
Another matter mentioned by Mr. Bundy was his belief that the morale of the intelligence community as a whole stands to suffer in the absence of a carefully done review and report which is being expected from the Board.

With regard to the interim report which the Board has under way, Mr. Bundy informed the Chairman that the report could be delivered to him or it could be presented to the President directly, and Mr. Bundy thought it important that the Board present it to the President in person. One further matter discussed was the Board's concern about any intelligence let-down in the wake of the Cuba crisis, it being Mr. Bundy's belief that no such let-down is in prospect if present directives and discussions on the subject have any effect in Government.

(At the conclusion of the Chairman's account of his discussion with Mr. Bundy, the Board recessed for lunch.)

At 2:30 p.m., the Board was briefed on the world situation by Mr. Thomas Lawlor, senior intelligence officer in CIA's Office of Current Intelligence (Mr. Ray Cline, Deputy DCI/Intelligence was on vacation leave and not available to be present at this Board meeting). Mr. Lawlor explained that his own responsibilities included the handling of current intelligence matters, the selection and write-up of current intelligence items (e.g., in the CIB and in memoranda for the White House), and the preparation of internal intelligence notes for use at the CIA working level. Mr. Lawlor pointed out that his duties were in the areas of analysis and production, not the collection, of intelligence. His briefing of the Board included the following subject matters:

USSR/Chicom relations: Recriminations between the USSR and Communist China are the greatest in the history of their dispute, and an open break in party relations is most likely near.

USSR/Cuba: The USSR is presently reappraising its foreign policy positions in the light of the Cuba crisis aftermath.

USSR/Berlin: The USSR is at a diplomatic standstill in Berlin and this is traceable to the USSR/Chicom rift.

20
The Chairman asked the DCI whether the MONGOOSE activity presented any particular intelligence problem in the Cuba situation. Mr. McCone said what it had not. He said that in the MONGOOSE activity the Special Group and the Attorney General had given a great deal of consideration to the need for intelligence collection with respect to Cuba, but the intelligence needed was primarily for covert action rather than other purposes. Nevertheless, the MONGOOSE activity contributed to the over-all intelligence collection effort on Cuba. Mr. McCone recalled that there was a hiatus in the collection of intelligence on Cuba, after the Bay of Pigs invasion, and when he took office in November 1961 Mr. McCone was surprised to learn that no interrogation of Cuban refugees was taking place. Thereafter, following discussions with the President and the Attorney General they got the refugee interrogations underway.

Mr. Murphy wondered why there had been a let-down in intelligence gathering after the Bay of Pigs incident. Mr. McCone said that this took place before his time, but he assumed that the reasons had to do with discouragement and other psychological factors. In response to Dr. Killian's question as to whether another intelligence let-down was in store in the wake of the Cuba crisis, Mr. McCone said that there was in fact a great danger of such a development following what some officials consider was an "intelligence victory" for the United States. Mr. McCone, noting that the Soviet SA-2's remain in Cuba, said he had brought this up forcefully a week ago at an NSC Executive Committee meeting, and the President had agreed to get word to the USSR that any interference with our aerial reconnaissance of Cuba would be considered as being most grave and Messrs. McCloy and Stevenson have passed this word to Kuznetsov. Mr. McCone added that while low-level reconnaissance flights have been suspended, should any ominous development occur, it will be necessary to obtain Presidential approval of the resumption of low-level flights.

Mr. Pace inquired as to whether there were any prohibitions on the conduct of intelligence operations with regard to Cuba. Mr. McCone said yes, it is desired to follow a more aggressive pattern of agent infiltration into Cuba. He would like to see a 3 or 4 month effort directed toward the obtaining of straight intelligence on Cuba (in lieu of political warfare, for example) to determine the trend of Soviet plans in Cuba. The DCI noted that the Soviets may quietly get out of Cuba, or they may in

21
fact take one step back and two steps forward, and hold on to the Cuba real estate as a propaganda and insurgency base, as a means of keeping Castro under control, or in order to retain a capability for quickest restoration of a Soviet offensive capability. The kind of concerted intelligence action which the DCI had in mind would include (1) penetration of the Castro government regime, (2) the placement of additional agent teams in Cuba, (3) the continuation of efforts to obtain the assistance of British, French and German representatives in Cuba, (4) the possible obtaining of useful intelligence from the attorney, Donovan, who is negotiating prisoner releases, and (5) possibly the obtaining of useful information from the captain of the "African Pilot who had a 3-hour talk with Castro and who yesterday asked to see a U. S. intelligence officer..

Mr. Pace asked whether Mr. McCone would favor the use of Guantanamo Naval Base as a base for launching intelligence and related operations against Cuba. Mr. McCone said that he would not be in favor of this because if we were caught using Guantanamo for intelligence operations Castro would obtain UN and other support for Cuba's demands for U. S. evacuation of the Naval Base.

Answering General Doolittle's question, the DCI stated that U-2 overflights of Cuba were going at the rate of two a day, resulting in coverage of all targets once a week and in coverage of some important targets (e.g., harbors) more often. Mr. McCone said that COMOR and USIB list the targets and that he then establishes flight schedules.

Going back to the subject of Guantanamo, Mr. Pace asked whether the DCI had made a study of the expected intelligence return that would be obtained if intelligence operations were conducted from the Base -- Mr. Pace adding that he thought such a study should be made before a final policy decision was reached. Mr. McCone said that he had not made such a study. He added that in August the "operators" in CIA had proposed to the MONGOOSE Group that Guantanamo Base be so used, but this was opposed at the policy level. Mr. McCone said that he would not be opposed to a restudy of the proposal at this time In answer to Dr. Killian's inquiry, Mr. McCone confirmed that we are conducting SIGINT Operations at Guantanamo, and Mr. Kirkpatrick noted that NSA had only recently added two more positions there

22
Mr. Murphy asked the DCI to state the meaning of MONGOOSE B PLUS". Mr. McCone explained that in the MONGOOSE Group it was originally conceived that Phase I would be one of gathering intelligence on the possibilities for the organization and supply of resistance groups within Cuba, but this effort was "only fairly successful" because Castro has some 100,000 informers in place in Cuba and exercises internal security controls through a system of ration cards, and therefore, CIA did not get as many teams into Cuba as had been hoped. On August 10, Phase II was reached with MONGOOSE planning for (a) violent actions (b) a relatively high level of actions, or "B-PLUS", and lesser actions, or "B MINUS". Mr. McCone said that he had not been prepared to endorse proposed "B PLUS" actions in the absence of plans for military backing, because of his own speculation that the U.S. would be faced with MRBMs in Cuba. In any case, the MONGOOSE effort became diverted by considerations of Soviet activities in Cuba, Mr. McCone stated.

In answer to a question from Mr. Murphy as to who chairs the MONGOOSE Group at this time, Mr. McCone said that he did not know whether Mr. Bundy or the Attorney General was now serving as Chairman.

