# 104-10003-10041 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

☐ UNCLASSIFIED 
☐ INTERNAL ONLY 
☐ CONFI**I**NTIAL 
☑ SECRET

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Clipping of article "The Kennedy Murder and the Secret Services of the USA"

FROM:

WE/4/INT Arthur P. Iorio 

EXTENSION NO. 

DATE: 26 March 1964

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) | DATE | OFFICER'S INITIALS | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
-----|------|-------|-----
1. CI Staff Birch O'Neil Room 2603 | RECEIVED | FORWARDED | The attached article, which may be of interest to you, appeared in the 7 March issue of the Italian Communist Party weekly Rinascita. The writer, Gianfranco Corsini, has been on and off US correspondent for the Italian Communist press. Note that in the section pencille in red rumors are referred which suggest that kind it was the Agency to organize the murder of President Kennedy.
2. | | | 
3. | | |
4. | | |
5. | | |
6. | | |
7. | | |
8. | | |
9. | | |
10. | | |
11. | | |
12. | | |
13. | | |
14. | | |
15. | | 18 |

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS 3-62

☑ SECRET 
☐ CONFIDENTIAL 
☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY 
☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Clipping not retained
104-10004-10143
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Date: 05/08/96
Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10004-10143
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 201-289248

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : DISCUSSION BETWEEN MEMBER SR DIVISION CONCERNING
OSWALD'S STAY IN HELSINKI.
DATE : 06/01/64
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : HELSINKI TRIP
USSR CONSULATE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/12/93
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : OSW10:V43 1993.06.12.10:33:55:150000:

[R] ITEM IS RESTRICTED
NW 64937 Docld:32106269 Page 1

INTERNAL
USE ONLY
CO DENTIAL
SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: CIRA/PS
2823

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
SX-25605
1 June 64

OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
1.
IPIAN
5 MAR 1975
Phoe assign
SX # and
clamefs to
2.
3.
4.
5.
IP JEDI
6.
201-289248
7.
8.
IPIFILES
Document Number 716-838
for FOIA Review on JUN 1976

Ath Pori, Millen
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS
NW-64937 DocId 32906269 Page 2
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED

MEMO FOR THE RECORD
1 June 1964.
SX-25605
Discussion betroen MOMBOR SR. Divisiong
and CoS Helsinki CONCERNING timetable
OF OSWALD'S stay in and Holsinki

1. At 0900 this morning I talked with Frank Friberg recently
returned COS Helsinki re Warren Commission inquiry concerning
the timetable of Oswald's stay in Finland in October 1959, including
his contact with the Soviet Consulate there. (Copy of the Commission
letter of 25 May 64 and State Cable of 22 May 64 attached.)

2. Friberg gave me the following information:

a. It takes 25 minutes to drive from the airport to
downtown Helsinki;

b. By taxi, it would take no more than 5 minutes to
reach the Soviet consulate;

C. The Soviet consulate probably closed at 1300 hours local
time on Saturdays in 1959;

d. Passenger lists (manifests) at the U.S. Consulate in
Helsinki are retained for six months only and then are destroyed.
Mr. Robert Fulton (CIA) was U.S. consular official there at
the time.

e. A copy of State's cable inquiry would go to the Helsinki
Station and they would assist in preparation of a reply.

3. Mr. Friberg agreed that it would be worthwhile to cable che
Station concerning points not covered by State in their inquiry. He
suggested changes incorporated into the cable sent to Helsinki.

Lee H. Wigren
C/SR/CI/R

Document Number
for FOIA Review on.
716-838
JUN 1976
SAME AS RELEASED
DOC
340

RECORD COPY
1
1 Jun 64
201-289248
NW 64937 Docld:32106269 Page 3
10.00000
104-10004-10143 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

13-00000

MEMO FOR THE RECORD 1 June 1964
Sx-25605

DISCUSSION between members SR Division,
and CoS Helsinki concerning timetable
OF OSWALD'S stay in Finland and Helsinki

1. At 0900 this morning I talked with Frank Friberg recently
returned COS Helsinki re Warren Commission inguiry concerninge.
the timetable of Oswald's stay in Finland in October 1959, including
his contact with the Soviet Consulate therer. (Copy of the Commission
letter of 25 May 64 and State Cable of 22 May, 64, attached.)

2. Friberg gave me the following information:

a. It takes 25 minutes to drive from the airport to
Helsinki.

b. By taxi, it would take no more than 5 minutes to
reach the Soviet consulate;

c. Consulate in Helsinki was open Saturdays in 1959;

d. Passenger lists (manifests) at the Helsinki airports of
Helsinki are retained for six months only and then are destroyed.
Mr. Robert Fulton (CIA) was U.S. consular official there at
the time.

e. A copy of State's cable inquiry would go to the Helsinki
Station and they would assist in preparation of a reply.

3. Mr. Friberg agreed that it would be worthwhile to cable the
Station concerning points not covered by State in their inquiry. He
suggested changes incorporated into the cable sent to Helsinki.

Lee H. Wigren
C/SR/CI/R
TRAVEL PROGRAM
IP/EDI ABSTRACTA
INDEX
IP/FIS
IP/PH
PREPARE FOR FICKING
FILM
CODE NO. (2,3,4)
RYBAT REST CODE
ISO/DCU
CABLE IDEN (11)
NTD (8)
IP/FILES
FOR FILING

Document Number 716-838
for FOIA Review on JUN 1976
SAME AS RELEASED
DOC -340

RECORD COPY

1. Jun 64
201-289248

Box 8
10.00000
104-10004-10156
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Box 8

13-00000

1 June 1964

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

1. At 0900 this morning I talked with Frank Friberg recently
returned COS Helsinki re Warren Commission inquiry concerning
the timetable of Oswald's stay in Finland in October 1959, including
his contact with the Soviet Consulate there. (Copy of the Commission
letter of 25 May 64 and State Cable of 22 May 64 attached.)

2. Friberg gave me the following information:

a. It takes 25 minutes to drive from the airport to
downtown Helsinki;

b. By taxi, it would take no more than 5 minutes to
reach the Soviet consulate;

c. The Soviet consulate probably closed at 1300 hours local
time on Saturdays in 1959;

d. Passenger lists (manifests) at the U.S. Consulate in
Helsinki are retained for six months only and then are destroyed.
Mr. Robert Fulton (CIA) was U.S. consular official there at
the time.

e. A copy of State's cable inquiry would go to the Helsinki
Station and they would assist in preparation of a reply.

3. Mr. Friberg agreed that it would be worthwhile to cable the
Station concerning points not covered by State in their inquiry. He
suggested changes incorporated into the cable sent to Helsinki.

Document Number 780-340

FAIA Review on JUN 1976

SAME AS 716-838

ZONET

13-00000

See Sanitized File
Number 335
For steril
H
104-10004-10213 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

YF2-27221
9 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT : Discussion with Warren Commission Staff Member
REFERENCE: Letter from J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel of the
President's Commission, to Mr. Richard Helms
dated 3 July 1964

>O SRICE DISCUSSION with SLAUSEN & Tily on .girations.
Svitt felicy towards design woats HALETICONS ANd
CUINT Visa Puccedures,
1. With the approval of C/SR and the DDP, I met with Mr. W.
David Slawson of the staff of the President's Commission on the
Assassination of President Kennedy at 1400 hours on this date in
the Commission's offices at 200 Maryland Avenue, N.E., Washington,
D.C. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss apparent inconsistencies
in material provided the Commission by CIA and by the Department of
State which were called to our attention in a letter from the General
Counsel of the Commission to Mr. Helms, dated 3 July 1964.

2. By way of introduction, Mr. Slawson said that in the portion of the
Commission's report that he was writing, he would have to deal with the
question of whether or not the OSWALDs' departure from the USSR - and
the circumstances (i.e. timing) of that departare were unusual or
suspicious in any way. He expressed his belief that they probably were
not and cited Soviet relaxation in such matters in the post-Stalin era.
However, he wanted to be sure in his own mind that our information was
not in conflict with that which the Commission had received from State
since all of that information would remain in the records of the
Commission.

3. After stating my belief that there was no real disagreement or
inconsistency between the information from CLA and that from State, I
expressed the view that the matter resolved itself into three questions:

Document Number 767-864
for FOIA Review on
/a. Do the Soviet
JUN 1976

CS COPY

SECRET

a. Do the Soviet authorities normally permit Soviet
citizens married to foreign nationals to emigrate from the
Soviet Union to the homelands of their spouses?

b. Do they normally permit such Soviet citizens to
accompany (i.e. depart simultaneously with) their spouses
from the Soviet Union?

c. How long does it take such Soviet citizens to get
Soviet exit visas for such a purpose (time lapse from application
to granting of visas)?

4. Concerning the first two questions (3a and 3b above) I pointed out.
that we had addressed ourselves mainly to the question of Sovie: citizens
being allowed to accompany their spouses abroad while State dealt only
with the larger question of Soviets married to foreigners being allowed
to emigrate without reference to whether or not they left simultaneously
with or at another time from their spouses. Mr. Slawson commented
that this explanation was most helpful and he reread what both we and
State had said in that light.

5. By way of further explanation, I said that the statements in
paragraph 6 of our memorandum of 6 April 1964 concerning Soviets being
permitted to accompany their foreign spouses abroad were based on a
review of 26 cases, of which 10 involved Americans. In only four of
these cases did a Soviet wife leave the USSR in the company of her foreign
husband; in 14 of the cases the foreign spouse departed alone; and in the
remaining seven cases insufficient details are known to permit us to
categorize them. I added that although State's information began by
citing the issuance of 724 quota and non-quota immigrant visas by the
American Embassy in Moscow during the period FY 1954 to December
1963, it did not indicate how many of these visas were for Soviet citizens
who had married U.S. nationals. Actually State provided detailed
information for only sixteen cases and did not indicate in many of these
whether or not the Soviet was permitted to accompany the foreign spouse.
16. In response to

-2-

6. In response to a question from Mr. Slawson I stated that most
of the 26 cases upon which we based our statements involved foreign
students, exchange teachers and other relatively transient persons,
and while a number of cases have certain points in common, they bear
little similarity to the OSWALD case in that none involved a defector who
married prior to repatriating. I noted that paragraph 6 of our 6 April
1964 memorandum to the Commission had pointed this out. Mr. Slawson
indicated that he was now satisfied on this matter.

7. Concerning the length of time taken by Soviet authorities to
process exit visas for Soviet citizens married to foreign nationals
(question 3c above), I stated that, in my opinion, the information
provided by State (in the third enclosure to Mr. Meeker's letter)
substantially corresponded to the views expressed in paragraphs 6 and 7
of our memorandum to the Commission dated 6 April 1964. Mr. Slawson
asked if it would be possible to elaborate paragraph 7 of our memorandum
of 6 April by providing a statistical breakdown of the cases on which our
statements were based. I indicated that this could be done.

8. At this point Mr. Slawson stated that as a result of our discussion
he felt that the question of possible inconsistencies bad been resolved.
However, he asked that we send a brief written reply to the Commission's
letter of 3 July 1964 embodying the substance of what I had said concerning
the basis for statements included in our 6 April 1964 memorandum. (This
would include the gist of the draft reply to the Commission which I showed
to C/SR on 8 July plus an elaboration of our statements concerning Soviet
visa applications.]

9. Mr. Slawson indicated that he would be sending parts of his report
dealing with the Soviet intelligence services to CIA for checking as to
their accuracy. He did not say when this would occur.

10. After concluding the meeting with Mr. Slawson, I read Volume 52
of the transcript of testimony before the Commission. This included the
reinterview of Marina OSWALD.

-3-

Lee H. Wigren
C/SR/CI/Research

@Do. sors normally permit Sov. cityens married to for
natla to engrate pom Sll to homeland of sprise ?
• State says you - cites 724 visa applicationم
(perbably minority Spouse's; mij
belatives ite ast mijint)
- We cite absence of law; do not say.

2 arimally
② Do Sros permit sou. cits menit to fon marks to
accompany (ie depont simultanernely co.) spouses
from Sele to homelandes of spouses
- State does not say
se cite evidence that they do not
We ليه

③ How long does it take Soveits to gel. Sevivians
at to homelan Ss of fou Spouses?
to junge at
-Our #7 and State's inse
فه
Cases inhuid. it ikurus ajrec

Notes, Hedin
Co
CS-COPY

dil Ite XAA2-27221

Le 7
with) friin sprστασις
Based on in de la 26 Cail
fre till out c/ SU.
(10 US)

-Safe left line oftenband - 4
 -
-
-
-
- 7- !

② Irifi in fu 47
1-2 fine taken by for allite
bisa apple of Sor Spencer of fin
substant illy agrees is lite o infe
نر
4. on Juice taken by Sri-st. poreias veda
aggelies of Sou woofcitis (1)

Gust of State is w
life cancion y bar, tibi of tense to her bij de citthoritie
1.
bun cits in Sel
life in the poor
/
740
li inquest for norme of all 1152
ت
:/ cits vitus ricerit'd in Cast
2: 10 quo cesta Collis len, the of
fine betinien intrs of aggler. l. He apport
by God auth
2 יני

Aun cat
0063
>

② Date of appplectenfor os doit reser
Ion dedures, in 14
12

"
[10dayo-194]
Promplit all itthees
-10 line to 14 yeю
- Cant till bord
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRETARTDAT

30 September 64 FILE NO. 201-4524

BONN, FRANKFURT, BERLIN, COPENHAGEN,
REYKJAVIK, PARIS, STOCKHOLM
DIRECTOR THE HAGUE BRUSSELS

nue, stess, cluez, VR, FILE

UN, FRAN, BRLN, COPENJO GMNY
E. PARI, STOC, muda, Hagu, Beas

AT/KUDESK/TPMURILLO / CATIJA

KIGREST TRACES JOACHIM JOESTER DPOB 29 JUL 07 COLOGNE.

ENTER ENTIRE ADULT CAREER AND AUTHOR CA 30 BOOKS AND NUMEROUS
SPAPER ARTICLES. POST WWII WORKS VERY ANTI-KUBARK, LAST
OK TITLE - OSWALD: ASSASSIN OR FALL GUY? HAS WRITTEN UNDER
UE NAME AND UNDER PSEUDONYMS: FRANZ VON NESSELRODE; H.F.
LIKIN; WALTER KELL; PAUL DELATHUIS.

