If developer lost: Agent so indicates in letter to Madrid (in 5/4):
re-supply will take place through one of the three Dead Drops which
Agent has been told to locate and report soonest by S/W. Identity of
Drop utilized and date loaded to be conveyed to Agent through 5/
message developed by "scorch" method... see below.

14-00000

7. Required indicatore:
A. For presence of 3/5 on letters to the agent: All letters to agent
will contain S/.
B. To indicate loss of writing materials: Carton sheets: Agent
writes to Madrid, letter with no S/4. Developer: Agent writes
in 5/ and so indicates.

C. Indicate carton re-supply by mail: Upon indication of loss of
carton sheets (see above), preferably the next letter sent to
Agent will be a carion sheet. In any caso agent understands
that any cover letter containing the word "fincs" (Spanish for
farm) has teen written on a carton sheet, which he is then to use
Tor S/W correspondence as needed.
8. Optional Indicatore: Any letter received by Agent containing the word
"hacienda" in the cover letter is understood to indicate that the
S/ message contained therein is to be developed by the "scorch"
system.

Danger or control indicators:
Letters from Agent: Any word, mark, phrase, etc., after the
Spanish word "FDI" at the end of the S/ message indicates
agent is under control.

Letters to the Agent: Acknowledgement of Agent's control indicator
is to be made by duplicating his "control indicator" in the
next S/ message to him.

-2-

14-00000
AGENT S/W RECORD
Date 29 August 1962

1. Agent Cryptonym: AMLASH/1
2. Si supplies issued to the igent (date and quantity):
2 sheets of carbon 3/4 paper #15136 and 48 pills of developer
#56638 both issued on 22 August 1952.
3. Cover correspondence to the agent will be in Spanish and handwritten
or typed from the agent will be printed or typewritten (in Spanish).
4. Location assigned for placement of S/4 text: 5/ text will be placed
on the face of the cover letter; agent has, however, been instructed
to check both sides of lotters received for S/. Letters from the
agent on face of cover text.
5. AcoCHERcdation addresses:
e
To be supplied by agent in first S/W letter he sends (this to be
by 15 September 1962 at the latest.)

Accommodation addresses for letters from the agent:
Regular accommodation address:
Rapid/Emergency accommodation address:
Senorita Maria Dolores Gomez
Apartado 12318
Madrid, Spain

Mr. Humphrey R. Boncavil
P. O. Box 892
General Post Office
NYC 1, N. Y.
:

Agents letters to be signed "Ramon".
6. Re-suppl arrangements:
C
If carbons lost: Agent writes cover letter to Madrid address in
normal manner. Absence of S/H message indicates loss of carbons and
Agent is to expect next letter he receives to be a re-supply of
carbons (in the form of the letter itself).

If developer lost: Agent so indicates in letter to Madrid (in S/s);
re-supply will take place through one of the three Dead Drops which
Agent has been told to locate and report soonest by S/W. Identity of
Drop utilized and date loaded to be conveyed to Agent through S/W
message developed by "scorch" method... see below.

14-00000

7. Eequired indicators:
A. For presence of 8/4 on letters to the agent: All letters to agent
will contain 3/4.
2. To indicate loss of writing materiale: Carton sheets: Agent
writes to Madrid, letter with no 34. Developer: Agent writes
in S/ and so Indicates.

C. Indicate car'on re-supply by mail: Upon indication of loss of
carton sheeta (see above), preferably the next letter sent to
Agent will de a carton sheet. In any case agent understands
that any cover letter containing the word "finca" (Spanish for
fare: has been written on a carton sheet, which he is then to use
Tor S/t correspondence as needed.
8. Optional indicators: Any letter received by Agent containing the word
"hacienda" in the cover letter is understood to indicate that the
5/ message contained therein is to be developed by the "scorch"
syaten.

Danger or control indicators:
Letters from Agent: Any word, mark, phrase, etc., after the
Spanish word "FIN" at the end of the S/W message indicates
agent is under control.

Letters to the Agent: Acknowledgement of Agent's control indicator
is to be made by duplicating his "control indicator" in the
next 5/4 message to him.

-2-
104-10295-10168 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

D. ATCH NO. HKH-A-3418
201-3272

TO: Chief, WHD
FROM: Chief of Station, Habana
SUBJECT: GENERAL - Administrative
SPECIFIC - Arthur G. VAIVADA

DATE: 21 February 1957

Ref: HKH-W-2092, 8 February 1957

1. With regard to the contents of reference dispatch, which were communicated to the Subject, VAIVADA has no objections and is agreeable to conversion to the career agent category as described therein.

2. VAIVADA requests, however, that the plans already proposed for acquisition (U.S. citizenship by his wife) be carried through. He, and the Station, believe that this step will provide him with greater security in non-official cover assignments. In addition, such action will minimize the red tape he must cut each time he has to obtain new visas for himself and family.

3. The Station will submit a new request for VAIVADA's training several months prior to the desired new training dates.

James R. Palinger
James R. Palinger

Distribution:
3-Washington
2-Files

20 February 1957

JRP/nta

51-28 A

CS COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-168 881
19-1-1-7856
RI COPY
104-10298-10095 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DBA/32
Miami, Florida
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION April 16, 1963

RE: CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

The April 9, 1963, issue of the "Miami News"
carried an article entitled, "Exiles Say Miro To Quit".
This article stated that informed exile sources claim
that Dr. JOSE MIRO CARDONA would resign his post as head
of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. The article said
exile sources gave two possibilities for his resignation.
One faction believed that MIRO's recent trip to Washington
from which he returned Sunday (April?) was to pin down the
United States Government to a statement of positive policy
regarding Cuba. Another school of thought was that the
Council head was retiring from his post in protest of
Government curbing of hit-and-run raids on the Communist
island of Cuba.

The article went on to state that Dr. MIRO'S
leadership in the Council, aimed at uniting all Cuban
exiles, has been burdened by problems since his appointment
in March 1961.

On April 10, 1963, MM T-1, a former Cuban
business executive, who is employed by the Cuban Revolutionary
Council and who is a close personal friend of Dr. MIRO CARDONA,
who has furnished some reliable information in the past,
advised that an all-night session of the Council was held
beginning April 9, and ending at about 6:00 A.M., on
April 10, during which time MIRO CARDONA presented his
resignation but the Council refused to accept his resignation
and MIRO CARDONA was persuaded to remain as President of the
Council.

MM T-1 said that MIRO's resignation consisted of
a 25-page statement which was in effect an indictment against
the administration of President JOHN F. KENNEDY of the United
States. In rejecting his resignation, the Council backed up

CS COPY

19-124-25/2

CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

MIRO but in the interest of both the United States and the
Cuban exiles, decided upon a public statement which reads
as follows:

"CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL

"The Cuban Revolutionary Council, having studied
the report of its President, Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, concerning
present relations with the United States Government, agrees:

"1. Not to accept the resignation of Dr. Jose Miro Cardona,
and declare its full support for the basic plans contained
in his resignation.

"2. To affirm that there is a serious crisis, brought about
by the present policy of the government of this country.

"3. To express the Council's hope of overcoming the present
crisis and calling upon all of America, including the United
States, for moral and material support in their fight to
regain their sovereignty and independence, and the strict
fulfilment of American treaties and agreements, as well
as the joint resolution of the U. S. Congress, calling for
effective action against Soviet intervention in America..

"4. To affirm that the Council has always insisted, and
still insists, upon the necessity of Cuban participation
in the process of liberating Cuba. The only procedure
which the Council would accept would be coordination of
forces, on a plane of complete respect for national dignity.
Cuba will never renounce her legitimate right to be in the
first line of combat.

"5. To reaffirm their unshakeable decision to continue the
fight against the Soviet-Castro regime, under any circumstances
whatsoever.

2.

CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
INTERNAL SECURITY CUBA

"6. In these difficult times, the Cuban Revolutionary
Council urges all Cubans to close ranks to achieve the
national unity needed to hasten our march towards
Freedom.

"Miami, April 10, 1963

"Movimiento Democrata Cristiano
(Christian Democratic Movement)
JOSE FERNANDEZ BADUE

"Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
(Movement for Revolutionary Recovery)
CESAR BARO

"Agrupacion Montecristi
(Montecristi Group)
FRANCISCO CARRILLO

"Unidad Revolucionaria.
(Revolutionary Union)
FERNANDO FERNANDEZ CABADA

"Rescate Democratico Revolucionario
(Revolutionary Democratic Recovery)
RAUL MENDEZ PIREZ

"Movimiento Revolucionary 30 de Noviembre
(30th of November Revolutionary Movement)
ORLANDO RODRIGUEZ

"Accion Revolucionaria Democratica
(Democratic Revolutionary Action)
GERARDO QUESADA

"Frente Obrero Revolucionario de Cuba (FORDC)
(Revolutionary Labor Front of Cuba

"Military Section
JOSE E. MONTEAGUDO

3.

CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
INTERNAL SECURITY CUBA

"Sector Frofesional
(Professional Section)
ENRIQUE HUERTAS

"Corporaciones Economicas
(Economic Branch)
Dr. TULIO DIAZ RIVERA
MANUEL ANTONIO DE VARONA
SERGIO CARBO
RICARDO LORIE
ΑΝΤΟΝΙΟ MACEO
ANTONIO SILIO, Secretary

MM T-1 explained that when Dr, MIRO CARDONA returned
to Miami from a trip to Washington, D. C., on Sunday, where he
contacted high government officials, he came away with the
feeling that:

1) The United States has no plan to free Cuba
of Communism.

2) If the United States ever does formulate any
plans, it will do so without consideration
for the Cuban exiles in the United States.

3) The United States policy is now one of
peaceful co-existence with Communist Cuba.

MM T-1 said that in his opinion, the Cuban exiles
are frustrated, confused, losing faith in the United States
and there is a growing feeling of abandonment of them by the
United States.

The April 10, 1963, issue of the "Miami Herald"
carried a headline article entitled, "Miro Resigns as Exile
Chief; Raps U. S. Policy". This article stated that MIRO
CARDONA resigned because the United States refused to allocate
fifty million dollars to train a Cuban invasion force, according

4.

CUBAN FEVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
INTZPNAL SECURITY CUBA

to government sources. The article said that exile leaders
close to MIRO said he resigned not only because of disagree-
ment with United States policy, "but because he feels
Waenington does not have any concrete plans to deal with
the dictator".

The April 11, 1963, 18sue of the "Miami Herald"
carried an article entitled, "Cuban Exile Council Vows to
Continue the Freedom Fight". In this article it was
stated that the Cuban Revolutionary Council had vowed to
continue its fight against Castro-Communism whether the
United States likes it or not. The article said that Dr.
MIRO CARLONA denied reports from U. S. Government sources
that he offered his resignation to the Council because the
United States refused to allocate fifty million dollars to
train a Cuban invasion force. The article stated that an
informed source said that MIRO decided to quit "because
of the change in the U. S. Cuban policy".

The April 16, 1963, issue of the "Miami Herald"
carried an article entitled "JFK Accepts Demand, Fidel Says".
This article by the UPI bearing a Havana dateline reported
that PILEL CASTRO told Cubans on Thursday (April 11) that the
KENUZDY Administration has accepted one of his five demands
for an end to tension in the Caribbean. This article stated
that in a one hour and forty minute speech, CASTRO said that
Washington in forbidding exiles to carry on further armed
attacks on Cuba, has fulfilled one of "five points for peace"
advancedby him and endorsed by the Soviet Union. The article
then went on to state that FIDEL announced that there are
still four conditions to be fulfilled and that acceptance of
them is the only sensible thing the KENNEDY Administration
can do. One of the five conditions, according to the article,
18 U. S. evacuation of the big Naval base at Guantanamc.

On the morning of April 15, 1963, Miami radio news
broadcasts announced MIRO CARDONA would again offer his
resignation to the Council on that same day.

5.

CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COMICIL
INTERNAL SECURITY CUBA

On April 15, 1963, MM T-l advised that he was
positive that MIRO CARDONA did not intend to again tender
his resignation on Monday, April 15, 1963, but was
contemplating taking that action on the following Thursday,
April 18, 1963. MM T-1 said that the Council was meeting
on Thursday to take a definite attitude or tough line of
action and that it was entirely probable that all of the
members of the Council might resich in protest to the present
policy of the United States with regard to the Cuban situation.
He said that the prezent feeling of the Council towards the
United States is basically "to hell with it".

MM T-1 expressed the personal feeling that U. S.
policy towards Cuba is presently in a vacuum and consequently
everything is at a standstill. The Cuban exiles in the
Miami area feel that the U. S. is abandoning their cause
and has now adopted a course of peaceful co-existence with
Communist Cuba.

On April 16, 1963, мм T-2, a Cuban exile who has
furnished some reliable information in the past and who is
associated with fellow Cubans who belong to several different
organizations, advised that reaction among the Cuban exiles
18 "very bad against the United States", He explained that the
Cuban exiles allege that President KENNEDY has made promises
to help them in their fight against CASTRO but is now opposing
them and consequently they feel that the U. S. 1s now committed
to a policy of peaceful co-existence with Communist Cuba.
The Cuban exiles are fearful as to the future, confused as to
why the U. S. has changed its policy and the exiles feel that
they have been abandoned in their fight.
-
PROPERTY OF FBI This memorandum is loaned to you
by the FBI and neither it nor its contents are to be dis-
tributed outside the agency to which loaned.

6.*

19-124-25/7
104-10298-10184

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

PA
191145/2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE: 27 MAY 62
TO: DIRECTOR
FROM: JWAVE
ACTION: TFW 10 (MR CHARLES NATIT, JEW, NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED
INFO: DCI, DDP, ADDP, CA GA/PRG, CA/PROP, S/C

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
IN 41885

COPY DIS CITE WAVE 4777
-GYLOSE
1. MIAMI HERALD 27 MAY CARRIES FRONT PAGE ITEM BY JAMES BUCHANAN ENTITLED "MIRO FADES AS EXILE CHIEF: THREE LATIN LEADERS BEHIND RAY". ARTICLE FLATLY STATES MIRO AND COUNCIL HAVE BEEN REPLACED BY MANUEL RAY WITH BACKING FROM MUONOZ MARIN, PRES ROSILO DETANCOURT AND FORMER PRES JOSE FIGUERAS, THAT RAY HAS TAKEN OVER POST WITH THE BLESSING OF THE UNITED STATES", FURTHER, ARTICLES STATES "FROM VARIETY SOURCES HERALD LEARNED THAT MIRO WAS NOTIFIED OF CHANGE ONLY THIS WEEK" AND THAT PAYS REAPPOINTMENT AS "CHIEF IN EXILE" CAME FROM "UNDER-GROUND IN CUBA" ACCORDING TO JOAQUIN GODOY, PROVISIONAL MRP HEAD IN MIAMI. AFTER FURNISHING RESUME CURAN ACTIVITIES SINCE ORIGIN OF AMBUD, ARTICLE CREDITS CUBANS IN MIAMI WITH SAYING "NEW MAN IN FIELD IS ADOLF A. BERLE JR. WHO HAS BEEN SPECIAL ASST TO STATE DEPT AND IS ALSO "MEMBER OF PRES KENNEDY'S SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON LATIN AMERICA". IMPLICATION BEING THAT BERLE IS RUNNING NEW UNITED STATES SPONSORED CUBAN EFFORT.

2. THIS RELEASE CAUSING SOME FUROR IN LOCAL CUBAN COLONY TO EXTENT AT LEAST ONE OPS AGENT DESTINED FOR ISOLATIONS TRAINING HAS ASKED TO BE RELIEVED IF THERE ANY TRUTH THIS STORY. MEANWHILE WAVE

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

PAGE 2

CHECKS WITH KNOWLEDGEABLE CONTACTS HAS PRODUCED LITTLE OTHER THAN 2. VILLIAY'S. WIRALDA'S STATEMENT THAT BUCHANAN JOURNALISTIC REPUTATION INDICATES HE INACCURATE AND SENSATIONALIST. ANCLAITER-1 AND PASSOVO ATTEMPTING DISCREETLY TRACE BUCHANAN SOURCE FOR "U.S. BLESSING."

3. BUCHANAN HAS PREVIOUSLY ATTACKED MIRO IE DURING RETURN FLAYA GIPO PRISONERS MIAMI. HAVE NO REAL INSIGHT INFO SIGNIFICANCE THESE ATTACKS BUT BELIEVE THEY COULD REFLECT BUCHANAN OR MIAMI HERALD ATTEMPTS FORCE CHANGES IN UNITES STATES POSTURERE CUBA.

4. EXPECT ASTICLE WILL HAVE FURTHER REPROCUSSIONS AS IT SPREADS. WISH ALERT HQS THAT IT MAY BE NECESSARY INITIATE ACTION DISCREDIT BUCHANAN STORY AS WELL AS REASSURE MIRO. WILL FORWARD SUGGESTIONS THIS REGARD AFTER WE HAVE OPPORTUNITY FURTHER ASSESS STORY'S IMPACT.

5. POUCHING CLIPRING 28 MAY

END OF MESSAGE

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

UNITED STATES GOVL. NMENT
Memorandum

TO : Files DATE: 29 January 1964

FROM :

SUBJECT: THE LEE HARVEY OSWALD CASE #351164

1. According to a newspaper column of "Allen and Scott" in the
Chicago American of 6 December 1963, on the OSWALD Case, Abram CHAYES,
Legal Officer of the State Department, was one of two persons im-
mediately responsible for OSWALD's being permitted to return to the
United States from the Soviet Union in June 1962. The other individual
named was Llewellyn THOMPSON, the then Ambassador to Russia. Another
said to have been involved in the handling of OSWALD'S case was Samuel
WISE, Counsel of the American Embassy in Moscow.

2. Abram CHAYES, #352234, who as of 16 February 1961 was described
as "the new Counsel in State", was granted Security approval for liaison
contact with J. Foster COLLINS (in the office of the Chief of the Covert
Action Staff) on 6 March 1961. The request for CHAYES clearance was a
"Blanket" request to permit discussion with him of NSC 5412/2 matters on
a need-to-know basis.

3. In September 1961 there was a White House namecheck request on
CHAYES' wife Antonia (Toni) Leigh CHAYES, nee: HANDLER.

4. In March 1962, CHAYES was granted a renewal of his liaison
contact clearance with C/CA on a continuing basis. This time his contact
was Archibald ROOSEVELT, Jr.

5. On 10 February 1962, HUMAN EVENTS reported as follows with
reference to CHAYES:

"SOFT ON COMMUNISM: Representative Francis E. Walter (R.-Pa.),
Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, has
scored the new State Department regulations on passports, claim-
ing they would allow Reds denied passports to "rifle freely the
confidential files of the FBI, the CIA and other investigative
agencies." The man behind the new regulations, which Walter
claims violate the Internal Security Act of 1950, is reportedly
State's chief legal officer, Abram Chayes. Chayes, a Kennedy
appointee, is an ex-Harvard professor who was Chester Bowles'
top legal adviser when Bowles was Governor of Connecticut.
Walter has introduced legislation to remedy the new passport
regulations."

Document Number 1271-1029
for FOIA Review on FEB 1977

-2-

6. Samuel WISE, "Counsel in the American Embassy in Moscow" who
is referred to above, may well be Samuel Griffin WISE Jr., #74574,
SD & SSD, who apparently was once a contract employee on
The State Department reviewed WISE's file on 2 June 1954; and as of
September 1962 a Samuel G. WISE was Second Secretary of the American
Embassy in Moscow. At that time WISE advised in a cable to the State
Department that it appeared that Bruce Frederick DAVIS, #352267, who
defected from the United States Army in Germany on 18 August 1960, had
not expatriated himself. DAVIS' case is very similar to that of
OSWALD; and he, like OSWALD, lived in the Soviet Union for two years
after his defection and prior to making application for return to the
United States.

7. WISE was an applicant for CIA employment in early 1953 and
was security approved subject to polygraph on 11 August 1953. He did
not enter on duty and in September 1953 the office which had been
interested in him was "no longer interested". On 13 November 1953,
WISE was granted a CSA to permit his use as a contract employee on
in New York City. His CSA was cancelled on 24 March 1958.

8. WISE was named as a friend of William Orville MUNSELL, #61693-DL,
during an investigation of the latter for possible CIA employment in 1952.
WISE, according to MUNSELL's landlady and social acquaintance in Washington,
D.C. during the period of about a year which ended in April 1952, was the
only person she knew by name with whom MUNSELL was friendly. According
to the informant, WISE was a student at Columbia University whose address
was 423 Furnald Hall. MUNSELL was Security disapproved for CIA employment
in June 1952 because of his close association on a professional and social
basis, while attending Denver University from 1946 to 1951, with persons
of questionable loyality. In November 1954, MUNSELL was of interest to
project with reference to assignment to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia;
however, the interested office withdrew their request on him, after
Security advised of the derogatory information regarding him.

9. WISE from 1951 to 1954 attended Scarsdale High School in Scarsdale,
New York, which was attacked by a Citizen's Group, which alleged Communist
influence in the school system. He had several questionable associates in
addition to MUNSELL.
104-10301-10008
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Description of JMWAVE Components

Support Branch

The Support Branch provided routine administrative
services to JMWAVE. These included finance, logistics and
records management and clerical support. The Branch had 19%
of JMWAVE's staffing.

Operations Branch

The Operations Branch was divided into two sections,
the FI Section and the Special Operations Section.
Staffing, consisting of operations officers and clerical
support, was 17% of JMWAVE's total.
The FI Section (Foreign Intelligence) was responsible
for the collection of intelligence from the target country
through covert HUMINT means.
The Special Operations Section was responsible for
paramilitary operations.

Covert Action Branch

The Covert Action Branch was responsible for covert
propaganda operations. Staffing was 10% of JMWAVE's total
and consisted of operations officers and clerical support.

External Operations Branch

The External Operations Branch was responsible for
collecting HUMINT on the target country through assets in
areas other than the target country. Staffing was 13% of
JMWAVE's total and consisted of operations officers and
clerical support.

Reports Section

The Reports Section prepared intelligence reports for
Headquarters and intelligence community consumers. Staffing
was 10% of JMWAVE's total.

Technical Services Section

The Technical Services Section provided photographic
support to JMWAVE. Staffing was 6% of JMWAVE's total.

Communicators

The communicators were responsible for secure
communications between JMWAVE and Hqs. Staffing was 8% of
JMWAVE's total.

13-00000
SUPPORT
BRANCH
SECRETARY
SECRETARY
JMWAVE
ORGANIZATION
CHIEF OF STATION
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STATION
COMMUNICATORS
OPERATIONS BRANCH
CA BRANCH
EXTERNAL
OPS BRANCH
REPORTS
SECTION
TECHNICAL
SERVICES SECTION
FI SECTION
SPECIAL OPS
SECTION

13-00000
4/10/98-0kd
vy Do/IRI
εω

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS - 1963
Deputy Director for Plans

Western Hemisphere Division
Western Europe Division
Soviet Russian Division
Eastern Europe Division
Africa Division
Far East Division
Near East Division
Special Operations Division
Technical Services Division
Domestic Operations Division
Counter-Intelligence Staff
Foreign Intelligence Staff
Covert Action Staff
Operational Services Staff
Special Activities Staff

13-00000
4/1098 K by
DO/IR8
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS - 1961
Deputy Director for Plans
Western Hemisphere Division
Western Europe Division
Soviet Russian Division
Eastern Europe Division
Africa division
Far East Division
Near East Division
Technical Services Division
Development Projects Division
International Organizations Division
Counterintelligence Staff
Foreign Intelligence Staff
Covert Action Staff
Cover and Commercial Staff
Operational Services Staff

13-00000

SECRETARY
SECRETARY
JMWAVE
ORGANIZATION
CHIEF OF STATION
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STATION
SIGNAL CENTER
4-COMMUNICATORS
EXTERNAL
OPS BRANCH
REPORTS
SECTION
TECHNICAL
SERVICES SECTION
SUPPORT
BRANCH
OPERATIONS BRANCH
FI SECTION
-Chief, Support
1-Secretary
1-Officer
1-Finance Officer
(Refugee
99
1-Finance Asst
Debriefings)
1-Logistics
1-Officer (On
Officer
Island Assets
1-Officer
1-Logistics qq
Asst
(Liaison with
1-Records
Local Services
Officer
1-Officer (FI
-Intel Asst
Third Country)
1-Clerk
1-External Ops
Rep (AMOT)
2-Intel Assts
(Management
of On-Island Ops
1-Secretary Steno
SPECIAL OPS
SECTION
2-Operations
Officers
1-Training
Officer
1-Property
and Supply
Assistant
99
CA BRANCH
!
99
1-Chief
1-Ops Officer
(Radio)
1-0ps Officer
1-Ops Officer
(JMCHALK)
)
(Pol Action
Press and
1-0ps Officer
Publication)
1-Admin Asst
1-Secretary
(Referent with
Station FI
Branch)
1-Intel Asst
1-Secretary
1-Clerk
Steno
99
Typist
99
3-Reports
Officers
(One of
these AMOT
officer to
handle AMOT
reporting)
1-Secretary
Steno
99
1-Photo General
1-10 Tech Aide
1-Clerk Typist
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

with a limited number of people. We believe the direction of the station is of high caliber, but not all the station effort is carefully directed at priority targets. Under current personnel ceilings, there is little hope of increasing the manpower available for this critical effort. Thus, both Headquarters and the station must carefully place emphasis on assignment of priorities and upon selective execution of the activities to meet those priorities.

