
NGHE AN AND HOA BINH SHOULD DEMONSTRATE TO THE
OF
AMERICANS AND TO THE GOVERNMENT/VIETNAM THE FUTILITY OF SUCH OPERATIONS
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
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PAGE 3

ROBERTS ALSO COMMENTED THAT HE WAS SURPRISED AT THE FAILURE

OF THE VC TO REACT EARLIER IN THE PROPAGANDA FIELD TO OBVIOUSLY

EXPLOITABLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM
AND THE AMERICANS.
JOURNALIST
SOURCE COMMENT THE SAID THAT HE THINKS THE ARTICLE THAT CAUGHT
RACCOMA ANT31090300 THE INTEREST OF AMBASSADOR HOHLER/ONE DATELINED SAIGON 29 JUNE 1962,

APPEARING IN AN EARLY SULYWISSUE OF THE PHILIPPINE HERALD, ENTITLED
INTRA PARTY RIFT IN RED NORTH VIETNAM MOSCOW HAS AN EDGE ON PEIPING?"
JOURNALIST,
THE SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THE

AMBASSADOR HAD READ OUT OF THE CONTEXT
AND MISINTERPRETED VARTOUS STATEMENTS IN THE ARTICLE TO WHICH HE REFERRED,

JOURNALIST THE STATEMENTS BELIEVED
/LED HIM TO CONSIDER THEM A NEUTRALIST!
INVOLVED WHICH APPEAR IN LAST PARAGRAPH OF THE ARTICLE, ARE
JOURNALIST

AS FOLLOWSED STUDENTS OF COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAM AERE WERE...
OF AGREEMENT THAT THE REPORTED GAINS - AT LEAST FOR THE TIME

BEING, WILL EXERTA TEMPERATE INFLUENCE
ONE THE COURSE OF LEVENTSEM UNLESS THE SERIES ARE FURNED BY PEPPING
IN FAVOR OFF SPUPPETSING MYRN THEIR PUPPETS AND IF THE FREE WORLD KNOWS HOW TO CASH
INION THE RED DISPUTE THE CHANCES WERE NOTISMISSED OF OR LONGER
TRUCE IN WEEL A
TION TO EMBATTLED VIETNAM
SOLUTION
LAOS, AND EVEN OF A POLITICAL

FIELD COMMENT SIN WELATE JULY CONVERSATION WITH AN
AMERICAN OBSERVER THE COUNSELLOR OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN
SAIGON
BURROWS ATTACKED THE DIEM GOVERNMENT, STATING THAT
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
SECRET NOLNOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

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PAGE 4
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/BACKGROUND USE
ONLY

THERE COULD BE NO HOPE OF PROGRESS AGAINST THE VC.

UNLESS DIEM WERE REMOVED IN CRITICIZING THE

ILLIBERALITY OF THE DIEM REGIME, BURROWS APPLIED STANDARDS
OF CRITICISM THAT EVEN THE MOST ADVANCED WESTERN DEMOCRACY WOULD
FAILE TO MEET. DURING THE SAME CONVERSATION, COLONEL HENRY LEE,
MILITARY ATTACHE TO THE BRITISH EMBASSY, EXPRESSED HIS OPINION
THAT THE WAR AGAINST THE VC WAS NOT PROCEEDING FAVORABLY FROM
THE WESTERN POINT OF VIEW HE APPEARED CRITICAL OF DIEM AND
SEEMED INCLINED TOWARD A MILITARYMJUNTANE POSSIBLY
HEAD OF Walchokol

MAJOR GENERAL DUONG VĂN MINH.)

(FIELD COMMENT
FREDERICK E NOLTING, COMMENTED ON 8 AUGUST THAT AMBASSADOR HOHLER
HAS NEVER GIVER THE STIGHTEST INDICATION THAT THAT HE HOLDS THE
VIEWS ATTRIBUTED TO HIM IN THIS REPORT. ON 8 AUGUST, AMBASSADOR
HOHLER TOOK A COMPLETELY CONTRARY LINE IN A DISCUSSION WITH
AMBASSADOR NOLT ING, EXPRESSING OPTIMISM REGARDING THE PROSPECTS
FULITER OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAMAMBASSADOR NOLTING SATE THAT HE

BELTEVEDETART THE INFORMATION SHOULD BE TREATED WITH GREAT..
RESERVE, AND WITH THE POSSIBLILITY IN MIND THAT IT MAY REPRESENT
A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT TO CREATE MISTRUST BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
GREAT BRITAIN
AND
(FIELD COMMENT NGO DINH NHƯ BROTHER AND POLITICAL
ADVISOR OF PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM, TOLD AN AMERICAN OBSERVER
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
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NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

ON 8 AUGUST THAT, WHILE HE CONSIDERS FRENCH POLICY BOTH IN PARIS
AND IN SAIGON TO HAVE AS ITS. OBJECTIVE THE NEUTRALIZATION OF
SOUTH VIETNAM AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, HE FEELS THAT THE BRITISH
HAVE A CONTRARY POLICY MORE SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE US NHU
SAID THAT HE HAS HAD NO INDICATIONS THAT CAUSE HIM CONCERN WITH
RESPECT TO THE BRITISH ROLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM, AND INITIATED THE COMMENT
THAT AMBASSADOR HOHLER HAD SAID TO HIM RECENTLY THAT AN INTER-
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOUTH VIETNAM OR THE NEUTRALIZATION OF
SOUTH VIETNAM WAS "UNTHINKABLE.").
8. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR ONLY), CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION, CONTROLS
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
176-10037-10454 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10454
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE: Information Report
DATE: 9/25/1962
PAGES: 2
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 196: Countries, Vietnam, General 9/22/62-
9/27/62. Box 6.

---

upheldivia RAC 1/85 13
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting The National Defense of the United States within the Espionage Laws Title 18, U.S.C Secs 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is
CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In)
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CHINA (TAIWAN) LAOS NO FORE IGN DISSEM
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
SUBJECT PROPOSED JOINT CHINESE NATIONALIST- REPORT NO. TDCS-3/523,453
SOUTH VIETNAMESE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS DATE DISTR. 25 SEPTEMBER 1962
IN LAOS PRECEDENCE ROUT INE SMITH-BUNDY
_DUNGAN
_KAYSEN
IN KILDUFF
DATE OF INFO. MIO SEPTEMBER 1962 REFERENCES POUKSEN
_ SCHLESINGER
TAYLOR
PLACE &
DATE ACO. VIETNAM, SAIGON (21 SEPTEMBER 1962) FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 7977-BELK
APPRAISAL 2
SOURCE THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS-TENTATIVE
A HIGH-LEVEL MEMBER (B) OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST DIPLOMATIC MISSION-JIN SAIGON,
WHO IS BELIEVED TO REPORT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OR APPROVAL OF HIS GOVERNMENT. KLEIN
KOMER
RASKIN
_SAUNDERS

: 1. IN MID-SEPTEMBER 1962, TRAN KIM TUYEN, CHIEF, PRESIDENT I AL
SECURITY SERVICE, PROPOSED TO HUANG TIEN-MAI, CHIEF OF THE CHINESE
NATIONALIST NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAU INTELLIGENCE STATION IN SAIGON,
THAT SOUTH VIETNAM AND NATIONALIST CHINA CONDUCT JOINT INTELLIGENCE
OPERATIONS IN LAOS. TUYEN CLAIMED THAT THE DETERIORATING SITUATION.
IN LAOS, AND THE STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM
WOULD BREAK RELATIONS WITH LAOS, NECESSITATED.. IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATION
OF SUCH A PROPOSAL TUYEN TOLD HUANG THAT HE ENVISIONED THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF INTELLIGENCE: STATIONS ON THE BORDER BETWEEN LAOS..
AND SOUTH VIETNAM, AS WELL AS IN LAOS, TO SUPPORT JOINT VIETNAMESE/
NATIONALIST: CHINESE AGENT OPERATIONS
CONFIDENTIAL :: CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FORE IGN DISSEM
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OC.I ONE OCR ORR. ов! 00 EXO
STATE DIR
L
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
FORM
5-62 1Ka OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

---

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CONFIDENTIAL
NO FORE IGN DISSEM TDCS-3/523,453 IN 28327
(When Filled In).
PAGE 2
!
2. HUANG CONCURRED IN PRINCIPLE, BUT ADVISED TUYEN THAT HE
HAD TO OBTAIN THE APPROVAL OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT
BEFORE ENTERING INTO DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS. ON 19 SEPTEMBER HUANG
TELEGRAPHED HIS HEADQUARTERS IN TAIPEI, OUTLINING TUYEN'S PROPOSAL,
AND REQUESTING EARLY APPROVAL.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACE USOM MAAG
CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION.

CONFIDENTIAL END OF MESSAGE
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROL'S
NO FORE IGN DISSEM
KUDUEF
КУЛВЕЙ
D
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
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AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10460
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE: Task Force Status Report
DATE: 0/00/1963
PAGES: 1
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 332 R & S, Southeast Asia Task Force
Reports 4/11-6/13/63. Box 6.

170
15
SECRET
COPY / OF 10

STATUS REPORT
OF THE
TASK FORCE SOUTHEAST ASIA
COVERT ANNEX - HIGHLIGHTS

CAMBODIA
A CIA source in the Chinese Nationalist
diplomatic mission in Saigon has reported
GRC plans to assist dissident Cambodian
leader Son Ngoc Thanh in a political action
campaign against the Sihanouk government.
The GRC is also exploring Thanh's capability
for penetrating the Cambodian government and
the feasibility of assassinating Sihanouk.

NORTH VIETNAM
Over 700,000 CIA-designed leaflets were dropped
into the Haiphong/Lay Kay areas in April. The
objective of this operation, in addition to familiarizing
the DRV population with the anti-communism symbol
on the leaflets, is to create a diversion within North
Vietnam proper which may dissipate DRV security
strengths in response to psywar and deception
activities, and thus lessen DRV capability for action
in South Vietnam.

SOUTH VIETNAM
A two-month Civic Action Ministry training course
for 229 montagnard cadres was completed in April.
The first priority of these graduates, in direct
satisfaction of requirements levied by General Rosson
during his visit, is formation of fixed teams for use
at Special Forces camps. Included in the course
were 45 Vietnamese civic action cadre, all tribal
dialect speakers, who will serve as team chiefs.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
dewere
SECRET
do
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10491
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE: Information Report Re: Appeal to President Kennedy
DATE: 1/24/1962
PAGES: 2
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS:
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 195: Countries, Vietnam, General
11/13/61-11/31/61. Box 6.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs.
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
MODENTEO-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L  NOFORN/CONTINUED, CONTROL  FILE

COUNTRY- CAMBODIA/SOUTH VIETNAM
REPORT NO. TDCS -3/499,631
SUBJECT APPEAL TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY BY DATE DISTR. 24 JANUARY 1962
SOUTH VIETNAMESE REBEL OFFICERS
IN PHNOM PENH  PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
DATE OF 20 JANUARY 1962 REFERENCES IN -15274
INFO.
PLACE & CAMBODIA, PHNOM PENH (20 JANUARY 1962)
DATE ACQ.
APPRAISAL 2 FIELD REPORT NO. FDP 1560
SOURCE THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION, SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE: APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS: TENTATIVE.
AN AMERICAN OBSERVER (B); FROM MAJOR PHAM VAN LIEU.

1. ON 20 JANUARY 1962 MAJOR PHAM VAN LIEU, FORMER COMMANDER OF THE SOUTH
VIETNAM (SVN) MARINE CORPS AND MEMBER OF A GROUP OF SVN REBEL OFFICERS IN
PROTECTIVE CUSTORY BY THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT, PRESENTED A PROPOSAL FROM HIS
GROUP TO THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN PHNOM PENH ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY
WITH A COVER LETTER TO AMBASSADOR TRIMBLE. THIS PROPOSAL SIGNED BY THEIR LEADER
COLONEL NGUYEN CHẢNH THAI AND OTHER OFFICERS IN THE GROUP, CONTAINED A LIST OF
COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE DIEM GOVERNMENT'S CORRUPT AND INEFFICIENT METHODS OF
OPPOSING THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC) IT SUGGESTED THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY
REAPPRAISE THE US POLICY TOWARD THE DIEM GOVERAMENT AND UNSEAT AND REPLACE
IT WITH A GOVERNMENT TRULY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SVN PEOPLE. THE PROPOSAL WAS
PRESENTED IN TWO COPIES, EACH ONE HAVING ONE ENGLISH, FRENCH AND A VIETNAMESE

CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-ON-T-I-DIEN-T-I-A-L
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

STATE ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NICUSIA OCI ONE OCR ORR 00 AID DIA
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-ME-TOT-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL TDCS-3/499,631 IN 15274
PAGE 2

LANGUAGE VERSION.

2. MAJOR LIEU TOLD AN EMBASSY OFFICER THAT "COMPETENT CAMBODIAN AUTHORITIES"
WERE PLANNING TO RELEASE HIS GROUP FROM CUSTODY BY THE END OF JANUARY. HE SAID
PRINCE SIHANOUK HAD APPROVED, AND THAT A CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT SECURITY SERVICE WAS
OBTAINING DOCUMENTATION FOR THE GROUP. WHEN ASKED WHAT THEIR PLANS WERE AFTER
THEY WERE RELEASED, MAJOR LIEU SAID THAT THEY WERE STILL HOPING FOR ASYLUM IN THE
UNITED STATES AND WOULD AT LEAST LIKE TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH US EMBASSY OFFICERS.

SINCE NOTHING COULD BE DONE TO REMEDY THE SITUATION IN SVN UNTIL DIEM WAS
ELIMINATED, THEY WOULD FIGHT DIEM FIRST AND THE VC SECOND.

HEADQUARTERS COMMENT. SEE CS-3/486,609 AND FDP 1168/TDCS-3/473,682
IN WHICH MAJOR LIEU SAID THAT HIS GROUP WAS CONSIDERING JOINING THE SOUTH
VIETNAM LIBERATION ORGANIZATION.
5 FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, CINCPAC, PACFLT, ARPAC, PACAF.

EN-T-I-A-L END OF MESSAGE
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL
176-10037-10493 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER: 176-10037-10493
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM:
TO:
TITLE: Information Report Re: Comments
DATE: 1/28/1962
PAGES: 3
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE:
CLASSIFICATION:
RESTRICTIONS:
CURRENT STATUS:
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA:
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 195: Countries, Vietnam, General
11/13/61-11/31/61. Box 6.

EXEMPT NLK-81-213
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains Information, affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Esplanage Laws Time 18, U.S.C. Sed 1793. and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM REPORT NO. TDCS-3/500,097

SUBJECT COMMENTS OF TRAN VAN LY ON THE DESIRABILITY DATE DISTR 28 JANUARY 1962
PROBLEMS AND CONSEQUENCES OF A COUP D'ETAT
INFO.
DATE OF
25 JANUARY 1962
PLACE &
DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (26 JANUARY 1962)
APPRAISAL
PRECEDENCE ROUTINE COSTIN
TAYLOR REFERENCES IN 18750
KAYSEN
RETAIN OR DESTROY
FIELD REPORT NO: PF-VS7006
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION: SOURCE CRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE:
SOURCE AN OVIETNAMESE NATIONAL ARMY OFFICER WORKING AT THE GENERAL STAFF HEADQUARTERS,
FROM TRAN VAN LY.

ON 25 JANUARY 1962 TRẦN VAN LY, OPPOSITION LEADER IMPRISONED
FROM NOVEMBER 1960 TO FEBRUARY 1961 FOLLOWING STHE CATTEMPTED COUP
OF 1960, SAID THAT CERTAIN GENERAL OFFICERS HAVEL CONSULTED WITH HIM
THE POSSIBILITY OF ATTEMPTING A COUP D'ETAT (FIELD COMMENT.
(TDCS-3/500,042)
FVS-6999/BY THE SAME SOURCE REPORTED HIM AS POLITIC ADVISOR TOE
GENERAL NGHIỆME) ESUCHEA COUP WOULD BE TO PREVENT THE COUNTRYIEROM
FALLING TINTO THE HANDS OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS AVC)
NED
SAID THA THAT HE WAS SIN IN AGREEMENT WITH ATH THESE GENERALS IN
PRINCIPỨC ON THE NECESSITY FORTA COUNTDIETAN, BUTEWAS WORRIED BOTH
ABOUT THE METHOD TO BE EMPLOYED HAND THE CONSEQUENCESTO LY WASL
AWAPE THAT CUERPAIN FOEFT POALLAND RELIGIOBSTGROUPS IWISHEDATOT MUUNTOFE
CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTRO

STATE ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSANIC USTA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO DIA EXO
VTFS AIDS
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL TDCS-3/500,097 IN18750
PAGE

A COUP WITH THE SUPPORT OF MILITARY ELEMENTS. HOWEVER THESE GROUPS
WERE TOO DIVIDED TO BE SUCCESSFULLY BELIEVED THE ONLY SUCCESSFUL
COUF WOULD BE ONE MOUNTED BY THE ARMY ITSELF (FIELD COMMENT

TRAN VAN LY WAS A MEMBER OF THE "CARAVELLE" OPPOSITION GROUP
2.
(cs-3/474,755)
ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE OF FVS-59087HE WAS MOVING TOWARD A

NEUTRALIST POSITION IN 1960 AND WAS DISAPPOINTED OVER CONTINUED
SUPPORT TO DIỀM BY THE US A BRITISH OFFICIAL SERVICE REPORTED

THAT WHEN HE WAS RELEASED FROM PRISON ON 8 FEBRUARY 1961, HE WAS
FORCED TO SIGN A DECLARATION OF LOYALTY TO DIEM.) TΕΤΟ
SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRESIDENT

SPEAKING IN GENERAL TERMS, LY SAID THAT IN SETTING UP SUCH
A COUP TWO THINGS WERE IMPORTANT: TO AVOID BLOODSHED AND TO
ORGANIZEAS SMALLA FORCE AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER NOT TO ALLOW THERE

FLAN OF ACTION TO BE EXPLOITED BY THE VC. LY'S SOLUTION WOULD BE
TO HAVE THE GENERAL OFFICERS DECLARE THE WHOLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM
YET TO BE IN A STATE OF SETGE. THE TROOPS WOULD THEN BE FORBIDDEN
* 108020
CU
TO MOVE WITH THOUT AN EXPRESS ORDER FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE
DELE OF AND ALL ROADS LEADING TO SALICONE HOUD RESOUARDED.

