Although each request had unique characteristics,
all began as a request by the Board or an ARRB staff member
on behalf of the board for information. The requests fell
generally into five broad categories as follows:

a. Requests for access to basic information which
would help the board understand the CIA, its organizational
structure and how it operated around the time of the
assassination which included: Requests for organizational
charts, briefings, mission statements, etc.; review of over
histories of CIA offices and projects; a review of the
so-called "Breckinridge files;" and, a search for an IG
index of Oswald reports.

b. Requests about methodologies which included: How
cable traffic was handled at HQ during the relevant time
period; the existence and use of the inter-agency source
registry; and, the assignment and use of alias's pseudonyms,
crypts, etc.

c. Requests for subject specific matters which
included: The Mexico City Station annual reports; the
existence of DRE monthly reports; Oswald's pre assassination
files; and, a search for any documents or information
detailing the Agency's involvement in transporting and
processing the Zapruder film.

d. Requests for project specific information and
files, which included: Requests for information and files on
AMWORLD, QKENCHANT, an index to the HTLINGUAL materials, and
the Mexico City electronic surveillance tapes.

e. Requests for individual specific information
and files, which included both CIA and CIA associated
individuals and non-CIA individuals: Information on
individuals with JMWORLD; detailed information on Sylvia
Duran; a determination of the identify of a particular
"George Bush;" and, the files on William Pawley.

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;

3. How a Request was Worked Following receipt of a
request and HRP tasking the responsible Agency component(s)
to conduct a search, the materials found were first reviewed
by HRP staff members before access was provided to the ARRB
staff. ARRB staff then reviewed the documents and materials
and identified those which it believed were relevant to
their inquiry and these materials were placed in the normal
queue to be reviewed and processed for release. However,
the mere identification of materials did not equate to
automatic release. Rather, if particularly sensitive
information was involved, negotiations took place and, on
occasion, a written statement about the materials was
provided for release vice the actual document(s).

43. The Agency's written responses to each request
either a letter or memoranda included, of course, the fact
the materials designated were to be processed for release
according to then current guidelines. The ARRB staff then
wrote its own version of the request, search, and response.
Both of these are a part of the public record on this
project.

5 Lessons learned: A number of things surfaced as
HRP worked to complete these requests which required
considerable explanation, negotiation, and resolution.

a. First among these was the fact there existed an
outside Board which asked for information and carefully
monitored the responses (a very powerful external Board with
subpoena authority), without doubt caused documents and
information to be found and made available that would not
have been provided to an internal declassification project.

b. Second, for any large project such as JFK to be
successful, there is an absolute requirement that each
directorate and independent office identify two responsible
persons a senior management official who can ensure that
deadlines (particularly deadlines established by an external
:

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:

authority) are met; and, a senior focal point officer, who
has the substantive knowledge and background to both locate
all relevant material and make decisions on its sensitivity.

c. Third, the individuals identified and appointed
in sub-paragraph "b" next above must be fully versed in the
guidelines which pertain to each specific project. They
cannot rely on FOIA or other guidelines as to the depth of
their searches or the conditions governing release/
redaction/denial of materials.

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ATTACHMENT #1

Oswald Files
CIA'S JFK ASSASSINATION RECORD COLLECTION

Pre-assassination "201" file --approximately 40 documents that existed at the time of
the assassination. Released in 1992 with minimal deletions.

DO 201 File (Approximately 26,000 pages): Agency's primary file for documents dealing
with the assassination or mentioning Oswald; the file is still active. Contains pre-
assassination documents; materials collected after the assassination and during the
Warren Commission investigation; Mexico City files, Garrison investigation materials
plus other documents related to the assassination or Oswald received over the years. A
microfilm copy of file, as it existed in 1978, was sequestered by the House Select
Committee on Assassination (HSCA).

The DO's original (record copy) 201 was transferred to HRG in early 1992; a
declassified version was released in August 1993; it was re-released with fewer
deletions in 1996 under the authority of the ARRB. Additional documents, filed into the
201 after the its transfer to HRG, were released in September 1998.

Office of Security File (2041 pages): Contained key Oswald documents, FBI
investigative reports, newspaper clippings. This file, primarily duplicative of the 201,
was reviewed by the HSCA, but a copy was not sequestered with the rest of the
Agency's "JFK" collection. The file surfaced as a result of an ARRB request in 1997. A
declassified version of the file was released in 1998.

DCD "A" File (41 pages): A microfilm copy of this Oswald file was in the sequestered
collection. The ARRB requested that the original file by reviewed for release.

Marina Oswald's 201 file. A copy of this file from the sequestered microfilm collection
was reviewed and released in 1994. The ARRB requested that the original file be
reviewed for release by September 1999.

The ARRB directed that the classified originals of all documents from the Oswald files
be transferred to NARA for secure storage. These documents were transferred to
NARA in October 1998.

The Sequestered Collection

At the end of its investigation, the HSCA directed that all materials (files,
documents, memos, notes, tapes, etc.) collected or prepared in response to its
investigation be sequestered. This included files made available for review, but not
reviewed by the HSCA staff.

JFK boxes 1-63 (hardcopy): These boxes are the core of the Agency's JFK collection.
They are the working files/materials of the HSCA staff and reflects the wide range of
issues pursued by the Committee. In addition to Agency documents, they include
:

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approximately 30,000 pages of notes, letters and memos created by the HSCA or its
staff. The boxes are a combination of files on subjects and persons of interest to HSCA
including documents prepared by the Agency as a result of the investigation, eight
boxes of security files and Mexico City cable chrono files. The boxes contain a
significant amount of duplication (most of the Oswald 201 documents appear multiple
times in this part of the collection). A declassified version was released in August 1993,
then re-released under ARRB in 1997.

JFK Microfilm (72 reels): These reels are copies of Agency files that were made
available to HSCA staff. Although the HSCA interest usually focused on a small portion
of a file, the Committee sequestered the complete file. The microfilm includes
approximately 25 reels of 201 files, 6 reels of Office of Personnel files, 14 reels of
Anti/Castro - Cuban exile material, extensive files on Nosenko and operational and
production files from Mexico City. The microfilm also contains copies of all the Oswald
files except for the security file.

DCI Morning Meeting Minutes

This file contain 442 excerpts from the minutes of the DCI's Morning Meetings
that refer to JFK assassination and related issues and investigations. The initial search
for the minutes was in response to an FOIA. The material was turned over to HRG in
1993 for review and inclusion into the Collection.

Russ Holmes' Working Files (19 boxes)

Russ Holmes was a DO officer initially assigned to work on JFK assassination
records in the mid-70s. He was one of the Agency's liaison officers with the HSCA
during its investigation and subsequently became custodian of HSCA sequestered
collection. He continued in this role until 1992.

As the focal point for JFK related requests, Russ Holmes created a JFK
reference file know as the "Ancillary Collection" (13 boxes). The contents are primarily
duplicative (approximately 80%) of material found in Oswald's 201 and in the
sequestered collection, but organized by subjects and requests. The collection contains
some non-related material reflecting Holmes' involvement in other FOIA, etc. requests.
There were an additional six boxes of unorganized reference material and files from his
office transferred to HRG when he retired. These 19 boxes became know as the "Russ
Holmes Working Files" and were declared assassination records as a collection by the
ARRB. Non-duplicative records from this collection were released in September 1998.
The duplicative material is currently being reviewed and will be transferred to NARA in
early January 1999.

LA Division JFK Task Force Files

The survey undertaken in response to Executive Order ##### located seven
boxes of DO Latin American Division continuing JFK Task Force files and related Cuban
material. The ARRB staff reviewed the boxes; the non-duplicative JFK Task Force
A

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:

documents and selected documents from the Cuban material were designated as
assassination records. 1637 pages from these boxes were transferred to NARA in
October 1998.

New assassination Records -- "M" [Miscellaneous] Series

The ARRB submitted 53 numbered "Requests for Additional Information and
Records" (CIA-# and CIA-IR-# series) plus many informal requests on individuals and
subjects in their search for additional assassination records. Theses requests
generated several 100 additional assassination records including 185 audio tapes from
the Mexico City telephone taps. Additional material related to the JFK Act including DO
cables to the field and working files of the HRP project officer were declared
assassination records in the final actions of the Board. Over 4500 pages and 17 tapes
have been reviewed and prepared for transfer to NARA. The remaining records and
tapes are scheduled for completion by September 1999,.
:

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CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

JFK Assassination Records Collection Act
• Five year Effort; Estimated 100 person years expended

• Extraordinary Authorities/ Access/ "non Precedent Setting Releases"
• Processed over 14,000 CIA documents upon which the Board took
direct action.
• Transferred to the National Archives over 100,000 redacted pages for
the JFK Collection.
• Prepared a Declaration of Compliance with the Act, with a detailed
accounting of CIA actions in response to the Board's requests.
• Negotiated a detailed Memorandum of Agreement among CIA, the
JFK Board and the National Archives regarding the disposition and
processing of all documents resulting from the five year review.
• "The Review Board considered the CIA's compliance with the JFK
Act....to be one of [the Board's] highest priorities." It is particularly
significant that the board fully accepted the Agency's Declaration of
Compliance and reported favorably on the Agency's activities in
response to the Board.
6

During FY 1998, compliance with the legal requirements of the JFK Act
absorbed the preponderant portion of HRP resources. HRP completed necessary
coordination with the JFK Assassination Records Review Board on behalf of the
Agency, an ongoing process since FY 1994. HRP provided a central Agency
focus for a process which:
Coordinated with Board Staff on relevancy and classification on roughly
250,000 pages (many duplicates)
Processed over 14,000 CIA documents upon which the Board took direct action.

Transferred to the National Archives over 100,000 redacted pages for the JFK
Collection.
Prepared CIA's Declaration of Compliance with the Act, a detailed accounting
of CIA actions in response to the Boards requests.
Negotiated a detailed Memorandum of Agreement among CIA, the JFK Board
and the National Archives regarding the disposition and processing of all
documents resulting from the five year review.
The Board's report of 30 September 1998 states that "The Review Board
considered the CIA's compliance with the JFK Act....to be one of [the Board's]
highest priorities." It is particularly significant that the board fully accepted the
Agency's Declaration of Compliance and reported favorably on the Agency's
activities in response to the Board.

6

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•
JFK Act -- Process
Scope/Deadlines/Decisions defined by law and outside Board.
• Focal Point (HRP) Serves Primarily as: (1) Moderator
between Board and Components, (2) Bookkeeper, (3)
Consistency Keeper.
• Everything reviewed by Focal Point (HRP) and the appropriate
component (Often many times).
• Components often take strong initial position but recede in
face of strong arguments.
• Senior Agency Managers unaware of intricacies of the Process
unless problems come up.
• Exceptions: Issues Taken to Board by senior management:
Cover, Employee Names, Facilities Stations.
7

Without making a value judgment on the merits of the JFK Act, it is possible to
characterize the process which the Act dictated for CIA.
The scope/deadlines and decisons were defined in the law and by the
Assassination Records Review Board, an outside body. Over the course of the
history of this effort (5 years), CIA, as did other agencies, developed (and
redeveloped) processes and responses to the Board. For the most part the
detailed work by the Staff was at a level which did not involve senior managers
unless a major problem arose.
When problems did arise, Senior Agency officials were asked to make
presentations to the Board and, in all cases, consensus was achieved. No issues
from CIA had to be appealed to the President, the formal procedure in the Act
for resolving differences between Agencies and the Board.
:

7

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•
•
JFK Lessons Learned
Statutory Mandates are Not Efficient
Requirements to declassify All drives out focus on important
Standards for Declassification are Invariably Different
Projects of equal merit without a statute are orphaned
Structure and Planning
Good Communications with Oversight Body
Expertise in Subject matter and Information Management
Strategy, Concepts and Policy known and Understood:
• Guidelines (flexible),
• Deadlines (reasonable),
• Responsibilities
Understanding of Final Product Desired:
• Media, Databases, indexes, etc.
Support of Senior Management
8
:
•
Our experience is that statutory mandates such as the JFK Act are very inefficient. The specific
requirements of the act, including Board administrative decisions, required us to :

• Address all possibly related documents, no matter how insignificant.
• Engage in lengthy negotiation processes over an almost endless number of documents.
• Establish databases for management of the documents and workflow
• Treat documents in ways different from all other release programs.
Postpone plans for systematic declassification on other programs for which we had no legal
mandate.
• Our expectation is that there will be more of such mandates, including the recently enacted Nazi
War Crimes Disclosure Act. Similar proposals are under consideration for human rights violations in
central america. What we have learned from our JFK experience is that:
• We need to remain in very close coordination with the Oversight body to assure that we are
not going down the wrong street and will have to repeat efforts.
• We have found that annuitants "who know the territory" can be extremely valuable as a
resource for finding and understanding the senstitivity of material.
• We know that we have to organize within the Agency and to gain agreement early on with
regard to strategies for managing the effort, including agreement on what the final product is to
be and how we are to get there.
• We also need to keep senior management attention on what we are doing so that they are not
surprised at the end, which not only causes delays in an orderly process but can lead to
significant misunderstandings between senior participants.
• We are trying to apply these lessons learned to our planning for the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure
Act.
That deed must have the benefit of
8

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ΟΙΜ 99-0281
29 October 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Chief, Information Review Group, OIM

Charles A. Briggs
JFK Declassification Project, OIM

The JFK Declassification Experience
-
1. My assumption in preparing the attached is that
I was asked because: a) for seven-plus years I've been
involved in the project; and b) my past Agency assign-
ments, including being the first DO Information Review
Officer, gave me the opportunity to see declassification
from many vantage points: from a legalistic directorate-
oriented, either-or standpoint (taking full advantage of
allowed exemptions), to a "corporate" Agency-wide strategy
to foster credibility while protecting secrets that should
remain secret. My comments and conclusions reflect that
experience and do not necessarily reflect the views of HRP
management.