Organization for Operations

5. The Mexico City Station approaches the classic type station in opportunities and in operations. It has high-level liaison operations, unilateral operations, joint operations with the host government, and Soviet, Satellite, Cuban, and indigenous Communist Party operations. It has local collaborative liaison with other U.S. agencies: the State Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service and the military. To accomplish this wide range of tasks, the station is organized into the Soviet Branch, Cuban Branch, Satellite Branch, Covert Action Branch, Communist Party Branch, and an operational catch-all which is called the "Operational Support Branch." This latter branch is headed by a senior operations officer who has two assistants, but the branch in reality is an extension of the chief of station's personal clandestine capabilities, giving force and effect to that facet of the chief of station's personality as an operator. The deputy chief of station, in addition to his administrative duties, also personally handles the operations of three projects.

Cuban Operations

6. Mexico City is the only direct air link which Cuba has with the Western Hemisphere. It is the major transit point for all air travel to and from Cuba. Approximately 150 persons per week travel each way to and from Havana via Mexico City. This fact plays a prime role in shaping the station's operational activities. For example, over 10 per cent of the station's FI reporting on Cuban activities in the past year dealt with travel, both Cuban and non-Cuban, between Mexico City and Havana.

7. The station has no agents reporting from in place in Cuba. Two operations have had problems in loss of communications, but have some promise of future success. One agent, a Cuban refugee

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now working in Mexico City, had recruited three sub-agents before leaving Cuba but his channel of communications with them has been severed. Another station agent is in a good position in Cuba to obtain intelligence from foreign telephone communications. The station will attempt to re-establish contact with his through a legal traveler to Cuba. The station has a number of sources with access to Cuba in third country nationals who are debriefed each time thay return to Mexico City from Cuba. Best of these is a Western European who was the source of some 15 disseminated intelligence reports last year. He travels to Cuba four or five times a year and is contacted by a station onse officer after each visit. An operation, presently under development, is aimed at exploiting the presence of a religious order. A recruited agent will be in the high levels of the Mission. It is expected that the Mission will have secure communications facilities as is the case in other countries. Primary control, however, will be maintained by Mexico City Station through contact with the agent each time he travels to Mexico City from Havana

9. A major objective of station operations is the recruitment of personnel in the Cuban Rbassy. There are about 20 Cubans on the embassy staff of whom six are believed to be members of the Cuban Intelligence Service/As with operations directed against the Soviet Embassy, heavy reliance is placed upon surveillance through telephone, photo, physical, and audio operations as well as on access agents. The effort has been rewarded with some success (albeit limited). One official has been recruited, but his value is generally low due to lack of access to information of prime importance and to a reluctance to accept operational assignments. A Mexican woman exployee in the embassy is also a station agent, but she has no access to classified documents and provides only meager information. A recruitment pitch to another officer was unsuccessful and he was subsequently recalled to Cuba. Through Station efforts a "hot mike" was successfully placed in a bay office. Unfortunately, the target officer moved, and his old office is now being occupied by an officer of lesser potential, who is the supervisor of the recruited officer. This audio device is at the moment of little value except to provide en excellent check of the agent' activities.

10. As might be expected, Mexico City has a constant stream of refugees from Cuba, estimated at about 350 per month. Through an American contract agent the station runs the Cuban Refugee Re- ception and Orientation Center which screens refugees for possible

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operational leads and debriefs those with information of intelligence value. Heretofore this project has suffered from lack of adequate facilities and trained personnel. Only 29 positive in- telligence reports were disseminated by Headquarters during the past year. It is planned to correct these deficiencies and expand capabilities to the end that the intelligence product vill be in- proved and the operational leads increased. An experienced officer from the JISHAVE refugee center has been detailed to the station to assist in training the personnel there.

11. The station's Cuban case officers must devote a substan- tial effort to responding to requests for support from other stations, chiefly MIHAVE, with involvement in Cuban operations. Approximately 47 per cent of the station's cable traffic is con- cerned with Cuban operations. This volume alone is testimony to the relative effort which must be devoted to the support of Cuban operations originating in other CIA stations. The Cuban case officers in Mexico City feel that the requirements to keep abreast of day to day activities and to handle the volume of paper left insufficient time for planning and development of an effective station_operational program.

12. operations are being conducted against the Cuban Embassy, and the results, while limited, are as satisfactory as may be expected in view of the target. Given Mexico City's strategic loca- tion astride the only direct air link to Cuba, more success should be achieved in (recruiting agents in place in Ciba. This target has been assigned as Priority i to many Latin American countries and, if it is to be achieved at all, it is logical to expect that it will be done in Mexico City. To the extent possible, the Caban case officers should be freed from the excessive support to other stations so they can comestrate on this target. The Chief, WE Division, should direct other stations to carefully screen Cuban requirements on Mexico City, with a view toward reduction of such requirements.

It is recommended that:
The Chief, WE Division:

a. Instruct the Chief of Station, Mexico City, to concentrate Cuban case officer efforts on develop- ing agent assets resident in Cubas and,

No. 67

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evidence that the ambassador vould strongly object to Agency support for IISE propaganda activities. In addition, of a total annual budget of $16,000, $6,000 goes for the salary of a U.S. businessman cutout (LIHUFY-1) while $6,000 goes to the support of MIRO and $4,000 to support other activities of the IISE. This is an inordi- nately high sum for the services of a cutout in proportion to the total cost of the proposed project. These points, taken together, constitute a valid basis for terminating operations in connection with LIMIFF.

It is recommended that:
No. 70
The Chief, WE Division, disapprove the proposal of Chief of Station, Mexico, for Project LIHUFF and direct him to terminate operations in connection therewith.

18. The station has a highly successful project directed at the rural and peasant targets. The principal agant is a Catholic priest through whose efforts an extensive network of regional organi- sations have been established including youth groups, credit unions, agricultural co-ops and peasant unions. Some 26 regional centers of the Mexican Institute for Social Studies, a project mechanism, have been set up and 12,000 people were enrolled in special training courses during the year. This operation is now largely self-sufficient but the station should contime to give it support and direction. The project shows promise of expanding into Guatemala where the Archbishop of Guatemala has asked for assistance and training to set up a similar organisation. In view of the present lack of Agamay-sponsored peasant projects in Guatemala, every effort should be made to exploit this possibility.

It is recommended that:
The Chief, WE Division, expand Project LINOODLE to include assistance in establishing a similar covert action project targeted on peasant groups in Guatemala.
Soviet Operations

No. 71

19. Mexico is one of the four Latin American countries which maintain diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union thereby per- mitting the establishment of diplomatic installations in these

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countries. (Because of the relative ineffectiveness of the Mexican police and security services, Soviet activities in Mexico are not subjected to the same scrutiny as they are in the U.8 by the FBI and in Canada by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Soviet person- nel in Mexico thus have a freedom of movement which facilitates the conduct of clandestina operations targeted not only against the U.S. but also against other Latin American countries where there is no Soviet official presence. In addition, Mexico's long border with the U.S. has only minimum guards. Travel between the U.B. and Mexico is heavy and clandestine border crossing can be relatively simple. The Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, therefore, assumes more than the usual interest normally attached to similer Soviet in- stallations as targets for U.8. intelligence.

20. Soviet operations conducted by the station are directed primarily at the personnel of the embassy. At the present time, there are fifty-one officers attached to the embassy of whom thirty- three have been identified as mambers of either the HUB or the GRU. It may be assumed that dependents and nonintelligence persoanel, by performing various support functions, swell the total of those engaged in intelligence assignments. In its operations against the Soviets, the station is heavily dependent upon technical collection through telephone tape, photographic coverage of the embassy, physical surveillance, and hidden microphones. These operations produce masses of information daily on the activities of the Soviet personnel, such as telephons conversations with persons outside the embassy, complete photographic records of the coming and going of all persons-Soviet and non-Soviet-at the embassy, contests of embassy personnel outside the embassy, etc. Because of the strict security indoctrination of Soviet oversees personnel, the bulk of this information is low-level and not dissexinable as positive in- telligence. Its chief value, aside from occasional items of intelli- gence interest or operational import, derives from its compilation in depth to reveal patterds of activities and contacts, indicative of intelligence missions or associations, and to disclose behaviorial characteristics of individual Soviets which might be symptomatic of a vulnerability to recruitment. Bromalyzing this train over a period of time, the stationsbeeldentified Boviet officers in the KOB and GRU, and gained an insight into into their modus operandi in executing intelligence assigaments. This in itself is of value from a counterintelligence point of view even though exploitation against Soviets has been limited. Also, by collating the mes of collected data into personality reports on persons stteched to the Kabassy, the station hopes to be able to detect, foster, and even tually exploit any vulnerability to recruitment or detection-the

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mamber one priority of Soviet operations here as elsewhere in the vorld.

21. The station is seeking to supplement its collection through technical means with a program to acquire at least one access agent for each mber of the Soviet Embassy staff. These access agents serve two purposes: first, they provide addi- tional information on the activities and personalities of those with whom they are in contacts and second, they afford a channel for "getting at a Soviet individual should it be found advantageous to bring some sort of recruitment pressure to bear on him. Con- sideration is now being given by the station to expanding the effort to recruit Mexican nationals who are known, through tech- nical collection sources, to have been in touch with the Soviets on intelligence missions and to work through them to develop in- formation on Soviet clandestine activities. Additional care officer strength vill be needed if this approach is to be effective.

22. The station currently has six double-agent operations. Like most such cases they move slowly. The chief purpose in running these operations is to direct the agents into the U.8. where, in cooperation with the FBI, they might be used to, identify Soviet illegals. Three of these double agents have all received intelligence assignments from the Boviets of an as yet undefined nature in the U.8. Another appears destined for some Soviet es- sigment in the Philippines. Since the Soviets have no official representation in the Philippines, it is hoped that this agent my be put in touch with illegals. Still another is considered a poor double agent operation by the station, but shows com promise of developing into a penetration of the Mexican Foreign Ministry. The sinth is rated very low as a station operation, and is being contimied only at the specific request of the U.8. Argy. The station's technical collection assets provide a useful means for checking these double agents in their contacts with the Soviets.

23. • To evaluate properly the Soviet operations at Mexico City, which rely heavily on expensive technical) collection devices) would involve a basic allbesement of the whole concept of Boviet operations, which is beyond the scope of this report. Despite the exploitation of material collected by technical means for over ten years at the station, the primary objective of recruiting a Soviet national has not been achieved. Although the station's knowledge of Soviet intelligence activities centered about the embassy in Mexico City has been greatly widened, it has led to little positive

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[action to counter these activities) as they might affect U.s. Interests. While all the 8.8.8.R. diplomatic missions are targets of vital importance for U.S. intelligance, the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City has special significance because of its proximity to the U.8. The Mexico City Station has attacked this target with determination and imagination. The Chief, SR Division, and his principal officers have commended highly the Soviet operations in Mexico City Station. The failure the far to achieve the major objectives is testimony more to the impregnability of the target then to a lack of resourcefulness in attacking it. We believe that until some new Methods, offering prester pronise of ultimate success are developed, the present mode of attack should be continued at the present level

24. Probably the most significant contribution which the station's operations against the Soviets in Mexico City has made to the U.8. security has been peripheral to the Agency's mission there. The embassy has long been a magnet for disaffected Ameri- cans who want for one reason or another to establish contact with the Soviets. Through its technical coverage of the Soviet Embassy, the station has been able to spot and, through subsequent action, to thwart a number of such Africans, several of whom might have done untold damage to U.S. interests had they not been apprehended. In this respect, the station works closely with the FBI. The Warren Commission's report on the assassination of President Kennedy made reference to information collected by station assets in connection with Oswald's activities in Mexico City.

25. The Batellite Branch, which is staffed by EK Division personnel, has been diverting much of its recent time from its EK targets to a Comamist-Chinese presence in Mexico City. Although there is no official government representation by the Peking regime, the Hew China Rove Agency (CHA) has several people in Mexico City. At least three of these individuals have been identified as CHICOM intelligence officers. Project EIPESO is an endio operation against three rooms of their offices, and their telephone lines are tapped inder the LIFEAT Project. Bone of their wail has been examined through the LIKAYAK Project. The raw results of these operations have been forwarded back to Headquarters. The Mexico City Station has no capability for the translation of the material. As of the time of the inspection, the station had heard nothing from Heedquarter

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respopetble to control from the feamie operations officer who has recently been transferred to LILINK control. It is possible that this operation will be transferred to a covert action project, where some improvement is expected.

41. The station has a unilateral physical surveillance team, five of whom have been on the team for more than three years. Only one case of trouble has shown up in this project. One agent had soobe terminated because he talked too much and tried to black- mail bistcase officer. The use of the polygraph has been nost effoluere in control of this tean, which has been generally effec- tive.
Technical Operations

42. The station is heavily committed in the technical field with a large audio operation run jointly with the Mexican Govern- ment (LIKIVOY), as well as a unilateral audio operation (LIFEAT). The station has been imaginative in approaches to problems and villing to examine and experiment with the umsual. an example of this is the communications link between the station and the princi- pal agent of LILIK, which will be discussed later.

43. The LIENVOY operation, previously mentioned in connection with Soviet operations, resulted from an approach six years ago from President Lopes Mateos. After considerable discussions, the operation vas approved, providing the Mexican Government vould in- clude Soviet and Satellite targets, and such other communist targets as were obvious to the Mexican Government to be of concern to the United States. This project is manned by selected Mexican Army personnel, who are carefully screened and paid high incentive wages, reducing their vulnerability to bribery. Other privileges add to the high esprit de corps essential to such an operation. The unit is managed by a career agent who transmits the take regularly to the station by clandestine means. This project has been fruitful in intelligence reports and has been of value in operational leads Lance and a photo-surveillance capability. It was this project which provided data on the actions of Lee Harvey Oswald in his famous visit to Mexico City.

Obviously, the station cannot be content to have the Mexican Government knowledgeable of all its anti-communist opera- tions. Therefore, the station has continued its unilateral audio

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c. Exclude routine travel information and CI/CR information from DCS and CS reports; and,

d. Use the cable channel only for reports that are perishable or are of special intelligence interest.

Organisation for Administration

56. As in his direction of operations, the chief of station mintains a close personal hold upon the administrative life of his station. Such delegation as he makes does not include the granting of usual authority to a subordinate. For example, although the deputy has been delegated authority over the Registry, which vill be discussed in detail later, in reality the chief continues daily activities which have a marked effect on the Registry. The station has a smil, hard-working support section, handling finan cial and proparty matters, and the usual fine comamications section.

57. Morale and health vere generally good, although for a city as modern as Mexico there is an unusual amount of abdominal disorder known in Mexico City as "Hontezuma's Revenge." The embassy furnishes adequate medicines, and medicines are available on the open mrket, although not always to be trusted. One inci- dent was recently uncovered in which sulfur vas capsuled and sold as an antibiotic. Medical facilities have recently been improved by the opening of a new hospital which meets United States standards. Physicians and surgeons are well trained and quite competent. Insofar as social life is concerned, morale in the station vas excellent. Mexico City offere some of the finest social activities in the world, from honky-tork to opera. There is local television, radio, and a great interest in music. There is a great deal of outdoor activity available-swimming, tennis, golf, exploration of ruins, and vast city parks. Some sporte activities are compara- tively expensive. Masbership in country clubs is prohibitive ex- cept for persons on the diplomstic list.

58. One of the principal administrative problems fating the Chief of Station, Mexico City, is his Registry. The Registry handles the station files which are more complete then in any other station in the WE Division. There are more than 9,000 per- sonality files and a vast accuraılation of 35 card files (mostly biographic) which contimse to increase at the rate of 23 linear inches per month. The station's present level of activity pre- cludes any reduction in the card index file, but aperture cards

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are assisting in some reduction of the personality files. The Registry also handles the pouching. This task is also the largest in the WH Division, particularly in lateral pouching. On one occa- sion, at Headquarters' request, Mexico City handled the lateral pouching to 35 stations and bases of one document.

39. The problems of the Registry are compounded by the lack of training provided personnel assigned to the Registry. Person- nel problems in the Registry are many and diversified. First of all, with the limited number of personnel and the great burden of work, a large amount of overtime has been required. Secondly, it has been difficult to get people to accept an assigment to the Mexico City Registry because the tasks are dull, tedious, and infi- nitely demanding of the individuals' time. The morale in this section was poor. We made several recommendations to the chief of station pointing out to him a conscientious effort must be made by all members of the station to reduce the workload in the Registry. In this connection, we suggested that individual case officers ac- cept the responsibility for periodic cleaning of files which they used, and of which they have the most intimate knowledge. We further recommended that maximum discrimination be used in determin- ing material which should be filed and that wherever possible the sheer bulk of the filing be reduced. We further recommended that overtime be made voluntarily whenever possible, but that in any event personnel be provided with a full weekend off from time to time.

60. The chief of the Registry is the only senior person as- signed to the Registry and has no deputy or other person competent to take his place during his temporary absence. The chief at the time of our inspection had taken very little time off, including weekends in the two years of his tour. We feel that one of the positions in the Registry should be re-evaluated for possible upgrad- ing to includes the duties of deputy chief of Registry.

It is recommended that:
The Chief, WH Division, request the Director of Personnel to conduct a review of the function of Deputy Chief, Registry, Mexico City Station, to deter- mine whether or not such a position should be estab- lished in an appropriate grade

No. 78

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61. We found the Registry to be a controversial matter between Headquarters and the chief of station. The newly assigned deputy chief of station, whe primarily had supervisory responsibility over the chief of Registry, was making a determined effort to reduce the workload in the Registry and to seek means of relying upon Hend- quarters' files rather than station files. We were told that on several cccasions, Headquarters had reached the point of demanding that Mexico City reduce its Registry to a sise comparable to other stations. Each time such a decision was reached, there would be a concurrent flap which would prove the value of Mexico City's ability to instantly retrieve information from their files. One of the most noteworthy of such flaps took place in November 1963, when Mexico City's files brought forth detailed information on Lee Harvey Oswald's visits to the Cuban end Soviet Ribassies in Mexico City.

62. The nature of Mexico City's operations, particularly ite technical operations LIENVOY and LIFEAT produce [voluminous files.] Until some system is devised for this information to be quickly digested and retrieved in Headquarters, we believe that there is no alternative to the present system Mexico City is employing. However, we believe that a determined effort must be in Headquarters for processing and retrieval of such information.

It is recommended that:
The Chief, WE Division, in collaboration with the Chief, Records Integration Division, devise a mysten for reducing the volums of files held in Narico City, while maintaining a capability for rapid retrieval fron Headquarters of information essential to present and future operations in Mexico.

No.79

63. Mexico City is one of the great setropolises of the world and the booming economy of Mexico is reflected in its housing. It is difficult to find housing which compares exactly with United States housing because the Spanish tradition of servants' quarters, large space, and grand entertainment are a basic way of life. However, in such a great city, there is naturally a large selection of housing within this limitation. There are good apartments, but such apartments usually are more expensive than allowances will permit for single occupancy. Housing for officers and families is generally quite good, not plentiful, but with prudent selection, adequate housing can be found within reasonable range of the

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SECRET# 104-10302-10020
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DAILY SUMMARY

TOP SECRETCH IDM for Um
NOFORN

COPY NO. 107

SC NO.00555/63

6 December 1963

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NOFORN
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DAILY SUMMARY

6 December 1963

This summary of significant information has not been coordinated
outside the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a
complete coverage of all current reports received, nor does time
permit the complete evaluation of all reports which are included.