IN CASET THE COUP WEBE SUCC CCESSFACERICLUTINARY COMMITTE
ECL OF THREE GENERAL OFFICERS WOULDACI PORT LAVERYDAY GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS
DALS WITH THE HELP OF TECHNICAL ADVISORS AND ESTIALIS THE SECRETARIES OF
STATE WHO WOULD HAVE REMAINED AT THEIR POSTS. DURING THI PERIOD
THE PEOPLE WOULD BE ABLE TO CHOOSE THE HEAD-OF-THE-STATE
CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL TDCS-3/500,097 IN 18750
PAGE 3

5. (FIELD COMMENT. LY TALKED TO SOURCE IN GENERAL TERMS. IT
IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER THIS WAS BECAUSE OF RETICENCE ON LY'S PART IN
RESPECT TO SOURCE, OR WHETHER LY IS NOT IN FACT INVOLVED IN THE
ALLEGED PLANNING OF GENERAL NGHIEM.)
6. FIELD DISEM. STATE MAAG USOM CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

CONFIDENTIAL END OF MESSAGE
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL
176-10037-10494 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10494
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE: Information Report Re: Strategic Hamlets
DATE: 2/20/1962
PAGES: 5
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: NSF: Countries: Vietnam, General, 2/62, Box 195. Box 8.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and. 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited be law.

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL
REPORT NO.. TDCS-3/502,553
DATE DISTR. 20 FEBRUARY 1962
PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
FIELD NO. FVS-7075 IN 30145
RETAIN OR DESTROY

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM
SUBJECT STRATEGIC HAMLETS

DATE OF INFO. MID-FEBRUARY 1962
PLACE, & VIETNAM, SAIGON (14 FEBRUARY 1962)
DATE ACQ. IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT NHU'S VIEWS ARE AS EXPRESSED, AND THAT LUONG
APPRAISAL CORRECTLY REPEATED NHU'S STATEMENTS
SOURCE THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
: AN AMERICAN OBSERVER (B), WITH PARAS. 1-3 FROM NGO DINH NHU, AND PARA. 4 FROM
BUI VAN LUONG.
1. NGO DINH NHU, BROTHER AND POLITICAL ADVISOR OF PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM,
STATED ON 14 FEBRUARY 1962 THAT THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS PROGRAM WOULD BE MORE
THAN A METHOD OF AFFORDING DEFENSE FOR THE POPULATION OF VIETNAM, IT WOULD BE A
BASIC STRATEGY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF VIETNAM. HE STATED THAT A COMMON COMPLAINT
IN VIETNAM WAS THE WEAKNESS OF ITS CADRES, WHO FAILED TO TURN THE GOVERNMENT'S
REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM INTO REALITY. HE STATED, HOWEVER, THAT THE COMPLAINT WAS
ONLY 'PARTIALLY TRUE, AS THE OTHER ASPECT. HAD BEEN THE INABILITY OF THE CADRE TO
OPERATE IN THE CONDITION OF INSECURITY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. IT WAS NECESSARY
FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO 80 ORGANIZE THE SITUATION THAT THE CADRE COULD BE PLACED
IN THE AREA OF HIS WORK AND AFFORDED THE NECESSARY PROTECTION AND FACILITIES
FOR THE WORK. THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' PROGRAM WOULD' PROVIDE BOTH OF THESE.

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL
STATE ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR 00 AID DIA
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
SMITH-BUND
DUNGAN
GILDNER
KAYSEN.
PETERSEN
SCHLESINGI
VOLLWE
FORRESTAL
KOMER
BELK
SAUNDERS
RASKIN

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL
TDCS-3/502,553 PAGE TWO

2. THE PROGRAM AS PLANNED BY. NHU HAD THREE MAIN ELEMENTS WHICH WOULD MAKE
IT PARTICULARLY APPROPRIATE FOR VIETNAM.
A. IT WAS FIRST OF ALL TRADITIONAL, RESTING UPON THE BASIC UNIT OF
VIETNAMESE SOCIETY. THUS IT CAPITALIZED UPON THE INGRAINED HABITS OF THE
POPULATION

B. THE SECOND ASPECT WAS THAT IT WOULD AFFORD THE MEANS TO MODERNIZE
VIETNAMESE LIFE. NHU STATED THAT IT WAS LESS A PROBLEM OF RAISING THE STANDARD
OF LIVING THAN OF CHANGING THE MODE OF LIVING. HE SAID THAT IF ATTENTION WAS
GIVEN TO INSERTING NEW MODES OF LIFE INTO THE ORDINARY PEASANT'S EXISTENCE, IT
WOULD INEVITABLY BRING SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN HIS ORIENTATION. NHU COMPARED
THE RESULT OF THE INSERTION OF SMALL AUTOMOBILES, WASHING MACHINES, ETC., INTO
THE LIFE OF THE EUROPEAN WORKING CLASS WHICH HE CLAIMED HAD DISRUPTED COMMUNIST
INFLUENCE OVER THIS CLASS. AS A RESULT, NHU SAID, MOST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST
PARTIES OPPOSED MODERNIZATION. HE STATED THAT THE ASIAN COMMUNIST PARTIES
WERE LESS INTELLIGENT IN THEIR APPROACH, AS THEY ADVOCATED MODERNIZATION OF
ASIAN LIFE WITHOUT REALIZING THAT IT WOULD INEVITABLY REDUCE THEIR OWN ORGAN-
IZATIONAL POWER. NHU STATED THAT A STUDY OF STEPS APPROPRIATE FOR VIETNAM ALONG
THIS LINE SHOULD BE MADE AND A CONSCIOUS EFFORT DEVOTED TO INSERTING THESE NEW
MODES OF LIFE INTO VIETNAM. AS AN EXAMPLE, HE CITED THE EFFECT OF DISTRIBUTING
BICYCLES WITH MICROMOTORS, THUS MAKING THE PEASANT MOBILE AND CHANGING HIS MODE
OF LIFE. THE STRATEGIC HAMLET, HE REITERATED, WOULD AFFORD THE NECESSARY
PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC BASE FOR SUCH A MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL TDCS-3/502, 5.53 PAGE THREE

c. THE THIRD ELEMENT, NHƯ SAID, WOULD BE DEMOCRATIZATION. HE
DEFINED IT AS THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND ORDER TO RURAL LIFE. HE STATED THAT
AT PRESENT THE PEASANTS WERE EXPOSED TO ILLEGALITY BY THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS
AND BY GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) ELEMENTS, BOTH MILITARY AND CIVIL. THIS WAS
IN PART A RESULT OF THE DISPERSION OF THE POPULATION AND ITS INABILITY TO ASSUME
ITS OWN GOVERNANCE. AS AN INDUCEMENT TO FORM A STRATEGIC HAMLET, NHU SAID THE
POPULATION SHOULD BE ASSURED THAT THE HAMLET WOULD BE GUARANTEED THE FULL
APPLICATION OF LAW BY ITS OWN AUTHORITIES, THUS MOVING IT TOWARD A SYSTEM OF
DEMOCRATIZATION APPROPRIATE TO THE COMMUNITY. HOWEVER, IT WOULD HAVE LITTLE OR
NOTHING TO DO WITH CHANGES OF THE GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON. NHU STATED THAT HE HAD
BROUGHT OUT IN A RECENT TALK TO GVN OFFICIALS THAT ONE COULD CHANGE THE
GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON 35 TIMES WITH NO EFFECT UPON THE REAL SITUATION IN THE
COUNTRYSIDE, BUT THAT THE APPLICATION OF THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' SYSTEM WOULD
DEFINITELY AFFECT THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE COUNTRYSIDE IN A WAY WHICH TOUCHED
THE POPULATION ITSELF. THE STRATEGIC HAMLET WOULD ALSO, ACCORDING TO NHU, AFFORD
A BASIS FOR THE BUILDING OF INSTITUTIONS IN VIETNAM TO GIVE ADDITIONAL STABILITY,
E.G., COOPERATIVES, MEDICAL SERVICES, EDUCATION, WOMENS' MOVEMENTS, YOUTH
MOVEMENTS, ETC.
3. NHU STATED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' CONCEPTS WITH
A GROUP OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS RECENTLY, AND HAD MADE ONE VERY STRONG ADDITIONAL
POINT TO THEM. (FIELD COMMENT. FVS-7034, TDCS-3/501,110 GAVE AN ACCOUNT, FROM
A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE, OF NHU'S REMARKS AT THE MEETING.) HE STATED THAT HE

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL TDCS-3/502,553 PAGE FOUR

WAS AWARE THAT THERE WAS MUCH. DISCONTENT AMONG THE VARIOUS LEVELS OF THE
GOVERNMENT, WHICH, HE SAID, STEMMED FROM THE GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH TO THE JOB.
ANY LOCAL OFFICIAL WHO FACED A PROBLEM MADE A REQUEST TO HIS NEXT HIGHER AU-
THORITY FOR ASSISTANCE AND WAS DISCONTENTED IF THE ASSISTANCE WAS INADEQUATE.
THE NEXT LEVEL REQUESTED THE CHIEF OF PROVINCE, WHO REQUESTED ASSISTANCE FROM
THE MINISTRY, AND HAD THE SAME REACTION. THE MINISTER MADE THE REQUEST OF THE
PRESIDENT AND WAS DISCONTENTED AT INADEQUATE SUPPORT. THEORETICALLY, THE
PRESIDENT SHOULD MAKE REQUESTS OF THE AMERICANS AND BE DISCONTENTED WITH THE
AMERICANS FOR LACK OF ADEQUATE SUPPORT. NHU STATED THAT THE ENTIRE PROCESS WAS
INFANTILE, AND A CHILDISH WAY OF DEPENDENCE UPON A SUPERIOR TO SOLVE ONE'S
PROBLEMS. HE STATED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO DEVELOP A MATURITY IN THE
VIETNAMESE PEOPLE SO THAT THEY WOULD TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOLVING THEIR
OWN PROBLEMS, UTILIZING SUCH ASSISTANCE AS WAS GIVEN THEM, BUT NOT ATTEMPTING
TO SHIFT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM. HE STATED THAT THE
STRATEGIC HAMLET WAS THE WAY TO INTRODUCE THE PROCESS OF BEGINNING MATURITY
TO THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND THE GOVERNMENT. NHU SAID THAT THE OFFICIALS WERE.
MUCH AMUSED AT THE DESCRIPTION OF THE DISCONTENT AND FOUND MUCH VALIDITY IN HIS
STATEMENT OF HOW TO OVERCOME IT. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO
KEEP REPEATING THE LESSON, AS OTHERWISE THE OLD HABITS OF DEPENDENCE UPON
POWERS ABOVE WOULD RETURN AND THE WHOLE VICIOUS CYCLE OF DISCONTENT WOULD START
AGAIN.

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL TDCS-3/502,553 PAGE FIVE

4. MINISTER OF INTERIOR BUI VAN LUONG, IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION ON 13
FEBRUARY, STATED THAT NHU HAD GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS THAT THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS'
PROGRAM BE CONDUCTED UNDER THE FULL CONTROL OF THE NEW INTERMINISTERIAL
COMMISSION. HE SAID THAT NHU HAD SPECIFICALLY STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT DID
NOT WISH A REPETITION OF THE ERRORS MADE IN THE INITIATION OF THE AGROVILLE
PROGRAM. NHU EMPHASIZED THE NECESSITY OF EXPLAINING TO THE POPULATION WHAT
IT WAS BEING ASKED TO DO AND OF FOLLOWING VERY STRICT RULES, FOR INSTANCE,
THAT THE POPULATION HE ASKED TO ASSIST ONLY IN ITS OWN LOCALITY AND NOT BE
REQUIRED TO WORK ON DISTANT AREAS. HE ALSO STATED THAT THE PROVINCE CHIEFS
WERE INSTRUCTED NOT TO LAUNCH OFF IN ALL DIRECTIONS, CREATING STRATEGIC HAMLETS
ACCORDING TO THEIR OWN IDEAS, BUT TO FOLLOW THE PROGRAM AND PATTERN TO BE
ESTABLISHED BY THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' COMMITTEE.
5. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR MAAG AID CINCPAC PACFLT
ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL176-10038-10032 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER: 176-10038-10032
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

ORIGINATOR: DOS
FROM:
TO:
TITLE: Embtel 660 (Saigon) Re: Task Force on Vietnam
DATE: 11/16/1961
PAGES: 3
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE:
CLASSIFICATION:
RESTRICTIONS:
CURRENT STATUS:
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA:
COMMENTS: NSF: Countries: Vietnam, General, 11/16/61-11/17/61, box 195. Box 8

***

INCOMING TELEGRAM
SANITIZED VERSIO
NLX-75-92 3

Department of State

SECRET

Control: 9439
Rec'd: NOV. 16, 1961
3:50 a.m. 019

FE Action
Info
SS
G
SP
L
H
SO
EUR
AID
PX
IOP
INR
CIA
OSD
ARMY
AIR
NAVY
A
DC
RMR

FROM: SAIGON
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 660, NOVEMBER 16; 11 AM

SECTION DEPARTMENT 660, INFORMATION CINCPAC POLAD 2683

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION
TASK FORCE VN

REF: EMBTEL 0627
OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXPLOITATION OF NEW MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL
POLICE AND SECURITY SERVICE (COLONEL NGUYEN VAN Y VICE GENERAL
NGUYEN VAN (LA)) FALL INTO TWO GENERAL FIELDS, INTELLIGENCE AND
NATIONAL POLICE. BOTH CAS AND USOM HAVE FOR CONSIDERABLE TIME
BEEN STYMIED BUT WITH CHANGE BELIEVE REAL PROGRESS CAN BE
MADE. THIS WILL REQUIRE WORKING OUT OF DETAILED PROGRAMS FOR
ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE TRAINING, ETC., AND ADDITIONAL U.S.
PERSONNEL FOR NECESSARY LIAISON AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT.
AS HAS ALREADY PROPOSED TO IT'S HEADQUARTERS DEVELOPMENT OF
NATIONAL COMMUNIST PARTY PENETRATION SERVICE TO SERVE AS
"SPECIAL BRANCH" OF SURETE, WHOSE CHARTER AT PRESENT COVERS
BOTH SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AND ORDINARY INVESTIGATIONS.
THIS "SPECIAL BRANCH" WOULD HAVE REPRESENTATIVES AT PROVINCE
LEVELS AND BE MANAGED THROUGH REGIONAL DIRECTORATES. AT EACH
REGIONAL DIRECTORATE, CAS WOULD PROPOSE ASSIGN AT LEAST ONE
CAS OFFICER TO MAINTAIN CLOSE LIAISON AND COLLABORATION.
CONCERT WOULD BE FULL INTEGRATION HIS EFFORT INTO THE VN
VIETNAMESE EFFORT. THIS WOULD REQUIRE FOLLOWING CAS COMMITMENT:

A. CAS OFFICERS FOR DIRECTORATES AT HUE, NHA TRANG, BAN ME
THUOT, BIEN HOA, SAIGON/CHOLON, AND CAN THO, AS WELL AS ALREADY

SECRET
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

***

SECRET

-2- 660, NOVEMBER 16, 11 AM, FROM SAIGON

EXISTING PERSONNEL FOR LIAISON AT NATIONAL LEVEL. PERSONNEL
WOULD BE SUPPORTED BY NECESSARY INTERPRETERS, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

B. PROVISION OF INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNIST PARTY PENETRATION
TRAINING TO VIETNAMESE OFFICER PERSONNEL OF NEW SPECIAL BRANCH,
TAKEN FROM EXPERIENCED SURETE OFFICERS.

C. FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO GIVE PROVINCIAL SPECIAL BRANCH
OFFICERS FUNDS TO OPERATE AGENT NETWORKS IN PROVINCES.
EXACT SUM NOT YET DETERMINED BUT WILL BE SEEN TO BE SUBSTANTIAL
BY MULTIPLYING NUMBER OF PROVINCES (38) BY REASONABLE MONTHLY
SUM FOR EACH PROVINCIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO ENABLE HIM HIRE
AGENTS AND PAY OTHER OPERATIONAL EXPENSES.

3. USOM EQUALLY DETERMINED PROSECUTEE POTENTIAL FOR GREATER
COLLABORATION FOR DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICE STRUCTURE WITH
REGULAR INVESTIGATORY FUNCTIONS OF SURE TE, TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM ON EFFECTIVE NATIONAL BASIS TO BOLSTER
GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT COUNTRY, AND THUS CONTRIBUTE
TO CONTRIBUTE CRIME -- DISORDER, OVERT COMMUNIST ACTION, ETC.
THIS WOULD COMPRISE OVER-ALL DEVELOPMENT USOM POLICE, SURETE AND
RELATED INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICES TO INCLUDE:

A CONSOLIDATION OF CIVIL POLICE FUNCTIONS UNDER THE SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR INTERIOR.

B. A DELINEATION OF FUNCTIONS AS THEY PERTAIN TO THE SEPARATE
ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC SAFETY SERVICES.

C. THE ADOPTION OF A REALISTIC TRAINING PROGRAM, GEARED
TO AN APPROPRIATE PROGRAM OF COMMODITY PROCUREMENT.

D. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE PUBLIC SAFETY SERVICE.
USOM ENVISIONS DEVELOPMENT BASED UPON MUTUAL AGREEMENT AND
UPON RECIPIENTS'S ABILITY TO ABSORB INTRODUCTION OF NEW
CONCEPTS.

4. THIS BEING MADE TASK FORCE MATTER DUE MY CONVICTION IT IS
SUBSTANTIAL WE MOVE FORWARD IN BOTH ABOVE FIELDS TO MAXIMUM
DEGREE POSSIBLE, TAKING FULL ADVANTAGE OF WHAT APPARENTLY

SECRET

***

SECRET

-3- 660, NOVEMBER 16, 11 AM, FROM SAIGON

IS REAL NEW BREAK IN SITUATION. URGE FULLEST SUPPORT FROM TASK
FORCE LEVEL AND ABOVE OF THESE SUGGESTIONS FOR ACTIVITY BY
CAS AND USOM, AND SUPPORT IN WASHINGTON FOR NECESSARY PERSONNEL
AND BUDGET ADDITIONS WHICH MAY BE INVOLVED.