2. ACCORDING CAPTURED GESTAPO DOCS HE JOINED GERM CP ON
MAY 32 AND HAD MEMBERSHIP NO. 532315. OWNED LENDING LIBRARY
LN AND SOME TIME AFTER MAY 32 WENT USSR WHERE REMAINED UNTIL

33. DURING ABSENCE HIS LIBRARY MANAGED BY FIANCEE ANNA
SCHINSKY. LAST RESIDENCE GERMANY BRLN LUETZOWSTRASSE 40
BEI HESS.

Document Number 888-906
for FOIA Review on JUL 1976

CONTINUED

COORDINATING OFFICERS
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
AUTHENTICAT
OFFICER

SECRET/RYB
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

3. IN MAY 33 FLED TO FRANCE, WAS IN COPE 36-37 BUT EXPELLED
(OR LEFT) EDCAUSE HIS ANTI-DAHISK GOVT WAITINGS. LEFT DENMARK
FOR FRANCE VIA ICELAND. IN 40 IN SWEDEN, MARRIED MAY NILSSON,
CAME US VIA USSR IN 41 AND NATURALIZED CITIZEN SINCE 48

4. WOULD APPRECIATE AS FULL A CHECK AS POSSIBLE, INCLUDING
LOCAL SERVICES AND AVAILABLE OVERT LOCAL PRE-WWL REFERENCES
(PRESS, BOOKS, ETC.) ON JOESTEN AND FIANCEE.

5. FOR BAIN: PLS ALSO CHECK DDC AND REQUEST PHOTOSTATS
ANY DOCS, CAN ADDRESS AND NAME HESS BE CHECKED? ANY CHANCE
LOCATE FIANCEE?

6. ALL ADDRESSERS PLS HANDLE AEQUEST URGENTLY AS MATTER
ALSO OF INTEREST TO WARREN COMMISSION. CABLE SUMMARY RESULTS
AND POUCH DETAILS INCLUDING ALL COPIES AVAILABLE JOESTEN PRE
WWI WRITINGS.

CONTINUED

SEGRET/RVRAT

MIC PARASI THROUGK 3 AECVI IN PUBLIC DOMAIN, AUS
FILE
END OF MESSAGE

C/EE/06
C/WE/L
CAVELS

SEGRET/RVRAT
104-10006-10247
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
SECRET
FROM: (Requesters name)
BRANCH
ROOM
BADGE NO.
NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST
EXTENSION
DATE
RID CONTROL NO.
TO
TUBE
ROOM
DATE
INITIALS
RID/INDEX
DT-5
REQUESTER
RID/FILES
DT-6
REQUESTER
RID/ANALYSIS GT-7
RID/201
DW-6
RID/MIS
GT-6
RID/INDEX
DT-5

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED
SURNAME
(All spellings)
D'EDKOV, Roman Fedorovich er Vilasa Nikolaevna
SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED
AKA, ALIASES
OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (Occupation, sex, CP membership,
I. S. affiliations, etc.)
Poss. at soo. Eulest. Ind
RESIDENCE
New Delhi, Ind
SEX DATE OF BIRTH
PLACE OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP
USSR
Minse USSR

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK
COMMENTS
NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION
CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS
IN ALL CASES
1. Use gummed label; type or print all
entries.
2. Upon receipt of index card reproductions
draw a green diagonal line across the
items you do not want.
3. Edit (use green) the reproduced index
cards to indicate:
(a) cards to be destroyed (mark with
green D and note reason for destruction)
Examples: document destroyed; duplicate
or less informative than retained in-
formation; information of no CS value.

(b) corrections and additions, inclu-
ding infinity symbol ∞ when card in-
cludes all facts contained in the
document.

Note 1. Records of COI, SSU, OSS and CIG
are in RID/ARD, and those that meet
indexing criteria in CSHB 70-1-l are
carded in the CS Main Index. If you
believe there could be additional in-
formation of value in these records,
you must request an Archives Index
search.
201 CONSOLIDATION
1. Return this form with the card repro-
ductions, also return pertinent documents,
aperture cards and the dossier if a 201 on
the subject exists.
2. For each document to be included in the
consolidation (i.e., copy or cross reference
to be placed in the 201 file), green D the
corresponding card and check (a) or (b)
below:

(a) Consolidate into
201-
(b) Open 201 file on subject.

RESTRICTION (If any)
CRYPTONYM
OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS
ASSIGNED
YES
NO
FILE TO
BE KEPT
RID
DESK
Note 2. Information concerning foreign
public personalities (except mili-
tary) may be available in BR/OCR
x7997.
DATE
SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER

13-00000

One Roman Fedorovich DEDKOV, born 28 March 1927 in Ariansk, USSR,

and his wife Vilasa Nikolayevna DEDKOV, born 31 December 1930 in Minsk,
USSR, applied for were listed as applicants for entry visas to Indiad
sometime prior to April 1962. DEDKOV, who was issued Soviet passport
number 207461 on 17 September 1960, was scheduled to arrive in New Delhi
for two years as an English language teacher at the Soviet Embassy.

It is not known whether or not DEDKOV actually arrived in New Delhi.

Not at sent because it shows lioman to Indonians, aaring
"Home List" nut classified.
SCAT
10 AUG 1964

13-00000

INDIA 1

DEDKOV, Roman Fedorovich

Subj scheduled to arrive New Delhi for two years as an
English teacher at the Soviet Embassy; Ppt 207461 iss
17 Sept 60 (Mos Comment: Subj is presumed to have arr
sometime after sept 60). NBDA-8509, 24 Apr 62

Wife: Vilasa Nikolayevna (DPOB: 31 Dec 1930; Minsk)

201-756978

DPOB: 28 Mar 1927; Ariansk
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: Document Number 988-927 BD

for FOIA Review on SEP 1976

FROM: Chief, CI/R&A
2 C 17

TO: Chief, AF
7 C 32

Chief, EE
3 D 31 07

Chief, FE
5 D 31 07

Chief, NE
6 D 31 07

Chief, WE
4 B 44 05

Chief, WH
3 B 44 03

DDP
3 C 20 16

CI/R&A
2 C 17

PSD

RID

DATE 27-865
24 December 1964

For Coordination

DEFERRED

RID PROUESTING STOPPED
PLEASE INDICATE HANDLING

NOTE: This Document of the CA R
of the CS Decur
Desired Handling
For Signature and Release
BY HAND
PLEASE CALL

Easy Printing 201-289248

DISPATCH

Chiefs of all Stations

Chief, KUDOVE

Warren Commission Testimony - Selected Excerpts

FYI

1. The Warren Commission's Report on the assassination of
President Kennedy focused attention on the magnitude of the problem.
involved in the protection of the Chief Executive. As you know, it is
our responsibility, overseas and in headquarters, to render every
support possible to the Secret Service in the conduct of its statutory
responsibilities in the United States, and especially when the President
travels abroad,

2. The circumstances confronting the Warren Commission
produced discussion and testimony on various aspects of the problem
of Presidential protection and on interagency operational cooperation,
which normally do not find their way into the public domain. These
include the acquisition and dissemination of information, consultation,
coordination, and operational interchanges. I believe you will be
interested in the attached extracts of testimony given before the Warren
Commission by U.S. intelligence and security officials. Pertinent
Fortions have been side lined. I commend these materials for reading
by all officers in positions of senior responsibility in headquarters and
overseas.

Document Number 988-927 BD.

for FOIA Review on SEP 1976

FLETCHER M. KNIGHT
201-289245

Book Dispatch No. 4726

100-300-12

Raymond G. Rocca gwh

HQ COPY
DISPATCH

Distribution For
Book Dispatch No. 4726

AF Division
Abidjan
Accra
Addis Ababa 
Algiers 
Bamako
Brazzaville
Bujumbura
Conakry
Dakar
Dar-es-Salaam
Freetown
Kampala
Khartoum
Lagos
Leopoldville 
Lome
Lusaka
Mogadiscio
Monrovia
Nairobi
Pretoria
Rabat
Salisbury
Tananarive 
Tripoli
Tunis
Yaounde

The above listing has been
reviewed in the AF Division.

dw

EE Division
Athens
Bern
Frankfurt 
Nicosia
Vienna

The above listing has been
reviewed in the EE Division.

FE Division
Bangkok
Djakarta
Hong Kong
Honolulur
Kuala Lumpur
Manila
Melbourne
Okinawa
Phnom Penh
Rangoon
Saigon
Seoul
Taipei
Tokyo
Vientiane
Wellington

The above listing has been
reviewed in the FE Division.

себ

Distribution For
Book Dispatch No. 4726

NE Division
Aden
Amman
Ankara
Baghdad
Beirut
Cairo
Colombo
Damascus
Jidda
Kabul
Karachi
Kathmandu
Kuwait
New Delhi
Tehran

The above listing has been
reviewed in the NE Division.

WE Division
Brussels
Copenhagen
The Hague
Helsinki
Lisbon
London
Luxembourg
Madrid
Oslo
Ottawa
Paris
Paris/LCPIPIT
Reykjavik
Rome
Stockholm

The above listing has been
reviewed in the WE Division.

-2-

Distribution For
Book Dispatch No. 4726

WH Division
Asuncion
Bogota
Buenos Aires
Caracas
Georgetown
Guatemala City
Kingston
La Paz
Lima
Managua
Mexico City
Montevideo
Panama City
Paramaribo
Port-au-Prince
Port of Spain
Quito
Rio de Janeiro
San Jose
San Juan
San Salvador
Santiago
Santo Domingo
Tegucigalpa

The above listing has been
reviewed in the WH Division.

-3-

Headquarters Distribution for
Book Dispatch No. 4726

2 DDP
1 ADDP
1 C/OPSER
1 C/TSD
1 C/CA
1 C/CCS
1 C/SOD
1 C/CI
1 C/FI

2 C/AF
1 C/AF/1
1 C/AF/2
1 C/AF/3
1 C/AF/4
1 C/AF/5
1 C/AF/6

2 C/EE
1 C/EE/G
1 C/EE/K
1 C/EE/SA

2 C/FE
1 C/FE/CH
1 C/FE/HULA
1 C/FE/JKO
1 C/FE/PMI
1 C/FE/TBL
1 C/FE/VNC

2 C/NE
1 C/NE/1
1 DC/NE/AA
1 C/NE/4
1 C/NE/5
1 C/NE/6

2 C/WE
1 C/WE/1
1 C/WE/2
1 C/WE/3
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DD/P8:4635/1

26 NOV 1968

Sir Charles C. F. Spry
Director General
Australian Security Intelligence Organization
G. P. O. Box 510583
Melbourne

Dear Charles,

Thank you for your letter of 15 October
recommending against the declassification of
Warren Commission document CD-971. I might
mention that our inquiry to you in August (1968)
was in anticipation of further pressure for the
release of Warren Commission papers, a pressure
which has not materialized. Accordingly, there is
not, at the present time, any intention to release
CD-971.

Should the question be raised at some future
time, the points made by you in your letter provide
every reason to keep the document out of the
public domain.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,
/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

Document Number 1042-947c
for FOIA Review on SEP 1976

cc: DDCI

Signature Recommended:

Deputy Director for Plans
DDP/FE/PMI/AN/Amos Taylor, Jr. (X 5502):aib (25 November 1968)
5681

Distribution:
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1 - ADDP  2 - DCI
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21 NOV 1968
Date

SECRET

CORRES
RELATING TO
THIS-
INCLUDING
NAVYS OK
OF 27 June

FILE
MAIN
FILE
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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21 MAY
1982
US/82/71

Dear Anthony,

Regarding your letter 6/705 of 10 May 1982, our
records indicate that Valeriy Vladimirovich Kostikov
traveled to Mexico, France, Spain, the U.S. and Cuba
during the period 1959-61. In 1961, he was assigned
permanently to Mexico City as a consular officer and
served there until August 1965. He was variously
described as a translator, vice-consul, and attache.
During this tour he attempted to cultivate a U.S.
Government employee assigned to our embassy in Mexico
City.

In September/October 1963, Lee Harvey Oswald
approached the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City in an attempt
to get a visa allowing him to return to the USSR.
Kostikov, as a consular officer, handled this visa
request. We have no information which indicates any
relationship between these individuals other than for the
purpose of Oswald's making his visa request.

Kostikov returned to Mexico City for a second tour of
duty in July 1968. During this tour he was again assigned
to the consular section and was a second secretary. It
appeared that he was tasked with following the activities
of the Central American communist parties and left-wing
groups, and he met often with members of these groups,
reportedly providing them with funds and technical
guidance. In July/August 1969, Kostikov made an unusual
TDY trip to Moscow lasting three weeks. (His family
remained in Mexico.) In July 1970 he made a four-day trip
to Havana.

Kostikov's tour in Mexico ended unexpectedly in
September 1971. Our information indicated that he was
not due to leave for another three to four months, and at
the time of his departure, there was some speculation that
the suddenness of his departure was due to the fact that
he was known to Lyalin.

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-289248
DO NOT DESTROY

RECORD COPY

SECRET

XAE09222
21MAY 82
100-2-95

While in Mexico he was considered by some to be the
most effective and dangerous of intelligence officers in
Mexico. He has been described as being without morals,
education, and manners. Shortly after his arrival in
Mexico in 1968, he was arrested in front of a house of
prostitution after becoming involved in a fist fight with
some locals. It appears this incident did not affect his
position in Mexico City, despite the fact that it
received a good deal of press coverage.

We are aware only that Kostikov arrived in Beirut in
June 1978. We are unable to confirm his presence there
now.

Although our file indicates that Kostikov may have
been a member of Department 13 (Executive Action)
(Department V's predecessor), we have been unable to
confirm this. Also, to the best of our knowledge the KGB
has not engaged in such executive action since 1959.

Sincerely,

/s/ David

David H. Blee

Mr. Anthony C. M. DeVere

PHOTO ATTACHED

DDO/CI/RA/Joan Paxson (21 May 1982)

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100-2-95
104-10012-10024 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

6/705
10 May 1982

Dear David,

VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV

1. Please refer to our conversation of 6 May. KOSTIKOV, born 17 March 1933, Moscow, was posted to Beirut in 1978 as 1st Secretary and may still be there. He is identified KGB and served in Mexico City from 1961-71. There is a reference to him on page 307 of BARRON's KGB which suggests that he may have been Department V. We do not appear to have asked LYALIN about him, and are now doing so.

2. We also note that EPSTEIN in "Legend" claims that according to a CIA telecheck KOSTIKOV was Lee Harvey OSWALD'S KGB case officer in Mexico City. According to BARRON (page 335) OSWALD was in Mexico between September and November 1963 and was seeking to obtain a Soviet visa. There was certainly a KGB interest in OSWALD, although according to NOSENKO this was defensive.

3. The reason for our current interest in KOSTIKOV will be obvious. As you are aware, our Embassy in Beirut, in common with other Western Missions, has been subject to threats and violence in recent months, and in view of earlier hostile attentions from the KGB, we have been reviewing our records of KGB staff in the area who might have been involved in promoting strong-arm tactics.

4. We would be grateful for your views as to whether the KGB are likely to be behind any of the recent incidents (possibly through the Syrians) and for any information on KOSTIKOV and his activities in Mexico and in Beirut. In particular, what are your comments on the OSWALD story; can you confirm that KOSTIKOV is still in Beirut; is there anyone else in Beirut or Damascus whose trace record suggests an Active Measures role, or worse?