CONTENTS

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:
An intercepted Cuban military message of 5 December indicated that the Cuban armed forces are giving courses in chemical warfare defense. (Page 1)

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:
Moscow press reports the OAS meeting on Cuban arms shipments. (Page 1)

CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION:
Apparitions of Santa Barbara have been reported from Oriente Province. (Page 1)

The Portuguese ambassador in Havana reports his impressions of the reactions to President Kennedy's assassination. (Page 2)

Two government soldiers were killed in southern (Oriente) Province when a dice game, involving military and civilian personnel, was uncovered and fired upon by troops from (Unit 24 1948.) (Page 3)

Dolores Ibarruri,secretary general of the Spanish Communist Party, arrived in Havana from Moscow on 5 December, according to press reports. (Page 3)

CUBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, minister of INRA, has expressed serious dissatisfaction with Cuba's current agricultural situation and revealed that he disagrees with Castro's emphasis on "ultimate aims" in place of current "tactics." Rodriguez also informed the British ambassador that he had

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CUBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT cont'd

opposed the Second Agrarian Reform Law and is willing to use "doctrinally unwelcome" measures to increase production. (Page 3)

Cuba is taking further steps to improve its fishing industry, including several construction projects in the Chuyima shipyards in the Almendares River, the launching of 18 fishing boats, and the sending of an official mission to Spain)in connection with the fishing industry. (Page 4)

INSURGENCY AND CIVIL UNREST:

Counterrevolutionary elements apparently attacked an observation post on Cayo de Cristo on a recent undetermined date. (Page 4)

A suspected counterrevolutionary was arrested on 3 December in (Guantanamo.) (Page 5)

CUBAN FOREIGN SERVICE:

The Cuban ambassador to the USSR is in Havana for a short "vacation." (Page 5)

CUBAN AIR FLIGHT CONNECTIONS:
:
The Soviet-made AN-12 transport plane being ferried to Cuba reached Recife, Brazil, on 5 December, and left there for its last stop before it is scheduled to arrive in Cuba on 7 December. (Page 5)

SHIPPING SUPPORT FOR CUBA:
:
The US Embassy in Beirut believes that Lebanon may act to curtail the use of its ships in the Cuban trade. This would result in a significant decline in Cuban shipping in free world bottoms. (Page 5)

CUBAN CHINESE COMMUNIST RELATIONS:

Wang Yu-ping has been named the new Chinese Communist ambassador to Cuba. He is a senior diplomat, but not as high ranking an individual as the recently appointed Chinese Communist ambassadors to Algeria and the UAR. (Page 5)

BLOC ECONOMIC RELATIONS:

A Bulgarian arms negotiator has returned from Havana to Sofia. (Page 6)

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BLOC RELATIONS:
:
A four-man Soviet delegation to revise social science curriculum at Havana University has arrived in Havana. (Page 6)

NON-BLOC COMMERCIAL RELATIONS:

The US consul in Antwerp has been informed by the Varmi Company of Brussels that it will not sell construction equipment to Cuba; there have been reports that such a sale, perhaps totaling $1 million, was being negotiated. Meanwhile, a Cuban group, which had probably planned to complete negotiations on the sale, was delayed because of lack of visas. (Page 6)

The US Embassy in Tokyo sees little hope of inducing the Japanese Government to interfere with the implementation of a contract under which Japanese private firms have reportedly agreed to purchase 325,000 tons of Cuban sugar. (Page 7)

The director of a Spanish optical firm has gone to Havana to negotiate the sale of movie projectors; he is being sponsored by CILASA. (Page 7)

NON-BLOC RELATIONS:

A Cuban good-will mission was received by the Moroccan acting foreign minister; the US Embassy believes this may presage the official re-establishment of diplomatic relations. (Page 7)

The Swiss ambassador believes that Frank Emmick's trial will be held shortly after the completion of the current OAS investigation of Venezuelan charges against Cuba; Emmick's preliminary hearing has been completed and the ambassador is trying to find a Cuban lawyer to defend him. (Page 8)

The government of Trinidad gave a "chilly reception" to a visiting Cuban official and turned down a suggestion for trade talks, at least for the present. (Page 8)

CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES:
The (Chilean Embassy) in (Havana) has received information from sources in Cuba it considers reliable which supports

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CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES cont'd

Venezuelan charges that Cuba has been shipping arms to South America. (Page 8)

Havana Radio announced yesterday that pro-Castro guerrillas in the Dominican Republic have established "six operational zones"; Cuban exiles in Miami feel that the failure of pro-Castro terrorists in Venezuela may force him to turn to terrorism in the Dominican Republic. (Page 9)

Cuba is reportedly making preparations to recognize a Venezuelan government-in-exile, according to information received by an official (West German) service from a fairly reliable source with contacts in Havana. (Page 9)

The OAS Investigating Committee which is looking into the Cuban arms cache discovered in Venezuela does not intend to limit its investigation to the cache, but has expressed interest in looking into other evidence of Cuban activities directed against Venezuela. The Venezuelan Government has agreed to furnish all possible evidence on its complaint. (Page 10)

On 5 December an American woman told a minister in New York that her boy friend had left that day for an unknown destination in Central America from which he planned to fly in a pro-Castro Venezuelan coup on Saturday. (Page 10)

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MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

An intercepted Cuban military message of 5 December indicated that the Cuban armed forces are giving instruction in defense against chemical warfare. An unidentified) military unit in Las Villas) Province reported the selection of two officers and four sergeants to attend a "chemical defense course." (USN-856, 2X/SL/CUM/T407-63, 6 December, SECRET SABRE)

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:

Moscow has given rather standard treatment to the OAS meeting which heard the Venezuelan Government charge Castro with illegal arms shipments. On 4 December, TASS correspondent Leonid Shokin reported that "the weavers of plots against revolutionary Cuba are still at it...accusing it of delivery of arms to Venezuela for 'subversive purposes'." Shokin found "certain US circles are the most interested in this, as is evident from the fact that representatives of the US State Department declared at the meeting that the United States would 'firmly support' additional economic and diplomatic sanctions by the OAS against Cuba." He thought it unexceptional that "these provocative attempts were not supported by the largest Latin American countries" and warned that "such attempts to interfere in Cuban internal affairs are fraught with extremely harmful consequences for the cause of peace." (CIA/FBIS, Moscow, 4 December, UNCLASSIFIED)

CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION:

Several weeks ago there were CAS reports that the storm-tossed peasants of Oriente looked on Hurricane Flora as the vengeance of God--a God, who in the tradition of the Old Testament's stern and sometimes vengeful Jehovah, had loosed his fury on a people first seduced and now impressed by an alien regime. Now a report from the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay provides yet another insight into the frame of mind of the Cuban populace. While the incidents pictured in this report do not necessarily reflect anything other than a combination of religious fervor and superstition, they are significant to the extent that they reflect the unrest--and, perhaps a growing feeling of hopelessness and despair--current among the Cubans.

In any case, there are prevalent locally tales of St. Barbara's appearing several times to prophesy a change in the regime or admonish errant youths to mend their ways. Barbara, virgin daughter of the heathen Diosorus, was beheaded by her father near Heliopolis in 235 A.D. for embracing Christianity. A fearful thunderclap is alleged to have greeted her execution. Symbolized by a windmill-like tower with three windows, the type of fortress in which her father was wont to confine her while he was absent from home, Barbara is the patroness of artillerymen and miners.

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CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION cont'd

In the Church's calendar, her feast is marked on 4 December. Apart from her significance in the Christian ritual, Barbara figures prominently in a neo-pagan cult known as the Santeria. Devotees of Santeria regard themselves as Catholics and believe that the names of the Catholic saints are translations into Spanish of the Nigerian names of African gods. Catholicism is viewed as the Spanish tribal version of Santeria. The association between Catholicism and Santeria is based on a largely superficial similarity between Catholic saints and the pantheon of African spirit gods. Saint Barbara is thought to be Shango, the God of War.7

According to one of these tales, a woman dressed in martyr's red stopped a bus outside Guantanamo City on 25 November, stepped inside and berated the Castro regime. The woman is alleged to have said that the Cuban people could not live forever in such misery and to have predicted that Castro would be taken from them sometime between 4 and 7 December. A militiaman passenger told her that she would be arrested when the bus arrived in the city. When it had, she'd disappeared. Continuing on to Caimanera, the bus stopped in the town square with the same woman sitting on one of the seats inside the vehicle. The militia again was summoned and again the woman was nowhere to be seen.

On 26 November the same woman allegedly appeared outside a school in Caimanera and admonished several children not to thrown stones at a nearby shack. The children fled into the school and the woman followed. Challenged by a teacher, the woman said she was Santa Barbara and vanished. The next day neither the teacher nor the children would return to the school, though it subsequently has been reopened. (COMNAVBASE GTMO, 01731/T1/JFK/3, 4 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

government)
Fidel Castro was "frightened, if not terrified," by the possible consequences of President Kennedy's murder, according to the Portuguese ambassador in Havana) Cabling his government on 27 November, the (Portuguese diplomat) described what he called "a large movement of troops" late on the afternoon of the President's death--"they were sent to take up positions around Havana and the northern coast of the island." He found it surprising that Castro "jumped into the arena to denounce insinuations which were merely from news and nongovernmental agencies, but added that "it is the general opinion in diplomatic circles that the assassination will be the spring which will unleash passions and violent and blind hysteria of the American people against Cuba and Russia and provide the excuse which up to now was lacking.... There is talk again about the coincidence of rumors concerning a crisis at the end of the year...." Finally, the ambassador noted that "the assassination did not cause a great deal of consternation in counterrevolutionary circles in the interior. (NSA, 3/0/(POD)/T1463-63, 5 December, TOP SECRET DINAR)

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CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION cont'd

Two government soldiers were killed in southern Oriente Province on 3 December when members of Unit 1948) at an unidentified location within the First Army) area, uncovered and fired on a dice game, which apparently included personnel from their own unit. A 3 December message from military unit 1948 to South Sierra Maestra Sector Headquarters stated that "when the players attempted to flee, the soldiers commenced firing without orders, causing the death of one unnamed player and the chief of organization and personnel of Unit 1948) The message added that the bodies and the "civilian and military prisoners" were being sent to sector headquarters. (USN 835, 2/LR1/(CUM)/R196-63, 5 December, SECRET KIMBO)

Dolores Ibarruri, "La Pasionaria" of Spanish Civil War fame and secretary general of the Spanish Communist Party, arrived in Havana from Moscow on 5 December, according to press reports. Ibarruri, who resides in Moscow, was invited to Cuba by Castro during his visit to the Soviet Union. (The New York Times, 6 December, UNCLASSIFIED)

CUBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, minister of INRA, has expressed serious dissatisfaction with Cuba's current agricultural situation and revealed that he disagrees with Castro's emphasis on "ultimate aims" in place of current "tactics." In a long talk with the British ambassador in early November, Rodriguez agreed "with surprising enthusiasm" that the two main problems facing Cuban agriculture were the lack of competent personnel to run the appropriated farms, and the lack of consumer goods which are necessary to stimulate production, especially by the remaining private farmers. Rodriguez had advised Castro that there were not sufficient agricultural experts to run the state farms which had been previously organized, and he had counseled against taking over medium-size farms (as the Second Agrarian Reform Law did) until sufficiently trained and experienced personnel were available; he commented on Soviet complaints about the low educational level of Cubans sent to the USSR for agricultural training. Rodriguez said that despite his advice, Castro had gone ahead with the Second Agrarian Reform Law for two "political" reasons: to push ahead with the progress of Cuba's Socialist economy, and to destroy the support for counterrevolutionaries which Castro believed existed among the "rural bourgeois." Rodriguez thought it ironical that US pressure on Cuba (presumably he meant aid to counterrevolutionaries) had forced Cuba to seize lands faster than it would otherwise have done. He also stated his belief that the seizure of medium-size farms would lead to a drop for several years in many branches of Cuban agriculture, particularly in market gardening and dairy farming.

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CUBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT cont'd

Rodriguez also agreed with the British ambassador that the second problem facing Cuban agriculture was the lack of consumer goods which were necessary to stimulate production. However, Rodriguez said that Cuba was in a vicious circle: farmers did not have incentive to produce because there were few consumer goods available, yet such goods could not be obtained until farm production had been raised. Rodriguez' main concern seemed to be the scarcity of many consumer goods; in fact, he admitted that he was willing to undertake temporary expediencies which might help raise production, even though they might be "doctrinally unwelcome." Rodriguez referred the ambassador to Lenin's New Economic Policy, and made no attempt to disguise his disagreement with Castro's insistence on "ultimate aims" instead of current "tactics." (British Embassy Havana, 13 November, CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

Cuba is taking further steps to improve its fishing industry. A Havana radiobroadcast reported the completion of several construction projects in the Chuyima shipyards in the Almendares River in Havana, including a pier 307 meters in length, a concrete esplanade measuring 17,000 square meters with a capacity of 24 ships, two launching ramps, and the dredging of the Almendares River in front of the pier, pending partial completion, as well as several minor jobs. It also reported that the shipyard has launched 18 Lambda-75-class ships; 14 more are expected to be launched by January. According to a 29 November intercepted message, an official mission in connection with the fishing industry was expected to arrive in (Madrid) in early December. The (delegation) was composed of (Jose Lavia) and (Juan de la Fe Flores). (CIA FBIS 03, 6 December6 OFFICIAL USE ONLY; NSA 2X/O/CUD/T2523-63, 5 December, SECRET SABRE)

INSURGENCY AND CIVIL UNREST:

Counterrevolutionary elements apparently attacked the (Selva Marina) observation post at Cayo de Cristo) on a recent undetermined date. A partially garbled message from (Central Army Headquarters) in (Santa Clara) informed Havana) that personnel in the observation post located on a cay off (Isabela de Sagua) "repelled the aggression and caused the flight of the attackers.. In a probe of the place by air, land, and sea, nothing more than some footprints were observed." Because of the garbles at the beginning of the message it is impossible to determine the time and nature of the attack. (USN 856, 2/SL/CUM/R297-63, 6 December, SECRET KIMBO)

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INSURGENCY AND CIVIL UNREST cont'd

An unidentified military unit informed (First Army Sector E Headquarters at (Mayari Arriba) that a suspected counterrevolutionary had been arrested in (Guantanamo) The suspect, militiaman Esteban Mendez Almaquel, was arrested in the home of Genaro Moya on 3 December. Moya was identified as being implicated in the counterrevolution and as an informer. (USN 835, 2X/ LRL/CUM/T675-63, 5 December, SECRET SABRE)

CUBAN FOREIGN SERVICE:

Carlos Olivares, Cuba's ambassador to the USSR, arrived by plane yesterday in Havana for what Prensa Latina described as a "short vacation." (CIA/FBIS, Havana, 5 December, UN- CLASSIFIED)

CUBAN AIR FLIGHT CONNECTIONS:

Intercepted(civil aviation) communications indicate that the Soviet-made AN-12 transport aircraft being ferried to Cuba from the Soviet Union is adhering to its schedule. It arrived at the Brazilian airport of Recife from Conakry on 5 December and left there the next day for Belem, Brazil. It is scheduled to leave Belem on 7 December for Havana. The intercepts also indicated that Jamaica has granted permission for the plane to use Kingston as a reserve landing point in the event of necessity. (USA-51, 2/J8/RUT/R894-63, 6 December, SECRET KIMBO)

SHIPPING SUPPORT FOR CUBA:

The US Embassy in Beirut believes that Lebanon may act to curtail the use of its ships in the Cuban trade. This would result in a significant decline in Cuban shipping in free world bottoms because Lebanese companies provided ten of the thirty- two free world ships which called at Cuba in October. The Lebanese foreign minister planned to ask the cabinet for a provisional measure whereby he would be able to demand that all ships carrying Lebanese flag must call at Lebanon periodically and report their destinations. He believed this would cut the Cuban traffic quickly by 60 percent. Because US aid to Lebanon is almost nonexistent, the US Embassy believes that this Lebanese action would be prompted by motives of principle rather than fear of losing US aid, an action which is being discussed by the US Congress. (Am Emb Beirut 520, 5 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

CUBAN CHINESE COMMUNIST RELATIONS:

A Havana Prensa Latina broadcast of 6 December announced that President Dorticos has assented to the appointment of Wang Yu-ping as Chinese Communist ambassador to Cuba. This is the first information indicating that Ambassador Shen Chien, who has served in Cuba since December 1960, is about to be replaced. The new Chinese Communist ambassador is a 53-year-old senior diplomat; since 1950 he has served three- to four-year terms as Communist ambassador in Rumania, Norway, and Cambodia. He is married and has two children.

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CUBAN CHINESE COMMUNIST RELATIONS cont'd

While he is, of course, a member of the Chinese Communist party, he is not a ranking party member. He appears to be a lower ranking person than newly assigned Chinese Communist ambassadors to such countries as the UAR and Algeria. The earliest biographic references to him have him as a member of the Chinese Communist Army in 1931. He subsequently became an army political commissar and rose to the rank of general. It is not unusual, however, for Chinese Communist diplomats to be generals. He speaks Russian, but there is no information that he speaks Spanish. For the last year and a half, however, he has been stationed in Peiping and he could have learned the language then. He accompanied Chinese Communist chief of state Liu Shoa-chi on the latter's visit to Cambodia last spring. (CIA FBIS Havana, 6 December, OFFICIAL USE ONLY; BACKGROUND DATA: SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

BLOC ECONOMIC RELATIONS:

L.P. Kyuchukov, chief of the Engineering Directorate of the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Trade, was to arrive in Prague from Havana yesterday and fly on to Sofia today. Kyuchukov, who is thought to have negotiated Bulgarian arms shipments to Cuba, was noted traveling between Havana and Santiago de Cuba on 21 and 23 November--the third time he has been in Cuba since November 1962. (DIRNSA, 2X/0/QOC/T2810- 63, 5 December, SECRET SABRE)

BLOC RELATIONS:

A 4-man Soviet delegation, headed by USSR Deputy Minister of Education Serafim Nikichev, arrived in Cuba on 5 December to spend a month "working on the curriculum of Havana University's School of Social Sciences." Nikichev was accompanied by "academicians" Aleksandr Smirnov, Vassiliy Rayike, and Maria Filipova. The group was welcomed at Jose Marti airport by the Rector and Deputy Rector of the univer- sity, Juan Mier Febles and Mariano Rodriguez Solveira, and the school's protocol specialist, Professor Pedro Canas. The delegation's trip to Cuba is the first tangible result of the Soviet-Cuban educational exchange agreement signed in Mos- cow two months ago. That agreement provides for the loan of Soviet academicians and educational administrators to Cuban schools, the exchange of students and instructors between the two countries, and the use of Soviet texts in Cuba. (CIA/FBIS, Havana, 5 December, UNCLASSIFIED)

NON-BLOC COMMERCIAL RELATIONS:

The US consul in Antwerp has been informed by the Varmi Company of Brussels that it will not sell construction equipment to Cuba; there have been reports that such a sale, perhaps total- ling $1 million, was being negotiated. (See Daily Summary of 7 and 13 November.)

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NON-BLOC COMMERCIAL RELATIONS cont'd

The director of Varmi confirmed to US officials that he had been negotiating with a Spanish firm (probably CILASA) for the sale of US-origin construction equipment; after being informed that the material was destined for Cuba and having been warned of the consequences of such a sale, the director agreed on 2 December to stop negotiations. The US consul comments that it is not sure whether the knowledge of the eventual sale to Cuba or the fact of US intervention in the matter caused Varmi to stop the arrangements.

Meanwhile, a source with access to CILASA's files reported on 28 November that a Cuban comission headed by Rene Narbona of the Cuban tractor importing agency would be unable to arrive in Brussels on 30 November because of inability to obtain visas. This group had probably been scheduled to com- plete negotiations for the purchase of the Varmi construction equipment. (Am ConGen Antwerp, 29, 3 December, CONFIDENTIAL; CIA Madrid TDCS-3/566,653, 5 December, SECRET NO FOREIGN DIS- SEM)

The US Embassy in Tokyo, in receipt of a report that private Japanese companies have contracted for 325,000 tons of Cuban sugar for delivery between July 1964 and June 1965, sees little prospect of inducing the Japanese Government to interfere with the transaction. The Japanese Government would have difficulty intervening because of the general world sugar shortage, the unavailability of sugar from other sources at comparable prices, and the political problem which rising sugar prices is causing the Ikeda administration. (Am Emb Tokyo 1688, 5 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

The director of the Spanish firm Empresa Nacional de Optica, Vicente M. Cabanillas Gonzalez, left Madrid for Havana on a 29 November IBERIA Airlines flight. As reported earlier (see Daily Summary, 11 October), Cabanillas is negotiating through CILASA for the sale of a large quantity of movie pro- jectors to the General Administrator of University Inspection in Havana. According to a CILASA employee with access to company files, Cabanillas' travel expenses are being paid by CILASA. Cabanillas had hoped to get a Cuban visa which would not appear in his passport, as he hoped to visit the US later. He was unable to arrange this, however, and finally had to ac- cept the Cuban visa in his passport. (CIA, Madrid, IN 74453, 5 December, SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

NON-BLOC RELATIONS:

A Cuban good-will mission was received by the Moroccan acting foreign minister on 2 December, according to information received by the US Embassy in Rabat. The mission was probably composed of Antonic Carrillo Carreras, Enrique Vian Audivert of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and Dr. Enrique Rodriguez Leoches, Cuban ambassador to Moroc- co, (See Daily Summary of 29 November for recent Cuban-Moroccan relations.)

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NON-BLOC RELATIONS cont'd

Despite the Moroccan announcement of its break in diplomatic relations with Cuba, the Cuban ambassador is still in Rabat and attends functions he normally attended. The chancery offices are open and the Cuban flag is flying. This situation has been a source of some embarrassment to the Moroccan Foreign Ministry. However, the US Embassy believes that the reception of the Cuban delegation by the Moroccan Government may presage the official re-establish- ment of diplomatic relations. An officer in the Spanish Embassy in Rabat believes this is entirely possible; he be- lieves the Soviets are using their influence to keep the Cuban Embassy in Rabat. The US Embassy also feels that the Moroccan King may not feel he received sufficient benefit to justify continuing the break in diplomatic relations with Cuba. (Am Emb Rabat 860, 4 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

The Swiss ambassador in Cuba was informed by the deputy foreign minister that the preliminary hearing had been completed for the US citizen Frank Emmick, who reportedly will be charged with being a CIA agent. (See Daily Summary of 5 December.) The ambassador believes that Emmick's trial will be held shortly after the completion of the OAS inves- tigation into charges by Venezuela of Cuban intervention in Venezuelan affairs. Currently, the ambassador is trying to find a Cuban lawyer to defend Emmick. He is considering the lawyer hired by the Canadian Embassy to defend the Cuban pilots Lippert and Milne, an attorney who handles Swiss Em- bassy affairs, or a member of the Havana University Law School faculty. (Am Emb Bern 363, 5 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

Prime Minister Williams of Trinidad. Tobago gave a "very chilly" reception on 4 December to a visiting Cuban official, Robert Gerardo Sanchez, commercial officer in the Cuban Consulate in Kingston. A Foreign Ministry official in- formed the US Embassy that Williams was annoyed that Sanchez had presumed on a scant acquaintance with him to visit Port- of-Spain, despite advice from the government of Trinidad that such a visit would be inopportune. Reportedly, the prime minister turned down Sanchez' suggestion for trade talks, on the grounds of Cuba's involvement with Venezuela and Trinidad, Tobago's delicate and difficult relations with Caracas. He did not, however, close the door on such discussions at some appropriate time in the future. The government of Trinidad expects Sanchez to leave the country soon. (Am Emb, Port of Spain, 223, 5 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES:
In a message of 3 December, the Chilean Embassy) in Havana) reported to its Foreign Ministry information it had received from "reliable sources" in Cuba on Cuban efforts to ship weapons to Venezuela and other Latin American countries.

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CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES cont'd

The embassy)stated that "everything leads to the belief that" the arms recently discovered in Venezuela had come from Cuba. According to one of the Chilean Embassy's) sources, two ships had left Cuba at an unspecified date en route to British Guiana with "packages consigned as machinery consigned to an industrialist of known Communist tendencies whose property is adjacent to the Venezuelan border." Various of the Chilean Embassy sources "accept the rumor" that the arms are of Belgian and British (sic) make and that the shipments have been made from various Cuban ports. The embassy) report also expressed the belief that Cuba not only sends arms to various points in South America, but also Cuban guerrilla leaders. (NSA 3/0/CLD/- T1129-63, 5 December, TOP SECRET DINAR)

Havana Radio announced yesterday that pro-Castro guerrillas have established "six operational zones" in the mountains around Santiago and Puerto Plata in the Dominican Republic. The Havana radiobroadcast credited the announcement to "the first communiqué issued by the command." Meanwhile, press dispatches from Miami report that most Cuban exiles feel that the Havana announcement is an attempt to cover up the failure of Castro terrorists to stop Venezuela's presidential elections last Sunday. Other exile sources predict that the announcement and the setback in Venezuela mean that the Castro regime will launch a concerted terrorist campaign against the military-installed provisional regime in Santo Domingo. Batista Falla, leader of the Cuban exile Christian Democratic Movement (MCD), said yesterday in Miami that the failure of terrorism in Venezuela "has put Castro in a difficult position and damages his chances in the rest of Latin America." He added that he expects Castro to "make desperate attempts to picture terrorism as successful, despite its miserable failure in Venezuela." All reporting by the Dominican Government indicates that its forces are in effective control of the areas of guerrilla activity. About 40 insurgents of the outlawed pro-Castro 14th of June Political Group (APCJ) are said to have been captured, with only isolated bands yet to be apprehended. (UPI, Miami, A-11, 6 December, UNCLASSIFIED and Background Information, SECRET)

Cuba is reportedly making preparations to recognize a Venezuelan government-in-exile, according to an official West German service from a fairly reliable source with contacts in Havana. Reportedly, the Cuban Foreign Ministry is consulting the USSR and other bloc countries to induce them to recognize this government-in-exile. The Cubans, according to the source, do not expect the USSR and other countries to agree to this; nevertheless, the attempt is being made.