NOLTING

MM
SECRET
177-10001-10060
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date: 8/26/201

Agency Information

AGENCY: LBJ
RECORD NUMBER: 177-10001-10060
RECORD SERIES : NSF, COUNTRY FILE, CUBA, TDCS, VOL. I, BOX 32
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM:
TO:
TITLE:
DATE: 12/18/1963
PAGES: 2
SUBJECTS: CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: 1B
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 10/02/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: DOC. #158

v9.1
NW 50955 DocId: 32282900 Page 1
25

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
158
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs.
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/
BACKGROUND USE ONLY
(When Filled In)
COUNTRY CUBA
REPORT NO. TDCSDB-3/658, 582
SUBJECT CUBAN GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARDS PRESIDENT
JOHNSON'S ADMINISTRATION
DATE DISTR. 18 DECEMBER 1963
PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
REFERENCES
IN 82930
DATE OF LATE NOVEMBER 1963
INFO.
PLACE & 16 DECEMBER 1963
DATE ACO.
APPRAISAL
FIELD REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
SOURCE A HIGH-LEVEL CUBAN DIPLOMAT IN WESTERN EUROPE WHO HAS BEEN A FAIRLY RELIABLE
REPORTER OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INFORMATION.
:
1. FIDEL CASTRO WAS VERY UPSET OVER THE CHANGE IN THE UNITED
STATES ADMINISTRATION BROUGHT ABOUT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S ASSASSINATION.
THE TOP CUBAN LEADERSHIP WAS SURE PRESIDENT KENNEDY WOULD NOT INVADE
CUBA AND THEY WERE CONVINCED THAT THE POLICY OF HIS ADMINISTRATION
FOR ECONOMIC BLOCKADE AND INTERNAL SUBVERSION AGAINST CUBA WOULD
NOT OVERTHROW THE RÉGIME.

2.
THE PRESENT POLICY OF THE CUBAN GOVT., ON ORDERS FROM CASTRO,
IS NOT TO ATTACK PRESIDENT JOHNSON IN PUBLIC OR DO ANYTHING TO
IRRITATE HIM. ACCORDING TO CUBAN GOVT, LEADERS, CASTRO WANTS TO
WAIT AND SEE WHAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON SAYS AND DOES ABOUT CUBA,
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/
BACKGROUND USE ONLY
STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACS1 NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC XXXXX OCI ONE OCR ORR EXO
STATE/DIR REPCINCLANT I&NS TREASURY...
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
FORM
10-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)
NW 50955 DocId: 32282900 Page 2

CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/
SECRET/ NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
(When Filled In)
IN 82930
TDCS DB-3/658,582
PAGE

AND GIVE HIM. AN OPPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE, IF HE FEELS SO INCLINED,
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT.

(END OF MESSAGE)
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
SECRETA NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/
NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
NW 50955 DocId: 32282900 Page 3
177-10001-10061 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System Date: 8/26/201
Identification Form

Agency Information
AGENCY: LBJ
RECORD NUMBER: 177-10001-10061
RECORD SERIES : NSF, COUNTRY FILE, CUBA, TDCS, VOL. 1, BOX 32
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Information
ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM:
TO:

TITLE:

DATE: 12/13/1963
PAGES: 2
SUBJECTS: CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: IB
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 10/02/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS: DOC. #170

v9.1 26
NW 50955 DocId: 32282901 Page 1

TELEGRAM IN.ORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 170
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs.
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/
(When Filled In) CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
COUNTRY CUBA REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/658,469
SUBJECT ALERT STATUS OF CUBAN DIPLOMATIC DATE DISTR. 13 DECEMBER 1963
MISSIONS, AS RESULT OF THE ASSAS-
SINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY
DATE OF
INFO. 9 DECEMBER 1963 REFERENCES IN 79459
PLACE &
DATE ACO. 9 DECEMBER 1963
APPRAISAL FIELD REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
SOURCE A SENIOR CUBAN DIPLOMAT WHO IS AN ASTUTE OBSERVER AND HAS DEMON-
STRATED MATURITY, DISCERNMENT, AND RELIABILITY IN HIS PAST
REPORTING.

1. ABOUT 2 DAYS AFTER THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT - BUNDY-SMITH
JOHN F. KENNEDY, CUBAN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS ABROAD BEGAN TO - ALEXANDER
- BELK
RECEIVE A SERIES OF MESSAGES PLACING THEM ON A SPECIAL ALERT - BERECK
- CLABE
STATUS. THESE MESSAGES WERE OBVIOUSLY DUE TO APPREHENSION - DINGEMAN
- CAEL
BY THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUND I NG - 1UARESTAL
- JOHNSON
THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY MIGHT LEAD TO HOSTILE - KILDUFF.
- KLEIN
ACTIVITY DIRECTED AGAINST THE MISSIONS. THE DIPLOMATIC - KOMER
- SAUNDERS
MISSIONS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, WERE EXHORTED TO EXERCISE - SCHLESINGE
- SMITH, WM, Y.
EXTREME VIGILANCE, TO MOUNT A NIGHT-AND-DAY WATCH OF MISSION
PREMISES, TO BE CERTAIN THAT THERE WERE "NO COMPROMISING
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS GROUP I
SECRET Excluded from automatic
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/ downgrading and
declassification
CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC XXXXXXX OCI ONE OCR XXX 00 FBI
STATE/DIR REPCINCLANT INS ORR EXO
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
FORM
10-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)
NW 50955 DocId:32282901 Page 2

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS IN 79459
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/
(When Filled In) CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY TDCSDB-3/658,469 PAGE 2
DOCUMENTS ON THE PREMISES," AND TO BE ON GUARD AGAINST HOSTILE
PROVOCATIONS.
2. ONE CHIEF OF MISSION, WHO, FOLLOWING HIS USUAL
PRACTICE, REQUESTED BY TELEPHONE PERMISSION TO ACCEPT A
LONG-STANDING INVITATION TO VISIT A COUNTRY FRIENDLY TO
CUBA, WAS TOLD THAT HE MUST FORMALLY SUBMIT HIS REQUEST
BY CABLE. HE DID SO ON 29 NOVEMBER, BUT IT WAS NOT UNTIL
6 DECEMBER THAT HE RECEIVED THE AUTHORITY TO QUIT HIS POST.
3. AS OF 9 DECEMBER THERE HAD BEEN NO INDICATION FROM
HAVANA THAT THE ALERT ORDER WAS TO BE CONSIDERED REVOKED.
4. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/
CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
NW 50955 DocId: 32282901 Page 3
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date: 8/26/201

Agency Information
AGENCY: LBJ
RECORD NUMBER: 177-10001-10063
RECORD SERIES : NSF, COUNTRY FILE, CUBA, TDCS, VOL. 1, BOX 32.
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Information
ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM:
TO:
TITLE:
DATE: 11/24/1963
PAGES: 2
SUBJECTS: CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT
CLASSIFICATION: Secret
RESTRICTIONS: Consulted
CURRENT STATUS: Withhold
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 08/13/1993

OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: DOC. #188

TELEGRAM INI ORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs.
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CLASSIFICATION – DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SECRET
(When Filled In)
COUNTRY: URUGUAY
SUBJECT CUBAN PRECAUTIONS FOLLOWING ASSASSINATION
OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY
DATE OF 22 NOVEMBER 1963
INFO.
PLACE & URUGUAY, MONTEVIDEO (23 NOVEMBER 1963)
DATE ACO.
APPRAISAL 2
REPORT NO. TDCS-3/565,829
DATE DISTR. 24 NOVEMBER 1963 DY-SMITH
_ALEXANDER
BELK
BRUDECK
PRECEDENCE ROUT INE
REFERENCES
FIELD REPORT NO. HUM-2414 FORRESTAL
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.N
SOURCE A URUGUAYAN POLICE OFFICIAL (B)..
KILDOF
KLEIN
KOMER
SAUNDERS
SCHLESINGER
SMITH, WM. Y.
(CUBAN INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE)
1. RICARDO GUTTIEREZ TORRENS, THIRD SECRETARY AND CIS/
CHIEF OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MONTEVIDEO, TELEPHONED THE
MONTEVIDEO POLICE AT 1710 HOURS (MONTEVIDEO TIME) ON 22 NOVEMBER TO
REQUEST EXTRA POLICE PROTECTION FOR THE CUBAN EMBASSY. GUTTIEREZ
SAID THE EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED REPORTS THAT A MOB WAS PLANNING
TO STONE THE EMBASSY. (FIELD COMMENT: THE NEWS OF PRES.
KENNEDY'S ASSASSINATION WAS RECEIVED IN MONTEVIDEO AT
APPROXIMATELY 1600 HOURS, MONTEVIDEO TIME).
2. THE POLICE FURNISHED EXTRA PROTECTION TO BOTH THE CUBAN
EMBASSY AND TO THE SOVIET LEGATION, ALTHOUGH THE LATTER HAD

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
SECRET
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OC I ONE OCR ORR XXX 00 EXO
STATE/DIR

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM
10-62 IK OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM TDCS-3/565,829

2
PAGE
MADE NO REQUEST. AS OF 1600 HOURS 23 NOVEMBER THERE HAVE BEEN
NO DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST EITHER DIPLOMATIC INSTALLATION. (FIELD
COMMENT: THE POPULACE OF MONTEVIDEO HAS BEEN PROFOUNDLY SHOCKED
AND GRIEF STRICKEN OVER PRES KENNEDY'S ASSASSINATION. A SPONTANEOUS
CROWD ESTIMATED BY PRESS TO COMPRISE 3000 PERSONS
MARCHED TO AMERICAN EMBASSY RESIDENCE EVENING OF
22 NOVEMBER TO EXPRESS THEIR SORROW).
3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
177-10001-10064
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date: 8/26/201

Agency Information
AGENCY: LBJ
RECORD NUMBER: 177-10001-10064
RECORD SERIES: NSF, COUNTRY FILE, CUBA, TDCS, VOL. 1, BOX 32
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Information
ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM:
TO:
TITLE:
DATE: 11/23/1963
PAGES: 2
SUBJECTS: CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT
CLASSIFICATION: Secret
RESTRICTIONS: Consulted
CURRENT STATUS: Withhold
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 08/13/1993

OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: DOC. #190

v9.1
NW 50955 DocId: 32282904 Page 1

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
190
This material contains information effecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs.
793 and 794, he transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
SECRET
(When Filled In)
COUNTRY CUBA
SUBJECT
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
COMMENTS OF CUBAN OFFICIALS ON THE
ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY
DATE OF
INFO.
22 NOVEMBER 1963
PLACE &
CHILE, SANTIAGO (22 NOVEMBER 1963)
DATE ACO.
APPRAISAL SEE BELOW
SOURCE
REPORT NO. TDCs-3/565,826
DATE DISTR. 23 NOVEMBER
PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
REFERENCES
FIELD REPORT NO.
ALEXANDER
BELES
BRUBECK
HAB47
DINGEMAN
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENTUS TENTATIVE.
A CHILEAN WHO HAS A GOOD KNOWLEDGE OF ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE CUBAN ENGLISUFIN
SANTIAGO ACQUIRED THROUGH PROLONGED ASSOCIATION WITH THE OFFICIALS OF EMBASSY.
HE IS AN ACCURATE, RELIABLE REPORTER.
APPRAISAL: IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THE REMARKS WERE MADE AS REPORTED.

KOMER
SAUNDERS
SCHLESINGER
SMITH, WM. Y.
1. THE FOLLOWING ARE REMARKS MADE BY OFF ICIALS OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO
REGARD ING THE ASSASS INATION OF PRES IDENT KENNEDY:

A. ON 22 NOVEMBER JOSE TOHA, VICE PRES IDENT OF THE CHILEAN CUBAN CULTURAL
INSTITUTE AND DIRECTOR OF THE PRO-CASTRO LEFT IST PRESS ULT IMA HORA , INFORMED
PEDRO MART INEZ PIREZ, CHARGE OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO, THAT KENNEDY HAD
BEEN ASSASS INATED. TOHA SAID "ESTE ASUNTO DE KENNEDY SE ESTA PONIENDO COLOR DE
HORMIGAS" (POSSIBLY MEANS ASSASS INAT ION OF KENNEDY LOOKS LIKE IT COULD HAVE
SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS). MART INEZ COMMENTED THAT HE HEARD THAT THE PERSON
ARRESTED WAS PRES IDENT OF A FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE AND THAT IF THE YANKEES
OR CIA ASSASSINATED KENNEDY TO RESUME THE ASSAULT ON CUBA, THEN A THIRD WORLD WAR
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
SECRET
STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR
TATE/DIR
GROUP I
Encluded from automatic
downgrading.and
declassification
00
FBI
ORR
Exo
I&NS TREASURY REPCINCLANT
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
DRM
62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
NW 50955 DocId: 32282904 Page 2
(15-20)

SECRET
(When Filled In)
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
IN 67147
TDCS-3/565,826
PAGE 2
WOULD START. HE SAID THINGS ARE VERY CLEAR AND THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THEY
HAVE ASSASSINATED HIM, THE CONTRADICTIONS ARE WELL DEFINED AND THE MOMENT WAS
VERY SPECIAL, LIKE THAT OF THE MA INE. MARTINEZ SAID THE UNITED STATES IS NOW
IN THE MOST DIFFICULT POSITION OF THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS IN LATIN AMERICA,
THE WORLD, GOULART, ARGENTINE PETROLEUM, PERUVIAN LANDS, CHILEAN MINES AND IN
GENERAL ALL OVER LAT IN AMERICA. TOHA SA ID HE WAS VERY WORRIED AFTER READ ING
THE CABLE TRAFFIC. MART INEZ ADDED THAT IF THE USA IS THINKING OF INVAD ING
CUBA THEN THEY MUST HAVE EVERYTHING ALL PREPARED AND ALL THE STRATEGY CREADY AND
THEREFORE THE ALARM MUST BE GIVEN SO THAT CUBA CAN BE PREPARED.
B. THE CUBAN CONSUL AT VALPARA ISO CALLED THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO TO
DETERMINE POLICY IN THE MATTER OF FLY ING THE FLAG AT HALF MAST. THE REPLY WAS.
THAT THERE ARE NO DIPLOMAT IC RELATIONS WITH THE USA AND THAT NO OFFICIAL WORD
HAD YET BEEN RECEIVED FROM CUBA, SO THEREFORE NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE. (FIELD
COMMENT: THIS IS AGAINST PROTOCOL BECAUSE THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT HAS DECREED
OFFICIAL MOURNING INCLUDING FLYING FLAGS AT HALF MAST.)
C. MARTINEZ REFUSED TO MAKE FURTHER STATEMENTS PREFERR ING TO WAIT FOR
OFFICIAL WORD FROM HABANA. SEVERAL TIMES HE DENIED THAT THE ASSASS IN WAS
INVOLVED IN THE FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE INS IST ING THAT THIS PERSON IS ONLY
A SUSPECT AND THAT EXTREME, RIGHT ISTS OR SEGREGATION ISTS ARE TO BLAME. MARTINEZ
SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WOULD TRY TO PUT THE BLAME
ON CUBA.
2. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO CINCLANT.
SECRET
END OF MESSAGE
CLASSIFICATION - DISSECTION
***NO"PUREIGN DISSEM

NW 50955 DocId: 32282904 Page 3
177-10001-10305
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date: 8/26/201

Agency Information
AGENCY: LBJ
RECORD NUMBER: 177-10001-10305

RECORD SERIES : VP SECURITY FILE, CUBA, MISC. PAPERS, 5/61 & 11-12/62, BOX 9

AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Information
ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM: CIA
TO:
TITLE:

DATE: 03/27/1963
PAGES: 44

SUBJECTS: NEED SUBJECT ASSIGNED

DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: 1B
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 06/04/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS: DOC. #2

v9.1
NW 50955 DocId:32283208 Page 1

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2
CENTRALINTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Memorandum

NTRAL INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AGENCY
CUBAN TRAINING OF
LATIN AMERICAN SUBVERSIVES
27 March 1963

SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32283208 Page 2

THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

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27 March 1963

CUBAN TRAINING OF
LATIN AMERICAN SUBVERSIVES

SUMMARY . Page 1

DISCUSSION
A. Recruitment of Trainees 2
B. Travel. 2
C. Numbers of Trainees 4
D. Training. 5
E. Subsequent Employment and
Countermeasures 6
F. Purpose and Propaganda. 7

ATTACHMENTS
Argentina 8
Bolivia .10
Brazil. .12
Chile 14
Colombia. .15
Costa Rica. .17
Dominican Republic. .18
Ecuador 20
El Salvador 22
Guatemala # # .23
Haiti .25
Honduras. .26
Mexico. .28
Nicaragua .30
Panama. .32
Paraguay. .34
Peru. .35
Uruguay .37
Venezuela .38
Others. .41

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OCI No. 0515/63

27 March 1963

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

MEMORANDUM: Cuban Training of Latin American Sub-
versives

SUMMARY
1. We estimate that at least 1,500 to 2,000
Latin Americans have received guerrilla training or
political indoctrination in Cuba.

2. We have recorded the travel of 5,059 Latin
Americans to Cuba in 1962, and reporting to date in-
dicates that at least another 417 went during the
first two months of 1963.

3. Field replies to a survey estimate that there
were about 11,000 arrests in Latin America during the
past 15 months for terrorism, sabotage, guerrilla ac-
tivity, or other subversive activity. Only a small
percentage of those arrested, however, were brought to
trial; almost all were released after varying periods
of detention.

4. Current efforts to improve and exploit re-
porting on travel to Cuba had not made themselves
felt during the reporting period. The security serv-
ices of Latin American countries accordingly were un-
able, with isolated individual exceptions, to estab-
lish Cuban direction, instigation or training of ar-
rested subversives.

5. Incidence of guerrilla, terrorist, and sab-
otage activity at present is highest in Venezuela,
Peru, and--in the form of largely non-political ban-
ditry--Colombia. There is sporadic guerrilla activity
in and around Nicaragua and Guatemala, and a guerrilla
potential in Ecuador and Brazil.

NW 50955 DocId:32283208 Page 5
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A.
SECRET
DISCUSSION
Recruitment of Trainees
1. Candidates for subversive training in Cuba
are selected by the leftist organizations sponsoring
such activity in their homeland. These organizations
are not always Communist, particularly in countries
where the regular Communist leadership is less mil-
itant than other extremist groups. One training
group of Argentines included Peronists, Trotskyites,
and Vanguard Socialists. A Peruvian group has sent
to Cuba for extended guerrilla training youths who
are not members of any organizations but have ex-
pressed leftist ideas.

