30 October 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Chief, CI Meeting with Mr. Paul Wallach, Chief Counsel of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

This meeting occurred on Wednesday, 29 October 1975 as a result of concern on the part of Senate Select Committee officers that the Agency was not forthcoming with file material related to the Lee Harvey Oswald case, i.e., the assassination of President Kennedy. The following points were made by the principals as indicated.

Chief, CI - To open the meeting Mr. Kalaris made it clear that the Agency is anxious to demonstrate that we have nothing to hide and that all pertinent material was made available to the Warren Commission. He added that the procedure for making material available to the Senate Staff posed certain problems with regard to sources, methods and liaison, which were delaying the turnover of material. He then presented several examples of the sanitization process in which cables taken directly from the 201 file were edited so that all evidence of source, method and liaison information was removed.

Chief Counsel - As an opening reply Mr. Wallach stated that his position was that he considered that the Senate Committee should have the same access as the Rockefeller Commission. He added that in his discussions with several senators on his committee they had mentioned reports that a Rockefeller reviewing official by the name of Belin who had had access to the original file, had appeared on several talk shows and was going to write a book based on his review of Agency holdings on the Oswald case.

Chief, CI - Mr. Kalaris then pointed out that there were certain particularly sensitive aspects of the material which could not be released for use outside of the building.

He gave two examples of this. One was the fact that the Mexican Government security liaison contact on the case was the current President of Mexico. He said, and Mr. Wallach agreed, this was obviously a matter which had to be protected. The second case was the Mexican Government penetration of the Cuban Embassy. Again Mr. Wallach agreed.

Chief, CI - Mr. Kalaris then suggested that the answer might very well be for the Senate Committee review officers to work with the original file with the exception of those particularly sensitive items which would either be sterilized or summarized. Mr. Kalaris added that to establish the sensitivity of these items he would be willing for the sterilizations/summarizations to be spot checked against the originals by the Senate reviewers.

Chief Counsel - Mr. Wallach conferred with his colleagues and then agreed that this would be acceptable. He did inquire as to approximately how many such items there would be. He was informed by Mr. Kalaris that it was somewhat difficult to access but that there should not be more than 100 such items.

Chief Counsel - Mr. Wallach commented that it would be necessary for his people to take notes, but he would agree that these notes not be taken from the building. The purpose of the notes is simply to allow the reviewers to keep track of where they have been and what they have seen. It was agreed at a minimum that their notes would be checked with us.

Chief, CI - At this point Mr. Kalaris called Mr. Blee and requested approval of the above procedure. Mr. Blee concurred.

Chief Counsel - Mr. Wallach commented that his people would tab those sterilized or summarized items which they wanted to discuss and we would confer with them on those points.

Comment

Mr. Wallach mentioned that Mr. Proctor (DDI) is a family friend and he wanted to make contact by phone.

At the end of the day the reviewers returned the three files of other agency documents and offered their notes for review. It was agreed they would return on Monday to start reviewing files and that we would have at least 15 volumes ready for them. Mr. Wallach was to call on Friday to confirm our readiness.

Robert G. Wall
Deputy Chief, CI/OG

cc: Chief, CI
ADDO
SA/DDO
Review Staff - Walt Elder
104-10322-10056 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

24 OCT 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Supplementary Information on James Earl Ray

REFERENCE: DDO Memorandum for DCI dated 23 October 1975
Subject: Background for Rather Interview
James Earl Ray

Dick Ober (then in CI) who wrote all the early Ray cables,
recalls that he had numerous discussions with the FBI on the
matter, and is certain that whatever we did was undertaken at
the request of the FBI. Because of the fast moving situation,
most of his discussions with the FBI were on the phone, and
not the subject of written memoranda. The paper clipped
outgoing cable in referring to Eric Galt (the man initially
identified by the FBI as the assassin of Dr. King) requests
"addressees make every effort determine if Galt is or has
been in your area. Information para one should be passed
to liaison and any other likely sources. FBI requests that
any information reported be evaluated as to reliability and
that as much detail as possible be provided. Cable any
positive reply priority to HQS. and pass to legal attache
if any in your country." There is a scribbled note in the
file, presumably in Ober's hand, which reads: "4. Ray
fingerprints: FBI agreed to my proposal we send to field
for liaison." Ober, also logically points out that the FBI
would not have provided us later with a fingerprint formula
(see attached cable), a detailed physical description and
photos unless they wanted this passed on to overseas liaison
services. (Note that our cables did not go, for example, to
Ottawa or Mexico City?)

David H. Blee
Associate Deputy Director
for Operations

Attachments

E2 IMPDET
CL-BY-035768

13-00000

ORIG: Richard Ober
UNIT: CIOP/DO
EXT: 6537
DATE: 18 Apr 68
CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:
SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS SEEN BY
1 6
2 7
3 8
4 9
5 10

INDEX DESTROY RETURN TO BRANCH FILE RIC

PER ORIGINATOR NO INDEX FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONFI INFO RID COPY FILE VR CS/RF DCI D/DCI DDP

C/EUR C/NH C/NE 19 0132 Z 92664

TO PRIORITY NO NIGHT ACTION
ASUNCION, BANGKOK, BARCELONA, BEIRUT, BERLIN, BERN, BOGOTA,
CARACAS
BRASILIA BRUSSELS, BUENOS AIRES, COPENHAGEN,
FRANKFURT, GENEVA, GEORGETOWN, GUATEMALA CITY,

GUAYAQUIL, THE HAGUE, HAMBURG, HELSINKI, HONG KONG,

KINGSTON, LA PAZ, LIMA, LONDON, MADRID, MANAGUA, MONTEVIDEO,

NEW DELHI, LISBON, MANILA, MUNICH, OSLO, PANAMA CITY, PARIS,

PORT AU PRINCE, PORT OF SPAIN, PORTO ALEGRE, QUITO, RECIFE,
RAWALPINDI, RIO DE JANERIO, ROME, SAN JOSE, SANTO DOMINGO,

SAN SALVADOR, SANTIAGO, SANTIAGO DE LOS CABALLEROS, SAO PAULO,

STOCKHOLM, TEGUCIGALPA, TOKYO, VIENNA, ZURICH
RYBAT WOMUSE

1. FOLLOWING INFORMATION FURNISHED BY LNERGO

CONCERNING SUSPECTED ASSASSIN OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

NAME ERIC STARVO GALT, ALIAS HARVEY LOWMYER, ALIAS JOHN
WILLARD, BORN 20 JULY 1931, HEIGHT FIVE FEET EIGHT INCHES TO

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

13-00000

C
MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:
SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS SEEN BY
1 6
2 7
3 8
4 9
5 10

INDEX DESTROY RETURN TO. BRANCH FILE RIL

NO INDEX FILE IN CS FILE NO.
CONFI INFO: RID COPY FILE VR

CITE DIRECTOR 92664

FIVE FEET ELEVEN INCHES, WEIGHT 160-175 POUNDS, MEDIUM
BUILD, BROWN HAIR, PROBABLY CUT SHORT, BLUE OR HAZEL EYES,

MEDIUM COMPLEXION, RACE WHITE. OCCUPATION: HAS CLAIMED
EMPLOYMENT AS SEAMAN. REMARKS: NOTICEABLY PROTRUDING
LEFT EAR; REPORTEDLY IS A LONE WOLF; ALLEGEDLY ATTENDED
DANCE INSTRUCTION SCHOOL; HAS REPORTEDLY COMPLETED XXX
COURSE IN BARTENDING; CONSIDERED ARMED AND EXTREMELY

DANGEROUS.

2. WILL POUCH PHOTO OF GALT TO ANY ADDRESSEE
DESIRING IT. ADVISE.

3. GALTS CURRENT WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN. WHILE HAVE
NO REASON BELIEVE GALT HEADED FOR YOUR AREA, DESIRE
COVER ALL POSSIBILITIES.

4. REQUEST ADDRESSEES MAKE EVERY EFFORT DETERMINE
IF GALT IS OR HAS BEEN IN YOUR AREA. MEXICX INFORMATION PARA ONE
SHOULD BE PASSED TO LIAISON AND ANY OTHER LIKELY SOURCES.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
REPRODUCTION DY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFF IS PROHIBITED.
COPY NO.

13-00000

UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:
SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS SEEN BY
1 6
2 7
3 8
4 9
5 10
INDEX DESTROY RETURN TO. BRANCH FILE R

CITE DIRECTOR 92664

LNERGO REQUESTS THAT ANY INFORMATION REPORTED BE EVALUATED
AS TO RELIABILITY AND THAT AS MO MUCH DETAIL AS POSSIBLE
BE PROVIDED, CABLE ANY POSITIVE REPLY PRIORITY TO HQS AND
IN
PASS TO LEGAL ATTACHE IF ANY AT YOUR COUNTRY.

DC/CI (in draft)
(Mr. Hunt)
E/COPS

WH/FI (by phone)
(Mr. Smyth)
DC/FE (by phone)
Mr. Smith)
for C/NE Obo

NCI/OP/DO

SECRET

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declossilication
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
COPY NO.
104-10326-10010
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET
MHFNO
98-1333007
SENSIND: RYBAT
SECRET
PAGE:
1

FRP:
STAFF
CONF: CE/EXO
INFO: CE/LGL, CE/R/IO, CE/ST, CE/STR, CE/STSWE,
CE/WUMB, CEDORECORD, DC/CE, LIMITED, MDSX, ODPD, RYBAT, FILE, CE/R, CE/W,
(3/P)
98 1333007
ASP
PAGE 001
TOT: 012139Z MAY 98
DIRECTOR 795035
SECRET
STAFF
TO: PRIORITY MOSCOW INFO MINSK.
012139Z DIRECTOR 795035
FROM: LIMITED DISSEM CE/EXO INFO CE/R, CE/R/IO, DC/CE, CE/LGL,
CE/WUMB
SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT
*SUBJECT: <ASSASSINATIONS>RECORDS REVIEW BOARD AND DEPT OF STATE
REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN APPROACHING FSB/SVR FOR OSWALD FILE
REF: NONE
TEXT:
1. ACTION REQUIRED: WOULD APPRECIATE STATION THOUGHTS ON
*BELOW PROPOSAL TO APPROACH FSB/SVR SEEKING ACCESS TO FILE ON<LEE>
*<HARVEY ((OSWALD))

2. THE <ASSASSINATIONS>RECORDS REVIEW BOARD (ARRB),
ESTABLISHED BY PUBLIC LAW 102-526 IN OCTOBER 1992, HAS THE
PRESIDENTIAL MANDATE TO IDENTIFY, SECURE, AND MAKE AVAILABLE ALL
*RECORDS RELATED TO THE ASSASSINATION>OF<PRESIDENT KENNEDY. THE
IDENTIFIED (DECLASSIFIED) RECORDS WILL_BE HOUSED IN THE NATIONAL
ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION. (CB HAS HAD SOME DEALINGS
WITH THE ARRB, BEGINNING WITH THEIR REQUEST FOR ACCESS TO THE
RESTRICTED MOSCOW STATION HISTORY FROM THE 1960'S. THE ARRB'S
PREMISE IS TO DECLASSIFY AS MUCH INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE, EVEN
*DOCUMENTS ONLY MOST TANGENTIALLY RELATED TO THE KENNEDY>
*<ASSASSINATION.>
3. PL 102-526 SPECIFICALLY STATES:
"THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD CONTACT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF RUSSIA AND SEEK THE DISCLOSURE OF ALL RECORDS OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, INCLUDING THE RECORDS OF
THE KOMITET GOSUDARSTVAΝΝΟΥ ΒΕΖOPASNOSTI (KGB) AND THE GLAYNOYE
*RAZVEDYVATELNOYE UPRAVIENIYE (GRU), RELEVANT TO THE<ASSASSINATION>
*OF<PRESIDENT KENNEDY, AND CONTACT ANY OTHER FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
*THAT MAY HOLD INFORMATION RELEVANT TO THE ASSASSINATION>OF
*<PRESIDENT KENNEDY>AND SEEK DISCLOSURE OF SUCH INFORMATION."
4. THE ARRB HAS REQUESTED STATE AND AGENCY HELP IN GETTING
ACCESS TO THE KGB RECORDS ON OSWALD. THE RECORDS, ORIGINALLY HELD
SECRET

13-00000
MHFNO:98-1333007
SECRET
SENSIND: RYBAT
PAGE:
2
*IN MINSK, WERE FLOWN TO MOSCOW IN '63 FOLLOWING THE ASSASSINATION, >
THEN RETURNED TO MINSK WHERE THEY ARE STORED TODAY. WHEN
APPROACHED BY STATE AND THE ARRB, THE BELARUSIANS HAVE SHOWN
SAMPLES FROM THE FILE BUT HAVE NOT AGREED TO ARRANGEMENTS TO COPY.
THE ARRB CHARTER EXPIRES ON 30 SEPT 98 AND THE OLD KGB FILE(S) IS
A MAJOR OUTSTANDING REQUIREMENT. STATE HAS MANAGED TO GET THE
SUBJECT AS THE NUMBER ONE TALKING POINT ON VICE PRES GORE'S RECENT
CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS. THE BELARUSIAN RESPONSE WAS TO TRY IT
AGAIN LOCALLY IN MINSK, OFFERING INCREASED "COPY FEES".
5. THE ARRB CHAIRMAN HAS COME BACK TO STATE TO ASK THEY
CONTACT THE AGENCY WITH THE FOLLOWING_REQUEST: CAN THE STATION
CHECK WITH THE FSB/SVR TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE RUSSIANS RETAINED
*A COPY OF THE LEE HARVEY OSWALD'S>KGB FILE IN MOSCOW? CAN WE GET
ACCESS TO THE FILE AND, PRESUMABLY, OBTAIN A COPY FOR THE ARRB?
WE NOTE THAT THE ARRB WILL PROBABLY PUSH HARD_TO_DECLASSIFY THE
RUSSIAN DOCUMENTS AS WELL. JOBVIOUSLY SUCH A REQUEST COULD HAVE
SEVERAL IMPLICATIONS WHICH WE MUST CAREFULLY CONSIDER, I.E., THE
RUSSIANS MIGHT ASK FOR FILES OF THE ROSENBERGS OR OTHER NOTORIOUS/
PERSONALITIES. THE HOS CONTEXT IS THAT WE ARE GRAPPLING WITH THE
ARRB ON A VARIETY OF OTHER SERIOUS DECLASSIFICATION/DISCLOSURE
ISSUES AND WE MIGHT BE ABLE IN A BETTER NEGOTIATING POSITION IF WE
COULD BE SEEN AS ASSISTING THEIR EFFORTS TO GET THE OSWALD FILE.
6. OBVIOUSLY SUCH AN ACTION HAS TREMENDOUS IMPLICATIONS AND
WE WELCOME A FULL DIALOGUE_FROM STATION ON THIS MATTER.
REGARDS...
6. FILE: NONE. CL BY: 714549, CL REASON: 1.5(D), DECL
ON: X5, DRV FROM: LIA 3-82.
CABLETYPE: GECO STAFF 4.0.1.>
RELNO: DORELS0100952954
ORIG: CE/EXO (CHENGMD, 39263); AUTH: AC/CE/R (BANNERMAN); COORD:
C/CE/R/IO (ZERRUSEN), C/CE/WUMB (WARD); INFO: CE/LGL (WATSON);
RELDE/CE-(LEVEN).
END OF MESSAGE
SECRET-
SECRET
MHFNO: 98-0748996
SECRET
SENSIND
PAGE: 1
FRP:

STAFF

ACTION: CE/WUMB (276) INFO: CE/LGL, CEDORECORD, DC/CE, DCCE/OPS, LIMITED,
MDSX, ODPD, ORMS/CE, PCS/CAB, FILE, C/PCS, CE/W, CED/CIC (4/W)

98 0748996
ASR
PAGE 001
IN 0748996
TOR: 061335Z MAR 98
MNSK 17622

SECRET 061332Z MAR 98 STAFF

CITE MINSK 17622

TO: DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT DISSEM CE/WUMB INFO CE/W, CED/CIC, PCS/CAB, DCCE/OPS,
DC/CE, CE/LGL

SLUGS: WNINTEL JYVAPOROUS

*SUBJECT: BKGB ACCESS SUPPORT TO USGASSASSINATIONRECORD REVIEW
BOARD

REF: NONE.

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE SEE BELOW; TRACES ON SUBJS IN PARA
5; GUIDANCE ON ARRB-BKGB ACCESS REQUEST.

2.
ON MORNING 6 MAR 98 POLECON_OFFICER AND DCM MET WITH COS) TO
ALERT HIM TO POSSIBLE NEED FOR STATION SUPPORT TO FACILITATE FUTURE
MEETING (S) WITH BKGB BY EMBASSY OR OTHER USG PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN
*FOLLOWUP INQUERIES ON BEHALF OF USG'SASSASSINATIONRECORD REVIEW
BOARD (ARRB). ARRB IS CONGRESSIONALLY MANDATED AND FUNDED BODY
*LOOKING AT ALL DOCUMENTS RELATED TOASSASSINATIONOF PRESIDENTJOHN
*F.KENNEDY OF INTEREST IN MINSK ARE RECORDS HELD BY THE BKGB
*RELATED TO LEE HARVEY OSWALD AND THE TIME HE SPENT HERE. ARRB
APPARENTLY WANTS COPIES OF ALL THESE BKGB RECORDS TO MAKE THEM
AVAILABLE FOR SCHOLARLY REVIEW AND RESEARCH PURPOSES.

3.
PER POLECON OFFICER, THE ARRB CHAIRMAN (A RESPECTED RETIRED
FEDERAL JUDGE)_HAD REPORTEDLY MADE INQUERIES HERE IN OCTOBER 1996, AT
WHICH TIME STATION HAD, WITH HOS CONCURRENCE, FACILITATED BKGB
MEETINGS (BUT(STATION WAS APPARENTLY DIRECTED BY HOS TO AVOID ALL
OTHER INVOLVEMENT). BKGB TOOK REQUEST FOR COPIES OF THE DOCUMENTS
UNDER REVIEW, BUT NO DOCUMENTS WERE EVER PROVIDED. WHEN PRESSED,
BKGB SAID THEY WOULD ANSWER SPECIFIC QUESTIONS, BUT THEIR "PRIVACY
LAWS" WOULD NOT LET THEM RELEASE RECORDS WHICH RELATE TO LIVING
BELARUSSIANS (PER POLECON, THIS SPEFICALLY INCLUDED OSWALD'S FORMER
WIFE, MARINA). ARRB PRESENTED LENGTHY LIST OF DETAILED, LEGALISTIC,
AND (WHAT POLECON OFFICER, HERSELF A LAWYER, DESCRIBED AS) ONEROUS
QUERIES. BKGB NEVER RESPONDED.
SECRET

13-00000
(MHFNO: 98-0748996
SECRET
SENSIND
PAGE:2
4.
EMBASSY UNDERSTOOD THAT LEGISLATIVE MANDATE FOR ARRB HAD
EXPIRED IN FALL 1997, SO DID NOT FOLLOWUP FURTHER. HOWEVER, MANDATE
WAS APPARENTLY EXTENDED TO FALL 1998, AND ARRB'S INTEREST IN BKGB
INFORMATION HAS BEEN REACTIVATED. ARRB TEAM MAY WISH TO COME TO
MINSK TO TRY AGAIN TO OBTAIN THESE RECORDS FROM BKGB, OR AT LEAST GET
EMBASSY TO REVITALIZE EFFORTS TO DO SO.

5. FOR THE RECORD (AND HOS TRACES), AT THE TIME OF THE ARRB'S
ОСТ 1996 MEETINGS WITH BKGB, ARRB MET PRINCIPLY WITH THE FOLLOWING
BKGB OFFICIALS:

ALEKSANDR ((VERAS)), HEAD OF SECTION (NFI)
LEV ((PIMENAU)), HEAD OF SECTION (NFI)
ALEKSANDR ((ABLAMEIKA)), PUBLIC RELATIONS DEPT.

AT SOME POINT DURING MEETINGS THEY WERE JOINED BY:

GENNADIY ((NARKEVICH)) (PHONETIC), A DEPUTY
CHAIRMAN, BKGB. (THIS IS ALMOST CERTAINLY
IDEN.)

REQUEST HQS TRACES ON FOUR BKGB OFFICERS ABOVE.

6. COMPLICATING ALL THIS IS FACT THAT AT SOME POINT, AUTHOR
NORMAN MAILER (APPARENTLY WITH EMBASSY ACCESS ASSISTANCE) WAS GIVEN
ACCESS TO (SOME/ALL? OF) THE BKGB'S OSWALD RECORDS, WHICH MAILER
REFERS TO EXTENSIVELY IN HIS BOOK "OSWALD'S_TALE: AN AMERICAN
MYSTERY," PUBLISHED IN_1995. AFTER THE FACT, PER_POLECON_OFFICER,
BKGB REALIZED THAT MAILER MADE SUBSTANTIAL PROFITS FROM THIS BOOK,
AND THAT THE BKGB HAD GOTTEN NOTHING FOR PROVIDING ACCESS TO THEIR
RECORDS, THUS THEY REPORTEDLY FELT THEY HAD BEEN CHEATED.

7.
BALL IS NOW IN STATE'S COURT, BUT THEY AND EMBASSY EXPECT
THAT REQUEST WILL BE FORTHCOMING FROM ARRB IN NEAR FUTURE, AND THENCE,
TO STATION, TO FACILITATE MEETINGS WITH BKGB ON THIS MATTER. TO BE A
BIT AHEAD OF THE CURVE, REQUEST HQS GUIDANCE AND AUTHORIZATION AS
APPROPRIATE.

8.
FILE: 227-002-001; 201-1482358. DECL ON: X1. CL REASON:
1.5(C). CL BY: 0702653. DRV HUM 4-82.
END OF MESSAGE
SECRET
SECRET
1104-10326-10044
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

ΜΗΕΝΟ 96-5388761
SENSIND :
SECRET
PAGE: 1

FRP: STAFF

CONF: EA/J INFO: C/ORMS, DC/EA, DCEA/CI, EADORECORD, LIMITO,
MDSX, ODPD, PAS, FILE, EA/XO (2/P)

96 5388761 ASP PAGE 001 DIRECTOR 941533
TOT: 131946Z SEP 96

SECRET 131953Z DIRECTOR 941533
STAFF
TO: PRIORITY TOKYO.

FROM: LIMIT EA/J INFO DC/EA, DCEA/CI, D/PAS

SLUGS: WNI-NTEL
*SUBJECT: NEW STORY ON LEE HARVEY OSWALD AND CIA IN JAPAN

REF: TOKYO 30260 96 5367593

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: SUGGEST COS HAVE EMBASSY PRESS OFFICER
REFER THE UPI CORRESPONDENT TO THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF.