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CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES cont'd

Although this is the first report on the possibility of a Cuban-sponsored Venezuelan government-in-exile, the Cuban radio and press have been emphasizing the slogan that the Betancourt government does not represent the people and that the real representatives of the people are to be found in the ranks of the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). According to Cuban newspapers, Pedro Duno, a former professor of the Central University of Venezuela, arrived in Havana to join the "mission" of the FALN in Havana. (CIA Munich TDCS- 3/566,731, 5 December, SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

The OAS Investigating Committee which is looking into the Cuban arms cache discovered in Venezuela does not intend to limit its investigation to the cache. The group has no intention to expand its study to cover domestic political as- pects of the FALN or Communist Party activities; however, the members expressed interest in looking into such aspects as Cuban broadcasts inciting to violence, possible transfer of funds from Cuba, training of Venezuelans in Cuba in subversive techniques, and evidence of other clandestine arms shipments. In addition to examining the arms cache, the committee also voiced interest in hearing tapes of recent Cuban broadcasts, examining transcripts of interrogations and documents seized from captured terrorists, saboteurs, and guerrillas, talking to Venezuelan authorities responsible for combating terrorism and insurgency, and possibly interviewing some prisoners. In a meeting with the committee, the Venezuelan foreign minister placed emphasis on vverification of the Cuban origin of the arms cache, but also indicated his government would furnish all possible evidence on the Venezuelan complaint that the committee might want. (To Am Emb Caracas 485, 5 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

An American woman told a Unitarian minister in New York on 5 December that her "boy friend," a former RAF flyer and soldier-of-fortune, has left for an unknown destination in Central America from which he will fly in a pro-Castro coup in Venezuela tomorrow. Dr. Walter Kring, minister at the All Souls Unitarian Church, told a USUN official yesterday that he had been approached by an American woman who asked him to get her story "into the proper channels." The woman stated that her friend left New York on 5 December by unknown means for an unidentified location in Central America. He told her that he would fly to Venezuela on 7 December in connection with a pro-Castro coup which she would read about in the Sunday papers.

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CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES cont'd

Dr. Kring said that he was impressed by the woman's utter sincerity and normal behavior. He believed she was convinced of the truth of her story and of the honesty of her friend. The woman had apparently, at some earlier date, contacted the FBI in connection with her friend's participation or knowledge of a coup in Honduras. She later retracted her story because she felt it seemed "too implausible and silly." (USUN, New York 2376, 5 December, CONFIDENTIAL BACKGROUND USE ONLY)

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104-10302-10030 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

27 December 1963
SC No. 00624/63
Copy

WEEKLY REVIEW
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM

TOP SECRET
52-228703
GROUP | Excluded from automaric
downgrading and declassification

13-00000

This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

It is to be seen only by US personnel especially indoctrinated
and authorized to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
information; its security must be maintained in accordance with
COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS.

No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLI-
GENCE which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages
to be gained, unless such action is first approved by the Director
of Central Intelligence.

DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

This document MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS. If marked with specific dissemination
controls in accordance with the provisions of DCID 1/7,
the document must be handled within the framework of
the limitation so imposed.

13-00000

(TOP SECRET DINAR

CONTENTS
(Information as of 1200 EST, 26 December 1963)

THE COMMUNIST WORLD
SOVIET TRADE ACTIVITY IN THE INDUSTRIAL WEST
Within a week after the central committee approved
Khrushchev's plan for the chemical industry, Soviet
traders apparently had their instructions and were
renewing contacts in the industrial West.
CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERS' AFRICAN TOUR
While Chou En-lai and Chen Yi have been able to
project an aura of Afro-Asian amity during the
first two weeks of their two-month tour, they have
not scored-comparable successes in the political or
economic fields.
EAST GERMAN REACTION TO RELAXATION OF BERLIN TRAVEL
The East German people, while elated over the holi-
day travel arrangements in Berlin, are publicly
voicing hope that they may be permitted to visit
their relatives in West Berlin and West Germany.
NORTH KOREA IMPROVES AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY
Pyongyang has more widely dispersed its supersonic
MIG-21s, has acquired relatively sophisticated new
radar, and has equipped its IL-28s with an improved
blind bombing and navigational system.
NORTH VIETNAM'S MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
This military force, primarily a ground army with
no tactical air and little naval capability, is
nevertheless the most formidable in Southeast Asia.
Its most notable achievement is its highly special-
ized capability to support and maintain insurgency
operations in adjacent countries. (Published sep-
arately as Special Report SC No. 00624/63B)

ASIA-AFRICA
ENTHUSIASM FOR SOUTH VIETNAM REGIME FLAGGING
LAOS
The military regime is beginning to take steps to
make its counterinsurgency effort more effective,
but the generals still seem to have little idea of
how to rally significant popular support.

Page
1

2

3

4

5

Communist forces have moved to erase recent gains by
rightist units in central Laos. Neutralist and Pathet
Lao representatives are continuing their efforts to
ease tension between the two factions.
6

27 Dec 63
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued)
FRENCH CABINET MINISTER TO VISIT CAMBODIA
Armed Forces Minister Messmer's visit in early Jan-
uary is designed primarily to strengthen French in-
fluence in the wake of Sihanouk's call for an end
to the US aid program.
ARABS PLAN NO OVERT ACTION AGAINST ISRAELI PROJECT
Arab military chiefs apparently feel that overt mil
itary action against Israel's Jordan River diversion
project is not feasible, but sabotage of its facili-
ties may be attempted.
CYPRUS DISPUTE FLARES AGAIN
The new outbreak of fighting on Cyprus is a reaction
to President Makarios' determination to change the
constitution so as to limit the role of the Turkish
minority.
BREAKUP OF THE FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND
The ten-year-old federation is being dissolved on
31 December because its black African population
has persistently opposed it as a device to perpet-
uate white rule. Its dissolution will end London's
hopes for an economically integrated, multiracial
state and increase the danger of bitter clashes
between white and black nationalists in its three
erstwhile constituent territories. (Published sep-
arately as Special Report SC No. 00624/63A)
AREA NOTE
Saudi Arabia

Page
7

8

9

10

EUROPE
THE COMMON MARKET CRISIS
Agreements reached on agricultural policy on 23 De
cember are apparently sufficient to discourage De
Gaulle from breaking up the community. The agreement
on a position for the Kennedy Round is not necessarily
favorable to the US.
UK-US FRICTIONS OVER SHIPPING POLICY
The British Government has advised shipping circles
not to comply with US demands for information relat
ing to rate discrimination against US exports.
WEST GERMAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Willy Brandt has again taken the center of the polit-
ical stage with the success of negotiations to open
the Wall for the holiday season. He has been named

11

12

13
acting chairman of the SPD.

27 Dec 63
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW
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EUROPE (continued)
NATO and Iceland

WESTERN HEMISPHERE
DOMESTIC POLITICS IN CUBA
Castro has cautiously continued efforts to reduce
the influence of the Moscow-oriented Cuban Com-
munists, who are said to have banded together to
work clandestinely against him.
DOMINICAN REGIME FACES NEW POLITICAL CHALLENGES
The killing of 15 guerrillas by army troops ap-
parently removes the insurgent threat but could
provoke dangerous political repercussions. The
head of the provisional government has already re--
signed.
BRAZIL
Appointment of Ney Galvao as finance minister
reduces the already slight prospect that Brazil's
critical financial problems would be handled ef-
fectively. Other cabinet changes may follow.
AREA NOTE
Bolivia
Page
14

15

16

17

18

27 Dec 63
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW
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The Communist World
SOVIET TRADE ACTIVITY IN THE INDUSTRIAL WEST
Within a week after the
central committee approved
Khrushchev's plan for the chem-
ical industry, Soviet traders
apparently had their instruc-
tions and budget allocations
and were renewing their activ-
ity in trade circles of the in-
dustrial West.
Contracts for fertilizer
installations, plastics and syn-
thetic plants, petrochemical
equipment, and mining machinery
are already in various stages of
negotiation. Officials in Bonn
report they have under consider-
ation a proposal by a West Ger-
man consortium to supply the
USSR with $400 million worth of
petrochemical equipment. A
Soviet mission is negotiating
with the British Imperial Chem-
ical Industry (ICI), which here-
tofore has supplied the USSR
with technical know-how. ICI
reportedly has offered to de-
liver equipment and processes
for the production of fertiliz-
ers, herbicides, rubber chem-
icals, and plastics. Negotia-
tions also are under way for
large numbers of Japanese chemi-
cal fertilizer plants.
In
Another Western consortium,
involving US equipment and proc-
esses, is discussing delivery
of a large oil refinery.
addition, contracts for a wide
range of other machinery and
equipment will probably soon be
signed. These contracts appar-
ently had been postponed until
the new chemical equipment buy-

ing program was presented to
the plenum and allocations for
various trade corporations for
next year were approved.
The Soviet need for addi-
tional credit to finance planned
expanded purchases is crucial.
The USSR presumably can generate
sufficient funds to meet down
payments on sizable orders.
However, credit arrangements
must be set now to spread out
the heavy crush of payments
which otherwise would fall due
in 1965-66 when equipment con-
tracted for next year will be
delivered.. Soviet ability to
increase hard-currency reserves
is not likely to improve in the
near future. Moscow's current
grain imports will reduce its
gold reserves by 25 percent.
If these continue beyond mid-
1964, the Soviet hard-currency
position will be under further
strain.
Despite the bleak foreign
exchange prospects for the USSR,
Soviet officials appear hopeful
that Western competition for
Soviet orders will be adequate
to foster Western governmental
and banking opinion favorable
to more and longer term credit.
Moscow may also hope that a
continuation of its relatively
restrained foreign policy will
be helpful in this context.
While viewing the USSR as an
acceptable commercial risk, the
banking community has hereto-
fore been unwilling to extend
credits beyond a five-year pe-
riod because of uncertainty
about future political develop-
ments. (SECRET)
27 Dec 63
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW
Page 1
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13-00000
TOP SECRET DINAR
The Communist World
CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERS' AFRICAN TOUR
With two weeks of their pro- | continent. Criticism of the
jected two-month tour of Africa
completed, Chou En-lai and For-
eign Minister Chen Yi can claim
high marks for their efforts to
project an aura of Afro-Asian
amity and to identify Peiping
with African aspirations. There
is no evidence, however, that
they have scored any comparable
success in the political or eco-
nomic fields.

The joint communiqué issued
on 21 December at the conclusion
of the Chinese leaders' visit to
Cairo contains few surprises,
and reports from Algiers suggest
that discussions with Ben Bella
are following predictable lines.
Thus far the Chinese have at-
tempted to minimize differences,
play up past contacts, and press
such themes as militant struggle
against colonialism and "US im-
perialism."

In both Algiers and Cairo,
Chou's hosts sought to demon-
strate their nonalignment by
actions designed to play down
the impact of the Chinese lead-
ers' arrival. Chou was greeted
in Cairo with a 21-gun salute,
but Nasir was not on hand. In
Algeria, Ben Bella was on hand
to greet his guests, but the top-
level delegation he sent to the
Soviet Union just before Chou's
arrival is receiving more pub-
licity than the Chinese guests.

It has become increasingly
apparent that a major objective
of the trip has been to undercut
Soviet influence throughout the
USSR was reportedly a recurrent
theme in Chou's four lengthy
talks with Nasir. Nasir report-
edly said that Chou talked about
the USSR the way the Soviets
used to talk about the US. He
accused the Soviets of trying
to colonize China, of breaking
political and economic promises,
and of becoming tools of the
US, and he warned that any Afro-
Asian country which became de-
pendent on Moscow would suffer
the same fate as Peiping.

In Algeria, Chou sounded a
similar note. He cited China's
early support for Algerian rev-
olutionaries--support which ac-
tually pre-dated that of the USSR.
He has also undoubtedly scored
Soviet unreliability. The Chi-
nese may be pressing the Algerians
to use some of the $50-million
credit offered in October. This
offer was made to counter a $100-
million Soviet credit offered
earlier the same month.

Sino-Soviet rivalry for
African support also flared at
the UN, where Peiping outmaneu-
vered Moscow on the question of
enlarging the representation in
principal UN organs to accommo-
date the African bloc. Soviet
delegate Fedorenko had attempted
to make it appear that the Chi-
nese were opposed to the African-
sponsored expansion plan because
they insisted that any change
in the UN be tied to Peiping's
own admission to the Security
Council. The USSR found itself
holding a suddenly emptied bag,

27 Dec 63
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW
Page 2
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13:00000

TOP SECRET DINAR
however, when Peiping loudly
repudiated Fedorenko's statement
and accused the Soviets of using
the issue as a pretext for op-
posing Afro-Asian demands.

Chou can be expected to
capitalize on this during next
week's visit to Morocco and in
subsequent stops in Guinea,
Ghana, and Mali. No details of
Chou's itinerary beyond Rabat
have been made public by Peiping.
The Communist World
|_ Such secrecy may well be prompted
by security considerations. Chi-
nese officials were apparently
seriously shaken by the abortive
plot to kill Liu Shao-chi in
Cambodia last spring. The Chi-
nese envoy in Cairo reportedly
told Nasir of concern for Chou's
safety and asked that travel
plans during the Chinese leader's
visit to the UAR not be made
public. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DIS-
SEM)
EAST GERMAN REACTION TO RELAXATION OF BERLIN TRAVEL
Reaction of East-Germans
to the agreement to let West
Berliners visit relatives in
East Berlin is hopeful but still
fairly cautious, judging by re-
ports from local party officials.

The party central head-
quarters, obviously concerned
that the agreement might have
domestic repercussions, ordered
district officials to submit
immediate reports and detailed
follow-ups on reactions to this
partial relaxation of travel
curbs imposed in connection
with the building of the Berlin
Wall. Most of the responses
state that the people are elated
but are publicly voicing hope
that they may be permitted to
visit their relatives in West
Berlin and West Germany. Many
East Germans express hope that
the present move will be followed
by other relaxations--a reaction
probably quite unpalatable to
the regime.

Public comment--at least
as reported by the various
party headquarters--is-still
fairly cautious: One party
member in Magdeburg said: "The
reason we don't let our citizens
go to West Germany is that we
are afraid they will defect."
But he was promptly silenced by
comrades who parroted the party
line on "the terror against our
GDR citizens in West Germany."

Public expression of dis-
satisfaction with harsh travel
and internal controls has been
recurrent in recent months,
reaching a peak prior to the
20 October parliamentary elec-
tions.

The people's reaction to
the pass agreement with West
Berlin points up one of the re-
gime's major problems: how to
project an image of itself as a
sovereign state and of East Ber-
lin as its capital without in-
creasing discontent among its
population, who still risk shoot-
ing if they attempt to escape
to West Berlin. (SECRET KIMBO)

27 Dec 63
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW
Page 3
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13-00000

TOP SECRET DINAR

CHINA

NORTH
KOREA
Yalu
KIMCHAEK
CHONG SIN
SINCHANGNI
NAMSI
CHONGJU
SAMCHAM
SONDOK
FUKCHANGNI
PYONGNI
KOREA
SUNAN
JIMIRIANI
PyongyangPYONGYANG
ONCHON
HWANGJAS
KOKCHONGNI
YONAN
SAM site
Bomber elements
☑ Fighter defense elements
★Combined command headquarters
• Radar station
٠٢
▲ East coast filter center
Early warning radar coverage
TOP SECRET DINAR
27 DECEMBER 1963
MILES
34447
WONSAN
SEA OF TAPA
CHANG JON
•SINGYE
PYONGGANG
KAESONG
Seoul

100
QUELPART
ISLAND

SOUTH KOREA
TOP SECRET DINAR
TSUSHIMA

13-00000
TOP SECRET DINAR
The Communist World
NORTH KOREA IMPROVES AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY
North Korea has recently
taken several steps which signif-
icantly strengthen its air de-
fenses. MIG-21 (Fishbed) jet
fighters, which were first de-
tected only at Pukchang-ni air-
field, now are being stationed
at other airfields. Pyongyang
has also apparently just acquired
a large number of relatively
sophisticated types of radar
sets. In addition, the North
Korean bomber force, which has
a total of about 100 IL-28
(Beagle) jet light bombers, is
in part now equipped with, and
has been training with, an im-
proved blind bombing and naviga-
tional system.
Testing of and flight train-
ing with the new fighters--10
to 14 of which were apparently
obtained from the USSR in the
fall of 1962--were first noted
in communications intelligence
in June 1963. Since that time
the MIG-21s have been detected
frequently in flight activity
involving ground controlled in-
tercept exercises.
Beginning in October, MIG-
21s have been noted operating
from Wonsan on the east coast
of North Korea. Their deploy-
ment to this airfield places
supersonic fighters on both the
east and west coasts of North
Korea.
The North Koreans have re-
cently expanded their radar
coverage. Six new types of
radar, at least one of which
is believed to be exclusively
of Chinese Communist manufacture,
have been detected. For the
present these radars will ap-
parently supplement rather than
replace North Korea's original
three types--Kniferest A, SCR-
270, and Token.
The identifiable new types
include Kniferest B, Spoonrest
A, and a new type of Chinese Com-
munist origin which is probably
a substantial modification of
the SCR-270. Spoonrest A is
sometimes used as the acquisi-
tion radar for surface-to-air
missile sites, but it is also
used in an early warning role
and is probably intended for that
use in North Korea. Acquisition
of these new radars reflects
North Korea's efforts to extend
the range of its early warning
detection system. To improve
height-finding capability, Pyong-
yang has also introduced more
sophisticated radars such as
Rockcake and Stonecake.
Another improvement in North
Korea's air capability is the
equipment of about twenty IL-28s
with an improved blind bombing
and navigational radar system des-
ignated Shorewalk. When properly
used, this system permits preci-
sion navigation and blind bombing
without the use of ground communi-
cations which would betray the di-
rection of the flight and the tar-
get designation. (TOP SECRET DINAR)

27 Dec 63
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW
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4
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13-00000
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Southeast Asia
ENTHUSIASM FOR SOUTH VIETNAM REGIME FLAGGING
Communist guerrilla activ-
ity increased only slightly in
connection with the third anni-
versary, on 20 December, of the
Viet Cong's Liberation Front,
despite advance Communist proра-
ganda exhortation for a major
military effort. The Viet Cong
continued to direct attacks and
harassing activities primarily
at strategic hamlets.

South Vietnam's new govern-
ment is showing extreme sensi-
tivity to discussion of a "neu-
tralist solution" to its in-
surgency problem. The Communists'
Liberation Front has repeatedly
proposed such a settlement, and
the idea is gaining new advocates
as a result of Cambodia's call
for an international conference.
Saigon's military rulers last
week closed down a newspaper
which was expressing interest in
neutralism. However, editorials
in the vernacular press, even
though attacking neutralism, have
kept the debate in the public eye.
On 20 December, Saigon students--
possibly encouraged by the re-
gime--demonstrated against neu-
tralism.

On the military front, the
government is beginning to take
some steps to overcome the leth-
argy that has affected its coun-
terinsurgency effort since the
coup. A long-range pacification
program has been launched in one
of the most troublesome provinces
in the northern part of the coun-
try, and broad command changes
have been introduced in two prov-
inces south of Saigon where
security has been deteriorating.

In the political field,
the government has named 60
members of the civilian advisory
Council of Notables. Returned
exiles apparently are not rep-
resented, and there is a dearth
of direct provincial represen-
tation. Many appointees, how-
ever, are prominent political,
professional and lay religious
leaders who could provide effec-
tive guidance to the regime if
they are given a chance.

Apathy and disenchantment
over the new government are wide-
spread among such key elements
as middle-grade officers, stu-
dents and politicians. Criti-
cism centers on the lack of
firm direction by the ruling gen-
erals, on repeated reshuffling
of local officials deemed in-
competent, corrupt or close to
the Diem regime, and on the rise
in Viet Cong activity. There
are signs that junta members
themselves are beginning to share
the disillusionment of some cir-
cles with Premier Tho's provi-
sional cabinet, which is described
as ineffective and regional in
outlook.

Leading generals névertheless
seem to have few effective steps
in mind to rally popular support.
Three generals recently complained
to US officials that they were hav-
ing trouble finding qualified
Vietnamese to fill government posi-
tions and that press criticism
of their efforts was unhelpful.
General "Big" Minh, the chief of
state, has indicated a personal
distaste for a prominent role,
and has asserted that the people
would gradually come to appreciate
the new government as problems
were solved on a province-by-
province-basis. (SECRET NO FOR-
EIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY)
27 Dec 63
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW
Page 5
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13-00000
LAOS
Ssumao
CHINA
Nam
Phong Saly
Hou
Dien Bien Phu
BURMA
Nam Tha
Muong Sai
Sam Neua
34435
Ban Houei Sai
Mekong
Sayaboury
Luang Prabang
P'aine
Ban Ban
Xieng
Jarres Khouang
Vang Vieng
13
Pak Sane
VIENTIANE
NORTH VIETNAM
Mekong
Kam
Keut
8
Lak
Sao
Nhommarath
HANOI
CHINA
GULF OF TONKIN
Vinh
(12)
Thakhek
12A
Ichepone
Savannakhet 9
SOUTH
VIETNAM
THAILAND
Road
Track or trai!
Railroad
STATUTE MILES 100
CAMBODIA
(23)
Saravane
Pakse
(23
CODE WORD MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE
Attopeu

13-00000
LAOS
TOP SECRET DINAR
Asia-Africa
Communist forces have
moved to erase recent gains
made by rightist units in cen-
tral Laos. Pathet Lao troops,
reportedly supported by sub-
stantial numbers of North Viet-
namese, on 19 December captured
Kam Keut and the nearby airfield,
three days after occupying the
key route junction at Lak Sao.
Right-wing messages have de-
scribed a key rightist parabattal-
ion as "completely smashed."
Communist units have advanced
south of Lak Sao toward neutral-
ist positions along Route 8-A,
but there have been no indica-
tions that they intend to press
their advantage by a major drive
on Nhommarath, which is still
held by rightist forces. In
other areas, there have been
reports of only limited activ-
ity, involving scattered skir-
mishes and artillery exchanges.

Meanwhile, neutralist and
Pathet Lao representatives are
continuing their efforts to
negotiate an easing of tensions
between the two factions. At
a meeting on 20 December in the
Plaine des Jarres, both sides
called for an "early" meeting
between Premier Souvanna and
Prince Souphannouvong. They
also agreed, in principle, that
elements of the coalition govern-
ment should be transferred from
Vientiane to the royal capital
at Luang Prabang, which would be
neutralized and placed under tri-
partite control. Both factions
reiterated their support for
the formation of a mixed police
force in a neutralized Vientiane.

General Phoumi's right-
wing faction, which was not
represented at the meeting,
remains skeptical of Pathet
Lao intentions. Phoumi apparently
believes that an agreement for
the neutralization of Luang
Prabang is unlikely, but he may
join in talks on the subject.
He has indicated, however, that
the neutralization of Vientiane
is contingent on the willingness
of the Pathet Lao to allow free
movement in areas of Laos now
under their control. (TOP SE-
CRET DINAR)

*
*
*
27 Dec 63
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW
Page 6
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13-00000
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Asia-Africa
FRENCH CABINET MINISTER TO VISIT CAMBODIA
Armed Forces Minister-
Pierre Messmer's visit to Cam-
bodia from 4-7 January is de-
signed primarily to strengthen
French influence there in the
wake of Prince Sihanouk's call
for an end to the US aid pro-
gram. Messmer's high-level
entourage, which includes the
chiefs of the Foreign Ministry's
Indochina and Cultural and Tech-
nical divisions, will probably
recommend some increases in aid,
but De Gaulle apparently has
no intention of taking on any
large new commitments.

French-grant aid to Cam-
bodia since 1956 has amounted
to only $15 million. Current
assistance is threefold:
military training mission of at
least 250 men; cultural aid in
the form of a university mission
and 319 teachers in Cambodian
schools; and the maintenance of
about 40 experts in the fields
of health and public works. In
addition, a number of French
nationals hired by the Cambodian
Government hold positions of
considerable influence in the
Ministry of Finance, the Treas-
ury, and the premier's office,
and are among Prince Sihanouk's
advisers.

Paris has indicated it has
no intention of equaling the
US aid program. Any increase
in military aid probably would
be limited to reconditioned and
obsolete equipment, such as
trucks and light armored vehicles.
Increased cultural and technical
assistance probably would include
further help for the French uni-
versity mission, more teachers,
and 30 or 40 additional technical
experts, especially agricultural-
ists.

The extension of French aid
will be complicated by Cambodia's
claims for compensation for
losses incurred as a result of
the 1958 devaluation of the
French franc. Since 1958 France
has asserted that a large-scale
aid program would be impossi-
ble until there is agreement on
an exchange rate, but a compro-
mise may now be in sight.