2. In countries where there is Cuban diplo-
matic representation, candidates are screened by
the embassy's G-2 officer. We have no information
on how approval is granted in countries which have
no diplomatic relations with Cuba.

B. Travel
1. There is a concerted effort to conceal or
obscure the amount of travel to Cuba, the identities
of the travelers, and the length of their stay. Docu-
ments are falsified and such devices as detachable
visas, circuitous travel, and some surreptitious bor-
der crossing are used.

2. Since the October crisis, the only Western
Hemisphere access to Cuba by scheduled airline has
been through Mexico. Throughout the reporting period
Mexican authorities have been photographing passports
of travelers arriving from or leaving for Cuba, and
relaying the information to interested OAS members.
In some cases the travelers themselves have been pho-
tographed.

3. Cuban embassies, however, have been issuing
visas on separate sheets of paper to avoid any re-
cord of Cuban travel in the passport. In addition,
since some passports are fraudulent, the Mexican re-
port of Cuban travel may neither reach the correct
country nor permit identification. At this agency's
suggestion, Mexican travel control authorities late
in February began stamping passports to show arrival
from or departure for Cuba. While this effectively
counters the device of the detachable visa in the
-2-

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case of legitimate passports, most Latin American
countries have inadequate personnel and adminis-
trative machinery to scrutinize the passports of
returning travelers.

4. Travel control in Mexico City logged
4,912 legal travelers to Cuba in 1962, and 969
in the first two months of 1963. (These figures
do not cover access by other routes prior to the
quarantine in 1962, and include Cubans as well as
all other nationalities. Accordingly they do not
correlate with totals for legal and illegal travel
to Cuba derived from available reporting in the in-
dividual Latin American countries. It should also
be noted that a "legal" traveler in Mexican reporting
may be listed as an illegal traveler by his homeland,
either because he had no authorization to visit Cuba,
or because of fraudulent documentation.)

5. Anniversary celebrations, goodwill tours,
and international conferences afford pretexts for
travel to Cuba ostensibly unconnected with subver-
sive training. Identities of trainees are usually
protected by pseudonyms, at least during actual
training, and the guerrilla candidate may return to
his Havana hotel every few days to maintain a fic-
tion of sightseeing. There have also been reports
that trainees have for cover purposes attributed ex-
tended stays in Cuba to detention by Cuban police.

6. Prior to the October crisis, there was
some direct travel to Cuba from Central American
countries, and occasional Cubana charter flights,
but the main jump-off points were Mexico City,
Curacao, and Trinidad. A Canadian non-scheduled
airline has operated a few flights between Canada
and Havana, carrying both personnel and cargo. Cu-
ban freighters call fairly regularly at Mexican
ports, and some Latin American trainees could reach
Cuba aboard Cuban ships picking up rice in British
Guiana. There is small ship traffic, of unknown
but limited extent, between Cuba and neighboring
islands.

7. Soviet and Czech airlines continue trans-
atlantic service to Cuba, and Iberian airlines on
11 February announced resumption of a schedule of
two flights a month to Havana via the Azores. Aero-
flot has occasionally sought and received permission
NW 50955 DocId: 32283208 Page 7
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to land at Recife, Brazil, en route to Havana, and
may have picked up some passengers
8. Controlled sources who have undergone guer-
rilla training, and a comparison of inbound and out-
bound travelers identified by travel controls make
it clear that at least in the case of guerrilla
trainees one leg of the travel is often by way of
bloc countries and Western Europe. We know of Latin
Americans given Cuban training who appear on no
travel controls, suggesting that travel in both di-
rections was either by way of the bloc or completely
surreptitious.

9. A center providing funds and forged pass-
ports for travel to Cuba is known to exist in Monte-
video, Uruguay. The Cubans are known to provide
forged passports for some of the returning trainees.
One group of Argentines returning through Prague and
Western Europe was furnished with both Cuban and
Ecuadorean passports, to be surrendered in Monte-
video prior to re-entering Argentina.

C. Numbers of Trainees
1. Our estimate that 1,500 to 2,000 Latin Amer-
icans have received subversive training in Cuba is
derived from a combination of travel information, de-
briefing of controlled sources who have taken training,
penetrations of sponsoring organizations, and in a
few cases from the records of cooperating Latin Amer-
ican security services.

2. Monitoring of travel into Cuba gives some
indication of how many have stayed long enough to
receive training, but does not permit differentiation
between military training and political indoctrination.
We cannot establish a hard total or be certain about
length of visit because of travel via the bloc. Forged
documentation obscures an accurate nationality break-
down of the travelers.

3. The hardest figures on guerrilla trainees by
nationality are obtained from established and reliable
sources who have access to such information through
sponsoring organizations and in a number of cases have
themselves taken such training in Cuba. We do not,
however, have enough such sources to provide independ-
ently a comprehensive total of Latin America. Only a
few of the local Latin American security services have
adequate assets for contributing such information.
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NW 50955 DocId: 32283208 Page 8

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D. Training
1. The scope of training varies with the time
available. One agent who participated in a four-
week course in mid-1961 received basic training
covering cross-country movement of guerrillas, use
and maintenance of weapons, and basic guerrilla
tactics. Another clandestine source who spent
nearly six months in Cuba in 1962 devoted more than
10 weeks of training to weaponry, communications,
the fortification of defense positions, combat tactics,
general strategy, map-reading, security, and sabotage.
Both men reported considerable time devoted to polit-
ical indoctrination and physical conditioning.

2. One controlled agent reported that his en-
tire group was required to fill out an extensive ques-
tionnaire aimed at developing targets in the homeland
for sabotage, subversion of military and police, il-
legal entry and movement, operation of dummy business
concerns to cover clandestine operations, and possible
zones for air-drops.

3. Extensive use is made of Che Guevara's book
on guerrilla warfare. The trainees also use a hand-
book by Alberto Bayo, former colonel in the Spanish
Republican air force who trained the original guer-
rilla group with which Castro invaded the Sierra
Maestra. Thousands of copies of these books, in Span-
ish or in Portuguese, have been printed or mimeographed
and are circulating in Latin America. Some have been
specifically revised for individual countries.

4. We also have reports of related courses of
instruction, lasting as much as six to eight months,
in such fields as espionage, psychological warfare,
political action, agent communications, and military
medicine. Some of the trainees are women.

5. Most of the instructors of the guerrilla
warfare courses are Cuban. There are some reports
of Spanish instructors. Del Bayo himself is too
old to participate actively, but apparently has an
"emeritus" connection. General Enrique Lister has
been reported to be associated with guerrilla training.
There have been a number of reports, without hard con-
firmation, that Soviet and satellite instructors han-
dle some of the more sophisticated training in such
matters as sabotage and espionage.
NW 50955 DocId: 32283208 Page 9
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6. Reports of trainees indicate that weapons
training is confined to weapons they will be able
to obtain, maintain, and replenish in their own
countries. We have reliable and corroborative re-
ports that trainees and sponsoring leaders alike
have been told Cuba does not intend to supply ap-
preciable quantities of weapons because a guer-
rilla must be self-sustaining. It should be noted
that while Cuba does supply some funds, guerrilla
handbooks also suggest that bank robberies make
guerrillas self-sufficient in this respect. Leftist
militants have in fact resorted to robberies in
Peru, Venezuela, and Argentina

E. Subsequent Employment and Countermeasures
1. Clandestine reporting has established a
number of incidents of sabotage, terrorism, guer-
rilla activity and other subversive action in which
individuals known to have received training in Cuba
have participated. The clearest cases involved the
establishment of local guerrilla training camps by
Ecuadoreans and Brazilians returning from training
in Cuba. In each case, however, our evidence of
the guerrilla training in Cuba comes from clandes-
tine sources, there is no legal evidence of such
Cuban instruction, and there has been no move to
prosecute. All 48 arrested in Ecuador were re-
leased after short detention. Two individuals ar-
rested in connection with the Peasant League training
activities in Brazil are still known to be detained.

2. The records maintained by Latin American
security services are inadequate and far from stand-
ardized, so that it has been difficult to establish
a statistical approach to arrests for all types of
subversive activities. Available reporting indicates
at least 11,000 such arrests since 1 January 1962,
but a survey shows that most of these arrests amounted
to little more than detention and some interrogation.
There were relatively few trials and convictions, prob-
ably not exceeding five per cent of arrests.

3. Some of those arrested were released for lack
of evidence, In other cases, for example in Ecuador,
Brazil, and in Peru until last January, there has been
little evidence of any inclination on the part of the
government to prosecute. In cases where trials have
taken place, the local security services have frequently
-6-
{
NW 50955 DocId: 32283208 Page 10
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been unable to establish any Cuban connection, as in
the case of the 139 guerrillas tried in Venezuela
last fall.

4. In the absence of a comprehensive statis-
tical approach, information on arrests, trials,
and the involvement of Cuban trainees in subversive
activities is given in the individual country re-
ports attached to this memorandum.

F. Purpose and Propaganda
1. Fidel Castro stated in July 1960: "We
promise to continue making Cuba the example that
can convert the Cordillera of the Andes into the
Sierra Maestra of the American continent." For the
past year Cuban spokesmen have been taking the line
in public that Cuba provides the example for Latin
American revolution, with the implication that nothing
more than guidance need be exported. In private, they
have been offering training and financial and technical
assistance to Latin American revolutionaries. While
Cuba's economic dependence on the USSR restrains a
wholehearted endorsement of the more militant Peiping
attitude, Guevara and Education Minister Armando Hart
insist both in public speeches and in private remarks
to visiting Communists that "Socialism" can be brought
about in Latin America only by force.

2. Direction and support by propaganda is on
a massive scale. The work of Radio Havana and of the
Prensa Latina news service is backed up by bulk mail
and even air freight shipments. Postal and customs
authorities in Panama, for instance, are destroying
a monthly average of 12 tons of Cuban propaganda which
is entering or being sent through Panama. Costa Rica
averaged 10 tons in 1962.

3. Radio Havana's international service, started
in May 1961, now leads all Latin American international
services in program hours. It broadcasts a weekly total
of 188 hours of propaganda in languages including Spanish,
Portuguese, Haitian Creole, English, French, and Arabic.
This includes 108-1/2 hours in Spanish to the Americas,
7 hours in Portuguese, 7 hours in Haitian, and 17-1/2
hours in English to the Western Hemisphere. It also
originates black broadcasts on occasions such as the
disorders in the Dominican Republic in late 1961, and
makes transmitters available to Latin American exile
groups.

Attached annexes discuss Cuban training of Latin
American subversives on a country-by-country basis.
SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32283208 Page 11

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27 March 1963
ARGENTINA
1. About 500 Argentines are estimated to have
traveled illegally to Cuba for training in subversive
activities. One training group alone, given guerrilla
warfare training over a six-month period in 1962,
varied in number from 34 to 50. For the past four
months departures from Argentina for Cuba have averaged
35-40 a month. Argentine intelligence says 80 of the
500 are known to have received guerrilla training;
the number is probably considerably higher.

2. The federal district around Buenos Aires re-
cords no arrests for guerrilla activity. There were
155 arrests and three convictions for sabotage in 1962,
and 14 arrests, but no convictions, to date in 1963.
Records on terrorist activity show 468 cases, 60 arrests,
and 27 convictions in 1962; 121 cases, two arrests and
two convictions in 1963. Argentine police also list
628 arrests in 1962 and 1963 on the broader charge of
"subversive activity."

3. Altogether police files show 1,285 incidents
of sabotage or terrorism, of which 425 were committed
by unknown persons. Police have no evidence that any
of those arrested or convicted are known to have re-
ceived training in Cuba.

4. None of the individuals known to have re-
ceived extensive Cuban training hold influential
positions, but the following individuals in position
of influence have traveled to Cuba and may have re-
ceived some training:

Fanny Edelman, former secretary-general of
the Argentine Communist women's organization UMA,
presently assigned to foreign liaison of the Argentine
Communist Party.

Maria Josefa de Mastroberti, prominent member
of the Cuban Solidarity Committee for Argentina.

Osaias Leon Schujman, director of the Federation
of Communist Youth, national deputy for the Argentine
NW 50955 DocId:32283208 Page 12
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Communist Party, reportedly a supplier of false pass-
ports for travel to Cuba.

Jorge Francisco Timossi, former Argentine
representative for Prensa Latina.

Hector Villalon, prominent Peronist close
to Peron.

5. Argentine guerrilla training units in Cuba
have been mixed, including Peronists, Communists, and
Vanguard Socialists. There are indications that the
most active recruitment is carried on by the Argentine
Communist Party and by the Communist-influenced left
wing of the Peronist movement, under the direction of
John William Cooke in Cuba. His wife, Alicia Cooke,
lives in Montevideo, Uruguay, which is the principal
center providing funds and forged documentation for
the recruits.

6. An Argentine taking a six-month course re-
ceived training in weapons, marksmanship, explosives,
ballistics, communications, strategy, tactics, sani-
tation, closed and open order drill, and construction
of defenses. Weapons used included Mauser and Garand
rifles, Brownings, Thompson submachineguns, bazookas,
81-mm mortars, and a 57-mm recoilless cannon.
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27 March 1963

BOLIVIA
1. About 500 Bolivians traveled legally to Cuba
in 1962, and 25 in the first two months of 1963. There
have been no arrests of pro-Cuban agitators for sab-
otage, terrorist, guerrilla, or other subversive
activities in Bolivia to date.

2. We can identify by name 214 of the travelers
to Cuba. The individuals who killed a number of anti-
Communists during a pro-Cuban demonstration on 26
October 1962 were identified as having visited Cuba.
Six of these agitators were indicted but released
when government investigators placed the blame for
the incident on anti-Communists.

3. Otherwise there have been no known incidents
which might be attributed to Cuban training.

4. Zenon Barrientos Manani, a national deputy
belonging to the Bolivian Communist Party (PCB),
since his return from Cuba has been reported with-
out confirmation to be organizing guerrilla forces
among Bolivian peasants. The same untested source
said Barrientos was active in supplying weapons to
Peruvian guerrillas and had aided Peruvian guerrilla
leader Hugo Blanco during a reported Bolivian visit
by Blanco.

5. Other Bolivians in positions of influence
who have been in Cuba long enough to receive train-
ing include:

Daniel Saravia Quiroz, secretary-general of
the Bolivian Labor Confederation (COB). (Saravia,
however, is reported to have changed his beliefs
since his travel to England.)

Baldomero Castel, COB leader.

Oscar Salas, mine leader.

Oscar Sanjines, leader of the Cochabamba
Labor Federation.

Ofelia Altamirano de Sabrabi, factory wor-
kers' leader.
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Student and youth leaders Andres Soliz Rada,
Dulfredo Rua, Walter Quisbert Barrios, and Alberto
de la Barra.

PCB leading members Mario Manje and Hilario
Claure.

Alcides Monasterios, national deputy of the
left-wing sector of the governing National Revolu-
tionary Movement (MNR).

6. In January 1963, there were 60 Bolivian
scholarship students in Cuba who had attended com-
pulsory 20-day courses of military instruction.
The Cuban charge in Bolivia reportedly said last
month that Cuba expected to give more than 80 schol-
arships to Bolivians in 1963.

7. The Bolivian government in June 1961, pub-
lished documents purporting to prove that left ex-
tremists had been corresponding with the Cuban Em-
bassy in an effort to obtain arms and instruction
for pro-Castro "combat groups." While Bolivia has
had extensive paramilitary formations ever since
the MNR defeated the armed forces and seized con-
trol, and while the extreme left of the MNR in
particular has strong militia units, we know of no
paramilitary formations linked directly with Cuban
subversion.

8. We assume, however, that some proportion
of the 500 legal travelers received indoctrination
while in Cuba.
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27 March 1963

BRAZIL
1. Approximately 400 Brazilian nationals trav-
eled legally to Cuba in 1962, and another 24 the
first two months of 1963. A total of about 50 Bra-
zilians are believed to have received specific guer-
rilla warfare training in Cuba, starting with a con-
tigent of 12 men in July-August 1961. We know of
19 Brazilian specifically. A defecting Cuban army
officer who claims to have run a base for guerrilla
training reports that 37 Brazilians took courses
there at a time which does not coincide with the 19
cases in our records.

2. At least four of the guerrilla trainees in
the original contingent of 12 were connected with
the guerrilla training camps of the Brazilian Peas-
ant Leagues, exposed by the Varig air crash docu-
ments. At least six such camps were established,
and each was to have 30 men and at least one leader
trained in Cuba. Only one of the Cuban trainees is
known to have been arrested. Altogether there were
only three arrests, although 24 additional warrants
were issued.

3. All of the Brazilians we can identify as
guerrilla trainees have come from the regular or
the dissident Communist party or the Marxist-oriented
Peasant Leagues of Francisco Juliao. Trainees sent
by the Leagues were in some cases also members of
the regular Communist party.

4. Brazilians in positions of influence known
to have received training in Cuba include:

Clodomir dos Santos Morais, number two man
in the Peasant Leagues, and principal agent in set-
ting up the training camps; still in custody.

Joaquim Ferreira, Pedro Motta Barros,
Rivadiva Braz de Oliveira, and Amaro Luiz de Car-
valho, Peasant League leaders. (Ferreira, a lawyer,
is a former economist for SUDENE, development agency
for the impoverished northeast. Barros and de Oliveira
are also student leaders, and Barros is a Communist
Party youth leader.)
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Florentino Alcantara de Moraes, Pernambuco
state leader of the regular Communist Party of Bra-
zil.

Carlos Danielli, Angel Arroyo, Mauricio
Grabois, and Joao Amazonas, leaders of the dissident
Communist Party.
NW 50955 DocId: 32283208 Page 17
-13-
SECRET

SECRET
27 March 1963
CHILE
1. There were 551 legal travelers from Chile
to Cuba in 1962, and another 110 in the first two
months of 1963. (Anniversary celebrations tend to
make travel in January higher than the monthly av-
erage.) In addition, field reports show about 400
illegal travelers in 1962, under a definition which
lists nationals of one country who obtain their
Cuban visas in a third country as "illegal."

2. We have no hard clandestine evidence of
Chilean guerrilla trainees. A defecting Cuban army
lieutenant has told reporters that a base he com-
manded gave 19 Chileans guerrilla training in late
1961. Since neither travel to Cuba nor the large
Communist party is illegal in Chile, a Chilean na-
tional has little reason, other than the intention
to take subversive training, to conceal travel to
Cuba. On this basis it would appear to be a safe
assumption that more than half of the illegal trav-
elers probably received military or political in-
doctrination.