2. IN DISCUSSING REF WITH THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
PAS
THOUGHT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO TREAT UPI CORRESPONDENT AS THEY
WOULD ANY OTHER REPORTER WHO SEEKS A COMMENT ON A STORY OR FACT
PERTAINING TO NWBOLTON. THEREFORE, PAS RECOMMENDS THAT COS TELL
THE EMBASSY PRESS OFFICER TO SUGGEST THAT THE UPI CORRESPONDENT
ADDRESS HIS QUESTIONS TO PAS AT (703) 482-7677 AND ASK TO SPEAK TO
A MEDIA SPOKESPERSON. BASED ON THE UPI CORRESPONDENT'S QUESTIONS,
PAS MAY THEN REFER THE REPORTER TO HISTORICAL RECORDS OR OTHER
OUTSIDE OFFICE.

3. FILE: NONE.
ON: X1, DRV FROM: HUM 4-82 CL BY: 2164121, CL REASON: 1.5 (C), DECI
CABLETYPE: GECO STAFF 1.0.2.3.
RELNO: DORELS0100513880
ORIG: EA/J (BRYSNBS, 35162); AUTH: DC/EA/J(CONNELLY); REL:
-DC/EA/J(CONNELLY)

END OF MESSAGE
SECRET
1104-10326-10045

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

96-5367593
SECRET

SECRET
PAGE: 1

ACTION: EA/J (223)
INFO: C/ORMS, CIC/CEG, CIC/OG, CIC/PRC, DC/EA, EADORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, PAS, FILE, CIC/EA, EA/XO (3/W)

96 5367593 ASP
PAGE 001 IN 5367593
TOR: 120802Z SEP 96 TOKY 30260

SECRET 120758Z SEP 96 STAFF

CITE TOKYO 30260

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT AC/EA/J INFO D/PAS, DC/EA, C/EA/CI

SLUGS: WNINTEL

*SUBJECT: NEWS STORY ON LEE HARVEY OSWALD AND CIA IN JAPAN

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE PROVIDE NAME AND PHONE NUMBER OF *PROJECT OFFICE RESPONSIBLE FOR DECLASSIFICATION OF KENNEDY> *<ASSASSINATION>PAPERS.

2. EMBASSY PRESS OFFICER/ADVISED COS AT RECEPTION LAST NIGHT THAT LOCAL UPI REPORTER IS ABOUT TO FILE A STORY BASED ON LOCAL RESEARCH AND AN INTERVIEW WITH A RETIRED MARINE OFFICER WHO CLAIMED *TO BE LEE HARVEY OSWALD'S COMMANDER IN JAPAN THAT OSWALD WAS RECRUITED BY CIA WHILE STATIONED WITH THE MARINES IN JAPAN IN THE 1950S. UPI CORRESPONDENT OFFERED (PRESS OFFICER A CHANCE TO COMMENT. PRESS OFFICER DECLINED. COS SUGGESTED THAT MUCH, IF NOT ALL PAPERS ON OSWALD'S PERSONAL HISTORY HAVE BEEN DECLASSIFIED FOR USE BY MEDIAΑ, *RESEARCHERS AND ASSASSINATION>BUFFS AS PART OF OVERALL. (COS) ALSO RECALLED THAT THE UPI REPORTERS STORY, IN SOME FORM, ALSO HAS ALREADY BEEN WRITTEN. HENCE, AS A LONG SHOT AT KEEPING A CIA-RELATED STORY FROM SURFACING CIN JAPAN, THEREBY PROMPTING JAPANESE JOURNALISTS TO PURSUE THE SAME INFORMATION, COS SUGGESTED TO PRESS OFFICER THAT (SHE) PASS NUMBER OF THE HISTORICAL OFFICE ATCHEADQUARTERS RESPONSIBLE FOR DEALING WITH PUBLIC QUERIES TO THE REPORTER, ADVISING THAT HIS SCOOP MAY, IN FACT, BE OLD NEWS.

3. WOULD THEREFORE APPRECIATE NAME AND/OR NUMBER THAT UPI REPORTER COULD CALL AT HEADQUARTERS SHISTORICAL OFFICE RESPONSIBLE FOR *<JFK ASSASSINATION>INQUIRY DECLASSIFICATION. IF THERE IS ANOTHER OFFICE AT NATIONAL ARCHIVES OR ELSEWHERE THAT HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUCH INQUIRIES, THAT WOULD BE FINE AS WELL. THANKS FOR THE HELP.

4. CL REASON 1.5(C); DECL X1
SECRET

13-00000

96-5367593
SECRET
PAGE: 2

5. FILE: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.
END OF MESSAGE

SECRET
1000000
104-10326-10055
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

MHFNO: 96-3123036
SECRET
SENSIND-RY-BAT-
SECRET
PAGE: 1
FRP: 2,
STAFF
ACTION: C/EUR/NOR (729) INFO: EUDORECORD, EUR/LGL, MDSX, ODPD, RYBAT, FILE,
DC/EURN, CIC/EUR (3/W)
96 3123036
ASO
PAGE 001
TOR: 081248Z FEB 96
IN 3123036
COPE 94608

SECRET 081247Z FEB 96 STAFF
CITE COPENHAGEN 94608

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.
FOR: LIMIT EUR/NOR INFO DC/EURN, CIC/EUR, EUR/LGL
SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT
SUBJECT: RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT

REF: DIRECTOR 633349 96 3117723

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: SEE PARA 2.

2. THE FAX STATION RECEIVED APPEARS TO BE INCOMPLETE. IT
CONTAINED A COVER SHEET, A ONE-PAGE COPENHAGEN CABLEJSTATING "NO
TRACES" AND THE FIRST PAGE OF A DIRECTOR CABLE REQUESTING TRACES ON
*<LEE HARVEY ((OSWALD))> (UNLESS THE MISSING PORTIONS OF THE DIRECTOR
CABLE HAVE SOME BEARING ON DENMARK, STATION-CANNOT MAKE-A-CASE.
AGAINST RELEASE OF THIS MATERIAL. WE WOULD INSIST, HOWEVER, THAT
CRYPTS BE DELETED AS REF INDICATED WOULD BE THE CASE.

3. PLEASE KEEP US APPRISED OF DATE THESE DOCS WILL BE RELEASED
SO THAT STATION MAY INFORM AMBASSADOR-AND-OUR_LIAISON_SERVICE
CHIEFS

4. CL BY: 07164-97-CL REASON: 1.5 (C) DECL ON: X1
4. CFILE 021-120-004/1 DECL DRV HUM 4-82

END OF MESSAGE
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SECRET
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

MHFNO: 95-1758303
SENSIND:

PAGE: 1

STAFF
CONF: LA/MCGMXB INFO: C/ORMS, CIC/CEG, CIC/CEGLA, CIC/LA, LA/MCG,
LADORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, C/LA, DC/LA (3/P)
95 1758303 ASO PAGE 001
TOT: 221413Z SEP 95 DIRECTOR 456844

STAFF
TO: IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY. 221413Z DIRECTOR 456844
FROM: LIMIT LA/MCGMXB INFO C/LA/MCG
SLUGS: WNINTEL KDSOMBRERO KDMARTINI
SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE ON MEXICO CITY TELTAPS
REF: NONE
TEXT:
1. ACTION REQUIRED: STATION COMMENTS PER PARA 3.
2. IN 22 SEP 95 ISSUE, WASHINGTON POST PUBLISHED AN ARTICLE
ENTITLED "CIA BUGGED SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY." THE ARTICLE
*IS BASED ON CIA DOCUMENTS DECLASSIFIED UNDER THE<JFK ASSASSINATION>
RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992. MOST OF THE DECLASSIFIED
DOCUMENTS ARE EDITED STATION CABLES FROM THE EARLY 1960'S. HQS
HAD ATTEMPTED TO BLOCK THE RELEASE OF THE DOCUMENTS; REGRET THAT
WE WERE UNSUCCESSFUL.
3. THE ARTICLE DISCUSSES SOME AGENCY ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO
*CITY IN TIMEFRAME OF THE<JFK ASSASSINATION. MOST SIGNIFICANTLY,
FROM A DAMAGE STANDPOINT, THE ARTICLE STATES " THE CIA HAS TRIED
TO KEEP SECRET ITS WIRETAP OPERATION, WHICH WAS CARRIED OUT WITHS
THE COOPERATION OF THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT. THE AGENCY HAS ARGUED
THAT DISCLOSING SUCH PAST ACTIVITIES MIGHT ENDANGER SIMILAR
ONGOING OPERATIONS, IN MEXICO CITY OR ELSEWHERE." WOULD
APPRECIATE STATION'S INPUT ON ANY REACTION BY LIAISON
(PARTICULARLY KDSOMBRERO) OR UNILATERAL ASSETS TO THIS FURTHER
DISPLAY OF THE INABILITY OF THE USG TO KEEP CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS
OUT OF THE PUBLIC EYE.
4. THE ARTICLE IS BEING FAXED TO STATION.
4-82.> FILE: 050-002-037/3, 050-002-033/3 DECL OADR DRV HUM
PRELNO: E245787
ORIG: LA/MCGMXB (LUCEMW, 39342); REL: C/LA/MCGMXB (LUCE). CL
LBY_0712052
END OF MESSAGE

SECRET
SECRET
104-10326-10074
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

MHFNO 95-1374342 SENSIND: RYBAT PAGE: 1

FRP:
SECRET SECRET
STAFF
ADV: CE/W/MB (1102Z)
ACTION: CE/W/MB (773) INFO: CE/TNI, CEDORECORD, COMPT, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD,
FILE, CE/W, DDO (4/W)
95 1374342 PAGE 001 95 1374342
ASP TOR: 161102Z AUG 95 MNSK 14144
SECRET 161059Z AUG 95 STAFF

CITE MINSK 14144 (FALANTZ ACTING)
TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.
FOR: LIMIT/CE/W/MB INFO C/CE/W
SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT CODEL
SUBJECT: BRIEFING PAPER AND OSWALD FILES
REF: DIRECTOR 404798 95 1366840

TEXT:
1. ACTION REQUIRED: FYI OR COMMENT

2. STATION IS FAXING TO HQS A COPY OF BRIEFING PAPER
FOR CODEL SHELBY, REVISED IN ACCORD WITH SUGGESTIONS OF
REFERENCE. UNLESS ADDITIONAL REVISIONS ARE REQUIRED, THIS
IS THE COPY WHICH WE WILL PROVIDE TO CODEL TO READ, BUT NOT
TO CARRY AWAY.

3. APPRECIATE SUMMARY INFORMATION REGARDING
HISTORICAL CONVERSATION WITH LOCAL SERVICE ABOUT FILES ON
*<LEE HARVEY OSWALD. ACOS BELIEVES HE DID SEE THE CABLE
MENTIONED IN REFAT TIME OF RECEIPT STATION WAS VERY BUSY
AND IN ACCORD WITH "READ AND BURN" POLICY A COPY--WAS-NOT
(RETAINED. A RETRANSMISSION IS NOT NECESSARY ALSO, IT MAY
NOT BE NECESSARY FOR HQS TO PURSUE THE MATTER FURTHER,
SINCE SUMMARY INFORMATION WILL PROBABLY SUFFICE.
ADDITIONALLY, ACOS HAS LEARNED THAT YESTERDAY THE
AMBASSADOR SUBMITTED A DIPLOMATIC NOTE TO DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER ANDREI SANIKOV WHICH IS AN OFFICIAL REQUEST FOR
THE FILES ON OSWALD. STATION JUDGES BY THIS THAT FBI HAS
CARRIED THE ACTION TO STATE_WITH THIS RESULT. STATION
COMMENT: THERE IS BELIEF HERE THAT THE FILES WERE MADE
*AVAILABLE TO THE AUTHOR OF A RECENT BOOK ON THE KENNEDY>
*<ASSASSINATION->

4. STATION WILL ADVISE HQS OF IMPRESSIONS OF CODEL
SHELBY AT CONCLUSION OF VISIT. THANKS FOR PROMPT AND
THOUGHTFUL SUPPORT IN PREPARATIONS FOR THIS VISIT.

5. FILE: NONE DECL_OADR_DRV-HUM482
SECRET

13-00000

MHFNO: 95-1374342 PAGE: 2
END OF MESSAGE
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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

MHFNO: 95-1366774
SENSIND: RYBAT
PAGE: 1

FRP:

STAFF

CONF: CE/W/MB
FILE, CE/W, DDO (4/P)
INFO: CE/TNI, CEDORECORD, COMPT, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD,

95 1366774
ASO
PAGE 001
TOT: 1522112 AUG 95
DIRECTOR 404768

SECRET
STAFF

TO: IMMEDIATE MINSK.

FROM: LIMIT C/CE/W/MB INFO C/CE/W

DIRECTOR 404768

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT CODEL

SUBJECT: DRAFT BRIEFING PAPER AND OSWALD FILES

REF: A. MINSK 14140 95 13601.7.8
B. DIRECTOR 398108 95 1311426.

TEXT:

1- ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE CORRECT DRAFT BRIEFING PAPER TO
REFLECT CHANGES REQUESTED IN PARA 3, BELOW.

2. SRE PARA 2, REF A THE BACKGROUND OF THE OFFER TO PROVIDE
THE<LEE HARVEY OSWALD>FILES WAS TRANSMITTED TO STATION ON 9 AUG
VIA REF B THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT THE MATTER WAS TURNED OVER TO
THE FBI BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVITY CONNECTED WITH THE KENNEDY
ASSASSINATION. WE ARE QUERYING THE FBI TO SEE WHERE THE MATTER
STANDS. YOU ARE WELCOME TO PASS THIS ALONG TO THE AMBASSADOR. WE
WILL ADVISE AS SOON AS THE FBI RESPONDS TO OUR REQUEST.

3. PAGES ONE AND TWO OF YOUR BRIEFING PAPER ARE RIGHT ON THE
MARK. PAGE THREE HOWEVER CONTAINS SOME ISSUES THAT WE REQUEST YOU
DELETE AND/OR SOFTEN.

A. FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 4. DO NOT DISCUSS ANY
UNILATERAL OPERATIONS WITH THE SENATOR. WE ARE CONCERNED WITH ANY
DISCUSSION OF SOURCES; IN THIS INSTANCE THE CASE IS INACTIVE AND
WOULD NOT ADD TO YOUR DISCUSSION.

B. PARAGRAPH 7. PLEASE REDRAFT TO READ AS FOLLOWS:
REGARDING EMBASSY SECURITY, OUR CONCERN IS THAT WITHOUT A 24 HOUR
PRESENCE WE DO NOT HAVE AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT TO SURREPTITIOUS
ENTRY. ELECTRONIC SECURITY DEVICES WILL ONLY TELL US THAT AN
SECURITY AT
ENTRY HAS BEEN MADE. IT WILL NOT STOP AN ENTRY.
EMBASSY MINSK WAS RECENTLY DISCUSSED BY CE OFFICERS WITH THE SSCI,
THE FACT, OF
WHO HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN TO THE DEPARTMENT.
COURSE, IS THAT STATE DEPARTMENT DOES NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO
HAVE MARINE GUARDS AT ALL LOCK AND LEAVE EMBASSIES AND NWBOLTON
APPRECIATES THAT. (FYI: THIS IS A PARTICULARLY CONTENTIOUS ISSUE
WITH THE AMBASSADOR. WE SEE NO POINT IN ALIENATING HIM BY PUTTING

SECRET

SECRET
PAGE: 2
MHFNO: 95-1366774
SENSIND: RYBAT
HIM ON THE SPOT WITH THE SENATOR WHEN, IN FACT, THIS MATTER IS
BEING SORTED OUT IN WASHINGTON.)

C. PARAGRAPH 8. PLEASE DELETE IT. HOS HAS NOT AGREED
TO ALL OF THE PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS YOU NOTED SO WE WOULD PREFER
THAT THEY NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH THE SENATOR.

3. PLEASE ADVISE IF YOU DID NOT RECEIVE REF B AND WE WILL
RETRANSMIT. REGARDS AND GOOD LUCK!

4. FILE: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.

RELNO: E224938
ORIG: C/CE/W/MB (DOWDON, 73516); AUTH: C/CE/W (WEBER); REL:
C/CE/W (WEBER.) CL BY 520992.

END OF MESSAGE

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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

MHFNO: 95-1311426
SENSIND: RYBAT

PAGE: 1

CONF: CE/W/MB
CE/W, CE/W/IS (4/P)
INFO: CE/TNI, CEDORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE,

95 1311426 ASP
PAGE 001
TOT: 092204Z AUG 95 DIRECTOR 398108

TO: PRIORITY MINSK.
092204Z DIRECTOR 398108
FROM: LIMIT C/CE/W/MB INFO C/CE/W/IS, C/CE/W
SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT GTDANCER
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE
REF: MINSK 14072 95 1207999

TEXT:

13 ACTION REQUIRED: INFORMATION BELOW PROVIDED AS
BACKGROUND FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE AMBASSADOR

2. WE RESEARCHED THE GYVAPOROUS PROMISE TO DELIVER FILES ON
*<LEE HARVEY OSWALD.> WHILE NOT MUCH ON THIS SUBJECT IS REFLECTED IN
THE FILES, WE DID COME UP WITH INFORMATION WHICH INDICATES THAT
THAT MATTER WAS TURNED OVER TO THE FBI FOR ACTION! THE ORIGINAL
OFFER WAS MADE BY JIVAPOROUS/1 (V/L) TO FORMER CEDIN MAY 92. IN
OCTOBER 1992, DC/CETF/W VISITED MINSK FOR FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSIONS
CWITH V/1 RE THIS AND OTHER SUBJECTS THE FOLLOWING IS TAKEN
DIRECTLY FROM THE TRIP REPORT:

★

"WE OPENED THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE TOPIC OF THE <LEE HARVEY>
*<OSWALD>FILES; TELLING THE FBI IS PREPARING A LETTER TO PRIME
MINISTER KEBICH, ASKING PERMISSION TO SEE THE FILE. /1 BECAME
IRRITABLE_AND DEFENSIVE, SAYING THAT SINCE THE USG DID NOT DEIGN
TO MAKE PUBLIC ALL MATERIAL PERTAINING TO ITS OWN INVESTIGATION OF
*THE <KENNEDY ASSASSINATION>(THE WARREN REPORT), WHY SHOULD НЕ ВЕ
PRESSURED INTO SURRENDERING HIS FILE. WE SAID NO PRESSURE IS
INVOLVED WE ARE ONLY FOLLOWING UP ON HIS OFFER. (STILL DEFENSIVE
HE STATED HE WOULD NOT ALLOW ACCESS TO THE RAW FILE, WHICH WOULD
EXPOSE SOURCES AND METHODS USED TO SURVEIL AND INVESTIGATE OSWALD
IN MINSK HE OFFERED INSTEAD SUMMARIES CONTAINING THE RESULTS OF
THE INVESTIGATION AND SURVEILLANCE, WHICH OSTENSIBLY WERE PREPARED
AT THE TIME OF OSWALD'S STAY IN MINSK HE WOULD ALLOW OUR
"EXPERTS" (PRESUMABLY USG) TO EXAMINE THE DOCUMENTS CLOSELY AND TO
CONFIRM THEIR AUTHENTICITY AND COMPLETENESS. HE HINTED THAT WE
(NWBOLTAN REPRESENTATIVES) MIGHT BE ALLOWED TO LOOK A BIT INTO THE
RAW FILE. WE SAID WE WOULD RELAY THIS TO OUR SUPERIORS, BUT
EXPLAINED AGAIN THAT, DUE TO THE SENSITIVITY AMONG SOME AMERICANS
*STEMMING FROM THEIR DISTRUST OF NWBOLTAN VIS A VIS THE<KENNEDY>

MHFNO: 95-1311426
SENSIND: RYBAT
PAGE: 2

<ASSASSINATION, WE COULD NOT UNILATERALLY HANDLE THE FILES
THOUGH WE COULD HELP FACILITATE THEIR PASSAGE TO THE PROPER USG
AUTHORITIES (THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT)
11
V/1 THEN TOLD OUR C/O THAT THE FBI'S LETTER SHOULD BE
SENT TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET VICE THE PRIME MINISTER
AND WE AGREED TO SO INFORM THE FBI. THAT MEMO IS THE LAST
INFORMATION WE HAVE ON THE MATTER. THERE IS NOTHING TO INDICATE
THAT THE FBI DID INDEED SEND THE LETTER OR, IF IT WAS SENT, THAT
THEY RECEIVED A REPLY TO IT. BECAUSE IT WAS PREVIOUSLY DETERMINED
THAT THE FBI HAD PRIMACY IN THIS MATTER, IT IS OUR DETERMINATION
THAT WE SHOULD NOT REQUERY JYVAPOROUS. WE HAVE ASKED OUR REP AT
THE FBI TO CHECK (INFORMALLY) AS TO THE STATUS OF THEIR DIALOGUE
WITH THE JYVAPOROUS AND WILL LET YOU KNOW AS SOON AS WE RECEIVE
THE ANSWER. PLEASE ASSURE THE AMBASSADOR THAT HE WOULD LIKE US TO
PURSUE THIS MATTER WITH THE FBI THROUGH OUR CHANNELS, WE WILL BE
GLAD TO DO SO. REGARDS.
FILE: NONE. INDEX: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.>
RELNO: E221787 REL:
ORIG: C/CE/W/MB(DOWDON, 73516); AUTH: CE/W (FREIMANN);
CE/W (WEBER). CL BY 520992
END OF MESSAGE
104-10326-10078 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

MHFNO: 95-1207999
SENSIND: RYBAT
PAGE: 1
FRP: 2,
STAFF

ACTION: CE/W/IS (513) INFO: CEDORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX ODPD FILE, CE/W,
CE-/-W-/-MB-(-4-/-W-)
95 1207999 ASP PAGE 001 IN 1207999
TOR: 311003Z JUL 95 MNSK 14072

CITE MINSK 14072 (OLEAN ACTING)
TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.
FOR: LIMIT CE/W/IS INFO C/CE/W/MB, C/CE/W
SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT GTDANCER
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE
REF: NONE
TEXT:
1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE ADVISE IF HQS WOULD LIKE
PARA 2 QUESTION RAISED WITH JYVAPOROUS.

2. ON 29 JULY, AMBASSADOR SHOWED ACOS STATE CABLE
GIVING HIM HEADS-UP ON OFFICIAL DISPLEASURE THAT
*JYVAPOROUS, UNCOOPERATIVE IN SHARING ITS FILES ON<LEE>
*<HARVEY OSWALD WITH USG, MADE SOME OF THEM AVAILABLE TO
NORMAN MAILER FOR HIS BOOK, AND SUGGESTING THAT IT MAY BE
TIME TO ASK AGAIN. WHILE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THIS WAS
ONLY A HEADS-UP, AND NO OFFICIAL GUIDANCE HAD YET BEEN
RECEIVED, HE PROMISED TO KEEP ACOS INFORMED IF SUCH A
REQUEST DOES COME IN. IF HOS BELIEVES SUCH A LINE OF
QUESTIONING IS APPROPRIATE, OLEAN CAN FOLLOW UP WITH
JYVAPOROUS/3 IN LINE WITH PRIOR DISCUSSIONS ON LACK OF
RECIPROCITY IN LIAISON RELATIONSHIP.