Sihanouk has sought French
help in maintaining Cambodia's
policy of neutrality, and in
recent talks with the US and the
UK, France has supported his
call for an international con-
ference on Cambodian neutral-
ity, despite US objections.
Indeed, De Gaulle has consist-
ently sought to meet Sihanouk
more than half way, and Paris
may now encourage Sihanouk
to press this issue. (CON-
FIDENTIAL)
27 Dec 63
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW
TOP SECRET DINAR
Page 7

13-00000

ISRAEL'S
JORDAN RIVER
DIVERSION PROJECT
-
Canal or conduit,
proposed or under construction
Demilitarized Zone
こと
LEBANON
ISRAEL
Haifa
¿Dead
NEGEV
DESERT
JORDAN
Mediterranean
Sea
Tel Aviv-Jaffa
GAZA
STRIP
NEGEV
DESERT
34446
Lituni
LEBANON
Pumping Station
(Under Construction)
Reservoirs
Tunnel
Tunnel
Tunnel ISRAEL
JORDAN
Jerusalem
DEAD
SEA
Husbani
Ranivts
SYRIA
Yarmak
STATUTE MILES
30
CODE WORD MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE

13-00000
TOP SECRET DINAR
Asia-Africa
ARABS PLAN NO OVERT ACTION AGAINST ISRAELI PROJECT
The Arab states evidently
do not plan any overt military
action against Israel when in
late January or early February
the Israelis begin pumping tests
for their Jordan River diversion
project, but sabotage of the
project's facilities may be at-
tempted.
The Arab military chiefs
who met in Cairo in mid-December
apparently decided that direct
military attacks are not feasi-
ble. The chiefs reportedly
agreed, however, that the states
bordering on Israel should
mount independent and uncoor-
dinated clandestine operations.
The Arab League Defense
Council, which meets in January,
probably will approve this rec-
ommendation, but its implementa -
tion is another matter. Egyp-
tian, Jordanian, and Lebanese
officials have indicated pri-
vately that their governments
have no intention of taking
aggressive action of any kind
against the Israeli project.
Nasir, however, told the
Canadian ambassador in early
December that he was worried
that Syria might act unilater-
ally and present the other Arab
states with a dilemma. Damascus
will be under strong pressure
to fulfill its threats against
the Israeli scheme, particularly
in view of the close proximity
of the Syrian border to Israel's
pumping station on Lake Tiberias.

Nasir's wariness about be-
coming involved in a war with
Israel over Jordan waters was
also evident in a speech he
made on 23 December. He empha -
sized that the problem is polit-
ical rather than military in
nature and that the chiefs of
staff cannot solve it. He
called for a summit meeting of
Arab presidents and kings to
seek a solution.

Israel, according to the
chief of Israeli military in-
telligence, considers there is
an outside possibility that
Syria might bomb or shell the
pumping facility's transformer
station. However, the Israelis
believe the primary threat stems
from former Palestinians now
living in Syria, Jordan or
Lebanon, who might make a dra-
matic effort to sabotage the
project even though they prob-
ably could not cause serious
damage. (SECRET NO FOREIGN
DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY)

*
27 Dec 63
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW
Page 8
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13-00000
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Asia-Africa
CYPRUS DISPUTE FLARES AGAIN
Fighting between the Greek
and Turkish Cypriot communities,
which began on 21 December and
was continuing on 26 December
despite efforts to obtain a cease-
fire, is the culmination of a
steady growth of tension on the
island during the past few weeks.
The new tension followed Presi-
dent Makarios' presentation to
Turkish Cypriot leaders of propos-
als for changing the Cyprus con-
stitution. The proposals, which
essentially involved removing the
guarantees to the Turkish minor-
ity that had been written into
the Cyprus settlement of 1959,
were rejected by the Turkish Gov-
ernment even before the Turkish
Cypriots had made their views
known.

Most of the initial fight-
ing appears to have been between
Greek Cypriot police and the Turk-
ish underground, and to have taken
place in the Turkish areas of Nic-
osia.. The situation there de-
teriorated progressively during
the week, as the police lost con-
trol to extremist groups of ir-
regulars from both communities.
A cease-fire, to be supervised
by the British, had not been ef-
fective as of the morning of 26
December. Fighting had also con-
tinued at the port city of Lar-
naca; the rest of the island was
quiet but tense.
In the face of these de
velopments, the Turkish Govern-
ment threatened to exercise its
right under the 1959 agreement
to intervene on Cyprus. Three
Turkish jet fighters flew over
Nicosia on 25 December, and
Turkish naval units appeared off
the island. Part of the 650-man
Turkish garrison on Cyprus left
its barracks to move into one
of the Turkish quarters of the
capital. Part of the 950-man
Greek contingent then moved to
protect Greek areas. The situa-
tion evidently prodded Athens
and London into a more active
role, and Greek, Turkish and
British forces on Cyprus have
been placed under a unified Brit-
ish-led command. Britain has an-
nounced it is sending 150 ad-
ditional troops.

The violence may make lead-
ers of both sides more cautious
in pressing political demands.
Soon after the outbreak, Makarios
told the US ambassador he would
go more slowly in pushing his con-
stitutional revisions. Both eth-
nic groups, however, will be fur-
ther embittered--particularly
the Turkish community, which
is believed to have suffered
much the heavier casualties.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
27 Dec 63
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW
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13-00000
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Asia-Africa
AREA NOTE
Saudi Arabia: Crown Prince
Faysal appears to have weathered
his latest dispute with King
Saud without making any conces-
sions. The details of a new
arrangement between the two are
not known, but Faysal is still
firmly in control of the govern-
ment. Royal Guard elements
which the King ordered to posi-
tions around his palace at the
height of the dispute have now
been withdrawn.

The dispute centered on
Saud's attempt to resume per-
sonal control of the government,
which he relinquished to Faysal
a year ago when his health
broke. The immediate issues
were variously reported to have
been the new budget, which cuts
the
funds allotted to the royal
family, and Faysal's refusal
to give cabinet posts to two
of Saud's sons.

In blocking Saud's chal-
lenge, Faysal apparently was
supported by most of the im-
portant members of the royal
family. Throughout the crisis
the Saudi regular army remained
under the orders of the minis-
ter of defense, Prince Sultan,
a Faysal adherent. Some2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

KENT EXTRACT

Mr. William M. Kent joined the Agency in December
1951. He had previously received a degree in diplomatic
and public relations from the Latin American Institute,
New York City and had served time in the U.S. Army from
1946 to 1948. He graduated from the Latin American
Institute with the highest honors and 4 awards.

Mr. Kent was initially assigned to the Office of
Special Operations as a clerk typist and, after six
months, in June 1952, was assigned to Panama as an
intelligence officer under non-official cover. In July
1956 he returned to Headquarters where he worked as an
area operations officer in the Western Hemisphere Divi-
sion. After a successful stint in the Cuba section he
was assigned as an operations officer to Caracas. After
an excellently productive tour in Caracas, Mr. Kent was
selected to join JMWAVE in Miami. There he really shone
as attested to in the following quote from his fitness
report: "He has been placed in most difficult positions,
particularly in the handling of incompatible people and
groups which he has managed without alienating either
side and on various occasions accomplishing the impossible
by satisfying everyone concerned." After his tour in Miami,
he headed several sections in Headquarters in the Western
Hemisphere Division, In 1967 he was transferred to New
Orleans and then to the Washington Base. In both places
he worked under non-official cover. From 1970 until his
retirement he served in several capacities ranging from
the planning and guiding of Covert Action programs to
occupying managerial positions. During these eight years
he received seven strong and three outstanding overall
ratings. Of special note are the various commendation
and laudatory reports concerning Mr. Kent's performance during
the "Chilean crisis". Because of his excellent performance
during the Chilean crisis he again was asked to help the
Latin American Division during several investigations. He
performed admirably as reflected in a commendation
written by the Deputy Chief of LA Division on 5 December 1975:
"When confronted with a need to produce a paper on Chile in
a short timeframe, I instinctively turned to him. It was not
only because he had expertise on Chile, but to service in
the Chile Branch, but because he is highly skilled in written
presentation. He organizes his material well and presents
it in a lucid, highly readable manner. On the first occasion,
he helped us prepare a paper that was eventually used by the
Director in his presentation before the Senate Select Com-
mittee on 14-15' July. On the second occasion his contribution

-2-

was used by the DDO in his appearance before the Senate
Select Committee on 28 October. Both of these papers
were excellent and have withstood critical scrutiny."

Mr. Kent has now left the Agency after 26 years of
distinguished service as an operations officer and as a
manager both in the field and at Headquarters. On the
occasion of his retirement, it is appropriate that Mr.
Kent's career achievements be suitably recognized. It
is recommended that he be awarded the Career Intelligence
Medal in recognition of his long and distinguished service.
104-10304-10000
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

911 7-1-12-79
PERS 79-1222
Allx 790112

8 January 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel
SUBJECT : Annual Fitness Report - George Joannides
Operations Officer
GS-16
ESN 064818 23
DOB 5 July 1922
067180743

1. This Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report is prepared
in accordance with HR 20-20, for the period mid-June 1978 through
12 January 1979. The occasion of the Fitness Report is the
retirement of the rating official.

2. The undersigned was detailed in mid-May to serve
as the Agency's Principal Coordinator for work with the House
Select Committee on Assassinations. As it became apparent that the volume
of the work required assignment of additional full-time personnel, the
decision was made that one experienced officer was needed to handle
the DDO account. A senior officer experienced in DDO work and available
to serve for several months was requested. Mr. Joannides was known to
the undersigned by reputation, although not personally, and arrangements
were made for his detail to the work. While there is no way to outline
the qualifications that one should have for this sort of work, it
became quickly clear that Mr. Joannides was the perfect man for it.

3. Mr. Joannides was responsible for a new procedure in
recording of exchanges with the HSCA. As it developed, the Agency's
logs and records on the status of requests by the HSCA and the Agency's
responses became the only reliable record; it was clear that the HSCA
often did not know the status of business in this respect and time
and time again had to come to this office for clarification. Beyond
that early contribution to the ordering of the affairs of the office,
Mr. Joannides handled day-to-day follow-ups of requirements by
telephone with the DDO focal point as well as throughout the DDO.
Further, the firm position that he took with the young investigators
in response to aggressive harassment on some occasions was exactly
what the situation called for. A person of his maturity and experience
handled the job exactly as required by the situation. If the peculiar
nature of the work did not call on Mr. Joannides for all the talents of
his wide experience, it nonetheless was his experience and quick
perceptions that ensured a superior performance. His advice and

3/hnc 19

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counselling on courses of action to cope with unique situations
was always sound and responsible.

4. The work in this assignment provided little occasion
for Mr. Joannides to demonstrate attitudes on either EEO matters or
economy, considerations that are required by regulation for comment
in Fitness Reports. As a result, no comment is made.

5. Not because of the demands on his superior talents,
but because of the cool efficacy with which he handled an unusual
special assignment, Mr. Joannides' work is evaluated as Outstanding.

S. D. Breckinridge

I certify that I have seen the comments in the Narrative section
of this memorandum.

George Joannides
2
اشة
8 79
Date
14

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION Norge GENERAL
1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)
EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
06481858
2. DATE OF BIRTH 3. SEX 4. GRADE 5. SD
7-5-22 M99 GS-14D

gm
jp
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT 8. CURRENT STATION
DDP/S.A.S.
JMWAVE

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
Ops. Officer

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT 10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
CAREER
RESERVE
TEMPORARY INITIAL REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X
ANNUAL REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions Section C)
SPECIAL (Specify): SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1963 - 31 March 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W-Weak Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires
positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on
probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A- Adequate Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor
excellence.

P - Proficient Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O-Outstanding Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of
others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES
List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the
manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees
with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 RATING
LETTER
Supervises and manages the Station's covert action branch which S
employs [ten] staff officers and Seven contract employees. 199
24 24
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2
RATING
Serves as senior case officer for a student project which involves LETTER
distribution of printed propaganda, production of radio programs, 99
and the development of political action programs.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 RATING
LETTER
Maintains liaison with the FI, CI and PM branch chiefs, in order 94
to insure that t the Station's covert action effort is appropriately (P
supporting the missions of the other branches.

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 RATING
Conducts production and security reviews on the Station's covert LETTER
action operations.: 99
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 RATING
LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 RATING
LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION, D?
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as per-
formance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and
particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, RATING
LETTER
[s] S
place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.of.

8 JUN 1964
4-62
FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from avtomatle
downgrading and
declassification

9/mc

13-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS
OFFI
Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in profer pergestive their relationship to
overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendatiotraining. Comment
on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section Bio provide best
basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or, supervisory duties must be described, if
applicable. JUN 4
M
Subject is a hard working, dedicated and effectos Affficer who has
proven by performance that he can accomplish assigned operational tasks
in allowable time limits. The period covered by this fitness report
represents Subject's initial Agency exposure to those first echelon
management responsibilities which are implicit in a branch chief's
assignment in a Station that has 313 employees. Subject responded
to the challenge of the first echelon supervisory responsibilities
in an exemplary manner. Subject managed a branch that had a yearly
budget of two million four hundred thousand dollars. These funds
were judiciously spent on printed propaganda, white and black radio
programs, and on political action operations which were implemented
via labor, student and professional groups. Subject has the knack of
judiciously blending quality with quantity and in this melding effort,
Subject reflected cost consciousness and effectiveness in the use of
personnel, space equipment and funds. Subject has a distinct flair
for political action operations and can translate policy directives
into meaningful action programs by all of his assets. Subject has the
ability to delegate authority and to appropriately fix responsibility
with those officers whom he supervises. In the management field)..
Subject's only discernible weakness is a tendency to be abrupt with
subordinates. It is believed that this minor shortcoming will be
overcome with the acquisition of added experience in the field of
personnel management. On balance therefore, Subject's overall perfor-
mance as a supervisor and as an intelligence officer warrants an 99
SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS evaluation of' Strong"
BY EMPLOYEE
1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT
DATE SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
(CONTINUED)
15 May 1964 /s/ (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal)

BY SUPERVISOR
2.
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
UNDER MY SUPERVISION
22 months
DATE
OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
15 May 1964 Chief of Station, JMWAVE (s/ Andrew K. REUTEMAN
(signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans
3.
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Although I have had few chances to personally observe
work, I concur in the supervisor's comments and
rating due to my general impression of capabilities
and performance of duty received in occasional meetings
extending over a number of years.

DATE TYRED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
1 June 1964 Deputy Chief, WH (SA) Bruce B. Cheever

SECRET
2/mc

13-00000

C
C

SECRET

CONTINUATION SHEET
Section C - Narrative Comments

Subject has additional growth potential as an intelligence
officer and as a first echelon supervisor of individuals doing
a basic intelligence task. Ethnic origins, foreign language
fluency and experience acquired to date generally dictates a
career for Subject in the general arena of Greek operations.
While the major thrust of Subject's career orientation should
be geared toward Greece and its related problems, it is believed
that it is essential that, on a periodic basis, Subject be directed
into non-Greek areas of interest, in order that the continued
challenge of new horizons will stimulate Subject to develop to
his full capacity. In practical terms, this means that out of
any eight-year time cycle, at least two years should be spent
by Subject on non-Greek or even non-European affairs. This
officer has the potential to be a broad-gauged officer but he
must be stimulated and led in that direction which will fully
harness the totality of his potential.

The rating officer would be pleased to have Subject work
with him at any other Field Station that might be entrusted to
the rating officer.

SECRET
0807 1
Excluded from automatic
dexagrading and

13-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A Joannides, hore Es GENERAL
1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)
EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
[0648187
2. DATE OF BIRTH 3. SEX 4. GRADE 5. SD
5 Jul 1922 MP GS-14 D
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT 8. CURRENT STATION
DDP/S.AS.
JMWAVE
10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
INITIAL
ANNUAL
XX REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
OPS OFFICER

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
CAREER
RESERVE
TEMPORARY
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions Section C)
SPECIAL (Specify):-

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. SPECIAL (Specify):
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From-to-)
1 January 1963 - 31 July 1963
SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires
positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on.
probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A- Adequate Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor
excellence.
W-Weak

P-Proficient Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O-Outstanding Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of
others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES
List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the
manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees
with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 RATING
LETTER
Deputy Chief of Branch handling (in absence of Chief) all aspects
of political action and psychological warfare activity and S
supervising fourteen case officers and clerical personnel. [s]

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 RATING
LETTER
Case officer for student project involving political action, S
propaganda, intelligence collection and a hemisphere-wide apparatus. [s]

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 RATING
LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6
RATING
LETTER
POSTED ON
RATING
LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION
RATING
LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as per-
formance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and
particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, RATING
LETTER
S
place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

17 OCT 1963

4-62
FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

6/mc

13-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS
Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to
overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment
on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best
basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if
applicable.

Reference is made to paragraph C of subject's previous fitness report
dated 10 January 1963 which is still applicable. During the period
covered by this report subject has done an excellent job in the handling
of a significant student exile group which hitherto had successfully
resisted any important degree of control. Under subject's direction
an exile teachers' group reached a high level of effectiveness in the
propaganda field and was turned over to another case officer.

Subject has effectively terminated unproductive operations in the prop
field (one magazine and a news letter) and is building up Station radio
capability directed at the maintarget.

His high professional standards, complete comprehension of the problems
faced by the Station and strong urge to win in our struggle with the
opposition make it a distinct pleasure to see him take over as Chief
of the PW branch.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS
BY EMPLOYEE
1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT
DATE SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
JUL 31 1963 /s/ Walter D. NEWBY (signed in pseudo on Fld. Transmittal)

BY SUPERVISOR
2.
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
UNDER MY SUPERVISION.
15 months

DATE TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR
31 July 1963 Chief, PW /s/ Robert K. TROUCHARD
(signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.
3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
The Reviewing Officer is familiar with Subject's
work based primarily on discussions with Subject and Subject's supervisor,
general observation of Subject during the past year and freqüently review-
ing his completed work. Subject is an extremely hard working, dedicated
individual with an ability to develop rapport quickly with his contacts.
Subject works long hours including weekends without complaining and is
always available when there is a job to be done. Subject has demonstra-
ted those qualities of management, initiative, drive and devotion to
duty that are necessary to perform the many and varied tasks of a fast
and continually changing situation. The Reviewing Officer- concurs with
the Rating Officer's overall evaluation of Strong)

DATE TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
SEP 24 1963 Deputy Chief of Station /s/ Frederick J. INGHURST
(signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

SECRET
Утс

13-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS
Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to
overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment
on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best
basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if
applicable.

No change from previous report,submitted 19 January 1963.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS
BY EMPLOYEE
1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT
DATE SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
27 March 63 /s/Walter D. NEWBY (signed on Field Transmittal)

BY SUPERVISOR
2. IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN
UNDER MY SUPERVISION
12

DATE OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
27 March 63 Chief, PW Branch /s/ Robert_K. TROUCHARD
(signed on Field Transmittal)
3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
2 April 1963 Chief of Station, JMWAVE /s/ Andrew K. REUTEMAN
(signed on Field Transmittal

SECRET

13-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A Joannides, toge E, GENERAL
1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)
EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
037747064818)
2. DATE OF BIRTH 3. SEX 4. GRADE 5. SD
5 July 1922 Male 99 @S-147 D
USFuid
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT 8. CURRENT STATION
DDP/S.A.S.
JMWAVE
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
OPS OFFICER

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT 10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
CAREER
RESERVE
TEMPORARY INITIAL REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X
ANNUAL REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions Section C)
SPECIAL (Specify): SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January 1963 - 31 March 1963
SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W-Weak Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires
positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on
probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A- Adequate Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor
excellence.

P-Proficient Performance is more than satisfactory.. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O-Outstanding Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of
others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES
List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the
manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees
with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO.1 RATING
LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 RATING
LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 RATING
LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 RATING
LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 RATING
LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 RATING
LETTER

POSTED CIT
-
31 December 62
still current.
Period 1 January

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION
RATING
LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as per-
formance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and
particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period,
place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

16 APR 1963

4-62
FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from aviomatic
downgrading and
declassification

13-00000

SEGRET
(When Filled In)
Sed agni
EMPLONEE SERIAL NUMBER
06480
FITNESS REPORT
st) (Middle)
SECTION A Joannidis, hoe E, GENERAL
(Last)
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
OPS OFFICER

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
CAREER
RESERVE
TEMPORARY
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions Section C)
SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
SECTION B
W-Weak
A- Adequate
P-Proficient
S- Strong
2. DATE OF BIRTH 3. SEX 4. GRADE 5. SD
D
5 July 1922 Male 99 [GS-14]
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT 8. CURRENT STATION
DDP/S.AS. CA
10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
INITIAL
X
ANNUAL
SPECIAL (Specify):

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From-to-)
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
JMNAVETA

REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

1 January 1962 - 31 December 1962
Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires
positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on
probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor
excellence.
Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of
others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES
List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the
manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees
with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 RATING
LETTER
Deputy Chief of Branch handling (in absence of Chief) all aspects
political action and psychological warfare and supervising (fifteen 99
case officers and clerical personnel. 24 [0]

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 RATING
LETTER
Case Officer for student project involving political action,
propaganda, intelligence collection and hemisphere-wide 99
[$]한
apparatus.

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 RATING
Case Officer for teacher's organization engaged in hemisphere- LETTER
wide press and radio propaganda. 49
(s)

SPECIFIC DUTY. NO.4 RATING
LETTER
04
Case Officer on project producing news letter aimed at press
outlets in Latin America..

SPECIFIC DUTY.NO. 5 RATING
LETTER
Maintains contacts with key elements of a veteran's type
organization as a developmental project.

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 POSTED ON
26768
OVERALL PERFORMANCE. IN CURRENT POSITION
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as per-
formance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and
particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, RATING
LETTER
A
RATING
LETTER
place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance 5799
S
蛋
4-62
FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

9/mc

13-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS
Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to
overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment
on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best
basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if
applicable Subject's strengths lie in his ability to analyze a problem quickly
and skillfully, to strip it of unnecessary detail and to render a
decision without waste of motion. He has contributed greatly to the
efficiency of the Branch by eliminating unproductive ventures, counseling
the members and promoting the principles of correct tradecraft. He has
been successful in resolving complicated problems involving control of
an unruly group. He has a strong personality and firm convictions about
the proper manner of carrying on covert operations and voices his
convictions without fear. He is an excellent supervisor and is respected
by the members of the branch for his forthrightness and his sober
judgment and sound advice. His handling of agents and contacts on the
outside both directly and indirectly mixes to a proper extent firmness
and friendliness. In short he is a distinct asset to the clandestine
services both administratively and operationally.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS
BY EMPLOYEE
1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT
DATE SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
19 JAN 63 /s/Walter D. NEWBY (signed on Field Transmittal)

BY SUPERVISOR
2. IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN
UNDER MY SUPERVISION
10 months

DATE TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR
19 JAN 63 Chief/PW - JMWAVE /s/ Robert K. TROUCHARD
(signed on Field Transmittal)
3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
Subject is an unusually competent officer in the
field of covert action operations in that he blends a flair for this
activity with sound tradecraft principles and a firm adherence to valid
reporting techniques. Subject is dedicated and hard working and he has
proven by performance that he is willing to work long hours in order to
accomplish his operational objectives. Subject's overall performance
warrants an evaluation of "strong" 9 Subject has growth potential both as
an intelligence officer and as a first echelon supervisor of individuals
doing a basic intelligence task. Subject's activities come to the
attention of the reviewing officer on a weekly basis.

DATE TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
FEB 1 5 1963 Chief of Station, JMWAVE /s/ Andrew K. REUTEMAN
(signed on Field Transmittal
SECRET
Утс
104-10306-10007 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

1 October 1963

NOTES FOR MR. McCONE:

98
1. DDP has prepared for your information a summary of General
Chiang Ching-kuo's visit to the U.S. Attached to this summary
are the four most important papers as follows:

a. Your position paper;
b. CIA commitments paper;
c. Memorandum for the record on DDP briefings;
d. Record of conversation with the President.