3. The only known arrests in the past 15 months
for subversive activity took place in October 1962,
when five members of the Progressive Socialist Move-
ment (MSP) were arrested following an explosion while
they were assembling bombs in a downtown Santiago
apartment. Four of the five were released after three
days; the fifth, whose hand had been blown off, was
given a jail sentence. The bombs were to have been
used against the U.S. embassy.

4. Julio Stuardo, leader of the MSP and one
of those arrested, had traveled to Cuba, but is not
known to have received any particular training. He
had been photographed prior to the bombing incident
with Cuban embassy officials believed to be intel-
ligence officers.

5. There are no Chileans in positions of in-
fluence who are known to have received training in
Cuba. However leftist Senator Salvador Allende, the
probable FRAP candidate in the next presidential elec-
tion, has made numerous visits to Cuba.
NW 50955 DocId:32283208 Page 18
-14-
SECRET

SECRET
27 March 1963

COLOMBIA
1. We have record of about 400 Colombians
who traveled to Cuba legally during the past year,
and no record of any illegal travel. Approximately
100 appear on manifests via Curacao, and 65 via
Mexico City. Travel information on the remaining
235 is based on agent reports and liaison.

2. Of these 400, 37 are reported to have re-
ceived training in guerrilla warfare, one in coun-
terintelligence, and one attended a staff or cadre
school.

3. Most of those selected for training are
members of either the United Front for Revolutionary
Action (FUAR) or the Worker-Student-Peasant Move-
ment (MOEC). Both are made up of revolutionaries,
dissident Communists, and recruits from the ranks
of labor, students, and the unemployed lower classes.
Both receive Cuban financial support, and are at-
tempting--without appreciable success to date--to
coordinate operations with the bandit gangs terror-
izing the violence areas of Colombia.

4. Two guerrilla leaders imprisoned in 1961--
Eddie Aristizabal of MOEC and Tulio Bayer--and one
killed in 1961--Antonio Larotta of MOEC--were re-
ported to have received guerrilla warfare training
in Cuba. Larotta's training was in 1959.

5. Colombian army statistics (which the U.S.
army attaché considers on the high side because of
the statistical procedures used) list 2,582 rural
bandits captured and 1,029 individuals detained on
suspicion of involvement in rural banditry in 1962,
and 300 captured and 134 detained in the first two
months of 1963. The Colombian army has no statistics
on subsequent trials, but on the basis of past ex-
perience it is estimated that about two percent of all
those arrested and detained--i.e., about 80 persons--
were convicted and sentenced. The bandits are not
considered guerrillas in a political sense, although
some Cuban propaganda has been found on dead bandits.
There were 388 bandits killed in rural areas in 1962,
and 89 in 1963.
NW 50955 DocId: 32283208 Page 19
-15-
SECRET
(

SECRET
6. According to official records, there were
13 terrorist attempts in Colombia during 1962, in
the course of which nine terrorists were captured,
and one was killed. Three of those captured--all
members of FUAR--were convicted. One of the three,
Alvaro Santiago Paz of Cali, is known to have
traveled to Cuba. To date in 1963 there have been
15 terrorist attempts, including eight in Bogota.
There have been 16 captured and one killed in Bogota
preparing or attempting terrorist acts. One terrorist,
identified as a FUAR member, was convicted in Cali.
One terrorist, not yet identified, was captured in
Medellin.

7. Santiago is the only captured subversive
known to have been in Cuba. Three leading members
of MOEC--Aristizabal, mentioned above; Pedro Abella;
and Fabio Molino--are known to have received training
in Cuba.

NW 50955 DocId: 32283208 Page 20
1
-16-
SECRET

SECRET
27 March 1963
COSTA RICA
1. A total of 216 Costa Ricans visited Cuba
in 1962. As many as 30 probably received para-
military training.

2. In February, 1963, 21 Costa Ricans re-
turned from visits of four to six months. It has
been reliably established that nine of them were
trained as instructors in guerrilla warfare, and
one was trained as an organizer and instructor for
militia training. The length of stay suggests
that the remaining 1l also received paramilitary
instruction. Three other Costa Ricans, including
one woman, known to have gone to Cuba for such
training are not yet reported to have returned
to Costa Rica.

3. Two Costa Rican Communist leaders are
reported independently by fairly reliable sources
to have stated that guerrilla warfare training
camps are to be established in Costa Rica. The
purely Costa Rican aspect makes this a new develop-
ment; guerrilla activity in Costa Rica hitherto
has centered in the relatively wild and lightly
policed northeastern frontier area, and has been
targeted against Nicaragua.

4. There have been no arrests for sabotage,
terrorism, or guerrilla activity in Costa Rica.
About 50 have been temporarily detained for sub-
versive activity, and one individual was arrested
and jailed for one year. (This does not include
about 30 suspected subversives detained during
President Kennedy's visit.)

5. Nineteen of the 30 Costa Ricans believed
to have received guerrilla training in Cuba are
known by name. Of the 19, the only ones in posi-
tions of influence are Oscar Morera Madrigal, San
Jose physician, and Modesto Ruiz Ruiz, leader of
the Communist labor union in the banana zone.
NW 50955 DocId: 32283208 Page 21
-17-
SECRET

SECRET
27 March 1963
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
1. The Dominican Republic in 1962 and 1963
arrested 120 persons for sabotage, terrorism, or
other subversive activity. Of these, 45 were held
for an appreciable time, tried, or sentenced. This
includes 33 who were deported. Of these, three are
known or believed to have received training in Cuba.

2. There were 15 incidents in all, five of
which are considered to have been inspired by Cuban
trainees. The remainder were caused by people not
believed to have had any Cuban training.

3. There is no hard evidence of legal or ille-
gal travel from the Dominican Republic to Cuba since
1 January 1962, although some of the deportees may
have returned from Europe to Cuba. The best avail-
able estimate is that about 25 Dominicans may have
gone to Cuba illegally. We have an unconfirmed re-
port that three Dominicans went to Cuba for guer-
rilla training, and 12 others are believed to have
stayed long enough for appreciable training or in-
doctrination.

4. Individuals in positions of influence,
known or believed to have received training in
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RECORD NUMBER: 177-10001-10445
RECORD SERIES : NSF, JOHN MCCONE MEMORANDA, MTGS. 6 JAN. 64-2 APR. 64, BOX 1
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Information
ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM: MCCONE, JOHN
TO:

TITLE:

DATE: 02/21/1964
PAGES: 2

SUBJECTS:
NEED SUBJECT ASSIGNED
DOCUMENT TYPE: MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
CLASSIFICATION: Secret
RESTRICTIONS: Withhold
CURRENT STATUS:
DATE OF LAST REVIEW:
OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS: DOC. #12

v9.1
NW 50955 DocId: 32283348 Page 1

SECRET-EYES ONLY

20 February 1964
10
12
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President 20 February 1964 Alone

1. I advised the President of my willingness to go with him and to meet
early in the day with General Eisenhower if he thought this would be
constructive. He said he felt General Eisenhower might feel he was being
high-pressured and that he intended merely to advise him of the plan to
surface the OXCART and exchange formalities. He would then tell him hé
was ordering me to go out and brief him in the next week or two and I
should make my own arrangements.

2. I told the President we had a very sensitive effective operation
working in Mexico City jointly with President Mateos which involved
telephone surveillance and was being done in a most careful manner with
his knowledge and with the assistance of a few of his trusted officials.
This had resulted in a very intimate relationship between our station chief,
Mr. Win Scott and the President. Ambassador Mann knew of this from
Scott, as did certain selected people in State Department. However
President Mateos did not know of Mann's knowledge of the operation and
looked upon the operation as an intimate arrangement between himself and
the CIA station. I mentioned that Mateos had been best man at Win Scott's
recent wedding. I said the President should not mention this but I wanted
him to know about it if it was raised by President Mateos.

3. I told President Johnson that we continued our interrogation of
Nosenko; our counterintelligence people were inclined to feel he was a
plant but had not made up their minds. President said he thought he was
probably legitimate and would give us some good information. I said I
hoped this was true that we certainly were taking advantage of everything
that he did give us; that we were working closely with the FBI, however we
could only conclude at the moment that the Soviet's performance and
action were so different from any other defector case that our suspicions
had been aroused. The President asked to be kept informed.

4. The President then raised the question of Spain, suggesting I
might return to Spain to talk again to Franco. He said he was in a very
difficult situation because of announcement of the cut-off of aid to
Britain, France and Yugoslavia which he did not know about until he read it
in the paper, and that he was beside himself because he wanted to give aid
of $31 million to Spain but had the greatest difficulty in the justification.

NW 50955 DocId: 32283348 Page 2
SECRET-EYES ONLY

SECRET-EYES ONLY
I told the President it was my impression from information gained from
clandestine sources that Franco had made some moves to curtail trade
with Cuba after my visit with him but that the Spanish companies were
endeavoring to circumvent his orders by various surreptitious methods.
The President asked that I study the matter carefully and speak to him
about it next week.

ACTION: I have asked Mr. O'Ryan to contact Noel
and I am asking Mr. Ball to contact Ambassador Woodward to
determine whether the Spanish had taken any actions which they
have announced or might communicate to us which would indicate
an intention on their part to curtail or restrict shipping or trade
with Cuba.

5. The President then said he wanted to do everything possible to
get me out of the cloak and dagger business. That he was tired of
a situation that had been built up that every time my name or CIA's name
was mentioned, it was associated with a dirty trick. He asked if our
economic studies had stood up and I said yes, they had, and that they were
reconfirmed and supported by an exhaustive article in TIME Magazine.
The President seemed pleased at this, expressed satisfaction in CIA's
operations but was most emphatic in his feelings that we should get away
from the cloak and dagger image and expressed a determination to bring
this about by statements he would make from time to time.

JAM/mfb
NW 50955 DocId: 32283348 Page 3
SECRET-EYES ONLY
177-10002-10012
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AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Information
ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM:
TO:
TITLE:
DATE: 02/18/1963
PAGES: 7
SUBJECTS: NEED SUBJECT ASSIGNED
DOCUMENT TYPE: DRAFT BRIEFING NOTES
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: 1A
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW:
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS:

v9.1
NW 50955 DocId: 32205169 Page 1
20

SECRET
Guba 2
DRAFT BRIEFING NOTES 18 February 1963
CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

I. Introductory Statement
The public pronouncements of Cuban leaders, the
daily record of events in Latin America, and reports
from our intelligence sources within Communist and
other left-extremist elements throughout this hemis-
phere all agree on one salient conclusion: that
Fidel Castro is encouraging and supporting the efforts
of Communists to overthrow and seize control of the
governments in Latin America.
A. Analysis indicates that the immediate threat
stems less from the subversive efforts of tra-
ditional Communist movements than from Cuban
support of any and all active revolutionary and
terrorist movements.
B. These distinctions are not precise. In some
countries, Castro's original success has spurred
the established Communist movement to action,
and he supports it. In others, the old-time
Communists may even oppose radical action at this
time, and Castro works with more active and more
militant revolutionists.

NW 50955 DocId: 32205169 Page 2
SECRET

c. SECRET
In any event, we know of only two coun-
tries--Mexico and Uruguay--where Castro
appears inclined for the time being to
forego inciting violence, and this only
because he wants a favorable climate for
his operations into other countries.
II. Even before the October missile crisis--and
with increasing rancor since then--Cuban leaders
have been exhorting revolutionary movements to
violence and terrorism, and supporting their
activities,
A. Cuban support takes many different forms.
We have occasional evidence of direct
participation by Cuban nationals, as in
the La Oroya disorders in Peru in December.
We know that some funds move, generally in
cash by courier, from Cuba to the revolu-
tionaries in other countries. While we have
not been able to come up with the kind of
airtight proof a court would require that
weapons move directly from Cuba to these
same groups, we do know that Cuba furnishes
money to buy weapons, and that some guer-
rilla forces in Peru, for instance, are
equipped with Czech weapons which most
logically would come from Cuba.
-2-
SECRET
NW 50955 DocId:32205169 Page 3

B.
c.
SECRET
But by and large, our evidence shows that
Cuba is not now attempting a large program
of physical support for Latin American rev-
olutionaries. It is, rather, concentrating
on supplying the inspiration, the guidance,
the training, and the communications and
technical assistance they require.
In essence, Castro tells would-be revolu-
tionaries from other Latin American coun-
tries: "Come to Cuba; we will pay your
way, we will train you in underground or-
ganization techniques, in guerrilla warfare,
in sabotage and in terrorism. We will see
to it that you get back to your homeland.
Once you are there, we will keep in touch
with you, give you propaganda support, send
you propaganda materials for your movement,
training aids to expand your guerrilla forces,
secret communications methods, and perhaps
funds and specialized demolition equipment."
Castro is not, as far as we know, promising
these other Latin Americans any Cuban weapons
or Cuban personnel--either leaders, ad-
visers, or cadres. But he probably does
tell them: "If you succeed in establishing
NW 50955 DocId: 32205169 Page 4
-3-
SECRET

D.
SECRET
something effective by way of a revolu-
;
tionary movement in your homeland, if your
guerrillas come down out of the hills
and confront regular armed forces, then we
may consider more concrete forms of assist-
ance."
So far, it should be noted, none of the
movements in South America has reached this
final stage--and in fact even Castro's
Sierra Maestra guerrillas never had to fight
a pitched battle with regular military
formations which might have required more
advanced weapons than small arms, grenades,
mines, and machineguns. In many ways, Cuba
under Castro is the Latin version of the old
Comintern, inciting, abetting, and sustain-
ing revolution wherever it will flourish.
:
III. Before going into more detailed evidence of Cuban
subversion in Latin America, I should note that
Venezuela is apparently number one on Cuba's
priority list for revolution.
A. Fidel Castro said so to the recent meeting
of Communist front organizations for Latin
American women.
1. Che Guevara and Blas Roca both empha-
sized the outlook for revolution.in
Venezuela in speeches in January.
-4-
SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32205169 Page 5

SECRET
B.
2.
One of our established sources of proven
reliability, high in the ranks of the
Venezuelan Communist Party ((a veteran
party member and leader of the FALN)),
says the Central Committee agreed in Jan-
uary that a "peaceful solution to the
present situation in Venezuela is out of
the question."
This same source reported that Communist guer-
rilla and terrorist operations in Venezuela
were placed under a unified command in late
1962, which coordinates activities with the
other militant extremist group in Venezuela,
the MIR. The result has been the creation of
the FALN,, or Armed Forces of National Liberation.
1.
2.
The FALN is currently trying to publicize
!
its existence by such acts as the hijack-
ing of the freighter ANZOATEGUI, and by
acts of sabotage and indiscriminate shoot-
ings. These have also been designed to
dissuade President Betancourt from his trip
to Washington.
:
I do not wish to minimize the violence in
Venezuela. The sabotage is the work of
NW 50955 DocId: 32205169 Page 6
-5-
SECRET

SECRET
3.
experts, and is being done with advanced
types of explosives. The shooting has
reached the point in Caracas where it is
not safe to go out after ten at night in
some sections of the capital. But it is
the opinion of both our people and the em-
bassy that this is not a threat to govern-
ment control. It is one thing for a group
of young men to race down a dark street
firing a machinegun from a speeding car.
It is quite a different matter to stand
up to the armed forces, or seize and hold
government buildings.
We believe that Cuba has given guerrilla
training to more nationals from Venezuela
than from any other country. I shall ex-
plain in more detail later how we arrive
at our figures on guerrilla trainees. Our
best estimate now is that more than 200
Venezuelans received such training in 1962.
a.
Many of these are engaged in terror-
ism in the cities, and others were
rounded up and given long prison
sentences when they committed themselves
NW 50955 DocId: 32205169 Page 7
-6-
SECRET

SECRET
b.
prematurely last spring in a country-
side where the rural population strongly
supports the Betancourt administration.
One of our best penetrations of the Com-
munist Party in Venezuela tells us that
at present the unified command has less
than 150 guerrillas in the field, in
widely separated groups of 15 to 25 men
each.

NW 50955 DocId: 32205169 Page 8
-7-
SECRET
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RECORD NUMBER: 177-10002-10016

RECORD SERIES: NSF, UNARRANGED FILES, LA/CUBAN SUBVERSION, BOX 5
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Document Information
ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM:
TO :
TITLE:
DATE: 02/18/1963
PAGES: 5
SUBJECTS:
NEED SUBJECT ASSIGNED

DOCUMENT TYPE: DRAFT BRIEFING NOTES
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: 1A
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 04/21/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS:

v9.1 17
NW 50955 DocId: 32205165 Page 1

SECRET

DRAFT BRIEFING NOTES 18 February 1963

FUNDING

I. Cuban financing of subversive operations in Latin
America is easy to ascertain and hard to document.
Our evidence shows that it is generally effected
by couriers carrying cash.
A. A Venezuelan politician, Fabricio Ojeda, re-
turned from Cuba in March of 1962, and was seen
by several witnesses to have large quantities
of US currency stuffed in a false-bottomed com-
partment of his suitcase. There is no law
against bringing currency into Venezuela, so
that authorities could not even determine how
much he had brought in. Ojeda later was cap-
tured, tried, and sentenced for guerrilla ac-
tivity.
B. A Nicaraguan exile, Julio Cesar Mayorga Porto-
carrera, was flying from Mexico to Honduras in
September, 1961, when weather forced the plane
to overfly Honduras and land in Nicaragua. He
was found to be carrying $3,600 in cash from
Cuba for Nicaraguan rebels in Honduras.
c. Last March Ecuadorean troops raided a guerrilla
training camp in the mountains west of Quito and

NW 50955 DocId:32205165 Page 2
SECRET

SECRET
arrested some 48 members of the URJE (Union of
Revolutionary Ecuadorean Youth). The leaders of
the group admitted having received guerrilla
training in Cuba, but there was no other evidence
at the time of any Cuban involvement. The URJE,
however, was a Communist-front group whose leaders
had thrown off the discipline of the regular Com-
munist party, and this January the Communists man-
aged to have a URJE convention, run by Young Com-
munists, expel the leaders. They were accused,
according to published accounts, of having wasted
$44,000 supplied by Cuba for guerrilla activities.
One of our reliable sources in the Communist Party
((a regional Communist leader in contact with the
Cuban chargé in Chile, and a member of the PCE
inquiry commission)) has informed us that the
next-to-last Cuban chargé in Quito blamed the
fiasco on the fact that his successor had passed
the money to the URJE without coordinating with
the regular Communist party.
D. A highly placed Guatemalan Communist who defected
last November has given us a specific account of
procedures by which Cuba sent cash to Mexico to
buy weapons which were then smuggled into Guate-
mala.