With reference to the absence of photographic evidence of Soviet offensive missile deployment prior to October 14 photography, Mr. McCone said that if one locks at photography of Cuba obtained on September 5 it is possible to spot evidence of activity at the San Cristobal MRBM site, but this activity could have been that of agricultural workers and the evidence did not then point to missile activity. Dr. Killian noted the Board's concern that Soviet camouflage operations may be deceiving us. Mr. McCone expressed his own great concern that the Soviets are deceiving us by camouflage methods. Acknowledging that our intelligence estimates leave a certain margin for error, Mr. lic Cone noted that it is nevertheless impossible for us to say that we know all that is going on in the USSR with respect to missile activity. In response to Dr. Killian's comment that public discussions seem to indicate that U. S. missile capabilities are superior to those of the USSR, the DCI considered that any such conclusion is erroneous and dangerous and could lead to a complacency which might well result in curtailment of the U. S. missile program by an economy-minded Congress. Mr. McCone added that in his presentations to select Committees of the Congress he always expresses reservations concerning U.S. missile superiority

Dr. Killian wondered whether the President; the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress understand the danger of conclusions that "nothing is there because it can't be seen". Mr. Me Cone said that undoubtedly there is a tendency toward heavy dependence upon photographic intelligence
180-10110-10100
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date: 10/20/20

Agency Information
AGENCY: HSCA
RECORD NUMBER: 180-10110-10100
RECORD SERIES : SECURITY CLASSIFIED FILES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 125-JFK

Document Information
ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM:
TO:
TITLE:
DATE: 00/00/0000
PAGES: 1
SUBJECTS: OSWALD, LEE, POST-RUSSIAN PERIOD, TRAVEL, TRIP TO
MEXICO
DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: 1A
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 01/01/2003
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: Box 4.
v9.1
NW 50955 DocId:32263505 Page 1

Wich Danny get exact.
+
focumented visits
phonecalls: /
SCENARIO
Educa y Joys
gregand by Dan Hardwa
CHRONOLOGY OF OSWALD'S VISITS TO THE SOVIET AND CUBAN EMBASSIES.

September 26, 1963
Thursday
A man claiming to be Oswald vists the Cuban
Embassy between 10:00 A.M. and 2:00 P.M.
The visit probably occurs around one o'clock.
"Oswald" is discribed as 5'6" tall, blond hair,
sunken cheeks, very thin, aquiline nose, very
straight eyebrows, approximately 35 years old
and wearing a light blue Prince of Wales suit.
He was said to look very cold with a hard face
and a penetrating cunning way of looking at you.
"Oswald" was seeking an intransit visa to Cuba
on his way to Russia. He displayed documents
that showed his membership in the Fair Play
for Cuba Committee and the American Communist
Party. He was told that he would have to
first obtain a visa to Russia before he could
be issued an intransit visa. He is also told
that he should return to the Cuban Embassy
with his passport and a copy of a photograph
in order to fill out the visa application.

September 27, 1963
Friday

Circa 10:30 Α.Μ.
"Oswald" calls the Soviet Military Attache (SMA)
Teltry with whom he speaks in Spanish. He tells the
SMA that he is looking for a visa to Odessa.
The SMA tells him to call the Consulate. "Oswald"
asks for directions to the Embassy and recieves
them.

10:37 Α.Μ.
"Oswald" calls the Soviet Consulate and asks to
Teltop speak to the Consul in Spanish. He is told that
the Consul is not in. He is told that he can
call back at 11:30. "Oswald" says that he is
looking for a visa to Odessa.

circa 11:30 Α.Μ.
"Oswald" goes to the Russian Embassy where he
Tel log at once again exhibits the documents he has already
shown the Cubans as well as other documents such
as his and Marina's marriage license. "Oswald"
discusses his situation with someone at the
Embassy and comes away with the understanding
that everything would be expeditiously handled.

circa 12:15 Ρ.Μ.
Someone from the Soviet Embassy calls Azcue
w/C here whom he is aware of because of what "Oswald"
Azque has told him, and tells him that they have to
get authorization from Moscow to grant him a
visa and that it will probably take four months.

circa 12:45 Α.Μ.
"Oswald" returns to the Cuban Embassy with the
NW 50955 DocId: DocId: 32263505 Page 2

Page Two.

9/27/63
12:45 (cont'd)
photo and completes the visa application,
e stating that he would like to leave in three
days. He asks Azcue about how long it will
Arque take to get the visa. Azcue explains his
DUNAN misconception to him, an argument results and
5:00 Sivasey Azcue throws Oswald out. Duran feels sympathetic
w/C. to Oswald, gives him her address, and promises
to help in any way she can. She feels that
Oswald should have been granted the visa with
no problems and that Azcue's actions are wrong.

1:25 Ρ.Μ.
Oswald calls the Soviet Consulate in an attempt
to find out what has gone wrong with the arraing-
ment he thought he had. In Spanish, he asks for
the Consul. He is told that the Consul is out
and that he can be contacted between four and
five on Mondays and Fridays. This call may have
been from Duran's phone. If it was he then told
her that he could get hold of the Soviet he had
his deal with and would she be kind enough to
talk to him. She said that she would and to
come back at four o'clock. If the call was not
made then Oswald got this message to Silvia and
the same arraingments for Silvia's four o'clock
call were made.

4:05 Ρ.Μ.
Silvia Duran calls the Soviet Embassy. She
tells them the American citizen, the one who
wants a visa to Cuba in transit to Russia, is
-4 there. She asks who he talked to at the Soviet
Telitop Embassy when she sent him there to get a Soviet
visa so he could get an intransit visa to Cuba.
She tells the official she is speaking with that
the man seeking the visa wants to know with whom
he spoke because he had been assured that there
would be no problem. The man at the Soviet
Embassy puts another man on the phone and Silvia
goes through it again. He tells her that her
call will be returned..

4:26 Ρ.Μ.
A Soviet Official returns Silvia's call. The
TelTgs situation is explained to Silvia. She realizes
that she cannot give him a visa because of the
delay on the Soviet end and the fact that he
does not know anyone in Cuba. What does Silvia
tell Oswald who is still setting there waiting?
In light of subsequent events it was probably
something that would keep his hopes up.

Night
Oswald goes to a party at Rubin Duran's with
Silvia and two American friends. This may have
been, more likely was, the night of the 26th.
He is seen by Elena Garro de Paz. He spends the
night with Silvia.
NW. 50955 DocId: 32263505 Page 3

Page Three.

September 28, 1963
Saturday

circa 11:00 Α.Μ.
Oswald is back at the Soviet Embassy bugging
them to expedite his visa. They send him back
to the Cuban Embassy to get an address.

11:51
Duran calls the Soviet Consulate and puts Oswald.
He tells them that he is returning
6 to the Soviet Embassy with the address.
d on the phone.

circa 12:00
Oswald returns to the Soviet Embassy and is
assured that a telegram will be sent and that
it will be handled as quickly as possible.

afternoon
Oswald decides that he needs more help and
tracks down a revolutionary, pro-Castro Cuban
group on the campus of the University of Mexico.
Maybe he hopes that he can find someone who
will say they know him in Cuba. In any case,
he seeks some sort of assistance from these
Pro-Castroites. He spends the night with them.

September 29, 1963
Sunday Morning
Oswald spends the day with the Pro-Castro group.