2. Historically, the Deputy Directors have not
paid much attention to information management unless
there's a problem. Then the approach has been: what went
wrong; who's to blame; how can we ensure that this doesn't
happen again; what lessons have we learned? What this JFK
experience reiterates is the need for a proactive, not just
reactive, flexible strategy, with corporate Agency direction
through the Deputies to their Information Review Officers.
And the IROS, who, in essence, determine credibility and
resource impact, should be supergrades, with experience
in at least two directorates. Because information release
has become a major management issue, the Executive Director
is the obvious officer to ensure consistent and informed
implementation of release policy.

AIUO When Separated
from Attachments
-SECRET-
CL BY: 0611637
CL REASON: 1.5(d)
DECL ON: X5
DRV FRM: LIA 2-82

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SUBJECT: THE JFK DECLASSIFICATION EXPERIENCE

3. Considerable skepticism in the public, the media,
and, unfortunately, the Congress results from the in-house
conclusion that denial is justifiable in the absence of
"official acknowledgment" of Executive Branch information,
even though such information is already in the public
domain, from senior Agency officials' publications,
Congressional investigations, books by former Cabinet-level
NSC members, even Presidents. This inflexible legal
strategy may win the battle and lose the war. Lawsuits are
a lot more expensive than negotiation.

4. The Agency Task Force that in 1992 considered
some of the aspects of DCI Gates' "openness" philosophy
did not have the benefit of the JFK experience. I suggest
that a senior-level panel be established to consider an
objective look at the need for continued classification
of generic versus specific sources and methods information,
particularly that already in the public domain and when
dealing with matters of high public or historic interest.
HR 70-14, referring as it does in paragraph e. (4) to
"Guidelines for Declassification" in Executive Order 12356,
does not promote the tactical approach which is suggested
in the Comments section on page eight of the attached.

Charles Bug
Charles A. Briggs Briggs

2
SECRET

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SUBJECT: THE JFK DECLASSIFICATION EXPERIENCE

DA/OIM/IRG/SCD/CABriggs:104-10338-10018 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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OCI No. 1586/64

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
4 June 1964

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Cuban Subversion in Latin America
Since July 1963

1. Cuban subversive efforts in Latin America
are continuing at a steady pace, despite recent
major setbacks in such countries as Venezuela and
Brazil. From July 1963 through December, when
Havana evidently believed a "second Cuba" was likely
in Venezuela, Cuban propaganda stressed the inevi-
tability of Castro-inspired revolutions in the
hemisphere. Since the first of this year, however,
Cuban leaders have muted direct exhortations to vio-
lence and have emphasized other policy priorities.
Nevertheless, the Cuban potential for subversion in
Latin America remains high.

2. In his speech of 26 July 1963, Castro re-
captured much of the militant tone of his speeches
in late 1962. He made it clear that he regards
Cuba as the main source of inspiration and guidance
for inevitable revolutions in the rest of Latin
America. He claimed that what has been done in
Cuba can take place "exactly the same way in many
Latin American countries." The hemisphere's mili-
tants, he said, must take advantage of conditions
presently favoring revolution and "open the breach."
On 28 September, Castro said that while "imperial-
ists believe they can destroy the Cuban revolution,"
the Cubans believe that before that could be accom-
plished "many other revolutions like ours will ap-
pear on the continent." On 24 November, Che
Guevara said the spreading of revolution in the
hemisphere "is also our responsibility and it is
part of our daily preoccupation."

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3. What emerged from these and other Cuban
pronouncements was the apparent conviction of
Castro and his aides that further Communist revolu-
tions in Latin America are inevitable, that Cuba
can speed up the process, and that in Cuba's own
interest it is urgent that revolutionary action be
initiated wherever possible and as soon as pos-
sible. It is logical to assume that despite recent
official soft-pedaling of the issue, the basic
Cuban viewpoint remains the same. Cuban leaders
continue to believe that the very presence of their
regime will inspire other Latin American revolu-
tionaries to action, and undoubtedly will continue
to give assistance to these efforts.

4. Cuba's policy of revolution in the hemi-
sphere has suffered severe defeats, however, since
the 3-ton Cuban arms cache was discovered on a
Venezuelan beach on 1 November 1963. For example,
OAS action stemming from that discovery is pending;
despite the Cuban-supported terrorist campaign,
constitutional government in Venezuela was success-
fully transferred following President Leoni's dra-
matic election victory last December; and the out-
breaks of violence in Panama last January failed to
upset constitutional processes there. The April re-
volt in which President Goulart of Brazil was over-
thrown was also a severe defeat for Havana. These
reverses may have produced a feeling in Havana that
a breathing spell is necessary. In addition, Castro
may have been cautioned to moderate his revolutionary
tactics when he visited the USSR last January. This
year has been designated "the year of the economy."
This and Cuba's all-out campaign to obtain needed
commercial and industrial goods from West
also may be factors prompting Havana to lessen its
public expressions of support for revolution. More-
over, Castro may believe that a soft-pedaled policy
on revolution now may pay dividends after the US
elections in November. He probably assumes that
conditions for a US-Cuban modus vivendi--on his
terms--will be more favorable then.

5. Nevertherless, evidence presented in the
accompanying country-by-country index shows that
Cuba has continued since the first of the year to
promote, finance, and otherwise support pro-Castro
groups and individuals in Argentina, Brazil, (be-
fore the April revolt), Chile, Panama, British

2

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Guiana, and other countries. Indeed, on at least
two recent occasions, Che Guevara was quoted as
restating familiar Cuban views on revolution. In
an interview published in an Italian newspaper in
March, Guevara reiterated that the road to "national
liberation" in Latin American must take a turn to
violence. He emphasized that violence would be
"necessary" in "almost all" Latin American countries,
for "there is no other way." In an April interview
in Algiers, Guevara said: "It is very, very, very,
very, but very, hard to achieve liberation in Latin
America by employing peaceful means."

6. A number of reliable clandestine sources
have provided information on the many facets of
Cuba's subversive effort in Latin America. The most
serious form of subversion from Havana is its train-
ing of other Latin Americans in the practical arts
of guerrilla warfare. As many as 1,500 received
such training in 1962. It is estimated that several
hundred
Americans who
traveled to Cuba in 1963 also received such train-
ing. It has been learned that "scholarship students"
who go to Cuba ostensibly to study "agriculture" re-
ceive guerrilla warfare training. This instruction
encompasses the use and management of communications
equipment; the techniques of military intelligence,
including methods of establishing intelligence net-
works to obtain information from peasants; training
in a variety of weapons, including rifles and small
arms, which are readily available in most Latin
American countries; training in explosives, and
training in guerrilla tactics, including instruc-
tion on how to operate independently in the country-
side for extended periods of time. A separate train-
ing school reportedly trains Communist youth from
other Latin American countries. The school's one-
year course is divided between the study of Commu-
nist theory and practical training in political
agitation and subversive activities. Reports from
returning trainees confirm that the Cubans are de-
veloping extensive files on most Latin American
countries on subjects pertinent to the planning
and development of further subversive activity.
Detailed questionnaires submitted to Argentine,
trainees requested comments on possible air drop
zones, weather conditions, locations of military
bases, competence of local authorities, border and
frontier controls, and a long list of similar ques-
tions, obviously designed to build up a body of basic
knowledge on.

3

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7. Latin Americans returning to their coun-
tries after having received training in Cuba often
take a round-about route to conceal the fact that
they have been in Cuba.
Bloc
ightsabowPrague. They then go through
Europe to some other Latin American country, from
which they enter their own. Cuba gives these
travelers documents which show no indication that
they had been in Cuba. Some guerrilla warfare
trainees are chosen for intelligence assignments
and are given special training in clandestine.com-
munications, which permits them to maintain a con-
tact with Cuba after they have returned home.

8. In addition, Latin Americans who receive
guerrilla warfare and other types of training in
Cuba are encouraged, on their return home, to pass
on what they have learned. Cuba-trained men are
known to have been conducting such training in
Costa Rica, Panama, British Guiana, Peru, and else-
where. Thus, the Castro-oriented revolutionary ef-
fort in Latin America has a potential for steady
growth even if there should be a lessening in the
actual training program in Cuba.

9. Numerous reports have alleged that Cuba
is supplying arms clandestinely to some Central
and South American-based extremist groups. Only
in the case of the arms cache discovered in Vene-
zuela on 1 November, however, has there been in-
controvertible proof of Cuban complicity in such
efforts. A good deal of the undeniably extensive
arms traffic which goes on in several areas of the
hemisphere is basically a continuation of long-
established patterns of arms smuggling between
nationals of the countries involved. Cuba does
possess over 100 fishing vessels and some cargo
planes which are well-suited to gun-running or
air drops, but we cannot confirm that they are used
for this purpose. In addition, Cuban leaders have
always stressed the importance of Latin American
revolutionaries procuring their own weapons from
local sources. Moreover, some financing from
Havana undoubtedly is used to buy arms.

10. Another important aspect of Havana's ef-
forts in Latin America is centered on supporting
and guiding hemisphere front organizations. Havana
has long sought to establish a new hemisphere-wide

4

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labor organization which could serve as a platform
for spreading pro-Castro propaganda among urban
labor movements. The embryonic Single Center of
Latin American Workers (CUTAL), which held its con-
stituent congress in Brazil in January 1964, ends
Havana's quest. This Brazilian congress was such
a total failure, however, that it is doubtful if
in the near future CUTAL will provide Havana with
the type of organization it envisaged. Cuba's sup-
port for the 9 March Second Latin American Youth
Congress (LAYC) also was well established. This
conference, too, ended in near-failure. Havana now
is attempting to organize another hemisphere "soli-
darity-with-Cuba" congress in Montreal, Canada in
July. This proposed congress--which, however, is
being officially discouraged by the Canadian govern-
ment--would be modeled on a similar effort staged
in Niteroi, Brazil in March 1963.

5

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ANNEX
Country-by-Country Rundown on Cuban Subversion

1. Argentina

Clandestine reporting for the past year con-
firms that the Cubans are cooperating with small
extremist Peronist groups in an attempt to estab-
lish a coordinated subversive effort in Argentina.
Extreme-left wing Peronists such as
AmericosBarnzos,AUDELO-Gafregor and Hectors
Villalon have been in close liaison with Cuban
agents in and elsewhere. Gallego
appears to be the principal support agent of a
group of Argentine terrorists and left-wing Peron-
ists believed to be directed and supported by the
Montevideo.

Last January, Gallego traveled to the provinces
of Jujuy and Salta, near the Bolivian border where
Argentine police discovered pro-Castro guerrilla
camps in March. Some guerrillas who were arrested
in that raid are known to have had guerrilla war-
fare training in Cuba. Among the propaganda items
found at these camps was a book written by Jorge
Ricardo Masetti, who was in Cuba in 1963 as a
director of Prensa Latina. He is thought to be
"Commandante Segundo" and is probably in charge
of the small guerrilla bands discovered in north-
ern Argentina in March and April. One of the FAL
rifles found in the hands of the guerrillas_pos-
sessed the same specifications as those found in
the 1 November Venezuelan arms cache. It is be-
lieved to be of Cuban origen.
More than
500 Argentines have recivedndoctrina
tion or subversive ning in Cuba Since 1950.
At least 222 Argents traveled to Cuba
64

2. Bolivia

Cuban subversive activity in Bolivia has been
centered on attempts to strengthen pro-Castro
sentiment among the followers of extremist Vice

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President Juan Lechin. Through its embassy in La
Paz, Cuba reportedly has given Lechin and his sup-
porters some arms and money to aid his bitter strug-
gle with President Paz Estenssoro for political
domination of the country.
September
extremist leaders, Cuban
Charge Roberto Lassale said the Cuban government
believed it necessary to organize well-armed combat
cadres from among various leftist-extremist groups.
He said Havana was prepared to supply the required
arms.
Reliable clandestine sommes was told
gave him two boxes of arms to be distrubuted among
the volatile Bolivian tin miners who at that time
were in revolt against his government.
1964 Mr. Madrob
the
Cuban government was willing to provide financial
and material support to Lechin for his campaign
to unseat President Paz in the 31 May presidential
elections. Lechin was scheduled to meet with Cuban
agents in early April to discuss his financial
needs and to determine what he was prepared to of-
fer in return for the proposed Cuban assistance.

In addition, the Comittee of Anti-Imperialist
Struggle, a pro-Castro Bolivian youth group which
aspires to establish a terrorist organization on
the model of the Venezuelan Armed Forces of Na-
tional Liberation, was organized last year with
the help of Mauro Garcia, then an officer of the
Cuban embassy. Members of this group were caught
in November 1963 attempting to plant bombs at the
home of the commander of the Bolivian Air Force
and near the residence of the US Ambassador.

The Cuban government continues to regard Bolivia
as a staging area from which to send trained sub-
versives into neighboring countires. It is pos-
sible that some Cuban support for guerrillas in
northern Argentina may have come across the border
from near-by Bolivia. Bolivia also has long been
a favorite transit area for terrorists returning
to Peru after having received guerrilla warfare
training in Cuba. In August 1963, a Bolivian Com-
munist Party (PCB) member in north Bolivia led

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police to an arms cache which was to be used to sup-
port guerrilla operations in Peru. Bolivian authori-
ties have uncovered and dispersed at least three pro-
Castro guerrilla groups in this area in the past year.
Some 300 Bolivians have
1964.

3. Brazil

Before the overthrow of President Goulart, Cuba
was engaged in an active subversive effort in Brazil
providing funds, guerrilla training, and propaganda
support to Communist and pro-Communist groups. Operat-
ing primarily through its embassy in Rio de Janeiro,
Havana collaborated closely with Francisco Juliao's
Peasant Leagues in northeast Brazil and with Leonel
Brizola, Goulart's violently anti-American brother-
in-law. The former Cuban ambassador privately
described Brizola as having the best prospects for
starting a Castro-stule revolution in Brazil. The
ambassador appeared to be favoring him over Juliao
from late 1963 until the April overthrow.
ELERATO February a usually reliable source.
ported stirsingreedstor acceptoffers of Cuban
financial assistance to finance his expanding press
and radio activities and to "buy_some_arms" from_his
Popular Mobilization Front. The same sounce reported
first Subsidy on Havana
GUNONGTOS to buy arms In addition, a usually
reliable reports
Embassy in Mexico City reports that about 10 days
before the beginning of Goulart's overthrow, Ha-
vana sent money to Brazil in an effort to bolster
the Brizola forces, Four Cuban_couriers_reportedly
took the money to Brazil Mexico City

Cuba also maintained a substantial propaganda
operation in Brazil, primarily through the local
office of Prensa Latina. A Communist party member
in the state of Bahia revealed, for example, that
the local Communist newspaper was financed by Cuba,
The number of Brazilian-Cuban Cultural Institues

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had increased to the point where they covered all
major cities; Rio alone had seven. Similar or-
ganizations existed at the national level, such
as the Society of Friends of Cuba and the National
Committee Against Intervention in Cuba. Cuba also
broadcast daily to Brazil in Portuguese.