NW 50955 DocId: 32205165 Page 3
-2-
SECRET

SECRET
E. We also have considerable evidence of involved
bank transfers by which Cuban money eventually
reaches Latin American front groups to pay for
political and propaganda activity. In some
countries where the Cubans still have diplomatic
missions, we have obtained photostats showing
that Cuban diplomats paid for printing of front-
group propaganda.
F. Just last month, one of the first Brazilians to
receive guerrilla warfare training in 1961 was
picked up with a suitcase full of ammunition he
was carrying to some of those same guerrilla
training camps exposed when the Varig plane
crashed in Peru. Interestingly enough, the
Brazilians believe that the money Cuba had been
providing for the camps actually came from Com-
munist China. Since the exposure of the Varig
documents--and probably since the guerrillas
first reached the Cuban embassy in Rio with
their complaints about mismanagement, confusion,
and corruption--the Cubans have apparently
stopped financing this operation, but the evidence
shows it is still limping along. The man with
the suitcase full of ammunition said that a woman
attorney in Rio had given him the money to buy a
large hacienda as a new guerrilla camp. We know
-3-
SECRET
NW 50955 DocId:32205165 Page 4

SECRET
II. that this woman is a cut-out in the communica-
tions between the pro-Communist Peasant Leagues,
which have run the camps, and the Cuban embassy.
The principle that guerrillas must be self-sustain-
ing has obviously been applied to finances as well.
Communists have staged waves of bank robberies in
Venezuela, Peru, and Argentina.
A. The most spectacular hold-up was that of a bank
in a Lima suburb last year which netted almost
$100,000. Some of the participants have been
caught and are being tried in the mass trials
of more than 200 Communists just starting in
Peru. We know that the hold-up was carried out
by a combination of guerrillas and ordinary
criminals, who divided the loot fifty-fifty.
Some of the share of the common criminals has
been recovered, but the Communist half is be-
lieved to have reached the sizeable guerrilla
forces of Hugo Blanco in the Cuzco Valley.
B. Just last week a bank in an outlying Venezuelan
town was robbed of $25,000 by men wearing FALN
armbands.
c. Argentine police last July raided a Buenos Aires
warehouse and found evidence that it had been
the headquarters for a gang of terrorists--ap-
parently working with both the Peronists and the
-4-
SECRET
NW 50955 DocId:32205165 Page 5

SECRET
Communists--responsible for a wave of hold-ups,
burglaries, and attacks on police posts designed
to obtain funds, weapons, and explosives.

NW 50955 DocId:32205165 Page 6
-5-
SECRET
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Document Information
ORIGINATOR: STATE
FROM: DEAN RUSK
TO: THE PRESIDENT
TITLE:
DATE: 02/18/1964
PAGES: 5
SUBJECTS: NEED SUBJECT ASSIGNED
DOCUMENT TYPE: MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 04/21/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :
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v9.1
NW 50955 DocId:32205112 Page 1
12

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
"THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
999
9
Bundy
Orig & Dangan
SECRET
FEB 1 8 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Your Meeting with President Lopez Mateos
We do not expect to make any major political decisions
but want to give new emphasis to the friendly relations
which exist between Mexico and the United States. These
relations are now at an all-time high. Mexico felt it had
a real friend in President Kennedy. They feel the same
relationship exists with you but want to be reassured. A
warm Texas handshake and abrazo when you greet Lopez Mateos
at Los Angeles would symbolize the continuance of that
relationship.
We want to stress the identity of interests of our two
countries and our ability to work out in the "spirit of
El Chamizal" any problems that may arise between us.
Despite the informal atmosphere of the visit, we
should give scrupulous attention to Mexico's extreme
sensitivity on sovereign equality and Mexico's strong
desire to avoid any appearance of subservience to the
United States.
Lopez Mateos speaks for the Mexican Government and
no important decision is made without his approval. He
has followed an "independent" foreign policy but knows
that good relations with us, especially in the economic
sphere, are essential to his country. At times his foreign
policy has been too independent--for example on Cuba and in
commercial and cultural relations with Communist China.
But
NW 50955 DocId: 32205112 Page 2
SECRET
GROUP 2
Exempted from

SECRET
-2-
But when fundamental issues are at stake we have usually
found him understanding and willing to be helpful--controlling
travel of Castro agents, non-recognition of Red China, offer-
ing help on Panama.
Lopez Mateos has chosen his successor, Gustavo DIAZ
Ordaz, who will take office in December 1964 after elections
in July. Power is therefore drifting toward Diaz Ordaz.
Enclosed is a paper on points which it is suggested
you raise at the meeting, and those which it is believed
Lopez Mateos will raise.
Enclosure:
Paper on points to be
raised at the meeting
NW 50955 DocId: 32205112
Page 3
SECRET
7s/ Dean Buck
Dean Rusk

SECRET
MAJOR POINTS OF INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES
1. General Information and Hemisphere Relations
We desire to continue close working relations with
Mexico both within and outside the OAS and the UN.
We hope Mexico will continue to use its key political
and geographic position to help control Castro/Communism.
Mexico is very sensitive about publicizing its cooperation
and we have carefully avoided any public comment on Mexican
control measures.
Mexico has offered its assistance on Panama. Mexico
is not aware of the role of President Orlich of Costa Rica
in mediation efforts and we do not desire that this come to
Mexico's attention. We welcome Mexico's assistance within
an OAS context.
2. Red China
The coming visit of De Gaulle to Mexico and Brazil in
March has prompted speculation that these two countries
are about to recognize Red China. Lopez Mateos has given
us secret assurances, through CIA channels, that he has
no intention of recognizing Red China. We do not desire
to raise this issue, but if Lopez Mateos raises it, we
should let him know we are aware of his assurances.
3. Mexico's Role in the Alliance for Progress
Mexico's participation in the Alliance is essential
to its success. Mexico has played a leading role in IA-ECOSOC
and has named the Director General of the Bank of Mexico as
its representative to CIAP. It has cooperated with us in
providing extensive training facilities for Latin American
technicians. We want to encourage Mexico to make a greater
NW 50955 DocId: 32205112 Page 4
SECRET
}
contribution

SECRET
-2-1
contribution. Mexico is making renewed efforts to promote
private enterprise and we also want to encourage Mexico
along this line. We should continue to cooperate with
Mexico in maintaining financial stability and promoting
economic development.
4. Disputed Tracts on Rio Grande
There remain several tracts on the Rio Grande over
which sovereignty is in dispute. We desire to have the
International Boundary and Water Commission study these
problems and recommend a solution.
5. Control of Narcotics
Mexico and the United States are cooperating in
controlling the importation of narcotics and dangerous
drugs into the United States. We should strengthen this
cooperation in the mutual interest of both countries. We
hope therefore that Mexico will agree to periodic meetings
of the highest law enforcement officers of the two countries.
6. Desalinization Plant at Tijuana
An appraisal report by Interior shows that this is
the most economical way to supply water to Tijuana. We
are prepared to go ahead with a feasibility study if
Mexico desires and will share the cost.
MAJOR POINTS LOPEZ MATEOS IS EXPECTED TO RAISE
1. Salinity Problem on Lower Colorado
The Mexican President wants a reaffirmation of Presi
dent Kennedy's commitment "to reach a permanent and effect-
ive solution at the earliest possible time" of the salinity
problem. We can agree but should avoid any commitment on
timing. If Lopez Mateos raises the related problem of the
NW 50955 DocId:32205112 Page 5
SECRET
groundwater

SECRET
-3-
groundwater recovery program at Yuma, we agree that the
Boundary Commission should study the problem. Farmers
in the lower Rio Grande Valley are seriously concerned
about saline drainage discharged into the river by Mexico
and want the Boundary Commission to achieve an early
solution to this problem.
2. Bracero Program
The Mexican Government is privately seriously
disturbed about the termination of this program. Con-
gressional opposition to it is strong and we cannot commit
ourselves to continue the program. We are looking into the
problem to see if anything can be done to help Mexico.
possibility is an expanded community development program
in Mexico through private channels (P.L.480 foodstuffs
through U. S. voluntary agencies) if Mexico is interested.
3. Mexico's Concern about U. S. Trade Policies
Mexico is concerned about United States restrictions
One
or threatened restrictions on textiles, lead, zinc and
meat and other products and United States cotton policies
which it claims hurt Mexican cotton exports to the world
market. We recognize that we are natural markets for each
other. We desire to expand trade, promote competition and
develop markets. We want to maintain or expand the present
level of access to each other's market but we would not be
able to guarantee Mexico its present share of our market in
each commodity or a share in increased consumption.
4. Chamizal Settlement
Lopez Mateos wants to be recorded in history as the
man who returned the Mexican flag to the Chamizal. He
wants a ceremony at the Presidential level at El Paso-Ciudad
Juarez before December 1964 to symbolize the Chamizal settle-
ment. We should only agree to consult later in the year on
an appropriate ceremony and a possible date.
NW 50955 DocId: 32205112 Page 6
SECRET
177-10002-10070
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System Date: 8/26/201
Identification Form

Agency Information
AGENCY: LBJ
RECORD NUMBER: 177-10002-10070
RECORD SERIES : NSF, COUNTRY FILE, MEXICO, LOPEZ MATEOS VISIT, BOX 61
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Information
ORIGINATOR: STATE
FROM: DEAN RUSK
TO : THE PRESIDENT
TITLE:

DATE: 02/18/1964
PAGES: 5
SUBJECTS: NEED SUBJECT ASSIGNED
DOCUMENT TYPE: MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 04/21/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: DOC. #10

v9.1 11
NW 50955 DocId: 32205111 Page 1

SECRET 60
10
JLM PBM/1
February 18, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Your Meeting with President Lopez Mateos oun

We do not expect to make any major political decisions
but want to give new emphasis to the friendly relations
which exsist between Mexico and the United States. These
relations are now at an all-time high. Mexico felt it had
a real friend in President Kennedy. They feel the same
relationship exsists with you but want to be reassured.
A warm Texas handshake and abrazo when you greet Lopez Mateos
at Los Angeles would symbolize the continuance of that
relationship.
:
We want to stress the identity of interests of our
two countries and our ability to work out in the "spirit
of El Chamizal" any problems that may arise between us.

Despite the informal atmosphere of the visit, we
should give scrupulous attention to Mexico's extreme
sensitivity on sovereign equality and Mexico's strong
desire to avoid any appearance of subservience to the
United States
Lopez Mateos speaks for the Mexican Government
and no important decision is made without his approval.
He has followed an "independent" foreign policy but
knows that good relations with us, especially in the
economic sphere, are essential to his country. At times
his foreign policy has been too independent--for
example on Cuba and in commercial and cultural rela-
tions with Communist China. But when fundamental issues
are at stake we have usually found him understanding
and willing to be helpful--controlling travel of
Castro agents, non-recognition of Red China, offering
help on Panama.
Lopez Mateos has chosen his successor, Gustavo DIAZ
Ordaz, who will take office in December 1964 after
elections in July. Power is therefore drifting toward
Diaz Ordaz.

SECRET
Group 2
Exempted from automatic downgrading
By: Robert M. Sayre
NW 50955 DocId:32205111 Page 2

SECRET
- 2 -
Enclosed is a paper on points which it is suggested
you raise at the meeting, and those which it is believed
Lopez Mateos will raise.

Enclosure:
Paper on points to be
raised at meeting.
NW 50955 DocId: 32205111 Page 3
SECRET
Dean Rusk

SECRET
:
MAJOR POINTS OF INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES
1. General Information and Hemisphere Relations

We desire to continue close working relations with
Mexico both within and outside the OAS and the UN.

We hope Mexico will continue to use its key political
and geographic position to help control Castro Communism.
Mexico is very sensitive about publicizing its cooperation
and we have carefully avoided any public comment on Mexican
control measures.

Mexico has offered its assistance on Panama. Mexico
is not aware of the role of President Orlich of Costa Rica
in mediation efforts and we do not desire that this come to
Mexico's attention. We welcome Mexico's assistance within
an OAS context.
:
2. Red China:
:
The coming visit of De Gaulle to Mexico and Brazil in
March has prompted speculation that these two countries
are about to recognize Red China. Lopez Mateos has given
us secret assurances, through CIA channels, that he has
no intention of recognizing Red China. We do not desire
to raise this issue, but if Lopez Mateos raises it, we
should let him know we are aware of his assurances.

3. Mexico's Role in the Alliance for Progress
Mexico's participation in the Alliance is essential
to its success. Mexico has played a leading role in IA-
ECOSOC and has named the Director General of the Bank of
Mexico as its representative to CIAP. It has cooperated..
with us in providing extensive training facilities for
Latin American technicians. We want to encourage Mexico to
make a greater contribution. Mexico is making renewed efforts
to promote private en civate enterprise and we also want to encourage
Mexico along this line. We should continue to cooperate
with Mexico in maintaining financial stability and promoting
economic development.
SECRET
Group 2
Exempted from automatic downgrading
By Robart in fape (Nam)
NW 50955 DocId:32205111 Page 4

:
SECRET
2
4. Disputed Tracts on Rio Grande

There remain several tracts on the Rio Grande over
which sovereignty is in dispute. We desire to have the
International Boundary and Water Commission study these
problems and recommend a solution.

5. Control of Narcotics
Mexico and the United States are cooperating in
controlling the importation of narcotics and dangerous
drugs into the United States. We should strengthen this
cooperation in the mutual interest of both countries. We
hope therefore that Mexico will agree to periodic meetings
of the highest law enforcement officers of the two countries.

6. Desalinization Plant at Tijuana

An appraisal report by Interior shows that this is
the most economical way to supply water to Tijuana. We
are prepared to go ahead with a feasibility study if
Mexico desire and will share the cost.

MAJOR POINTS LOPEZ MATEOS IS EXPECTED TO RAISE
1. Salinity Problem on Lower Colorado
The Mexican President wants a reaffirmation of
President Kennedy's commitment "to reach a permanent and
effective solution at the earliest possible time" of the
salinity problem. We can agree but should avoid any commit-
ment on timing. If Lopez Mateos raises the related problem
of the groundwater recovery program at Yuma, we agree that
the Boundary Commission should study the problem. Farmers
in the lower Rio Grande Valley are seriously concerned
about saline drainage discharged to the river by Mexico and
want the Boundary Commission to achieve an early solution, to
this problem.
SECRET
Group 2
ne (nton)
Exempted from automatic downgrading
By Robert m Saigre
NW 50955 DocId: 32205111 Page 5
:
SECRET
2. Bracero Program

The Mexican Government is privately seriously
disturbed about the termination of this program.
Congressional oppostion to it is strong and we cannot
commit ourselves to continue the program. We are looking
into the problem to see if anything can be done to help
Mexico. One possibility is an expanded community develop-
ment program in Mexico through private channels (P.L. 480
foodstuffs through U.S. voluntary agencies) if Mexico is
interested.

3. Mexico's Concern about U.S. Trade Policies
Mexico is concerned about United States restrictions
or threatened restrictions on textiles, lead, zinc and
meat and other products and United States cotton policies
which it claims hurt Mexican cotton exports to the world
market. We recognize that we are natural markets for
each other. We desire to expand trade, promote competi-
tion and develop markets. We want to maintain or expand the
present level of access to each other's market but we would
not be able to guarantee Mexico its present share of our
market in each commodity or a share in increased consumption.

4. Chamizal Settlement
Lopez Mateos wants to be recorded in history as the
He
man who returned the Mexican flag to the Chamizal.
wants a ceremony at the Presidential level at El Paso-
Ciudad Juarez before December 1964 to symbolize the Chamizal
settlement. We should only agree to consult later in the
year on an appropriate ceremony and a possible date.
SECRET

Drafted by:
ARA:MEX:RMSayre
Cleared by:
ARA Mr. Mann
Interior Mr. Carr
Mr. Lanning
Labor Mr. Goodwin
Treasury Mr. Giordano
E Mr. Johnson
FE Mr. Green
L-Mr. Kearney
S/S-S Hawthorne Mills, Room 7239A, Ext. 6958
NW 50955 DocId:32205111 Page 6
177-10002-10092 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date: 12/12/20

Agency Information

AGENCY: LBJ
RECORD NUMBER: 177-10002-10092
RECORD SERIES: NSF, INTELLIGENCE FILE, CODEWORD MATERIAL, VOL. 1, BOX 6
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM:
TO:
TITLE:
DATE: 11/26/1963
PAGES: 5
SUBJECTS: INTELLIGENCE REPORT
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret
RESTRICTIONS: Consulted; Mandatory Review Material
CURRENT STATUS: Withhold
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 12/12/1997
OPENING CRITERIA:
COMMENTS: DOC. #28

v9.1

ROUTING

NAME AND ADDRESS DATE INITIALS
1 James Hathis, Spec. Access, NARA 1/14/15
2
3
4

ACTION DIRECT REPLY PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL DISPATCH RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT INFORMATION RETURN
CONCURRENCE FILE SIGNATURE
REMARKS

CONTROL NO. ESC-NLS-082/93B]
COPY 3 OF

FROM NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO DATE
Jennifer Cuddeback, UBS Library 1/14/15

Handle Via
COMINT

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

TOP SECRET
(Security Classification)

TOP SECRET
Cia - codeword
Mih

11/26 28
2

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL

WARNING

This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code, Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN COMMUNICATIONS
INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AT ALL TIMES

It is to be seen only by US personnel especially indoctrinated
and authorized to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
information; its security must be maintained in accordance with
COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS.

No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLI-
GENCE which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages
to be gained, unless such action is first approved by the Director
of Central Intelligence.

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET DINAR

BRAZILIAN AMBASSADOR ASSESSES JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION

FR WASHINGTON: BRAZILIAN EMBASSY 26 NOV 63
TO RIO DE JANEIRO: FOREIGN MINISTRY URGENT 825
(TWO-PART MESSAGE COMPLETE)
NR. 825.
CONFIDENTIAL.