Sunday Afternoon/
evening and night
?

September 30, 1963
? Note: the association with the Cuban group
could have been anytime between the afternoon.
of 9/28 and the afternoon of 9/30. Contreras
said that he met Oswald in the afternoon and
spent the rest of the day, that night and part
of the next day with him.

October 1, 1963
10:31 Α.Μ.
Oswald calls the Soviet Military Attache
inquiring about a telegram. He is refered
Tueday to the Consulate..

10:45 Α.Μ.
Oswald calls the consulate with the same inquiry
and learns that the telegram has been sent but
f no reply has been received. He is discouraged.
Obyedkov hangs up on him.

later or earlier
Oswald calls the man with whom he had made his
"arrangement" and discusses the assistance that
was promised him. He is dangled and the man

later or on the 2nd.
Oswald leaves Mexico.
Wednesday
==End of OCR for page 4==

On or about
9/30/63
Mondens

10/1/63
this may have happened
MCS recieves a transcript in which Silvia
Duran discusses an American and his prob-
lem with a Soviet Counsel. Win Scott
writes "Can we identify?" on transcript........
Goodpasture notifies Flick that an Ameri
can is apparently trying to get a visa
and that the COS would like to ID, The
Cuban and Soviet monitors are asked to
notify Flick of any conversation involving
an american, or in English. etc, HOWEVER.

Flick is notified by a monitor that there
is an English conversation on the Soviet
tap. Flick listens and hears the man
ID himself as Oswald. He pulls the tape
and marks it "urgent" and notifies
Goodpasture that they have an ID on
an American. The tape is delivered to
Tarasoff for immediate transcription.
It is recieved late this day or early on
the second by Goodpasture. Disposition
of tape unknown, could "urgent" tapes
have been routinely retained for longer
period? Goodpasture now has ID but does
not know for sure that it is the one that
Scott has asked about. The guy in the
9/27 conversation sounds real interesting
but there is nothing in this conversation, OR,
that clearly connects. She discusses
reporting it with Manell. There is some
disagreement over whose responsiblity it
is to report. Either decesion is made, or
conflict continues until photos is checked.

Goodpasture ties in 9/28
Soviet conversation re:
address.

10/7/63 Photos from 10/1, 10/2, 10/3, 10/4 (?)
are recieved in base from Soviet Embassy.

10/8/63 B. Manell drafts report cable. Goodpasture
adds paragraph 2.

10/10/63 (in interim: Goodpasture tries to ID
MMM photo? how?) HQ response recieved.
Descriptions don't match. Controversy in
station on whether Oswald's same. 9/2749/28
DAFINATELY
conversation tied in to LHO during this
week. by similarity of SULTANTIVE CONTENT
OF CADIZ AND CONVERSATION ATUD VOICE
COMPARISON.

10/16/63 Oswald "P" file opened.

10/18/63 by this time photo of MMM recieved at
Station. Goodpasture picks up on it.
This MMM photo one from Cubemb on 10/15.
NW 50955 DocId:32263505 Page 5

10/21/63
10/15 MMM shown to penetration agents
by this time. What response? MCS
cables HQ asking for a photo of LHO.
For what purpose? Was it just to compare
to surveillance photos? Were they planning
on showing to penatration agents? why?
note: quite a few people say interest.
level was high--so what actions werė
taken?
NW 50955 DocId: 32263505 Page 6

COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
24 August 1978
011042
HSCA Interview of David Atlee Phillips at HSCA offices, 8/23/78, 1:20 to
4:35 P.M., by Dan Hardway, Charles Berk, and Gaeton Fonzi.

Mr. Phillips was reminded that the CIA omnibus release letter still
1
applied to our discussions and that he should feel free to answer our
questions in spite of any secrecy oath that he may have executed during
his employment with the CIA, He was asked if he remembered and under
stood the letter and if he wanted to review the letter again, Mr. Phillips
stated that he remembered the letter and did not think it necessary to
see the letter again,

リ
1
Mr. Phillips was asked about his activities in Mexico that related
to his job as Chief of Covert Action in the Mexico City Station from
1961 to 1963, Mr. Phillips was asked how many persons were in his
propoganda shop in Mexico City, He said that it was manned only by
himself, a case officer under his direction and a secretary. He later
added that there was also one other case officer under his direction who
worked under deep cover outside of the Embassy. Mr. Phillips stated that
from 1961 to 1963 he ran only about 6 or 7 operations or projects. He
added that there would have also been many "ad hoc" actions. Under
questioning, he stated that it is possible that he was responsible for
as many as 14 to 17 ongoing operations and 3 to 6 developmental stage
operations. Most of these operations were directed at the Cuban target
and "the great percentage of them had an anti-Cuban or anti-Soviet bias."

Mr. Phillips was asked about the handling of agents, He stated that
he himself handled "very very few agents, "Usually I met with someone
who was working deep cover and they in turn would handle several agents."
Mr. Phillips did recall handling one agent personally, a radio-TV
broadcaster. He also said that he would often meet with other agents even
NW 50955 DocId:32263505 Page 7
:5
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE

Phillips, page 2.
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
1.?
though he was not handling them on a day to day basis, He stated that at
all times he had at least one deep cover officer working outside of the
Embassy and that, sometimes, he had two such officers,

Mr. Phillips stated that he did have access, and did use in some of
his propoganda activities, agents who were located outside of Mexico,

Mr. Phillips also stated that he did use a few assets that he had developed
prior to his transfer to Mexico City; he specifically recalled a man
named SAYAS who had been a newspaperman in Cuba and went to workin
Mexico City. He said that while he had been a propoganda officer for
the JMARC operation he had used assets that he had developed during his
prior tour of duty in Hayana, Mr, Phillips said that such assets were
usually handled by him personally during the Bay of Pigs,
:
7
Mr. Phillips stated that during the Bay of Pigs operation he
travelled to Miami "fairly frequently; every 6 weeks, 3 weeks, 5 weeks."
He stated that responsibility for propoganda operations were divided
between him and his subordinate in Miami, William Kent, When asked to
explain that division Mr. Phillips stated:
Kent reported to my shop in Washington, He had day to day
contact with the groups we were supporting down there, the
student group and the doctors or whatever, and the people
involved in Radio Swan,

Phillips stated that Radio Swan was run out of Miami, through the
mechanism of the Gibralter Steamship Company, He did say that he was
in contact with the agent who ran Radio Swan, He said that he felt uncom-
fortable naming thần agent and suggested we ask the Agency for his identity,
D
Mr. Phillips stated that when he traveled to Miami he often went
"
to see the people he knew from Hayana, including those he was running
as agents himself,
.:
He would also, on occassion meet with agents whom
NW 50955 DocId:32263505 Page 8
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE

Phillips, page 3.
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
Bill Kent was running "if Bill Kent got to the point where he felt he
would like a little weight," Sometimes he went down to Miami on a
"trouble shooting" mission, as when problems developed with a commercial
radio station the Agency was funding,
1
:
Mr. Phillips stated that he had had no recent contact with Mr.
Kent relating to anything being done by this Committee, He did state
that, approximately a month ago when Mr. Kent retired from the CIA, he
received a call from Mr, Kent, He said that Mr. Kent said that he was
setting up an executive employment agency and had asked for Mr. Phillips
help in finding jobs for former employees of the agency as well as
referring people for specific skilled jobs, They did not discuss the
HSCA at all, 1 according to Phillips,
1.
Mr. Phillips stated that it would be accurate to state
that there were two "sets" of propoganda activities during
the Bay of Pigs; one that was run out of the Miami offices
coordinated by Bill Kent and a second set that he personnally
ran without coordinating with Mr. Kent. Most of Mr. Phillips
prior established assets were in the second set of propoganda
operations.