Brazil under Goulart also afforded Cuba an
excellent base for promoting hemisphere-wide, pro-
Cuban front groups. The constituent congress of
the Single Center of Latin American Workers (CUTAL) --
which is planned to replace the moribund Confedera-
tion of Latin American Workers (CTAL)--was held in
Brazilia in late January. The Brazilian delega-
tion to the Cuban-supported Second Latin American
Youth Congress (LAYC), held in Santiago, Chile on
9 March, was headed by President Goulart's nephew,
who brought a letter from the President warmly sup-
porting the conference. Brazil was also used as
a transit area for some Latin American subversives
returning to their countries after having received
training in Cuba.

In late April, the dissident Communist Party
of Brazil (CPB), which follows a pro-Chinese line,
was reported to have directed two Cuban-trained
leaders to begin paramilitary operations in Sao
Paulo and Goias. CPB members have been encouraged
by their Cuban comrades--many have been trained in
Cuba--but Havana is not known to have given them
direct support.
57 Brazilians
veled to Cuba in
4. British Guiana

The government of Premier Cheddi Jagan is openly
pro-Castro. Thus, Cuban activities in British Guiana,
In contrast to subversive efforts elsewhere in the
hemisphere, are designed to support rather than to
bring down the existing regime.

Clinton Adlum, the Cuban trade representative
in Georgetown, is probably giving both political and
economic advice to Jagan's People's Progressive Party
(PPP)Cuban ships call frequently at British Guiana
ports to deliver food and fuels and to pick up rice.

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Numerous unconfirmed reports have stated that these
ships also transport arms to British Guiana which
allegedly are then shipped elsewhere in Latin America.

The vehicle for British Guianese trade with Com-
munist countries, as well as for Cuban funding of
Jagan's regime and the PPP, is the Guyana Import Ex-
port (GIMPEX). Havana ordered payment $ 300,000
to the manager of GIMPEX in September, ostensibly
for payment of goods, according to a usually reliable
source. It is unclear, however, whether the money
was ever actually paid. GIMPEX has loaned such funds
in the past both to the government and to the PPP
publishing house. Another source reports that the
publishing house passes the funds to Janet Jagan
for PPP salaries and expenses.

Georgetown officials believe Cuban-
trained terrorists are behind much of the sporadic
violence which has occurred during the months-long
strike by the pro-Jagan sugar workers union; it is
attempting to gain an official endorsement by the
Guianese sugar industry. A senior police official
has told the US Consul General that six or eight
Cuban-trained youths provide the technical support
for this group's growing terrorist efforts in George-
town. Another source reports some Guianese were
receiving guerrilla training in the interior of
the country in November 1963, presumably for the
newly-formed Guyana Liberation Army
Guyanese
aveled to cuba in
have
traveled to Cuba in 1963
5. Chile

The Cuban effort in Chile concentrates on sup-
port for the presidential campaign of Salvadore
Allende. Allende is the candidate of the Communist-
dominated Popular Revolutionary Action Front (FRAP),
and he has a chance of being elected in the September
presidential elections. Allende has visited Cuba
on several occasions; his campaign manager was in
Havana in January. While there, he was promised
financial support for Allende's campaign. A usually
reliable source reports that Che Guevara recently
said: "Watch Chile, it will be the next Latin Ameri-
can country to enter our camp."

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A clandestine source much to
Chilean student
Cuba reported in February that
returning student said some 40 Chileans
would soon be leaving Cuba to return to Chile. The
Source said these Chileans had received political
training in Cuba and were returning with funds from
the Cuban government for Allende's presidential
campaign. Chilean police are reported to have identi-
fied 400 Chileans who have visited Cuba over the
past three years as "subversives," but we have no
evidence of any organized guerrilla training of
Chilean groups in Cuba.
350 chileans
Traveled sto Cubanat
uba on19163
64 months.

6. Colombia

Cuba has been providing funds to subversives
in Colombia since 1960. The pro-Castro, Worker-
Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC), the United Front
for Revolutionary Action (FUAR)--whose members are
building up the newly activated National Liberation
Front (FLN), and the recently organized National
Liberation Movement have been the principal recip-
ients of Cuban funds. A fairly reliable source
ASTRA
Colombia to evaluate the FLN and its prospects
and to pass funds for further activity.
Site
Cuba has established some contact with bandit
gangs infesting the Colombian countryside. Army
troops who are fighting the bandits have found
Cuban propaganda in the possession of these bandits.
Some bandit leaders may have had guerrilla training
in Cuba, but Havana does not appear to have had
substantial success so far in directing bandit
activity for political ends.
7.

Costa Rica

The Communist Popular Vanguard Party (PVP)
continues to send members for subversive training
in Cuba. Some of these militant returnees have

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begun training small groups of party members, but
they appear to have no immediate plans for anti-
government action. Much of the_pro-Castro acti
vity in Costa Rica appears to have been directed
against neighboring Nicaragua. Cuba-trained
revolutionaries based in Costa Rica have on oc-
casion crossed into Nicaragua. The police in-
spector at a town in the Pacific banana zone re-
ported in early February that two unidentified
Cubans who traveled from Panama to Costa Rica at-
tempted to stir up Costa Rican banana workers in
support of Panamanian charges against the US.

The Costa Rican Society for Friendship with
Peoples, a small Communist-front group designed"
to propagandize on behalf of the Cuban revolution
and pro-Castro "revolutionary movements" in other
Latin American countries, is an important Havana
asset in San Jose.
Cuba,

8. Dominican Republic

The country's two militant pro-Communist or-
ganizations, the 14th of June Political Group (APCJ)
and the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD), are faith-
ful supporters of Castro. Havana Radio quickly
voiced support for last December's abortive APCJ
guerrilla campaign, but we have no firm evidence
of Cuban material support for this effort. The
quick response from Radio Havana suggests, how-
ever, the existence of a communications link with
one or more pro-Castro organizations in the country.
Quick response by Havana to unrest in the Dominican
Republic also was reflected during the transit
workers strike in early May.

One Dominican who has received guerrilla train-
ing in Cuba organized the 14th of June Revolutionary
Movement (MR 14J) earlier this year out of the old
APCJ and MPD. The immediate aim of this new or-
ganization is to promote urban terrorism. A ter-
rorist captured by police in mid-March is said to
have told police that this group is receiving arms
and guidance from Castro.

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9. Ecuador

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Since the 11 July 1963 military coup, the
Ecuadorean government's careful monitoring of
anti-government activities has hampered Cuban ef-
forts there. When the junta began to exile Com-
munists and pro-Castro extremists last fall,
several took up residence in Havana.
Osilentosiding in Bolivia told a clandestine source
in late March that exiles in Cuba were receiving
guerrilla warfare training before returning to
Ecuador to initiate anti-government activities.
Rafael Echeverria, leader of the hard-line faction
of the Ecuadorean Communist Party (PCE), is re-
portedly planning a trip to Havana in late May
to confer with Castro. Echeverria expects to have
laid the groundwork for guerrilla operations by
then so that he can "prove his good faith" to the
Cubans; he expects to be offered financial aid.

Other clandestine sources report Cuban aid
has been offered to supporters of former presi-
dent Velasco Ibarra and that aid is being of-
fered to followers of former president Arosemena.
ravel
tuba throughs Apri
64

10. El Salvador

There has been little evidence of direct Cuban-
supported subversion in El Salvador during the
past 10 months. The Castro government probably
helps members of the Salvadoran Communist Party
(PCES) and its front groups to get to Cuba for
guidance and training. Havana radio, heard
clearly in El Salvador, provides a propaganda
line which can be echoed in locally published
Communist publications.

Havana-has at least one well-trained Salvadoran
intelligence agent, who provides intelligence on
selected targets. He was trained in Cuba for a
year and a half, not only in guerrilla warfare
but in clandestine communications. Like many
other Cuban agents, he is not actually working
in Salvador but in a neighboring country, from
which he deals with Salvadoran operations across
the border on direct instructions from a Cuban
intelligence officer

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traveled to Cuba
Salvadorans
throug April 1964.
ravelesto Cuba through

11. Guatemala

Cuba has been giving assistance and guidance
to Guatemalan guerrilla and terrorist groups for
over two years. While we have no firm evidence of
substantial Cuban assistance in 1963, two clandes-
tine sources reported hat extremist
guerrilla leader von Sosa and some of his followers:
traveled tto.Cuba during
ar and returned
Warren Barge to finance their activit
es in addition, another source reports one of
the persons involved in October by the premature ex
posion on a homemade bomb, was acknowledged by the
Guarenanian_commisit Party as a Cuban-trained ex-
partin explosives. Mexican Marxist journalist
Victor Rico Galan, often used by Castro as an agent
in Central America, saw Yon Sosa in October and is
said to have urged him to work more closely with
the Guatemalan Communists.

Strong anti-Subversive measures by the Peralta
Government have curtailed, but have by no means
eliminated, the insurgency threat in Guatemala.
The assassination on 11 April of a colonel with
special antiguerrilla duties indicates the guer-
rillas are still at large in the mountainous areas
of the country. They maintain reliable communica-
tions and contacts and have the capability to stage
damaging raids on carefully chosen targets.

At least 64 Guatemalans are known to have
traveled to Cuba in 1963. On the basis of clandes-
tine reporting, it is estimated that another 50
traveled secretly and that these received training
in guerrilla tactics or political indoctrination.
12. Haiti

Known Cuban activity in Haiti is limited to
two daily propaganda broadcasts by Havana Radio.

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A French-language transmission is aimed at the
educated class and a broadcast in Creole is beamed
to the masses. The speaker has been identified
as Rene Depestre, a top-ranking Haitian Communist
exile in Cuba. The content of Depestre's broad-
casts is consistently pro-Cuban and anti-Duvalier.
Some Haitians may have received guerrilla train-
ing in Cuba, but we have no firm evidence that any
such trainees have returned to Haiti, The long-
time presence of many hundreds of Haitian nationals
in eastern Cuba provides Castro with material for
sizable infiltrations into Haiti if he should so
desire.
Twenty-threes Hartrans traveled to Cuba-in

13. Honduras

Much of the pro-Castro activity in Honduras
appears to be directed toward support of similar
activities in neighboring Nicaragua and Guatemala.
The country's rugged terrain, the absence of an
effective internal security force, and the presence
of long-established routes for smuggling into
neighboring countries make Honduras well suited
for such a role.

Two recent clandestine sources report the
Cuban government is dissatisfied with efforts of
the Honduran Communist Party to establish an ef-
fective guerrilla movement. Cuban leaders are
said to favor the establishment of a new organiza-
tion with no direct ties to orthodox Communist
groups. The Cubans are said to have selected
Mario Sosa to organize the new movement, and to
begin making contacts with "liberal" leaders to
investigate their readiness for armed action
against Honduras' military government.
50 Honmansstraveled to cuva

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14. Mexico

The Castro regime has been careful in the past
to avoid antagonizing the Mexican government, in
view of the importance to Cuba of maintaining its
embassy and its civil air connections through Mexico.
The Cubans continue to use their embassy in Mexico
City as well as individual Mexican nationals and
exiled Central American residents there to support
subversive activities elsewhere in Central America.
The activities of Mexican journalist Victor Rico
Galan are a case in point.

Havana may find it difficult, however, to
avoid exploiting the endemic peasant_unrest which
is increasing in northern Mexico. A clandestine
source reported from the Cubanrembassy
Claustre Cobam charge
giving Shen Sharb SoS of money to the Communist led
Sidependente
Central (CCI)--which has been
behind much of the peasant unrest. The US consul
general at Tampico reported last May that the Cuban
consul there was openly preaching revolution and
distributing inflammatory propaganda and that he
had stepped up the tempo of his activities consider-
ably in recent months.
least 512 Mexicans traveled to Cuba in 1963;
traveled to Cuba from January through April of
This year.

15. Nicaragua

Cuban subversive efforts aimed at Nicaragua
have been channeled principally through the National
Liberation Front (FLN), a Communist-dominated revo-
lutionary organization. Most of this group's guer-
rilla leaders were trained in Cuba in 1961-62, along
with members of various other Nicaraguan revolu-
tionary movements. Cuban aid to the FLN takes the
form of financial support, training, and guidance,
but details are lacking regarding its current size
or effectiveness. In August 1963, the FLN launched
an unsuccessful guerrilla foray into northern
Nicaragua from Honduras which cost the small organ-
ization some of its key personnel. Since then,
the FLN has been the object of harassment by both
Nicaraguan and Honduran security forces. It has
shown no capability to make another move soon.

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tos Cuba 11-1963.

16. Panama

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guans are knownstos have traveled

Pro-Castro and Communist elements moved quickly
to exploit the January outbreaks of violence in
Panama. For some four months preceding the 9-11
January incidents, Havana had been increasing its
pressure on its contacts in Panama to cooperate in
starting revolutionary action. Revolutionary
leaders of the Castro-supported Vanguard of the
National Revolution (VAN) were urged as early as
the threatened banana workers' strike in October
1963 to cooperate in initiating an anti-government
campaign. Planning quickened after the early
November visit of Victor Rico Galan and possibly
other Castro agents. Some of the approximately
100 Panamanians believed to have received training
in Cuba were planning to give guerrilla warfare
courses in December and again in May.