5. We should be grateful for an early reply and as I said on 6 May will treat anything you can tell us on a strictly Service to Service basis.

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-289248

DO NOT DESTROY

Yours ever

A C M de Vere

Form 547a Processed
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

1 UNCLASSIFIED
INTERNAL USE ONLY
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: E/BC
4C 20 Hqs?

EXTENSION NO
1413
7220

DATE
5 APR 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE
OFFICER'S INITIALS
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column, after each comment.)

1. CilRTA
2. Hausman APR 1978 ch
3. Rum Holmes
4. 3D57
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
This is the ACTION/INFO copy of a communication received on from MI-6 in Washington.

Another copy is being held in E/BC.

Any reply should be directed to E/BC for forwarding to Liaison.

Processing by IP is to be determined by

Coordination with E/BC is required prior to any dissemination of this information outside the DDO.

NB: Richard A. SPRAGUE, Chief Counsel and Director of HSCA, saw a copy of attached document... See his attached letter to Sergyj CZORNONOH, 04 December 1976.

RBH
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Our ref: GEN 1

Dear Art,

30 March 1978

Please find attached correspondence received from one Sergyj CZORNONOH who claims that he provided information about Lee Harvey OSWALD to the American Vice Consul (presumably Tom Blackshear) in Sofia, Bulgaria, in August 1963.

2.  I have sent copies of these letters to the FBI and to my Head Office in London.

Mr A H Stimson

Enc.

DH Jones for GML Blackburne-Kan

CONFIDENTIAL

SERGYJ. CZORNONOH
1106-11TH STREET
SACRAMENTO CALIFORNIA
95814

M. Wall

TO BRITISH EMBASSY
3100 MASSACHUSETTS AVE, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
REGISTERED NO.257254

SERGYJ CZORNONDH
1106-11TH STREET
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA, 95814

MARCH 15, 1978.

TO BRITISH AMBASSADOR
BRITISH EMBASSY
3100 MASSACHUSETTS AVE, N. W.
WASHINGTON, DC.

DEAR SIR.

I WROTE LETTER ON FEBRUARY 15, 1978 TO MR. JAMES CALLAGHAN PRIME MINISTER I ENCLOSED REGISTERED MAIL NO. 251067.

ON JULY 18, 1963 I WAS IN LONDON ENGLAND AT THE AIRPORT IMMIGRATION OFFICER NO. 175 I HAD NO VISA IMMIGRATION PLACE ME UNDER HOUSE ARREST, MR. SMITH IN POLICE UNIFORM SECRET SERVICE BROUGHT ME STEAK DINNER AND POLICE OFFICER INTERROGATED ME, HE ASKED ME WHAT THE EMBASSY OF US.S.R. SAY YOU HEARD IN VIENNA, AUSTRIA, I SAID I HAVE HEARD THAT ONE AMERICAN DEFECTOR (MR. LEE HARVEY OSWALD) TO RUSSIA AND HE RETURNED TO UNITED STATES OF AMERICA THIS MAN HE PREPARING TO KILL TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY, MR. SMITH POLICE OFFICER ASKED ME DO YOU KNOW HIS NAME, I SAID HIS NAME SOHT ONTO TIME WAS PUBLISHED ONE TIME IN NEWS PAPER IN WASHINGTON POST, MR. SMITH POLICE OFFICER SAID

I DO SEARCHING FOR THIS FILE IN BRITISH POLICE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE AND BRA IMMIGRATION, JASKING YOUR EMBASSY TO HELP TO FIND THE TRUTH AND I ASK YOUR GOVERNMENT TO FORWARD My RECORD CE JULY 181 1963 TO PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER AND SENATOR DANIEL K. NOUYE CHAM 21. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON IN 11 GENCE I ENCLOSE HIS Copy LETTER TO ALSO I ENCLOSE you copy LETTER I JANT ON FEBRUARY 17, 1978 TO RUSSIAN AMMASSA YOUR JUSTICE ALWAYS WILL BE APPLIA MY INCOMING MAIL iS CONTROL BY FIBI AGENTS SOME OF THE MAIL IDENT GET NOT FORWARD TO ME FIBI, Suppress My INFORMATION AND TORTURE MED DRUG RESPECTFULLY YOURS "21.S. PASSPORT NO, DO 2.7000 Sergyj

copy. 10
BRITISH AMBASSADOR

Sergyj Czornonoh
1106- 11th Street
Sacramento, California 95814

To Russian Ambassador
Embassy of U.S.S.R.
1125 - 16th Street
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

This is retyped letter from hand written

Mr. Wasilev Consul gave me order to transmit this information to U. S. Government, on August 9, 1963 in Sofia, Bulgaria. Mr. Wasilev, Consul of Embassy of U.S.S.R., gave me this information about Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald on August 14, 1963. Mrs. Besera Asenova, girl friend of Russian Consul came to my room and repeated that Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald is assassin. He will kill President Kennedy.

On August 15, 1963 in Sofia, Bulgaria, at the airport in embassy car, I told to Mr. Blackshire, American Vice Consul, that Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald is assissin. He has a weapon or has ordered one. Mr. Blackshire said it seems like he will kill someone. I said that Mr. Lee H. Oswald is preparing to kill President of the United States, John F. Kennedy. Mr. Blackshire said where will it happen. I said they (right wing) will invite President, criticize him in the newspaper, then kill him. Mr. Blackshire told me he will give the telegram to Department of State and he gave me the address where to report.

At 9 a.m. on August 19, 1963 in Washington, D. C., I went to see (Mr. Kippingan). Director of Special Counselor Service Department of State at 1901 Pennsylvania Avenue-11th floor. I told the Director that I have information about President Kennedy. The Director said do not mention name of President Kennedy, only respond to the questions. The Director said tell us what will happen to Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald then. I said Mr. Lee H. Oswald will be killed after kill Kennedy. I said I will take the truth drug to tell the truth. Director tell us who else get killed in this country. I said as I heard, that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. will be killed. Who will kill Dr. King, Jr. Negro leader? I said a man who is in prison at this time. (Mr. James Earl Ray was in prison at that time.) Director asked where assassination will happen. I said in Dallas, Texas. Director said if someone gave this information here I would expel the man. Director did call on F.B.I. agents after F.B.I. use anesthesia gas to freeze me to drub me to keep amnesia.

I told Director Department of State that Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald have a weapon. Go see him. Director told me you too can have weapon--so what if Oswald got weapon.

Sincerely,

U.S House of Representatives Select Committee on Assassinations told me to write letter to Embassy in early 1977.

Sergyj Czornonoh
Regis Hotel
1106 11th Street
Sacramento, CA 95814

GITY MANAGEAS
ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS
BRITISH EMBASSY

February 6, 1978

Mr. John M. Price
District Attorney
Sacramento, California

Dear Mr. Price:

This is a retyped letter. I visited Mr. Ferry, Deputy District Attorney, on August 16, 1977. I told in the office that F.B.I. agents and Secret Service use police department to harass me. Police department do... supply pencil of anesthesia gas to the manager of the building I live. The manager door use certain people, to freeze me by anesthesia gas - then push drugs, poison in my mouth to torture me - to take my sleep away - or bleed by rectal and they use many other chemicals to brainwash me to use me in political assassination which I refused. On January 20, 1976 in Sacramento on 8th and I Streets, man came to me from police or post office, U.S. Department of Justice and freeze me by gas and told me to take gun, pistol and we will tell you where to go to shoot - to kill - Mr. Sargent Shriver. I refused. Manager, Mr. Sisel, of Marshall Hotel, call on the man to tell me this on the street. In February 1976, police intelligence told me that assassination will not happen here. How about to move to Maryland state.

In this letter I ask you to get report from Dr. Frederick S. Baker, M.D. colon and rectal surgery on January 31, 1978. His phone – 452-4095. I do bleed today very much and I am weak, In this letter I ask you to give re- strain order or respond to me what could be done. The right wing in America made record to use me in assassination. I refuse. I am human and I like to be treated as human. Police put frame up on me - just to take advantages on me. Police use lie, police use mental case to take advantages on me and tell me that right wing do use such people like me. To prove I enclose copy mid- night June 14, 1976. Also I enclose copy letter I sent to Mr. Ted Sheedy, Supervisor, on January 26, 1978 and copy of his reply to me.

Please respond to me. Thank you.

Very truly yours

Sergyj. Czornonoh

Mr. Sargent Shriver was run for President in 1976.

Legal Center
For The Disabled

1722 J STREET, SUITE 19 SACRAMENTO, CA 95814
Telephone: 446-4851

March, 1978

Sergyj Czornonoh
1106 11th Street
Sacramento, CA 95814

Dear Mr. Czornonoh:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter regarding difficulties you have encountered with the police and the FBI.

In the event that there is legal action taken by the police or the FBI to institutionalize you this office will provide you with legal representation.

If you have any further legal problems please contact this office.

Sincerely,

LESLIE KAY
Paralegal

CATHERINE HUGHES
Staff Attorney
LK: ab

REGISTERED NO 2.51067
FROM 1106801124 95814
TO MR. JAMES CALLAGHAN
SF Wen la OFFICE OF MINISTRY
LONDON ENGLAND
13-00000

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104-10012-10078
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ONLY
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FROM:
Chief Far East Division
TO: (Officerdesignation, room number, and.
building)
EXTENSION NO.
FORWARDED
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INITIALS:
DATE
20 Nov.68
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
DATE
RECEIVED
Chief CI Staff 27 NOV 1968
CIRA
Mr. Dooley
27 NOV 1968
boo
for file
Document Number
येद
1128-988
for FOIA Review on SEP 1976
201-289248
FORM
3-62
610
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIEDERAL CO DENTIAL
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2323
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
1.
IP/AN
2.
3.
4.
5.
JP/EDI
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Document Number
for FOIA Review on
28/Flas
HP/RMS
12.
13.
ONLY
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
EXTENSION NO.
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
DATE
26 που. 68
XAAZ-35926
26 NOU 68-
SECRET
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
@ Please asijo
XAAZ # and
os pay & Of
1128-988
SEP 1976
MAY
1978
clamifs to
201-289748
26.
Date: 2 NOV 68)
Salgent
Covesperelerce Cotisan
0%
CIA and ASIO.
Re: release
of exftinatun ly
Woven Commessen
14.
15.
FORM
3-62
D
610
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
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UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
20 NOV 1968
KEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA
SUBJECT
Deputy Director for Plane
304635
Executive Registry
68-516011
XAAZ-
35926
Letter for Direstor from Bir Charles Spry (ASIO)
1. Attached is a scaled letter fron Sir Charles Spry,
Director General of the Australian Security Intelligenco
Organization (who provided a copy of the letter to the Chief
of Station, Heibourne), and a suggested reply for your
signature.
2. Bir Charles' letter to you recommends again好家
doclassification of the Farrea Comaission document CD-971,
which refers to our investigation of anonymous telephone
calls to the Canberra Babassy before and after the
amcassination of President Kennedy.
3. I consider the points made by Bir Charles in his
letter to be valid and accordingly recommend against the
decisosification of CD-971 in the foreseeable fature
Staff concurs with this recommendation.
Document Number 1128-988
for FOLA Review on SEP 1976
4. Naison
William E. Nelson
of
K
P/ERI
Chief, Far East Division
Attachments, 5
130/900
A.
Letter from Sir Charles Spry
PROCARE FOR THAUNG
575 40. (2.3.4)
AVGAT REST, CODE
CABLE ICON (11)
(4)
B.
Letter Replying to Sir Charles Spry
P/FRES
FOR FILING
C. FAMA 5008, subject: Declassification of Warreh
Commission Document CD-971-
D.
Copy of CD-971
E. FAMW 3636, subject: Request for Release of Warren
Commission Document
20: DOCI
DDP/FE/PMI/AN: Amos Taylor, Jrl:arc (19) November 1968)
Distribution
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1 DDCI
-
2
-
1
DDP
ADDP
RECORD COPY
-
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1
1
-
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...and
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26 που 68
201-289248
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SECRET

68-2/60/a
RD/08-4635/

26 NOV 1968

FILE

Sir Charles C. F. Spry
Director General
Australian Security Intelligence Organization
G. P. O. Box 51058B
Melbourne

Dear Charles,

Thank you for your letter of 15 October
recommending against the declassification of
Warren Commission document CD-071. I might
mention that our inquiry to you in August (1968)
was in anticipation of further pressure for the
release of Warren Commission papers, a pressure
which has not materialized. Accordingly, there is
not, at the present time, any intention to release
CD-971.

Should the question be raised at some future
time, the points made by you in your letter provide
every reason to keep the document out of the
public domain.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

cc: DDCI

Signature Recommended:

Deputy Director for Plans

Distribution:
Orig - Addee
1 - ADDP 2 - DCI
1 - CFE 1 - DDCI
1 - PMI 2 - DDP
1 - PMI/AN

Date

DDP/FE/PMI/AN/Amos Taylor, Jr. (X 5502):aib (25 November 1968)

201-289248
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET
IMS(FABOSS)

SECRET
FRP: ,2,

STAFF

ACTION: C/EUR/NOR (729) INFO: EUDORECORD, EUR/LGL, MDSX, ODPD RYBAT.(FILE,

OC/EURN, CIC/EUR (3/W)

96 3123036 ASO PAGE 001 IN 3123036
TOR: 081248Z FEB 96 (COPB 94608
SECRET 081247Z FEB 96 STAFF 19-6
CITE:(COPENHAGEN)94608

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT EUR/(NOR) INFO DC/EURN) CIC (EU, EUR/LGL)

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT

SUBJECT: RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT

REF: DIRECTOR 633349 96 3117723

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: SEE PARA 2.

2. THE FAX (STATION) RECEIVED APPEARS TO BE INCOMPLETE. IT
CONTAINED A COVER SHEET, A ONE-PAGE COPENHAGEN) CABLE STATING "NO
TRACES" AND THE FIRST PAGE OF A DIRECTOR CABLE REQUESTING TRACES ON
LEE HARVEY ((OSWALD)). UNLESS THE MISSING PORTIONS OF THE DIRECTOR
CABLE HAVE SOME BEARING ON (DENMARK, STATION) CANNOT MAKE A CASE
AGAINST RELEASE OF THIS MATERIAL WE WOULD INSIST, HOWEVER, THAT
CRYPTS BE DELETED - AS REF INDICATED WOULD BE THE CASE.

3. PLEASE KEEP US APPRISED OF DATE THESE DOCS WILL BE RELEASED
SO THAT (STATION) MAY INFORM AMBASSADOR AND OUR LIAISON SERVICE
CHIEFS.