Mr. Phillips said that even after he became Chief of
Cuban Operations in Mexico City he still worked very closely
with the propoganda shop, and his successor as head of that
shop, James Flannery, in propoganda operations.
Mr. Phillips said that his "Cuban shop" covered the
activities of the Cuban Embassy and that a special group
covered the airport. He said that a good deal of time was
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
NW 50955 DocId:32263505 Page 9

Phillips, page 4.
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
spent looking for opportunities to recruit Cubans who came to
Mexico City. The shop also ran a debriefing center for Cubans
who left Cuba by way of Mexico. He also said that one of the
primary activities of the Cuban shop would have been to identi-
fy the DGI officers in the Cuban Embassy and their functions,
duties and assignments whenever possible. Mr. Phillips said
that he was still involved in propaganda activities at this
time specifically recalling a Mexican broadcaster whose radio
station could be heard in Cuba. Mr. Phillips pointed out that
he had been a close friend of Mr. Flannery's and that Mr.
Flannery was made Chief of Covert Action in Mexico on his,
Phillip's, recommendation.

Mr. Phillips' said that he had "quite good" relations
with Win Scott and that he reported directly to him as opposed
to reporting through the Deputy Chief of Station which would
have been the routine manner. Mr. Phillips stated that he thought
that Robert Shaw had been in charge of the Cuban photographic
surveillance operations and that they had two penetration
agents in the Cuban Embassy. He stated that he could not
remember the names of the penetration agents and was not sure
of the cryptonyms.

Mr. Phillips was asked why his name came up so infrequently
in a review of Agency documents of this period from Mexico
City. He said that his name should appear on any "formal
project" he had going, but that he "did like to delegate work."
He said that his name must be on many papers.
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
1
DocId:32263505 Page 10

COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
Phillips, page 5.

Mr. Phillips said that there was a CI responsibility in the
Cuban shop. "You always watch out for it, but there was no
formal program." He said, however, that "I never really under-
stood what CI was." Phillips said that there were some CIA
officers who made counter-intelligence their primary concern
during their entire careers but that he was not one of them.

He described the CI effectiveness of the Mexico City Station
as "average" and its Cuban section as "less than average."

Mr. Phillips stated that he was aware of the existence
of the Special Affairs Staff in Washington that dealt with
Cuban matters. He was also aware that the SAS had its own
counter-intelligence section. He recalled meeting the Chief
of that section, Hal SWENSON, on a trip to Washington. He
normal
also said that it would have been routine for Mr. Swenson to
have traveled to Mexico City on "routine trips" or special
cases. He said that he had probably seen Swenson in Mexico
but that he did not recall any specific meetings.

Mr. Phillips recalled that the Legat office of the U.S.
Embassy in Mexico was large; that it had 11 to 20 officers
assigned to it. He said that there was a close relationship
between the Agency station and the Legat office. He said
what?
that the Legat got "drop copies" of most reports. He said that
it would have been routine to advise the Legat of "interesting
cases" and that an American reporting to a foreign embassy
would have been such a case. He said that a local dissemination
would have definately been routine and that this liaison
NW 50955 DocId:32263505 Page 11
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE

COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
Phillips, page 6
relationship would have been at least partially responsible
for reporting such a visit to Headquarters.

Mr. Phillips was queried about whether, in such a case,
it would have been routine for the Agency station to take any
action other than just reporting the information that had come
to its attention. Mr. Phillips said that it could have happened
in certain circumstances, such as if the contact looked as if
he had recruitment potential or was a serious security case.
In those instances it was possible that other actions would
be taken. Mr. Phillips remembers one such instance specifically
and pointed out that it is related in his book, Nightwatch,
on pp. 126-128. This is a story of an American military
officer who offered to spy for the Cubans and an operation
mounted against him by the Agency in Mexico. In response to
a direct question Mr. Phillips acknowledged that the Station
other than just reporting
could, and often did, take actions/in regard to Americans in
Mexico that were in contact with Soviet or Bloc Embassies
without a specific request from another interested agency; i.e.,
they often took investigative and operational action on their
own initiative. Mr. Phillips said that the reason that the
Station could do this was Mr. Scott's ranking (informal) in
the agency. Mr. Phillips illustrated this point by saying
that when Mr. Scott returned to Washington to report he did
not go to the Chief of Western Hemisphere Division but directly
to either the DCI or DDP. He pointed out that Scott had been
a division chief himself prior to his assignment as Chief of
Station in Mexico.
NW 50955 DocId:32263505 Page 12
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE

COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
Phillips, page 7.

Mr. Phillips was asked if the CIA shared assets and
informants with the FBI in Mexico. He said that he did not
know of any such cases but there was coordination and liaison
with the Bureau on the surveillance operations.
have
Mr.
Mr. Phillips acknowledged that one additional area in
which the Station and the FBI shared an interest was the
colony of American expatriates in Mexico. He said that he
was not sure of who had the responsibility for that area in
the Station but that it may of been Ms. Ann Goodpasture.
Phillips stated that he was not aware of any Agency liaison
in Mexico City with either Army or Navy regarding counter-
intelligence or counter-espionage cases. He said that he had
never heard of any arguments that may have occured concerning
whose responsibility it was to report Oswald's initial contact
with the Soviet Embassy or about the extensiveness of the
Station's reporting after the assassination.

Mr. Phillips does remember Viola June COBB. "Blonde,
flew an airplane, track record for hitting a lot of beds in
Cuba, had a twin sister involved in aviation. That's what
comes to mind." He vaguely remembers messages or reports
from or about her coming out of his Cuban shop but he believes
that she was run out of Washington or Miami as an asset and
that someone from one of those two places would have regularly
come to Mexico to run her.

Mr. Phillips stated that he did not recall an officer
with a hair lip or who spoke with a lisp.
NW 50955 DocId: 32263505 Page 13
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE

COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
Phillips, page 8.

Phillips stated that he did not know if Ms. Cobb was also
an informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Phillips stated that he recalls three or four members of
the Warren Commission staff coming to Mexico. He said that
he may have chatted with them informally but he had no formal
dealings with them. He said that they spent most of their
time with Mr. Scott.