Clandestine reporting also discloses Cuban
efforts to influence the outcome of the 10 May
1963 national elections. Havana is reliably re-
ported to have provided some funds for campaign
assistance to selected deputorial candidates of
the Radical Action Party (PAR).
Seven Panamaniansextremists returned to Panama
In late March after thaving spent varying periods
of time training in Cuba. Four of these were VAN
members. Another group of recently-returned trainees
was reliable, reported in early May to be seeking
to establish a new revolutionary group in Panama
and to launch revolutionary activities in the near
future.
Sixty-one Panamanians traveled to Cuba-in 1963.

17. Paraguay

Cuban subversive efforts directed against
Paraguay continue to be confined to supporting and
training Paraguayan exiles based for the most part
dy Montevideo, Uruguay. The Paraguayan Communist
Party (PCP) and its paramilitary front group, the
United Front for National Liberation (FULNA) are
the most prominent recipients of Cuban aid and

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attention, which is given through-the-Cuban embassy
Ane Montevideo. Some FULNA members have received
guerrilla training in Cuba.

A once-weekly pro-Castro broadcast in the
Guarani language has been heard in Paraguay since
mid-November 1963. The PCP is said to be keeping
two Paraguayans in Cuba permanently to enable the
program to continue to be broadcast in Guarani.
Only six Paraguayans traveled to Cuba in**1963.
However, probably more exiles in Uruguay traveled
to Havana.

18. Peru

The primary recipient of Cuban assistance for
armed revolution against the Belaunde government is
the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a
militant pro-Castro organization composed of some
1,000 members and 3,500 sympathizers. Between 4.50
and 500 MIR members have received guerrilla train-
Ing abroad, most of of them in Cuba. Police raids in
January and May probably upset the MIR's timetable
for initiating anti-government action, but the move-
ment is well-financed, well-armed, and well-organized.
It has the potential for carrying out a subversive
campaign of considerable disruptiveness. Luis de
la Puente, the leader of MIR, has visited Cuba on
several occasions, and is on good terms with Castro.

Cuba has assisted other pro-Castro groups of
lesser importance, but such assistance has been
limited to guerrilla training. One such group, the
Army of National Liberation (ELN), organized by
Peruvian extremist students in Havana, has isolated
bands of guerrillas operating in remote areas of
the country. The National Liberation Front (FLN)
is openly pro-Castro, and has sent members to Cuba
for subversive training. Principal FLN leader
Salomon Bolo visited Cuba last September.

Castro-inspired extremists have exploited re-
curring peasant unrest in Central Peru for the past
several months and they have been behind much of
the illegal peasant land incursions which have oc-
curred there.

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Hidrty three Peruvians are known to have
Boaveled to Cuba in 1963, 16 traveled to Cuba
through April of this year.

19. Uruguay

We have no evidence of Cuban support for revo-
lutionary activity directed at subverting the
Uruguayan government. Uruguay's importance to
Havana lies in its value as a place where Cubans
and Cuban agents are relatively free to carry on
subversive contacts with dissidents from neighbor-
ing countries, particularly Argentines, Paraguayans,
and Brazilians. The Cuban embassy in Montevideo
has been particularly useful as a transit point for
air travel to Cuba of of travelers wishing to conceal
their ultimate destination. Uruguay also has been
useful to Cuba as a distribution point for Cuban
propaganda for neighboring countries. Cuban propa-
ganda is widely disseminated in Uruguay as part of
a more subtle policy of building up Castroism among
Uruguayan leftists and intellectuals.
12.00000
104-10406-10136
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10
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OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

3. DEFINITIONS

Within the context of this instruction, the definitions listed below will apply.
Special note must be taken of the fact that the key term "operational use"
employed throughout this instruction has been defined in the most succinct
manner consistent with clarity. It has not been feasible, however, to cover in
a definition the entire scope of possible variations in operational circumstances
which may be encountered in DDO activities. The definition of "operational
use" is intended to provide guidance for the majority of cases, and must be
employed with responsible operational judgment. Issues involving a deter-
mination of "operational use" which cannot be resolved with reasonable as-
surance by the responsible operating components will be referred to the
Deputy Director for Operations for decision.

a. Operational Use
Operational use is interpreted to mean the recruitment, utilization, or train-
ing of any individual or group for DDO purposes on either a witting or
unwitting basis by or on the behalf of an element of the Operations Direc-
torate. Utilization is made of an individual or group whenever that in-
dividual or group, responding to the direction or solicitation of a DDO
element, provides information, performs services, provides cover, or supplies
financial, material, or other support necessary for the accomplishment of
DDO operational objectives either directly or indirectly, to or for an ele-
ment of the Operations Directorate.

b. DDO Element
Any person or group who or which is responsible to, owned or controlled
either directly or indirectly by the Operations Directorate. Included under
this definition are employees or members of Agency proprietary mech-
anisms.

c. Operational Contact
Any association having as its purpose the initiation or furtherance of DDO
operations.

4. RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE

a. Restrictions on the operational use of individuals or groups are of four types
and cover twenty five separate categories as outlined below and as described
in greater detail in paragraphs 5 through 8 of this instruction:
(1) Operational Use is Prohibited (see paragraph 5):
(a) Members and trainees of ACTION;
(b) Fulbright grantees;

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(c) Officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural
Freedom;
(d) Officials, employees, or grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and
Carnegie Foundations;
(e) Employees of US private detective investigativexagencies.
(2) Operational Use Requires Special Extra-Agency Concurrence (see
paragraph 6): AND APPROVAL OF SA/ADDO,
(a) Employees of other U.S. Government agencies;
(b) DDO agents or assets in the United States;
(c), Agents and human sources of foreign intelligence registered by
other U.S. agencies;,
(d). Citizens (or persons documented as citizens) of Australia, Canada,
the United Kingdom (including its overseas dependent territories)!
and New Zealand;.
(e) Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands;!
(f) (Merchant seamen on ships of certain countries.!
(3) Operational Use Requires Special Approval by the DDO (see para-
graph 171)
(a) Publishers, producers, journalists or employees of public infor-
Imation media;
(b) [CARE employees;
(c) Individuals engaged in public relations activities;'
(d) Officials, representatives, or employees of Communist countries!
in the United States;
(e) Foreign delegates or employees of the United Nations assigned
| in the U.S. and U.S. citizen delegates or employees whereverl
assigned;
(f) Staff members or officials of Red Cross societies; 1
(g) (Officials of the Vatican State;
(h) U.S. Government-funded professors, lecturers, students or grantees;
(i) (Members of educational or private voluntary organizations;
(j) Officials or employees of the African-American Institute;
(k) (Volunteers to America.l
(4) Operational Use Requires Approval by Chief of Area Division (see
paragraph 8):
(a) Citizens or alien residents of the U.S. in denied areas;
(b) Non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of United Nations for
ganizations not assigned in the U.S.;
(c) Members of the academic community.
b. Operational use of an individual who comes under more than one type of
restriction will be controlled by the highest type of restriction applicable
in his particular case.

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5. OPERATIONAL USE PROHIBITED

a. Members and Trainees of ACTION
(1) It is Agency policy that members and trainees of ACTION will not be
used in any capacity, with or without remuneration, by the Agency.
or by organizations under its jurisdiction. (The term "members of AC-
TION will be understood to mean anyone employed by or associated
with ACTION except trainees.)
(2) It is Agency policy that former members_of_ACTION may be em-
ployed or used by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction
only in accordance with the following:
(a) Except as stated in (b) below, a former member of ACTION
may be employed or used operationally by any element of the
Agency only if a period of five full years has elapsed since his..
separation from ACTION.)
(b) An Agency-controlled organization may hire a former member of
ACTION, but only for duties related to the overt purposes of such
organization, if a period of at least.twenty-four months has elapsed:
since his separation from ACTION.
(c) The employment or use of a former member of ACTION under
the provisions of subparagraph (a) or (b) above must have the
specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations.
(3) Former trainees whose ACTION service included duty or training over-
seas are subject to the rules governing employment or use of former
members of ACTION (subparagraph (2) above). Former trainees who
did not serve at any time as members of ACTION and whose (ACTION)
service did not include duty or training overseas may be employed or
used operationally by DDO elements provided the specific prior ap-
proval of the Deputy Director for Operations is obtained.
(4) A former member or trainee of ACTION whose employment or use
is permitted by subparagraph (2) or (3) above may not be assigned
to or used in a country for which he had been trained or to which
he had been assigned while with ACTION
(5) Information may be received by the Domestic Collection Division
from private corporations and other organizations employing former
ACTION personnel, notwithstanding the fact that the information may
originate with former ACTION personnel. However, any direct brief-
ing or debriefing of or contact with former members or trainees of
ACTION is subject to the following:
(a) The specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations
must be obtained.
)
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(b) If the individual is a former member of ACTION, or a former
trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training over-
seas, five years must have elapsed since his separation from
ACTION.
If contact with a former ACTION member or a former trainee whose
ACTION service included duty or training overseas should be un-
avoidable during the required five year, waiting period, the Deputy
Director for Operations may request an exception from the Director
of Central Intelligence. Among the possible reasons for such unavoid-
able contact would be the designation of a former member_or_trainee
as the liaison officer to the Domestic Collection Division.
b. Fulbright Grantees
DDO policy prohibits the operational use of individuals who are receiving
U.S. Government support under certain provisions (see below) of the
Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, as amended,
commonly known as the Fulbright-Hays Act. Falling under this prohibi-
tion are teachers, research scholars, lecturers and students) (including stu-
dent artists and student musicians) who have been selected to receive
scholarshipstore grants by the Board of Foreign-Scholarships appointed
by the President of the United States. Operational use of such individuals
is prohibited only during the period when they are participating in the
educational and cultural exchange program. This prohibition specifically
does not apply to the several other categories of grantees supported by
other provisions of the Fulbright-Hays Act such as artists, athletes, leaders,
(specialists or participants at international trade fairs for expositions) who
do not come under the aegis of the President's-Board of Foreign Scholar-
ships) (see 7.j., below).
c. Officials or Employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom
DDO policy prohibits the operational use of the officials or employees
of the "International Association for Cultural Freedom. Contacts with such
individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover ca-
pacities must be limited to their cover assignments.
d. Officials, Employees, or Grantees of the Ford Rockefeller and Carnegie
Foundations
DDO policy prohibits the operational use of grantees of the Ford Founda-
tion, the Rockefeller Foundation or the Carnegie Foundation or of other
persons actively participating in programs which are wholly sponsored.
and controlled by any of these fotundations. Additionally, there will be
no operational use made of the officials or employees of these organiza-
tions. In general, however, there is no restriction on nonoperational con-
tacts or consultations with such individuals.
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e. Employees of U.S. Private Detective Investigative Agencies)
DDO policy prohibits the operational use either in the United States
or overseas of the employees of any U.S.-owned or -controlled private)
detective investigative agency. This policy does not apply to operational
use of employees of organizations which are engaged strictly in commercial
or credit investigations.,

6. EXTRA-AGENCY CONCURRENCE REQUIRED
a. Employees of Other U.S. Government Agencies)
Approval for the operational use of staff or contract (including foreign)
employees of other U.S. Government agencies will be granted only in
cases where the employee's parent agency in Washington has been notified
of and has approved of the intended operational use in accordance with
the provisions of DOI 10-5.
b. DDO Agents or Assets in the United States
In accordance with the agreement existing between the Federal Bureau/
of Investigation and this Agency, the restrictions listed below apply to
the operational activity of the Operations Directorate conducted in the
United States. Coordination with the FBI of appropriate information on
DDO operational activities in the United States is the responsibility of
the Chief, Liaison Group, Operations. Staff.
(1) All investigations by this Agency of foreign officials in the United
States require the prior concurrence of the FBI. In this context, the
term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or pro-
cedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood
inquiries) aimed at developing information concerning an individual's
activities or background; "investigation" does not include the ac-
ceptance or the development of information through social contacts
or contacts normally made by Agency officials in discharging their
cover functions.
(2) Any approach in the United States by a DDO element for recruit-
ment of any foreign official or of any visitor from a Communist country
requires the prior concurrence of the FBI.
(3) Any planned meeting in the United States for assessment and social
development between a DDO element and a foreign official of known
or presumed interest to the FBI or between a DDO element and an
official or visitor from a Communist country requires that prior noti-/
fication be provided to the FBI
(4) Whenever domestic DDO operations involve matters pertaining to
the national security of the United States, appropriate identification
of persons engaged in the operations in the United States will be
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provided to the FBI. In accordance with this policy, the following
categories of DDO assets will be identified (to_the FBI: DDO per-
sonnel, agents of the Operations Directorate who are either U.S. citizens
or alien residents, and foreign agents of the Operations Directorate
recruited abroad who come to the United States for operational
purposes.
c. Agents and Human Sources of Foreign Intelligence (Registered by Other
US. Agencies)
The Interagency Source Register (ISR) has been established at head-
quarters to provide for United States Intelligence Board (USIB) agencies
a centralized record of agents and human sources of foreign intelligence.
A principal purpose of the ISR is to register primacy of interest and
prevent multiple recruitment or unintentional duplicate operational use
of such agents and human sources. It is USIB policy that no individual
(registered in the ISR by one USIB agency will be used for operational pur-
poses by any other USIB agency without the specific prior approval of the
agency having primacy of interest. If a DDO element desires to arrange the
transfer or joint operational use of a registered individual, the ISR will con-
tact the agency having primacy of interest to determine whether there is a
willingness to discuss this matter.
d. Citizensor Persons Documented as Citizens) of Australia, Ganada, the
United Kingdom (including its Overseas Dependent Territories) and
New Zealand
(1) The operational use of citizens of the above-named countries (includ-
ing the overseas dependencies of the United Kingdom) is restricted
by agreements with the intelligence, or security authorities of such
countries, which require the prior approval of the appropriate liaison
authority. Such approval will be obtained at the earliest feasible stage
of development through the European Division (in the case of citizens
of Canada or the United Kingdom), or through the East Asia Division
(in the case of Australian or New Zealand citizens).
(2) The above restriction also governs the use of false documentation
representing DDO staff or agent personnel as citizens of the_above-
named countries. Approval for the use of such documentation will
be sought through the same channels as stated in subparagraph (1)
above.
(3) Authority to make operational use of the persons or documentation
described in the above subparagraphs without obtaining the prior
approval of the liaison authority) concerned may be granted only
by the Deputy Director for Operations or by the Director.
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e. Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands
The operational use of any citizen of Norway, West Germany or The
Netherlands is, under certain conditions, contingent on prior approval
of the national intelligence service concerned These countries are par-
ticularly sensitive in cases involving the operational use of their citizens
who are merchant seamen and who are serving on ships carrying their
only flags. Each case involving the proposed operational use of a citizen of
one of these countries will be reviewed by the Chief of the European
Division in the light of the agreements existing between this Agency and
the national intelligence service concerned. After weighing all of the
equities, the Chief of the European Division will decide whether approval
is required from the national intelligence service concerned. When re-
quired, approvals for the operational use of such individuals will be
obtained from the appropriate national intelligence services by the Euro
pean Division.
f. Merchant Seamen on Ships of Certain Countries
The operational use of merchant seamen, regardless of their citizenship;
who are serving on ships carrying the flags of Australia, Canada, the
United Kingdom (or its overseas dependencies), New Zealand, Norway,
West Germany For The Netherlands is, under certain conditions, subject
to provisions of the agreements existing between this Agency and the
national intelligence service concerned. Each case involving the proposed
operational use of sucha merchant seaman will be reviewed by the Chief
of the European Division or the Chief of the East Asia Division, as ap-
propriate, in the light of the pertinent interservice agreements. After
weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European Division or the
Chief of the East Asia Division will determine the course of action to
be taken with regard to the national intelligence service concerned.