4. CL BY: 0716497 CL REASON: 1.5(C) DECL ON: X1

4....FILE: 021-120-004/1. DECL DRV. HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET

DO NOT DESTROY
CROSS FILE COPY FOR:
201-0289248
# SECRET

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

OPERATOR: SEEGER, EDWA BADGE: KT283 DATE : 14 SEP 93
OFFICE : IMS/FABOSS PHONE: 047552 TIME : 15:24
ROOM : GC520HB PRINTER: T019 PAGE : 001
REQUESTER: HM877
DSN: SPET 21162 DOC DATE: 20 NOV 91 MHF#: 91-6320813

//

SECRET FRP:
STAFF

ACTION: SE/USSR/10-3 (752) INFO: C/ORMS, DOMDS, LIMITO, ODPD, SEDORECORD.
FILE, DDO-2, SE/RR-3 (9/W)

91 6320813 ASR PAGE 001 IN 6320813
TOR: 201455Z NOV 91 SPET 21162

SECRET 201454Z NOV 91 STAFF

CITE ST PETERSBURG 21162

TO: MOSCOW INFO DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT SE/USSR/10 INFO SE/RR

SLUGS: WNINTEL GTDANCER

SUBJECT: KGB OFFICIAL NIKONOV

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE.

2. DURING THE WEEK OF 3-9 NOVEMBER 1991, U.S. PROFESSOR
Ε.Β. ((SMITH)), HAD SEVERAL DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW WITH "SLAVA"
((NIKONOV)), WHO IS A LONGTIME FRI?ND AND NOW DEPUTY TO KGB
DIRECTOR ((BAKATIN)). THE PROFESSOR HAS KNOWN NIKONOV WELL
SINCE 1976. HE CURRENTLY IS INSTRUCTING ON A FULBRIGHT GRANT
AT ST PETERSBURG STATE UNIVERSITY UNTIL 22 DECEMBER 1991. SEE
PARA 7 FOR BIO ON THE PROFESSOR. DCOB STEVEN R. HEIBERG HAS
BEFRIENDED THE PROFESSOR, WHO WAS DINNER GUEST AT HEIBERG'S
HOME ON 10 NOVEMBER AND PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFO ON NIKONOV
AND HIS NEW KGB JOB.

3. NIKONOV IS THE GRANDSON OF FORMER SOVIET FOREIGN
MINISTER VYACHESLAV MOLOTOV. THE U.S. PROFESSOR TAUGHT NIKONOV
IN 1976 AT MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY WHILE A FULBRIGHT
PROFESSOR. NIKONOV WAS REGARDED AS EXTREMELY INTELLIGENT AND
CAPABLE BUT GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS AN IDEOLOGICAL
HARDLINER. THE PROFESSOR BELIEVED THAT HE WAS LIKELY TO BE A
RISING STAR IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDED HIM FOR AN
IREX-SPONSORED VISIT TO THE U.S. AS EXPECTED, NIKONOV'S VIEWS
AND RHETORIC MODERATED VERY VISIBLY AFTER HIS FIRST DIRECT
EXPOSURE TO THE U.S. HE HAS HAD AT LEAST ONE ADDITIONAL
IREX-SPONSORED TRIP TO THE U.S. AND HAS SPENT PERIODS OF TIME
AS A PERSONAL GUEST AT THE HOME OF THE U.S. PROFESSOR IN
MARYLAND.

4. ΝΙΚΟΝNOV CAME TO WORK IN HIS POSITION AT THE KGB AS A
RESULT OF BEING A CLOSE FRIEND OF BAKATIN. DURING THE AUGUST
1991 COUP ATTEMPT NIKONOV SAID THAT HE REFUSED TO FOLLOW HIS
BOSS'S ORDER TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DECLARED STATE OF
EMERGENCY. HE WAS DISMISSED BY HIS BOSS (NFI) FROM THIS
POSITION AND CALLED BAKATIN TO SEEK ADVICE. BAKATIN SAID HE
WAS ALSO OPPOSING THE COUP AND WOULD LOOK OUT FOR NIKONOV ONCE
ORDER WAS RESTORED. SOON AFTER THE COUP BAKATIN CALLED HIM TO
ASK THAT HE ASSIST WITH RESTRUCTURING THE KGB. AFTER IT WAS
AGREED THAT NIKONOV COULD DECLINE TO ACCEPT TWO-STAR MILITARY
KGB RANK AND WORK IN THE JOB FOR AN EQUIVALENT CIVILIAN
COMPENSATION PACKAGE, HE CAME TO THE KGB AS BAKATIN'S DEPUTY.
NIKONOV SAID HIS FRIENDS WERE DELIGHTED THAT HE HAD DECLINED
THE KGB COMMISSION.

5. ΝΙΚΟΝOV'S FIRST ASSIGNMENT FROM BAKATIN WAS MAKING
ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE KGB-CIA LIAISON RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAS NOW
COME INTO BEING. IN PREPARATION FOR ONE POSSIBLE QUESTION

<<< TEMPORARY WORKING COPY DESTROY AFTER USE >>>
SECRET

# SECRET

OPERATOR: SEEGER, EDWA BADGE: KT283 DATE : 14 SEP 93
OFFICE : IMS/FABOSS PHONE: 047552 TIME : 15:24
ROOM : GC520HB PRINTER: T019 PAGE : 002
REQUESTER: HM877
DSN: SPET 21162 DOC DATE: 20 NOV 91 MHF#: 31-63208:3

WHICH MIGHT BE RAISED, NIKONOV PERSONALLY REVIEWED KGB FILES TO
DETERMINE IF LEE HARVEY ((OSWALD)) HAD BEEN A KGB AGENT. HE
REVIEWED FIVE THICK VOLUMES OF FILES ON OSWALD. NIKONOV IS NOW
CONFIDENT THAT OSWALD WAS AT NO TIME AN AGENT CONTROLLED BY THE
KGB. FROM THE DESCRIPTION OF OSWALD IN THE FILES HE DOUBTED
THAT ANYONE COULD CONTROL OSWALD, BUT NOTED THAT THE KBG
WATCHED HIM CLOSELY AND CONSTANTLY WHILE HE WAS IN THE USSR.
HE COMMENTED THAT OSWALD HAD A STORMY RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS
SOVIET WIFE, WHO RODE HIM INCESSANTLY. THE FILE ALSO REFLECTED
THAT OSWALD WAS A POOR SHOT WHEN HE TRIED TARGET FIRING IN THE
USSR.

6. IN PREPARATION FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A LIAISON
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SWEDISH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, NIKONOV
PERSONALLY PERFORMED AN INQUIRY FOR BAKATIN INTO THE FATE OF
SWEDISH DIPLOMAT RAOUL ((WALLENBERG)). THERE IS STILL PRESSURE
FROM THE SWEDISH SIDE TO HAVE A DEFINITIVE ANSWER ON THIS
MATTER BECAUSE OF THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF THE WALLENBERG
FAMILY. NIKONOV WAS AMAZED TO FIND OUT THAT THE KG3 HAD NOT
BEEN ABLE TO PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISH WHETHER WALLENBERG HAD DIED
AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES. HE WAS ABLE TO FIND PARTIAL
EVIDENCE FROM FOURTEEN DIFFERENT SOURCES (NF:). NIKONOV NOW
BELIEVES, BUT FOUND NO CONCLUSIVE PROOF, THAT WALLENBERG WAS
EXECUTED LATE IN 1947. THERE WERE INDICATIONS THAT WALLENBERG
WAS SUSPECTED OF HAVING CONTACTS WITH OTHERS WHO WERE ACCUSED
OF PROVIDING FALSE DIPLOMATIC IDENTITY DOCUMENTS TO OTHERS
BEYOND JEWS SAVED FROM THE HOLOCAUST. AMONG THESE WERE NAZI
WAR CRIMINALS WHO WERE ALLOWED TO ESCAPE. THERE WAS NO PROOF
OF WALLENBERG'S GUILT IN ANY OF THESE CHARGES.

7. FULBRIGHT PROFESSOR WHO IS NIKONOV'S FORMER PROFESSOR
AND FRIEND IS:
NAME: Ε.Β. ((SMITH))
DOB: C.1920
CIT: USA
OCC: PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AT UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND,
RETIRED
LOC: RESIDES NEAR ANNAPOLIS, MD
OTHER: FULBRIGHT PROFESSOR FOR WINTER 1991 TERM IN ST
PETERSBURG STATE UNIVERSITY, USSR, TWO PREVIOUS FULBRIGHT
ASSIGNMENTS IN MOSCOW AND SEVERAL IN PRC AND GERMANY; HOSTS
FORMER STUDENTS FROM USSR AND PRC ON U.S. VISITS
THERE ARE NO BASE TRACES ON SMITH. HE SERVED IN THE
MILITARY AND IS VERY WELL DISPOSED TOWARDS THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT. HE VOLUNTEERED INFO ON NIKONOV AND OTHER USSR, PRC
AND GERMAN CONTACTS TO HEIBERG AND CAN PROVIDE CONSIDERABLE 810
AND ASSESSMENT INFO ON THEM.

8. FILE: 074-005-011, 201-0005925
DEFER. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.
END OF MESSAGE SECRET

END OF DOCUMENT

<<< TEMPORARY WORKING COPY DESTROY AFTER USE >>>
104-10016-10021

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
1
2
4
5
6

DIRECTOR
RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

MELBOURNE
The following action is authorized: DE SENSITIZE

CAMH
Signed: R. Haufton
DCI, D/DCI, DDP, C/CI, C/CI/SI, VR
R.O. #1 - Unit: CI/RKA
CS COPY

SECRET 0204222
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

DIR INFO CNBR CITE MELB 2517 (ROLLOFIER ACTING)
2 DEC 63 IN 71187
AVDAT GPFLOOR

REF DIR 85690

1. SQUARE PRELIMINARY CHECKS ON RECORDED CONVERSATIONS REVEAL FOLL:

A NO TRACE 1952 DARK BLUE BUICK BELONGING SOVIET OR BLOC INSTALLATION CNBR OR SYDNEY.

B NO LICENSE PLATE IDENTICAL TO ONE MENTIONED BUT FOLL N.S.W. VARIANTS CHECKED: CCC 012, 1960 VAUXHALL, TWO-TONED BLUE, HERMAN SATRAPINSKY, 149 WENTWORTH AVE, WENTWORTHVILLE; CCC 122, 1949 STANDARD, FAUN, WILLIAM JOHN SIMS, BINALONG; CCO 122, 1960 HOLDEN, BIEGE, KEITH BETHKE, 28 HEWITT AVE, WAHROONGA. NO SQUARE DEROG ON ABOVE.

Document Number 270-676 for FOIA Review on. MAY 1976
C NO IDENTIFIABLE INFO ON AUSSIE MENTIONED CNBR 9591.(IN 68838)

D FRASERS MENTIONED SAME REF ARE ALP MPS.

E INDON FIRST SECY POSSIBLY IDW R. WILLY SASTRANEGARA HAS MOUSTACHE; RUSSIAN CAPABILITY NOT KNOWN TO SQUARE; NOT NOTICEABLY CLOSE TO SOVS CNBR.

D: 200-5-41
CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CS COPY CONDUCTED ON 24 MAY 1970 1289248
E IMPDET CL BY 012208

GROUP
SECRET
Excluded from ovlomatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
Copy No.

13-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 71187 PAGE 2

2. SQUARE HAS ARRANGED WITH PMG LIAISON OFFICER TED YOUNG TRACE ANY FURTHER CALLS MADE. EMBASSY IN CLOSE CONTACT SQUARE REP CNBR.

3. WILL ADVISE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

SECRET

C/S COMMENY: Hqs requested information on the Polish driver connected with the Russian diplomatic establishment in Australia.

SECRET
1400000
104-10023-10087
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

( SECRET DO NOT REPRODUCE
RETURN TO CIA
(
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III
15 November 1974
ANNEX B
THE 201 SYSTEM
RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce
:

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific in-
terest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent
information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying
subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for
producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a rela-
tively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify
opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and
CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organi-
zations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of corre-
spondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. The 201 Number: a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each
individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that
individual.

b. The 201 Dossier: the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form
831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., per-
sonal history, current status, and prospects.

c. The Master 201 Record: a machine record generated by the opening of
a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and
stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. Main Index Master 201 Reference: this reference, printed in reply to an
Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent
within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the ref-
erence consolidated..

SECRET
14-00000
SECRET
(
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974
い
0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON
SEX M DOB 12 APR 26
CIT GERM
REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53
POB GERM, BERLIN 5
OCC PHARMACIST 6
OCC CODE CHEN
201-0032671*
ΤΥΡΕ ΝΑΜE T-
ΟΙ CODES AA XX-10
RCD DATE 53.
SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS
AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH
29 ОСТОВER.
30 NOV 70
(3
Information About Subject
1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text
Document Reference Data Group
8. 201 Number
7
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference
ISG Control Information
13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number
24
SECRET
00833555
14
!
14-00000
( SECRET (
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974
7
e. Ol Code: a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 per-
sonality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual
with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelli-
gence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or
suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI
codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)
(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services
or other specific organizations.

À component may request an OI code be established by submitting a mem-
orandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management
Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned
when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see
paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added
at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201
personalities by Of codes. For example, if an Ol code has been opened for the
security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members
of that service.

f. 201 Machine Lists: produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on
names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers
exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. General

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational com-
ponent, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates
a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing.
of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be
opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter If of this
handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information
will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on
persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and per-
sons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those
persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals
are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff
employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

25
SECRET
14-00000

SECRET
(
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk
and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO
records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy require-
ments on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose.
names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201
dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational ap-
proval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested
for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of opera-
tional interest for training purposes only.
اه

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than
denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five
or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/
ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. Requesting a 201 File Opening

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting
a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Main-
tenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the
master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assign-
ment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample
201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field
station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Head-
quarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the
subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening
is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by
placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN
will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsi-
bility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of
201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.

28
SECRET
che kind while distribunal raudase andur, sinclarations . indian phính thi song
14-00000
( SECRET (
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into
his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through
a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must
be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation
procedures.
?
Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and
handwriting samples.
1.1
c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

1. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the
subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting:
:

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which
have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which
have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles
on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

26,1
عت
SECRET
14-00000
( SECRET (
DOHB 70-1-1-4
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

a. Purging
Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires
discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the
simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take
place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done
periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should
be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for
the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if
a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number
then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch
cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information
contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is
by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier
forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention
in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized
officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction
over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification-
authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained
at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained
in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a
cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location
of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. Maintenance Procedures

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order.
In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201
26.2
SECRET
14-00000
SECRET (
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974
7
dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash
number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are
to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification
into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may
be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards
should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201..