The visit is considered to have been a success and Chiang Ching-kuo
returned with an understanding that any abrupt move by his govern-
ment to recover the mainland with military force would not be
supported by this country. Chiang Kai-shek has accepted the position
paper and CIA's commitments paper, and our station is now working
out cooperation on intelligence and operational activities against the
mainland. 7

98
2. In commenting on the proposal to send Dr. Cavanagh to Rome, Bill
Harvey suggests that Cavanagh be certified to the Vatican as your
personal representative, and suggests you might do this through
Cardinal Cicognani or Archbishop O'Connor. Request your guidance.7

98
3. DDP has run another assessment of the reliability of the documentary
material provided by Penkovskiy and see no reason to change their
statement of 31 May to USIB that it was A most serious penetration
of Soviet officialdom and one that will hurt them for years to come".
Helms suggests you have this assessment checked with DDI and OSI
and if they concur, re-assure USIB along the above lines.

4. Dez FitGerald briefed the Joint Chiefs recently on his overall program
against Cuba. In the discussion the main thing that emerged was
General LeMay's view that the present program was far too small to

13-00000

overthrow Castro. General LeMay wondered why we did not/use
bombings. There was also a discussion of Navy and Air Force
programs to protect raiders in international waters and in the
event of hot pursuit. It was agreed that further planning would be
conducted.

4.8
5. John Warner has reviewed the record of recent congressional
debates on the test ban treaty and finds 13 senators made reference
to you. No one criticized you. Senators Pastore, Humphrey, and
Anderson praised you.

98
6. John Warner has prepared a recommendation based on his reading
that our standing in Congress is currently on the decline He
suggests that you meet privately with such members as Russell,
Saltonstall, Vinson, and Arends to seek advice and develop a strategy
for public statements by these members and other Subcommittee
members.

98
7. Mr. Kirkpatrick has forwarded a memorandum on efforts to obtain
a replacement for Colonel Grogan

8. Dick Helms has forwarded a memorandum of his briefing of the
Bureau of Budget officials on the Agency's covert action programs.
McGeorge Bundy attended and offered 2 opinions: (a) that there be
a regular annual briefing of the Special Group on covert operations
as a whole, and (b) that during the present period of apparent detente
there might well be very good reasons for investing even greater
resources in covert actions.

98
9. John Bross has forwarded a memorandum for the record on your
meeting with Generals Carter, Blake, and Carroll about personnel
security. Bross is presently drafting a memorandum to the Secretary
of Defense on this subject which is being reviewed by Houston and
Bannerman.7
-2-

13-00000

98
10. Mr. Gilpatric has written you a letter confirming His conversation
about assigning Frank Hand as Special Assistant to General Carroll.
I suggest I pass this to General Carter for Agency action.J
-3-
W. Elder
18 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: 303 Committee Meeting - 18 June 1964

1. Item I: Autonomous Operations

This was raised in view of Manuel Ray's request for
$25,000 and indications that he is attempting to make a new expedition to
Cuba in a chartered ship. Various courses of possible action with Ray
were discussed, ranging from cutting him off altogether to giving him
the money. It developed that Ray is acting inconsistently with the agreement
with him which was that he would operate outside the United States. Therefore
it was decided that we would tell him that he must abide by the agreement,
that he must find a base of operations outside the United States and if he does
we will endeavor to secure the release of his ship which is now in Puerto Rico,
and that we will give him financial support.

2. With respect to Artime, it was pointed out that Artime's
operations are very costly. CIA has put ($4.6 million) into this operation
this year the future bill will be large, but not as great. FitzGerald
reported that Artime planned one hit and run operation a month, but he noted
he would be lucky if he could pull off one every 3 months. Bundy seemed to
feel Artime was more of a threat than an operator and should be maintained
for that purpose and operations discouraged. FitzGerald pointed out this is
not practical. It was agreed to proceed with Artime recognizing that U.S.
or CIA support of him would probably be "blown". Furthermore it was
suggested that he be cautioned to be careful and not follow unduly reckless
courses of action.

3. There was a long discussion on the implications of the CIA
June 10th memorandum reporting plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate leading
Cuban government leaders. This report was taken most seriously by the group.
It was felt that the purpose of advising us through CIA of these plans was to
put us on notice and therefore we should not fail to take appropriate precautionary
actions to see that no assassination attempt of which we had knowledge was
carried out. It was decided that appropriate authorities, i.e. Department of
Justice and the FBI, should be notified and urged to take appropriate action
against the individuals involved.

I took the position that we are overly exercised, that I was
inclined to write the whole thing off as Miami cocktail party talk rather than
definite plans. Had I seen the Memo before it was distributed, I would have
investigated the sources and the credibility of the whole thing before taking
action. However the group were more concerned than I and therefore planning to
discuss the subject with the Attorney General and possibly Mr. Hoover.

I pointed out that copies of the Memorandum had been sent
to the Attorney General and the Department of Justice but there had been
no conversation on the subject.

ACTION: Discuss with General Carter and Mr. Helms
steps we should take to establish the
credibility of the report; also communicate
with the FBI through Mr. Papich. Also I
should call the Attorney General personally.

4. Prior to the meeting Mr. Vance asked my opinion of using
the 22 million psyops leaflets which inadvertently had been printed on
U.S. manufactured white sulphite paper, all as reported in MACV
cable MAC SOG 5050 dated 18 June 1964 (IN 09143). I told Vance that I felt
we should go ahead. It was too bad it had been done this way, but it is one of
those things that a person not thoroughly acquainted with this type of operation
might overlook. He was in agreement and presumably will instruct the release
of the leaflets.

NON-CIA TELETYPED MESSAGE 09143

ACTION: FE 18

TE IF Ø34

00 RUEPIA

A

DE RUMSMA 1647F 18/06412

0 1806272

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUEPCR/WHITEHOUSE

RUEPDA/SECSTATE

RUEPDA/O SD

RUEPIA/CIA

RUEKDA/JCS

INFO RUHPA/CINCPAC

ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON

RUHPA/CAS HONO

BT

TOPSECRET MAC SOG 5050

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION SPECIAL HANDLING SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE STATE FOR SULLIVAN, OSD FOR MCNAMARA AND ANTHIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR MCGEORGE BUNDY, CIA FOR MCCONE, CARTER AND

HELMS, JCS FOR GEN TAYLOR, INFO AMEMB SAIGON FOR AMB LODGE

AND NES, CINCPAC FOR ADM FELT.

A. OPLAN 34A

1. IN ORDER TO MEET OPERATIONAL SCHEDULES FOR JUNE AND

JULY PSYOPS LEAFLET DROPS, TWENTY TWO MILLION LEAFLETS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

WERE PRINTED ON SIXTEEN POUND US GRADE WHITE SULPHITE
PAPER. THIS WAS NECESSITATED DUE TO UNAVAILABILITY OF
OTHER PAPER SUITABLE FOR IHIGHSPEED LEAFLET PRESS.

2. UNLESS THESE PRINTED LEAFLETS ARE AUTHORIZED FOR
DISSEMINATION OVER NORTH VIETNAM UNDER SCHEDULED OPLAN
34A OPERATIONS NUMEROUS PSYOPS OPPORTUNITIES EXPLO ITABLE
UNDER PRESENT LIGHT OF THE MOON PERIOD WILL BE MISSED AND
TIMELINESS OF SEVERAL OF THESE LEAFLETS WILL BE LOST.

3. REALIZE SUBJECT OF PLAUSIBLE DENIAL BECOMES INVOLVED
HERE BUT FEEL IN THIS CASE PROBLEM OF POSSIBLE ATTRIBUTION
TO UNITED STATESTBUST BE JUDGED IN LIGHT OF FOLLOWING CIR-
CUMSTANCES:

A. PAPER STOCK USED IS STANDARD US MANUFACTURE OB-
TAINED THROUGH US ARMY QUARTERMASTER SOURCES AND IS
ASSUMED TO BE AVAILABLE ON WORLD MARKET FOR SALE TO ANY
CONSUMER. MAP SUPPORTED FORCES SUCH AS ARVN OR OTHERS
COULD HAVE ACCESS TO SAME TYPE PAPER.

B. ANY DESIRE TO ATTRIBUTE OPLAN 34A ACTIONS TO US
COULD BE MORE READILY SUBSTANT IATED BY DRV PRODUCING AGENT
PERSONNEL OR MORE CRITICAL ITEMS LOST IN SOME PREVIOUS
TEAM OPERATIONS.

C. PAPER STOCK ITSELF IS NOT ONLY ATTRIBUTABLE ITEM,
BUT ALSO OFFSET PRINTING PROCESS EMPLOYED WITH OTHER TYPE
PRINTED MATTER.

D. IN ESSENCE ALL OPLAN 34A ACTIONS ARE DESIGNED TO
IMPRESS DRV THAT PRESSURE IS BEING APPLIED BY MAJOR POWER.
USE OF US PAPER AND ייןIRECT INDICATION OF US INVOLVEMENT

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

TEND CONTRIBUTE TO THAT BASIC OBJECTIVE.

E. ONLY CHEMICAL ANALYSIS COULD ASCERTAIN THAT PAPER
USED IS U.S. MANUFACTURED STOCK.

F. IN ANY EVENT, U.S. BLAMED BY DRV FOR ALL OPLAN 34A
ACTIONS THEY CHOOSE TO PUBLICISE AND U.S. IN EACH CASE
COULD CHOOSE TO DENY OR IGNORE ACCUSAT IONS.

4. REQUEST APPROVAL TO PROCEED WITH DISSEMINATION OF PRE-
PARED LEAFLETS AT THIS TIME AND UNTIL SUITABLE FOREIGN
SOURCE PAPER STOCK CAN BE OBTAINED WHICH SHOULD BE WITHIN TWO WEEKS.

5. IN ORDER TO MEET CURRENT JUNE SCHEDULE REQUEST REPLY
WITHIN 48 HOURS.

3 April

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECOR D

SUBJECT: Special Group Meeting (5412) - 2 April 1964

1. Briefly reviewed the status of North Viet Nam operations 34A.
All concluded that the results have been negative and disappointing.
I took the position this was to be expected but that now the period of
organization had past, we might get some better results.

(The CIA IDEALIST-TACKLE program was approved except
for the North Korean flight. Defense interposed an objection to this
flight on the grounds that they were nearing agreement for the release
of helicopter crews which have been held in North Korean custody.

ACTION: This particular flight should be withheld.
USIB
and most particularly DIA should be informed in the meeting
On Wednesday, the 8th.7

2. (Discussed the problem of captains and crews for the SWIFT
and NASTY craft and the necessity of withdrawing the German mercenaries
and the Swedish captains. This was recognized as a must. It was agreed
that substitution of Chinese Nationalist captains was acceptable on an
interim basis.

ACTION: DDP to arrange with Secretary Vance for appro-
priate actions by the Department of Defense through their
representatives in Taiwan for the recruitment, movement,
compensation and care of these captains.7

3. Reviewed DoD peripheral reconnaissance which was approved
after extended discussion of capabilities of the new radar in Cambodia.
It was agreed that the field would be instruded to carefully observe
operation of this radar to determine whether the U-2s were being picked
up by it. If this turned out to be a regular practice by the Cambodians,
the matter should be resubmitted for reconsideration.

A CTION: The field should follow this carefully with MACV:

4. Review of ground rules for U-2 in North Viet Nam as outlined.
Secretary Vance's paper was approved.7

5. The recommendation to overfly Laos was held in suspension.
DoD was asked to bring in specific details of the particular 34A operations
which required such overflights and the probable advantages of continuing
the operations by means of overflying Laos. State held very positive view
against Laotian overflights.

6. The proposed in filtration and exfiltration operations in Cuba
were approved. Mr. FitzGerald was warned not to cache arms with
agents felt to be under Castro control. He stated that this particular
Cache involved money and other things, but no arms. The caching of
small quantities of arms elsewhere in Cuba was approved.
Memorandum on the operation of autonomous exile groups was noted and no
instructions were given to restrain these operations. The overall question
of future sabotage operations was discussed. Mr. Bundy agreed to bring
the matter before the President and senior Cabinet officers promptly.

7. The Chilean political action as outlined in the CIA paper of
April 1st was approved. It was pointed out that since the paper was
drafted, COS and Ambassador in Santiago had reached an agreement about
the handling of funds.

8. Proposed political action in Zanzibar was approved. Mr. Waller
gave a brief account of the results of the favorable negotiations with the
British. Understood that implementation of this paper was to be
coordinated with the British in accordance with agreement reached in
London.7

OTHER MATTERS:

1 ( Statement was made that a CIA U-2 was "painted" with radar
on February 24th, implication being that the CIA U-2$ in the vicinity of
Phnom Penh.

ACTION: I would like to know the facts on this

2. Question was raised about need for continuing the 30 mile
intrusion into Cambodiand Laos. Indications were that the photography
had produced no useful information for MACV.

ACTION: This question should be studied and brought
up for discussion at meeting on April 9th. I should cable
Carter to investigate fully.7

27 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of 5412 Group

1. The question of the extent of the SAC planes operations in South
Vietnam was discussed against the background of Dr. McMillan's
letter of February 26th.

1. Overflights of South Vietnam -- Ο.Κ.

2. Overfly that part of North Vietnam which is within 30 miles
of South Vietnam or of the coast line.

3. That part of Laos which is within 30 miles of the South
Vietnamese border.

4. That part of Cambodia which is not more than 30 miles
from South Vietnam.

With respect to 4., instructions were to be given that the primary
purpose of the flights was to survey border activity and the 30 mile shot
is provided to give range and operational flexibility. I felt in reviewing
McMillan's proposal that if the SAC planes were to go as far north as the
21st parallel, then they should go all the way to the China border and the
proposed CIA operation out of Takhli should be abandoned. This raised the
question of whether civilian or military planes and pilots should be over
North Vietnam to the extent which could not be explained as being "off
course". All agreed that the SAC Air Force operations should be either
limited as outlined above or should cover the entire country. It was
decided to refer the matter to higher authority for decision. I interposed
no objection to SAC's overflight of North Vietnam but merely took the
position that if they went as far north as proposed by McMillan, they
should cover the entire country.7

2. The program of infiltration and exfiltration of Cuba was approved
with the exception of one operation operation #434 about which
Mr. Cheever explained that he thought the agents we were resupplying were
under Cuban control and the resupply operation was for the purpose of
deception. It was agreed that the resupply should be confined to money and

medicine and that the small amount of arms involved should not be cached.
Otherwise the operation was approved.

Alexis Johnson and Mr. Bundy raised questions of the consequences
of finding an arms cache or knocking over an infiltration at the time of the
OAS debate on the Venezuelan problem. Arguments were persuasive that
we should go slowly during this period. I read from the February 25th
Cuban checklist of the deterioration of the spirit of the people of Cuba, the
feeling that we were about to recognize the Castro government and the apathy
toward further resistance as evidence of the price we are paying for
slow-downs and deferments of action against Cuba. I said that I thought our
Cuban program was in complete disarray. We had no policy or covert
operations. We now are hesitating on infiltration and exfiltration, our
economic denial program was failing, while Castro is making significant
progress.

3. The forcast of NRO activities for March was approved.

4. The status report on political action in Kenya was approved.

February 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

Attached is a paper which I would like to table for
discussion at the next meeting of the 5412 group.

February 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Clandestine and Covert Activities Against Cuba

The objective of the U. S. Government is to overthrow
the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba. In accomplishing its
objective, the U. S. is not willing to risk nuclear war or, at
this time, substantial deterioration in its relations with its
Allies, or significant escalation in tensions between this
country and the Soviets. Thus, any covert U. S. program
should be set at a level that is not likely to incur such risks.
Such a program would appear to be a low-risk, clandestine
program of harassment and sabotage directed against Cuba.
In addition, a program of higher risks seems justified when
it is directed against Cuban subversion of Latin America.

Actions Against Cuba

1. Sabotage. A low level campaign of sabotage and
harassment against Cuba might include such targets as the
Canete Saw Mill, smaller POL storage plants (such as the
one at Pilon), the Nazabal warehouse and pier, and ships
(such as barges or Cuban patrol boats). Where possible,
it would seem desirable to make the raids appear to have
come from within Cuba. Cuban ships outside Cuba can be sabotaged
by discreet means (such as placing sand in gears or sugar in fuel).

2. Harassment of Free World Shipping to Cuba.

a) Initiate a more comprehensive program of
overt and covert pressure against Free World firms trading
with Cuba. In this connection, develop a comprehensive list
of firms doing business with Cuba, check them against known
DOD off-shore and foreign purchase suppliers so that
:
appropriate retaliation can be applied against those suppliers.

b) Place unactivated incendiary and explosive
devices in cargoes and on ships bound for Cuba and subse-
quently "tip off" port or shipping officials so that they will
search and discover the devices with the attendant publicity.

3. Covert Economic Activities.

a) Intensify covert activities directed against
critical commodities destined for Cuba with resort, if
necessary, to carefully considered and controlled preclu-
sive buying.

b) Make it known discreetly through the press
that we maintain careful records of the companies dealing
with Cuba, suggesting without saying so that these records
constitute a potential "blacklist."

c) Form a group of responsible and qualified
Cuban exile businessmen to maintain pressure on firms
trading with Cuba by indicating that such firms will have
no future in a post-Castro Cuba.

4. To the extent possible, encourage dissidence
among different factions in Cuba - Peking, Moscow,
Nationalist -- by spreading rumors, internal and
external sabotage designed to accomplish this purpose
(such as actions against homes of leaders, etc).

Actions Against Cuban Subversion in Latin America

1. Develop a list of vulnerable Cuban agents in Latin
America against whom a concentrated program of bribery,
blackmail and coercion can be instituted.

2. Carefully select key Latin American members of
the Havana-Peking school and institute a program of kidnapping,
and personal and physical harassment, while attempting to
attribute these acts to rivals who support Moscow. Institute
the reverse process as a retaliatory program against Moscow
supporters.

Any of the foregoing activities would be conducted against
a background of U. S. propaganda (black, white and gray) and
political activity designed to increase internal dissension within
Cuba, to support economic isolation of Cuba, to avoid splitting
with our allies over the Cuban issue and to reduce, and perhaps
eliminate, Castro subversion of Latin America. In addition,
surveillance activities should be significantly stepped up.
14-00000
# MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Page 1, File

| Item # | Date of Meeting | Participants | Subjects Covered |
|---|---|---|---|
|  | Apr 6 | DCI, Fubini, Bross | Lunch--M/R to be prepared by Mr. Bross |
|  | Apr 7 | DCI, Sen. Brewster | Breakfast at Hqs. M/R to be prepared by Warner. |
|  | Apr 7 | DCI, Sen. Saltonstall Warner, Helms | M/R to be prepared by Warner. |
| -- | Apr 8 | DCI, (Gen. Dethleffsen C/Intel Directorate W. German Intel Ser Dr. Klaus Ritter, Gen. Quehlin, R. Jack Smith Bronson Tweedy | See TAPE #121 |
| 48 | Apr 8 | DCI, Harriman, Helms, G. Fields | M/R to be prepared by Glenn Field  DCI, Tshombe & Nyerere, Brazzaville; Zanzibar  |
|  | Apr 8 | DCI, Dr. John Foster | Met at the Residence-- |
|  | Apr 9 | DCI, Amb Jack Hood Vaughn, Rufus Z. Smith, Herbert & Cline | See TAPE # 122 |
|  | Apr 9 | DCI, Amb. Kohler | At the residence-- |
| -- | Apr 10 | DCI, Wm. Manchester Chretien,  | Met in DCI's ofc See TAPE #123 IST |
| 8 | Apr 14 | DCI, Augustine Edwards, FitzGerald, Herbert | See TAPE # 124 (Edwards is a newspaperman in Chile) |
| 48.5 | Apr 14 | DCI, Hadyn Williams, Russell Smith (Asia Found) Helms, Laphan, Ned Barnes | M/R to be prepared by Helms Barnes Destroyed and 1/28/72 |
| -- | Apr 15 | DCI, Secy Vance | Lunch/meeting with Vance See TAPE #125 |
| 48.6 | apr 16 | DCI, Cannon Comte Warner | Briefed Cannon Comte (M/R to be prepared by Warner  See Congress Ce |
| 49 | Apr 16 | DCI, Robt. Anderson | Met with Anderson in Bundy's ofc campaign funds Destroyed Beard 1-28-72 |
|  | Apr 16 | DCI, Ch Justice Warren, Sen Cooper Stern, Rankin, Willens | Met in DCI's office |
|  | Apr 18 | DCI, Sec Dec, Black, Dillon, Lindbergh, et al | re: SST (Accompanied by Alexander) (see separat SST file) |
| -- | Apr 21 | DCI, Ted Lewis, Ch, Wash Bureau, NY Daily News Chretien | M/R. to be prepared by Chretien See TAPE # |
|  | Apr 21 | DCI, Frank Wisner |  |
| -50- | Apr 22 | DCI, Pres, Rusk, McNamara Majority & Minority Ldrs | Breakfast Mtg at White House (See M/R #22 of Pres. File) |

9/mc

---

14-00000
1707
# MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Page 2, File #3

| Item # | Date of Meeting | Participants | Subjects Covered |
|---|---|---|---|
| 50 | 22 Apr | DCI, Pres, Rusk, McNamara, Majority & Minority Ldrs | Breakfast meeting at White House (See M/R #22 in President's File) |
| 51 | 22 Apr | DCI, Rusk | Destroyed In Beard 1-28-72 Cambodia-Laotian border, Italian SecGen of NATO, visit of Eshkol, Cyprus, Brazil, Barrington of Burm Italian takk deal, exchange of W and L. |
| 52 | 22 Apr | DCI, Eisenhower Destroyed Beard 1-28.72 | Organ, of Pres. office, Soviet Military & Economic strength, Sino-Soviet Dispute, SVN, Cyprus, Zanziba presidential elections (SEE SEPARATE FILE |
| 52.5 | 27 Apr | DCI, Gen. Pakravan (Iran), Conway, Critchfield | See TAPE #127 also M/R prepared by Critchfield. Destroyed Beard 1-28-72 |
|  | 28 Apr | DCI, David Wise & Tom Lambert of Herald Tribune & Paul Chretien | Luncheon meeting - M/R to be prepared by Chretien See TAPE #129 |
|  | 28 Apr | DCI, Dr. McMillan | See TAPE # 128 |
| 53 | 29 Apr | DCI, McNamara | Col. Walters, problems w/satellite reconnaissance, |
| 54 | 29 Apr | DCI, (Archduke Otto |  Bacan vien Angola, Mozambique |
|  | 30 Apr | DCI, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Wheelon | re: types of aircraft--M/R to be prepared by Wheelo |
| -- | 1 May | DCI, Gen. Dogu (Turkish Intel), Phil Dibble, Bill Doyle | See TAPE # 131 |
|  | 1 May | DCI, Mr. Bundy | Lunch at Bundy's ofc-- |
| 55 | 2 May | DCI, Secy McNamara Destroyed Beard 1-28-72 | SST, ECM equip. over Cuba, OXCART |
|  | 2 may |  | PFIAB Report ON NRO (see "WRO Package" IN WRO FI |
| 56 | 3 May | DCI, (Mrs. Fleur Cowles Montague-Meyer | Harold Wilson, Labor Gove, England and his relationship with the Soviet Union |
| -- | 4 May | DCI, Sir Kenneth Strong Alan Crick, Cline | See TAPE # 132 |
| 56.05 | 4 May | SecState, AG, Bundy A. Johnson | re. Angola and Mozambique M/R prepared by Glen Fields Destroyed Beard 1-28-72 |
| 57 | 5 May | DCI Memo Destroyed Beard 1-28-72 |
| 57.5 | 5 May 7-May | DCI, Meany, Meyer DCI, Lex-Pres Somoza Col King | Re: The Invisible Government, by Wise and Ross  Re: Cuba? See TAPE #134 |
| 6,8 58 | II May | DCI, Clyde Weed, Brinkerhof & parttime Helms, FitzGerald, Col King | re: Elections in Chile Also see TAPE #135 Beard Destroyed 1-28-72 |