Mr. Phillips said that he first heard the name of Silvia
Duran about the time he arrived in Mexico, as soon as he started
reading the telephone tap transcripts. "Her name appeared time
and time again." He added: "We had no interest in her. She
wasn't friendly with anyone." Mr. Phillips had previously
mentioned, in his discussion of the Cuban shop's interest in
recruiting agents, the name of Ambassador Lachuga and their
interest in pitching him. Mr. Phillips was shown Slawson's
memo concerning his trip to Mexico where Scott told him that
the CIA had a substantial prior interest in Duran because of
her affair with Lắchuga. Phillips seemed surprised and said
"No one let me in on this operation." Mr. Phillips said that
it is possible that the Agency pitched Duran. "At one time
we pitched almost everyone at the Cuban Embassy. She must
have been considered." Mr. Phillips said that it was possible
that she was not pitched because the station could not identify
any of her weaknesses. At this point Mr. Phillips was told
about the LITAMEL/9 reports on Duran that said that all that
1
NW 50955 DocId:32263505 Page 14
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE

Phillips, page 9.
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
all that would have to be done to recruit her was get a blonde,
blue eyed American in bed with the little "puta." Mr. Phillips
admitted that it sounded like she had at least been targeted
and that the station's interest was substantial and that the
weakness and means had been identified. He pointed out,
however, that targeting does not necessarily mean that she
had been pitched, or, even if she was pitched, that she had
accepted the pitch. Mr. Phillips said that he was not aware
that a pitch had been made.

Phillips stated that Ms. Duran's 201 file should be
"very thick". He stated that a thin 201 file prior to the
assassination "would be very surprising". He said that a
name trace should come up with at least a lot of 3x5 cards
that predate the assassination.

Mr. Phillips stated that he saw Lachuga only three times
after he left Cuba: once on an airplane from Miami--"we just
nodded"--; once at the inauguration of Mexican President
Diaz Ordaz; and once when he was having lunch at a fancy
resturant near the American Embassy in Mexico. On the last
encounter Phillips said that he knew Lắchuga was going to
be there and that he had specifically gone there to talk to
him. He said that Lachuga turned off all the advances he made.

Phillips was asked why the Agency had sent a cable to
Mexico after Ms. Duran's arrest saying "don't allow any
Americans to have contact with her."
(paraphrase). He
said: "Don't know. I can't tell you why they did that. I
can't guess why." He said that he was not aware that the
NW 50955 DocId:32263505
Page 15
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE

Phillips, page 10.
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
Warren Commission staffers who were in Mexico wanted to talk
to Duran. He said that he knew Clarence BOONSTRA well, that
the last he heard he was in North Florida, but that he had
never discussed the assassination or Oswald with him.

Mr. Phillips said that he vaguely remembered that Win
Scott did have a safe in his office. He guessed that Scott
and his secretary would have been the only people who had
access to that saff. He said that Scott had had several
secretaries over a period and that he only remembers the first
name of one of them: Dottie. He said that he had no idea of
what Scott kept in his safe.
personallyy
He said that when he was chief
of station in the Dominican Republic, Brazil and Venezuela,
he kept really "very sensitive" material in his safe in his
office. He assumes that the same would have been true of Mr.
Scott. Phillips offered the example that someone would call
and say that someone at the Embassy was a prostitute, he would
note that for the record in keep it in the private safe. He
guessed that the material in the safe would have been material
Scott generated himself. He said that memos of meetings with
the Mexican president in which sensitive topics were discussed
would have been a likely candidate for retention in Scott's
safe. He said that he does not know what happened to Scott's
safe after he died but that he has heard a vague story that
someone went out and found a lot of documents that Scott had
kept.

Mr. Phillips stated that he thought that the Chief of
NW 50955 DocId:32263505 Page 16
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE

Phillips, page 11.
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
the DGI in Mexico was a man named "LUNA."

Mr. Phillips was asked about the story in his book con-
cerning the DGI officer with the penchant for antique jewelry
that appears at page 133. He said that he does not remember the
name of that person, but says he took some literary license
because he doesn't specifically recall if the person was, in
fact, a DGI officer. "Thank God my next book is fiction,"
he said.

Phillips was asked about the following DGI officers:
Orestes Guillermo Ruiz Perez--"vaguely familiar";
Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez--"Yes, familiar.";
Manual Vega--could have been Chief of DGI;
Luisa Caldern--"familiar";
Teresa Proenza--"definitely familiar";
Alfredo Mirabal--"familiar";
Eusebio Azcue--the consul, "to my knowledge he was not Cuban
intelligence."

Mr. Phillips was asked if Proenza was a CIA asset. He
said "The name is familiar but I don't recall the context."
He also could not remember if Luisa Calderon had been an asset..
He said: "I don't really remember the true names of the agents.
I never saw them or dealt with them." He stated that he could
not remember whether the Agency had ever pitched Ruiz but that
"there were several attempts to pitch intelligence types."

Mr. Phillips was shown Carlos Blanco's report of 28 June
1963. He stated that he had probably seen it previously but
does not remember it specifically. He said that the name
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
NW 50955 DocId:32263505
Page 17

Phillips, page 12.
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
Carlos Blanco had probably been made up for the purposes of
this one report. He said that he recalled the name of Luisa
Calderon a bit better after reading the document. He said
that she may have been the asset who worked in the Embassy
for the Agency but he still could not be certain because he
could not recall the true names. He said that he did not
know if there would have been a "further report" and that, if
there was, it would not have necessarily been sent to Head-
quarters unless it had been of special interest.

Mr. Phillips was then shown the dispatch concerning
Luisa's sister. (CIA # 3715.) He said that he does not know
whether she was ever identified, contacted or used. He said
that he had never heard of a "domestic exploitation section"
and pointed out that the words were not capitalized.

Mr. Phillips stated that he did know Mr. Barney Hidalgo.
He does not recall him ever being in Mexico but said that it
was possible that Mr. Hidalgo could have been there and that
he would not have known about it. He said that he had on
occassion worked with Mr. Hidalgo. He said that Hidalgo did
not have any executive talents, but he was involved in a lot
of operations. He said that Hidalgo had some problems: "I
don't want to say he was crazy, but I was always uncomfortable
around him." Mr. Phillips also recognized the cryptonym
AMMUG/1.

Mr. Phillips was shown CIA #3's 3665 and 3662 which are
reports from AMMUG that the Cubans believed that Calderon had
been recruited by the CIA and had, therefore, called her back
NW 50955 DocId:32263505 Page 18
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE

Phillips, page 13.
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
to Cuba. Mr. Phillips said that that did not help him recall
that much about Calderon other than to make him think that
she was not a CIA agent "because she went back to Cuba."

Mr. Phillips stated that he was not aware that after the
assassination that Thomas Mann expressed a great deal of interest
in the Mexico City investigation. He also said that he did not
know why Mann would have been pressing for the arrest and
questioning of Luisa Calderon. He said that, in fact, he had
never known or heard that such was the case.

call.
Mr. Phillips was shown the transcript of the Calderon
(CIA 3717.) He said "I've seen this document before...
He
when we were reviewing things after the assassination."
was asked what the Mexico Station had done to follow up on
that conversation. He said that he could not recall that any-
thing was done other than forwarding the conversation to Head-
quarters. He said that he did not know what Headquarters had
done with it. He said that he could not remember being tasked
or his shop being tasked, with anything concerning this lead.
He said that he did not know if this conversation was given
to the WC by HQ but acknowledged that it was not shown to the
staff members who visited Mexico. He does not recall any specific
follow up regarding Calderon. He does not know why Calderon
was not arrested.