3. FILE: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.
END OF MESSAGE
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104-10326-10087 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

MHFNO: 94-8695408 SENSIND: RYBAT PAGE: 1

FRP:

STAFF

ACTION: LA/MCGMXB (373) INFO: C/ORMS, CIC/LA, LA/TERR, LADORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, C/LA, DC/LA (3/W)

94 8695408 ASR PAGE 001 IN 8695408
TOR: 022121Z DEC 94 MEXI 53620

022120Z DEC 94 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 53620 (NOWOCIN ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT LA/MCGMXB

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT

*SUBJECT: <JFK ASSASSINATION>ISSUES

REF: DIRECTOR 932873 94 865598

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUESTED: NONE.
2. AS HOS IS AWARE, STATION CONTINUES TO CONDUCT JOINT TELTAP OPERATIONS WITH MEXICAN LIAISON AGAINST THE RUSSIAN AND CUBAN EMBASSIES; HOWEVER, THE TAKE ON THE CUBANS IS VERY LIMITED. WE ARE CURRENTLY IN THE PROCESS OF INITIATING A UNILATERAL TELTAP OP AGAINST THE CUBAN EMBASSY AND SEVERAL RESIDENCES. THUS, ANY OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF WHERE TELTAP TAPES ON OSWALD WERE DERIVED WOULD HAVE DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON CURRENT LIAISON RELATIONSHIP. THE MEXICAN LIAISON SERVICES AND SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO BE SENSITIVE RE THE NWBOLTON RELATIONSHIP, AND THERE ARE THOSE WITHIN THESE RANKS WHO QUESTION WHETHER OR NOT THE MEXICANS SHOULD HAVE ANYTHING MORE THAN A FORMAL RELATIONSHIP WITH NWBOLTON. STATION BELIEVES THAT ANY EXPOSURE (WHETHER OLD OR NEW) AT THIS STAGE OF THE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP (A NEW REGIME IS COMING TO POWER) WOULD FORCE THE MEXICANS TO REASSESS THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH US AS WELL AS QUESTION OUR ABILITY TO MAINTAIN A DISCREET AND PROTECTED RELATIONSHIP. (IT WOULD ALSO GIVE OUR DETRACTORS THE EXCUSE TO FURTHER REDUCE OR COMPLETELY BREAK OFF THE RELATIONSHIP.) GIVEN THE HIGH INTEREST OF POLICYMAKERS IN NARCOTRAFFICKING, TERRORISM, AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN MEXICO, THE PRESERVATION OF STATION LIAISON EQUITIES IS PARAMOUNT AT THIS TIME. STATION ENCOURAGES HQS TO CONTINUE TO DO WHATEVER IS POSSIBLE TO KEEP THE LID ON THE BOX RE PREVIOUS JOINT OPS WITH THE MEXICANS.
3. RE THE (NOC INVOLVED IN THE TRANSCRIPTION OF THE TAPES,

MHFNO: 94-8695408 SENSIND: RYBAT PAGE: 2

STATION PLANS TO DISCREETLY CHECK CONSULAR FILES TO DETERMINE IF HE IS STILL RESIDING IN MEXICO IF NOCIS IN MEXICO WILL QUERY HIM RE HIS REACTION TO FULLER DISCLOSURE OF HIS ROLE WITH THE TAPES INITIAL STATION REACTION RE DISCLOSURE OF NOC'S INVOLVEMENT WITH OSWALD TAPES AND IMPACT ON (STATION OPERATIONS AND EQUITIES IS NEGATIVE SINCE BLOWBACK POTENTIAL COULD BE TWOFOLD: IT COULD DRAW LIAISON ATTENTION TO POSSIBLE STATION USE OF (NOCS) IN MEXICO, AND LIAISON WOULD PROBABLY SCREEN MUCH CLOSER U.S. BUSINESSMEN TRAVELLING AND OPERATING IN MEXICO
4. FILE: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.
END OF MESSAGE
MHFNO: 93-4593421
SECRET
SENSIND:
SECRET
PAGE: 1
FRP: 2, , , , ,
STAFF

ADV: CE/R/IO (16132)

ACTION: CE/R/IO (479) INFO: C/ORMS, CEDORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, CE/R, DC/CE (4/W)

93 4593421 ASP PAGE 001 IN 4593421
TOR: 191613Z NOV 93 MCOW 62359
SECRET 191610Z NOV 93 STAFF

CITE MOSCOW 62359

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO ST PETERSBURG.

FOR: LIMIT CE/R/IO INFO C/CE/R, DC/CE

SLUGS: WNINTEL GTDANCER NQHAYWIRE

SUBJECT: 11 NOVEMBER 1993 MEETING WITH THE SVRR

REF: A. MOSCOW 62226 93 4516923
B. MOSCOW 62260 93 4536763
c. MOSCOW 62261 93 4536806

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUESTED: SEE PARAS FOUR AND FIVE. SEPARATE
CABLE TRAFFIC CONTAINING SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR ACTION WILL BE
FORWARDED TO APPROPRIATE HQS ELEMENTS.

2. ON THE MORNING OF 11 NOVEMBER 1993, LEONID
((RYABCHENYA)), DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE FOREIGN LIAISON
DEPARTMENT, RUSSIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SVRR)
TELEPHONED TO ARRANGE AN "URGENT" MEETING WITH COS. THE
MEETING TOOK PLACE AT 1600 HOURS AT KOLPACHNIY PEREULOK. REFS
CONTAIN STATION'S TRANSLATIONS OF THE ITEMS RYABCHENYA PASSED
DURING THE MEETING (TEXT OF A LETTER TO THE DCI FROM PRIMAKOV
CONTAINING HIS THOUGHTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE CURRENT
PEACE PROCESS; A PAPER ON AID TO THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS; AND A
PAPER ON THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA, RESPECTIVELY.)

3. RYABCHENYA ALSO RAISED THE NAME OLEG ((NECHIPORENKO)),
RETIRED SENIOR KGB OFFICIAL. AS WE KNOW FROM PRESS ACCOUNTS,
NECHIPORENKO'S BOOK, "PASSPORT TO ASSASSINATION" WHICH PROVIDES
*NECHIPORENKO'S ACCOUNT OF<LEE HARVEY OSWALD'S>INVOLVEMENT IN
THE ASSASSINATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY IS SCHEDULED TO BE
PUBLISHED IN MID-NOVEMBER. RYABCHENYA SAID THAT NECHIPORENKO
IS PLANNING TO TRAVEL TO THE U.S. ON BOOK PROMOTION TOUR.
RYABCHENYA STATED THAT HE WAS BRINGING THE SUBJECT UP IN ORDER
TO PUT ON RECORD THAT THE SVRR HAS NO CONNECTION TO THE BOOK,
ITS CONTENTS, OR NECHIPORENKO'S TRAVEL. RYABCHENYA WAS ADAMANT
THAT THE ENDEAVOR WAS "100 PERCENT PERSONAL."

SECRET

MHFNO: 93-4593421
SECRET
SENSIND:
4. NEXT RYABCHENYA INQUIRED WHETHER ANY DECISIONS HAD BEEN
MADE WITH REGARD TO THE SCHEDULING OF THE NEXT EXCHANGE ON
YUGOSLAVIA. HE RECALLED THE NEXT ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS WERE
TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE IN DECEMBER 1993 IN
WASHINGTON. REQUEST HOS ELEMENTS INVOLVED ADVISE INTENTIONS
FOR THE SCHEDULING OF THE NEXT EXCHANGE.

5. RYABCHENYA ALSO INQUIRED ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE
UNCLASSIFIED PAPER PRESENTING THE FINDINGS OF THE U.S.
SCIENTISTS INVOLVED IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL TASK FORCE EFFORT
SCHEDULED TO BE PUBLISHED IN OCTOBER 1993. HE REMINDED COS OF
OUR PROMISE TO PROVIDE A COPY (A PROMISE MADE FIRST DURING THE
VISIT OF THE ETF TEAM IN JULY AND LATER REPEATED BY THE DCI
DURING HIS 9 AUGUST MEETING WITH SVRR LEADERSHIP). RYABCHENYA
EXPLAINED THAT THE SVRR HAS HELD SOME MEETINGS WITH RUSSIAN
SCIENTISTS AND IS WORKING ON A PROPOSAL FOR AN EXCHANGE OF
VIEWS BETWEEN U.S. AND RUSSIAN SCIENTISTS ON THIS SUBJECT.
AFTER THEY HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE PAPER, THE SVRR
WANTS TO MOVE FORWARD AND SCHEDULE AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN
U.S. AND RUSSIAN SCIENTISTS. (AN EVENT MOTIVATING THE SVRR'S
DESIRE TO MOVE FORWARD WITH THIS INITIATIVE IS, OF COURSE, THE
GORE/CHERNOMYRDIN MEETINGS SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE IN MOSCOW IN
THE MIDDLE OF NEXT MONTH.) REQUEST HOS PROVIDE A COPY OF THE
UNCLASSIFIED PAPER BY THE MOST EXPEDITIONS MEANS POSSIBLE.
LENGTH PERMITTING, SUGGEST USE OF SECURE FAX TO THE STATION.

5. FILE: 74A-002-001. DECL OADR DRV LIA 1-87.
END OF MESSAGE
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430000
104-10326-10101
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

MHFNO: 92-7827323
SENSIND:
PAGE: 1

STAFF

INFO: C/ORMO, CICEDC, CIDORECORD, DOCHRONO, DOOPS,
CONF: CIC/CEX-3
MDSX, ODPD, ORMS/CI, FILE, C/CIC, CE/RBI, CED/CIC, CETF/W-5, CETF/W/BAL,
CIC/CEG, CIC/CEI, CIC/CLFL, CIC/EOB, CIC/ISB, CIC/OG-4, CIC/PRB, CIC/TA,
DC/CE, DC/CIC, DDO-2 (28/P)
92 7827323 ASR PAGE 001 DIRECTOR 324829
TOT: 041754Z APR 92

STAFF 0417542 DIRECTOR 324829
TO: * VILNIUS.

FROM: CIC/CEX INFO CIC/PRB, CETF/W/BAL.

SLUGS: WNINTEL TAZZACEX LWOPUS

SUBJECT: WASHINGTON TIMES ARTICLE RE KGB OFFER TO HOLLYWOOD
REF: A. DIRECTOR 283424 (92 7575137)
B. VILNIUS 10599 (92 7801082)
C. VILNIUS 10578 (92 7735236)
TEXT:

1. FYI.

2. ACTION REQUIRED:
FOLLOWING ARTICLE APPEARED IN THE 27 MARCH EDITION OF
THE "WASHINGTON TIMES:"
"THE KGB SPIES WHO CAME IN FOR THE GOLD
"MOSCOW: ON THE 'STREET OF TRUTH,' RETIRED KGB
SECRET AGENTS CAME TO TELL ALL.

"WITH NO HINT OF SHAME, THE COLD WAR SPY MASTERS
SAID THEIR MEMOIRS CAN BE HAD FOR CASH-ON EVERYTHING
FROM<LEE HARVEY OSWALD>TO KIM PHILBY AND THE SPY RING
THAT STOLE THE SECRETS OF THE ATOM BOMB FROM AMERICA.

"'THE IDEA THAT ALL PEOPLE WHO ENGAGE IN ESPIONAGE
ARE VERY RICH IS SIMPLY NOT TRUE, SAID ANATOLY PRIVALOV,
VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE ASSOCIATION OF KGB VETERANS OF
FOREIGN ESPIONAGE, OR FIVA, AS THE RUSSIANS CALL IT.

"MR. PRIVALOV AND THREE COLLEAGUES FROM THE ELITE OF
KGB ESPIONAGE CAME NOT OUT OF THE COLD BUT OUT OF THE
RAIN WEDNESDAY TO THE OFFICES OF KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA ON
ULITSA PRAVDA (TRUTH STREET).

"THEY TOLD REPORTS OF THEIR PLANS TO ENTER THE
CAPITALIST WORLD THAT THEY TRIED TO VERY HARD TO

13-00000

MHFNO 92-7827323
SENSIND

PAGE: 2
UNDERMINE DURING THEIR CLOAK-AND-DAGGER DAYS.

"FEAR OF POVERTY HAD SPURRED THE RETIRED SPIES TO
SIGN UP WITH THE HOLLYWOOD FIRM ENTERTAINMENT AND
COMMUNICATIONS HOLDINGS ASSOCIATION TO PEDDLE THEIR
INSIDE HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR FOR FILMS, MINISERIES AND
DOCUDRAMAS.

"'DUE TO THE PRESENT CONFUSION IN OUR COUNTRY, MANY
OF THE VETERANS ARE IN A VERY DIFFICULT (FINANCIAL)
SITUATION, MR. PRIVALOV SAID.

"OLEG NECHIPERENKO, A 25-YEAR KGB VETERAN, SAID HIS
FORTHCOMING BOOK WILL GIVE DETAILS OF HIS TWO MEETINGS
WITH LEE HARVEY OSWALD>IN MEXICO CITY TWO MONTHS BEFORE
OSWALD SHOT<PRESIDENT KENNEDY.>

"THE OSWALD MEETINGS TOOK PLACE SEPT. 27-28, 1963,
ON THE INITIATIVE OF OSWALD, SAID MR. NECHIPERENKO, THEN
KGB STATION CHIEF IN MEXICO CITY.

"'HIS MOOD WAS BAD, SAID MR. NECHIPERENKO.

"BUT, HE TEASED, THE OSWALD HE MET IN MEXICO CITY
WAS THE SAME ONE WHO WAS IN DALLAS.

"ANOTHER NECHIPERENKO TIDBIT: TWO OTHER KGB MEN
WERE PRESENT AT THE INTERVIEW AND AN OPERATIVE IN MOSCOW
WAS KEPT ABREAST OF THE DISCUSSIONS.

"EXHIBITING FAMILIARITY WITH OLIVER STONE'S MOVIE
<'JFK, '>MR. NECHIPERENKO SAID HE WOULD AGREE WITH SOME OF
THE CONCLUSIONS OF JAMES GARRISON, BUT ONLY BASED ON THE
FORMER NEW ORLEANS DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S BOOK, NOT ON ANY
EVIDENCE.

"IF HE HAD THE DOCUMENTS, MR. NECHIPERENKO SAID, HE
COULD GIVE A BETTER VERDICT. OF COURSE, NO TALK OF SUCH
AN ASSASSINATION>TOOK PLACE IN MEXICO CITY AND THERE WAS
NO ENCOURAGEMENT OF SUCH A DEED, HE SAID.

"MR. NECHIPERENKO HAS BEEN TROTTED OUT BEFORE BY THE
KGB ALONG WITH YURI MODIN, THE HANDLER OF KIM PHILBY, THE
BRITISH MASTER SPY WHO WORKED FOR THE SOVIETS. PHILBY
DIED IN MOSCOW IN 1988.

"THE NEW FACE SHOWN WEDNESDAY WAS ANATOLY YAZKOV,
CODE-NAMED 'YAKOVLEV' IN HIS WORLD WAR II YEARS IN
AMERICA WHEN HE HELPED RUN THE SPY RING THAT GAVE JOSEF
STALIN THE ATOM BOMB. IT WAS ONE OF THE MOST SUCCESSFUL
ESPIONAGE PENETRATIONS IN HISTORY.

"BUT MR. YAZKOV, BEYOND ADMITTING THAT HE WORKED OUT
OF THE RUSSIAN CONSULATE AT 7 E. 61ST ST. IN NEW YORK
CITY, ACROSS FROM THE HOTEL PIERRE, WAS SINGULARLY

13-00000

MHFNO 92-7827323
SENSIND
PAGE: 3
RETICENT.

"ASKED IF JULIUS AND ETHEL ROSENBERG, WHO WERE
EXECUTED IN 1953 FOR PASSING ATOMIC SECRETS, WERE INDEED
GUILTY, MR. YAZKOV SAID HE PREFERRED 'NOT TO TALK ABOUT
PEOPLE WHO TOOK PART IN THIS OR MIGHT HAVE TAKEN PART IN
THIS.

"IT WAS NOT THE BEST ADVERTISEMENT FOR HIS
FORTHCOMING WORK.

"WHEN ASKED IF HE MISSED THE COLD WAR, MR. YAZKOV
REPLIED, THANK GOD THAT IT IS OVER.'

"UNCONTRITE, HE INSISTED HE WAS 'NOT SPYING AGAINST
AMERICA, BUT IN SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET UNION IN ORDER TO
BALANCE THE TWO POWERS.'

"ABOUT 5,000 FORMER KGB OPERATIVES ARE MEMBERS OF
THE ASSOCIATION.

"'WHEN A PERSON LEAVES HIS POST, HE IS LEFT ALL
ALONE, SAID MR. PRIVALOV, A 42-YEAR KGB VETERAN. 'SO IN
ORDER THAT PEOPLE WILL NOT FEEL THEMSELVES ABANDONED, WE
DECIDED TO UNITE AND TO ORGANIZE A CLUB WHERE VETERANS
COULD COME TO RELAX, TO DRINK A BEER OR A WHISKEY, AS THE
ASSOCIATION OF THE CIA DOES.

"INSTEAD OF FEELING SORRY FOR THEMSELVES, THE FORMER
CLOAK-AND-DAGGER MEN WILL WORK ON A FILM ABOUT THE ATOM
BOMB SPY RING; A TV MINISERIES ABOUT U.S. NAVY EMPLOYEE
GLENN MICHAEL SOUTHER, A SOVIET SPY WHO COMMITTED SUICIDE
IN MOSCOW IN 1989; AND A DOCUMENTARY ON OSWALD'S BIZARRE
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE KGB.

"DOCUDRAMAS ON THE ASSASSINATION OF LEON TROTSKY AND
THE CASE OF NATO OFFICIAL ROBERT LEE JOHNSON, KNOWN AS
'THE AMERICAN KIM PHILBY, ARE ALSO PLANNED."
B. FOR THE RECORD, WE HAVE NOTED THAT SOME SIMILAR
THREADS RUN THROUGH BOTH THIS ARTICLE AND THE LWOPUS CASE.
A. THE TIMING OF THE OFFER BY THE FIVA GROUP ON
WEDNESDAY, 25 MARCH, FALLS DIRECTLY INTO THE MIDDLE OF THE
WINDOW ESTABLISHED BY LWOPUS (24-26 MARCH). ALSO, LWOPUS
NOTED THAT IF THERE WERE ANY DOUBTS ABOUT GETTING THE
MANUSCRIPT-ACROSS THE LITHUANIAN BORDER, HE WOULD RESORT TO A
RESERVE VARIANT BUT WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF OTHER PARTIES,
I.E., HE WOULD APPROACH SOMEONE ELSE.

B. LWOPUS SENT A SAMPLE OF HIS WORK TO US NOT FOR
PUBLICATION BUT FOR A CRITICAL READING. HE STATED THAT IF A
PUBLISHING HOUSE SHOWED INTEREST IN HIS MANUSCRIPT AGREEMENT

13-00000-

MHFNO 92-7827323
SENSIND
PAGE: 4
COULD BE REACHED REGARDING JOINT ACTIONS AND MUTUAL LEGAL
COMMITMENTS - ALTHOUGH MONETARY-COMPENSATION_IS_IMPLIED.-
LWOPUS DOES NOT MENTION ANY SPECIFIC SUM, RATHER HE SUGGESTS
THAT HE IS WILLING TO ENTER INTO SOME SORT OF CONTRACTUAL
AGREEMENT. THIS IS COMPATIBLE WITH WHAT THE FIVA GROUP
APPEARS TO BE ATTEMPTING. THE FIVA GROUP STATES IN NO
UNCERTAIN TERMS THAT THEY NEED MONEY.
C. IN EACH CASE THERE APPEARS TO BE A LARGE VOLUME
OF MATERIAL. LWOPUS STATED THAT UP TO NOW HE HAS PREPARED
SEVEN FOLDERS ON FOURTEEN COUNTRIES AND FORESEES WRITING
22-
25 SMALL BOOKS OR EPISODES ON DIFFERENT COUNTRIES. THE FIVA
GROUP ALSO IMPLIES THAT A LARGE VOLUME OF MATERIAL EXISTS.
LWOPUS CLAIMS THAT HIS WRITINGS WERE BASED ONLY ON DOCUMENTARY
SOURCES. THE FIVA GROUP MAKES NO SUCH CLAIM, BUT IMPLIES THAT
THEIR MATERIAL IS FROM PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
D. BASED UPON THE GEOGRAPHIC DIVERSITY OF THE
MATERIAL AND THE TIME SPAN IT ENCOMPASSES, WE SUSPECT THE
LWOPUS MANUSCRIPT MIGHT BE A JOINT EFFORT. IF IT IS NOT A
JOINT EFFORT, COLLECTION MUST HAVE BEEN GOING ON FOR A LONG
TIME BY SOMEONE WITH EXCELLENT ACCESS TO ARCHIVAL MATERIAL.
THE FIVA GROUP IS A COMMON EFFORT OF AT LEAST FOUR (AND
PROBABLY MORE) RETIRED KGB OFFICERS.
Ε. LWOPUS NOTED THAT HE IS CONCERNED FOR HIS SAFETY
AND THAT OF HIS FAMILY. HIS FAILURE TO SHOW AT THE EMBASSY IN
VILNIUS DURING THE WINDOW MIGHT BE THE RESULT OF HIS CONCERN.
AMBASSADOR JOHNSON STATED THAT HE HAD ALREADY ALERTED THE
EMBASSY, INCLUDING THE LITHUANIAN FSN IN HIS OFFICE, THAT THEY
SHOULD BE ALERT FOR THE RETURN OF THE LWOPUS MESSENGER. IF
LWOPUS BECAME AWARE THAT THE LITHUANIAN EMPLOYEE HAD BEEN TOLD
TO WATCH FOR THE MESSENGER, HE MAY HAVE ELECTED NOT TO RETURN.
IN SUCH CASE, ASSUMING THAT YURASOV IS CONNECTED WITH THE FIVA
GROUP, THEIR OFFER TO THE HOLLYWOOD FIRM MAY BE AN ALTERNATE
PLAN.
F. IN EACH CASE, THE MATERIAL PRESENTED WOULD HAVE
APPEAL FOR THE GROUP TO WHICH IT IS OFFERED, I.E. THE OFFER
TO US OF INTELLIGENCE RELATED SNIPPETS REGARDING IN-PLACE
AGENTS VS THE OFFER TO THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY OF THE MORE
SPECTACULAR CASES THAT WOULD APPEAL TO A MASS AUDIENCE.
G. THE NAME OF YAZKOV (TRUE ΝΑΜΕ ΑΝΑΤTOLIY YAKOVLEV)
IS SIMILAR TO YURASOV. ALTHOUGH IT IS CERTAINLY NOT TRUE IN
EVERY CASE, THE FORMER SOVIETS FREQUENTLY USED COVER NAMES
SIMILAR TO OR WHICH HAD THE SAME FIRST LETTER AS THEIR OWN
NAME.
HLWOPUS IS OBVIOUSLY HEDGING HIS BETS. HE ALSO-
MENTIONED THAT HE HAD MADE TWO PREVIOUS_UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS

13-00000.