--12/mc

---

14-00000

# MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Page 3, File #3

| Item # | Date of Meeting | Participants | Subjects Covered |
|---|---|---|---|
| -- | 13 May | DCI & Bundy | re: NRO report and NSAM on Communications |
| -- | 14 May | DCI, Rankin (No MR expected) | Warren Commission (accompanied by Mr. Helms) Helms saw Commission transcript & returned it to the Comm. |
| -- | 14 May | DCI, Bundy |  |
| 58.1 | 14 May | DCI, Scotty Reston Yerxa, Frankel, Szulc, Helms, Cline Chretien | Lunch at N. Y. Times ofc M/R to be prepared by Chretien- destroyed Beard 1-28-72 |
| -- | 15 May | DCI, Gov. Rockefeller Kent | Presidential candidate briefing - M/R to be prepare by Dr. Kent |
| 58.-3 | 15 May | DCI, David Wise, Tom Ross, Kirkpatrick Chretien | See TAPE #136  The Invisible Govt.  |
| 58.5 | 15 May | DCI, Hedley Donovan Chas Murphy, Tom Griffeth, John Steele, Geo. Hunt, Cline, Helms, Chretien, Elder | Working dinner at residence M/R to be prepare by Elder destroyed Beard 1-28-72 |
| 58,7 | 17 May | DCI, Rusk, McNamara Harriman, Wm Bundy McNaughton | Southeast Asia settled on cable for Lodge |
| 59 | 18 May | DCI, Rusk, McNamara Wm & Mac Bundy | Southeast Asia --Laos & SVN; US forces to Thailand; T-28's; military action against NVN; telecon to Amb Unger |
| 60 | 18 May | DCI, Wm. Hearst, Jr. Conniff, Considine, Kaplan, Warner, Chretien | Lunch--M/R to be prepared by Warner or Chretien Sov Policy & Mil posture; Sino-Sov Rift; Diem coup; SEA; Cuba; Bay of Pigs; Sov Economy; U-2 & All destroyed 1-28-72 |
|  | 18 May | DCI, Fubini | (Partially taped) TAPE #137 |
|  | 19 May | DCI, Sam Papich | SEE TAPE #138 |
| -- | 19 May | DCI, Russell Comte | M/R to be prepared by Warner  |
| 61 | 19 May | DCI, J. J. McCloy | Dinner at residence-re: Oswald Destroyed  Beard 1-28-72 |
| 21 May | DCI, Joe Alsop | Lunch at residence |
| 21 May | DCI, Gov. Scranton | Presidential Candidate Briefing |
| 62 | 25 May | DCI, Gen. Eisenhower | Briefed at Gettysburg Gettysburg destroyed |
|  | 27 May | DCI, Mike Forrestal | Lunch at residence |
|  | 28 May | DCI, Mr. Greenwood | Friend from Seattle, Wash. |
|  | 28 May | DCI, Dr. McMillan | See TAPE #159 |
| 63 | 25 May | DCI paper | Notes on draft memo of May 25th re: SVN Destroyed Beard 1-28-72 |
|  |  |  | CONTINUED IN FILE #4 |

---

14-00000

# MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

File #4
Page 1
1964+

| Item # | Date of Meeting | Participants | Subjects Covered |
|---|---|---|---|
| 64 | 1 Jun | DCI memo | 2 May Report of President's Board on NRO |
| 65 | 1 & 2 June | HONOLULU Mtgs | Oservations and Agreed Actions on SVN |
| -- | 3 June | DCI, Gov. Harriman | Lunch |
|  | 4 June | DCI, Gen. Meir Amit (Israel) Ephraim Levy, Helms, Angleton, Millett John Hadden | See TAPE #139  140 |
| 65.2 | 4 June | DCI, Colby | Mtg in Sit Room on Laos M/R tobe prepared by Colb |
| 65.5 | 5 June | DCI, Colby | White House Mtg on SEA (M/R prepared by Colby) |
|  | 5 June | DCI, For Min Quat (Vietnam) Colby, Paragellis | See TAPE # 149 |
| -- | 4 June | Rusk, McNamara, Bundy et al | Mtg at State Dept fr 8:30 to midnight? |
| 66 | 6 June | McGeorge Bundy | Problems re getting Joint Resolution to commit troops to Laos. Problems with Clifford Report recommendations. Provisions for CIA's re-entry in active role in SVN: |
| 66 | 6 June | Mike Forrestal |  |
|  | 9 June | Joseph Alsop | DCI request for research of SEATO Agreement. Dinner at Alsop's residence-- |
| 67 | 10 June | DCI, Colby | Mtg in Sit Mr re Laos & SVN (M/R to be prepared b Colby) |
| 68 | 11 June | DCI Memo | Thinking paper for internal mtg on Course of Action in Laos |
| 69 | 12 June | DCI, Mr & Mrs. Henry Luce | Memos used at lunch re: Cuban article in TIME NO DISTRIBUTION |
| 70 | 15 June | DCI, Colby, Cooper | ExCom Mtg on SEA M/R prepared, by colby |
|  | 15 June | DCI, W. W. Rostow | Lunch in SDR |
|  | 15 June | DCI, Amb. Bowles, James Grant, Dep' Asst Secy For NE; Meyer, Critchfield, Loch Phillips | See TAPE #142 |
|  | 16 June | DCI, Mahon Comte Houston | (See Congressional Comte file) |
| 70.5 | 17 June | DCI, John Steele, Ed Reingold, Richard Clurman, Chretien, Geo Daniels, Helms | Luncheon M/R to be prepared by Chretien (Background papers) Destoryed Beard 1-28-72 |
| 71 | 17 June | DCI, McNamara | at Pentagon--SEA; SST; NRO |
|  | 17 June | DCI, Peter Grace, Walter Donnelly, Col King, FitzGerald | at residence M/R to be prepared by FitzGerald |

---

14-00000

# MEMORANDUM FOR THE REC D

Page 2
1964

| Item # | Date of Meeting | Participants | Subjects Covered |
|---|---|---|---|
| -- | 18 June | DCI, House Armed Services subcomte | Briefed committee--see Congressional Comte File |
| -- | 19 June | DCI, Amb Blair et al | Luncheon-- |
| -- | 19 June | DCI, Dr. Fubini | See TAPE # 143 |
| 72 | 21 June | DCI, Secy Rusk | Cyprus; SEA; briefing Harold Wilson; Congo |
| -- | 22 June | DCI, Amb Gordon (Brazil) FitzGerald | See TAPE # 144 |
| 6,8 73 | 22 June | DCI, PM Inonu | Luncheon at White House--re: Dr. Z. Peykee, Professor of Medicine at Turkish University Destroyed Beard 1-28-72 |
| -- | 23 June | DCI, Adrian Fisher, Dr. Scoville | See TAPE # 145 29 |
| 73.5 | 23 June | DCI, Drew Pearson, Kent, R. J. Smith | M/R to be prepared by Smith. Adds little to what has already been said in his colum |
| 74 | 24 June | DCI M/R | Discussions re Joint Resolution by Congress in Connection with SEA |
| 74.5 | 25 June 1 | DCI, Dr. Land Panel | Mtg in Conf Rm--M/R to be prepared by Wheelon re: FULCRUM Also see TAPE #146 |
| 75 | 25 June | DCI Memo | Re memo of 19 June to Sec Def proposing changes in wording of Presidential Directive as proposed by PFIAB on NRO |
| 76 | 26 June | DCI Memo McMillan, Fubini Wheelon, Maxie | Talking paper for Meeting w/Fubini, McMillan, re: FULCRUM project incorporation into NRP Also see TAPE # 147 also MIR by Wheelon att |
| 77 | 26 June | DCI, Gen. Kuehlin, Eric Eisenstadt | to say good by to Gen. Kuehlin. M/R to be prepared by Eisenstadt (discussed Soviet agriculture) |
| 78 | 28 June | DCI, Secy Rusk | Laos, communication fr (Pres Segni: Sihanouk contact in Paris |
| 79 | 29 June | DCI, Sulzberger, Sr. Arthur Sulzberger, C. L. Sulzberger, et al | Lunch in N. Y.-- CIA publicity, The Invisible Govt. estimates, Bay of Pigs situation, coordination 5412 Committee, SVN/Laos |
| 80 | 29 June | DCI, Secy McNamara Secy Vance | NRO |
| 80.1 | 7 July | DCI, DDCI, Bross, Clark, Kirkpatrick, Wheelon | Heads of Agency Budget Preview--M/R to be prepare by Clark -Third Party COMINT, Missile & Space Indeed Tech Research, CIA commo support to NCS |
| 80.2 | 8 July | DCI, Robert Kleiman of TIME, R. Jack Smith | Lunch--M/R to be prepared by R. Jack Smith |
| -- | 8 July | DCI, Mr. Wm. Webster | Mtg in East-- |
| 80.3 | 8 July | DCI, Marengo, Foster McNamara | Informal session of the Principals--nuclear vehicle freeze verification |
|  |  |  | CONTINUED IN FILE #5 |
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

26 March 1963

ADDITIONAL NOTE IN MY MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT:

The President and I engaged in a brief discussion of the Soviet plans with respect to Cuba. He indicated that he once felt that the Soviets would withdraw all of their forces from Cuba, but that he had now reached the conclusion that the plan had changed. Bundy volunteered that they at no time had said specifically that they were to withdraw all of their forces, in fact their particular wording was somewhat vague. McCone stated that indicatorg were conflicting. On the one hand, certain information such as the recent Brazilian intercept and report of Castro's own statements would lead one to the conclusion that a gradual and continuing withdrawal would take place; that the Cubans were trained and became proficient in operating advanced sophisticated Soviet equipment, This would take many months, probably the balance of the year and Castro welcomed this period of time because it would mean a continuing Soviet interest in Cuba. On the other hand, DCI pointed out that building of permanent installations and the arrival of undisclosed but apparently sophisticated equipment, although in small quantities, nevertheless important volume would indicate a conclusion that Soviets were there to stay, but perhaps on a somewhat reduced scale.

JAM/ji (taped)

SECRET

The President then suggested a meeting be held this afternoon to determine a number of matters.

1. We should establish what our contacts are with the groups so that we can guide them effectively, whether we can stand down the operations.

2. A policy statement which State is undertaking.

3. The question of prosecution which the AG would undertake.

4. Discussing with UK since there is evidence that much of this originated in the Bahamas.

5. The question of any informal discussion with the Soviet Union.

At the meeting attended by AG, McNamara, McCone, Cottrell, Douglas Dillon, it was decided to send a group to Miami this afternoon for discussion with the Miami representatives of the FBI and CIA, Immigratio officials, Coast Guard, etc. Principal purposes would be to:

1. Find out all we know about the groups, who they are, where they are, and what can be done about them.

2. Lateral transfer of information between CIA and FBI Miami. Apparently there is not sufficient exchange between CIA and FBI in Miami.

3. Ways and means of using Customs and Coast Guard for some of this.

4. Warning the unauthorized groups in advance of actions we intend to take against them. Also warning the suppliers of explosives; arms, etc.

5. FCC shut down illicit radio stations, provide a truck equipped with DF-equipment to locate the stations.

6. Explore what could be done to influence the groups away from Soviet targets. In this connection, the AG favored a complete standdown before any attempt was made to guide the groups.

7. Alexis Johnson expressed greatest concern over the plane matter and asked that the group take immediate action to immobilize the plane.

Excerpt from President's Press Conference -- April 3

THE PRESIDENT: As you know, our best information is that they did not come from the United States. We have already indicated that we do not feel that these kind of raids serve a useful purpose. It seems to me in some ways they strengthen the Russian position in Cuba and the Communist control of Cuba and justify repressive measures within Cuba which might otherwise not be regarded as essential. So that we have not supported this and these men do not have a connection with the United States Government. I think a raid which goes in and out does indicate the frustrations of Cuban exiles who want to get back home and who want to strike some blow, but I don't think that it increases the chances of freeing Cuba.

CONFIDENTIAL Attachment
John A. Mc Core

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

March 26, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL MEMBERS OF THE RIC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE:

Draft letter to the President from the Secretary regarding the probles presented by Cuban refugee groupe

The President has called an HSC Executive Committee Meeting for Friday, March 29 at 12:30 p.m. to discuss the probles posed by Cuban refugee groups.

The Secretary has asked me to make available to you the attached proposed letter from his to the President which will serve as a basis for discussion at tomorrow's meeting. The letter has not yet been signed by the Secretary but presumably vill go to the President in its present fors. If any substantive changes are made at the time of signature I shall so infors you.

Attachment:
As stated.

CONFIDENTIAL

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
Washington

DRAFT LETTER
TO BE USED AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AT THE NSC EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE MEETING FRIDAY, MARCH 29 at 12:30 p.m.

Dear Mr. President:

I am concerned that hit and run raids by Cuban exiles may create incidents which work to the disadvantage of our national interest. Increased frequency of these forays could raise a host of problems over which we would not have control.

Actions such as yesterday's exile attack which caused substantial damage to a Soviet vesse may complicate our relations with the USSR without net advantage to us.

I therefore propose several measures which could impede or deter further attacks of this nature.

First, the intelligence community could increase its efforts in Miami to develop hard information about projected raids. This is currently communicated to Customs authorities charged with investigation of violation of arms control.

Second, Customs and the Coast Guard, on the basis of this information can ston and search the vessels. (They now do this, and picked un about 50 men and four boats last year.) Arms and vessels are confiscated, and participants arraigned if a violation of aw has

The President,
The White House.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

occurred. Bail is set in accordance with the severity of the violation. An increase of one or more vessels to facilitate current customs and Coast Guard operations in the Miami area would be helpful.

Third, CIA, FBI and Customs officials in Miami could quietly inform suspects in the exile community that the United States intends to intensify enforcement of violations of pertinent laws relating to exile raids.

Fourth, the FCC could locate and close down illegal radio transmitters operating out of the Miami area in connection with these raids.

Fifth, we can inform the British Government of our plans to try to control these activities and express our understanding that the British Government has become increasingly concerned about the possibility that British territory in the Bahamas may be used for these raids and may be considering action to police these areas more effective¹y.

These measures have not been discussed with any of the senior officials of the Departments concerned, but if any of the measures commend themselves to you, I suggest that a meeting of the interested Departments be called to discuss the problem.

Faithfully yours,
Dean Rusk

CONFIDENTIAL
March 28, 1963

MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Unauthorized Cuban Raids

29 March 1963

1. Organizations such as the Second Front of Escambrey, Alpha 66, and Lamba 66 are well-known in the Cuban colony in Florida and Puerto Rico. Their plans are discussed openly, are picked up by CIA and reported almost daily in our CIA bulletins.

2. There is no doubt that the individuals are in and out of Florida and Puerto Rico. The boats, outboard motors, guns, ammunition and explosives originate in the United States from legally licensed or unlicensed sources (of which there are many). We believe that the operations are staged out of the Bahamas and other non-U.S. areas.

3. The operations are skillfully executed by men of obvious courage and dedication. Apparently the organizations are building up and we can expect more rather than fewer instances in the future.

4. Obviously raids of this type will exascerbate problems with Castro and more particularly the Soviet Union and, from that standpoint, are desirable. However, successful harrassment will create very considerable annoyance, will stimulate internal dissension, will complicate Castro's problems and will have very considerable effect in discrediting Castroism in Latin America. Inability of Castro to deal with these raids might cause the Soviets to question the strength of his position and therefore reappraise their own position in Cuba. It is impossible to predict the result of such reappraisal. On the one hand it might cause them to question their presence in Cuba; on the other to reinforce it; and finally, might cause them to open up a discussion of their presence with the United States.

5. Finally, although it is outside of the competence of the Intelligence Community, it is my personal view that a concerted and publicized effort to "stand down" these operations would probably draw more public and press criticism in the United States than would result from tolerating these acts while officially disassociating the government from them through denial of both responsibility and control.

JOHN A. McCONE
Director

SECRET
29 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Executive Committee Meeting - 12:30 p.m. 29 March 1963
IN ATTENDANCE: All present, plus Cottrell, Kaysen, Dungan and others

The President raised the question of what should be our policy on hit-and-run raids and asked my views. I reported my views as per the attached memorandum of 29 March. Secretary Rusk stated that the United States would be blamed for unauthorized raids, the Soviets would expect that we could stop them and they would immediately take counter actions such as escorting ships, etc. On a minimum, we should act to disassociate ourselves and do all possible not to permit the continuance of unauthorized raids.

Dillon stated that we could not stop them because of the number of ports, small ships, inadequate coast guard facilities, etc. McNamara countered by saying that we could stop them by utilizing military resources. As a second alternative he suggested we might explore modifying our course of action and finally, should disassociate ourselves from responsibility. The Attorney General outlined various steps that could be taken to identify the leadership of the various groups and to either prosecute them or exclude them from the country through immigration procedures. Thompson and Harriman expressed particular concern over the reported airplane that was ready to bomb Soviet ship. Practically all in attendance thought that we should try and guide the operation away from attacks on Soviet ships because of obvious reaction of the Soviets. The Vice President felt that we would be criticized either from letting them go on the one hand, or stopping them on the other. He felt the military should immediately study that which should be done to stop them and all actions should be taken to halt the unauthorized raids.

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Notes on Remarks by President Kennedy before the National Security Council
Tuesday, January 22, 1963

I will start by reviewing areas of policy which will be before us
in the coming months and indicate the general attitude which I have toward
them and to emphasize where we might put our emphasis in the next few months.

The responsibilities of the United States are worldwide and the U.S.
is the only country which is recognizing its wide responsibilities. We are
part of NATO, SEATO, etc. and support other pacts even though we are not
a part of them. Other nations are not doing their share.

Would like to say a word first about Cuba.

The indications are that the importance of timing is of paramount
importance in reaching judgments -- both by the USSR and the US. Our big
problem is to protect our interests and prevent a nuclear war. It was a
very close thing whether we would engage in a quarantine or an air strike.
In looking back, it was realy that it presented us with an immediate crises
and the USSR had to make their judgment and come to a decision to act in
twelve hours. In looking back over that four or five day period, we all
changed our views somewhat, or at least appreciated the advantages and
disadvantages of alternate cources of action.

That is what we should do
in any other struggle with the Soviet Union
and I believe we will be
in one in the future. We should have sufficient time to consider the
alternatives.

You could see that the Russians had a good deal of debate
in a 48 hour period. If they had only to act in an hour or two, their
actions would have been spasmodic and might have resulted in nuclear war.
It is important that we have time to study their reaction. We should
continue our policy even though we do not get Europe to go along with us.

TOP SECRET
2.

The time will probably come when we will have to act again on Cuba.
Cuba might be our response in some future situation - the same way the
Russians have used Berlin. We may decide that Cuba might be a more
satisfactory response than a nuclear response. We must be ready -- although
this might not come. We should be prepared to move on Cuba if it should
be in our national interest. The planning by the US, by the Military,
in the direction of our effort should be advanced always keeping Cuba
in mind in the coming months and to be ready to move with all possible
speed. We can use Cuba to limit their actions just as they have had
Berlin to limit our actions.

In thematter of Europe, the US has been faced since 1958 with deGaulle's
position.
.... nuclear veto by French President Eisenhower
reviewed the problem and took the position that it should be reviewed by
the NATO nations the NATO nations would not act. ... no agreement
between the Three. That decision this Administration also supported.
However, this decision has not produced the present contention with the
French. Even when I was in Paris last June, de Gaulle said he would
make some proposal in regard to NATO itself. All through his speeches
and his memoirs he indicates it is his desire to have a Europe in which
France would be a dominant power speaking to the USSR and to the Western
World as an equal. If we had given him atomic weapons he would be difficult
to deal with.
De Gaulle did not question our support of Western Europe because we
have maintained strong representation there, but the French have not.
They have not been aggressive as we have been and, therefore it is not a
distrust of us that we will desert Europe but it is that he feels that France
shou'd assert a position as a strong France and cease its growing reliance
on the U.S.

TOP SECRET
3.

Having made such proposals to the US and Great Britain and been
turned down, he has made the same turn to Germany. This is not so bad
as it has prevented Germany moving to the East. And, historically,
Germany's trade has been to the East. There is not much harm to us
in this position. With Great Britain joining the Common Market, this
would strengthen Europe but France will not let them in at this time.
If G.B. does go in, it will cost us a good deal in trade, but it will
be good for the stability of Europe. France keeping Britain out is a
setback for us, but a more severe setback for G.B. They are going to
have a difficult time in Europe. It is our interest to strengthen Europe
and the unilateral concept, and deGaulle is opposed to this. By
strengthening the multilateral concept, it strengthens NATO and increases
their dependence on us. This strengthens our invluence in Europe and
gives us the power to guide Europe and keep it strong. The events of the
past two weeks makes it important for us to support the multilateral
concept and that is why deGaulle is more opposed to it. It will be
difficult to work this out, but it is important that we do so. But
we should not be wholly distressed.
(After all we have done for France in so many ways, deGaulle has opposed
us in many places throughout the world - in NATO, in the Congo and other
places
but he is there and we have to live with it. One way we can do
so is to strengthen the mutilateral force and NATO.

Our negotiators on trade matters will have to be very careful to protect
our interests. Our trade balance is of great concern and is not under control.

If we get down to the $12 billion coverage of our national reserve we will
be in trouble. We will have pressure on the dollar and pressure from the
Congress and they will begin to follow a much narrower policy. We will

TOP SECRET
4.

We will be very tough about the actions that Europe takes. We maintain
large forces in West Germany. If West Germany does not maintain sufficient
forces but instead concentrats on agricultural production for instance to
our detriment, we must take a strong position. At present we are paying
helf of Norway's air and sea power for instance and supporting NATO, and
they are "living off the fat of the land" while we are paying for their
protection. In the coming months we must concentrate on howwe can
protect the interests of the United States. We have pursued a very generous
policy. We have lost our economic power over these countries. Now we
are running out and if the French and others get atomic capacity they
will be independent and we will be on the outside looking in. Do not
think that the Europeans will do anything for us even though we have done
a lot for them. So we must have all our representatives looking out
very strongly for the U.S. interests.. We must be sure our economic house
is in order and use our military, policital power to protect our own interests.
Regarding our attitude toward the neutrals. [There is criticism about
our lack of difference between the Allies and the neutrals. the Pakistanis
are critical, but we must recognize the importance of the Indians. If
they joined the Chinese we would have no free south Asia. The Pakistannis
are struggling against the Indians and the Afganistans. They will use or
attempt to exploit our power. Our interest is to make a strong sub-continent.
We will use the country that can help further that aim. We have used India
lately. We do not like their present leadership, but we can use them. While
doing this we have moved away from the Pakistannis and they are moving closer
to the Chinese and against the Indians. We have not been able to persuade

TOP SECRET
the Pakistannis or the Afganistans to chance thir policy on India.
These forces were there long before we came on the scene and we cannot
do much about it -- we cannot settle all the disputes, but we want to
keep them free from the Communists. We cannot permit those who call
themselves neutrals to be completely taken into the Communist camp.
We must keep our ties with Nassir and others, even though we do not
like the leaders themselves.
With regard to AID which is going forward under General Clay, we
hope we can tie this whole concept of aid to the safety of the United
States. This is the reason we give aid. The test is whether it will
serve the United States and if we can equate it to that. AID is not
a good word. Perhaps we can describe it better as Mutual Assistance
though this is an old term. Some countries can go it alone, but we
must do all we can. We must make every effort to keep a country out
of the communist bloc. It is more difficult to get a country out of a
communist bloc once it is in. It sometimes seems hopeless. The Congress
may cut the heart out of Foreign Aid and this is a great danger to the
safety of the United States. Even the French give more aid than we do
on a per capita basis. We will probably take a cut, but we do not want
to hurt our Defense effort. We would not like four or five countries to
suddenly turn communist just because we did not give a certain amount of
aid. We must look this over very carefully and put aid on the basis it
will best serve our own interest.