THE PERSONALITY AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON, AS WELL AS THE CIRCUM-
STANCES WHICH BROUGHT HIM TO POWER, SEEM TO INDICATE
THAT AMERICAN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES, UNDER
THE NEW ADMINISTRATION, WILL PROBABLY ADHERE TO THE
FOLLOWING BASIC DIRECTIVES:

1. IN THE SHORT RUN, AS A NATURAL RESULT OF
THE MOMENTUM OF A STRONG ADMINISTRATION, SUCH AS
THAT OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY, NO PROFOUND CHANGES ARE
EXPECTED, ESPECIALLY IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN POLICY
(PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAS ALREADY STATED THAT HE WILL
FOLLOW THE FOREIGN POLICY OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY):

2. IN THE LONGER RUN, HOWEVER, ONE CAN FORE-
SEE:

A) IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN POLICY, WITH
THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT OVER THE
WHITE HOUSE "STAFF" (WHICH REFLECTED THE STRONG

TOP SECRET DINAR

TOP SECRET DINAR

PERSONALITY OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND HIS MARKED
INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL POLICY), THERE PROBABLY
WILL BE:

I) NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE FROM THE
KENNEDY LINE IN RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION;
THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WILL TEND TOWARD A WAIT-AND-
SEE ATTITUDE;

II) IN THE FIELD OF RELATIONS WITH
WESTERN EUROPE, OR MORE PRECISELY WITH FRANCE, A
LESS RIGID ATTITUDE AND ONE OF GREATER ACCEPTANCE
OF THE FRENCH POSITION, WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF MAIN-
TAINING A UNITED WESTERN FRONT VIS-A-VIS THE POSSI-
BILITY OF A POLITICAL OFFENSIVE BY THE KREMLIN:

III) IN RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA,
THE INTERVIEW WHICH PRESIDENT JOHNSON WILL HAVE
THIS AFTERNOON WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER WILL CER-
TAINLY BE MORE ENLIGHTENING THAN ANY PREDICTION
MADE AT THIS TIME;

B) IN THE FIELD OF DOMESTIC POLICY, THERE
WILL POSSIBLY BE AN IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE EXECUTIVE AND THE LEGISLATIVE WITHIN THE LINE
OF "COMPROMISE"; THE NEW PRESIDENT, MUCH MORE THE
CONSERVATIVE THAN THE INNOVATOR, WITH INTIMATE
CONNECTIONS WITH THE CONGRESS, AND A SOUTHERNER,
WILL HAVE MORE FACILITY IN GAINING APPROVAL OF THE
-2-

TOP SECRET DINAR

TOP SECRET DINAR

BIG BILLS ("CIVIL RIGHTS," "FISCAL REFORM," "MEDICAL
AID," "AID TO THE AGED," ETC.) PRECISELY BECAUSE HE
WILL ACCEPT MORE CONSERVATIVE FORMULAS OF COMPROMISE;
THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WILL ALSO TEND TO BE MORE
CONSERVATIVE WITH REGARD TO GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
IN THE ECONOMY; HOWEVER, RADICAL CHANGES CANNOT BE
EXPECTED, SINCE JOHNSON WILL ALSO FACE THE PRESSURE
OF THE MORE LIBERAL WING OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY,
AND ANY MORE PRONOUNCED SPLIT WITHIN THE PARTY WOULD
BE FATAL TO THE HOPES FOR VICTORY IN NEXT YEAR'S
ELECTION.

ROBERTO CAMPOS
-3-

TOP SECRET DINAR

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET
177-10002-10096 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 Date: 3/6/2018
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY: LBJ
RECORD NUMBER: 177-10002-10096

RECORD SERIES: NSF, INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS, 11/23/63-12/5/63, BOX I
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM:
TO:
TITLE: THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

DATE: 11/25/1963
PAGES: 11

SUBJECTS: INTELLIGENCE REPORT

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: 1B; Mandatory Review Material
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 12/12/1997

OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: DOC. #3
v9.1 1

TO:
1
2
3
4
ROUTING
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE INITIALS
James Mathis, Sper. Access, NARA V14/15
TOP SECRET
(Security Classification)

ACTION DIRECT REPLY
APPROVAL PREPARE REPLY
COMMENT RECOMMENDATION
CONCURRENCE RETURN
REMARKS: INFORMATION SIGNATURE
CONTROL NO. ESC-NLJ-083/93 B]
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS. AND PHONE NO.
DATE
Jennifer Cudde back, LB3 Library 1/14/15
COPY 2 OF
Handle Via
COMINT
Channels
Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
TOP SECRET
(Security Classification)

THE PRESIDENT'S
INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
:
:
25 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET
3

1. South Vietnam
a. Vietnamese Communist forces
kept up their high post-coup level
of activity over the weekend.

b. The most significant action
was an attack early yesterday morn-
ing against a US special forces train-
ing camp some 30 miles from Saigon.

c. When the smoke cleared after
a sharp fight, four US soldiers were
missing and at least 35 South Vietnamese
were dead.

d. Late yesterday morning, the
Viet Cong shot down two aircraft sup-
porting a government operation in
the extreme south, and damaged twelve
more. Two more Americans are missing
in this action.

e. Back in Saigon, the new re-
gime's troubles with the ambitious
General Ton That Dinh continue.

f. He is still angling to get
control of the important strategic
hamlet program and has yet to give
up command of the Third Corps, which
the generals assigned to another of
their number earlier in the month.
This corps is of particular signifi-
cance in that it surrounds Saigon.

For The President Only - Top Secret

BURMA
Manila
CAMBODIA
South
Vietnam
South
LIPPINES
China.
:
THAILAND.
Sea
!
MALAYSIA
Kuala Lumpur.
♡
BRUNEI,
Sarawak
SIA
MALAYS Sabah
Celebes Sea
SINGAPORE
SUMATRA
RI AU
ISLANDS
BORNEO
00
CELEBES
000
INDIAN
OCEAN
MALAYSIA
NDONESIA
Java Sea
Djakarta
Banda
Sea
TIMOR
CONFIDENTIAL
MILES
1000
AUSTRALIA
631.124 34176
1.
1
1
{

2. Indonesia-
Malaysia
3. Venezuela
a. Sukarno is beefing up the
subversive aspects of his confronta-
tion campaign against Malaysia.

b. Intercepted Indonesian mes-
sages indicate that regular army
units will shortly begin infiltration
operations across the border into
Sarawak and Sabah.

c. Seven thousand regular army
troops in Indonesian Borneo, the
messages show, are getting an inten-
sified course in guerrilla tactics.
This training is to be completed
next month.

d. Other messages speak of
the arrival, beginning today, of a
battalion of regulars from West Java.
(INTERCERPTS throughout)

a. The weekend was marred only
by sporadic and minor acts of ter-
rorism in several cities. Govern-
ment security forces have the situa-
tion generally under control.

b. The Venezuelan Air Force
is stepping up its efforts to track
down and destroy intruder aircraft.
The Venezuelans are convinced that
planes have been ferrying supplies
to pro-Castro guerrillas in the
mountains of the northwest.
For The President Only - Top Secret (Cont'd)

72
12
10
Rivaracaibo
RELA
70
68
66
CURAÇAO
(Neth.) BONAIRE
Amuay
El Cardón
Corp
Cabimas 2
LAGO D
ACASan Lorenzo
Encontrados
Trujillo
64
САКІВBEAN SEA
raca
Barcelona
San
Fellpe
Valenc
Maracay
Barquisimafo
San Juan
Los Teques
San Carlos de los Morros
Guanare
El Calvario
Barinas
COLOMBIA
VENEZUELA
6309195
San Fernando
de Apure
50
100
200 Miles
50
100
200 Kilometers
BRAZ
72
70
Puerto Ayacucho
La Asunción
Cardpano
Cumana
o Puerto La Cruz
:
62
60
GRENADA
(U.Κ.)
TOBAGO
Port
of-
TRINIDAD
Spain
• Matu
Puerto
Ordaz
Tucupita
BRITISH
GUIANA
¥2
10
B
4
BRAZIL
2
68
66
64
62
60
L
1
L
L..

4. Iraq
5. Syria
c. The Betancourt government
has scheduled a press conference
tomorrow to break the story that a
three-ton cache of Cuban arms has
been unearthed. A formal accusation
against Cuba is to be made before
the Organization of American States
a week from today.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

a. The air of tension in Bagh-
dad dissipated somewhat after the
government lifted the curfew and once
again permitted private vehicles on
the streets.

b. Neither the city nor its
new rulers are, however, at ease.
Troops are still very much in evi-
dence.

c. The new regime apparently
is not convinced that the hard core
of the Baath Party and its paramili-
tary supporters have been put down
for good.

a. We have information that a
showdown between the moderate and
extremist factions of the ruling
Baath Party in Syria is fast approach-
ing.
For The President Only - Top Secret (Cont'd)

6. Italy
b. A clandestine source identi-
fies Prime Minister Hafiz as the
leading figure on the side of modera-
tion. General Umran heads the doc-
trinaire extremists.

c. It was a split along the
same lines that brought about the
Baath Party's fall from power in
Iraq.

a. Premier-designate Moro ex-
pects that the program for a "center-
left" coalition government will be
approved today by the four parties
involved.

b. Details of the foreign
policy planks are not yet available,
but they were drafted with the
thought that the death of President
Kennedy makes it more important for
Italy to play an active role within
the Western alliance.

c. After the program has been
approved, the final selection of a
cabinet can be undertaken. This
could take the rest of the week,
For The President Only - Top Secret

Asast
Abha
Qizan
IRAQ
CAIRO
JORDAN
UAR
(EGYPT)
Medina.
Aswan
SAUDI
Ras
Banas
Yenbo
ARABIA
SAUDI ARABIA
Zahran
Jiddal
Najran
Mecca
Taif
Sadah
Major road
Other road or track
STATUTE MILES
100
Harad
Maydi
UNCLASSIFIED
23
Abs
Hajjah
Wadial Jaw/
SEA
Khamis Mushait
Najran
Umran
Qizan
KAMARAN
(U.K.).
Raudha
Marib
Sadah
Sirwah
SANA.
Boundary
Jihannah
Harib
Marib
SANA
Al Hudaydah
TAIZZ
Mocha
ETHIOPIA
FRENCH
SOMALILAND
lbb
ETHIOPIΑ
Qatabah
Al Bayda
Ad Dali
ADEN PROTECTORATE
5
ADEN
CADEN
KUWAIT
NEUTRAL
ZONE
undefined
Al Hudaydah
Al Bayda
TAIZZ
RIYADH
KUWAIT
ADEN PROTECTORATE
ADEN
GOLF OF ADES
630801 3
STATUTE MILES
400
YEMEN
i
1
L
1.

7. UAR-Yemen-
Egypt
a. The Saudis told our embassy
in Jidda yesterday that a Saudi vil-
lage near the Yemeni border was at-
tacked Thursday by Egyptian aircraft.

b. It was the second time this
month that Yemeni-based Egyptian air-
craft have struck across the border
into Saudi Arabia.

C. As in the previous cases,
the Saudis have lodged a formal com-
plaint with the UN Observation Mis-
sion.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)
For The President Only - Top Secret

i
NOTES

He
A. Oswald Press stories to the effect that Lee Harvey
Oswald recently visited Mexico City are true, accord-
ing to our information. Oswald visited both the
Cuban and the Soviet embassies on 28 September.
was trying, we are told, to arrange for visas so
that he could travel to the USSR via Havana. He
returned to the US on 3 October.

B. Brazil A new round of military promotions and re-
assignments will be made public today. The present
instability of the Brazilian political scene is re-
flected in the numerous reports of coup plots which
this event has precipitated.

C. USSR At last report the three Soviet range in-
strumentation ships were dead in the water 500 miles
south of Johnston Island, roughly the same position
they occupied for last year's extended range ICBM
shots. No announcement closing this area of the
Pacific to shipping has been made and there is no
activity as yet at the Tyuratam missile test center,
but we look for some action in the next few days.
(INTERCEPTS)

D. Algeria We have a report from a good clandestine
source that a group of army officers is plotting
with Defense Minister Boumedienne to overthrow Ben
Bella. A growing estrangement between the two has
been apparent for some time, but this is the first
good indication that Boumedienne is making common
cause with those who wish to turn Ben Bella out of
office.
(Cont'd)
For The President Only - Top Secret

E. Australia - Communist China Peiping has signed con-
tracts for just over one million tons of Australian
grain to be delivered early next year. We had been
expecting the Chinese Communists to enter the market,
since they had another mediocre grain crop this year.
Peiping has been buying close to five million tons
of grain for the past several years.

F. Congo We hear that the Soviet Embassy in Leopold-
ville had booked 75 places on a flight to Brussels
last Saturday. There is still no information on
whether any Soviet Embassy officials have actually
departed, however.

G. Berlin There was no new harassment of Allied ac-
cess routes to Berlin over the weekend. A total of
16 flares were fired last evening near Tempelhof
Airfield, but we connect these with Communist ef-
forts to prevent escapes from East Berlin. East
German police were observed stringing barbed wire
in the same area a short time later.

H. Laos The neutralists claim to have made significant
gains in their limited offensive in the Vang Vieng
area. They have not, however, been able to dislodge
the Pathet Lao from positions within artillery range
of the town's airport.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)
For The President Only - Top Secret
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TITLE: THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST
DATE: 11/26/1963
PAGES: 11
SUBJECTS: INTELLIGENCE REPORT
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: 1B; Mandatory Review Material
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DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 12/12/1997
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THE PRESIDENT'S
INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST
ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
26 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET

1. Iraq-Syria
a. The shaky new accommodation
between the two countries following
the recent coup in Iraq has been
threatened by Syria's action in grant-
ing asylum to Ali Saleh Saadi, the
exiled leader of the extremist wing
of the Iraqi Baath.

b. Saadi had arrived in Syria
unannounced following a brief stay
in Madrid. On Friday, Iraq sent a
message asking Syria to expel him on
grounds that sheltering him was a
breach of agreement.

c. Both regimes continue to be
troubled with internal dissension
with affairs in one deeply tangled
with those in the other.

d. In Syria, as we mentioned
yesterday, the Baathist regime is
split between moderates who desire
a broadening of the government's
power base, and a doctrinaire faction
which wants to keep all control of
the government in Baathist hands.

e. In Iraq, the pull is more
away from the Baathists. Two minis-
ters have threatened to resign unless
the government adopts an openly pro-
Egyptian policy. Nevertheless the
government feels secure enough to
ease up on curfew and transport re-
strictions imposed since the coup.

(Cont'd)
For The President Only - Top Secret

2. Laos
f. Iraq has announced that the
military union with Syria remains in
force, and that a new commander of
the joint armies will be announced
soon.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

a. Intercepted neutralist mes-
sages on Sunday reported that govern-
ment forces had finally secured Vang
Vieng and its airfield, long held
by the Pathet Lao. They also told
of the capture of Ban Namone farther
south on Route 13.

b. The neutralist, rightist Lao
Army, and Meo tribal guerrilla forces
hope to sustain their coordinated
clearing action until remaining Pathet
Lao pockets in this area north of
Vientiane are cleared,

c. Such operations in Laos
have often been followed by a Com-
munist riposte. We have a few in-
dicators that something could be up
on the Communist side, but these are
so far very tenuous indeed.

d. One such indicator is a
stand down in the last two weeks on
the Hanoi-controlled military com-
munications net in Laos which could

(Cont'd)
For The President Only - Top Secret

3. South Vietnam
point to a change in the disposition
or strength of Communist forces.
Other enemy nets are normal.

e. There are also unconfirmed
reports of North Vietnamese troop
reinforcements in the Plaine des
Jarres.
(INTERCEPTS)

a. According to press reports,
Viet Cong attacks on Sunday wiped
out two of the government's strategic
hamlets in the central highlands about
250 miles north of Saigon.

b. More than 1,000 inhabitants
in the hamlets--who are minority
tribesmen--are missing and possibly
have fled into the mountains. They
abandoned a significant quantity of
weapons to the Viet Cong.

c. These attacks not only sug-
gest continued erosion of the govern-
ment's programs to win over tribal
support, but also signal that stepped-
up Viet Cong pressure against the new
regime is spreading to the north.

(Cont'd)
For The President Only - Top Secret

22 OCTOBER 1963 ICBM FIRING FROM PLESETSK

4. USSR
d. This Communist effort is
aimed at discrediting the post-Diem
regime before the new leadership is
able to get its feet on the ground
and capture the loyalty and respect
of people in the provinces.

e. Although the Viet Cong still
continues to draw its main strength
from local recruiting, a steady stream
of cadre and training personnel con-
tinues to make its way to the south
from North Vietnam along the Laotian
border.

f. We are now reasonably sure
that at least 784 persons infiltrated
from the north during 1963 and the
actual total may be much higher.

a. There have been no further
developments in Soviet preparations
for a series of extended range ICBM
shots to the Pacific.

b. We probably should have had
by now an announcement closing an area
roughly 500 miles south of Johnston
Island to shipping. We suspect the
Soviets may have delayed it in order
not to appear to be rattling rockets
immediately after President Kennedy's
death.

(Cont'd)
For The President Only - Top Secret

5. USSR-Berlin
c. The USSR may repeat last
year's performance of multiple fir-
ings from a prototype operational
complex at Tyuratam. Three such
launchings were attempted at five-
minute intervals in May 1963; two
succeeded.

d. We also do not rule out the
possibility of firings from opera-
tional sites as opposed to the test
center at Tyuratam. We observed
the first such firing on 22 October
from the Plesetsk site, roughly 400
miles northeast of Moscow.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

a. Embassy Bonn feels that
the Soviet Union may be seeking at
least a temporary modus vivendi on
the autobahn without prejudicing
its juridical position, which can
be used to cause difficulties there
in the future.

b. The embassy bases this on
the Soviet replies to the Western
notification to the USSR on 29
October regarding harmonized convoy
procedures--two oral statements on
16 November and a note of 21 Novem-
ber.

(Cont'd)
For The President Only - Top Secret

6. Brazil
C. The Soviet note was designed
to make a record, showing that the
USSR exercises "control" of the auto-
bahn and that the recent incidents
resulted from US refusal to comply
with "existing procedures."

d. On the other hand, the Soviet
procedures described in the oral re-
plies seem to reflect actual Allied
practices, though there is enough
ambiguity to afford the USSR flexi-
bility in any future actions.

a. The danger of an immediate
coup against the Goulart regime has
receded with the reported decision
of Second Army Commander General
Bevilaqua not to join the coup plot-
ters.

b. Bevilaqua, who has been some-
thing of a storm center, may have
been asked to hand over his command
today as part of a series of reassign-
ments made by President Goulart to
keep the military off balance.

c. On the other side of the
coin, there is widespread belief
that Goulart himself will at some
time resort to a coup to establish
an authoritarian regime.