MHFNO 92-7827323
SENSIND
PAGE: 5
TO CONTACT US. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO CONFIRM EITHER
OF THESE-ATTEMPTS, IT-FS-NOTEWORTHY-THAT-THE-MANUSCRIPT-HE-
PROVIDED TO US WAS A CARBON. BASED ON THE QUALITY, WE BELIEVE
THAT IT WAS NOT CARBON NUMBER ONE.

4. WE ARE CURRENTLY CHECKING THE FILES OF THE FOUR FIVA
OFFICERS TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THEIR BACKGROUNDS MIGHT OFFER
THEM ACCESS TO THE SAME INFORMATION THAT LWOPUS PROVIDED. WE
ALSO PLAN TO COMPARE THE MATERIAL WE RECEIVED FROM LWOPUS TO
SEE IF THE FILES OF THESE FOUR OFFICERS INDICATE THAT THEY HAD
CONTACTS SIMILAR TO ANY OF THOSE MENTIONED IN THE LWOPUS
MATERIAL.
5. WE WILL ADVISE YOU OF THE RESULTS OF OUR RESEARCH.

WELCOME VILNIUS COMMENTS.

6. FILE: 201-1478016. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.>
ORIG CIC/CEX (BORGRINK)_;_ COORD: C/CIC/CEG (ROBINSON),
C/CIC/PRB (BANNERMAN), CETF/W/BAL (MILLER) ; AUTH: C/CIC/CEX
(SANDERS); REL: C/CETF/W (MORRIS).
END OF MESSAGE
CL BY 0710601.
104-10332-10009
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

BoX 11
-SECRET Fidel?

OGC 78-3595
5-31-78
Executive Registry
78-84321
OLC 78-1012/8 JUN 5 10 04 AH 78.
30 May 1978
CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : S. D. Breckinridge
Principal Coordinator, HSCA
Office of Legislative Counsel
SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Assassinations
Request for Access to the "Hart Report"

1. Action Requested: That you approve the recommendation at
paragraph 14 for limited access of selected House Select Committee
on Assassinations (HSCA) staff members to a classified, sanitized
version of the Hart Report.

2. Background: As you know, the HSCA Staff Director, Mr. Blakey,
has requested you in a letter dated 9 May 1978 (Tab A), to provide access
to a report prepared by John Hart in 1977 on the subject of the Agency's
handling of the Nosenko case. This request is part of an inquiry into
hypotheses arising from Epstein's book Legend, in which the view is
presented that Nosenko was a dispatched agent with the mission of
concealing KGB ties with Lee Harvey Oswald. Central to HSCA interest
is the question of Nosenko's bona fides. Additional to that issue, interest
has developed in the manner in which Nosenko was treated during the period
that his bona fides were suspect. These two issues are treated separately
below.

I

3. The Hart report is directed at the handling of the Nosenko case,
addressing the actions and conduct of various officers in the Agency. These
matters cannot be treated without also considering the question of Nosenko's
bona fides, so there also is considerable review of the methodology employed
and the analyses of those handling the matter. Mr. Blakey states in his
letter that he has been informed that the report contains no information on
the issues of bona fides, being concerned instead only with personnel and
internal procedures. This understanding on his part is incorrect, and
his letter suggests that he himself has reservations about it.
-SECRET
S
#05948
SECRET

4. The Agency has made available to the HSCA two studies conducted
in 1967 and 1963 by SE Division, both of which questioned Nosenko's
bona fides. A subsequent study by the Office of Security in 1968 has also
been made available; it reached a conclusion contrary to the preceding
studies and supports Nosenko's bona fides. Other Soviet defectors have been
interviewed by the HSCA staff, as well as knowledgeable CIA officers and
retirees. As a result, much of the information on the case has been
revealed to the Committee.

5. The two SE Division studies, concluding that Nosenko was a KGB
agent, were superceded by the Office of Security study, which prevailed.
The HSCA investigators reportedly have problems with how the earlier two
studies could be rejected so shortly after their completion. As a result,
the HSCA seems focused on the issues as viewed at that time. The Hart
report has the advantage of having been prepared after a ten year period,
during which experience with the validity of Nosenko's information provides
the basis for an objective re-examination. It is relevant to HSCA interests
that the Hart Report constitutes a convincing statement of the bona fides
of Nosenko. Access to this portion of the Hart Report would help broaden
and complete the understanding of the HSCA of the matter.

6. Because of the above, the Agency has everything to gain and nothing
to lose in providing the Hart Report for its review of the issue of Nosenko's
bona fides. :
:

II

7. In addition to the central issue of Nosenko's bona fides, Chairman
Stokes has expressed interest in the treatment accorded Nosenko during the
period that his bona fides were in question. Nosenko reportedly has provided
the HSCA with some detail on this. We have made the point that how
Nosenko was treated was a result of the issue, not a part of it. When we
questioned the relevance of this line of inquiry to the HSCA charter,
HSCA staff representatives assert that their charter extends to the conduct
of the intelligence agencies in the Warren Commission inquiry which
includes this. The rationale appears a bit contrived and stretched in terms
of the real issues. How Nosenko was treated may indicate how concerned
CIA was with the man's bona fides, but so far as relating further to the
inquiry concerning President Kennedy's assassination, it seems marginal at
best. The rationale is so far-fetched that we have been led to consider that its
dramatic qualities are attractive for the projected TV spectacular this
coming September. It also doubtless provides an opportunity for public
criticism for those staff members who have been acknowledged by Mr.
Blakey as hostile to the Agency.

2
SECOCT
8. If the rationale of the HSCA for pursuing the question of
Nosenko's treatment is contrived, and largely peripheral to the real
purpose of the Committee, as we believe it to be, it should be faced
in those terms. No one would disagree with there being relevant
inquiries, but it is hardly proper to take an internal critique and turn
it against the Agency on a point irrelevant to the central purpose of the
inquiry. The HSCA staff position is tendentious, and reflects on its
face a hostile attitude that the Committee may not otherwise want to be
so obvious. The Committee has the right to determine what is relevant
to its charter, but the Agency should also assert a similar right to defend
itself from truly peripheral and hostile fishing expeditions.

9. Therefore, while we believe that the Hart Report should be made
available to the HSCA staff, we do not believe that such action should be
taken prior to attempting to limit the use made of information contained
in the Report not related to the issue of Nosenko's bona fides.

III

10. There are aspects of the Hart Report that contain information on
foreign liaison services that should not be exposed to the HSCA. There is,
therefore, a question of some sanitization to be conducted prior to the
Report's being made available.

11. A version of the Report has been prepared for the FBI in which the
names of employees below the DCI have been removed, as well as certain
modifications in more dramatic rhetorical phrases. That version is in
other respects faithful to the original Report. It provides a working basis
for further sanitization. Sanitization prior to review is not foreign to the
HSCA, as the Directorate of Operations has had a continuing policy of
selected sanitization. Extending this practice to the Hart Report would
be consistent with the extant working relationship with HSCA. The Report
will remain classified.

12. If the paper is made available, classified and sanitized, it should be
on a highly restricted basis; the HSCA wants six named persons to have
access to it, which is at least three times the number needed for bona fide
research purposes.

13. Staff Position: This paper favors making a sanitized version of the
paper, in classified form, available to a limited number of the HSCA staff
representatives at the CIA Headquarters Building at Langley. Any such
release should be preceded by appropriate discussions limiting use of the
material by the Committee. The General Counsel is of the opinion (Tab B)
3
SECRET
mat if the paper is withheld, and a court test results, the Agency
must expect to fail in withholding the paper. The Office of the General
Counsel, the Office of Security, SE Division and CI Staff favor making the
paper available under the conditions set forth above.

14. Recommendation: That you approve granting access to a limited
umber of staff members of the HSCA to a classified, sanitized version of
the Hart Report. Such access shall be conditioned on agreement to limit
use of materials contained in the Report to those matters relating to the
question of Nosenko's bona fides.

S. D. Breckinridge
Attachments
CONCURRENCE:
General Counsel 31 MAY 1978
Date
Chief, SE Division Date
Chief, CI Staff Date
1 JUN 1978
Director of Security Date
/s/ Frank de Carles
APPROVAL:
Dif
Director of Central Intelligence Date
[SAPPROVAL:
Director of Central Intelligence Date

4
SEODET
OLORLI
SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations
Request for Access to the "Hart Report"

Distribution:
Orig
Adse
1
DDCI
1
ER
1
OGC
1
C/SE Div
1
C/CI Staff
1
SA/DO/0
1- D/OS
1
OLC/Subj
1 OLC/Chrono
OLC/SDB/ksn (30 May 78)
CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
/2000
NOTE FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: Peter Earnest
Chief, Media Relations

SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST Request to Talk to an Agency
Specialist on the Kennedy Assassination

11 March 1993

The WASHINGTON POST is preparing a series of articles cles on/
the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Kennedy
assassination.

With the help of CIC, we recently arranged for George
Lardner and Walter Pincus of the WASHINGTON POST to interview
former KGB officer Yuri Nosenko about his knowledge of Lee
Harvey Oswald during the time Oswald lived in the Soviet
Union. To ensure that Nosenko's resettlement identity and
location would remain protected, I made the arrangements for
Nosenko to come to Washington for the interview.

The POST reimbursed Nosenko for expenses and paid him a
$250 consulting fee. The interview was done on Wednesday,
3 March, at the POST offices downtown.
I did not remain for
it. Lardner and Pincus also hosted a lunch for Nosenko which
was attended by Ben Bradlee. Lardner and Pincus were very
pleased with their session with Nosenko and appreciative of
our making it possible. I also spoke afterwards with Nosenko
who said he was satisfied with how the interview was
conducted and with the financial arrangements.

Shortly after the interview, Lardner faxed me a list of
the questions that he and Pincus had prepared for themselves
to use in checking out Nosenko's information. They asked if
there was anyone at the Agency they could talk to about the
individuals named. I told them that developing information
in response to their questions would probably take a good
deal of research and that I doubted the Agency would be able
to take on such a task at this time for the POST. However, I
said I would take it up with the appropriate offices.

Although I told the POST that I do not believe anyone
would be willing to undertake research on their questions,
I'm wondering if there is anyone around who might be
knowledgeable of Nosenko's information who would be willing
to talk with Lardner and Pincus on background based on
his/her existing knowledge. I think Lardner and Pincus would
be grateful for making such a person available even if

SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST Request

all their questions aren't answered. Considering that they
are trying to do serious research on the Kennedy
assassination, I think any effort on our part to help them
would be seen as a gesture of good will.

Attachment:
As stated

Peter Earnest

Agree to having a specialist talk to them on background
about the Nosenko information if an appropriate person is
available.

No, do not want anyone from the DO talking about the
Nosenko information.
SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST Request to Talk to an Agency
specialist in the Kennedy Assassination

DCI/PAI/Earnest:ncbx37758 (11 March 1993)

Distribution:
Original Addressee
1 ADDO
1 SA/DDO
1 DO Registry
1 D/PAI
1 D/DO/CIC
1 C/DO/NROC
1 C/DO/CE
1 C/CSI
1 C/History Staff
Names of Russians we should try to track down about Lee Harvey Oswald, Yuri Nosenko and the
JFK assassination:
1. General Oleg M. Gribanov, head of the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB in the early 1960s
where Nosenko says he worked, primarily against American tourists, as deputy chief of the Seventh
Department. Nosenko described himself as sort of favored by Gribanov and he said Gribanov in-
structed him, after the JFK assassination, to retrieve the Oswald file from the Minsk KGB right
away.
2. Anatoliy Koralenko, deputy chief of the Second Chief Directorate or one of its departments, at
time of JFK assassination. Nosenko said when the file arrived from Minski, he and Koralenko were
going over the all-important first volume--and finding KGB had nothing to do with Oswald-when a
KGB officer from the First Department came in and picked it up on Gribanov's orders, to review it
and write a summary of it.
3. The officer who picked it up was Col. Matveey, deputy chief(I think) of First(or American) De-
partment, Second Chief Directorate. Unhave first name.
4. Chief of this First Department was Col. Sergei M. Fedoseyer or Fedoseer and presumably he
would have had a hand in or supervised preparation of the "spravka" or summary.
5. Gribanov and more than 40 other KGB officers were kicked out because of Nosenko's defection,
according to Nosenko. That right? What happened?
6. Maj. Georgi Rastrusin. Was in 1959 a senior case officer in KGB responsible for Intourist mat-
ters. Nosenko says that it was Rastrusin who told him about Oswald and how he wanted to stay in
Soviet Union. Nosenko said Rastrusin said Oswald "doesn't present interest" to KGB and Nosenko
checked out with his superiors. Word came back not to bother with Oswald. Nosenko was told to tell
Rastrusin to tell Intourist to deal with him.
7. Rastrusin returned next day and said we got problem. Oswald tried to kill self, etc. KGB
washed hands of him, decided to let Intourist deal with him. Intourist then part of Ministry of For
eign Trade. Nosenko said he believes question of what to do with Oswald was run to top of that min-
istry and beyond, to Khruschev or one of his deputies. In any case, decision was made to let Oswald
stay in Minsk. But not, Nosenko says, by KGB.
8. In the fall of 1963, a KGB colleague, M. I. Turalin, Service No. 2(counterintelligence in foreign
countries), First Chief Directorate, told Nosenko orally that Mexico City station had just sent a cable
about a request by Oswald for a visa to re-enter Soviet Union. What should be done?
Nosenko said he said, 'wait a second. How come he's back in America?" At that point, Nosenko said
he hadn't know Oswald had gone back.
9. Nosenko said he said let's go to chief of department who he identified as a Col. Chelnekov or
Chelnenko(but later seemed to say his timing might be off and somebody else may have been chief of
Nosenko's department at the time). In any case, Nosenko quoted chief as saying, in effect, 'I remem-
ber this crary nut. No. No. No. Tell them we don't have any interest.'
Cable back to Mexico City advising KGB there get rid of Oswald by telling him to go back to his
own country and apply for a visa at Soviet Embassy in Washington, etc., etc.
10. Col. Gruzder, was chief of the KGB department in Minsk that was responsible for foreigners
there.
11. Oleg Nechiporenko, one of three KGB officers stationed in Mexico City who reportedly inter-
rogated or dealt with Oswald on his visit to Embassy there. Now living in Moscow area.
Other two Mexico City officers, both still alive in Russia: Valeriy Kostikov and Pavel Yatzkov.
3 March 1994

Memo to: C/HRG

Subject: Mangold Litigation

Today I alerted OGC (Theresa Wilcox/Kathy Kelly) that
the JFK collections contains a significant number of
documents on Nosenko (5-6000 pages) which may impact on the
Mangold litigation. As I understand it, the Mangold
Litigation is over the Angelton files and is several years
old. According to JFK reviewers at the FBI, documents on
Nosenko's defection and treatment are part of case.
talked with Theresa Wilcox who is the para-legal handling
the litigation, however, she was not familiar with the
documents involved. She will consult with Kelly, the lawyer
on the case, and get back to me.
I

I consider the ball in OGC's court. I propose that we
continue to review the Nosenko files. If there are Mangold
or other consideration to address, we can do so after the
HRG review is complete.

Barry
file
Re: NOSENKO
9)narch94

Davesig Reviewed By 45
We
note several Reports, not completely
identified as to author.
(1) "Conclusions & Comments in the Case of
Yuriy I. Nosenko "sile Sale
Report) - 264 pgs.
(This is vi Box 4.5", FOLDER 8)
( Las been released in JFK/-JFK62-F9
( condudes NOSENKO is 9000)
(2) "Cose of Yury I hosenko." (835 page study)
dated Felmuay 1967.

(no indication lat i los been relcored)
wor
(Believe it was preponed in SB (perlups
by Ba
-
Bagley - on perlaps wilt Cit/STACE)
(condes NOSERKO BAD
(3) "The Examination of de Bona Dedes of
Sefecth"
-TS # 197124
duled FEBRUARY 1968
This is found in ORIS BOX 62 JFR-FE09)
(
Husreleased except for ANNEX A
which
fuund in Box 45 F. 23...
(A concludes NOSENKO
NOT
Bona fede)
Don't Know author):
WIFS
Su)
INTERNAL USE ONLY
23 March 1994

Memorandum For: C/HRG

Subject: Nosenko and the Mangold Litigation

I received a call from Kathy Kelly, OGC, this morning
concerning the Nosenko files in the JFK files. I described
the files again (about 4000+ pages that include transcripts
of all his interrogations and numerous studies on his bona
fides and treatment by the Agency including the Solie and
Hart reports and an 835 page comprehensive study). Since
Nosenko is an important figure in the JFK assassination
story and the files are part of the sequestered collection,
HRG is reviewing the files under the JFK Assassination
Records Collections Act. However, we were aware that some
of the documents were part of the Mangold litigation and
wanted to make sure that they were properly coordinated.

Kathy Kelly said that the Mangold litigation should not be a
factor in HRG's review. If the files were subject to the
JFK Records Act, they should be processed under that Act.
When the review is complete, a list of the documents
released should be provide so that OGC can treat them the
same in the Mangold case.

I also talked with Kathy Stricker (yesterday) to get some
background on the handling of Nosenko files and what were
the "secrets" given what we know is publicly available. She
said for years the agency "glomared" Nosenko except for the
Oswald information: however, once Golitsyn became public
that ended. Today, the battle over his bona fides and how
he was treated are public knowledge. The Agency up until a
couple years ago had not released some of the studies (she
mention Solie) but she was not sure that this was still the
case or if it was possible to continue to deny them. DO has
protected the information provided by Nosenko on other
Soviet sources and leads for possible recruitment. This
type of information should continue to be protected.

Kathy Stricker's comments are consistent with HRG's handling
of the Nosenko files. We are considering all of the files
as related; his bona fides is a key element of the story and
there was a large amount of information including parts of
the studies on him in both the Oswald 201 and the JFK hard
copy collection. We have deleted information provided on
other sources and operations not related to the JFK story.
We are also recommending release of the rest of the studies.
Although they contain potentially embarrassing information
for the Agency (as did the IG report on the Castro plots),
there doesn't appear to be grounds for denying under the JFK
Act.
SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

Restrictions on Declassifying Material on Yuriy Ivanovich
NOSENKO

The following should be used as guidelines in
declassifying material files pertaining to the career and
"bona fides" of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
5/94

1. CIA Knowledge of Russian intelligence tradecraft.
Specific information in the files about KGB targetting of
American citizens could reveal to the Russian Intelligence
service our knowledge of their tradecraft. Since the
Russian services continue to target Americans, this
information should continue to be protected.

2. Το protect a CIA asset. Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
remains an asset of this agency, and is under contract.
Moreover, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVRR)
remains interested in NOSENKO's whereabouts and activities.
Russian intelligence services since the Second World War
have tried to track their defectors. There are indications
that the Russian services remain interested in the NOSENKO
case.

The US
At the time of his arrest, Rick Ames had some
NOSENKO files (AESAWDUST) in his possession.
Counterintelligence Community is unsure if this
material was passed to the Russian service.

--Following NOSENKO's brother and mother's visit to the
United States, both were questionned by the Russian
service about NOSENKO's activity and place and
residence.

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
Legal position
CI.
SEP 16 '94 09:50AM P.3/4

Mr.Robert Fringle
2909 Rock Manor Court
Herndon, Virginia 22071

Dear Bob,
It was very good to meet with you again in Washington on June 12.
I am writing to confirm our recent conversation about the CIA's release
of documents about me to the National Archives. As I explained to you at
our meeting, I am very displeased that this was done without my knowled-
ge and especially since my photograph was officially released by the
Agency for the first time in thirty years.

As you know, it has come to my attention that the CIA released these
many hundreds of pages to the public without consulting we or telling
me that this was going to be done. I have already seen copies of two of
these reports totalling more than 700 pages. One is the October 1968
report supporting me by Bruce Solie; the other was a February 1968 re-
port by the CI Staff which attacked my credibility. (This latter report
contains a copy of my photo from the late 1960s. I consider this a breach
of my personal security.)

I also consider many of the details in both of these reports to be of a
very personal nature. Other pages deal with with some very sensitive
cases which I gave the Agency about other people. The information in
these reports was given freely and accurately by me to the CIA officers
in the 1960s under terms of strict confidentiality. Although it is very
difficult for me to say this, I feel that my trust in the Agency has now
been seriously damaged.

This release particularly troubles me because for the past thirty years
I have remained very loyal to the Agency and considerate of its wishes.
For instance, despite many requests, I have only spoken to a few fourf
nalists, and only when the Agency advised me toso. I have never sought
SEP 16 '94 09:51AM P.4/4

Page 2

en my own to publish my story in an article or book. But now, the CIA
.' has not returned this courtesy. Instead, it has released sensitive
information to the public without speaking to me first.
Under the circumstances, I would like to respectfully request the
following:
1. That you show this letter to DDO Ted Price, Director James Woolsey,
and the current heads of the CIA's Freedom of Information Office and
Historical Review staff -- so that they are aware of what has happened.

2. I would like to receive, in writing, an explanation from these res-
ponsible. of why this release was done.

3. I would like to receive a list of the major reports about me which
have already been released. Aside from the twe reports that I already
have seen, I would like to receive copies of any other major studies
that have been released. (For instance, if there are reports released
by Peter Bagley, Newton Miler, James Angleton, the CI Staff and John
Hart, then I would like to see them as well.)

4. I would like te be given the Agency's written assurance that further
releases will not ecour without consulting me first.

Bab, you should know that before I wrote this letter I have speken
about this matter with my geed friend George Kalaris. He too was troub-
led by what I told him, and he advised me that I should ask the Agency
for an explanation.
Beb, I apologize fer troubling you with this matter, but I have no one
else to turn to fer assistance.
Please let me know if there is any respense as soon as possible.
Respectfully yours,
Secret
SEP 16 '94 09:50AM P.64
Draft letter to Nosenko from the DDO

Dear
CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000
The Director has asked me to respond to your letter
expressing concern that US Government declassification of
material could compromise your privacy and security.

In regard to your question about the documents that have
already been released, rest assured that I have directed
officers responsible for FOIA reques
in reviewing information concerning you in light of your
special circumstances. We will make full exemption possible exceptions to FOIA-mandate declassification in
to take special care
order to protect your privacy.