7. APPROVAL BY THE DDO REQUIRED
Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations for the operational use
of any individual who falls into one of the categories described in this para-
graph will be requested by memorandum. The individual's covert approval
status will be described in the memorandum to the Deputy Director for
Operations, together with a concise explanation of the intended operational
use. (In connection with this paragraph, contacts by the Domestic Collection
Division with individuals or firms do not require approval by the Deputy
Director for Operations provided they constitute merely briefing or de-
briefing for the purpose of obtaining information acquired by an individual
or representative of a firm in the course of his normal activities. If, however,
in any case the contact is on behalf of another element of the Operations
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Directorate or another agency; or if an individual or firm will be requested
to perform an operational task or to deviate from his or its normal pattern
of activity; or if the activity, even though consistent with the individual's
or firm's normal pattern of activity, will take place because requested or
funded by the Domestic Collection Division; that case will be subject to
the requirement for approval by the Deputy Director for Operations.)
a. Publishers, Producers, Journalists, or Employees of Public Information
Media (see DOI 240-6)
(1) Operational use of publishers or producers of public information media
requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations whenever
there is danger that such activity might serve in any way to influence)
U.S. public opinion.) Such activities include but are not limited to the
publishing of books, newspapers, or magazines, the making of films,
the production of TV or radio programs or the issuance in the United
States of any public opinion influencing information media. The op-
erational use abread of publishers or producers of public information
media for non-U.S. audiences does not require approval by the Deputy
Director for Operations even though such activities may have some
unintended and unsolicited fallout in the United States.)

(2) Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is also required prior
to the operational use of journalists, newspaper, TV, radio, or news
service correspondents or stringers, and employees of news media
including TV and radio stations, whenever the individual is a U.S.
citizen or when the news medium involved is under U.S. ownership
or control.
b. CARE Employees
It is DDO policy to avoid operational use of employees of the CARE
organization including indigenous employees. Exceptional individual cases
involving priority operational objectives will be considered on their merits.
Prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations will be required
in all cases.
c. Individuals Engaged in Public Relations Activities (see DOI 50-18)
Individuals (engaged in public relations activities which in any way have
or seek to have an influence on public opinions in the United States are
considered to be in a separate sensitive category. In view of the peculiar
aspects of public relations activity, including the special requirements of
the Foreign Agents Registration Act; approval by the Deputy Director
for Operations is required prior to the operational use in a public relations)
capacity of any individual who is engaged in public relations activities)
and who is located in or operating into the United States.
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d. Officials, Representatives, or Employees of Communist Countries in the
United States (see DOI 60-11)
Prior approval of the Director or the Deputy Director for Operations is
required for operational contact in the United States with or operational
use of officials, representatives, or employees of the USSR, its satellite
countries, Communist China, or any other country under Communist
contro If, while in the United States, such individual is to be investigated,
approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior
concurrence of the FBI will also be required in accordance with para-
graph 6.b., above.
e. Delegates or Employees of the United Nations
It is DDO policy that the operational use of delegates or employees of
the United Nations, including those of its various main organs and of
its related intergovernmental agencies, is of such sensitivity as to require
special consideration by the Deputy Director for Operations. In especially
worthwhile cases wherein operational use of a particular (UN) individual
is deemed essential for the accomplishment of the DDO mission, approval
may be obtained. In each case involving a non-U.S. citizen assigned in
the U.S. or a U.S. citizen wherever assigned, the prior approval of the
Deputy Director for Operations will be required. (See paragraph 8.b.
regarding use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees, not assigned
in the U.S.) If, while in the United States, the UN individual is to be
investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational pur-
poses, the prior concurrence of the FBI may also be required as outlined
in paragraph 6.b., above.
f. Staff Members or Officials of Red Cross Societies
The operational use of staff members or officials of the International Red
Cross or its affiliated national Red Cross, Red Crescent, or other equivalent
societies requires special consideration and prior approval by the Deputy
Director for Operations. DDO elements should make every effort to avoid
the operational use of staff members or officials of Red Cross societies. How-
ever, when especially high priority objectives are at stake and alternative
agent assets are not available, approval for the use of such individuals may..
be granted by the Deputy Director for Operations.
g. Officials of the Vatican State
Operational contact with officials of the Vatican State will be made only
with the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Operational
use of Vatican officials will be contingent on prior approval by the Deputy
Director for Operations.
h. U.S. Government Funded Professors, Lecturers, Students or Grantees
U.S. or foreign professors, lecturers or students and other persons partici-
pating in U.S. Government-sponsored academic, cultural, athletic or other)
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exchange programs (except certain Fulbright grantees see paragraph 5.b.,
above) are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. Operational
use of such individuals while they are actively participating in an exchange
program funded by the US. Government-requires special consideration
and approval by the Deputy Director for Operations prior to such use. In
certain especially worthwhile cases wherein the operational use of a par-
ticular 'U.S. Government supported exchangee is considered essential to
the accomplishment of the DDO mission, the Deputy Director for Opera-
tions may grant approval. Memoranda requesting such approval will be
forwarded through the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. In such cases the
Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek the
concurrence of the U.S. Government sponsor.
i Members of Educational or Private Voluntary Organizations
(1) It is U.S. Government policy that no federal agency shall provide any
covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the
nation's educational or private voluntary organizations. This policy.
applies to all foreign as well as domestic activities of such organiza
tions. In compliance with the above proscription, DDO policy requires
the most careful scrutiny of all cases involving operational contact with
U.S. educational or private voluntary organizations including trade and
professional organizations. The operational use of any employee, staff
member or official of such an organization requires prior approval by
the Deputy Director for Operations. The Deputy Director for Opera-
tions will determine whether or not to seek extra-Agency approval for
the conduct of such operations.
(2) Operational use including covert funding abroad of foreign-based
international voluntary organizations and the personnel thereof is per-
mitted even if the organization is also funded by U.S. private voluntary
organizations.
j. Officials or Employees of the African-American Institute
Operational use of the officials or employees of the African-American/
Institute requires prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations.
Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in
their cover capacities will not involve operational matters until the approval
of the Deputy Director for Operations has been secured.
k. Volunteers to America
Operational use of or operational contact with members of Volunteers.to/
America while they are on assignment in the United States will not be
made without the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations.
(Volunteers to America are participants in programs established by various
foreign countries in collaboration with the Department of State as a
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counterpart to the U.S. Peace Corps. Such volunteers are sent to the U.S.
for a period of service in schools and community development programs.
The name of the organization may vary by country.

8. OPERATIONAL USE REQUIRES APPROVAL BY CHIEF OF AREA
DIVISION
Operational use of any individual in the categories listed in this paragraph
is considered of such sensitivity as to require special consideration and ap-
proval by the appropriate Area Division Chief. This authority may not be
delegated. The request for approval will be by memorandum in which the
individual's covert approval status will be described, together with a concise
explanation of the intended operational use.
a. Citizens or Alien Residents of the U.S. Used in Denied. Areas (see
DOI 50-19)
The operational use in denied areas of U.S. citizens, or of aliens who have
been admitted for permanent residence or have resided for a prolonged
period in the U.S., requires the prior approval of the Chief of the Area
Division under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place.
b. Non-U.S. Citizen Delegates or Employees of the United Nations not As-
signed in the U.S.
The operational use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of the
United Nations who are not assigned in the U.S. requires the prior ap-
proval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the in-
tended use is to take place.
c. Members of the Academic Community
(1) Within the context of this instruction a member of the academic com-
munity is defined as: any student, faculty member, administrative
officer or staff official of a college, university or similar institution of
higher learning including their associated research centers. Persons
associated with institutions such as police or military training centers
(except the four college-level military service academies) or under-
going specialized technical training with business or commercial firms
are not considered to be members of the academic community.
(2) Operational use of members of the academic community, especially
those cases wherein an individual is to be made witting of Agency
interest, will be on a highly selective basis. Each case will be examined
to ascertain its essentiality to the DDO mission in terms of the price
of possible disclosure, and to ensure that proper security procedures
can be observed. When it has been determined that the operational
use of a member of the academic community as defined above is
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operationally feasible and without suitable alternative, prior approval
in the following cases will be obtained as indicated below:
(a) Any U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community)
and who is associated in any way with any U.S. or foreign college,
university or similar institution of higher learning;
(b) Any non-U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community
and who is associated in any way with any U.S.-owned or U.S.-
affiliated college, university or similar institution of higher leam DDO
ing which is located either in the United States or abroad.
Opproval
If the individual is located in the United States, approval will be re-C
quested by memorandum to the Chief, Foreign Resources Division.
The memorandum will include a statement that the individual is, or
is not, a DCD asset or contact, and in the event he is will include
the concurrence of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division. If the in-
dividual is located outside the United States, approval will be requested
by memorandum to the Chief of the Area Division who has jurisdiction
over the area concerned. Operational use of foreign members of the
academic community who are not associated in any way with U.S.-
owned or U.S.-affiliated institutions of higher learning is also con-
sidered sensitive.. The operational use of such individuals also requires
the approval of the Chief of the Area Division In any case involving
a well known person or having special security implications, the
Division Chief to whom the request is referred under the above pro-
visions will consult with the DDO and obtain the latter's approval.
(3) The provisions of paragraph (2) do not apply to Domestic Collection
Division contacts with members of the academic community, but such
contacts are subject to the following requirements:
(a) If a member of the academic community would be asked to per-
form an operational task or to alter his normal pattern of activity
in order to serve Agency purposes, prior approval of the Chief,
Domestic Collection Division is required. Additionally, if such an
individual will be in a foreign area, the concurrence of the Chief
of the Area Division concerned will be obtained.
(b) Prior concurrence will be obtained from the appropriate Area
Division Chief if an individual is to be utilized in a politically
sensitive area where his presence or activities could potentially
embarrass the interests of the U.S. Government.
(c) The requirements of paragraph S.a. apply if a citizen or alien
resident of the United States would be used in a denied area.
(4) At the end of each calendar year, Chiefs of Divisions will submit a
report to the Deputy Director for Operations (via Chief, Foreign
Resources Division) on the number of individuals recruited from the
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academic community during that year. This audit will permit the DDO
to keep abreast of major quantitative changes in the number of po-
tentially sensitive operational cases in each Division.
(5) It should be noted that the provisions of this paragraph do not apply
to DDO employees who wish to study on teach privately Approval for..
such activity will be obtained in accordance with the provisions of
HR 10-7.

9. INDIVIDUAL CHANGES OF STATUS OR CATEGORY
When an individual undergoes a change of status which places him in one of
the restricted categories described above, or transfers him from one category
to another, his operational use or continued operational use is contingent upon
approval or reapproval as prescribed for his new status.

10. INTERPRETATION OR MODIFICATION OF RESTRICTIONS
Certain of the policy restrictions described in this instruction are subject to
interpretation, extension or modification by the Deputy Director for Opera-
tions depending on the conditions and the atmosphere for DDO operations
at any particular time. Especially when dealing on the edges of policy rulings
and within the guidelines set forth herein, particular heed should be paid to
the price of disclosure, including careful consideration of the sensitivities of
the individuals involved. When there is any doubt concerning the application
of these restrictions, guidance should be obtained from the Deputy Director
for Operations.

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

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ANNEX B
THE 201 SYSTEM

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III
15 November 1974

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific in-
terest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent
information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying
subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for
producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a rela-
tively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify
opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and.
CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organi-
zations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of corre-
spondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. The 201 Number: a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each
individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that
individual.

b. The 201 Dossier: the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form
831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., per-
sonal history, current status, and prospects.

c. The Master 201 Record: a machine record generated by the opening of
a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and
stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. Main Index Master 201 Reference: this reference, printed in reply to an
Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent
within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be inoved up and the ref-
erence consolidated.

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0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON
SEX M DCB 12 APR.26
CIT GERM
REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53
POB GERM, BERLIN
OCC PHARMACIST
OCC CODE CHEN

SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS
AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH
29 OCTOBER.
201-0032671*
ΤΥΡΕ ΝΑΜΕ T-
ΟΙ CODES AA XX-10
RCD DATE 53
30 NOV 70

Information About Subject
1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
8. Occupation Code
7. Text

Document Reference Data Group
8. 201 Number
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference

ISG Control Information
13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number

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e. Ol Code: a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 per-
sonality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual
with organizations or activities of operational interest. Of codes cover intelli-
gence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or
suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI
codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services
or other specific organizations.