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff
employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to
the ISG/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be
closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true
name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) (201 files no longer of active interest
should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material
has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified
to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an
OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and
Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing
to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number)
containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201
should be sent to. IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document
for inclusion in a-201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic
document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document
remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document
in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L,
or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will
automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may con-
tain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the
file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black--- v
tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

26.3
SECRET
14-00000
SECRET
(
DOHB 70-1-14
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be
handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201
dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a
Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below..

UNCLASSIFIED
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
SUBJECT:
FROM
TO O
1.
IP/Files
CC-52
2
5.
7.
L
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS
DATE
OFFICERS COMMENTS eru samned to show ham sh
SHETLALS
(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1,
Chapter III, Annex B.)
Volume(s) of volume(s)
of 201-
Restricted Dossier
(Attach Foru 2021 to
Dossier)
Non-Restricted Dossier
10.
For Split Charge Dossiers:
11.
All documents prior to
(date)
12
12
14.
15.
forvarded to IP/Files. All
documents after
retained at
BIDE
SECRET CONFIDENTIAL
PETERMAL
28.4
SECRET
(date)
desk.
CL STA
UNCLASSIFIED
::
14-00000
( SECRET (
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any
period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk
officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer.
Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Account-
ability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.
TO:
HAME
CONFIDENTIAL
(Thon gitled in)
NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY
BADGE
COMPONENT
ROOM
TUDE
EXT.
This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited
below has been transferred to you by:
Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files,
Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.
SUBJECT OF REQUEST
FORM 2377E PREVIOUS COITIONS
1-73
DATE
FILE NO.
DOC. STHSOL & NUMBER BOC. DATE
40
TRANSFER
CHARGE
PERM
OR TENP
CONFIDENTIAL
CL BY: 007672
The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action
Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the
201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings
for his component..

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the
desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201
Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

26.5
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:
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( SECRET (
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge
from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being
returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form
2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by sub-
mitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).
TO
IP/FI
GC-52 TUBE DT-6
IP/DCU
GC-40 TUBE HT-4
ACTION DESK: 1.
SECTION A
CONFIDENTIAL
(When Pilled In)
INITIALS
FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not
necessary).
2. To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature
Decessary).
FILE HUNGER
RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28)
RESTRICTED BY:
COMPONENT:
Date:
SECTION B
REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY)
COMPONENT:
R.O. No.
Date:
FORN
2-23 2021 IONS
CONFIDENTIAL
8-2, IMPORT CL BY, CG7122
7
b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the
personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request
for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier
held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-
routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file
to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The
desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted
dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that
desk by Central Files.

26.6
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CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974
?
8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the
subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the
requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201
file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should
supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

`Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by
telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the
information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge
Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent
by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after
appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will
destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and
number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder
will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit
(IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names
and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of
interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its
alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening
the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request
(Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16)
blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box -14), and indicate
permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the
201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are
categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

a. Standard Listings

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's
interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

28.7
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CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974
**
Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The
standard listings available are:
i

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;
९.
i

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.
FUL & CHINA
201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST
03 ICT
1973.
NAPIE
SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY
C, SH 117185/1343/5030/
CHEM. SHOU 117115/1343/0001/
CINE. SHU 1. 17115/1343/0001/
CHE. SHOU-JFY 16774/1108/0088
CHEM, SHOU EI
17JUL14
BIRTHPLACE
DA/MO/YR
CERY GEFY
CHIN, RHANGTUNG
4
24 JANES
90
CHIN, AMOY
04JAN19
CHIN, FUXIEM, PROV.
A
1240V22
CHIN, HUNムス
IPMARAS
CHIN
C41
CHIN, CAN ΤΩΝ
TYPE
008
DCC. CIT. 201
01-101-2. ACT. LOC. (ir.
MAME
CRAY
CIRY CE
CHINT 0165401
CHIN HR
DIPT
0218859
CHIN CHIN
5178653
CHEY
f-41G 17109/1343/690
CHAN. SIEU SHIH 17115/1105/001
CHFE SHCU-TAN
CHEY, SH-155467115/1109/1
CHEN, SHCU 126 /0701/1343/1807
CHEN, SHC-17115/1109/495
CHEM, SHU-٩٨١
CHY. SHAI-CHI4 17115/2005/6930
CHE: SHIU CINIAM 7115/3219/122
CHOM, SH-C17115/2535/2
CNCS. SITU 7115/2055/2797/ דניים
CHEN, SHU FEM
A
R
0258926 CHIM, LEARNING PRO
12JAN18
09 JUN99
1905619
02 JUL 30
:
19
NOV30
CIAC22
OF JUL 14
CHIN, FURIEN
CHIN, CAЧТО
CHIN, FLANGTING PROV
CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.
CHIN, FIJAN TANG IS
CHIN. PFILIU
CHIN, RAANG TUNG
ENGR CHAT 0832655
CHI47 0130415
CCC? 0091803
PROF CHIN? 0040289
CH417 0052638
ARMY CHAT 0328328
CHIN? 0124438
TSEA CRAT 0797335
210CT06 CHIM, PANCINIPIA, PORT ARTH
BUSP CCOM? 0043751
CHAT 0179620
CHIN HK
CHIM? 0234629
:
CHIN CUSA
CHIN CHIN
CHAT
0069786
CHIN
DIPT CCON
0905340
CHIM MALT
:
CHIK HX
CHIR TAIW
CHIN
CHIN USA
CHEN HWA
CHER TAL
CHEN IK
CHIN H
CHIT, SMI HA /7113/2885/3185/
CFT, SITI HEANG 17115/2579/74
CFS-510 7115/2985/7
10
23FERO7
CHIN, FUKIEN
CHEN, KWANGTUNG
CIER, SHU MS
17115/2835/8133
OSMAY18
CHIN, FOOCH
CHIT. SHU-درس
30×4326
CHIEN SINI-1 2711.5/2925/5030/
A
06F5816
CHIN, HOPET
CHIN? 0171622
DIPT CCCM. 0223161
CHIR USA
CHEN CHI
CHIN
CHIN CHIN
CHER USA
CHIN? 0200223
CHIN
04RAST7
CHIN ETH
CHEY? 0179621
CHIK? 0014759
CCO? 00923195
CILEN
CHIN CEY
CHEN, SIRU RUET /7215/2695/2710
Girn, SIRI LAY
27NQY23
CHIN. FANG CHIFING
PROF CHIN? 0175673
CHIM CHI
食
CHIN
CCON 0221972
CHIA CHI
CHLR, SIPI LIANG 77115/0547/009
CHEM. Sins 114 7115/2579/2631/
CIRCZE
CHIN
DEPT CHEN? 0223162
CHIN CHIN
25MMV20-
CHIN, FERGSHUN
CHIN? 0179624
CHIM TAT
CHOEN SHIT-L145 17107/2473/010
01 JUL 29
CHIN, FIANGSU
MILA CCM
0834440
CHIM LACS
20SE 20
CHER, HSIAM-HSLEN, KLANGSU
CHAT
009647-
CHIN USA
CHEM, SHY 4/7119/2285/0589/
CILM, SHU-PAD 7115/2579/0202/
CHFA, SHU-SEM/7115/2895/2773/
CHIFT, SINI-SHAN 17115/2579/091
CHEM, SHU-TE /7115/2455/1795/
154PR 30
1°PECI
A
300EC26
27JAN25
210EC37
CIPEN, SHU 1EH/475/
27MA 20
CHEN, CHEHCHA 1
CHIN, KWANGTING PROV.
CHIM, KWANG TUPIG
CHIM, FUKIEN PROY
CHEN, SHANGHAI
CHIM, CHANG SHO
CHIN CHI
CHAT? 0052638
CHEN HWAL
CHINT 0085119
CHIN TATH
CHIN? OL03249
CHEN CHIN.
GEOL CHIN? 0763416-
CHEN BUSA
0013991
CHIN
CM. SH15/0647/6639
CIPCTS
CHIN, HANG CHEA
CHIN? 0153929
OHER CAIR
CHEE, SHE T120 /7115/245/2757/
CICM. SU 1217:15/0647/0317 וי/
LAMAR17
CHEN:
FIN CCON0767442-CIA "UR
A
OZFEROS
0151320
CHIN
CEA, S-T40/7115/2655/1031
CIPES, SM-T11
CHIR. SHIP 1/7115/2845/5341
CHIM, SIRI-19/7115/2579/6992/
アレった。ベリー
COUNT. SIN 7115/2579/3842/ ניז/
11AOVOS
CHIN, RUENGTING
CHIN
OSAPRE?
CHIN, PEIPING
CHINT 0107306
CHIN CHEN
15 JUNOG
CHEN, FARG CHET KU
CHIM? 0179624
CHIN CHIN
0200130
21APP21
CHIN, SHANGHAS
04 SEP28
CHIS. SIECINAN
CHIN, HENG YANG HSIEN, HIJN ARMY-CHAT 0349624
171FM38 CHIN. CHER LANG
SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY
82 INPORS CL BY 056979
CHIN? 44010
CHIN? 0144758
CHIN TAIN
INT
0111410
CHIN DEUX
CHIN
CHIM TAEw
PAGE
150
26.8
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DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions must be destroyed
upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely
sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.

b. Non-Standard Listings
?
:
Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:

(1) Country of location

(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)

(3) Citizenship
;

(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)

(5) Occupation.

These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example,
a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the
OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DISPATCH

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTION
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

Chief, Special Activities Report on JMWAVE's Relationship with ANCARBON-1

ACTION REQUIRED: Paragraph 10
REFERENCES
A. WAVE 8981, dated 24 September 1962
B. WAVE 9169, dated 28 September 1962
C. WAVE 9343, dated 2 October 1962,
D. DIR 40975, dated 6 October 1962
E. UFGA 14417, dated 4 March 1964

1. INTRODUCTION. In Reference E, JMWAVE forwarded a review
of the nature of its relationship with AMCARBON-2. This review
indicates that the relationship with AMCARBON-2 evolved from that
action which was taken in September 1962 to insure that a security
breach would not occur as a result of an investigation which was
being carried out by the Identity 1 relative to the fact that the
establishment of the Identity 2 was being kept from the YOBELT
South Campus as a result of security restrictions which were in some
way, related to JMDUSK. While the relationship with AMCARDON-2
stemmed from the remedial action which had been taken in a crisis
situation, the establishment of a working relationship with the
Identity 3 was an objective which JMWAVE had always hoped to obtain.
As a matter of fact, in Reference A, the recommendation was made
that JMWAVE be given approval to contact the major South Florida
news media in an attempt to work out a relationship with these news
media which would insure that they did not turn the publicity
spotlight on those KUBARK activities in South Florida which might
come to their attention. Thus, when a relationship was established
with AMCARBON-2, it was carefully cultivated in order that JMWAVE
might be able to use this contact at the Identity 3 as a means of
achieving the objective of having a relationship with the Identity 3,
which would simultaneously insure the security of JMWAVE's operations
and give JMWAVE an outlet into the press which could be used for
surfacing certain select propaganda items. In the period October to

Attachments: USC
A - Five Newspaper Clippings
B- Identities

Distribution:
3-Chief, SAS, w/atts.
19 March 64
APR 2 1984

UFGA-14781

SECRET
201-

COS
Andrew K. REUTEMAN/vtp
251

Ri Chrono
1 - 201 file (O/COS
1- COS Chrono

DUDLEY R. WILLINGS

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN
(40) MAR 3 1 1964

December 1962, all of JMWAVE's business with the Identity 3
was handled via AMCARDON-2. In mid-December 1962, AMCARPON-2
made the suggestion that he introduce REUTEMAN to AMCARDON-1
in order that there be a backup contact, in the event that
AMCARBON-2 were out of town or unavailable at such times as
REUTEMAN might require assistance from the Identity 3. REUTEMAN
agreed to AMCARBON-2's suggestion, and, as a result, AMCARDON-2
hosted a luncheon on 12 December 1962 at the Miami Club in the
Hotel Columbus, Miami, Florida, at which AMCARBON-2 introduced
AMCARBON-1 to REUTEMAN. As a result of this initial meeting on
12 December 1962, an operational relationship has developed with
AMCARBON-1, and it is believed that this relationship contributes
to the fulfillment of the over-all JMWAVE mission. In view of
this, a special activities report is being submitted to cover the
nature of JMWAVE's relationship with AMCARBON-1 during the
period December. 1962 to March 1964.

2. FRAME OF REFERENCE FOR JAWAVE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH AMCARDON-1
When AMCARBON-2 introduced AMCARCON-1 to REUTEMAN, AMCARLON-2
reviewed the ground rules under which he had been cooperating
with REUTEMAN. This review was conducted for AMCARBON-1's
benefit, in order that he might clearly understand the frame of
reference, which should prevail in his relationships with REUTEMAN.
In this review, AMCAREON-2 pointed out that it was the policy
of the Identity 3 that it would take no action which would
purposely embarrass KUBARK or its South Florida operations. As
a result, if any embarrassing items relative to KUBARK's operations
in South Florida did come to the attention of the Identity 3, this
material would be brought to REUTEMAN's immediate attention.
AMCARBON-2 made it clear to AMCARBON-1 that such items should be
discussed with REUTEMAN in a frank manner. In addition, AMCARBON-2
made the point that, after an item was discussed, AMCARBON-1
should follow REUTEMAN's guidance relative to how any particularly
embarrassing item might be handled by the Identity 3, so that it
would not expose KUBARK operations and, at the same time, would
not jeopardize the journalistic reputation of the Identity 3.
In addition, AMCARBON-2 pointed out that, if AMCARBON-1 brought
a potentially embarrassing item to REUTEMAN's attention and
remedial action on the matter was not taken by REUTEMAN within
a reasonable period of time, then the Identity 3 would feel free
to expose any ineptness on KUBARK's part. AMCARBON-2 pointed
out that in return for this cooperation from the Identity 3,
REUTEMAN had agreed that he would be available for contact by
telephone or periodic personal meetings at which AMCARBON-1
and AMCARBON-2 could discuss broad trends and developments in
Latin American affairs. AMCARBON-2 advised AMCARBON-1 that this
arrangement did not mean that AMCARBON-1 could expect to obtain
any classified information from REUTEMAN. The point was also
made that AMCARBON-1 should not press for the obtaining of
classified information, but he should be alert to steering tips
which REUTEMAN might furnish him on fast-breaking news stories.
AMCARBON-1 indicated that he understood the frame of reference
which had been outlined by AMCARBON-2. This frame of reference
has prevailed throughout JMWAVE's relationship with AMCAREON-1
during the period December 1962 to March 1964....