The section of Carlos Blanco's report concerning Teresa
Proenza was pointed out to Phillips. He said that he thought
the report may have been written by a person used by the station
that thought that everyone was a communist. He said this may
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
NW 50955 DocId:32263505 Page 19

Phillips, page 14.
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
have been LIHUFF/1. He said that the document did not help
his memory that much and that "I don't know of any reason why
she would be termed dangerous."

(CIA # 3714.). Mr. Phillips
Phillips was shown the LITAMEL/9 contact report regarding
the firing of2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date: 10/19/20

Agency Information

AGENCY: HSCA
RECORD NUMBER: 180-10131-10324

RECORD SERIES : SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY 

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 014724

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: HSCA
FROM: NOSENKO, YURI
TO:
TITLE: TESTIMONY OF YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO

DATE: 06/20/1978
PAGES: 141

SUBJECTS: CIA, METHODOLOGY
KGB, FILES
KGB, METHODOLOGY
MCMILLAN, PRISCILLA JOHNSON
SOLIE, BRUCE
NOSENKO, YURI, TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE
OSWALD, LEE, RUSSIAN PERIOD
OSWALD, LEE, RUSSIAN PERIOD, DEFECTION TO RUSSIA
MEXICO CITY

DOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret
RESTRICTIONS: Consulted
CURRENT STATUS: Withhold
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 08/21/1993

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS: Folder 2 of 2. Box 4

v9.1
NW 50955 DocId: 32277209 Page 1

2 TESTIMONY OF:
3 YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO -- Resumed
PAGE
2
5
6
7
8
10 EXHIBITS
11 JFK F-2
Marked Received
10
12 JFK F-3 11
13 JFK F-4 18
14 JFK F-5 24
15 JFK F-6 32
16 JFK F-7 49
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
NW 50955 DocId:32277209 Page 2

THOMAS,'srs
retype smnp
EXECUTIVE SESSION
1
2
3 Tuesday, June 20, 197876
4
5 U.S. House of Representatives,
6 Select Committee on Assassinations
7 Subcommittee on the Assassination
8 of John F. Kennedy
9 Washington, D. C.
10 The Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 6:20 o'clock
11 p.m., in Room 1-D, Headquarters, Central Intelligence Agency,
12 Langley, Virginia, the Honorable Louis Stokes (Chairman of
13 the Committee) presiding.
14 Present: Representatives Stokes, Preyer, Burke, Fithian,
15 Devine and Sawyer.
16 Also present: G. R. Blakey, G. Cornwell, M. Goldsmith,
17 R. Morrison, E. Berning, M. Jackson, J. Smith, K. Klein and
18 S. Brady.
19
20 The Chairman. The Committee will come to order.
21 At this time the Committee will resume its sitting. We
22 jare still in executive session by virtue of the resolution
13 adopted by the Committee this past evening.
24 At this time the Chair will recognize Mr. Blakey.
25 Mr. Blakey. Off the record.
NW 50955 DocId: 32277209 Page 3

1 (Discussion off the record.)
2 The Chairman. Anything further?
3 Bring the witness in.
4 Let the record reflect that the Committee has resumed its
5 sitting and at this time the witness, Yuri Nosenko, is back
6 before the Committee once again.
7 Mr. Nosenko, I admonish you that you are still under the
8 oath that you took last night.
9 TESTIMONY OF YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO -- Resumed
10 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.
11 The Chairman. And at this time, then, the Committee will
12 recognize the counsel for the Committee, Mr. Klein.
13 Mr. Klein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
14 Good evening.
15 Mr. Nosenko. Good evening, sir.
16 Mr. Klein. You told us that after the assassination
17 you had an opportunity to be present when Oswald's file was
18 brought from Minsk, is that right?
19 Mr. Nosenko. Absolutely right.
20 Mr. Klein. Did you have an opportunity to read the entire
21 file at that time?
22 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.
23 Mr. Klein. How much of the file did you read?
24 Mr. Nosenko. It was simply looking, page by page, first
25 part of the first volume.
NW 50955 DocId: 32277209 Page 4

1 Mr. Klein. You went through the first part of the first
2 volume, page by page?
3 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.
4 Mr. Klein. Did you go through any of the other volumes?
5 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.
6 Mr. Klein. You told us that an officer named Matveev
7 took the file away to prepare a summary?
8 Mr. Nosenko. Right.
9 Mr. Klein. Do you know who wrote that summary?
10 Mr. Nosenko. The summary was written by the First
11 Department of the Second Chief Directorate.
12 Mr. Klein. Do you know who, in particular?
13 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, I do not know.
14 Mr. Klein. And did you ever have an opportunity to read
15 the summary that the First Department prepared?
16 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir; I didn't see it.
17 Mr. Klein. The Russian word "spravka", does that mean
18 Mr. Nosenko. Is summary, right.
19 Mr. Klein. And why were you not able to read the summary
20 that they wrote?
21 Mr. Nosenko. Well, the file was taken in the First
22 Department. I was working in the Seventh Department.
23 Mr. Klein. Did you make any attempt to read it?
24 Mr. Nosenko. No.
25 Mr. Klein. Was it at all unusual that with all your
NW 50955 DocId: 32277209 Page 5

1 involvement in the case you did not have an opportunity to
2 read that file?
3 Mr. Nosenko. It was the decision of the Chief of the
4 Second Chief Directorate, given big importance to this question,
5 that a resume will be prepared by the most prestigious depart-
6 ment, American Department, and that is why we couldn't even ask.
7 Mr. Klein. You didn't even ask to see it?
8 Mr. Nosenko. No.
9 Mr. Klein. So it was not unusual that you were not
10 allowed to see it?
11 Mr. Nosenko. No, it was not unusual.
12 Mr. Klein. You have testified before this Committee that
13 the KGB did not allow Lee Harvey Oswald to defect because he
14 was uninteresting. You have testified the KGB did not even speak
15 to Lee Harvey Oswald because he was uninteresting; and that you
15 decided he was not interesting without speaking to him.
17 Do you know what year Lee Harvey Oswald came to the Soviet
18 Union?
19 Mr. Nosenko. 1959.
20 Mr. Klein. In 1959, approximately how many Americans
21 wanted to defect to the Soviet Union or requested permission to
22 defect?
23 Mr. Nosenko. There was a defectionist, I remember, one
24 of the employees, one of the workers, who was helping to or-
25 ganize the American Exhibition in Moscow, Mr. Webster.
NW 50955 DocId: 32277209 Page 6