A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a mem-
orandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management
Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An Ol code may be assigned
when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see
paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added
at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201
personalities by OI codes. For example, if an Ol code has been opened for the
security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members
of that service.

f. 201 Machine Lists: produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on
names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers
exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER.

a. General
The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational com-
ponent, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates
a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing
of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be
opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this
handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information
will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on
persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and per-
sons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those
persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals
are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staft
employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

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persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk
and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO
records systém and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy require-
ments on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose v
names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201.
dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational ap-
proval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested
for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of opera-
tional interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than
denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five
or more documents (see DOΙ 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/
ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. Requesting a 201 File Opening

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting
a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Main-
tenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the
master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assign-
ment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample
201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field
station may request the opening of a 201 file by waiting 201- in the Head-
quarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the
subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening
is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by
placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN
will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsi-
bility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of
201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.

26
SECRET

13-00000

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into
his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through
a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must
be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation
procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:
a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and
handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security-approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers..

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

1. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the
subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which
have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which
have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles
on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

26.1
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13-00000

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

a. Purging

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires
discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the
simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take
place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done
periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should
be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for
the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if
a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number
then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch
cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information
contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is
by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier
forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention
in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized
officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction
over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification
authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained
at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained
in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a
cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location
of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. Maintenance Procedures

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order.
In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201

26.2
SECRET

13-00000,

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash
number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are
to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification
into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may
be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards
should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201...

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff
employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to
the ISG/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be
closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true
name-201-if-one exists or converted to the true name."

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest
should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material
has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified
to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an
OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and
Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing
to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number)
containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201
should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 20.1 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document
for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic
document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document
remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document...
in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L
or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will
automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may con-
tain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the
file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-
tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

25.3

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13-00000

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be
handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201
dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a
Routing and Recard Sheet with the notation shown below...

UNCLASSIFIED
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
PANSHITAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS

SUBJECT

FROM
TO
IP/Files
GC-52
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

EXTENSION
DATE
OFFICEIT'S
COMMENTS (to show from whom
INITIALS
(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1,
Chapter III, Annex B.)
Volume(s)
of 201-
of
volume(s)
Restricted Dossier
(Attach Form 2021 to
Dossier)
Non-Restricted Dossier

For Split Charge Dossiers:
All documents prior to
(date)
forwarded to IP/Piles. All
Jocumento accer
(date)
CL. STI CUTS2
FORW
8ICE
SECRET
COMFIDENTIAL
PATERNAL
USE GALY
UNCLASSIFIED

26.4
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13-00000

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any
period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk
officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer.
Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Account-
ability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.

TO: MANE
CONFIDENTIAL
(ghen gilled 10)
NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY

BADGE
COMPORENT
ROOM
TUBE
EXT.

This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited
below has been transferred to you by:

Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files,
Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.
SUBJECT OF REQUEST
FILE NO.
DOC. SYMBOL NUMBER DOC. DATE
DATE
OF
TRANSFER
CHALIG
PERM
OF TEMP
REG. NO.

PORN 2377 ۰۹
1-73
CONFIDENTIAL
CL BY: 007622

The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action
Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the
201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings
for his component.

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the
desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 2011
Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

26.5
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:

13-00000

SECRET
C
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge
from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being
returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form
2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by sub-
mitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filind In)
DATE
INITIALS
IP/FI
GC-52 TUBE DT-6
IP/DCU
GC-40 TURE HT
ACTION DESK: 1.
SECTION A
FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE

To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not
recessary).
:
2. To remove a restriction, complete Section 3 (R.O. signature
necessary).

FILE NUMBER
PESTRICT TO: (Use country or con-country code number. See CSI 70-28)
RESTRICTED BY:
COMPCIENT:
(man)
Date:
SECTION B
FEMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY)
COMPONENT:
R.O. No.
Date:
2332021.
CONFIDENTIAL
1-2, IMPOST CLV: CG7522
(13)

b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the
personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request
for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier
held in Central Files will be forivarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-
ronted cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file
to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The
desk will notify the requester of a denial.
:

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted
dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that
desk by Central Files.

26.6
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13-00000

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974
:

8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the
subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the
requester will be referred to the restricting desk..

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201
file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should
supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by
telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the
information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge
Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent
by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201. DOSSIER CANCELLATION

A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after
appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will
destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and
number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder
will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit
(IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names
and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of
interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its
alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening
the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request
(Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box: 16)
blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate
permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the
-201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are
categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special
a. Standard Listings

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's
mterest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

26.7
:
SECRET

13-00000

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The
standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.

FUL 4 CHINA
SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY
201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST
03 ICT 1973

NAME
TYPE
C08
NAME
77185/1343/5030 10 תריות היום/
CHEN, SHOW 1/7115/1343/0001/
CH SHI01017115/1343/0001/
DA/MO/YR
17JUL14
BIRTHPLACE
CIRY CITY
CHIN, KWANG TUNG
OCC. CIT.
OIPT
4
24 JAM11
CHE, SHCU-JFN 16774/1108/0038
CHEY, SHOVEL
CHIN, AMDY
OSJANE
CHIN, FUXIEN, PROV.
CF-4/7109/1343/690
CHER, SI SICH /7115/1169/001
CHF SHOU-TA
A
210CTOS
12NDV22
CHEN, MANCINIPIA, PORT ARTH
CHIN, MUNאג
18HAR 45
CHIN
CIFY, SH-155467115/1109/1
CHEN, SHCU 126 /0701/1343/1807
٢٠١٠٤٧, SH-7115/1139/459
CHEN, SU-
C41
CHEN, CANTON
DIPT CCON
ENGR CHAT
OZSEP26
CHIH, LIACNING PRO
12JAN18
CHIN, FUKIEN
09 JIING9
CHIN, CAMТОН
A
1905619
CITY, SM-14 17115/2005/5930
CIPE. SHU CIPIAN 17115/3219/122
07 JUL 30
:
19
CHEN, SHU-CA/7115/2395/2
CHEY SHU 7115/2095/2737 ויניים
L
NOV30
CIRC22
CHIEN. SHU FEN
A
CHEY, SHU HAO 17113/2P43/3185/
OF JUL14
CHIN, KATIGEUNG PFCV
CHIN, KWANGIUNG PFGY.
CHIN, PIJAN TANG TS
CHIN. PFILIU
CHIN, KHANG TUNG
231 01-1 01-2 ACT. LOC. 17.
CHINT 0105401
0230859
0179653
BUSP CCOM? 0043751
CHAT 0179620
CHAT
0832855
CHI47 0130415
CCCP 0091833
PROF CHIN? 0040299
CHAT7 0052638
ARMY CHAT 0328328
CHIN7 012443円
TSEA CHAT 0797335
CELY GIRY COWY.
CHIN HK
CHIN CHIN
CHIN
CHIN HK
CHIN CUBA
CHEN CHIN
CHEN
CHIM HALT
CHEK. HX
CHIA TAIW
CHIN
CHIN USA
CHIN MH
TALW
CITEM IK
CHIN? 0234627
0069786
0905340
CHI
CHIX HX
CHIN? 0200223
CHEN
0401577
СHЕN ЕГ
CHIV? 0179621
CHIN
CHIN
CIE, SIP HANG 7115/2573/74
10
CHING FUKIEN
CHIN7 0044757
CHIN
CF 31-510/7115/29-5/7
CHEY, SHU HS 7/115/2855/9133
CHI, SHJ-
23FЕЛОТ
CHIN, KWANGTUNG
CCO? 0073195
CILEN
05May16 CHIN, FOOCHГИ
CHIN? 0179422
CHIN CHIN
30MAR26
DIPT CCCM 0223161
CHIN CEY
CHEN SH-1 2711.5/2975/5030/
CHEM, SINJ 1/75/2805/2710
4
06F5816
CHIN, HOPES
DIPT CHAT 0239155
Cゅくは USA
Στην 23
CHIN, FANG CHENG
PROF CHIN?
0179673
CHIN
CHIN
CHIN. SHULE
R
CHIN
CCOM
0221772
CHIN CHIN
CHIN, SILIANG 15/0547/039
CHEN 114 7115/2579/2551
Смеч SH-1117109/273/010
CIRCZ1
CHIN
DSPT CISEN? 0221162
CHIN CHIN
25NMV20-CHIM, FERCSHUN
CHINE O179626
01Jりし?!
CHIN, XIANGSU
MILA CCTY
0451643
CHIM TATH
CHIRAS
וי
A
2056°20′
CHIN, HSCAM-MSIEN, KIANGSU
Char
0004967
CHIM 113
CHE 349 0 77115/2895/0599/
てか。リーフメ】 /711/2579/02028
1507210.
CHIN. CHANGHAI
CMMD CHIN? 0175525
CHIN CHIN
१९٠٦٢١٩
CIM, SHU-7115/29*3/2773/
CHIFY, S-5477115/2579/091
A
10DEC26
CHIANG TUNG
27JAN25
CHIN, KUANGTHING PRGV.
CFIER PROV
CNAT? 0052638
CHINT CO95119
CHINT 010140
CHEN, SHU-FE 1711517495/1795/
23DEC37
CHIN, SHANGHAI
COFN, SHIS EX/475/
V
27MA20
CHY, CHANG SHU
ונינונס
CON. SHLIS70667/6639
「どり!!!15/2005/2737/
CIPC7S
CHIN, HANG CHICA
CH:70153120
GEOL CHIN? 0753 16
CHEN HAA
CHIN TASH
CHIN CHI
CHEN S
CHEN
CHIN
CHIN
MAR17
COV
FIN
CCOM
0767442
CHIN UK
CNC, SL 32: 7115/7647/0317/
CS-1/7113/2695/1031
A
OZFEHOS
0:31
CHIN
1140406
CHEN, KLANGTUNG
CC07 וני
CHIN
CH'EN, SH-711
V
0540917
CHIN, PEIPING
CH147
3137:1
CHIN CHI
CHIN. 541 14/115/2845/5391/
1545
CHIN, FANG CHEY KM
CHIMP
C17
CHINCH
17115/2573/6902
0700130 CHIN, HENG YANG HSIEN, HIJN ARMY
CM۹۲
CIEN TAIM
٢٠٠٣٢٠٠٢١٠٠٠ーマリ
17039
14. CHESTANG
INT
٢٠٠٦
٥٦١٦٠:
CHEN OFIC
٢٠١٠٢٠١
2121
٢١ ٢١٠١٣
CRE
٢٠٠١ 17:15/257/3942/ V
045+728
CHIN, 3/
CHIN? 01
CHINTALN
SECRET/ORGANIZATICY INTERNAL USE FILY
PAGE

26.8
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13-00000

SECRET
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

All standard. listings are cumulative; previous editions must be destroyed
upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely
sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.
.2.

b. Non-Standard Listings.
:
:
Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:
(1) Country of location
:
(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)
(3) Citizenship
:
(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)
(5) Occupation.

These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example,
a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the
OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be
produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years. 1915
and. 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the
United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA.
Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an
OI code AA. Those personalities with an Ol code other than AA and those
with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that
persons who have not been assigned an Of code also be included13.00000
104-10408-10078
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

LOUIS STOKES, CHIC, CHAIRMA
HICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF,
SAMUEL
VINE, LOHID
STEWAR MCKINNEY, CONN
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH
CHARLES TONE, NEDR,
-
78-0070/15
CHRISTOPHER J. DOOO, CONN
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN,
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

(202) 223-4626
Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

FEB 21 1978

Mr. Patrick Carpentier
Office of the Legislative Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Carpentier:

In connection with the investigation of the House
Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of Presi-
dent John F. Kennedy, I am writing to request that by March
1, 1978, the Central Intelligence Agency provide provi a statement
explaining in detail the reasons for which a 201 file may be
opened. This statement should address the following possible
criteria, individually or in any combination, as well as any
other possible criteria not specifically listed:

1. Possible and actual sources of intelligence
information;

2. Possible and actual intelligence agents, assets,
or contract employees;

3.
4.
5.
::
Travelers, particularly travelers to communist
or unfriendly countries;

Individuals who defect or have attempted to
defect to communist or unfriendly countries;

U. S. servicemen or former U. S. servicemen who
pose counterintelligence dangers by revealing,
offering to reveal, or threatening to reveal
military or intelligence secrets to communist or
unfriendly countries;

6.
:
Individuals whose suspected counterintelligence
activities precipitate changes in United States
military or intelligence codes, methods, sources
or procedures;

13-00000

Mr. Patrick Carpentier
Page Two

7. Individuals who have been contacted by communist
or unfriendly intelligence organizations or in-
strumentalities thereof;

8. Individuals who have received money or other
items of value from communist or unfriendly
governments or instrumentalities thereof; and

9.
Possible and actual foreign intelligence agents
or employees.
:

Please address this statement to the time period 1958-
1964 in particular, and indicate whether there were any
changes in such criteria during these years. Finally, would
you please specify in your response under which criteria, or
combination of criteria, if any, the opening of a 201 file
was considered to be mandatory during this period.g

Sincerely,
12. Robert Bledning

G. Robert Blakey
GRB:mgj
Chief Counsel and Director

13-00000

SECRET
---
OLL#78 0070/
DO/ISS 78-098

28 February 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR:
O/SA/DO/O
Attention: Mr. Shepanek

FROM:
William F. Donnelly
Chief, Information Services Staff

SUBJECT:
House Select Committee on Assassinations
Request for Information on 201 Criteria (S)

REFERENCE:
OLC 78-0070/19, 23 February 1978

1. (S) With reference to the conversation of
27 February between Mr. Shepanek and Mr. Cleffi of ISS,
attached are copies of DOHB 70-1-1, 15 November 1974,
and an earlier version, CSHB 43-1-1 dated 15 February 1960.
A close study of the list of questions submitted by the
HSCA Staff has led us to conclude that the most complete
and effective way to respond would be by inviting the
Staff to review our regulation governing the criteria for
opening, maintaining, controlling and closing 201 files
by the Operations Directorate. A careful reading of the
regulation provides an answer to every question posed by
the Staff.

2. (S) The earlier version of the regulation is
included to reflect the situation as it existed in the
period of their primary concern (1958-1964). The later
version provides an expansion, clarification and refinement
of the earlier versions.

