit a
report to the Deputy Director for Operations (via Chief, Foreign
Resources Division) on the number of individuals recruited from the
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academic community during that year. This audit will permit the DDO •
to keep abreast of major quantitative changes in the number of po-
tentially sensitive operational cases in each Division.

(5) It should be noted that the provisions of this paragraph do not apply
to DDO employees who wish to study or teach privately. Approval for
such activity will be obtained in accordance with the provisions of
HR 10-7.

9. INDIVIDUAL CHANGES OF STATUS OR CATEGORY

When an individual undergoes a change of status which places him in one of
the restricted categories described above, or transfers him from one category
to another, his operational use or continued operational use is contingent upon
approval or reapproval as prescribed for his new status.

10. INTERPRETATION OR MODIFICATION OF RESTRICTIONS

Certain of the policy restrictions described in this instruction are subject to
Interpretation, extension or modification by the Deputy Director for Opera-
tions depending on the conditions and the atmosphere for DDO operations
at any particular time. Especially when dealing on the edges of policy rulings
and within the guidelines set forth herein, particular heed should be paid to
the price of disclosure, including careful consideration of the sensitivities of
the individuals involved. When there is any doubt concerning the application
of these restrictions, guidance should be obtained from the Deputy Director
for Operations.
D

D

:
?
William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

E
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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: (Optional)
TERNAL
SE ONLY
CONSENTIAL
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
House Select Committee on Assassinations Request for
Information on 201 Criteria (SAR
EXTENSION
(SFEB 28 4-50 PH 78
DATE
28 February 1978
FROM:
C/ISS
1D4124
SECRET
:
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
1.
O/SA/DO/O
2.
3. OLC
attn: Pat. Carpentier
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
RECEIVED FORWARDED
COMMENTS (Number each commend to show from whom
to whom. Drow a line across columa after each comment.)
1 to 3:
attached is the
to OCC
31078-0070/19
23 Feb 1978.
The atladed
regulations answer
anse
all of the questions
posal.
I. Phase
note the classifint
SECRET.
Me assume
that HSC & Staff
will porer
my

13.
110
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED
:
.

14-00000
:
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7
CHть 0070
DO/ISS 78-098
28 February 1978
:
FROM:
MEMORANDUM FOR: O/SA/DO/O
Attention: Mr. Shepanek
Chief, Information Services Staff
William F. Donnelly
SUBJECT:
House Select Committee on Assassinations
Request for Information on 201 Criteria (S)
L
REFERENCE:
OLC 78-0070/19, 23 February 1978

1. (S) With reference to the conversation of
27 February between Mr. Shepanek and Mr. Cleffi of ISS,
attached are copies of DOHB 70-1-1, 15 November 1974,
and an earlier version, CSHB 43-1-1 dated 15 February 1960.
A close study of the list of questions submitted by the
HSCA Staff has led us to conclude that the most complete
and effective way to respond would be by inviting the
Staff to review our regulation governing the criteria for
opening, maintaining, controlling and closing 201 files
by the Operations Directorate. A careful reading of the
regulation provides an answer to every question posed by
the Staff.
2.
(S) The earlier version of the regulation is
included to reflect the situation as it existed in the
period of their primary concern (1958-1964). The later
version provides an expansion, clarification and refinement
of the earlier versions.
Willkanin 7. mall
William F. Donnelly
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ANNEX B
THE 201 SYSTEM
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III
15 November 1974
Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966
1. INTRODUCTION
The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific in-
terest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent
information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying
subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for
producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a rela-
tively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify
opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and
CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organi-
zations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volune of corre-
spondence has accumulated.
2. THE 201 SYSTEM
The principal features of the 201 system are:
a. The 201 Number: a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each
individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that
individual
b. The 201 Dossier: the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form
$31) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., per-
sonal history, current status, and prospects.
c. The Master 201 Record: a machine record generated by the opening of
a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and
stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.
d. Main Index Master 201 Reference: this reference, printed in reply to an
Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent
within the record, s..cceeding data items or lines will be moved up and the ref-
erence consolidated.
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CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974
0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON
SEX M DOB 12 APR 26
CIT GERM
POB GERY, BERLIN
OCC PHARMACIST
OCC CODE CHEM
REF AACD-12345 25 53
SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEΞTH ANNUAL
COATERENCE OF THE PATERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHENISTS
AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THAOUGH
29 OCTOBER.
201-0032671
ΤΥΡΕ ΝΑΜE T-
ΟΙ CODES AA ZX-1
RCD DATZ 53

Information About Subject
1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
30 NOV 70
00833555
1
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text
Document Reference Data Group
3
8. 201 Number
!
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
E
11. Record Date (year only)
C
12. Reference
ISG Control Information
F
13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number
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DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974
e. Ol Code: a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 per-
sonality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual
with organizations or activities of operational interest. Of codes cover intelli-
gence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, er known or
suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI
codes for use by components:
(1) general Ol codes (Attachment 4)
(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services
or other specific organizations.
A component may request an Ol code be established by submitting a mem-
orandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management
Officer.
A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An Ol code may be assigned
when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see
paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added
at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.
The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201
personalities by Ol codes. For example, if an Ol code has been opened for the
security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members
of that service.
f. 201 Machine Lists: produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on
names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers
exist.
3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER
a. General
The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational com-
ponent, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates
a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing
of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be
opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this
handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information
will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on
persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and per-
sons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those
persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals
are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff -
1 employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on
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15 November 1974
persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk {
and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO
records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy require-
ments on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose
names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201
dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational ap-
proval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested
for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of opera-
tional interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than
denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five