1 Mr. Klein. Without giving particular names, how many
2 Americans would you say asked permission to defect in 1959?
3 What would the number be?
4 Mr. Nosenko. These two were known to me -- Oswald and
5 Webster.
6 Mr. Klein. From 1955 to 1960, what would be your best
7 estimate as to how many Americans asked permission to defect
8 to the Soviet Union?
9 Mr. Nosenko. As far as I heard, there I think was one
10 only.
11 Mr. Klein. One other, meaning three altogether.
12 Mr. Nosenko. One besides Oswald and Webster, what I
13 know.
14 Mr. Klein. Three?
15 Mr. Nosenko. T hree.
16 Mr. Klein. Of the three, was Oswald the only one turned
17 down because he was uninteresting?
18 Mr. Nosenko. Right.
19 Mr. Klein. Do you know any other defector who was ever
20 turned down because he was uninteresting?
21 Mr. Nosenko. No.
22 Allow me to tell, as you have seen, and you told yourselves,
23 how many Americans are defected. It is a very rare occasion and
24 KGB prefers defection when they are planning, they want, these
25 types of defectors, they like and invite those people who can
NW 50955 DocId:32277209 Page 7

1 give them certain information which is valuable.
2 Mr. Klein. Do you recall telling this Committee yesterday
3 that up until 1960 the Seventh Department was recruiting
4 left and right?
5 Mr. Nosenko. Absolutely right.
6 Mr. Klein. And that you recruited a woman in Utah who was --
7 Mr. Nosenko. I simply had given example of this recruit-
8 ment which took place up to 1960. When Seventh Department was
9 recruitng and giving files to the Intelligence Service, First
10 Chief Directorate, not asking them before, is it person will
11 be for them valuable or not.
12 Mr. Klein. And that KGB officers were getting bonus
13 and promotions when they induced people to recruit?
14 Mr. Nosenko. Right.
15 Mr. Klein. And despite that, Lee Harvey Oswald, when
16 he asked to defect, you turned him down without even speaking to
17 him, to find out if he had any information; is that right?
18 Mr. Nosenko. Sir, we had quite a few recruitments in 159,
19 a very big amount of them in '59 -- very interesting, much,
20 much more interesting -- professors and teachers -- and
21 even was a Co-op from CIA -- we had quite a few recruitments
22 and Oswald was nothing on this base, on this foundation.
23 Mr. Klein. Would the KGB have any interest in an
24 American student?
25 Mr. Nosenko. As I told you yesterday, KGB interested in
NW 50955 DocId: 32277209 Page 8

1 students, but particularly those students who are studying
2 the Russian language, Russian history, Russian economy.
3 Mr. Klein. And would they have any interest in an
4 American who had strong anti-American views and who was a
5 professed Marxist? Would they have any interest in that
6 kind of person?
7 Mr. Nosenko. Here were are coming to a very interesting
8 and sensitive question. From mid-1950, by the order of
9 Central Committee Communist Party, Soviet Union, KGB was
10 prohibited to make any approachment and recruitment of
11 members of the Communist Party of the West.
12 Mr. Klein. I am not asking about a member of the
13 Communist Party.
14 Mr. Nosenko. Your question is, and if he is some type
15 of Marxist here, the question maybe he is possibly a member
16 of Communist Party, and to check it for KGB very difficult
17 if he is a member of Communist Party or not of his country.
18 Mr. Klein. Would they ask him if he is a member of
19 the Communist Party?
20 Would they check it?
21 Mr. Nosenko. No, they would not ask him.
22 Mr. Klein. They wouldn't ask him?
23 Mr. Nosenko. No.
24 Mr. Klein. Would the Soviet Union be interested in
25 someone who was in the military and worked with radar equipment?
NW 50955 DocId:32277209 Page 9

1 Mr. Nosenko. It depends. If he was corporal, private,
2 is no big interest. If he was officer, maybe they would be
3 interested.
4 Mr. Klein. The fact that he worked with the equipment
5 wouldn't be enough; they would want to know what his rank was?
6 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir; it is not enough because they
7 had sources.
8 Mr. Klein. And in 1959 would the Soviet Union have been
9 interested in someone who served as a radar operator on an air
10 base where U-2s took off and landed?
11 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir; it would be very interested.
12 Mr. Klein. It is your testimony that Lee Harvey Oswald,
13 who was a student, who was a professed Marxist, who had --
14 Mr. Nosenio. Students? I never heard that he was a
15 student.
16 Mr. Klein. -- who had been a radar operator and had
17 worked on a base from which U-2 airplanes took off and
18 landed, that he wasn't even interesting enough for the KGB
19 to speak to him, to find out if he knew any of this information?
20 Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Klein, I understand your position,
21 but we didn't know that he had any connection with U-2 at all.
22 flights. That is one thing.
23 And if you, Mr. Klein, are basing on what was written by
24 Mr. Epstein in the book, it is a little bit from the air
25 taken ideas. Mr. Epstein even telling that how important
NW 50955 DocId:32277209 Page 10

1 for KGB to know about such base -- that base. We knew it
2 in '50's when I worked in GRU at the Navy, in 1950, '51, '52.
3 We knew every base and in Japan, at this Atsugi Base, and we
4 knew what kind of airplanes had been. We didn't know about
5 U-2, no. Sure, it is very interesting, but when Oswald
6 applied, requested to stay in the Soviet Union, we didn't know
7 a word about his knowledge, anything concerning U-2 flights.
8 Mr. Klein. And you didn't ask him if he had any kind of
9 information about that when he wanted to defect, is that
10 correct?
11 Mr. Nosenko. No.
12 Mr. Klein. And you told us that one reason that no one
13 was working on Oswald was because all of your people were
14 concentrating on the American Exhibition in 1959, is that
15 correct?
16 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir. Not only American Exhibition,
17 there were other tourists and among them were interesting
13 targets, very interesting targets.
19 Mr. Klein. You told us yesterday that things didn't
20 Mr. Nosenko. I can explain you why, because an American
21 Exhibition in Moscow was by the information which KGB had,
22 I don't know how much it's right, how much it's wrong, but it
23 was suspected quite a number of people from American intelli-
24 gence community who were working on American Exhibition in
25 Moscow, and when the work is going on against such targets,
NW 50955 DocId:32277209 Page 11

1 it is not one officer, it is a big amount of people involved
2 on each case, because it is very serious target.
3 Mr. Klein. Do you know what date Lee Harvey Oswald
4 came to the Soviet Union?
5 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, I do not.
6 Mr.Klein. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that this
7 document be marked for identification and shown to the witness.
8 The Chairman. Without objection.
9 (The document referred to was
10 marked as JFK Exhibit No. F-2
11 for identification.)
12 Mr. Klein. Looking at this document
13 Mr. Nosenko. Right.
14 The Chairman. Did counsel want to identify for the
15 record how the document has been marked?
16 The Clerk. JFK-F-2.
17 Mr. Klein. Looking at this document, does it say on the
18 top "Visa and Registration Office, Interior Department,
19 Executive Committee of the Moscow City Council"?
20 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.
21 Mr. Klein. Do you recognize that type of document?
22 Mr. Nosenko. Yes. It is from Department of giving Visas
23 and Registrations, which is working under auspices of Directorate
24 of Internal Affairs of Moswcow.City.?
25 Mr. Klein. And does this appear to be an authentic
NW 50955 DocId:32277209 Page 12