Willians 7. Dammulle
William F. Donnelly

SECRET
イ
E2 INPDET CL BY 015864

13-00000

SECRET

ANNEX B
THE 201 SYSTEM

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III
15 November 1974

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific in-
terest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent
information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying
subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for
producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a rela-
tively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify
opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and
CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organi-
zations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of corre-
spondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. The 201 Number: a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each
individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that
individual.

b. The 201 Dossier: the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form
831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., per-
sonal history, current status, and prospects.

c. The Master 201 Record: a machine record generated by the opening of
a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and
stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. Main Index Master 201 Reference: this reference, printed in reply to an
Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent
within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the ref-
erence consolidated.

23
SECRET

13-00000
:

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON
SEX M DOB 12 APR 26
CIT GERM
Ω
POB GERM, BERLIN 5
OCC PHARMACIST
6
REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53 OCC CODE CHEN
SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
7 CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS
AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH
29 ОСТОВER.
201-0032671* 8
TYPE NAME T-
ΟΙ CODES AA XX-10
RCD DATE 53.
11

30 NOV 70
(3
Information About Subject
1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text

Document Reference Data Group
8. 201 Number.
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference

ISG Control Information
13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number
24
SECREA
00833555
14
.:
い

13-00000

SECRET
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974
?

e. Ol Code: a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 per-
sonality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual
with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelli-
gence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or
suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of Of
codes for use by components:

(1) general Ol codes (Attachment 4)
(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services
or other specific organizations.

À component may request an OI code be established by submitting a mem-
orandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management
Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned
when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see
paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added
at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201
personalities by OI codes. For example, if an Ol code has been opened for the
security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members
of that service.

f. 201 Machine Lists: produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on
names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers
exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. General

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational com-
ponent, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates
a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing
of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be
opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this
handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information
will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on
persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and per-
sons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those i
persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals
are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff:
employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on
25
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SE
SECRET
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk
and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO
records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy require-
ments on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose
names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201
dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational ap-
proval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested
for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of opera-
tional interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than
denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five
or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/
ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. Requesting a 201 File Opening

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting
a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Main-
tenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the
master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assign-
ment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample
201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field
station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201 in the Head-
quarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the
subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening
is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by
placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN
will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsi-
bility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of
201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.
26
SECRÉT
SECR
[

13-00000

SEORET
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974
:

4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into
his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through
a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must
be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation
procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and
handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

l. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the
subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which
have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which
have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles
on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.
:
:
26.1
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13-00000

SECRET
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

a. Purging

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires
discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the
simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take
place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done
periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should
be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:
:.

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for
the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if
a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number
then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch
cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information
contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is
by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier
forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention
in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized
officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction
over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification
authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained
at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained
in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a
cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location
of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. Maintenance Procedures

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order.
In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201
26.2
SEORET

13-00000
CFOO

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash
number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are
to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification
into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may
be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards
should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff
employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to
the ISG/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be
closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true
name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest
should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material
has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified
to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an
OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and
Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing
to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number)
containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201
should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document
for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic
document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document
remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document
in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L,
or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will
automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may con-
tain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the
file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-
tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).
26.3
SECRET
:

13-00000

SEGRET
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be
handled as restricted dossiers.
:
.:
(11) An. inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201
....dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a
Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below..:
:
UNCLASSIFIED
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
SUBJECT
PROM
10
1.
2
2
7.
10.
11.
:
12:
13.
14
18.
IP/Files
GC-52
CONFIDENTIAL
SEGAST
ROUTING AND RECORD SHERT
TRANSMITIAL OF INACTIVE 201, DOSSIERS
ave
OFFICER'S Сомментар
PETRALS
(For guidance see CSRB 70-1-1,
Chapter III, Annex B.)
Volume(s) R
of 201-

volume(s)

Restricted Dossier
(Attach Forum 2021 to
Dossier)

Fon-Restricted Dossier

For Split Charge Dossiers:
All documents prior to
::
(date)
forvarded to IP/Files. All
documents after
(date)
:
retained at
desk.

CLO
6106
-74
XSECREP
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
OSE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED
26.4
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DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any
period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk
officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer.
Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Account-
ability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.

TO:
NAME
CON TUENTIAL
(Thon piiled to)
NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY
ICOMPONENT
ROOM
TUSE
EXT.

This is to notify you that sccountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited
below has been transferred to you by:
6.

Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files,
Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.
SUBJECT OF REQUEST
FILE NO.
OCC. SYMBOL RUNSER DOC. DATE
BAYE
OF
TRANSFER
CHAIGK
PCOM
ON TEMP
COMPIOENTHAL
CL BT: 007627
ясо. но.

The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action
Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the
201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings
for his component.

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the
desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201
Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.
26.5
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13-00000

SECRET
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX в
15 November 1974

(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge
from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being
returned to Central Files for rétention, a File Restriction Notice (Form
2021) must accompany the dossier.)
:

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by sub-
mitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021):
COMELDENTIA
(When Pilled (n)
BATE
INITIALS
TO

IP/FI
GC-52 TUBE DT-6
FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE

IP/DCU
GC-40 TUBE HT-4
ACTION DESK: 1.
To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not
necessary).
2.
To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature
Decessary).
SECTION A
FILE NUNG

RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28)
RESTRICTED BY:
COMPONENT:
(....)
Date:
SECTION B
REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY)
COMPONENT:
R.O. No.
Date:
FORM
22021000
CONFIDENTIAL
8-2, IMPORT CL 67, 007622
7

b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the
personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request
for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier
held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-
routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file
to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The
desk will notify the requester of a denial.
:

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted
dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that
desk by Central Files.
26.6
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13-00000

SECRET
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the
subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the
requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201
file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should
supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by
telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the
information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge
Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent
by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after
appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will
destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and
number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder
will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit
(IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names
and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of
interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its
alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening
the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request
(Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16)
blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate
perinanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the
201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are
categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

a. Standard Listings

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's
interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest
26.7
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13-00000
..

SCOPE
DOHB 70-1-1.
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

Desk" blocks on the 201. Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The
standard listings available are: 1.
:
:
(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;
:
i
:
:
(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;
:

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.

PULA CHINA
201 SIIRNAME ALPHA LIST
03 ICT 1973...
NAME
CHI, Shau 1. 77185/1343/9030/
CHEM. SHOW 1/7115/1343/0001/
TYPE
900
NAME DA/MO/YR
ECBAT/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY
BIRTHPLACE
CERY CITY
201
01-101-2. ACT. LOC. int."

17JULIA
CHIN, RHANG TUNG
CHE SIMS 1. /7115/1343/0001/
CHE, SHOU-JFM 16774/1108/0088
4
24 JANES
CHEY, SHOU EI
CAJAN19
CHER, SINI-16 17104/1343/690
CHAR, SH SH /7L15/1103/001
210СТОВ
4
12 NOV22
CHF
SHCU-TAN
SPMARAS
CHF
SH-15446/7119/1109/1
CHEN SHOU 126 /0701/1343/1POT
CHIEN, SHOリー1/7115/1104/485
14-1にみち おウ
04 JUN99
CHEY, SHP-S4
A
CITY, SM-CH14 /7115/2995/6930
CIM. SMJ CIPIAM 17115/3219/122
CHON, SHU-CHUAN /7115/2495/2
CHES, SU CIF/7115/2-85/2797
02 JUL 30
NOV 30
J
CHFN. SHIJ FLA
R
CHEY, SHI HA 7113/2943/3185/
CIFY, SINJ HS145 17115/2579/74
CF SIP-STUS/7115/29-5/7
CHEN, SHU HS
CHIN. FUKIEN
C41
025EP26
12 JANE
1906C19
CHIN, ΑΦΟΥ
CHIN, FURIEN, PROV.
CHIN, PANCINIPIA, PORT ARTH
CHEN, HUMAN
CHIN
CHEN, CANTאח
CHEN, LEACHINE PRO
CHIN, FUKIEN
CHIN, CAMTO
CHIN, KLANGTIING PROV
CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.
CHING HOAN TANG IS
CERC22... CHIM.PFILEu
OF JULI CHING RANGTUNG
10
DIPT
CHENT 0163401
0230059
0179653
BUSP CCOR? 0043751
CHEN? 0234629
CHAT 0179620
CHAT
0069796
DIPT CCO 0905390
ENGR CHAT
0437855
CHEMI OL30415
CCC 0091803
PROF CHIN? 0040298
CHAT? 0052638
ARMY CHAT 0328328
CHINT 012443円
TSEA CHAT 0797335
CHINT 0200223
0994577
CHEN? 0179621
CLEY CIRY CRY
CHIN HK
CHIN CHIN
CHIN
CHIN HK
CHIN CUBA
CHIN CHIN
CHIN
CHIN MALT
CHEK HK
CHER TALW
CHIN
CHIN USA
CHIN TAIV
CHIX HWAT
כיון ווא
CHIN HK
CHEN
CHIN Erut
CHIN CHIN
23FEROT
CHIN, WANGTUNG
CHINT 0044759
CCO? 0073195
CHIN
CHIN
/115/2835/9133
OSMAYEO
CHIN, FOCCHги
CHIN? 0179422
CHIN CHIN
CHI. SHU-
30M4426
DIPT CCOM 0223161
CHIN CET
CHIEN SIMI-1 27115/2205/5030/
CHEH, SIN KIVE! 1115/2695/2710
A
CHIN. HOPET
DIPT CHAT 083-156
CHEN USA
27723
CHIN. FANG CHENG
PROR CHI47 0179673
CHIN CHIN
Corn. SHU LAY
४.
CHIN
CCOM 0221972
CHEN CHIN
CHER, SIPI LIANG 17113/0547/009
CHEN. SINI LIT/7165/2579/2651/
CHEN SHI-LI43 17109/2473/010
CIRCZE
CHEN
DIPT CHINT 0223162
CHEN CHIM
25MOV20-
CHIN. FERGSHUN
CHIN? 0179624
:
CHEN TAIV
01PIL29
CHIN, KIANGSU
MILA COO
0834450104-10408-10316
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2003

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III
15 November 1974

ANNEX B
THE 201 SYSTEM

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific in-
terest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent
information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying
subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for
producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a rela-
tively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify
opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and
CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organi-
zations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of corre-
spondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. The 201 Number: a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each
individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that
individual.

b. The 201 Dossier: the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form
831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., per-
sonal history, current status, and prospects.

c. The Master 201 Record: a machine record generated by the opening of
a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and
stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. Main Index Master 201 Reference: this reference, printed in reply to an
Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent
within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the ref-
erence consolidated.

23
SECKET

SEGKET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

い
0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON
SEX M DOB 12 APR 26
CIT GERM
REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53
201-0032671*
TYPE NAME T-
POB GERM, BERLIN S
OCC PHARMACIST
ΟΙ CODES AA XX-10
OCC CODE CHEM
SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS
AND PHARMACISTS HELO IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH
29 ОСТОВER.
RCD DATE 53
30 NOV 70
3
Information About Subject
1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text
Document Reference Data Group
8. 201 Number
7
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference
ISG Control Information
13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number

SECRET
00833555
14

SECRE
(.
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974
7
e. Ol Code: a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 per-
sonality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual
with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelli-
gence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or
suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI
codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services
or other specific organizations.

À component may request an OI code be established by submitting a mem-
orandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management
Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned
when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see
paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added
at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.
:
The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201
personalities by Ol codes. For example, if an Ol code has been opened for the
security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members
of that service.

f. 201 Machine Lists: produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on
names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers
exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. General

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational com-
ponent, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates
a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing.
of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be
opened on persons who meet the carding crítèria described in Chapter If of this
handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information
will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on
persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and per-
sons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those
persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals
are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff
employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

25
SECRET
1

:::
SECRET
SEC
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk
and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO
records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy require-
ments on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose
names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201
dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational ap-
proval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested
for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of opera-
tional interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than
denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.
:
(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five
or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/
ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. Requesting a 201 File Opening

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting
a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Main-
tenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the
master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assign-
ment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample
201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field
station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Head-
quarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the
subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening
is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by
placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN
will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsi-
bility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of
201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.

26
SECRET

SEGRET
(
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into
his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through
a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must
be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation
procedures.
?
1
Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and
handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

1. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the
subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which
have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which
have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articlės
on the subject to finance and other_administrative papers.
26,1
SECRET

SEGRET
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

a. Purging

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires
discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the
simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take
place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done
periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should
be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for
the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if
a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number
then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch
cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information
contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is
by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier
forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention
in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized
officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction
over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification
authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained
at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained
in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a
cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location
of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. Maintenance Procedures

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order.
In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201
26.2
SECRET

SECRET
(
DOHB 70-1-1.
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974
7
dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash
number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are
to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification
into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may
be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards
should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201..

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff
employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to
the ISG/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be
closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true
name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest
should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material
has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified
to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an
OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and
Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing
to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number)
containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201
should be sent to. IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.
:
(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document
for inclusion in a-201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic
- document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document
remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document
in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L,
or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will
automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may con-
tain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the
file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black---
tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).
26.3
SECRET

(
SECRET-
(
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be
handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An. inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201
dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a
Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below..;
UNCLASSIFIED
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
SUBJECT:
FRON
TO
1.
IP/Files
CC-52
2
1.
4
5.
7.
10
12.
12
14.
15.
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
TRANSMITIAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS
DATE
OFFICIES
COMMENTS best show
(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1,
Chapter III, Annex B.)
Volume (s) of volume(s)
of 201-
Restricted Dossier
(Attach Fors 2021 to
Dossier)
Non-Restricted Dossier
For Split Charge Dossieres
All documents prior to
(date):
Larvarded to IP/Piles. All
documents after
(date)
retained at
desk.
h
ΒΙΟΕ
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
BETERNAL
USE DALY
UNCLASSIFIED
26.4
SECRET

(
SECRET
(
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any
period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk
officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer.
Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Account-
ability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.
TO:
NAME
CONFIDENTIAL
(When gitled In)
NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY
BADGE
COMPONEN?
ROOM
TUSC
EXT.
This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited
below has been transferred to you by:
Accordingly, IP's records nov reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files,
Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.
SUBJECT OF BEQUEST
FOR 2977PREVIOUS Cotton
1-23
FILE NO.
DOC. SYMBOL NUMBER BOC. DATE
CONFIDENTIAL
OATC
TRANSFER
of
CHARGE
PERM
OR TEMP
CL 87: 007622
Re.no.
The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action
Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the
201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings
for his component..