As you know, in 1992 Congress passed the JFK Assassination finvestigatie
agencies to release any records related to the overnmenttion of the
Records Collection Act, which required all US
of President Kennedy. As Deputy Director for Operations, I
am of course committed to fully supporting the DCI in
meeting this requirement, but I also appreciate your concern
about the files on you that are related to the
assassination. I have therefore directed a senior officer
Historical in the Do to meet with the officials in the Agency's
Review historical staff who are involved in the declassification
program. This officer has had extensive discussions with
members of the staff and has worked closely with them to
Identify those portions of the files that include personal
and operational information.

taken special was to protect an
As a result of this effort, we have (postponed release of any
Sensitive information touching on your private life or on operational
information pertaining to your debriefings. Under the JFK
law, a Presidential Review Board will make the final
decision on the disposition of the material. This Agency
values the sacrifices you have made for our country, and we
will present the Board with the strongest possible case for
protecting information that could affect your privacy and
security.
xcret

Best wishes,
UNCLASSIFIED
17 April 1997

Sue Amiano, SA/CIC, gave to Gary Brenneman to give to Barry
Harrelson, Historical Review Group, X31825, 2 soft files
entitled:
1. "WARREN COMMISSION/OSWALD"

2. "DOCUMENTS YURI Ivanovich NOSENKO/OSWALD"

found by Al Bonner in the vault.

Received Cisky M. BRONOMAN 17-APRIL-77

UNCLASSIFIED
Administrative HRG Internal Use Only
CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEAXE IN FULL
2000
30 April 1997

Note To: ARRB Staff

Subject: CIC Soft files:
1. Warren Commission/Oswald
2. Documents Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO/Oswald

The attached files were located in CIC. They are soft
(or working) files containing information on Nosenko, Warren
Commission and Oswald. It is not clear if the files date
from the Warren Commission period, or were created in
1975/76 (latest date of documents) in response to a request
or investigation.

Most of the documents are in the sequestered collection
(OGC folders). The other documents may be in the Norsenko
material put aside for discussion with the ARRB or in the
Microfilm part of the sequestered material (the Microfilm is
not indexed document by document).

Administrative - HRG Internal Use Only
Administrative
HRG Internal Use Only
:

30 April 1997

Note for the Record

Subject: CIC Oswald/Nosenko related soft files:
1. Warren Commission/Oswald
2. Documents Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO/Oswald

1. I advised Sue Amiano, SA/CIC, that most of the
documents in the two folders are duplicates of documents in
the CIA JFK Collection sequestered by the HSCA. The other
documents are related to Nosenko, but do not mention Oswald.
These documents are probably duplicated in the Nosenko
material set aside for discussion with the ARRB.
recommended that we make the folders available to the ARRB
staff. She concurred.
I

2. Documents will be made available to Michelle Combs,
ARRB staff, on her next visit.

Barry
Administrative
HRG Internal Use Only
Eileen M. Wukitch
James W. Zirkle
TO:
FROM:
DATE:
08/01/97 09:54:03
SUBJECT: Re: The Nosenko Papers

file
SECRET

CL BY:2034442
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: HUM 4-82

Eileen: Let me introduce myself. I am CIC/Legal. C/CIC asked me to touch base with you
concerning any possible ARRB release of privacy information concerning Nosenko. While we are
aware that such a decision to release is within the Board's discretion, we do believe that the
Agency, when giving this information over to them, should request that the Board protect such
information to the maximum extent possible. If I can be of help in that regard just let me know.
Jim

From the Desk of Dennis D. Lamb
NOTE FOR: Ron L. Seckinger
FROM: Dennis D. Lamb
DATE: 07/31/97 10:44:28
SUBJECT: The Nosenko Papers

CL BY: 0790429
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: HUM 4-82

At about 1020 hrs on Tuesday, 31 July, I received a call from Eileen Wukitch of the Agency's
External Support Group/Historical Collection Staff regarding Michelle Combs's interest in reviewing
the Nosenko papers for the upcoming meeting of the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB)
on 5 August. Wukitch said Combs, an ARRB staffer, is planning on taking 20 pages of the Nosenko
material with her. Wukitch wants to know whether we would like copies of the material Combs is
taking. I said yes. Wukitch said Combs appears understanding of our concerns in this case and to
this end wanted the following questions answered so she could put a human touch on our concerns
in explaining our position to the ARRB.
1. Is Nosenko married? (No one in CIC/AG knows.)

2. What part of the country is he living in? (This is known, but I can't see why she or the
ARRB needs to know.)

3. Did the Soviets actually sentence Nosenko to death? Or was this just his claim. (No one
in CIC/AG know, but it appears reasonable to assume that the Soviets did sentence him to death.)

4. Nosenko's current age? (No one in CIC/AG knows off hand. Henry's observation was
that Combs can find this out from open literature.)
SECRET
According to Wukitch, Combs also wants to take to the ARRB two letters pertaining to the affair:
the letter Nosenko wrote in 1994 objecting to the release of his material without his being consulted
or advised, and the letter Ted Price wrote to him in response assuring him that everything possible
would be done to prevent further release of his papers. I don't see any problem with this since the
papers would support our position--unless the ARRB starts thinking about releasing the letters also.

Wukitch said she told Combs CIC would have Bob Pringle, former Chief of AG/FIOB currently
serving as Officer in Residence at the University of Kentucky, flown in to address the ARRB if this
appears necessary. Combs will pass this on to the ARRB. Wukitch noted that Combs alluded to
the possibility that that ARRB might want to talk with Nosenko himself.

CC:
John B. ENGBERT Nancy T. BRUNONE, Edgar C. BAUML, Dennis D. Lamb, Curtis L.
MACKIAN, Jacqueline Frankfort @ DCI, Ron L. Seckinger

SECRET
MEMORANDUM
August 5, 1997

To: T. Jeremy Gunn

From: Michelle Combs

Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

I have prepared this memorandum at your request for the upcoming meeting where the
Board will be briefed on issues related to the Soviet defector, Yuriy Nosenko.
Summary and Recommendation

The information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA Sequestered
Collection microfilm consists of approximately 3500 pages of interviews, transcripts,
memos, and reports. Of the total, approximately 1200 have been released to the public
as open in full or with only minor redactions. Of the 1200 released pages, roughly 800
contain information directly relevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the Kennedy
assassination.

After my review of the Nosenko records and our discussion of the issues, it is our
judgment that the remaining 2300 pages are unrelated to the assassination of President
Kennedy and we recommend that they be processed as "NBR." These NBR records
consist of such items as general family and professional contact information, Soviet
intelligence methodology and operations, and Soviet navy information dating to
Nosenko's early career in Soviet Naval Intelligence. I suggest that we review carefully
these 2300 records to ensure that there is no assassination-related material, and, to the
extent this is correct, we should process them as "NBRs."
Background on Nosenko

KGB Lieutenant Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko first secretly contacted the CIA in
Geneva in June 1962. One and a half years later on February 4, 1964, he defected to the
United States for what he said were ideological reasons. His case became2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

ESG 95-02
14 July 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review Group

FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
DO, Focal Point for ARRB

SUBJECT: Position on Release of Information Pertaining to
Mexico City Station and the JFK Assassination
Records

1. At its monthly meeting on 17 July the ARRB will be
addressing the issue of the Mexico City Station and its operation
in light of any deletions made by the Agency to protect sources
and methods. The issues of greatest concern are those
surrounding the joint teltap operations run by the Agency and the
Mexican Services, official acknowledgment of which could have an
impact on liaison and foreign relations. We therefore, wish to
maintain protection of this information.

2. We are willing to release information which indicates
the existence of operational teltaps against the Soviet and Cuban
Embassies (as long as they appear unilateral and we can continue
to protect the existence of any participation of the Mexican
Services. We are willing to release documents which indicate the
existence of Mexico City Station during times outside the window
which we have acknowledged when they contribute significantly to
the historical record. These steps will be useful to the
historic record and reveal the extent of coverage employed
against these targets. We would want to continue protection of
the information which identifies coverage of other countries and
individuals other than Lee Harvey Oswald.

3. We also agree to release of the following:

A. Pseudonyms of employees, aliases of employees,
and file numbers.

CL BY 5243433
DECL OADR
DRV COV 2-87

SECRET

SUBJECT: Position on Release of Information Pertaining to Mexico
City Station and the JFK Assassination Records

B. Cryptonyms, such as those in the LI series,
unless they appear in the context of liaison
(operational equities (such as LITENSOR and
LITEMPO).

C. We need to continue the protection of the cryptonym
LIENVOY.
This cryptonym is used extensively throughout the
collect to describe the joint activity from
different perspectives. Individual occurrences may
not seem to reveal anything significant but, when
looking at the cryptonym in context over the entire
collection it reveals the joint activity which we
are trying to protect.

4. Regarding the revelation of names of employees who
retired under cover, we request the Board to table its final
determination until the individuals have been contacted and
informed that their name is being considered for release. This
will allow the individual to consider the impact it will have and
convey relevant information. The Directorate database is not set
up to track individuals who were involved in specific operations.
We need the assistance of the employees to know their operational
involvement's. Office of Central Cover has prepared and is
coordinating a letter to be sent to the employees which will both
inform them and solicit their assistance/comments.

Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

SECRET

SECRET-

September 11, 1995
WORKING PAPER

Notes from meeting w/ ARRB staff Sept. 11, 1995

ARRB Attendees: Marwell, Gunn, Mary + one
CIA Attendees : Barry, Ellie

Issue: Inconsistency between Mexico City Chrono item
#132 and ARRB document #31

Gunn proposed that the Agency release the information in
document 31 that was released by mistake in the Mexico City
Chrono. Otherwise, the staff would have to take the
document back to the ARRB for reconsideration which they
felt would undercut the credibility of the CIA and the
staff. The Board will not uphold a postponement in a
specific document if that information is released by mistake
in another copy of the same document.

Ellie's response because the information deals with Mex.
liaison, she will have to take their proposal to a higher
level. (response needed by 16 September]

They also requested a “new” highlighted version of the
Mexico City Chrono which reflects all information released
to NARA in the multiple copies of the Chrono and in the
documents referenced in the Chrono.

Issue: The three documents of concern.

GIBSON - Ellie reviewed the Gibson issues--the fact that he
had denied in court his affiliation with the CIA, etc. I
noted that since the document would not be included in the
determination list would the Board be willing to reconsider.

Marwell said that we could make an addition pitch to the
Board to reconsider, but he did not think it would have any
effect on their decision.

PROENZA Ellie explained that out goal here was to protect
the "asset" not the method and that the deletions could be
reduced to those words that could result in the
identification of the agent.

Marwell said that the Board may reconsider based on the need
to protect a source.

Mary ask who was the asset? Was it LIRING?
Ellie said she did not know (it could have been some "AM"
source.

SECRET

SECRET

Mary ask for more information on LIRING.

"PRIVATE LINE TAP" According the Marwell, the Board
considered the issue of the "private lines" but since the
paragraph dealt with Oswald, voted to release. Mary said is
was hard to defend the individual released since she did not
have any information on the person.

We pointed out that the this release impacted on other
documents which dealt with private line taps plus the Board
had not limited its release to the paragraph that mentioned
Oswald but released the name in other calls which had
nothing to do with Oswald.

Marwell said the Board may re-look at the document as part
of looking at similar documents.

Mary
The issue of the taps on other Bloc embassies came up.
said the Board was inclined to release given the end of the
Cold War.

[Note: we will locate as many of the "private line tap"
documents we can for special review]

Issue: Removing the Proenza and Private line tap
documents form the formal notification list

Marwell clearly prefers not to do it at this time (said they
would discuss). Has no problem with asking the Board to
reconsider or giving us the opportunity to presence
additional evidence since their next meeting was within the
30 days set by the law, but felt that the Board was not
inclined to keep tabling documents that they had reached a
decision on.

Marwell asked if the Agency plans to “appeal"; he would like
a heads-up.

Later, in private, Marwell said that he wanted to build into
the process a loop that would handle these types of
situations.

Issue: Presentation to Board at Sept. 20/21 meeting

It was agreed that "STATIONS” would be the focus of the
presentation 10:00 am, 20 Sept., one hour.

Marwell recommended providing evidence of bilateral
agreements as well as identifying current harm. Said that
the Board was leaning strongly toward releasing stations.

Mary pointed out that there were still issues on the Mexico
City station window. There are documents from the 50s,

SECRET

SECRET
references in summaries to the founding of the station and,
most important, the visit by the HSCA to Mexico City.

Ellie said there was the possibility of opening windows of
stations when Oswald was present, however, this was a key
issue for the Agency and a senior Directorate/Agency
decision. She indicated that the DO would oppose expanding
the Mexico City window into the 70s.

As for the older documents, we pointed out that we had
already agreed to the release of those documents.

Marwell suggest that the 20 Sept. presentation would be a
good opportunity to address the Private Line and other Tel
Taps issue rather than requesting a separate meeting.

After the meeting Marwell elaborated on the presentation.
He said to try a avoid going over old ground (US-Mexico
relationship; when possible provide specific/hard evidence
(bilateral agreements carry weight); war-stories did not go
over well and neither did Bill McNair. He emphasized the
importance of using the language of the law.

SECRET

SECRET
September 12, 1995
WORKING PAPER

Notes from meeting w/ ARRB staff Sept. 11, 1995

Issue: Presentation to Board at Sept. 20/21 meeting

It was agreed that "STATIONS" would be the focus of the
presentation 10:00 am, 20 Sept., one hour.

Marwell recommended providing evidence of bilateral
agreements as well as identif identifying current harm. Said that
the Board was leaning strongly toward releasing stations,
particularly those in Europe.

Mary pointed out that there were still issues on the Mexico
City station window. There are documents from the 50s,
references in summaries to the founding of the station and,
most important, the visit by the HSCA to Mexico City.

Ellie said there was the possibility of opening windows of
stations when Oswald was present, however, this was a key
issue for the Agency and a senior Directorate/Agency
decision. She indicated that the DO would oppose expanding
the Mexico City window into the 70s.

As for the older documents, we pointed out that we had
already agreed to the release of those documents.

Marwell suggest that the 20 Sept. presentation would be a
good opportunity to address the Private Line and other Tel
Taps issue rather than requesting a separate meeting.

After the meeting Marwell elaborated on the presentation.
He said to try to avoid going over old ground (US-Mexico
relationship); when possible provide specific/hard evidence
(bilateral agreements carry weight); war-stories do not go
over well. He emphasized the importance of using the
language of the law especially when citing harm. He
specifically mentioned Sec. 6. (B) (copy attached} which sets
a standard of “interfere with the conduct of intelligence
activities".

[Note: In a previous meeting with Gunn, he stressed similar
themes including avoiding what he called “chicken little”
arguments. He also raised the question on sensitivity of
acknowledging we had a station in Moscow during the 60s
"It would have been logical to have one during the Cold
War." ]
-SECRET

-SECRET
Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505 FEB 0 2 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Intelligence Coordination,
Intelligence and Research, Department of State

SUBJECT: Appeal of Unfavorable Determination by the JFK
Assassination Records Review Board (AIUO)

The JFK Assassination Records Review Board (Board) recently
released documents revealing the existence of CIA stations in
Helsinki, Bern, Geneva, and The Hague, a joint tel-tap operation
with Mexican liaison, and the identity of a unilateral
penetration of a liaison service. It is the CIA's assessment
that such releases could seriously damage intelligence operations
as well as adversely affect the foreign relations of the United
States. CIA is presently preparing an appeal of these rulings by
the Board and requests the support of the Department of State
should these appeals be brought before the President. (S)

Additionally, the Board has just released the existence of
stations in Rome, Madrid, Copenhagen, Oslo, Brussels, and
Stockholm, and in March-April, it will be reviewing a document
that reveals the location of every CIA station in 1965. It is
anticipated that CIA will be preparing to appeal those releases
and requests State Department's assessment as to the damage to
foreign relations should the location of CIA stations be publicly
acknowledged. (S)

It remains essential that the U.S. Government stand by
assurances to persons and foreign governments that information
they provide and activities they undertake based upon expected
confidentiality remain protected for as long as necessary. These
releases made by the Board seriously undermine the ability of CIA
to uphold secrecy obligations it took on in the past and to make
those assurances in the future. (C)

SECRET

CL BY 2103140
REASON 1.5 (c)
DECL X1; X5
DRV LOC 3-82
DRV LIS 3-82

SECRET

SUBJECT: Appeal of Unfavorable Determination by the JFK
Assassination Records Review Board (AIUO)

We have a critically short deadline in which to address
issues concerning the release of Helsinki, Bern, Geneva, and The
Hague stations, the identity of the asset, and Mexican liaison.
The release of the identities of the remaining stations must be
resolved over the next two weeks. We request your comments and
expert opinions regarding the impact such releases would have on
the foreign relations of the United States, and hope to cite
State Department's support as we finalize our appeal. (S)

David N. Edger
David N. Edger
Acting Deputy Director for Operations

CIR-316/ 00293-96

SECRET

SECRET

SUBJECT: Appeal of Unfavorable Determination by the JFK
Assassination Records Review Board (AIUO)

C/IMS/ESG/F.Wickham/tdn/x44448/2Feb96

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 DDO/Reg
1 AC/DDO
1 DCI/CSI/HRG
1 OGC
1 EUR/LGL
1 LA/LGL
1 C/IMS
1 IMS/IRO
2 ESG

SECRET

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani

NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
FROM: Linda C. Cipriani
DATE: 03/18/96 06:24:14 PM
SUBJECT: JFK Meeting today

After speaking with you tonight about the results of the meeting today, Jeremy Gunn called me and relayed his concerns about the
Board's understandings (or misunderstandings) of CIA's position. Bob Caudle and I discussed what happened at the JFK meeting and
the following is our impression of what resulted. Basically Edger did not commit himself on any specifics on these issues, but expressed
his willingness to cooperate with the Board:

1. Jerusalem Station Edger was more willing to negotiate this one, but does not agree to its release. CIA wants to present more
information. Edger was not under the impression that this station was to be discussed today so he did not come prepared to present new
information on it. CIA should do this for the Board at the next possible opportunity.

2. Open Period for Stations Edger agreed that the staffs of the Board and HRG should work out the exact time period. He had
no problem with the Sept(63.64 period and opening it up to 6in the Oswald file. He did not make any firm commitment on the dates to
the Board, saying that the staffs should come to an agreement on this.

3. Substitutions for Nordic stations Although Edger suggested "Scandanavia Station" as a substitution, he clearly prefered
something less revealing like "Northern European station 1, 2, etc.)". Using the former term has far less plausible deniability. The latter
option basically gives up what we want to protect.

- Once HRG hears from Edger as to what his understandings are, then someone needs to speak with Jeremy Gunn ASAP on Tuesday
morning before the Board leaves. Jeremy said that unless we correct the Board on its mistaken impression about the above, they will
leave assuming we have come to an agreement and will refuse to revisit this at a latter date.

Let me know if you need me to help out in any way on this. FYI, I will be in meetings at 10AM and 2pm (Win Scott settlement
discussions!!!) tomorrow.

CC: John F. Pereira
Eleanor Neiman @ DO

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

NOTE FOR: Fredrick Wickham @ DO
Johnny Goins @ DO
Eleanor E. Neiman @ DO
FROM: Linda C. Cipriani
DATE: 03/29/96 11:52:57 AM
SUBJECT: JFK release of Tokyo station(S)

SECRET
From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani

I just spoke with EA legal and informed her about the latest release by the JFK Board of Tokyo station and the fact that we have a letter
from the Ambassador objecting to the release. She indicated that Art Brown would be a good candidate to go down to speak with the
Board at their next meeting (what are the dates?) to request that they reconsider. It might also be more persuasive if we could arrange
for a State Department person (Japan, desk) to come to the Board with us and present the Ambassador's letter. (S)

I would appreciate hearing your thoughts on this course of action. If we plan on doing this, we need to arrange it with Marwell and then
brief the appropriate people in the DO and State Department as soon as possible. (S)

CL BY 2224130
CL REASON 1.5(c)
DECL ON X1
DRV FM LOC 3-83

CC: Robert D. Caudle
J. Barry Harrelson

SECRET

SECRET

21 March 1997

JFK PROJECT WORKING PAPER

SUBJECT: Policy Guidance--"Atsugi" and "U-2"

1. References to "CIA base/Station/representatives at
Atsugi, Japan" in the U-2 context is releasable.

2. Information relating to the station, other bases,
and Agency representatives elsewhere in Japan will continue
to be protected.

3. The issue was coordinated with the DS&T (Teresa
Wilcox), DO (Lee Carle), the Air Force (Captain Thomas D.
Rock) and the Department of State (Nina Noring); all of whom
had no objection to the declassification and/or release of
"CIA Base at Atsugi, Japan" and "U-2” project / effort/
activities.