3. AMCARBON-1'S JOURNALISTIC CAREER. AMCARBON-1 originally
started to work for the Identity 3 in 1957 on the City Desk,
and subsequently advanced from this assignment to an assignment
which entailed covering major political developments in Florida.
At a later date, ANCARBON-1 became a feature writer for the
Identity 3. Then in July or August 1962, AMCARBON-1 was made
the Identity 4. This assignment was considered to be a significant

promotion for AMCARBON-1, and it reflected confidence in him by
the Identity 3 management. AMCARBON-1 is by no means an expert
on Latin America, but he is developing his knowledge on the area
and, at the moment, he gives every indication of wanting to be a
long-term Latin American specialist. QDELF has been questioned
about AMCARBON-1, and he has indicated that AMCARBON-1 is regarded
in the journalistic trade as an extremely likeable fellow who has
a keen mind but who lacks experience in depth on Latin American
affairs. It is QDELF's opinion that given an appropriate lapse
of time, AMCARBON-1 will develop into one of the leading Latin
American specialists in U.S. journalistic circles. AMCARBON-1
has a working command of Spanish, and he is constantly attempting
to improve his language fluency. It is REUTEMAN's opinion that
AMCARBON-1 has developed rapidly as a Latin American specialist,
and he will continue to grow in this field. Thus, he is a contact
who should be developed and harnessed for exploitation, bearing
in mind that he does have long-term potential.

4. AMCARBON-1'S CONTACTS AND SOURCES. In keeping with the
traditional pattern of source protection which is common to
newspapermen, intelligence officers and law enforcement officers,
AMCARBON-1 attempts to guard the true identity of all of his
sources. On the other hand, when pressed, AMCARBON-1 has identified
some of his sources to REUTEMAN, in order that meaningful evaluations
could be made of that information which AMCARBON-1 had passed to
KUBARK. As a result of these occasional witting identifications
of his sources, and, as a result of general conversations with
AMCARBON-1, REUTEMAN has learned that AMCARBON-1's sources include
the following persons:

a. Luis FERNANDEZ Rocha (201-316766), secretary 'general
of the DRE.

b. Manolo *RAY Rivero (201-239298), chief of JURE,

c. Carlos *TODD y Lobo (201-264141) of the defunct
Havana Times.

d. AMBIDDY-1 (201-267437).

e. Aureliano *SANCHEZ Arango (201-019245), leader of the AAA

f. Edmund *LEAHY of the Washington News Bureau. AMCARBON-1
regards this source as being particularly interesting, in view
of the fact that LEAHY's daughter is a secretary in the office of
Attorney General Robert KENNEDY.

g. Frank *FIORINI (201-242256), free-lance pilot and
adventurer.

h. Eduardo *SUAREZ Riva, public relations man for the MRR.

1. Luis *MUNOZ Marin, governor of Puerto Rico.

J. Juan *BOSCH Gavino (201-103272), former president of
the Dominican Republic.

k. Charles *KEELY of the Copley Wire Service.

l. Jorge *VOLSKY Kraisler (201-352252), an employee of
USIA in Miami. ANCARBON-1 is well aware of the fact that VOLSKY
is a defacto stringer for Tad SZULC of the New York Times, but this
does not deter AMCARBON-1 from attempting to exploit VOLSKY as a
source of information.

5. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT. On occasion, AMCARBON-1 is used
to carry out certain operational support tasks. In such instances,
ANCARBON-1 makes his inquiries or carries out the required action
within the context of his normal journalistic activities. The
use of AMCARBON-1 for operational support tasks enables JMWAVE to
harness the investigative facilities of the Identity 3. Several
oxamples of how AMCARBON-1 has been used in operational support
tasks are outlined below:

a. Andrew ORDONO Camps. In March 1963, Andrew *ORDONO
Camps, DPOB 30 September 1914, Gibara, Cuba, A 12 837 617, arrived
in Miami and was given routine CAC processing. The details of this
processing are contained in MIAM-0085, dated 12 March 1963. After
being released by CAC, ORDONO was interviewed by the Identity 3, and
a sensational story was developed. In view of this story, JMWAVE
tried to locate ORDONO for debriefing. This effort was not productive,
thus AMCARBON-1 was asked to locate ORDONO. AMCARBON-1 did locate
ORDONO in Houston, Texas. See WAVE-6307, dated 25 March 1963, for
details.

b. Discrediting Carlos BANDIN of the MRR Splinter Group.
In UFGW-2555, dated 13 September 1963, Headquarters suggested that
JMWAVE might be able to discredit Carios BANDIN Cruz (201-309611)
of the MRR splinter group as a result of BANDIN's overinflated claims
relative to his faction invading Cuba. Headquarters' interest in
discrediting BANDIN was also stimulated by the fact that BANDIN's
irresponsible publicity stunts were causing problems for AMBIDDY-1.
As a result of Headquarters' interest in this matter, REUTEMAN had
a luncheon session with AMCARBON-1 on 24 September 1963, at which
AMCARBON-1 was advised that the BANDIN faction of the MRR was less
than accurate in its claims relative to its activities in Cuba.
In view of this, REUTEMAN suggested that the Identity 3 might want
to soft peddle any future war communiques which the BANDIN faction
might release. AMCARBON-1 stated that, in view of REUTEMAN'S
comments, the Identity 3 would not only soft peddle, but would
ignore the BANDIN faction in the future. Once BANDIN was discredited
with AMCARBON-1, the word was soon leaked by AMCARBON-1 to other
newspapermen that BANDIN was not a reliable source. As a result
of this action, the BANDIN group has received minimal media coverage
in South Florida since September 1963.

6. OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. In the period February 1963
to February 1964, AMCARBON-1 has furnished JMWAVE with operational
intelligence as outlined below:

a. In WAVE 4836, dated 21 February 1963, AMCARBON-1
reported that AMBEND-l was back in Miami and was the object of
a great deal of press interest in view of AMBEND-1's release from
a Havana prison. AMCARBON-1 also indicated that AMBEND-1 would
probably be a knowledgeable source on the current activities of the
UR in Cuba. This operational intelligence was most helpful in
terms of keeping JMWAVE informed on AMBEND-1's movements. Subsequent
developments revealed that AMCAREON-1 could not contact AMBEND-1,
and thus AMBEND-1's return to the United States did not cause the
publicity stir that was initially anticipated.

b. In WAVE 6176, dated 22 March 1963, AMCARBON-1
reported that the Identity 3 was attempting to research a full
feature article on the Bay of Pigs invasion. The intent of this
article was to furnish a recapitulation of the entire tactical
situation. In this connection, AMCARBON-1 pointed out that he was

thinking about exposing the role of Miami attorney Alex E. *CARLSON,
residing 145 Curtiss Parkway, Miami Springs, Florida, in the
Bay of Pigs operation. AMCARBON-1 stated that, if CARLSON were
of any current interest to REUTEMAN, then the Identity 3 would
soft peddle the CARLSON angle. REUTEMAN advised AMCAREON-1 that
he had no interest in CARLSON but knew of him and was of the
opinion that CARLSON was a sound and honest attorney. The receipt
of this operational intelligence enabled JNWAVE to brief CARLSON
on the Identity 3's over-all interest in the role that CARLSON had
played in the Bay of Pigs invasion. This briefing, in turn,
enabled CARLSON to more adequately prepare himself for a meeting
with AMCARBON-1. While AMCARBON-1 did attempt to pursue this
Bay of Pigs story, he never did put anything into print as the story
was overtaken by other developments before AMCARBON-1 could finish
his research.

c. In WAVE 0904, dated 9 July 1963, AMCARBON-1 advised
JMWAVE that Mr. Trevor *ARMBRISTER, an associate editor for the
Saturday Evening Post, was in Miami during July 1963 attempting
to research a story regarding the possibility that strategic
missiles were hidden in Cuban caves. This information enabled
JMWAVE to keep Headquarters informed on sensational-type articles
which might be appearing relative to Soviet missiles in Cuba.

d. In WAVE 4701, dated 20 September 1963, AMCARBON-1
gave JMWAVE his resume of the discussions which he had with
AMBIDDY-1 at the Miami Playboy Club on 19 September 1963. This
information was useful in obtaining an insight into what AMBIDDY-1
was telling the press.

e. In WAVE 5661, dated 10 October 1963, AMCARBON-1
reported on a discussion that he had had on 10 October 1963 with
AMBIDDY-1's public relations man. This operational intelligence
was useful in terms of keeping KUBARK advised as to what AMBIDDY-1's
representatives were telling the outside world about their
operational activities.

f. In WAVE 6910, dated 31 October 1963, AMCARBON-1
informed JMWAVE about the flood of telephone calls which were
being received at the Identity 3 relative to so-called KUBARK
vessels which were located in South Florida waters. This
information alerted JMWAVE to the fact that press scrutiny was
going to be directed toward the Identity 5. Armed with this warn-
ing, JMWAVE was able to take action which minimized the publicity
repercussions from a renewed press interest in the Identity 5.

g. In WAVE 7671, dated 16 November 1963, AMCARBON-1
reported to JMWAVE the fact that he had received a letter from
Peru which contained an interesting operational lead to one
Carlos MONTALVANO in Puno, Peru. This lead was examined by JMWAVE,
Headquarters and the Lima Station. This examination revealed
that the letter was written by a crackpot; thus, there was no
real operational potential in this lead. This incident did underscore
the fact that AMCARBON-1 is willing to bring potentially significant
operational leads to JMWAVE's attention.

h. In WAVE 1614, dated 6 February 1964, AMCARBON-1
advised JMWAVE that he had received numerous telephone calls
indicating that Armando Andres GUIROLA Forte, who had defected
from a Cuban fishing vessel might be an individual who had previously
been seen in Miami during November or December 1963. At the same
time, AMCARDON-1 pointed out that he was suspicious and thought
that these telephone calls indicated that GUIROLA was not a bona
fide defector, but was either a GOC agent or a KUBARK plant, who
was being used as a means of creating an incident which would
embarrass the GOC, as a result of their fishing boats penetrating

United States territorial waters. REUTEMAN a.ised AMCARDON-1
that KUBARK had played no role in mounting a provocation operation
against the GOC. At the same time, REUTEMAN pointed out that
it was highly unlikely that GUIROLA was a GOC agent. As a result
of this conversation, arrangements were made for JAMWAVE to check
out certain aspects of the GUIROLA story. At the same time,
ANCARBON-1 was prevailed upon not to write a story which might
lead the public to speculate on whether GUIROLA was an agent or a
plant in a propaganda play designed to embarrass the GOC.

7. PROPAGANDA OUTLET. AMCARBON-1 has been used successfully,
during the period covered by this report, as a propaganda outlet
through which items of interest to KUBARK could be surfaced in
the free world press. Examples of how AMCARBON-1 has been harnessed
in this field are outlined below:

a. AMCRAB-1. The AMCRAB-1 defection story originally
surfaced in the Miami area on 13 October 1963 via the Diario de
las Americas, which played up an API release from Montevideo.
The API Montevideo story highlighted AMCRAB-1's information
relative to GOC activities in Uruguay. The story in the Diario
de las Americas had an extremely limited impact on Spanish readers
in the Miami area. As a result, it was decided to do a series
of feature stories on AMCRAB-1, pointing up the fact that AMCRAB-1
was typical of the veterans of the Granma expedition, who felt
they had been betrayed by CASTRO and had been relegated to positions
of obscurity once the revolution had put CASTRO in power. AMCARBON-1
was briefed in detail on the AMCRAB-1 story, and he was given an
opportunity to debrief AMCRAB-1 under controlled conditions in a
JMWAVE safehouse. After completing his debriefing, ANCARDON-1
wrote a series of feature articles on AMCRAB-1. The first article
in the series received front page headline play. The series of
articles on AMCRAB-1 were well written, and they provided an
excellent peg for JMWAVE to mount a replay operation via other
propaganda assets. AMCARBON-1's story on AMCRAB-1 was picked up
by UPI, API and others, and it was played throughout Latin America.
The details of this surfacing can be found in WAVE 5826, dated
14 October 1963; WAVE 6092, dated 19 October 1963; and, WAVE 6174,
dated 21 October 1963.

b. Charles GRIFFIN Shrimp Boat Story. On 26 February 1964
JMWAVE learned that when Mr. Charles GRIFFIN's sons went to Cuba
to reclaim the hijacked shrimp boat, JOHNNY REB, they found that
select items were missing from the boat when it was turned over
to them. It was believed that this information would make a good
human interest story which JMWAVE assets could use to counter GOC
propaganda claims that United States officials had stolen items
from the Cuban fishing boats which had violated United States
territorial waters. In view of this opinion, a steering tip was
given to AMCARBON-1 to have the Identity 3 representative in
Key West interview Mr. GRIFFIN. This interview was carried out,
and an article outlining the points which were of interest to
JMWAVE was published in the 27 February 1964 edition of the
Identity 3.

c. LAYC Story. The March 1964 LAYC meeting in Santiago,
Chile, was not receiving appropriate coverage in the South Florida
newspapers; as a result, REUTEMAN contacted AMCARBON-1 on 5 March
1964 and suggested that the LAYC meeting was a story which the
Identity 3 should pursue. AMCARBON-1 was grateful for this steering
tip, and he assigned the task of preparing the story on the LAYC
to one of the members of his staff. A story on the LAYC was
subsequently published in the 6 March 1964 edition of the Identity 3

(COMMENT: Copies of the articles cited in subparagraphs a through
c above are attached for Headquarters information.)

8. POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE. Attempts have been made to
obtain disseminable positive intelligence from AMCARBON-1 during
the period covered by this report. This attempt has been generally
unsuccessful, in that AMCARBON-1 does not have a great number of
contacts in Latin America who would give him access to worthwhile
intelligence appreciably in advance of the information appearing
in the overt press. As a result, AMCARBON-1 is usually not aware of in
inside developments in any Latin American country; consequently,
he is not a worthwhile source of positive intelligence. As a
matter of fact, AMCARBON-1 is less valuable as a source of positive
intelligence than most journalists. This is attributable solely
to his lack of long-standing contacts in the Latin American political
scene, It is believed that AMCARBON-1 will ultimately overcome
this shortcoming; thus, we will continue to attempt to harness him for
the collection of positive intelligence.

9. COMMENT. In the period covered by this report, AMCARDON-1
has been found to be a straight-forward individual who is honest,
cooperative and who understands the need for security. Our
relationship also indicates that AMCARBON-1 is an accurate reporter
of that information which he passes to KUBARK. In view of this,
JMWAVE plans to continue to harness AMCARBON-1 in the same manner
that he has been used in the past. It is believed that our rela-
tionship with AMCARBON-1 enhances our ability to conduct our
operational mission in a secure manner. In addition, this relation-
ship tends to minimize the possibility that JMWAVE might have diffi-
culties with the media outlets in the South Florida area. As a
result of our continuing relationship with ANCARBON-1, a special
activities report will be forwarded at appropriate intervals.