(Cont'd)
For The President Only - Top Secret

d. As one example Raneiri
Mazzilli, President of the Chamber
of Deputies and next in line for the
presidency, told Ambassador Gordon
on Saturday that he profoundly mis-
trusts Goulart's intentions and in-
tends to maintain the strictest con-
gressional vigilance.

e. Our station in Brazil be-
lieves that Goulart is living in a
dream world. He seems either out
of touch with reality or very poorly
informed. Public opinion is not
with him and the tradition that po-
litical power should only be trans-
ferred constitutionally is very
strong in the army, coup reports
notwithstanding.

f. The biggest danger from
this quarter is that the opposition
may resort to some illegal act, giv-
ing Goulart the excuse to take over,

For The President Only - Top Secret

NOTES
A. Ethiopia-Congo Haile Selassie has acceded to our
ambassador's request and is rescinding his earlier
decision to withdraw the 1,743-man Ethiopian con-
tingent from the UN force in the Congo.

B.
-
Communist China Africa
The Guinean ambassador
in Peiping has it unofficially that Premier Chou En-
lai will leave in mid-December for a tour of some
Afro-Asian countries. He is to stop first in Egypt
and then visit several other African countries includ-
ing Guinea, Ghana, and Mali. Chou would be the high-
est ranking Chinese leader ever to visit Africa. (IN-
TERCEPTS)

C. Indonesia-Philippines
Two good sources have reported
that President Sukarno plans to go to Manila this
Thursday to confer with Philippine President Macapagal.
No reasons have been advanced for the visit. Our
chargé guesses that it is an Indonesian move to head
off Philippine recognition of Malaysia.

D. Venezuela The terrorists have struck again, this
time firing six US-owned oil and gas pipelines near
the northeastern city of Puerto la Cruz. The elec-
tions are still on for Sunday, and we look for a maxi-
mum effort from the pro-Castro terrorist organization.

E. Congo We now have word that 49 members of the Soviet
Embassy, including dependents, left Leopoldville on
Saturday aboard a Sabena flight for Brussels. They
are expected to book onward passage for Moscow.
It is
reported that the Congolese will allow one Russian
without diplomatic status to stay to look after Soviet
property.
For The President Only - Top Secret
177-10002-10098
v9.1
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Date: 3/6/2018

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AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Information
ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM:
TO:
TITLE: THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST
DATE: 11/27/1963
PAGES: 16
SUBJECTS: INTELLIGENCE REPORT
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: 1B; Mandatory Review Material
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 12/12/1997

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A
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TOP SECRET
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5
THE PRESIDENT'S
INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
27 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET

HAVANA
CUBA
SAM SITE

ISLE OF PINES
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
100
NAUTICAL MILES

-Nipe. Bav
BUS
Naval Base
63 11.26 6

1. Cuba
2. Syria-Iraq
a. Cuban tents are now begin-
ning to appear at a number of the
SAM sites--further evidence that
training of Cubans in operation of
SAM equipment has begun as scheduled.

b. High-altitude photography
taken this past weekend shows these
tents at six SAM sites in western
Cuba. These sites are in addition
to those at which we noted the pres-
ence of Cuban interpreters as we
reported on Saturday.

c. This training should be com-
pleted by next May or June.

d. Just before the training
started, we noted a series of moves
involving the relocation of eight of
the SAM sites.

e. The purpose, it appears,
was to shift the mission of the sys-
tem from an area defense of the
island as a whole to point defense
of specific targets, particularly
Havana, (Includes INTERCEPTS)

a. Syrian leaders have acceded
to pressure from Iraq and have ex-
pelled Iraqi Baathist extremist Ali
Saadi. He has gone to Athens

For The President Only - Top Secret

PARTY STRENGTHS IN TURKISH ELECTIONS
(by % of total vote)
1961 General Election 1963 Local Election
36.7
Republican Peoples' Party (RPP).
37.0
34.8
Justice Party (JP)
45.9
13,7
New Turkey Party (NTP)
6.5
14.0
Republican Peasant Nation Party (RPNP)
2.8
10
Nation Party (NP)
3.1
0.8
Independents (or unreported vote)
4.3
10
Turkish Labor Party (TLP)
0.4
631125 C
LLLL LLLLLLL

Turkey
b. This is an earnest of the
desire of moderate Baathist leaders
in Damascus to preserve workable re-
lations with Iraq, partly as a
counterbalance to Cairo and partly
to preserve what remains of Baathist
influence in Baghdad.

c. Intercepts show at least
some Syrian troops will remain in
Iraq at the request of Iraqi offi-
cials.

d. Preparations had been under
way for these forces to withdraw;
retention of at least some in Iraq
is another sign that both regimes
hope to preserve something of the
relations they once had.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

a. Prime Minister Inonu's
coalition government is about to
collapse.

b. It has long been shaky.
Last week it was dealt a severe set-
back when the opposition Justice
Party, heir of the Menderes regime,
emerged from local elections as the
country's majority party.

For The President Only - Top Secret (Cont'd)

160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET AGRICULTURE
INDEX OF NET AGRICULTURE PRODUCTION
1950=100
1963-?
Fertilizer program.
1963
Wheat purchases.
1953-55
1955-56
Corn program.
1954-56
New Lands program.
Procurement prices raised.
TOTAL POPULATION OF THE USSR
1950-100
1958
Machine-tractor
stations abolished.
1957-58
Program to "catch up" with
US in meat and milk output.
1962-63
Program to plow up and
plant fallow lands.
1962
Livestock product
prices raised.
1961-62
Administrative
reorganizations.
0
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
631021 2A

631021,2
SOVIET GRAIN
PRODUCTION
(million metric tons)
ALL GRAINS
Soviel Vier Official US Estimate
115
WHEAT ALONE
Soviet Official US Estimate
CONFIDENTIAL
1.

USSR wheat
c. Now the Peasant Party, one
of the three in the coalition, has
voted to pull out, and probably will
do so as soon as Inonu gets back from
Washington. Another partner, the
Turkey Party, has wanted to pull out,
and apparently has stayed in only
because of pressure from the.military.

d. A new coalition is at least
a theoretical possibility, with a
number of independents taking the
place of the Peasant Party, but
Inonu probably would not be prime
minister.

e. The military are working
for an all-party coalition. This
way, they feel, they could keep
tabs on the Justice Party, but the
Justice Party is not likely to buy
this arrangement.

f. As matters now stand, the
military would take over the govern-
ment itself before it would let the
Justice Party form one.

a. Soviet President Brezhnev
has told the Iranian prime minister
that the decision to buy wheat abroad
was taken to avoid lowering reserves,
which he has described as ample for
one or two years. We think the sit-
uation is more serious than that.

(Cont'd)
For The President Only - Top Secret

b. This year's harvest was
clearly very bad. The weight of
evidence suggests that Soviet grain
stockpiles have been far drawn down
this year and are not sufficient to
protect the country from another
poor harvest.

c. Our estimate is that total
grain production each year since
1958 has been well below that year's
level of 125 million tons, while
the population has continued to grow.

d. We have seen from intercepts
signs of extensive slaughtering in
anticipation of fodder shortages
during the winter. This runs counter
to Khrushchev's oft-stated plan to
build up the livestock industry.

e. We have also noted that
the extensive wheat purchases weaken
the USSR's gold reserves at a time
when it hopes to expand its imports
of machinery for a huge chemical
fertilizer program.

f. In addition, we have seen
signs of stringent measures to pro-
tect the grain supply, accompanied
by public discontent in some areas
over the absence of bread.

(Cont'd)
For The President Only - Top Secret

5. Communist
-
China
Argentina
a. Peiping last week con-
tracted for some 300,000 tons of
wheat (cost about $20,000,000) from
Argentina.

b. This adds to the 1,000,000
tons just contracted for with Aus-
tralia, but is still far below
the 5,000,000 tons the Chinese have
normally imported in recent years.
Additional suppliers will be hard
to find.

c. A large sale, apparently
involving some $56,000,000 worth
of meat, is apparently also being
arranged. This is interesting,
not only for the sizeable foreign
exchange outlay, but also for the
concern it shows for improving the
diet of the mainland's urban pop-
ulation.

d. The same caloric value
could be obtained from grains at
a fraction of this cost.
(INTERCEPTS throughout)

For The President Only - Top Secret

6. Czechoslovakia-
USSR
7. Cambodia
a. Czech President and party
boss Novotny has gone to Moscow,
evidently for economic talks, judg-
ing by the composition of his dele-
gation.

b. Novotny's background of
Stalinist excesses have put him on
the wrong side of Khrushchev. They
also have given rise to control
problems, particularly in the frac-
tious Slovak party where pressures
for liberalization have made their
mark.

c. Party problems and Novotny's
leadership may thus also come under
review.

d. A curious sign of the times
is the fact that, although President
Novotny is in Moscow, the presidential
flag has remained up at the official
residence. It might simply have been
an oversight, but the symbolism will
not be lost to the people in Prague.

a. Cambodia, as expected, has
asked the Geneva co-chairman to call
the Geneva conference participants
together (in Djakarta) to discuss
measures "to ensure the internation-
ally guaranteed and controlled neu-
tralization of Cambodia.".
For The President Only - Top Secret
(Cont'd)

Masi
Khamis Mo
Hille Mushant
БОРА 320,0
Dhila Tamniv
Pass
SAUDI AR
Ooz
Sabya
Qizan
Al Muwassam
SYRIA
B
JORDAN
IRAQ
★ Cairo
lawil
Marad
Majonna
W. Наbоuna
Husainiya?
Qabi
W. Najran
U. A. R.
(EGYPT)
Ras Banas
SAUDI
RedE
Riyadh
Jidda
Sea Mecca
Amla
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
Sadah Sug Anan
תח
Maydi Mi
Wari
Ay
00
"Zuhjati
Qidarm
Hajjah
KAMARAN
(U.Κ.)
Dahi
Salif
Turbah
Tannan
RED
Al Hudaydah
Ma Sanif
SEA
Talf
Bal Fagih
Mohad
Zabid
ETHIOPIA
33905
L
Mocha
FR.
SOM.
L
hekern
alaha
shara Kharab
Hamit
Rawdah
San'a
Jum
dara
Munakhs
Ma
Jinhah
SUDAN
Khartoum
Marib
Marib
Sirwah
Jihannah Jadidah
Hara Bayhän
Hun
Beihan al Qasa
Vid
Qafr
Taif
ARABIA
ETHIOPIA
★
Addis Ababa
Ricces
Fajaran
Rifah Lah
ADEN
GULF OF ADEN
2
50 MILES
13 SEPTEMBER 1963
:
Sana
YEMEN
P
EN
BOM
R.
L

Egypt-Yemen
b. Last year when this came
up, the French were inclined to go
along with some such idea.

c. They have indicated to us
that they still feel Sihanouk should
not be turned down, and Sihanouk is
obviously hopeful that they will
exert pressure on us and the British.

d. Sihanouk seems to be hoping
for at least a rump session attended
by conferees who are willing to do
his bidding.

a. An Egyptain military mes-
sage reporting to Cairo on operations
in Yemen this past weekend indicated
that poison gas (referred to as
"ghurab" in Egyptian military traf-
fic) was used against royalist tribes-
men in the northwest.

b. This is the first time we
have noted its employment since
last summer, although another inter-
cept shows that the Egyptian com-
mand has continued to authorize its
use.
For The President Only - Top Secret
(Cont'd)

Congo

c. It is basically a tear gas,
but in such highly concentrated form
that it has caused the death of a num-
ber of Yemenis.
(INTERCEPTS throughout)

a. Opposition leftist Congo-
lese exiles, operating from Brazza-
ville across the river, are reported
to be plotting to assassinate Congo-
lese Premier Adoula and some of his
ministers.

b. It is supposed to happen
sometime after 8 December.

c. Meanwhile, agents are being
infiltrated with money to buy off
opposition to a takeover immediately
thereafter by radical nationalist
Gbenye.

d. Adoula's government already
knows that this group of left-wing
subversives, which now numbers about
50, is being helped by the Communist
bloc.

e. It operates fairly freely
in the loose circumstances which now
obtain in Brazzaville. Its activities
may soon become a serious source of
friction between the two countries.
For The President Only - Top Secret

NOTES
A.
South Korea With 85 percent of the vote in, Pak
Chong-hui's Democratic Republican Party has already
won an absolute majority in the National Assembly
elections held yesterday.
B.
Venezuela
The country's three major presidential
candidates were the targets of unsuccessful assassi-
nation attempts yesterday as Communist-led terror-
ists moved into the final week of desperate attempt
to wreck next Sunday's elections. A US Embassy of-
ficial was also the intended recipient of a "Christ-
mas package" containing a bomb. Yesterday a US
rubber warehouse was set afire and destroyed by
terrorists.
C.
Indonesia-Philippines
We have what is about as
D.
E.
sure a sign as we can get that Sukarno will be go-
ing to Manila as reported yesterday. A reliable
source tells us Sukarno has sent advance word to
two of his favorite Philippine girl friends that he
will be arriving on 28 November.

Indonesia-Malaysia
Indonesian-inspired press re-
ports yesterday claimed a British military plane
was shot down near the North Borneo border. Brit-
ish Intelligence tells us the story is concocted;
no aircraft are reported missing.

Cuba The alert in the Cuban military which we
noted immediately after President Kennedy's death
has been lifted. (INTERCEPT)

For The President Only - Top Secret (Cont'd)

Cambodia
Cambodia is cutting its diplomatic rep-
resentation abroad to a bare minimum as an austerity
measure following curtailment of US aid, Sihanouk
announced last week that this would be done, saying
that missions in Communist countries would not be
affected since those countries "protect" Cambodia.
Curiously enough, among the missions being closed
down are those in New Delhi and Rangoon. (Includes
(INTERCEPTS)
G.
USSR-US Pravda this morning reports on Gromyko's
talks with President Johnson, giving top play to
Senator Fulbright's remarks about the desirability
of a meeting between the President and Khrushchev.

For The President Only - Top Secret

DOCUMENTS OF INTEREST
I. De Gaulle on NATO strategy.
II. Common Market official appraises President Johnson.
(Sensitive INTERCEPT)

For The President Only - Top Secret177-10002-10101 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System Date: 3/6/2018
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AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Information
ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM:
TO:
TITLE: THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

DATE: 11/28/1963
PAGES: 14

SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: 1B; Mandatory Review Material
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
TOP SECRET
(Security Classification)

THE PRESIDENT'S
INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST
President.
Read
Anang baghin
by me Cone
Bry

ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
28 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET

6
12
10
8
OMBICA
72
Amuay
GOLFO DE
VENEZUELA
70
CURACAO
(Neth) BONAIRE
Maracaibo Cabimas
Ule
ZULOIDEA
MARACAIBO
cuta
68
66
64
CARIBBEAN SEA
Goro
CARACAS Guaira
Varerficia
Maracay
COLOMBIA
VENEZUELA
++++ Selected railroad
34168 10-63
50 100 200 Miles
50 100 200 Kilometers
BRAZIL
72
Orinoco
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
62
GRENADA
TOBAGO
Carupanora
TRINIDAD
Spain
Mene Quiriquire
Grande
Maturin
Orinoco
Ciudad Bo
Rio
Rio Un
Tucupita
60
¥2
8
BRITISH
6
GUIANA
BRAZIL
70
68
66
64
62
60
BR. GUIANA
L
2
4
10

1. Venezuela
a. The country's six presiden-
tial candidates have swung into the
home stretch of their campaigns.
So have the terrorists, who are still
trying hard to sabotage next Sunday's
vote.

b. There is little doubt that
the terrorist effort has all-out
Cuban support. Castro looks on
Venezuela as his prime target in
Latin America and would do everything
in his power to prevent President
Betancourt from finishing his term.

c. So far, the terrorists have
tried to intimidate the candidates
by harassing political rallies, bomb-
ing their party headquarters in
various cities, and threatening them
with assassination. They have tried
to scare voters from the polls by
creating a general atmosphere of law-
lessness. Kidnappings, like the one
yesterday morning of Colonel Chenault,
are part of the pattern.

d. The government counterattack
is under the personal direction of
Betancourt, who is as determined to
finish out his term and turn over
power to a freely-elected successor
as Castro is to prevent this.

For The President Only - Top Secret (Cont'd)
:
2. South Vietnam
e. Yesterday it was announced
that the carrying of firearms by
anyone outside the security forces
was forbidden until the elections
are over.

f. Some 3,000 reservists have
been called up to protect the polls.
Leaves are being cancelled and all
security forces are maintaining a
high state of alert.

a. We now have a fuller ac-
count from official US sources of
the Viet Cong attack on two mountain
villages mentioned in Tuesday's
Checklist.

b. This account makes it clear
that the earlier press versions,
which spoke of 1,000 missing vil-
lagers, were highly colored.

c. Our present information
is that the attack, in company
strength, was successfully repulsed.
The Viet Cong suffered some 30 cas-
ualties; government losses were six
killed, three wounded and 39 missing.

For The President Only - Top Secret (Cont'd)
3. Israel
d. As is usual in these cases,
the villagers began to trickle back
once the Viet Cong left.

e. This episode aside, we see
a number of indications that the
Communists will try to sustain the
higher level of military activity
they have kept up since the coup.

f. The Communist radio has
called for more attacks in an effort
to destroy strategic hamlets and
"develop" Viet Cong forces. In sup-
port of this, Viet Cong communica-
tions traffic has been unusually
heavy and has involved a large vol-
ume of high priority traffic and
special alert patterns.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

a. We have some reason to be-
lieve that the Israelis are develop-
ing a surface-to-surface missile of
their own.

b. A reliable clandestine
source says that an Israeli repre-
sentative is trying to buy US stable
platforms for the inertial guidance
system of a missile with a range of
300-350 miles. He wanted delivery
in six to twelve months. There have
been several earlier reports that
(Cont'd)
For The President Only - Top Secret
Israel is buying missile components
in the US and England.

4. USSR-India
c. We think this missile pro-
gram is independent of another
Israeli venture: Tel Aviv's con-
tract with a French firm, Marcel