J. Barry Harrelson
File: G:\HRG\JAPOL.DOC

SECRET

SEGRET

DD/095-3059

7 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, JFK Assassination Records Review Board
FROM: David Cohen.
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents

1. I understand the JFK AARB is presently considering the
release of documents which would identify CIA stations to the
public. I am opposed in general to revealing the locations of
our stations and would prefer instead to substitute the station
name with a regional designation, e.g. European Station vice
Brussels. I would be willing, however, to open certain stations
during a specific window of time if they are substantively
relevant to the assassination investigation and provided that the
documents in question are sanitized to conceal the permanent
presence of the station? (S)

2. In all but a handful of instances, public acknowledgment
of a station would be a political embarrassment to the host
government and would threaten ongoing sensitive operations and
liaison relationships. In a few instances, the damage probably
would be minimal or not at all as long as the presence appears to
be temporary. I have surveyed the involved components and
determined the damage to national security which would follow
such release. (S)

3. I strongly urge that you not allow the information
regarding the Congo and Senegal to be released. The Congo is now
Zaire and the station in the 60's would have been in
Leopoldville, now Kinshasa where we are currently located. Our
current relationship with the Zaireans is not a full-blown
liaison type, but more of a limited relationship with certain
individuals from the services. In the past, we have had close

SECRET

CL BY 0695930
CL REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM LOC 3-82

SECRET
SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents

relationships with the Zaireans because of our need for their
cooperation in assisting with a Presidentially-mandated program
and will need to improve our relationship over the next several
months to accomplish our goals in that part of the world. We
also continue to have a station in Dakar, Senegal. We have
liaison there and would not want to jeopardize it. In dealing
with developmental contacts, there have been recent instances
where potential assets have voiced concern about our Agency's
ability to keep its relationships clandestine. To expose our
station there would further hamper developmental relationships
and eventual recruitments. (8)

4. Within the context of our European presence, I have the
following comments:

Brussels Public acknowledgment would force the
government and liaison service to pay closer attention to
Station operations and therefore present a threat to ongoing
sensitive operations. (8)

Helsinki - A neutral country. Public acknowledgment
of a CIA station would embarrass the government and liaison;
thereby inhibiting the close and productive liaison
relationships we now enjoy as well as presenting a threat to
ongoing sensitive operations. (8)

Paris No additional damage. (8)

Bonn - No specific damage. (S)

Berlin No specific damage. (8)

Luxembourg Public acknowledgment would embarrass the
government and inhibit liaison cooperation; thus endangering
ongoing operations. (S)

The Hague Public acknowledgment would draw questions
from the press and create political problems for the
government and liaison. This would endanger the
continuation of sensitive joint operations. (S)

2
SECRET

SEGRET
SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents

Oslo - Public acknowledgment would draw questions from
the press and threaten very productive and very sensitive
ongoing joint operations. (S)

Madrid - Public acknowledgment would draw prass
attention and embarrassing questions for the government and
liaison service. This would further damage an already
delicate liaison relationship which is vital to us for
counterterrorism operations. (8)

Stockholm - A neutral country. Public acknowledgment
would be politically embarrassing for the government and
liaison services. This would likely endanger any
continuation of joint operations. (S)

Geneva - A neutral country. Public acknowledgment
would create political problems for the government and
liaison service and force greater attention to our
operations. This would create an intensive
counterintelligence atmosphere for our operations; likely to
cause a decrease in our operations. (S)

London - No specific damage. (S)

Ottawa - No specific damage. (8)

5. Our Eastern European stations pose a unique problem when
we consider public exposure. Prague Station is recovering from
operating for almost fifty years in an undeclared status. During
the last three years we have managed, with much effort, to begin
the establishment of good working relations with the host
government and internal/external services. As a result, the
station has recently begun some very sensitive and high-level
bilateral operations. These obviously depend upon the good will
of the host service.
The Czech citizenry came of age in an
atmosphere in which distrust of intelligence services in general,
and the CIA in particular, was thoroughly ingrained. That
distrust lingers in the public's mind even today. Exposure of
our station's previously undisclosed presence and operational
activities during the Cold War will necessarily raise questions
about our activities then, and almost certainly lead to further

3
-SECRET

SECRET
SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents

inquiry about our present relationship. It is doubtful that our
relationship, and certainly our very sensitive operations, could
withstand the resulting public debate. The existence of Prague
Station, past and present, cannot be surfaced at this time
without serious damage to national security. (S)

6. Public acknowledgment of our stations in Managua,
San Jose, Panama City, San Salvador, Santo Domingo, Buenos Aires,
Lima, Santiago, and Montevideo would not further damage our
operational capabilities in a specific sense. Overall, any
release of information about a clandestine service breeds
distrust in professionalism and will put future operations at
risk. (S)

7. We receive significant national collection systems
support from Australia which affects national system collection
efforts against Tier IA targets throughout Asia. We would
jeopardize this by releasing the presence of our station to the
public. Tokyo is a special case in that there is continuing
disagreement regarding our station. We should not complicate the
current "Spy Mania" atmosphere in Tokyo. There have been two
incidents regarding our presence in Japan during the present
year. Any further disclosure would exacerbate the tension and
create an untenable operational atmosphere for our station and
personnel. (8)

8. Public acknowledgment of a station in India would be a
problem for the U.S. Government. U.S. and India foreign
relations are always delicate; the Indian Government is very
sensitive to perceived slights to its national sovereignty, and
public acknowledgment of a station would prove embarrassing to
the Indian Government which in turn could ask that the station be
closed. If the station were closed or significantly downsized,
it would affect a large number of important intelligence
collection operations. (8)

9. Public acknowledgment of a station in Tunisia would be
a problem for Tunisia vis-à-vis its Libyan neighbor. Libya and
Tunisia share a border which means the Tunisian Government must
act with some prudence regarding its relations with Libya. The
Libyan Government would almost certainly respond very negatively.

4
SEGRET

BECRET
SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents

to a public acknowledgment of a station in Tunisia and might well
engage in harassment/sabotage/terrorist actions in Tunisia to
show its displeasure. If the Tunisian Government should ask that
our station be closed, the U.S. Government would lose a
capability to collect on Libya, north African stability, and
Islamic extremiam. (8)

10. Public acknowledgment of a station in Morocco would be a
problem for Morocco vis-à-vis its Islamic fundamentalist
population. Morocco, like so many countries with a majority
Muslim population, has a growing Islamic fundamentalist problem,
and Islamic fundamentalists are frequently opposed to the U.8. in
general and the Agency in particular. Public acknowledgment of a
station in Morocco could cause its Islamic fundamentalist
population to react negatively and demand that our station be
closed. If the station were closed, the U.8. Government would
lose intelligence on the western Sahara conflict, north African
stability and Islamic extremism. (S)

11. In those instances where I have indicated damage to
operational capability and national security, I would feel
compelled to seek a reversal of any decision to make a public
acknowledgment.
In those cases where I indicate "no specific or
additional damage", I am prepared to accept your decision yet I
must call your attention to the general damage done to us by any
disclosure of operational presence. Our operational capabilities
are in direct proportion to the confidence placed in our ability
to protect source identities and operational methods. Disclosure
to the public of our presence weakens this confidence. (S)

David Cohen

5
-SEGRET
14-00000
104-10332-10023

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

THE DIRECTOR OF GENERAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

16 September 1998

Mr. John R. Tunheim
Chair, Assassination Records
Review Board
600 E Street, NW
Washington, DC 20530

Re: JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

Dear Mr. Tunheim:

This will respond to your 14 September 1998 letter regarding
Central Intelligence Agency compliance with the "JFK Act."

I have no doubt whatsoever that the CIA has fully met its
obligations to locate, review, and release "assassination
records" as defined in the JFK Act. The Agency's 2 September
1998 Declaration of Compliance-signed, as you note, by CIA's
Director of Information Management, Edmund Cohen-confirms my
judgment. I have full confidence in the scope of the Agency's
searches as described in Mr. Cohen's recent declaration.

As Director of Information Management, Mr. Cohen is directly
responsible for CIA's records systems and for ensuring the
adequacy of CIA's search, review, and release of documents under
the JFK Act. Mr. Cohen signed the Agency's Declaration of
Compliance because he was the most senior Agency official with
direct personal knowledge that its statements were accurate and
complete. There was no more appropriate signatory.

In sum, I understand that the appropriate CIA staff officers
have worked diligently to locate and disclose to the JFK Board
all relevant records in the Agency's possession and that they do
not believe any other relevant records are being withheld from
the Board. Mr. Cohen's declaration confirms my understanding.

I trust that this will meet your requirements.

Sincerely,
George J. Tenet

14-00000
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Special Assistant/EXDIR

Mr. Cohen,

CIA SPECPAT COLLECTIO
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

Jim Oliver called and wanted me to
pass on the following message:

Talked Judge Tunheim and he is willing
to release the two letters (Cohen & Tenet)
and refrain from other derogatory
comments if the Carey declaration
is substantially like the ones Ed signed.

Michelle

He still would like you to give him
I call on 31805.

14-00000
Central Intelligence Agency

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
Washington, D. C. 20505
2000

DECLARATION OF DAVID W. CAREY

I, DAVID W. CAREY, hereby declare and say:

1. I presently serve as the Executive Director of the
of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA or Agency). I have
held the position of Executive Director since July of 1997
and have served with the CIA for over 29 years in a variety
of operational, staff, and management positions.

2. As the Executive Director I am responsible, on
behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI), for the
overall daily management of the Central Intelligence Agency,
for strategic planning and coordination, and for the
development and execution of the Agency's annual program.
In order to carry out these responsibilities, I have been
delegated all authorities vested in the DCI and DDCI except
as prohibited by law or Agency regulation or policy.

3. The purpose of this declaration is to provide an
assurance that the Central Intelligence Agency: (1) has made
a diligent records search to locate and disclose to the JFK
Assassination Records Review Board (the Board) all records
in its possession relating to Lee Harvey Oswald and the
assassination of President Kennedy; and (2) is aware of no
other assassination-related records in its possession being
withheld from the Board. I make these and the following
statements (including those in the attachments by reference)
based upon my personal knowledge, information made available
to me in my official capacity, the advice of CIA's Office of
General Counsel, and the conclusions I reached in accordance
therewith.

4. With respect to the overall issues of search and
review, and as explained in the attachments or otherwise
included by reference, the CIA's Directorates of
Intelligence (DI), Operations (“DO”), Science and Technology
("DS&T"), and Administration ("DA") and the DCI Area
Information Review Officer have certified to me that their
respective offices or directorates have properly and fully
responded to requests from the Board. Accordingly, I
believe that the Central Intelligence Agency has worked
diligently with the Board to declassify, consistent with the
President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection
Act of 1992 (44 U.S.C. 2107) and other statutes,

14-00000

assassination-related records in its possession, in order to
make such records available to the public.

5. There are six attachments to this declaration,
which are incorporated by reference. Attachment I addresses
the universe and scope of documents that have been ther'
subject of CIA's review. Attachment II describes the
methodology and types of the searches conducted. Attachment
III describes, in general, the records declassified and
released (separate detailed indices will be provided when
documents are released to the National Archives and Records
Administration). Attachment IV addresses questions raised
by the Board regarding perceived gaps in our records,
including possible loss or destruction of records.
Attachment V discusses specific requests from the Board and
incorporates specific CIA responses by reference.. And
Attachment VI addresses commitments which this Agency makes
with regard to provision to the National Archives and
Records Administration of assassination-related documents,
including any documents which may be newly discovered or
created subsequent to the tenure of the Board.

6. Based upon the foregoing and the attachments
(Attachments I through VI, which are incorporated by
reference) I believe that the CIA is in full compliance with
the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992 (44 U.S.C. 2107).

I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT THE FOREGOING AND
THE ATTACHMENTS (ATTACHMENTS I THROUGH VI, WHICH ARE
INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE) ARE TRUE AND CORRECT.

Executed this 23rd day of September 1998.

DAVID W. CAREY
2

14-00000
UNCLASSIFIED

From the Desk of James R. Oliver
Chief, Historical Review Program

NOTE FOR: James R. Oliver@DA
FROM: James R. Oliver
OFFICE: OIM
DATE: 09/24/98 11:12:17 AM
SUBJECT: EXDIR Declaration Signature, 23 September 1998

Memorandum for the Record:

This is to confirm that I replaced the first page of the ExDir's signed JFK Declaration, dated 23
September, with letterhead stationery to assure that the statement was comparable to that signed
by Mr. Cohen, as earlier requested by the Board Chairman. The wording of the declaration was
unchanged; only the letterhead stationery was changed. I called Michelle in the EXDIR's Officer to
confirm that the Executive Director would have no problem with such a change (simply replacing
the first page). She called back, saying that she had asked Mr. Carey, and he had no problem with
this change.

Mr. Harrelson of this office will be hand carrying the EXDIR's declaration to the Board today. At the
same time, and in accordance with my agreement with Chairman Tunheim of yesterday, Mr.
Harrelson will be retrieving the earlier declaration signed by Mr. Cohen, the DCI letter of 16
September, both of which are being withdrawn. The Judge Tunheim also agreed yesterday that
since the EXDIR had agreed to sign the declaration that there will no longer be a need for the critical
language in their report on this issue.

James R. Oliver

CC: Edmund Cohen@DA
R. Bruce Burke@DCI
Sent on 24 September 1998 at 11:12:17 AM

UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000
Central Intelligence Agency

Declaration of EDMUND COHEN

I, Edmund Cohen, hereby declare and say:

1. I presently serve as the Director of Information
Management for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA or
Agency). I have held this position since February 1994; I
have also held the position of Director of the Office of
Information Management since October 1997. I have served
with the CIA for over 30 years in a variety of intelligence,
legal, staff, and management positions.

2. As Director of Information Management, I am
responsible for providing oversight and direction to the
Agency's records and classification management activities,
and information declassification and release programs. I am
also responsible for the development and maintenance of
automated tools to support these activities. I oversee
classification and declassification policies, procedures,
and practices. I manage the Agency Archives and Records
Center, and serve as the CIA Archivist and the Agency
Information Review Officer. I coordinate the conduct of
special searches within the Agency and the release of
information uncovered in such searches. I am also the
Agency's official liaison with the National Archives and
Records Administration and its Office of the Federal
Register, with the Information Security Oversight Office,
and with any other entities on any matters within the
responsibility or authority of the Director of Information
Management.

3. I make the following statements based upon my
personal knowledge, information made available to me in my
official capacity, the advice of CIA's Office of General
Counsel, and the conclusions I reached in accordance
therewith.

14-00000

Declaration of EDMUND COHEN

4. The Central Intelligence Agency: (a) has made
diligent records searches to locate and disclose to the JFK
Assassination Records Review Board (the Board) all records
in its possession relating to Lee Harvey Oswald and the
assassination of President Kennedy; and (b) is aware of no
other assassination-related records in its possession being
withheld from the Board.

5. With respect to the overall issues of search and
review, and as explained in the attachments or otherwise
included by reference, the CIA's Directorates of
Intelligence (DI), Operations (DO), Science and Technology
(DS&T), and Administration (DA) and the DCI Area Information
Review Officer have certified to me that their respective
offices or directorates have properly and fully responded to
requests from the Board. In addition to these
certifications, I have had briefings on the principal.
searches conducted and have had all of my questions answered
to my satisfaction. Accordingly, I believe that the Central
Intelligence Agency has worked diligently with the Board to
locate and declassify, consistent with the President John F.
Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, as
amended, reprinted at 44 U.S.C. 2107 note, and other
statutes, assassination-related records in its possession,
in order to make such records available to the public.

6. There are six attachments, numbered I through VI,
to this declaration, which I incorporate herein by
reference. Attachment I addresses the universe and scope of
documents that have been the subject of CIA's review.
Attachment II describes the methodology and types of the
searches conducted. Attachment III describes, in general,
the records declassified and released. Separate detailed
indices will be provided when documents are released to the
National Archives and Records Administration. Attachment IV
addresses questions raised by the Board regarding perceived
gaps in CIA's records, including possible loss or
destruction of records. Attachment V discusses specific
requests from the Board and incorporates specific CIA
responses by reference. Attachment VI addresses commitments
which this Agency makes with regard to provision to the
National Archives and Records Administration of
assassination-related documents, including any documents
which may be newly discovered or created subsequent to the
tenure of the Board.
2

14-00000

Declaration of EDMUND COHEN

7. Based upon the foregoing and Attachments I through
VI, I believe that the CIA is in full compliance with the
President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection
Act of 1992.

I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT THE FOREGOING,
INCLUDING ATTACHMENTS I THROUGH VI, ARE TRUE AND CORRECT.

Executed this 2 day of September 1998.

Edmund Cohen
3

14-00000

Attachment I

14-00000

Attachment I

Universe and Scope of CIA Documents
Addressed Related to the JFK Assassination

Summary. This Attachment discusses CIA material
examined in order to fulfill the requirements of the JFK
Assassinations Records Collection Act of 1992 (JFK Act). It
addresses the types of CIA documents found in the records of
earlier investigations, including that of the House Select
Committee on Assassinations, and materials and files
recovered in response to searches conducted in 1992 and
thereafter. It discusses the process by which documents
became "assassination-related records."

Discussion. The Central Intelligence Agency has
provided large numbers of documents and materials over the
years in support of successive reviews and investigations
related to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.
We estimate that the equivalent of roughly 320,000 pages
comprise the "CIA collection" of documents associated with
prior assassination reviews, including duplicates. In
addition, we estimate that in responses to the JFK Act, CIA
has reviewed over 100,000 pages of documents from the
National Archives, the Ford, Johnson, and Kennedy
Presidential Libraries and miscellaneous papers from the
National Security Council, the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), the Rockefeller
Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, and
the Senate Select (Church) Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.

The documentation exists in many forms, from original
contemporaneous material, such as field reporting from
overseas or analytic reports, to material generated
specifically as an Agency response to investigation
questions. The largest "CIA collection," as such, is
associated with the records of the House Select Committee on

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Assassinations (HSCA). The HSCA brought together in one
place in 1978 the principal documents retrieved over the
course of years from earlier investigations, including the
Warren Commission, the Rockefeller Commission, and the
Church Committee.

The Warren Commission in 1963 and 1964 was the first
major review of the JFK Assassination. Existing records
suggest that CIA provided roughly 4,000 pages of
documentation to the Warren Commission review, plus
testimony by Richard Helms and John McCone. The Warren
Commission pursued matters related primarily to events and
actions directly associated with the assassination event,
including materials from CIA's Mexico City Station, which
were considered relevant because of a visit to Mexico City
by Lee Harvey Oswald shortly before the assassination.

The Rockefeller Commission in 1975 and Church Committee
investigation in 1975 and 1976 were focused on allegations
of wrongdoing by the CIA. Nonetheless, as a part of these
investigations they yielded information which, to many,
appeared to relate in some way to the assassination, such as
an operational capability or willingness to consider
assassination as an intelligence method.

From 1976 through 1979 the House Select Committee on
Assassinations (HSCA) pursued additional leads, generating
still further documentation. The HSCA ultimately brought
together within its broad scope of investigation many of the
documents from the Warren Commission, the Rockefeller
Commission and the Church Committee. This collection
ultimately became the "HSCA sequestered collection,” which
altogether contains an equivalent of over 300,000 pages, in
paper, photographs, tapes, and microfilm media, including
duplicates. Because the myriad conspiracy theories included
possible Soviet, Cuban, Mafia or right-wing American
involvement, the scope of the HSCA investigation included
anything or anyone that might appear to support those
theories, including historical institutional behavior
patterns. Further, although this sequestered collection was
considered to be CIA's, it contains documents from other
agencies, primarily the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) and over 30,000 pages of HSCA originated material.

¹ The HSCA sequestered collection reflects the major corpus of CIA material or
information reviewed by the House Select Committee on Assassinations (or to
which they had access) during the 1976-1979 time frame. The pulling together
of this collection was coordinated by the Committee and they defined what it was
to include. This Collection has been physically held by CIA since 1979,
although CIA was not authorized access until 1992, when permission was given by
Congress to review the material in preparation for responding to the JFK Act.
2

14-00000

The HSCA sequestered collection is contained in 64
boxes of multimedia material, including paper, photographs,
and microfilm which have been loosely organized into major
categories of information. Boxes 1 through 34 are mostly
material collected by the CIA's Directorate of Operations,
the FBI, and other Government agencies, including field
reporting and handwritten notes. They also include
newspaper articles, name traces performed in response to
requests by the HSCA staff, and copies of other documents
such as the CIA Inspector General's 1967 report on CIA plots
against Castro and Richard Helms' executive session
testimony before the HSCA.

Boxes 35 through 63 of this collection are largely
records of CIA's Legislative Counsel, Inspector General,
General Counsel, Office of Security, and Directorate of
Science and Technology, as well as internal records of the
HSCA staff. They consist of reports, memoranda,
transcripts, cables, letters, newspaper clippings,
photographs, and charts. Box 64 contains 72 reels of
microfilm-the equivalent of roughly 72 more boxes of paper
documents. This material includes the file which the
Directorate of Operations maintained on Lee Harvey Oswald
(the 201 file) as well as similar files on additional
individuals. Many of the microfilm documents duplicate
other documents in the other boxes.

While not a part of the sequestered collection, a
separate "Oswald 201 File" has served as a CIA repository
for JFK assassination-related material over the years and to
a large extent material in this file is duplicative of
material in the sequestered collection. Only a few
documents were in the file at the time of the assassination.
The bulk of the approximately 26,000 pages currently in this
file consists of documents collected immediately after the
assassination and during the Warren Commission
investigation. Included are a large number of third agency
documents, primarily from the FBI. Other major additions to
the Oswald 201 file include relevant Mexico City Station
files and material generated by various FOIA requests and
investigations, such as that of New Orleans District
Attorney, James Garrison.

Assassination-related materials beyond the sequestered
collection and the Oswald 201 file which have been located
since 1992 generally fall into three categories. First,
there are new documents which have been generated since
1978, such as defector reports that mention rumors or
perceptions of conspiracies or newspaper or other open
3

14-00000

source materials related to an individual associated with
the assassination. Second, in a number of cases targeted
areas of inquiry or more precise definitions of areas of
interest by the JFK Board have yielded more information and
added documents to the collection. And third, improved
search techniques have provided better access to those files
which are searchable electronically. Nonetheless, the
material located since 1992 is quite small when compared to
the material in the sequestered collection and the overall
set of material from CIA which has been designated as
"assassination records" by the JFK Board.

In accordance with the law, the Board has the authority
to designate records which it considers relevant to the
assassination as "Assassination Records." These documents
are then subject to review for declassification or, as
deemed appropriate by the Board, held for declassification
in the year 2017. The Board has designated the entire
sequestered collection as Assassination Records as well as
selected material generated in the course of searches
subsequent to 1992. The entire set of these documents is
the equivalent of roughly 320,000 pages, including
duplicates.
4

14-00000

Attachment II

14-00000

ATTACHMENT II.

Search Methodology and Types of Searches Conducted

Summary. This Attachment discusses the methodologies
used in conducting the searches, including what we know of
the searches which were conducted on behalf of the earlier
assassination investigations. It includes, in referenced
tabs, documentation of selected taskings. It discusses the
distributed nature of CIA's paper recordkeeping systems and
electronic databases and the custom keyword searches that
are used with electronic databases which CIA maintains.

Discussion. The collection of CIA materials contained
in the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA)
"sequestered collection” has existed as a discrete body of
records since 1978. This material resulted from highly
labor intensive and systematic searches by individuals
familiar with the Agency's paper files and records systems
in use in the 1960s and 1970s. Today, the sequestered
collection comprises the great bulk of CIA-originated
documents which can be associated with the JFK Assassination
and related investigations.

For most of its history, the Agency has had a system of
records which has been shaped by the divergent requirements
of the directorates in accordance with the wide variance of
focus in their missions. These basic differences in the
missions of the directorates, as well as the compartmental-
ization-of-information procedures (the "need-to-know"
concept), have resulted in each directorate keeping its own
set of records in accordance with directorate-specific
guidelines. This applies equally to paper records as well
as to electronic databases.²

Since the late 1970s, the Agency has been in the
process of converting to electronic databases, which allow
for electronic searches for documents using keyword and

² Even within a single database, information may--in accordance with information
compartmentalization requirements based on the need-to-know principle--be stored
in separate files by several offices or divisions, each with its distinct
recordkeeping criteria and access requirements. In order for a search to be
thorough, a search for one term or a combination of terms must be conducted
across all such files.

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other indexing tools which provide much more expedited and
efficient searches. Because the most significant portion of
JFK assassination-related material was generated prior to
this conversion to electronic databases, searches of the
sequestered collection or other contemporaneous CIA records
have had to rely primarily upon labor intensive hand
searches.

Since 1992 and the passage of the JFK Act, CIA has, in
responding to the requests of the Board, had to devise
search methodologies and techniques to address both the hard
copy and electronic versions of our databases. With respect
to the hard copy material, Agency efforts have concentrated
on those component records most likely to yield
assassination-related documents. Short of a complete manual
review of all documents in the Agency, the techniques used
for searching hard copy materials include expert reviews of
file series and folder names, including associations with
known related topics, retrieving boxes of files from the
Agency's Archives and Records Center, and manually reviewing
those files identified as likely to contain the sought after
materials.