10. It is requested that a 201 number be assigned AMCARBON-1
and that JMWAVE be advised of the number.

END OF DISPATCH

Identities - 1 - The Miami News
2 - Sunland Training Center for
Retarded Children
3 - The Miami Herald
4-Latin American Editor
5 The LEDA

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - Chief, SAS
1- RI Chrono
1- AMCARBON-1 201
1 - COS Chrono
104-10048-10252
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECURITY INFORMATION
CONFIDENTIAL

From: BOGOTA
Report No: TLB-1684 Local File No:
No. of Pages:
No. of Enclosures: Memo

Report Made By: George S. Vinoops/Unt
Approved By:

Distribution:
Orally to:
By copy to:
Washington - 3
Caracas - 1
Guatemala City - 1
Havana - 1
Quito - 1
Maracaibo - 1
Guayaquil - 1
Files - 2

Source Cryptonym: See below
References: None

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:
The information in this report was obtained from a local detective who
works for the National Police. An informant of the Police in Paris
provided a report to the latter concerning activities of the Colombian
delegation, and he added names of delegates of certain other countries.
This informant is studying in Paris and he accompanied the delegates
to Berlin. It is likely that the interested stations have this infor-
mation, but it is thought it might serve to confirm, or possibly add a
bit to, the material already on hand.

30-77991

IR COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

APERTURE CAND MEPRODUCTIO
13-00000

SECURITY INFORMATION
CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Delegates to Youth Festival
in Berlin

Report No: TLB-1684
Place Acquired: Colombia, Bogota
Date of Information: August-September 1961
Evaluation: B-2
Date Acquired: January 1962
Source: Local Detective
Date of Report: 29 January 1962

1. Bouree reports that an informant in Paris has submitted information to the
local Police concerning delegates of certain other countries to the III
Festival Mundial de la Juventud held in Berlin in August and September 1961.
Those names together with the camments of the informant are included in
the following paragraphs.

2. The delegation of Guatemala consisted of the followings
Edelberto TORRES Rivas, Novena Ave. 8. No. 110
Octavio REYES ortiz, 17 c. o. No. 76
Hugo BARRIOS K100, 12 Calle Oriente No. 58.
José Victor PONZALEZ, 8 Ave. Bur No. 11

3. The following is a list of the Veneauelan delegates!
Juvenel HERRERA, estudiante do derecho
Francisco MIERKS, peligroso
Cordova ARMANDO, estudiante de derecho in Cumaná
Micolas CURIEL Acosta, escritor de teatro
Juan Pedro ROJAS, pintor
Yolanda Steffens de ROJAB, casada con el anterior

4. The Bouadoran delegates are as followes
Enrique Gil Gilbert, escritor
Enrique QUINIBERO.
Patricic CUEVAS, estudiante de medicina da Praga

5. The delegation of Cuba consisted of the followings

Nicolas GUILLEN, poeta y escritor
Santiago GRAJALES, obrero
Antonio NUNZZ-Jimenes,/profesor)de, Podagogía y "responsable de la
delegación de Cuba". Es peligroso y cuando hubo necesidad
de retratarlo en Paris no se dejó.
Francisco GARCIA Benites, comerciante de Holguin
Jose CANETTI, comerciante en Santiago de Cuba

Classification CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INOPAMA

02316
# SECRET

20 October 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Highlights of Tape-Recorded Conversation in Miami Between Mr. William D. Pawley and an Unidentified Cuban during Period 17-18 October

1. On 20 October the undersigned and Owen Faust of WH/3 listened to the play-back of a tape, brought to Washington from Miami and given to Colonel King by Mr. Pawley on 19 October, which was a recording of Mr. Pawley's conversations with two Cubans during the period 17-18 October. The first conversation was with an unidentified Cuban, believed to be a member of a group of wealthy anti-CASTRO Cubans, members of which have talked to Mr. Pawley recently about their plans for sabotage of the coming sugar harvest as reported in UMMA-32 dated 2 October. The second Cuban was AMPACA-1, a Cuban Journalist of operational interest to Station Habana, and a separate memorandum is submitted on that conversation.

2. The unidentified Cuban, who had somewhat of an accent and spoke indistinctly, was difficult to understand. He mentioned a meeting "with some of our people who came up from Cuba" to discuss plans. He said his group had been contacted by a representative of General Jose Eleutorio PEDRAZA, leader of Cuban revolutionary groups in the Dominican Republic, who wanted to know what action their group had taken and was told that they had a plan "to start sabotage". The Cuban said the PEDRAZA representative said their group (the PEDRAZA group) had four provinces organized in Cuba, mentioning Camaguey and Santa Clara, and that they had two provinces yet to be organized - Habana and Matanzas.

3. The Cuban said his group needed two things - moral backing and moneys he pointed out that Cubans in Cuba are afraid to start an underground movement, and there was no way to raise funds, etc. Mr. Pawley gave him no encouragement on the money angle, saying that even if there were Americans willing to run the risk of becoming involved in Cuban revolutionary activities by furnishing money for such a movement, which he doubted, he felt that at the present time it would be like "putting money down a rat-hole" for the following reasons: (1) there is no unity among the anti-CASTRO groups, and there are at least 10 that he knows of who are working absolutely independently of one another; and (2) CASTRO is in control of the country and has the support of a large number of Cubans, especially the under-privileged. Mr. Pawley said he felt the Cuban economic situation was worsening fast and that if it gets bad enough, a large number of Cubans will turn on CASTRO, but until that time comes it would be dangerous to try to organize a revolutionary movement.

# SECRET

4. Mr. Pawley asked the Cuban if his group felt they had moral support of the U. S. and the Cuban replied that they wanted U. S. moral support but whether they had it or not, they felt they were obliged to carry through with their plans. Mr. Pawley said he didn't know what to tell him - would have to think about it and see if anything could be done. He said, "having been connected with the U. S. Government, I can't get involved in revolutionary movements". Also said he would hate to see the Dominican Government get involved, which might be difficult to avoid with so many Cuban exiles there, but commented that he understood "the Dominican Government hasn't given them a dime".

# SECRET

Martha Tharpe
WH/III/CARIB
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

MICROFILMED
JUL 1 1983

DOC: SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO
HDCA-1382

TO : Chief, WHD DATE: 12 June 1958
FROM : Chief of Station, Ciudad Trujillo
SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operational

SPECIFIC PAWLEY Business Interests in the Dominican Republic
ACTION REQUIRED: For info only.

1. In addition to minerals exploitation in which Mr. William
D. PAWLEY has substantial investments, negotiations are being concluded
for the purchase by PAWLEY of the Hotel Hamaca in Boca Chica, a resort
town near the almost-completed new international airport, about 30 km
east of Ciudad Trujillo.

2. Another activity which is kept very much under wraps is the
concession granted PAWLEY for procurement and world-wide sale of all
new issues of Dominican postage stamps. This activity is managed by
Edward P. PAWLEY, brother of William, whose office is in the Dominican
post office building.
D. Pawley

3. The source (considered sensitive) of the information in para-
graph 2. is Mrs. Nora BRITZIUS, a U. S. citizen employed by PAWLEY
in the stamp business. The source volunteered the information on a
very confidential basis to Helene I. DAHLERUP at a social gathering.

Edward F. Stove
EDWARD F. STONESET

10 June 1958
Distribution:
3 - Hqs.

INDEX

CS COPY

CS COPY
SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

12 June 58
201-77378

D00708
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum

**TO**: Files
**DATE**: 29 January 1954

**FROM**: M. D. Stevens

**SUBJECT**: THE LEE HARVEY OSWALD CASE #351164

1. According to a newspaper column of "Allen and Scott" in the Chicago American of 6 December 1963, on the OSWALD Case, Abram CHAYES, Legal Officer of the State Department, was one of two persons immediately responsible for OSWALD's being permitted to return to the United States from the Soviet Union in June 1962. The other individual named was Llewellyn THOMPSON, the then Ambassador to Russia. Another said to have been involved in the handling of OSWALD's case was Sammuel WISE, Counsel of the American Embassy in Moscow.

2. Abram CHAYES, #352234, who as of 16 February 1961 was described as "the new Counsel in State", was granted Security approval for liaison contact with J. Foster COLLINS (in the office of the Chief of the Covert Action Staff) on 6 March 1961. The request for CHAYES' clearance was a "Blanket" request to permit discussion with him of NSC 5412/2 matters on a need-to-know basis.

3. In September 1961 there was a White House namecheck request on CHAYES wife Antonia (Toni) Leigh CHAYES, nee: HANDLER.

4. In March 1962, CHAYES was granted a renewal of his liaison contact clearance with C/CA on a continuing basis. This time his contact was Archibald ROOSEVELT, Jr.

5. On 10 February 1962, HUMAN EVENTS reported as follows with reference to CHAYES:

"SOFT ON COMMUNISM: Representative Francis E. Walter (R.-Pa.), Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, has scored the new State Department regulations on passports, claiming they would allow Reds denied passports to "rifle freely the confidential files of the FBI, the CIA and other investigative agencies." The man behind the new regulations, which Walter claims violate the Internal Security Act of 1950, is reportedly State's chief legal officer, Abram Chayes. Chayes, a Kennedy appointee, is an ex-Harvard professor who was Chester Bowles' top legal adviser when Bowles was Governor of Connecticut. Walter has introduced legislation to remedy the new passport regulations."

Document Number 1271-1029

for FOIA Review on FED 1977

-2-

6. Samuel WISE, "Counsel in the American Embassy in Moscow" who is referred to above, may well be Samuel Griffin WISE Jr., #74574, SD & SSD, who apparently was once a contract employee on AEACTIVE. The State Department reviewed WISE's file on 2 June 1954; and as of September 1962 a Samuel G. WISE was Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow. At that time WISE advised in a cable to the State Department
"[DAVIS case is very similar to that of OSWALD; and he, like OSWALD, lived in the Soviet Union for two years after his defection and prior to making application for return to the United States.]"

7. WISE was an applicant for CIA employment in early 1953 and was security approved subject to polygraph on 11 August 1953. He did not enter on duty and in September 1953 the office which had been interested in him was "no longer interested". On 13 November 1953, WISE was granted a CSA to permit his use as a contract employee on AEACTIVE in New York City. His CSA was cancelled on 24 March 1958.

8. WISE was named as a friend of William Orville MUNSELL, #61693-DL, during an investigation of the latter for possible CIA employment in 1952. WISE, according to MUNSELL's landlady and social acquaintance in Washington, D.C. during the period of about a year which ended in April 1952, was the only person she knew by name with whom MUNSELL was friendly. According to the informant, WISE was a student at Columbia University whose address was 423 Furnald Hall. MUNSELL was Security disapproved for CIA employment in June 1952 because of his close association on a professional and social basis, while attending Denver University from 1946 to 1951, with persons of questionable loyality. In November 1954, MUNSELL was of interest to project FJALIVE with reference to assignment to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; however, the interested office withdrew their request on him, after Security advised of the derogatory information regarding him.

9. WISE from 1951 to 1954 attended Scarsdale High School in Scarsdale, New York, which was attacked by a Citizen's Group, which alleged Communist influence in the school system. He had several questionable associates in addition to MUNSELL.

M. D. Stevens
104-10051-10170
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

ANNEX B
THE 201 SYSTEM

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III
15 November 1974

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific in-
terest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent
information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying
subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for
producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a rela-
tively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify
opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and
CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organi-
zations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of corre-
spondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. The 201 Number: a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each
individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that
individual.

b. The 201 Dossier: the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form
831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., per-
sonal history, current status, and prospects.

c. The Master 201 Record: a machine record generated by the opening of
a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and
stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. Main Index Master 201 Reference: this reference, printed in reply to an
Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent
within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the ref-
erence consolidated.

23

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

① 0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON
② SEX M DOB 12 APR 26
③ CIT GERM
④ POB GERM, BERLIN ⑤
⑤ OCC PHARMACIST
⑥ OCC CODE CHEM
⑦ REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53
SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
⑦ CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS
AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH
29 OCTOBER.
⑧ 201-0032671*
⑨ TYPE NAME T-
⑩ OI CODES AA XX-10
⑪ RCD DATE 53

⑬ 30 NOV 70
⑭ 00833555

Information About Subject
1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text

Document Reference Data Group
8. 201 Number
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference

ISG Control Information
13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number

24
SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

e. Ol Code: a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 per-
sonality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual
with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelli-
gence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or
suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI
codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services
or other specific organizations.

À component may request an OI code be established by submitting a mem-
orandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management
Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned
when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see
paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added
at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201
personalities by Ol codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the
security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members
of that service.

f. 201 Machine Lists: produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on
names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers
exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. General

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational com-
ponent, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates
a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing
of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be
opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this
handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information
will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on
persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and per-
sons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those
persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals
are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff
employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

25
SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk
and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO
records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy require-
ments on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose
names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201
dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational ap-
proval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested
for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of opera-
tional interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than
denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five
or more documents (see-DOI 70-20). -

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/
ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. Requesting a 201 File Opening

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting
a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Main-
tenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the
master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assign-
ment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample
201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field
station may request the opening of a 201. file by writing 201- in the Head-
quarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the
subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening
is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by
placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN
will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsi-
bility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of
201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.

26
SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into
his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through
a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must
be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation
procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and
handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

1. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the
subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

5. ΜΑΙΝΤΕΝANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which
have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which
have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articlės
on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

26.1
SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

a. Purging
Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires
discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the
simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take
place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done
periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should
be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for
the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884)..

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if
a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number
then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch
cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy-doeuments which only repeat-substantive information
contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is
by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier
forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention
in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized
officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction
over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification
authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained
at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained
in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a
cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location
of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. Maintenance Procedures

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order.
In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201

26.2
SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash
number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are
to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification
into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may
be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards
should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201..

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff
employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to
the ISG/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be
closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true
name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest
should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material
has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified
to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an
OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and
Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing
to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number)
containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201
should be sent to. IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document
for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic
document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document
remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document
in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L,
or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will
automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may con-
tain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the
file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-
tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

26.3
SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be
handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201
dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a
Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below..

UNCLASSIFIED
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM
SUBJECT:
TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS
TO
DATE
BUILDING

BUILDING

NO
DATE

building)

OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Humber cach comment to show from whos
who Draw a line avess amater auch comment
BECOMA PORWARDED
1.
IP/Files
GC-52
(For guidance see CSAB 70-1-1,
Chapter III, Annex В.)

2
3.
Volume(s) of
volume(s)
of 201-
7.
10.
Restricted Dossier
(Attach Form 2021 to
Dossier)

Non-Restricted Dossier
For Split Charge Dossiers:
11.
All documents prior to

:
(date)
12.
forwarded to IP/Files. All
13.
14.
15.
documents after

(date)

retained at
desk.

CL, BY: 007622
FORM
8-74
BIOE
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED
26.4
SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any
period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk
officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer.
Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Account-
ability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.