TOP SECRET
6.
Turning to the domestic scene, [we We
we will have a deficit of a bout $12
of $12 billion. We have made an effort to hold the deficit down and
we have in the past three years. Except for Defense and Space and
Interest on the Debt we have mox increased the National Budget but it
has been increased less than it was under the previous Administration.
With the tremendous movement from the country to the cities, we have had
many problems. While the costs have increased, the receipts have dropped.
We have only increased about 1% a year in the growth rate during the past
ten years. This is serious, particularly with the great increase in pop-
ulation.
I think this Tax Bill is very important. If we get another recession
in this country it will saxhdxfim have a bad effect on the gold reserve.
It will have a bad psycological effect on the people of the U.S. And when
we see the strong position that Mr. Khruschev is taking with regard to
agricultural and other domestic sections of the economy -- and if we just
drift, we will look very bad to other nations nations
Furthermore, the deficit is a reflection of the fight in the hot and
cold war we have been fighting during the past fifteen years. If we
go to a deficit of $12 billion, this would be a most serious affair for
the United States. If we can go forward with the present Tax Bill, we
will be in much better shape. All of these matters
the tax program,
AID, defense, etc. are all related.

The Military are disturbed because of our failure to go forward with
certain programs. For instance: The B-70, Nike-Zeus, Skybolt. As a
matter of fact, we are going forward with a large program and there is a
limit to how much we can do, and if the necessity develops we will do more

TOP SECRET
7.

This Administration has spent a good many millions more than has been
appropriated for Srace and Defense
and perhaps we should spend more.

(One of our big jobs will be to persuade Jour colleagues in Europe to
(to do a better job themselves. If we maintain six divisions in Europe
and they only maintain a force which will permit them to fight only two
or three days if we have sufficient force to fight and supply for
ninety days and those around us can only fight for two or three days,
then we should take another look. France carries their burden abroad,
but not in Europe. We should consider very hard the narrow interests of
the United States as well as the interests of the Free World. If we
grown weak economically, our influence will grown less and less and if
that happens, our Free World's position will grown weaker. De Gaulle
is basing his whole position on the position of the United States. He
can do this because he feels we will maintain our military power in Europe:
and he can bank on it.

Mr. Foster is engaged in the Test Ban. We might be successful here
if the Russians need it and if they know that we will change this if the
Chicoms develop an atomic capacity. If they do we will have great difficulty
in protecting Asia. If the Test Ban Treaty is successful it will inhibit
the Russians from starting a nuclear war and if so we should make every
effort to conclude the treaty. But if the nuclear test ban includes only
the Russians and the U.S. it is not worth very much.. We should support
Foster all we can until we see where it is going. If we get a successful
treaty, we will fight it through if it will help us.
(On the Hill ?)

Thanks for your cooperation. All worked well together and harmoniously.
Hope we can maintain the mutual relations which have been so good in this
Administration.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
SUBJECT: Meeting on the Multi-lateral Forces 5:30 p.m.,
22 March, 1963
ATTENDANCE: The President, Secretaries McNamara, Gilpatric,
Rusk, Ball, General Taylor, Ambassador Merchant,
Mr. McCone, Mr. Kaysen and several others
The purpose of the meeting was to receive Ambassador
Merchant's report on his visits to the Capitals. Merchant reported
qualified success, indicating reservations by the German,
Italians and British for various reasons, the two most prominent
ones being:
a. Problem of control;
b. Use of surface ships versus submarines.
A long discussion ensued in which it was evident that there
was no clear-cut decision on the part of those in attendance as to the
extent of the control of the United States versus control by
European countries since it seemed to mean that control should
shape up so that missiles could not be fired without United States
clearance; on the other hand the United States should not be able
to unilaterally decide to fire the missiles. However, no
country or group of countries exclusive of the United States
should be likewise able to fire them.

There was a difference of opinion between State and Merchant
on the one hand, and of the President on the other, as to whether
Merchant's discussions should be reviewed with the Foreign
Relations, Foreign Affairs, and Joint Committees at this time.
The President was insistent that no approach be made to Congress
at this time. Merchant dissented from this viewpoint but agreed
to the President's directive.

It was felt that the final expression of viewpoints should be
sought from the Germans and the Italians, and it was agreed to
draft a letter to Adenauer seeking an expression from him, with a
similar letter to the Italians, though it was thought that no opinion
should be sought from the Italians because of the impending election.

SECRET LIES UNLY

With respect to submarine versus surface ships,
McNamara restated the opinion that surface ships were better
and were quite invulnerable because they would operate in
coastal waters where several thousand ships of all types would
be operating and therefore the missile ships could not be readily
identified and attacked.

The President seemed to feel that the multi-lateral
forces idea was not going to go any place; as he wound up, he
seemed to be thinking more of how the idea could be put to bed without
its failure being used against the United States or his administration
to the advantage of de Gaulle and others who held stricly to the
"European control" idea.

No action was required on our part. I expressed no
viewpoint at this meeting..

JAM/mfb
JOHN A. MCCONE
Director
14-00000
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

19 December 1963

IA
Noted by Del.
Welder
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President on Cuba at 1100 on
19 December 1963

1. Included in the meeting were Acting Secretary of State
Ball, Acting Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, Secretary Cyrus
Vance, Secretary Douglas Dillon, Ambassador Thompson,
General Wheeler, Mr. Donald Wilson, Mr. McGeorge Bundy,
Mr. Bromley Smith, Mr. Edwin Martin, Mr. Ted Sorensen,
Mr. John Crimins, Mr. Gordon Chase, Mr. George Ready,
Mr. Bill Moyers, General Carter, Mr. Helms, and Mr. Fitz-
Gerald.

2. The President, after full discussion, postponed any
sizable operations by FitzGerald, primarily to avoid any possible
embarrassment to our OAS negotiations on the Venezuelan arms
cache. We are authorized to continue to put forward proposals
for operations and also to continue preparations for air ops. The
main thrust was to greatly increase political action with Canada,
Britain, Spain, Italy, and others in an effort to promote greater
economic blockade.

3. Mr. Bundy later stated that his analysis of the meeting
was that the President would continue to approve smaller
FitzGerald-type operations even though they would be relatively
unrewarding if they would assist in keeping up the morale of the
troops on shore, of our agents, and otherwise help in keeping the
ball rolling.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

29/23/98
14-00000

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting at the White House 19 December 1963

PRESENT: The President

The State Department: Under Secretary George W.
Ball, Deputy Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson,
Ambassador at Large Llewellyn Thompson,
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American
Affairs Edwin Martin, Coordinator of Cuban
Affairs John H. Crimmins.

The Defense Department: Deputy Secretary Roswell
Gilpatric, Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance.

Joint Chiefs of Staff: General Wheeler.

USIA: Deputy Director Donald M. Wilson.

The Treasury Department: Secretary Douglas Dillon.

The White House Staff: Executive Assistant to the
President McGeorge Bundy, Messrs. George Reedy
and Williams Moyers.and Gordon Chase.

CIA: General Marshall S. Carter, Messrs. Richard
Helms and Desmond FitzGerald.

1. The President arrived at the meeting approximately
five minutes early -- prior to the arrival of several
members of the group including Mr. Bundy. Without a formal
introduction I commenced the scheduled briefing on the Agency
Cuban program at the urging of the President and despite the
activities of the Presidential photographer.

2. The President appeared interested in the number of
agents inside Cuba but made no particular comment concerning
the program until the subject of economic denial was intro-
duced. He asked to be told what additional measures could
be taken to step up the denial program. I said that the
14-00000

2

principal soft spots among free world countries appeared
at the present time to be Canada, the U.K. and Spain. The
President requested a memorandum setting forth specifics
concerning leaks of economically strategic items from these
three countries together with recommendations as to what
could be done to stop these leaks. He requested Under
Secretary Ball to prepare to make demarches to the govern-
ments of these three countries as well as any others
engaged in the Cuba trade contrary to our interests. He
appeared particularly interested in the subject of econo-
mic denial and returned to it several times.

3. After hearing a brief description of our progress
in connection with promoting disaffection among the Cuban
military, the President said that it did not seem to him
that we had gone very far along this line and that one
day those concerned in Cuba matters, including himself,
would have to face the "grand jury" (of domestic public
opinion) to account for our progress in our attempts to
find a solution to the Cuban situation. I pointed out
that the program being presented was, with the exception
of the economic denial item, entirely a covert program and,
if run at full capacity, would tax the capabilities of the
clandestine services -- in other words, that if new and
broader measures against Cuba were to be undertaken, they
would have to be within the overt field.

4. After a brief description of the sabotage and
harassment program the subject of the proposed Matanzas
raid was discussed. After hearing the pros and cons the
President stated that he did not feel that the present time
was a good one to conduct an operation of this magnitude
which carried a less than 50 percent chance of success. He
said that he felt that such an operation, if pinned directly
on the U.S., might cause the Soviets to move in the wrong
direction with respect to Cuba, i. e, increase their econo-
mic aid or their military presence. Recognizing that a
cessation of raids would have a bad morale effect within
Cuba, he agreed that low risk operations, with admittedly
lower economic and psychological impact, should be con-
ducted. He further stated that planning for such opera-
tions as Matanzas should be continued. General Wheeler
raised the possibility of air strikes against major targets
by autonomous groups. This was discussed and it was agreed
that in view of the fact that preparations would take at
least three months, these preparations should proceed and
the question re-examined at the time that capabilities have
been perfected.
14-00000

3

5. On the question of autonomous groups the President
asked the cost of these operations (five million dollars).
He also asked the cost of Cuban operations for the current
year (21 or 2 million dollars) and the total Agency budget.

6. The intelligence summary concerning Cuba prepared
by General Carter for the meeting was examined.

7. Mr. Bundy then reviewed current U.S. policy vis-a-vis
Cuba. He then went down a check list of possible new courses
of action taken from the Department of State paper prepared
for the December 13 Standing Group meeting. Unilateral
actions presented were:

(1) Air attacks by our autonomous groups. No
further discussion.

(2) Selective relaxation of U.S. controls against
exile groups in Florida. No comment on
Mr. Bundy's generally unfavorable presentation.

(3) Military feints. No comment on generally
unfavorable presentation.

(4) Low-level reconnaissance flights. Comment by
Assistant Secretary Martin concerning the
value of keeping open the franchise for low-
level flights. Acknowledgement of certain
value to the intelligence community. No
decision requested.

(5) Extension of efforts to eliminate free world
shipping from the Cuba trade. No decision
requested.

(6) Presidential declaration concerning U.S.
policy on Cuba designed to stimulate anti-
Castro dissidence in the armed forces.
Mr. Bundy's comments indicated that there
was room for a stronger statement than that
made by President Kennedy in Miami.

(7) Talks with the Soviets and the Cubans. Not
elaborated and no comment.

(8) Other forms of covert actions. Not specified
or elaborated.
14-00000

4

8. In connection with bilateral and multilateral
actions involving the cooperation of the OAS and nations
of the Caribbean, Mr. Bundy stated that the nature and
import of the recently discovered arms cache in Venezuela
constitutes a point of departure for such actions as search
and seizure on the high seas or an OAS-sponsored quarantine
against arms shipments. Mr. Helms then briefly described
the nature of the arms cache and the plans involving those
arms as set forth in captured Venezuelan communist documents.
Mr. Helms showed a map prepared from those documents indi-
cating the manner in which the arms would have been used
to tie up the city of Caracas during the recent election.
Mr. Martin then briefed concerning OAS action with regard
to the arms cache. He said that the committee appointed
by the OAS to investigate had called for additional
evidence from the Venezuelan government which would take
two to three weeks to assemble. He said that he felt that
the OAS report would be out in mid-January although the
question of Cuban defense against the Venezuelan charges
had not yet been resolved. Mr. Bundy referred to the
efforts being made to increase the effectiveness of sur-
veillance of arms smugglers in Central America and referred
to the possibility of an OAS-sponsored search and seizure
on the high seas.

9. Under Secretary Ball stated that the Department of
Justice has warned that a number of students, some of more
respectable stripe than the last group which visited Cuba,
were planning to try to visit Cuba during the Christmas
vacation and that there is evidence of larger numbers
planning to do the same thing during the summer. He said
that the Attorney General was bothered by this and had
suggested the relaxation of present rules concerning travel
to Cuba. Mr. Ball said that the Department of State is
tentatively opposed to such relaxation particularly because
of its effect on Latin American countries. The President
strongly concurred with the Department of State position.
He said that he did not propose to change or relax present
regulations.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Special Affairs Staff
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13 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Discussion with the President, 13 December 9:30 a. m.

F6
1. Introduced General Carter but was unable to explain his
responsibilities.

2. Introduced Peer de Silva. The President spoke briefly of
what he expects of the Station and the representatives of the Government
in the Saigon community.

3. Reviewed the Checklist. I emphasized (a) the dangers of the
hostages in Bolivia, stating however that while 21 lives are extremely
important, nevertheless, we must avoid a policy decision the conse-
quence of which might mean the lives of an undertermined thousands
of people in the future. In fact I was saying we must not give the
Communists the upper hand in this argument. I explained the critical
location of the prisoners, and (b) I called the President's attention to
the international oil situation and the deadlock between OPEC and the
international oil companies and the opening that this is affording the
Italians and possibly the French.

4. Noted Item C in the notes, stating we felt, from sensitive
sources, Spinelli's observation was incorrect but there was a possibility
of a sufficient withdrawal by the Egyptians to make a favorable demon-
stration of intentions by which we could persuade Fiasal to withhold
military aid to the Royalists for an extended period of several months.

NOTE: Carter and de Silva left the room at this time.

5.I told the President that subject to Rusk's approval, I intended
to issue a series of articles on the weakness of the Soviet economy,
drainage on their gold supply, over-commitments on foreign aid, etc.
for the political figures who are wavering between leaning on the
14-00000

Soviets or the West, such as Sukarno and certain South American
Countries, so that they will understand they are not leaning on very
much when they lean on the Soviets.

6. Explained that I had given a complete briefing to General
Eisenhower and conveyed to the President General Eisenhower's
expression of friendship and support.

7. Discussed briefly my talk with Robert Kennedy and urged
the President to send a message to Kennedy but not to see him until
after the first of the year. I asked for the President's approval to
invite Kennedy to accompany me to Saigon.

NOTE: This invitation has been extended but Kennedy
felt it was untimely because of personal family commitments,
responsibilities to Jackie, concern on the part of his wife,
Mrs. Kennedy, and for other reasons.

8. Mr. Bundy joined in part of these discussions. The President
asked what the Attorney General intended to do, that is, stay on or leave.
I told the President the Attorney General intended to stay on as Attorney
General, but it was not clear to what extent the President wished him to
become involved in the activities outside the area of the Office of the
Attorney General, such as, intelligence work, NSC problems, counter
insurgency matters, etc. I explained to the President that I had told
Bobby he could not bring back the intimacy of relationship with the
President which he had had with his brother because that was a blood
relationship, not an official relationship. A type of relationship which
is seldom found between brothers and never found between officials,
either in business or government.

9. I gave the President a copy of the memorandum on Soviet
Foreign Aid.

JAM:mcm
Утс
14-00000

6 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Meeting with The President 9:45 6 December 1963

The first part of the meeting involved a discussion with Rusk,
McNamara, Rostow, William Bundy and McGeorge Bundy concerning
the procedures on MLF.

Rusk requested, and received, approval to brief General
Eisenhower and will arrange to have Amb. Merchant, Admiral Ricketts
and General Goodpastor present at the briefing. Rusk reported that a
group of "young Republicans" opposed the MLF.

Rusk also received approval to brief certain Congressional
leaders in small groups, but to intimate that no government, including
the United States Government, is committed to the MLF program.

Rusk gave an optimistic report on progress and stated the
most important objectives of the MLF was to give the Germans a sense
of participation in nuclear weapons planning and operations under a
scheme providing adequate control by other Allied nations, including
the United States

(McNamara stated that Mr. von Hassel had advised him that the
MLF was a "must" or else the Germans would undoubtedly pursue an
independent course in developing their own national nuclear weapons
resources. Rusk indicated that failure to proceed with the MLF might
force a German-French arrangement on nuclear weapons. McNamara
stated there was no military requirement for the MLF but the force
will have a military (?) utility and will permit a reduction in
planned United States national capabilities and hence the cost, which is
considerable, is not really an additional U.S. military cost.

The President then suggested a briefing of Congressional
leaders, both Democratic and Republican, Senate and House, substantially
along the lines of the NSC briefing of yesterday afternoon. I brought up
the question of security and pointed out the dangers. The President
asked that I develop a 10 or 15 minute briefing on Soviet strategic
capabilities, Soviet defense and Soviet economy, going just as far as I
possibly could without endangering sources and methods.

ACTION: Discuss with Cline, et al.
14-00000

The meeting then continued with the President, McGeorge
Bundy and McCone. I discussed the foreign aid figures as included
in the 6 December memorandum and the special report on Soviet
Foreign Economics Programs of 25 October, and stated that I
would prepare for the President some special graphics which would
show Soviet foreign, economic and military aid, both extensions and
draw-downs, to non-Communist countries and Cuba.

NOTE: Mr. Rostow raised the question earlier
as to the validity of comparing our aid figures with
USSR's aid figures because the latter did not include
aid to satellites. His position is that since we include
aid to NATO countries, particularly Turkey, Greece,
South Korea, etc., we should examine USSR aid to their
satellites in addition to Cuba. This should be examined.
I do not know whether the figures are available.

The President reviewed the Checklist and I made the following
comments:

1. I expect the USSR to expand the test ban agreement to cover
underground tests and it was quite possible they would soon make claims
for vast improvements in seismology. I mentioned the recent informa-
tion on the LASER beam.

2. I pointed out the seriousness of the Cambodian situation
stating the fact that the Khmer Serei clandestine radio had been located
in Southeast Thailand and that my information was that the Thais were
not inclined to put it out of business because the Cambodians were
broadcasting unfavorably against them.

3. noted the additional indicators of possible conflict over
Malaysia.

I then explained to the President the source of our information
that the Soviet Intelligence Service, on orders from Moscow, was
attempting to stimulate communications from India to him, Chief Justice
Warren and the Attorney General, urging a full probe into the
assassination of the President. I stated that this report comes from a
very reliable penetration and we evaluate it quite highly.

We then discussed the assignment of Peer de Silva to Saigon.
I stated that the staff had made such recommendation to me, but that
I felt it was only a good move if he was to remove Ambassador Lodge.
He felt that to do this would have political repercussions and would be
Mc
14-00000

tantamount to a vote of no confidence in the military junta, that it
would indicate President Johnson's support of Diem rather than the
present authorities. Therefore he stated he could not move to remove
Lodge but hoped that Lodge would remove himself and become a
candidate for the Republican nomination for the Presidency and would
be the nominee. (Note: I told the President he wanted things too
easy). I told the President that Lodge would destroy de Silva if he
opposed his assignment or did not like him, or wished to get rid of him.
The President said he would communicate most emphatically with
Lodge in this regard and asked Bundy to write an appropriate communi-.
cation. I told the President this would do no good, that Lodge was
absolutely unconscionable in matters of this kind and he had resorted
to trickery time and time again during the Eisenhower administration
and that he never failed to use the newspapers in order to expose an
individual or block an action. I therefore could only conclude that if he
was going to keep Lodge on that it would be better to stay with David
Smith as Chief of Station, who is a most competent officer but young
and not fully experienced, but this proposal did not meet his request
that the best and most experienced man we can find be placed on the
job. The President said he would exercise the full power of his
office to keep Lodge in line and felt our responsibilities in South
Vietnam are so great that CIA should have a "four-star man" on the job and
that is what he wanted.

JAM/mcm
14-00000

WE
3 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Discussion with the President at his residence on Sunday, Dec. 1 -
10:00 o'clock about 30 minutes. No one was in attendance.

1. Reviewed a series of reports. There was no Checklist.

2. The President asked about news from Venezuela, particularly
concerned about Chenault.

3. Briefly reviewed a clandestine report from Bonn as a means
of indicating sources to CIA not available to others.

4. Reported to the President that the UN Commission to Saigon
felt a bit critical towards the U.S. presence; however we are in some doubt
as to whether they will include such criticism in their public report

5. Briefly reviewed the final report on the Alvarado case in
Mexico City.

6. The President then brought up the question of men in government.
Emphasized the need for men, particularly young men. I urged the President
to discuss this matter with the Business Council and with the AFL-CIO group.
He said that meetings would be arranged this coming week.

7. I advised the President that I was to meet with Halaby to
pursue the SST problem

8. I requested the President to instruct Bundy that Memorandums of
Conversation with Heads of State should be distributed to me automatically.
Also that the State Department be instructed to send such Memorandums to
me. The President agreed.

NOTE: This should be followed up by Mr. Cline.
Bundy will apparently discuss this matter later
with the President who agreed that such distri-
bution should be automatic except in very special
circumstances in which he wished distribution
held to his own personal files for reasons of
his own choice. I could take no exception to this
decision.

9. We should contact Hoover concerning identification of people
sending in ads and letters to the Dallas newspapers.

NOTE: I should call Hoover concerning this.

JAM/mfb (tape)
5/mc
14-00000
TOP SECRET

2 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
EYES ONLY--NO DISTRIBUTION
SUBJECT: Discussion with the President, 30 November 1963

Throughout the conversation the President mentioned a
number of very personal problems and asked my help and also
asked that Bundy and I act as a team in trying to help him solve
some of his problems.

1. He indicated that there must be some Cabinet changes.
By inference he made reference to the Attorney General, but not by
direct statement. Apparently he is waiting for the Attorney General
to decide what role, if any, he wishes to play in the Johnson Adminis-
tration.

2. He stated that Secretary Celebrezze is very anxious for
a judgeship and that he, Johnson, was extremely favorably impressed
with Sargent Shriver and thought he would be an excellent Secretary
of H. E. W. This was enthusiastically endorsed by both Bundy and
myself.

3. He raised the question of whether Mrs. Kennedy might
be a very able ambassador.

4. (He was deeply critical of the handling of Ayub. He questioned
whether Ball was the proper man to have gone forward to negotiate
with Ayub. He felt that we needed a new ambassador and he asked for
recommendations, the name of an ambassador who could handle that
Embassy, and more particularly handle Ayub. At this point he asked
that Bundy and I work together in searching out names of individuals
who might be helpful in a number of critical areas. I protested his
criticism of Ball, stating that I felt that Ball had done a very good job
in his mission to Pakistan. The President expressed the highest regard
for Ayub.

2/mc
14-00000

5. [He then turned to a discussion of Latin America. Expressed
criticism of the Alliance for Progress. Stated that Moscoso was not
the man to handle it and he should be replaced and asked who could be
his replacement. He also stated that we had not handled the OAS
positively enough. He was very critical of our ambassador to the OAS,
Acting Ambassador Ward Allen, and asked for recommendations for
a replacement.

6. Throughout the conversation it appeared that President
Johnson is not going to be satisfied with the organization as it is
now composed and that he will make changes, and at the same time
he does not intend to make changes just for the sake of change nor
does he intend to move in the "hangers-on of the last 20 years."
Apparently he has had a vast number of approaches from people who
he termed to be political hacks and said he didn't want any part of
any of them.

JAM:mcm

(tape)

Утс
14-00000

2 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President, 11:00 a. m., November 30th,
in attendance Mr. Bundy, meeting lasted approximately
1 1/2 hours

1. Reviewed the Checklist. (The President immediately
raised the question of what we were doing about Colonel Chennault.
He expects most serious public reaction and has a feeling that we
are "drifting" on this situation. I assured him we and the Venezuelan
government were doing all that was possible. However, he requested
more positive action on a report on the actions being taken.

NOTE: Wish a full report from the station for Sunday
morning briefing.

2. No other Checklist items raised any serious questions.