Electronic files searches can actually be more complex
than manual searches, in major part because of the number of
different electronic systems in use. The Directorate of
Operations' electronic databases, for instance, include most
cables since 1978 and they can be searched using single or
multiple search terms against the full text of these cables.
The Directorate of Intelligence's automated systems include
original source material used for analytic assessments as
well as the products themselves and can be searched through
a variety of electronic techniques. The DCI Area
(considered, for this purpose a directorate) maintains the
Executive Registry files which are not normally retrievable
through full text search, but by index searches. The
Directorate of Administration maintains a large and diverse
system of databases and files on employees and contractors
that includes data on security issues, medical records,
training, etc. The Directorate of Science and Technology
and its subordinate components maintain other electronic
databases unique to individual missions. Each of these
systems requires a unique set of access criteria and search
commands and must be searched by information management
experts of the respective directorates.

Where possible, automated systems were searched using
key words such as JFK, Kennedy, assassination, executive
action, Oswald, place names, and a large number of names,
crypts, or pseudonyms identifying individuals known to have
2

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been associated with countries, key installations,
organizations, or operations that fell within the period
deemed relevant to the history of the assassination.

The following categories are examples of the guidelines
for relevancy with which both manual and computerized
searches were conducted. They include, but are not limited
to, individuals, organizations, places, projects, and
subjects which are considered central to the Oswald/JFK
assassination history and the ensuing investigations.

A. JFK Assassination Investigations:

* Warren Commission, 1963-64
* James Garrison, New Orleans District Attorney, 1966-68
* Rockefeller Commission, 1975 (JFK assassination & CIA
anti-Cuban plots aspects only)
* Church Committee (Senate), 1975-76 (JFK assassination &
CIA anti-Cuban plots aspects only)
* House Select Committee On Assassinations (HSCA),
1976-79

B. Key Subjects:

* Moscow Station, Mexico City Station, and JMWAVE
Station, as they related to Oswald's activities or
to possible conspiracies.
* KGB interest in Oswald.
* CIA anti-Cuban operations 1960-64 if they involve
JFK figures or subjects; most US anti-Castro
activities in 1963 are considered relevant.
* Cuban exile anti-Castro activities, leaders, and
organizations, 1960-64, if they involve JFK figures
or subjects.
* Castro assassination activities (plans and attempts)
without limit on time frame.
* Mafia, if related to Castro, JFK, or New Orleans
during Oswald time frames.

C. Key Figures: Material with the following terms was
considered JFK assassination-relevant unless the
context is clearly not related or the information is
outside the appropriate time period:

* AMLASH
* AMMUG
* Maurice Bishop (any reference)
* Silvia, Duran
3

14-00000

* Richard Gibson and the Free Cuba Committee
* Howard Hunt
* Priscilla MacMillan Johnson
* Valeriy Kostikov
* Mr. & Mrs. George de Mohrenschildt
* Yuri Nosenko
* Michael & Ruth Paine
* David A. Phillips
* Richard Snyder
* Win Scott

Prior to enactment of the JFK Act, in early 1992, the
Chief of the CIA History Staff, through various manual
searches of shelf lists, located the “sequestered
collection" of the House Select Committee on Assassinations
(sixty-four record center size boxes). After obtaining the
permission of the Congress, his staff surveyed these and
other related holdings on the assassination. In addition,
the History Staff located sixteen boxes of Lee Harvey
Oswald's 201 file and a number of loose folders, mainly from
Mexico City Station records that had been collected for the
Warren Commission.

In October 1993, following enactment of the JFK Act but
prior to the President's appointment of the Board, CIA'S
Historical Review Group (HRG) requested the directorates to
conduct a name search on Lee Harvey Oswald, JFK
assassination, and any related documents (Tab 1). This
request resulted in a series of meetings and discussions
with various Agency components and Information Release
Officers. More than thirty-one additional boxes of
materials were sent to HRG for review. Included in this
material were nineteen boxes of JFK working files of Mr.
Russ Holmes, a CIA employee who for many years was the
Agency's focal point officer with responsibility for
responding to questions related to our assassinated-related
records. Also included were two boxes on Nosenko, seven
boxes of Latin America Division documents, and three boxes
from the Bay of Pigs project. Out of these thirty-one
additional boxes provided to the Board staff, approximately
twenty-two boxes of material were designated by the Board as
assassination records. The preponderant volume of these
records is duplicative of documents in the sequestered
collection.

In April 1995, after the Agency received the Board's
first formal request, and in anticipation of "what are
4

14-00000

likely to be many requests from the Board for information..."
the Agency Executive Director asked each directorate and the
DCI Administrative Officer to appoint a focal point officer
for the JFK Assassination review. (Tab 2)

In the spring and summer of 1997, the Agency arranged
for the Board staff to receive a series of briefings by
representatives of each directorate on the files kept within
the records systems of each directorate. These briefings
covered aspects of the records systems, such as how the
records are organized, maintained, searched and retrieved,
as well as how they had been previously searched for
assassination-related materials.

The Board staff requested a number of additional
searches, which have now been completed. These requests
were both formal and informal and resulted in responses to
the Board staff which included a wide range of additional
material, some of which was judged relevant to the history
of the assassination. This material includes the histories
of various CIA operations and Agency components, files on
specific individuals involved in either the Warren
Commission or in HSCA investigations, and the results of CIA
internal reviews of programs and operations. Although many
requests from the Board and responses from the Agency were
handled informally, the significant initial requests are
listed in the table in Attachment V.

Prompted in part by the surfacing of a small number of
new relevant documents, the Board staff requested CIA in the
summer of 1998 to: (a) perform an additional set of searches
on certain specific topics; and (b) issue an Agency-wide
notice reminding CIA employees of the requirements of the
JFK Act.

Specially tailored tasking was sent to the three
Directorate of Operations components deemed most likely to
possess records relevant to the JFK assassination of the
kind of concern to the Board (See Tab 3). Among other
considerations, this special tasking included a list of new
or revised search terms, a request for clarification on the
disposition of the James Angleton files, and the requirement
to focus on potential new information from the debriefing of
defectors in which any reference to Oswald or to the Kennedy
assassination occurs.

DCI Tenet issued an Agency-wide Employees Bulletin on
22 July 1998 directing all CIA personnel to "consider
documents in their possession or with which they are
5

14-00000

familiar that might have relevance to the Board's review..."
(ΕΒ ΟΙΜ 98-02-See Tab 4).

Finally, and in a separate tasking, all directorates
were asked to assure that searches undertaken were
sufficient to enable a directorate representative to provide
a certification of compliance with the JFK Act, and that the
DCI's Bulletin had been forwarded to all directorate
employees. (See Tab 5).
6

14-00000

MEMORANDUM FOR: DO/IRO
DI/IRO
DA/IRO
DS&T/IRO
FROM: John F. Pereira
CSI-0331/93
25 October 1993

Chief, Historical Review Group/CSI
SUBJECT: Request to Conduct Search for
JFK Assassination Records

1. In recent testimony before the HPSCI the Director
indicated that a continuing search for JFK assassination-
related documents was in progress. In order to assure that
there are no oversights in this regard, we are requesting
the following, by directorate:

DO & DI: A name search on Lee Harvey Oswald for the
period 1980 through 1993; a subject search on JFK
assassination (Kennedy assassination, etc.), same
period; all appropriate components be asked to forward
to us any documents related to the assassination that
were not provided earlier.

DA & DS&T: All appropriate components be asked to
forward to us any documents related to the
assassination that were not provided earlier; a file
search when an obvious need is recognized.

2. Information responsive to this request should be
forwarded to the Historical Review Group, 404 Ames Building.
Questions may be directed to Frank Most, 30146.

John F. Pereira
2

14-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY-

ER 95-8097
6 April 1995
DO/INS 95-069/1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Administrative Officer, DCI

FROM: Executive Director

SUBJECT: Appointment of Directorate Focal Points
for JFK Assassination Board Requests

1. I would like each of you to appoint a focal point
officer for your Directorate who would be responsible for
responding to requests for information from the (President
Kennedy) Assassination Records Review Board.

2. The Agency has received the first (attached) of what
are likely to be many requests from the Board for information
related to the assassination of President Kennedy and to the
investigations into the assassination. Up to now, the Board
has focused on the "sequestered" records CIA had collected
for the House Assassination Committee's investigation and
documents that had been part of the Oswald 201 file. It is
expected that the new requests will require records searches
to be done for additional information.

3. The Historical Review Group (HRG) of the Center for
the Study of Intelligence (CSI), which has been the Agency's
principal liaison with the JFK Board, will continue in that
role. HRG will receive requests from the Board, and then
forward them to the Directorate focal points for action.
Responses from the Directorates will be coordinated by HRG,
which will make the responses available to the Board.

4. Please provide the name of your focal point officer to
John Pereira, Chief, HRG (x30373-secure) by 13 April.

Leo Hazlewood

Attachment

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY
3

14-00000

JUL 30

SECRET

ΟΙΜ 98-0081
30 July 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Counterintelligence Center, DO
Chief, Latin America Division, DO
Chief, CE Division, DO

FROM: Lee Strickland
Chief, Information Review Group
Office of Information Management.

SUBJECT: (U) New Search of CI Files for JFK
Assassination Records

REFERENCE: (AIUO) Bulletin OIM EB No. 02-98,
dated 22 July 1998

1. (U) The JFK Board has made a number of recent
specific directed requests to assure that the Agency has
complied fully with the requirements of the JFK Act. Among
these was a request for issuance of the Reference Employee
Bulletin, in which the DCI directed that employees leave "no
stone unturned" in assuring that relevant documents are
provided to the Commission.

2. (U) In part because relevant new documents have
surfaced within the past few months, the Board has also
requested specific focus on renewed searches of the Agency's
"counterintelligence files." The new documents have
surfaced due to a variety of reasons, including references
to assassination related personalities in recent defector
reports, records made available because of the break up of
the Soviet10.00000
104-10337-10001
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington DC 20505

April 1992

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on Government Operations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Director has asked me to respond to your letter of
April 6, 1992 requesting certain information regarding CIA
holdings of records related to the assassination of
President Kennedy. We do have a significant number of records
relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy,
although many of these records were originated by the FBI or
by investigating committees of the Congress. We believe that
a significant portion of our records could be released if H.J.
Resolution 454 were enacted into law.

I should also point out that the Central Intelligence
Agency is currently embarking on its own review of
assassination records. I would expect that this review will
result in the public release of a significant body of
information.

To help the committee understand the nature and number of
CIA records pertaining to the assassination, I am enclosing
the answers to the specific questions you raised in your
letter.

Sincerely,

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

13-00000

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
SUBJECT: Agency Records on the JFK Assassination

OCA/LEG/DMPearline:rw 23 April 1992 (OCA 1123-92)
(OCA 1123-92/1)
(OCA 1123-92/2)

Original - Addressee (w/enclos)
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ExDir
1 - ER
1 - D/OCA (w/enclos)
1 - DMPearline Signer (w/enclos)
1 - OCA/LEG Subject File (w/enclos)
1 - OCA Record (w/enclos)
1 - D/Center for the Study of Intelligence (w/enclos)

13-00000

OCA 1123-92

1. Did the CIA retain possession of records requested by
or developed on behalf of the House Select Committee on
Assassinations? If so, how many pages of such records does
the Agency have in its possession? What is the nature of
these records?

Yes, the CIA retained possession of records requested by
or developed on behalf of the House Select Committee on
Assassinations (HSCA). The Agency has approximately 300,000
pages of such records which include microfilm of CIA's Oswald
file (originally collected in response to the Warren
Commission's inquiry, then added to) as well as records
collected in response to specific requests from the HSCA.
Although these records cover a wide variety of topics, they
principally focus on CIA operations against Cuba and Castro,
Lee Harvey Oswald's sojourn in the USSR, and Oswald's
activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. The vast majority
of documents pertaining to Oswald were created in response to
specific inquiries from the Warren Commission and HSCA. They
also include a large number of name traces requested by the
HSCA staff, as well as materials relating to the Garrison
investigation, Watergate, Cuban exile activities, and copies
of FBI reports relating to Oswald. Because the HSCA was also
investigating the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr., there is also some material on the Black Panthers and the
civil rights movement.

2. Does the CIA have records outside of those related to
the HSCA that may be considered relevant to the assassination
of President Kennedy? If so, please describe such records and
the approximate number of pages.

The CIA responded to requests from the Warren Commission
and the HSCA (approximately 300,000 pages, see above). The
CIA has never, however, attempted to locate every document
bearing on every conceivable angle or theory relating to the
assassination of President John F. Kennedy. If the Agency
were asked to explore newly advanced theories the search for
documents could be a rather large undertaking involving the
review of thousands of additional documents. To conduct any
further search, CIA would require specific guidelines
describing the kinds of records sought.

3. Did any of the records described in questions 1 and 2
originate with the FBI? If so, approximately how many?

We believe that between 40 percent and 50-percent of the
records described in questions 1 and 2 originated with the
FBI.

1

13-00000

4. Did any of these records originate with any other
Federal, foreign, state, or local agency? If so, please
describe which agencies and the approximate numbers.

A small number of CIA's records pertaining to the
assassination of JFK, probably less than 5%, originated with
the State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization
Service. Another small number of records, also less than 5%,
are original HSCA records stating Committee requests to CIA.

5. How many of these records have been reviewed for
release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)? How many
of these records have been released pursuant to such requests?

CIA has released 7,432 pages of records pertaining to the
assassination of JFK, representing 1,969 documents, under the
FOIA. There is no documentation of how many JFK assassination
records CIA has reviewed under FOIA.

6. In the estimation of the CIA, approximately how many
records would be released under the standards contained in
House Joint Resolution 454?

It is very difficult to estimate the number of documents
that would be released if the Joint Resolution passed because
consideration for protection of classified information and
other sensitive categories of information would be required on
a document by document basis. We would review our holdings
carefully to ensure that the maximum amount of information is
released, consistent with the DCI's responsibility to protect
intelligence sources and methods and with privacy interests of
individuals involved.

2

13-00000
HPR 21 6 11.

UNCLASSIFIED

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DCI History Staff
316 Ames Building
Washington, D.C. 20505
Phone (703) 351-2621

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

TRANSMITTED DATE: 4/21/92 PAGES TRANSMITTED 8
(cover sheet included)

TRANSMITTED TO:

NAME: JOHN PEREIRA
ORGANIZATION: OGC
BLDG, ROOM
TELE/EXT: 76160 (FAX 874 3208)
SUBJECT: OCA LETTER (W/ENCL) & INR MEMO (W/O ATT.)
& CIANS DRAFT MOU WITH STATE

TRANSMITTED FROM:

NAME: KEN MCDONALD
BLDG, ROOM: 316 AMES
TELE/EXT: 30147 (FAX 522 9280)

MESSAGE:

Folm - The OCA letter (which Doved Pearlice
sent us yesterday) has muggested changes
on it. I think I sent you an earliөт
draft of our proposed access memo of under-
standing with state, to which the Wilcox
memo refers

Ken

UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

Central Intelligence Agency
Washingon D. C. 30505

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on Government Operations
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Director has asked me to respond to your letter of
6 April requesting certain information regarding CIA holdings
of records related to the assassination of President Kennedy.
We do have a significant number of records relating to the
assassination of President John F. Kennedy, although many of
these records were originated by the FBI or by investigating
committees of the Congress. We believe that a significant
portion of our records could be released if H.J. Resolutin 454
were enacted into law.

I should also point out that the Central Intelligence
Agency is currently embarking on its own review of
assassination records. I would expect that this review will
result in the public release of a significant body of
information.

To help the committee understand the nature and number of
CIA records pertaining to the assassination, I am enclosing
the answers to the specific questions you raised in your
letter.

Sincerely,

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

13-00000

CL

1. Did the CIA retain possession of records requested by
or developed on behalf of the House Select Committee on
Assassinations? If so, how many pages of such records does
the Agency have in its possession? What is the nature of
these records?

Yes, the CIA retained possession of records requested by
or developed on behalf of the House Select Committee on
Assassinations (HSCA). The Agency has approximately 300,000
pages of such records which consist of microfilm of CIA'S Oswald
file (originally collected in response to the Warren
Commission's inquiry, then added to) as well as recorda collected in
response to specific requests from the House Select Committee
on Assassinations. Although these records cover a wide
variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA operations
against Cuba and Castro, Lee Harvey Oswald's sojourn in the
USSR, and Oswald's activities in Mexico City and New Orleans.
They also include a large number of names traces requested by
the HSCA staff, as well as materials relating to the Garrison
investigation, Watergate, Cuban exile activities, and copies
of FBI reports relating to Oswald. Because the HSCA was also
investigating the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr., there is also some material on the Black Panthers and the
civil rights movement.

2. Does the CIA have records outside of those related to
the House Assassinations Committee that may be considered
relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy? If so,
please describe such records and the approximate number of
pages.

The CIA responded to requests from the warren Commission
and the House Select Committee on Assassinations
(approximately 300,000 pages, see above). The CIA has never,
however, attempted to locate every document bearing on every
conceivable angle or theory relating to the assassination of
President John F. Kennedy. To conduct any further search, CIA
would require specific guidelines of the kinds of records
sought.

3. Did any of the records described in questions 1 and 2
originate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation? If so,
approximately how many?

We believe that between 40% and 50% of the records
described in questions 1 and 2 originated with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.

1

13-00000

4. Did any of these records originate with any other
Federal, foreign, state, or local agency? If so, please
describe which agencies and the approximate numbers.

A small number of CIA'S JFK assassination records,
probably less than 5%, originated with the State Department
and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Another small
number of records, also less than 5%, are original HSCA
records stating Committee requests to CIA.

5. How many of these records have been reviewed for
release under the Freedom of Information Act? How many of
these records have been released pursuant to such requests?

CIA has released 7,432 pages of JFK assassination
records, representing 1,969 documents, under the Freedom of
Information Act. There is no documentation of how many JFK
assassination records CIA has reviewed under FOIA.

6. In the estimation of the CIA, approximately how many
records would he released under the standards contained in
House Joint Resolution 454?

It is very difficult to estimate the number of documents
that would be released if the Joint Resolution passed. We
would review our holdings carefully to ensure that the maximum
amount of information is released, consistent with the DCI'B
responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.

2

13-00000

SAM NUNH, GEORGIA
CARLEVEN, MIHIGAN
JIM SASGER, TENNESSEE
DAVIO PRYOR ARKANSAS
HERBERT KOHL WISCONSIN
GHN GLENN OHIC CHAIRMAN
JOSEPH & LIEBERMAN, CONNECTICUY
DANIEL & AKAKA, HAWAII
:
WILLIAM OF DELAWARE
TED SEVENS, ALASKA
WILLIAM & COMCH. WANE
WARREN & RUOMAN, NIW HAMPSHIRE
JOHN SEYMOUR CALIFORNIA
LEONARO WEISS, STAFF DIAЕСТОЛ
FRANKLIN C. POLK, MINGRITY STAAF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNEEL

United States Senate

The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Director Gates:

COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6250

April 14, 1992

CIA HAS NO CEJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICADOR
F.4
RELESS RIMATION
IN THIS LICU、こす
20 APR 1992
I am please to learn that you will be testifying before
ER 92-1316
the Committee on Governmental Affairs on Tuesday, May 12,
1992. The hearing will begin at 9:00 a.m. and be held in Room
342 of the Dirksen Senate Building. The subject of the hearing
will be the "Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992."
The legislation proposes to create an independent review board
to govern and coordinate the release of government information
relevant to the assassination of former President John F.
Kennedy. As required by Commmittee rules, please have 100
copies of your written testimony delivered to the Committee by
close of business, Friday, May 8, 1992. While your written
testimony may be as long as you wish, please plan to limit
your spoken testimony to five to seven minutes in length.

Your testimony will be extremely helpful to the Committee
and to the Congress as it considers this important
legislation. While you may discuss whatever aspects of the
legislation you desire, particularly how it relates to the
records and resources of your agency, the Committee would
appreciate learning your views on several specific subjects:

What are the reasons which the Central Intelligence
Agency has records related to the assassination of
President Kennedy?

What have the methods been to date for the identification
and definition of Central Intelligence Agency records as
material related to the assassination of President
Kennedy?

What steps has the Central Intelligence Agency made to
assess the scope of relevant documents outside of
materials requested by earlier investigative or other
official committees or commissions, or through the
Freedom of Information Act?

What is the volume of material which you might recommend
be released to the public without concern for further
postponement?

13-00000
:

P.5

The Honorable Robe: M. Cates
Page 2

Would you be opposed to a provision requesting agencies,
whenever possible, to self-certify materials which may
released without agency objection?

What recommendations can you make with regard to the need
for interagency working groups to identify third-agency
records in agency files, to avoid duplication, and to
assist in the efficient disclosure of information to the
public?

What are the logistical, manpower, and resource concerns
that you have with regard to the review and release of
assassination material?

Thank you for your assistance and consideration. I look
forward to seeing you on May 12th. In the event that you have
any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. Your
staff has already been very helpful to the Committee in its
preparation for the hearing. They may also contact Dr. Leonard
Weiss, Staff Director, or Steven Katz, Counsel, at
202-224-4751.

Geun

Sincerely
John Glenn
Chairman

JHG/sk

13-00000

HEARING
before the
SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
on
S.J. Res. 282:
THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992

Tuesday, May 12, 1992
9:00 a.m.
Room 342 Dirksen Senate Office Building

WITNESS LIST
****

Panel 1:
The Honorable David L. Boren
United States Senator (D-OK)

The Honorable Arlen Specter
United States Senator (R-PA)

The Honorable Louis Stokes
United States Representative (D-OH)
*

RELEASE OF ON INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

Panel 2:
The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Director
Central Intelligence Agency

The Honorable Williams Sessions
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Panel 3:
*

James Lesar
President
Assassination Archives and Research Center
Washington, D. C.

Professor Ernest May
Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Professor Athan Theoharis
Department of History
Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

13-00000
:

HEARING
before the
SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
on
S.J. Res. 282:
THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992

Tuesday, May 12, 1992
9:00 a.m.
Room 342 Dirksen Senate Office Building

WITNESS LIST
****

Panel 1:
The Honorable David L. Boren
United States Senator (D-OK)

The Honorable Arlen Specter
United States Senator (R-PA)

The Honorable Louis Stokes
United States Representative (D-OH)
Co
DECLAS
RELEAS OF GALL INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

Panel 2:
****

The Honorable Robert M.-Gates...
Director
Central Intelligence Agency

The Honorable Williams Sessions
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Panel 3:
James Lesar
President
Assassination Archives and Research Center
Washington, D. C.

Professor Ernest May
Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Professor Athan Theoharis
Department of History
Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
*

13-00000
APR 2
92
20
1.

P.2

CIA SPECIAL COLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

4/22/92
!

OUTLINE OF TESTIMONY ON JFK RESOLUTION

A. Agreement with Principles of Legislation.

B.
:

1. Favor disclosure of as much material on JFK as
is consistent with protection of intelligence
sources and methods.

2. Established own declassification program.
Presumption will be in favor of disclosure.

3. Pledge to cooperate with any reasonable
mechanism to declassify documents.

Describe Nature and Amount of Records.