TO:
NAME

CONFIDENTIAL
(When yilled In)
NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY
BADGE
COMPONENT
ROOM
TUBE
EXT.

This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited
below has been transferred to you by:

DANE
BADSE
COMPONENT
Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files,
Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.

SUBJECT-OF REQUEST
PORN 2977 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
1-73
FILE NO
DOC. SYMBOL & NUNBER DOC. DATE
CONFIDENTIAL
DATE
OF
TRANSFER
CHARGE
PERM
OR TENP
REG.NO.
CL. BY: 007622

The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action
Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the
201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings
for his component.

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the
desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201
Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

26.5
SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge
from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being
returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form
2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by sub-
mitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TO
DATE
INITIALS

IP/FI
GC-52 TUBE DT-6

FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
IP/DCU
GC-40 TUBE HT-4

ACTION DESK: 1.
To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not
necessary).
2.
To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature
necessary).

SECTION A
FILE NUMBER
RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28).
RESTRICTED BY:
COMPONENT:
(Name)
Date:

SECTION B
REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY)
R.O. No.
COMPONENT:
Date:

FORM
2-73 2021 EDITIONS

USE PREVIOUS
CONFIDENTIAL
8-2, IMPOET CL BY: 067622
(13)

... b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the
personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request
for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier
held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-
routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file
to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The
desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted
dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that
desk by Central Files.

26.6
SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the
subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the
requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201
file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should
supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by
telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the
information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge
Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent
by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after
appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will
destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and
number from-machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder
will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit
(IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names
and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of
interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its
alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening
the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request
(Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16)
blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate
permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the
201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are
categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

a. Standard Listings

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's
interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

26.7
SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974

Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The
standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.

201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST
03 ICT 1973

SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY
CHEN, SHAI-1 7115/1343/9030/
CHEN, SHOU-1 7115/1343/0001/
CIPAN, SHIU 1. /7115/1343/0001/
CHEN, SHCU-JFN 16774/1108/0038
CHEN, SHOU MET
NAME

TYPE DOR
CHEN, SU MING 17109/1343/690
CHEN SHE SHEH /7115/1103/001
CHEN, SHCU-145
CHFY, SHE-15G 7115/1109/1
CHEN SHCU 126 /0701/1343/LPOT
CHEN, ST-VES 77115/1103/495
CN, SPC
CHEY, SHU-GA
CIFY. SHU-CHEY 17115/2895/6930
CIPE SHY CHPAN 7115/3219/122
CILIEN, SHU-CHUAN 7115/2995/2
CHEN, SHU CO/7115/2985/2797
COFA, SHU FEA
CHEY, SHII HA 17115/2885/3185/
CHF, SHJ HSIANG /7115/2579/74
CFY, SH-51047115/2995/7
CHEN, SHU HS/7115/2895/8133-
CHI. SHU-HA
CFRND, SHII-1 47115/2205/5030/
CHEN, SHU KUET /7115/2295/2710
CHEN SHU LAV
CHEN, SHPI LIANG 77115/0547/009
CHER. STAI LI 17115/2579/2651/
CHIEN, SH-LING 17109/2973/010
CIF, SHU-1
CHEN, SHU 7115/2883/0589/
CHEPI. SHU-PAD 7115/?579/0202/
CHEN, SHU-SE/7115/2899/2773/
CHIEY, SH-50A/7115/2579/091
CHEN, SHU-TE 17115/2495/1795/
CHEN, SHU TEH /475/
1.1. SHI5/0647/6639
CIPC75
CHPT, SL T21/7115/0647/0317/
CHPEN, SH-7115/2695/1031
CHPEN, SHU-YIN
CHEN, SH 14/7115/2895/5391/
CHIN SHI-474 /7115/2579/6992/
LEE MARIT
YR
17JUL15
24 JAN11
04JAN19
210CT08
12 NOV22
18MAR45
C41
BIRTHPLACE
CTRY CITY
CHIN, KWANGTUNG
CHIN, ANYOY
CHIN, FUKIEN, PROV.
CHIN, PANCIUPIA, PORT ARTH
CHIN, HUMAN
CUTIE CANTOY
OZSEP26 - CHIH, LIACAL PRO
12JAN18
Hite FERIEN
CHIN, CANTON
CHTH, KLANGTHING PROV
OCC. CIT.
CHINT 0165401
20101-1 01-2 ACT. LOC. ENT.
CECY CIRY CIRY
CHIN HX
DIPT 0230059
0178653
CHIN CHIN
CHIN
BUSP CCOMP 0043751-
CHIN HK
CHIN? 0234629
CHAT
CHIN CUBA
0179620
CHIN CHEN
CNAT 0069796
CHIN
RIPT CCON 0905390
CHEN MALT
ENGE CAAT 0832855
CHIK
GILK HK
CHINT 0130415
CHIR TAM
09 JUN99
PROF CHINT 0040298
CHIN USA
1905619
CNAF7 0052638
CHIN HWAL
02 JUL 30
CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.
ARMY CHAT 0329328
CHIR TAIN
19
NDV30
CIRC22
CHIN, MIJAN TANG TS
CHIN.PFILIU
CHIN? 0124438
TSEA CNAT
0797335
CHIN MX
CHINT 0200223
CHEN
0488577
CHIN ETH
CHIN, KHANGTUNG
CHIN? 0179621
CHIM CHIN
10
23FEROT
OSMAYLA
30M4326
CHIN, FUKIEN
CHIN, KHANGTUNG
CHIN, FOCCHCH
CHIN? 0015759
CHIN
CCOM? 0073195
CHIN
CHIN? 0179622
CHIN CHIN
DIPT CCCM 0223161
CHIN CEY
OSFER 10
CHIN, HOPET
DIPT CHAT 083-150
CHIN USA
27NOV23
CHIN, FANG CHANG
PROF CHIN? 0179673
CHEN CHIN
CHIN SHU LAV
R
CHIN
CIRCZE
CHEN
CCOM 0221072
DIPT CHIN? 0223162
CHEN CHIN
CHIM CHÍN
25NDV20
CHIN, FERGSHUN
CHIN? 0179624
CHIN TAIW
01 JUL 29
CHIN, KIANGSU
MILA CCON 0854450
CHIN LACS
205620
CHIN, NSCAM-HSIEN, KIANGSU
CHAT 0096747
CHEY US
15APR 30
CHIN.CHANGHAI
CMMO CHIN? 0179625
CH
CHIN CHIN
१९०६८19
CHIM, KHANGELING PROV.
CNAT? 0052638
CHEN HWAΣ
10DEC26
CHEN, KHANGTUIG
CHIN? 0005119
CHER TAIW
27JAN25
CHIP, FUXIEN PROV
CHIN? O103289-
CHIN CHIN
210EC37
CHIN, SHANGHAI
GEOL CHIN? 076316
CHIN BU
27MAP 20
CHIN, CHANG SHU
0013991
CHIN
CHEN CHIN
CHEN CHA 19 7115/257/3842 ני ١١ ٢٠٠١٦/

CHINT
FIN
05APR17
CHIN, PEIPING
15JUNOG CHIN, FARG CILEN KW
0200130
CHIN, HENG YANG HSIEN, HUN ARMY
17/F439
CHEN. CIF BANG
INT
0313010
21APP 21
CHIN. SPΑΝΔΡΑΣ
CHINT G044010
V
045+P2P
CHIN, 3/1CHWAN
CHIN? 0153927
CCOM 0767442
CC047 0093176
CHINT 0107336
CHIN? 0179626
ENAT 0347529
CHIN CHIN
CHIN UK

CHEN 7115/2579/2737/
CHEN, SH SH 129 /7115/0647/0317/
CHEN, SH-7115/2695/1031
CHEN, SHU-YIN
CHEN, SH 14/7115/2895/5391/
CHIN SHI-474 /7115/2579/6992/
AZFEROS
110V00
CHIN, KARIGTING
V
CHINT 0144758
CHIN TAIN

CHIN, KHANG CICH

V
CHEN, SH 14/7115/2895/3842/

0191320
CHEN
CHIN
CHIN CHE او
CHIN

SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE DILY
EZ IMPORT CL BY 05477)
CHIN TAIN
PAGE
150

26.8
SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX В
15 November 1974

All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions must be destroyed
upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely
sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.

b. Non-Standard Listings
Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:
(1) Country of location
(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)
(3) Citizenship
(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)
(DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO:
Chief, SAS; Chief of Station, WAVE

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Contact Report/ITAMII-9

Attached herewith are contact reports of meetings with LI TAMIL-9
on 17 and 29 July 1963.

Willard C CURTIS

Attachment:
Contact Report

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD w/2/att
2 - C/SAS w/a/att
2 - COS WAVE w/2/att
3 - Filos

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA 21849

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE
31 July 1963

HOS FILE NUMBER
201-330173

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
FROM
SUBJECT :
Lame
Meen 11-23 17 July 1963

1. An unexpected meeting was held with LAME on 17
July -- Barker has a scheduled meeting with AMSAL-1 the Comercio
Ejercicio Nacional and/or Campo at 2100 hours was the plan --
Barker arrived at 2103 hours and just as --was about to enter
stopped by the corner of Gutenberg and Thiers -- he just drove up --
to make a call to
at a pay phone.
was supposed to meet
--stopped out of the broad
--but as B's car sailed --
said, in English, "Here I am."
- got in the car and drove away
--explained that he had called B's home --
understood the mystery was because --
3's wife, he said
about 2030 hours and --
probably be back in about half an hour--LAME came to see who might be
(from the pay phone at Gutenberg
--saw Barker pass- Later spotted the car pull up by the corner in the
vicinity of Thiers usual purp
-later spotted the car pull up by the corner in the
Thiers usual purpose.
time, Barker had spoken with his -- His wife, be assumed
the word that the AME
-explained his presente
better pick up point -- LAME
the end
(partly true) --
was only co -- for
soon was made of another scheduled meeting with AMSEL at the
hotel --
Hotel where he had been supposed to keep
meeting, with AMSEL -- where he had been supposed to keep off at 2325 hours
that might reveal something about source of the story

(with Alan Culbertson in the vicinity of the Dawn Hotel) --
embassy and cultural sections are such sharp people, hence when -s. LAME
plotted clandestine correction -- that would seem
the dangerous. LAME explained his presence--at the --
and warning and saw his previous meetings were explained
3. reporti
Cuban Engravings
(4) He reports
scheduled and non scheduled developments
(a) A big celebration of the 5th of July--is being planned to take place
in (Hampico). Dida celebration -- will take place in the
Club Circulo Tampiconense. (Primary), the principal particip-
are RICO, and stink boat or
is ready for these events
(b)

was introduced to two new people - and asked if LAME had
seen them -- LAME had

She was introduced to the First Lady by (Inu) BARRIOS --
of the first Lady (Chronic).
(c) The first Lady, the now Consul Colonel, that,
because he has done quite well in his Cuban relations.

(d) APALCIO also reported that the passing PUCHU LA CUBA is
trying to obtain certain airprints.

(e) APALCIO said that when he was in Prague he had trouble
with the climate and he asked to be sent to some other Europe
country - was surprised at the suddenness of his transfer
to Mexico.

(f) response to a question as to the should be the who
as, as, in his
told B that
belief, would be easiest to recruit among the Embassy staff, said
that he knows about JOBAIN Loyalty to the Castro regime
felt might be recruitable but would never activate him in
he might want a
such a risky venture.goes window shopping along
San Juan de Letran often - might be approachable there.

(g) Only two Cubans were invited to the French Ambassador's
Residence on Bastille Day. Ambassador is becoming
more openly pro-Castro in appearance, but B behaved normal
to him at a cocktail party a short while ago. French cul
(and I don't know what their
-at the Embassy who introduced the Ambassador to
to the French
Attachee to which he introduced the Cuban Attache.
is a close friend of that of
stayed at his side during the celebration on
14th At this array , B only gave him a superficial man and
it became clear that there is a Cuban in the distinction
1 suggested he would be to give them an impression
of another young woman
to give
the impression they
did, the Americans

(h) of
reported on recent meetings with two Ecuadoreans with Escala
for the Embassy.
A few days ago APALCIO saw in a group of
immigrant Ecuadoreans in Ecuador
to to Cuba
(i) About an embassy employee is involved with
transactions with Mexican individuals -
restrictio
and that it is
that he may have to work in a more clandestine fashion to avoid
his personal friction -- in this connection

(j) At the the Embassy some underligation by - that the

(k) turned over to (for potential) a handbill put out
by the Escuela Normal Rural de Santa Therobe Coahuila
dated 10 June 1963, explaining that schools invitation
to Fidel Castro to act as sponsor of the 1958-1963
graduating class. Copy attached.

(1) turned out a pornographic cartoon (for return) dis-
tributed by pro-Castro elements in Tampico. Copy not
attached.

(m) Wilfredo of the Cuban Consulate, Tampico, reported that
Luisa CALDERON has a sister residing in Reynosa, Tem,
married to an American of Mexican descent. Luisa may
come up to the border to visit her sister soon -or her
mother may make the trip -- details not clear.

seems to respect him highly and to admire him for his. He is also
getting along very nicely with his new boss, APARICIO. His information
gathering method is still to keep his eyes and ears open and ask no questions
-thus he often gets only fragments -- while questions or discreet elicitati
might fill in detail. He is extremely wary lest he arouse any suspicion.

6. While he suggested that
he suggested that
on the 20th in
Madara -he was also concerned lest any disruption might
get him in trouble since he is the principal organizer of both affairs
felt that the Mexican government might think the disruption was engineered
by the Castro Cubans, themselves, to throw suspicion ca the anti-Castros.

is to protect him. He loves talking about
--and needs constant encouragement and shoring-up.
He lo inclined to wax himself on the back quite often and wait
This characteristic comes out in his conversation with whom B stops and says,
I think my ideas on handling such-and-such are pretty clever,
don't you

pick up Jill standing at the corner of Thiers and Melchor Ocampo
at the prescribed hour and driving slowly up the street to Thiers and Gutenberg
the street to Melchor Ocampo - Will cruise by in his car and make the pick
up while L is waiting. details will be worked out at the next
meeting.
14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

27 MAY 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: DD/S-HB
ATTENTION : Mr. Joseph E. Murphy, Jr. GG 14
SUBJECT : PUGH, Robert West
#789 6567
08

1. Reference is made to your request dated 4 January 1966
wherein you requested a Covert Security Approval to permit Sub-
ject's use as First Officer in the Far East under Project HBILKA/
JBGREED.
12
2
C

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in Clandestine
Services Instruction No. 10-5 and Clandestine Services Instruction
Field No. 10-5, a Covert Security Approval is granted for the use of
the Subject as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1,
above.

3. Subjects of Covert Security Approvals are not to represent
themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

4. Your attention is called to the fact that a Covert Security