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the
desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.
:
(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box-2 on the 201
Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.
:
26.5
:
:
SEGRET

(
SEGRET
(
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974
:
(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge
from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being
returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form
2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by sub-
mitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).
CONFIDENTIAL
(When Pilled la)
ΘΑΤΕ
INITIALS
IP/FI
GC-52 TUBE DT-6
FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
IP/DCU
GC-40 TUBE HT-4
ACTION DESK: 1.
To restrict a file, complete Section A (sigusture of R.O. not
necessary).
2.
To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature
necessary).
SECTION A
FILE NUNGLA
RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28)
BESTRICTED BY:
COMPONENT:
(....)
Date:
SECTION B
REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY)
R.O. No.
COMPONENT:
Date:
FORM 2021***
CONFIDENTIAL
1.2 LAPDEY CL ET, OG7672 1131

b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the
personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request
for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier
held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple
routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file
to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The
desk will notify the requester of a denial.
::
c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted
dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that
desk by Central Files.
26.6
SECRET

(
SECRET
(
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974
?
8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES
The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the
subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the
requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201
file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned, Requesters should
supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

'Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by
telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the
information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge
Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent
by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after
appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will
destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and
number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder
will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit
(IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names
and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of
interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its
✓ alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening
the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request
(Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16)
blank, tise the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box-14), and indicate
permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the
201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are
categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

a. Standard Listings

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's
interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest
28.7
SEGRET
:
I
::

FUL & CHINA
::
SECRET
(
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The
standard listings available are: i

(1) Alphabetical by
etical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.
:..:
201 SIIRNAME ALPHA LIST
SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY
0311CT 1973..
NAME
TYPE
008
BIRTHPLACE
NAME
DA/MO/TR CTRY CITY
CAN, SHAL 1077185/1343/5030/
17JUL14
CHEN, KHANG TUNG
CHINT 0165401
CHEM. SHOU 1/7115/1343/0001/
DIPT
0234459
CHE, SHOU 1. 17115/1343/0001/A
24 JAMES
6179653
CHEM, SHOU-JFN 16774/1108/0088
90
CHIN, AMOY
BUSP CCOMP 0043751
201 01-101-2. ACT. LOC. fr.
CHIN HX
CHIN CHIN
: CHIN
CHIN HA
CHEY, SHELVE
04JAN19
CHIN, FUKIEN, PROV۰
CHIN7 0234629
CHIN CUBA
OEM SRL-4176 17109/1393/690
CHAT, SIC S-118 /715/1109/001
CIFE: SHCU-TA
210СТОВ
CIIIM, MANCINIPIA, PORT ARTH
CHAT
0179620
CHIN CHIN
A
12x0V22
CHIN, HUMA
CHAT
0069786
CHIN
18MAR45
CHIN
DIPT COOM
0905300
CHIM MALT
C41
CHIN, CANTאח
ENGR CHAT 0837655
:
CHIK HX
12J4NL
CHIN, FUKIEN
-ייי
09 JUN99
A
:
1906619
025E26 CHEN, LIACHING PRO
02 JUL 30
19
CHIN, CAMTOW
CHIN, KLANGTING PROY
CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.
CHIN, FIJAN TANG IS
CHIN. PFILIU
ARMY CHA 0328328
CHIN? 0124438
CH147 0130415
CCCM? 0091433
CHIA TAIW
CHIN
PROF CHINT 0040248
CHIN USA
CHAT7 0052638
CHIN MUAL
CHIN TAI
CHIN
TSEA CHAT 0797335
CHIK HOC
CHINZ 0200223
CHIN
0444577
CHIN ETHE
CI, SH-155467115/1109/1
CHEN, SHOU 128 /0701/1343/18ΟΥ
CHEN, SHEM-7115/1109/459
CHTY SMI-CHIN /7115/2595/6930
CSSCIPIAN 17119/3219/122
CHAN, SHU-CHAN 7115/2535/2
CES, SIN 7115/2085/2797
CHFA, SHU FEM
CHIM, SMI HAN /7113/2245/3185/
CFS SANG 17115/2579/74
CFY, SIM-104/7115/2985/7
CHER, SHU MSW 77115/2835/6133
CHIT. SHUートモンス
CHTEN SINI-1 4711.5/2975/5030/
CHEM, SU KU1/7115/2865/2710
Clish. SHI LAT
CHLH, SIPI LIANG 77115/0547/009
CHEM, SINS LIN 7115/2579/2651/
CHIEN SHI-140/2100/2973/010
CITO SHU-
CHET, SHY 4/7115/2885/0589/
CHLM, SHU-PA/7165/3579/0202/
CHIA, SHU-SEM/7115/2895/2773/
CIFY, SINJ-SHAW 17115/2579/091
CHEM, SHU-78 /7115/2445/1795/
CINFY, SHU TEH/475/
CIOFA SIM 11115/0647/6639
CUTE, SHE TUTELS/245/2737/
CIM. SIOU 24/7115/7647/0317/
COCA, SIRI-TA0/7115/2655/1031
CIIEN, SHU-17
CHIR. SIAP YI4 /7115/2845/531/
CHIM, SIRI-Y19/7115/2570/692/
Cofた。シャ١٠٧٢
PIMS-
NOV30
CIAC22
R
OF JULI
CHEN, RHANGTUNG
CHEY? 0179621
10
CHIN, FUKIEN
23FEROT
CHEN, WANGTUNG
CHIM? 0014759
CHIN
CCO? 0073195
OSMAYLO
CHIN, FOOCHOW
30×4326
A
CHIN, HOPET
2TROY23
CHIN, FANG CHIPNG
CHIN? 0171622
OIPT CCCH. 022-3161
DIPT CHAT 083-150
PROF CHINP 0175673
CHIN CHEN
CHEN
CHIN CHIN
CHIN CEY
CHILL USA
CHIM CHIN
CHEN
CCOM 0221972
CHIA CIIIN
CIRCOL
CHIN
DIPT CHIEN? 0223162
CHIN CHIN
25MMV20
CHIN. FENGSHUN
CHIN? 0179624
CHEN TAIM
01 JUL 29
CHIN. #TANGSU
MILA COOM 0854450
CHIN LACS
20SE 20
CHIN, HSTAM-HSLEN, KIANGSU
CHAT
154PR 30
CHIN, CHICHAS
CHAO CHIN? 0179425
009677CHEN USA
CHIN CHIN
10DEC19
CHIN, CHANGTING PROV.
CHAT? 0052638
CHEN MAALI
A
10DEC26
CHIN, KWANGTUNG
CHEN? 0085119
CHIN TATM
CHIM, FUKIEN PROY
CHINT 0103249
CHIN CHIN.
CHIN, SHANGHAI
GEOL CHIM? 0763416-
CHENBUR
V
CHIM, CHANG SHO
0013991
CHIN
CIPCTS:
CHIN, HANG CHO
CHINE 0153929
18 MAR 17
CHIN:
AOZFEBOS
FIN CCON0767462-ON "UK
019132035 CHIN
LAOVOS
CIIEN, КъейстONG
CC0170303196
CHIN
OSAPR17
CHIN, PEIPING
CHINT 0107306
CHIN CHIN
15 JUNOS
CHEN? 0179624
CHIN CHIN
CHIN, HENG YANG HSIEN, HIJN ARMY
CHAT
6340624
CHIM TAIM
INT
0311810
CHIN DFH
CHIM? ChiS4010
CHIN
CHINT 0144758
CHIN PAIN
PAGE
27JAN25
210EC37
27HA 20
CHIH, FARG CIETU
LTIFA38 CHIN. CIENTANG
отосго
21APP21
CHIN, SHANHA
04SEP2F CHIK. SEECINAX
C. 11115/2574/3842 ויז/
SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY
12 IMPORT CL GY 094974
26.8
SECRET

(
SECRET
(
DOHB 70-1-1.
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

All standard. listings are cumulative; previous editions must be destroyed
upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely
sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.
2.
b. Non-Standard Listings
:
i
Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:
(1) Country of location
(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)
(3) Citizenship
:
(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)
(5) Occupation.

These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example,
a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the
OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be
produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915
and. 1920, with the occupation.computer specialist, who are now citizens of the
United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA.
Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an
OI code AA. Those personalities with an Ol code other than AA and those
with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that
persons who have not been assigned120404083
104-10408-10329
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET

ROUTING
1
2
4
5
31
161
RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is
authorized: DE SENSITIZE.

: DIRECTOR
FELSCURNED
TO: DAM 4
DCI, D/DCI, DSP, C/CI, C/CI/SI, VR

Signed:
R.O. #1 Unit CI/RKA

SECRET 20204222 23 COPY
DER INFO CNBR CITE MELB 2517 (ROLLOFIER ACTING)
OPFLOOR
REF DIR 35690+
Note: If destruction, cite
reasons and coordinate
if appropriate.

12 DEC 63 IN71187

1. SQUARE PRELIMINARY CHECKS ON RECORDED CONVERSATIONS REVEAL
FOLL:

A NO TRACE 1952 DARK BLUE BUICK BELONGING SOVIET OR BLOC
INSTALLATION CNBR OR SYDNEY.
44

B NO LICENSE PLATE IDENTICAL TO ONE MENTIONED BUT FOLL
1. So. VARIANTS CHECKED: CCC 012, 1960 VAUXHALL, TWO-TONED BLUE,
ERIAN SATRAPINSKY, 149 WENTWORTH AVE, WENTWORTHVILLE; CCC 122,
942 STANDARD, FAUN, WILLIAM JOHN SINS, BINALONG; CCO 122, 1960
OLDEN, BIEGE, KEITH BETHKE, 28 HEWITT AVE, WAHROONGA. NO SQUARE>
EROG ON ABOVE.

CNO IDENTIFIABLE INFO ON AUSSIE MENTIONED CNBR 0591. (IN 68535)

D FRASERS MENTIONED SAME REF ARE ALP MPS.

E INDON FIRST SECY POSSIBLY IDW R. WILLY SASTRANEGARA HAS
JUSTACHE; RUSSIA!! CAPABILITY NOT KNOWN TO SQUARE; NOT NOTICEABLY
LOSE TO SOUS CNBIK.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 24 MAY 1970: 1--287248

D: 207-5-4.1
EIMPDET CL BY 012208

SECRET
PRODUCTION. BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

13-00000
CLASERHED MESSAGE IN 71187 PAGE 2

2. SQUARE HAS ARRANGED WITH PMO LIAISON OFFICER TED YOUNG
2
SE ANY FURTHER CALLS MADE. EMBASSY IN CLOSE CONTACT SQUARE
CNBR.

S. VILL ADVISE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.
CRET

/S COMMENT: Has requested information on the Polish driver connected with
e Russian diplomatic establishment in Australia.
DI LOIN KASO
104-10412-10005
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
DEFERRED TELEPOUCH 170106Z WASHINGTON
CONF: NEIPLOP5 INFO: FILE

TO: (BRUSSELS.4
FROM: SE/BIO INFO SE/CI/X, SE/X/EU, EABNLYBY
SUBJECT: WNINTEL CKTOP (PDGRAVE WIGALE) TRACE ON VLADIMIR
KUZNETSOV CASSIGNED 201-094361034
REFERENCE: BRUSSELS) 41919 IN 0253021
ACTION: FOR LIAISON LESS 201 AND FYIY

1. VLADIMIR KUZNETSOV (ASSIGNED 201-09436101 IS
POSSIBLY IDENTICAL WITH VLADIMIR SERGEYEVICH KUZNETSOV A GRU STAFF
OFFICER (FYI: (PD) SATISFY, DOI: 673.4

2. FYI: ACCORDING TO (PDSTORAGE, AS OF OCT 67, VLADIMIR
SERGEYEVICH KUZNETSOV HELD THE RANK OF ENGINEER-MAJOR AND WAS
ASSIGNED TO THE THIRD CANGLO-AMERICAN DIRECTORATE AT THE GRU HEAD-
QUARTERS IN MOSCOW. SOMETIME EARLIER IN 1967, KUZNETSOV ATTENDED
THE MILITARY DIPLOMATIC ACADEMY. END FYI.Y

3. FYI: SUBJECT OF (PD STORAGE AND (PDSATISFY INFORMATION
IS NOT IDENTICAL WITH VLADIMIR SERGEYEVICH KUZNETSOV (201-09002591
WHO SERVED AS COUNSELOR AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN JAKARTA FROM 72 TO
75. END FYI.Y

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT::"
B301-900259
RECORD COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS.
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

17 Sept 76
201-943610
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
E2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMFO 0 0 0 0 0 0
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

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DATE: 13 SEPT 76
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SE/CI/X P.W. JÓNSSONAL. SULLIVAN
TIN DRAFT
SE/X/EU M. NOSTER CIN DRAFT)
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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

HV-50120

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
PROJECT LINOG
COVERS HIM
SUBJECT: DEBRIEFING OF DAVID M. WILSTED (ps)
6 June 1960

1. On 1 June 1960 Mr. (John G. Heyn and Mr. John Kennedy of WHD,
Mr.(Robert Brown) of CI/OPS, Mr. (Robert Bryant) of FI/OPS and Mr. (Charles 03
Bray of FI/D met with David M. WILSTED (ps).

2. WILSTED emphasized that the whole telephone system in Mexico
"City is undergoing a reformation. The company Telefonos de Mexico, S.A.,
has sub-contracted this work of cleaning up and reorganizing the phone
system to the independent firm, Intel. They are cleaning up unused and
old lines, putting in new and spare lines, redefining exchange areas,
laying underground cables, etc. Eventually we should be better off be-