1. Reasons for having records.

2.
to.
Volume of existing material and who it belongs

3. How we have identified material related to JFK
assassination.

C. How Much Material Can be Released?

1. Give estimate of amount of material to be
released under CIA program or resolution.

2. Describe material that could not be disclosed.

a. Example of Intelligence Sources and
Methods that would require withholding.

b. Example of material the release of which
would invade privacy. :

3. Describe resources--manpower and funds--to
achieve results.

D. Concerns with Resolutions.
i

1. Address only Intelligence Community Concerns.
Will defer to DoJ on Constitutional objections.
:

13-00000
APR 22 '92 08:47

P.3

2. CIA or other agencies that originate documents
should conduct initial review of material to
determine whether it can be released. Material
withheld from public release could then be made
available to Review Board.

3. Agencies that originate information should be
allowed to review it for release even if that
information is contained in a document prepared by
another agency or Congress. Suggest interagency
working group to handle coordination issues likely
to arise with disclosure of third agency
documents.

4. Will cooperate with any request by the Board
for additional material that has a reasonable
relationship to the assassination.

5. Would hope that the Board will consult with
DCI before using subpoena power to compel
production of material that involves sensitive
intelligence sources and methods.

5. Exemptions need to be clarified so as to
ensure that deliberative process information and
identities of covert employees are protected.

E. Conclusion: Pledge to cooperate with whatever
mechanism is established to declassify material. Hope that
this effort will help to dispel myths regarding JFK
assassination.
.

13-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

OCA 2034-92
1 May 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: House Government Operations Committee Hearing on
H.J. Res. 454 (JFK Materials Resolution)

1. On 28 April, the undersigned attended a public
hearing on the proposed Assassination Materials Disclosure
Act conducted by the House Government Operations Legislation
and National Security Subcommittee. Majority
Committee/Subcommittee Chairman Conyers and Ranking Minority
Member Horton were present for the entire hearing; majority
Subcommittee members English, Neal, Peterson, and Thornton
and minority members Shays and Schiff and full Committee
member Martinez attended at least part of the hearing. The
Committee's Press release, which criticizes the government
and particularly CIA as releasing JFK-related documents "at
a snail's pace", and witness statements are attached.

2. The hearing was well attended by the public and
attracted much media coverage. Eight witnesses testified in
four groups: Congressmen Louis Stokes (assisted by
Robert Blakey, former counsel to the House Select Committee
on Assassinations) and former HPSCI Chairman Lee Hamilton
testified first. The congressmen were followed by the movie
"JFK"'s director Oliver Stone, who was followed by
Howard Willens, Counsel to the Warren Commission, and
James Johnston, Counsel to the Church Committee. The
session closed with a panel comprised of Ms. Leslie Harris,
Chief Legislative Counsel for the Washington office of the
ACLU; Dr. Herbert Parmet, Professor of History,
Queensborough Community College and Graduate School of the
City University of New York, and Dr. Harold Rellyea,
American National Government Specialist at the Congressional
Research Service.

3. Chairman Conyers advised in his opening remarks
that the Committee wanted to hear from the Executive branch
and thus would hold another hearing session. He noted that
"after much negotiation," the Director of Central
Intelligence would be testifying in mid-May. He further
noted that the Committee also hoped to hear from the
Attorney General, but negotiations with the Justice
Department were still ongoing. Conyers was criticized of
the DoJ at the outset, noting that the Committee had

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

13-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

Subject: House Government Operations Committee Hearing on
H.J. Res. 454 (JFK Materials Resolution)

received a long, single-spaced letter from Justice detailing
numerous "legalistic" objections to the resolution, which he
characterized as not reflecting a real willingness to work
together to release the documents to the American people.

4. The general tone of the session was strongly in
favor of the resolution and disclosure of the vast majority
of the material. Most witnesses conceded that there might
be some materials that required postponement of disclosure,
but the bias was clearly toward disclosure. Even
Oliver Stone, in response to a comment from Congressman
Shays that he (Shays) found it hard to imagine what national
security or privacy issues would persist after 30 years,
conceded that there might be some exceptions, but Stone
thought 98 percent of the material could be released.
Several witnesses, including Congressman Stokes and Church
Committee counsel, suggested that most national security
information should be released under the resolution, but
that privacy interests posed greater concerns.
Congressman Hamilton warned that the Congress should be
careful that nondisclosure "loopholes" do not "swallow up
the bill," which is why he said that review by an
independent board was so important.

5. Stone's testimony had quite an impact on the
hearing. Several congressman and witnesses credited his
movie "JFK" as "the reason we are all here today."
Chairman Conyers appeared particularly impressed with Stone,
describing his testimony in exchanges with later witnesses
as "persuasive" and "compelling." A few potentially tough
questions were thrown at Stone--did he not over-lionize
Garrison; how much research did he do for the movie and did
he seek to talk to or obtain information from the government
as part of his research process? However, there was no
aggressive follow-up to Stone's answers. Discerning
observers may have picked up on the fact that Stone's
"research" seemed tailored to and limited by pre-conceived
conspiracy theories. (For example, when asked if he had
talked to President Ford, a member of the Warren Commission
and advocate of disclosure of the JFK documents, Stone
answered no--that it was pretty obvious where Ford stood as
a proponent of the lone gunman theory.)

6. When asked about his personal views, Stone said he
believed that there were two conspiracies. The murder
conspiracy was small and covert--perhaps involving no more
that five to ten people--and was led by the "intelligence
agencies." Stone did not mention CIA by name at this point.

2

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

13-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

Subject: House Government Operations Committee Hearing on
H.J. Res. 454 (JFK Materials Resolution)

He mentioned Oswald's alleged ties to naval intelligence,
and also said that a closer look should be taken at an
operation "MONGOOSE" and a Colonel Landsdale. He also
posited a bigger "cover-up" conspiracy after the fact,
spearheaded by President Johnson (who Stone alleged told
Earl Warren he would be responsible for World War III if the
Commission tied the Cubans into a conspiracy). Stone
theorized that a much broader "Establishment", while not
directly involved in the assassination, was not sorry to see
Kennedy go because he was an agent of profound change
embarking upon several courses that disturbed that
"Establishment", including pulling out of Vietnam. In
response to a later question about various theories, Stone
called the Mafia theory a "red-herring." Stone said "as you
know, the CIA has always used the Mafia for plausible
deniability" and that it was important to look behind the
Mafia at "who pulls the strings."

7. Other matters of Agency interest discussed include
that both the Warren Commission attorney and particularly
the Church Committee attorney castigated CIA for "lying" to
the Warren Commission. The particular example offered had
to do with "AMLASH." This individual came up in connection
with traces the Agency apparently conducted for the Warren
Commission. CIA purportedly had a relationship with AMLASH
in connection with a Castro assassination plot, but did not
make this fact known to the Warren Commission. The
witnesses characterized this as pertinent information CIA
consciously withheld from the Warren Commission. Also, when
the final panel engaged in a broader discussion of
government disclosure and FOIA with the subcommittee, the
ACLU held up the CIA Openness Task Force report as an
example of why FOIA was a "dismal failure" as the mechanism
to "vindicate t public's right to know." (On 18 March
Conyers rigorously questioned Gary Foster on the task force
report when his subcommittee held a hearing on "Government
Secrecy After the Cold War.")

8. A major recurring theme was concern that, despite
the need to make the documents publicly available, the
Administration would not support the resolution and it could
be vetoed. Congressman Hamilton stated that, if the
resolution were vetoed, he hoped that at minimum the House
would pass a resolution to release its own records. (Such
an action would be problematic for the Administration,
because much Executive branch information is contained in
House records, and the House also probably considers
documents obtained from Executive agencies as part of its

3

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

13-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

Subject: House Government Operations Committee Hearing on
H.J. Res. 454 (JFK Materials Resolution)

records.) Most witnesses thought the Congress should try to
avoid a constitutional confrontation with the
Administration, however, and a few practical suggestions to
help work around problems were made. For example, the ACLU
suggested that the Review Board might be modeled after the
Advisory Committee established in connection with the State
Department's preparation of the Foreign Relations of the
United States (FRUS) series, with which CIA's historical
staff is familiar. This body was established by a provision
included in last year's Foreign Relations Authorization Act.

9. In conclusion, the hearing did not get into much
detail on provisions of the resolution. Much time was spent
on general propositions like the fact that the documents
ought to be released and why, and matters tangential to core
issues raised by H.R. 454.

Victoria L. Pepper
Assistant General Counsel
Office of Congressional Affairs

4

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

13-00000

OCA 2050-92
6 May 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: We Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: JFK Testimony

1. Attached is a copy of your opening statement for
the 12 May hearing before Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee on the JFK Joint Resolution. Because we are
commenting on legislation, Executive Branch guidelines
require us to submit the testimony in advance to OMB for
Administration clearance. We also intend to provide your
opening statement in advance to the DoJ and FBI. As you
know, Director Sessions will be joining you for a panel
presentation before the Committee.

2. Please let me know whether you have any objections
to release of your statement to OMB, DoJ, and the FBI. The
Committee has requested that an advance copy of your
statement be provided to them by 8 May.

Attachment:
as stated
Stanley M. Moskowitz

13-00000

Draft 5/6/92

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. GATES
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
:

UNITED STATES SENATE

12 MAY 1992

13-00000

Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide
my views on Senate Joint Resolution 282, "The Assassination
Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of
documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John
F. Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on
this important matter.

Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement
with the purpose underlying the joint resolution--that efforts
should be made to declassify and make available to the public as
quickly as possible government documents relating to the
assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and
giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public
access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that
still linger even 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe
over
that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that the CIA had anyther
participated in the murder of John F. Kennedy.
ת

Even before introduction of this joint resolution, I
recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents
of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the
establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible
for declassifying as many historical documents as possible
consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and
to do with

13-00000

methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the
Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for
declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national
intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are
10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of 30-
year- old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the
Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records
focusing on particular events of historical importance, including
Весиии of
high intessent
in the JPK
not waiting for
the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review apers, I am
Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of
declassifying the records. As we speak this Group has already
legislation or
other agencies
to start
begun its review of the documents related to the assassination of Legislation or
President Kennedy, and I am glad to report that the first group of
Sine Som these records, which includes all CIA documents on Lee Harvey
Can me
Idea of
#?
Is it
declassifying
documents wassination documents, we will use a presumption in favor of
Limited
only to the 37
which CHA
has
Legislation or
includin
Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified and
transferred to the National Archives for release to the public.

As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy
releasing as many documents as possible. In fact, I recently
approved new CIA declassification guidelines for our Historical
on the
next page.
good
Ken said
there wou
be
(specifically direct)
enou# 104-10337-10014
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
Co

RELEASE IN FULL
2000

24 November, 1998

Memo for the Record

Subject: JFK Records Review - Lessons Learned

The CIA's JFK Collection is made up primarily of
records pulled together for the Warren Commission, House
Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) and the
Assassinations Records Review Board (ARRB). It contains a
significant amount of duplication and non-JFK related
material. The current index is flawed and contains gaps.
Release standards were liberal; basically only source
identities and information, names of agents, employees under
cover, Agency locations and foreign liaison activities were
redacted. There is no evidence in the Collection to indicate
that the Warren Commission conclusions were wrong.

I. The JFK Act

Mandated review and declassification projects can be
two-edged swords. The JFK Act forced the Agency to review
records that should have been opened years ago. The legal
requirement to presume release, backed up by an independent
review, resulted in the opening of documents that clearly
would not have been released under other programs. However,
the Act and the Review Board created by the Act imposed un-
realistic deadlines, inflexible standards and procedures
which created a major drain on all Agency review resources
and had an over-all negative effect on the Agency's release
program.

Unrealistic Deadlines: The release dates set by the
Act did not take into account the start-up time and costs
(searches, inventorying and indexing) of a project of this
magnitude, nor the time it would then take for a page-by-
page review and sanitization of classified documents. For
example, initial indexing of the collection was done on a
crash basis using overtime employees and resulted in a
flawed database. The revising, re-indexing and updating of
that database took several thousand man-hours and continues
today."

Mandated Procedures: NARA's and ARRB's interpretation
of the law created a time-consuming, labor-intensive review
process that meant an inordinate amount of time was spent by
both the Agency and Board staff on issues which were
marginal to the story and to processing decisions by the
Board. For example:

a. Under the JFK Act every piece of paper in the
collection was considered a "unique" assassination record.
The result is a staggering amount of chaff and duplication.

13-00000

For example, one cable was files and processed 58 times in.
the collection.

b. The ARRB required that all sanitized documents be
reviewed by the Board and that each postponement (deletion)
be acted on individually. Even after the Board changed
procedures and accepted staff recommendations instead of
reviewing each document, the detailed tracking, recording
and coding of every deletion within each document required
processing resources well beyond what would be considered
reasonable for such a project. A most sanitized documents
contained multiple deletions (one contained more than 1600
deletions and many over 100).

Inflexible Standards: The level of evidence required
by the Board to postpone what was generally considered
protectable information was extremely high and usually
required docmentation of “current harm". Defenses based on
general principles such as official cover or sources and
methods were not acceptable. This required the Agency to
dedicate significant resources to prepare evidence to
support recommended postponements. Again, much time was
spent on issues that were marginal to the JFK story. For
example, several major evidence packages involving several
offices and presentations by senior agency officers and
officials were needed to secure Board agreement to protect
Agency physical locations and names of employees and other
persons not related to the JFK story.

Three times during the six years of the project, including
most of this past year, the JFK review effectively shut down
all other aspects of the Historical Review Program and had
to borrow additional resources from other offices and review
projects to meet deadlines. The JFK review will continue to
require a significant portion of HRP's resources through
FY99.

II. The Process

There are a number of basic lessons from the JFK review
that are applicable to other historical/systematic review
projects:

* We need reviewers with broad Agency experience, which
can be either managerial or substantive.

* We need to establish early on what information is
already in the public domain and address the issue of
"official release" in the context of each project.

* Develop a strategy/policy with the IROs concerning the
release of information. Be smart about it; do not accept
stonewalling by them on relevant information that can be
:

13-00000
1

released. At the same time, avoid confrontations with them
on marginal or non-relevant information.

* On-site Directorate reviewers are the most effective
way to handle the internal coordination requirements of a
large project. Without the DO's JFK team on site it would
have been impossible to complete the JFK project.

* Develop guidelines and processes for coordinating Third
Agency documents; include other agencies in discussions; do
not drop documents into the black hole of other agencies'
FOIA offices without this advance discussion.

* Maintain written, up-to-date, project-specific
declassification guidelines. This is no small task. A
"declassification guide" must be flexible; no guide can
anticipate all the issues which will arise in a review.
After six years, we were still revising the JFK guidelines
in the last month of the project.

* In establishing deadlines, allow sufficient time to do
a thorough, professional job as required by the project
activities (see Unrealistic Deadlines above).

* Ensure we have adequate support people for routine
processing tasks; declassification involves both tough
substantive analysis--and a lot of routine processing.

* If possible, inventory/index all materials before the
review and processing begins. Experienced indexers are a
must. Identification of duplicate documents should be a key
part of any inventory or index.

III The Requests

(being drafted)

Attachment I. (incomplete draft attached]

Description of the JFK Collection

Attachment II. (being drafted]

[statistical summary of collection including size and status
of documents (RIFS, SANS, DIFS, NBR, etc.)]
L

13-00000
CIA SPECIAL CYLIERCITONS
RECFOLL
2000

DRAFT

12 December, 1998

Memo for the Record

Subject: JFK Records Review Project and Lessons Learned

The CIA's JFK Collection is made up primarily of
records pulled together for the Warren Commission, House
Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) and the
Assassinations Records Review Board (ARRB). It contains a
significant amount of duplication and non-JFK related
material. The current index is flawed and contains gaps.
Release standards were liberal; basically only source
identities and information, names of agents, employees under
cover, Agency locations and foreign liaison activities were
redacted. There is no evidence in the Collection to indicate
that the Warren Commission conclusions were wrong.

I. Background (1992-1995)

The setting up of the Historical Review Program by DCI
Gates in early 1992 coincided with growing interest in
Congress to require federal agencies to declassify records
related to the assassination of President Kennedy. DCI Gates
decided to start declassification process before Congress
passed legislation:

* testified before Congress on 12 May 1992 about CIA`S
new openness policy and announced the declassification
of the first folder of Oswald's 201 (also known as the
pre-assassination file).

* six boxes of the Oswald's 201 were reviewed and
transferred to NARA by Oct. 1992.

The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection
Act of 1992 (JFK Act) was signed 26 October 1992:

* it called for Presidential-appointed Assassination
Records Review Board composed of non-government
individuals;

* established "a presumption of immediate disclosure"
for records relating to the assassination.

For first two years of its existence, the Historical
Review Program focused primarily on the review of JFK
assassination records:
:

13-00000
1

* there were two major releases of Agency records (August
1993 and August 1994) of approximately 227,000 pages;

* joint HRG/DO teams reviewed additional assassination
related collections at National Archives (Warren
Commission), the SSCI (Church Committee and the Ford
Presidential Library (Rockefellow Commission) plus
numerous referrals from other federal agencies (FBI,
State, Army, etc.).

Due to delays in the appointment of its members and the
time required to hire and clear a staff, the ARRB did not
actually begin reviewing documents until May 1995. It became
clear in immediately that the ARRB would require the release
of far more information than the Agency had released in the
1992-94 review. In mid-1995 HRG began a re-review of the
previously released sanitized documents:

* approximately 80% of the 227, 000 pages release in
1993-94 contained deletions

* resources were taken from other projects and added
to JFK project to meet Board's monthly deadlines.

II. The JFK Act and the ARRB

Mandated review and declassification projects can be
two-edged swords. The JFK Act forced the Agency to review
records that should have been opened years ago. The legal
requirement to presume release, backed up by an independent
review, resulted in the opening of documents that clearly
would not have been released under other programs. However,
the Act and the Review Board created by the Act imposed un-
realistic deadlines, inflexible standards and procedures
which created a major drain on all Agency review resources
and had an over-all negative effect on the Agency's release
program.

For
Unrealistic Deadlines: The release dates set by the
Act did not take into account the start-up time and costs
(searches, inventorying and indexing) of a project of this
magnitude, nor the time it would then take for a page-by-
page review and sanitization of classified documents.
example, initial indexing of the collection was done on a
crash basis using overtime employees and resulted in a
flawed database. The revising, re-indexing and updating of
that database took several thousand man-hours and continues
today.

Mandated Procedures: NARA's and ARRB's interpretation
of the law created a time-consuming, labor-intensive review
process that meant an inordinate amount of time was spent by
:

13-00000
1

both the Agency and Board staff on issues which were
marginal to the story and to processing decisions by the
Board. For example:

a. Under the JFK Act every piece of paper in the
collection was considered a "unique" assassination record.
The result is a staggering amount of chaff and duplication.
For example, one cable was files and processed 58 times in
the collection.

b. The ARRB required that all sanitized documents be
reviewed by the Board and that each postponement (deletion)
be acted on individually. Even after the Board changed
procedures and accepted staff recommendations instead of
reviewing each document, the detailed tracking, recording
and coding of every deletion within each document required
processing resources well beyond what would be considered
reasonable for such a project. A most sanitized documents
contained multiple deletions (one contained more than 1600
deletions and many over 100).

Inflexible Standards: The level of evidence required
by the Board to postpone what was generally considered
protectable information was extremely high and usually
required documentation of "current harm". Defenses based on
general principles such as official cover or sources and
methods were not acceptable. This required the Agency to
dedicate significant resources to prepare evidence to
support recommended postponements. Again, much time was
spent on issues that were marginal to the JFK story.
example, several major evidence packages involving several
offices and presentations by senior agency officers and
officials were needed to secure Board agreement to protect
Agency physical locations and names of employees and other
persons not related to the JFK story.

For

Three times during the six years of the project, including
most of this past year, the JFK review effectively shut down
all other aspects of the Historical Review Program and had
to borrow additional resources from other offices and review
projects to meet deadlines. The JFK review will continue to
require a significant portion of HRP's resources through
FY99.

III. The Process and Lessons Learned

There are a number of basic lessons from the JFK review
that are applicable to other historical/systematic review
projects:

* We need reviewers with broad Agency experience, which
can be either managerial or substantive.
:

13-00000
* We need to establish early on what information is
already in the public domain and address the issue of
“official release" in the context of each project.

* Develop a strategy/policy with the IROs concerning the
release of information. Be smart about it; do not accept
stonewalling by them on relevant information that can be
released. At the same time, avoid confrontations with them
on marginal or non-relevant information.

* On-site Directorate reviewers are the most effective
way to handle the internal coordination requirements of a
large project. Without the DO's JFK team on site it would
have been impossible to complete the JFK project.

* Develop guidelines and processes for coordinating Third
Agency documents; include other agencies in discussions; do
not drop documents into the black hole of other agencies'
FOIA offices without this advance discussion.

* Maintain written, up-to-date, project-specific
declassification guidelines. This is no small task. A
"declassification guide" must be flexible; no guide can
anticipate all the issues which will arise in a review.
After six years, we were still revising the JFK guidelines
in the last month of the project.

* In establishing deadlines, allow sufficient time to do
a thorough, professional job as required by the project
activities (see Unrealistic Deadlines above).
:
* Ensure we have adequate support people for routine
processing tasks; declassification involves both tough
substantive analysis--and a lot of routine processing.

* If possible, inventory/index all materials before the
review and processing begins. Experienced indexers are a
must. Identification of duplicate documents should be a key
part of any inventory or index.

IV ARRB Requests for Additional Information and Records

Attachment I. (see attached draft)
Description of the JFK Collection

Attachment II. (being drafted-will be available 17 Dec a.m.]
[statistical summary of collection including size and status
of documents (RIFS, SANS, DIFS, NBR, etc.)]

13-00000
9:irg-hrp
"reg.doc"

DRAFT:
Section I, ARRB Requests for Additional
Information and Records

1. Unlike most declassification projects, the Agency's
involvement in the JFK Project was governed by the dictates
of a Federal statute, the JFK Act, and the powers it vested
in the Board it established
the Assassination Records
Review Board (ARRB). In particular, under Section 7, the
Act armed the ARRB with the authority to dig for records and
information, specifically:

...(1) The Review Board shall have the authority
to act in a manner prescribed under this Act, in-
cluding authority to
:

* * *

(C)(ii) direct a Government office to make
available to the Review Board, and if necessary
investigate the facts surrounding, additional
information, records, or testimony from
individuals, which the Review Board has reason
to believe is required to fulfill its functions
and responsibilities;

* * *

(F) hold hearings, administer oaths, and subpoena
witnesses and documents.

This substantial authority provided the "ARRB and its staff
with almost unlimited access to Agency records and
personnel. It also was the basis for a number of specific
requests from the Board to the Agency for additional
information, document searches and explanatory papers. HRP
designated this ARRB activity, "Special Requests." During
its existence the ARRB sent to the Agency fifty-three
special requests, CIA 1-16 and CIA-IR 1-37.

2. Categories of Requests:

13-00000