1 document, an authentic copy of the document?
2 Mr. Nosenko. Sure.
3 Mr. Klein. Looking at Number 8, does it say what
4 date Lee Harvey Oswald came to the Soviet Union for the first
5 time?
6 Mr. Nosenko. October, 1959.
7 Mr. Klein. October what?
8 Mr. Nosenko. October 16, 1959.
9 Mr. Klein. I would ask that this document be marked for
10 identification, Mr. Chairman.
11 The Chairman. Without objection.
12 Would the clerk indicate for the record?
13 The Clerk. JFK-F-3, Mr. Chairman.
14 (The document referred to was
15 marked as JFK Exhibit No. F-3
16 for identification.)
17 Mr. Klein. Looking at the newspaper article clipping, on
18 the right hand side, with the heading "U.S. Fair in Soviet
19 Jammed at Close," do you see that?
20 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.
21 Mr. Klein. And what is the date of that story?
22 Mr. Nosenko. The date is September 4.
23 Mr. Klein. Are you aware of the fact that the American
24 Exhibition ended on September 4, more than a month before
25 Oswald came to the Soviet Union?
NW 50955 DocId:32277209 Page 13

1 Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Klein, I would like you to ask when
2 Americans who were working for this Exhibition left Moscow..
3 Mr. Klein. I will ask you another question.
4 Yesterday, when I asked you if things got back to
5 normal once the fair ended, did you say yes?
6 Mr. Nosenko. No, till they were leave the Soviet
7 Union. No. They are the same targets. Okay, you are right,
8 it is closed September 4th, but does it change the importance
9 of these people against whom KGB was working? They were
10 still in Moscow.
11 Mr. Klein. Do you recall yesterday my asking you, did
12 things in your department get back to normale once the fair
13 ended, and do you recall saying yes?
14 Mr. Nosenko. Well, I meaning fair ended when left all
15 the people involved in work on American Exhibition, Americans
16 when they left, and they were staying quite a long time
17 after it was closed. It was closed for visits for Soviet
18 citizens, but it took quite a time for them to leave.
19 Mr. Klein. You also testified yesterday that Lee Harvey
20 Oswald was allowed to stay in the Soviet Union after he said
21 that he was going to kill himself if they sent him home.
22 You told us that he slashed his wrists and two psychiatrists
23 examined him and both found him mentally unstable.
24 Mr. Nosenko. Right.
23 Mr. Klein. What was the point of having the two
NW 50955 DocId: 32277209 Page 14

1 psychiatrists examine him?
2 Mr. Nosenko. I think simply to be assured that it was
3 right found decision, concerning this person. Two independent.
4 Mr. Klein. After they examined him, the decision was
5 made to let him stay; is that correct?
6 Mr. Nosenko. It is not because of the examination
7 he was allowed to stay, Mr. Klein. You are a little bit mixing
8 things. He was allowed to stay because KGB and Soviet Govern+
9 ment had come to the conclusion if this person will kill
10 himself it will bereaction in newspapers, which can in any way
11 hurt the starting, the warming of Soviet-American relations.
12 Mr. Klein. The Soviets were worried he would kill himself
13 in the Soviet Union?
14 Mr. Nosenko. Right, if they would not allow him to
15 stay.
16 Mr. Klein. Could the KGB have taken him and put him on
17 the next plane out of Russia and thereby ended their whole
18 problem with Lee Harvey Oswald?
19 Mr. Nosenko. It is a very sensitive question. He can
20 jump out of car. If he decided, if he is mentally unstable,
21 you don't know what he will do.
22 Mr. Klein. Do you think the KGB didn't do that because
23 they were worried he might jump out of the car or do something
24 like that?
25 Mr. Nosenko. Simply a mentally unstable person, they
NW 50955 DocId:32277209 Page 15

1 didn't want to go it on any such action.
2 Mr. Klein. They would rather keep him in the Soviet
3 Union?
4 Mr. Nosenko. No, they would rather prefer they washed
5 their hands, Mr. Klein; they are not making decision, KGB.
6 In Soviet Union decisions are made by the Central Committee
7 of the Communist Party, and General Secretary and Politburo,
8 not by KGB. KGB a servant of the Politburo and Central Commit-
9 tee Communist Party.
10 Mr. Klein.. Going by the facts as you have told them
11 to this Committee --
12 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.
13 Mr. Klein. why wasn't he put on a plane and sent
14 back to America?
15 Mr. Nosenko. KGB washed their hands. Then from Intourist
16 it was given information Ministry of Foreign Trade; Ministry
17 of Foreign Trade reported to the Soviet Government. As I said,
18 I assumed the Chairman was surely asked; he told his opinion
19 of the KGB, and up to the Soviet Government how they would
20 decide.
21 Mr. Klein. Could he have been brought to the U.S.
22 Embassy and told them he is an American, "You take care of
23 him; we don't want him"?
24 Mr. Nosenko. It can be done, sure. It can be done, but
25 it wasn't done.
NW 50955 DocId:32277209 Page 16

1 Mr. Klein. Instead they elected to allow him to stay
2 indefinitely in the Soviet Union and they have to worry about
3 him every single day, what an unstable American would do, is
4 that correct?
5 Mr. Nosenko. They didn't allow, KGB didn't allow. Soviet
6 government allowed.
7 Mr. Klein. The facts as you have testified to them are
8 that the KGB allowed this mentally unstable person to stay
9 in Russia, and they sent him to Minsk to live and work in a
10 radio factory. Then the KGB allowed this mentally unstable
11 individual to marry a Soviet woman, and then this mentally
12 unstable individual was allowed to join a hunting club where
13 he had access to a gun.
14 Can you think of any other cases in all the time you
15 worked in the KGB where a mentally unstable person was
16 treated in thiskind of manner?.
17 Mr. Nosenko. I told you I do not know any other cases
18 of mentally unstable, excluding one code clerk, American, was
19 also mentally ill; he was delivered in Soviet Union. I heard
20 it. I never have worked with him, I never have seen him.
21 And the thing is, I am sorry, but you are putting and stressing
22 a number of questioning, and it sounds so peculiar. What does
23 it mean, KGB allow him to marry?
24 Mr. Klein, in the Soviet Union there is by degree of
25 Presidium of Supreme Soviet U.S.S.R. a law allowing marriage of
NW 50955 DocId:32277209 Page 17

1 Soviet citizens with foreign. A foreigner can marry a Soviet
2 citizen, by the law. There is not a thing that KGB can in any
3 way try not to give, not to make it possible, but this is in
4 cases when the person who is marrying a foreigner worked in
5 some sensitive place, let's say, in missiles, rocket
6 industry production, was in process of any place of his work
7 ing seeing classified material. In these cases, KGB will try
8 to put different type of fences. But it is unlawful. In
9 accordance with Soviet law, marriage is allowed; he doesn't
10 need to ask permission of Soviet Government or anyone. And his
11 wife, Marina, wasn't working in any place which was sensitive
12 from the point of view of Soviet security.
13 Mentally unstable it doesn't mean that he is raving
14 mad; it is mentally unstable.
15 Mr. Klein. You testified that not only was Oswald not
16 spoken to when he first said he wanted to defect but even after
17 the decision was made to allow him to remain in the Soviet
18 Union, still nobody from the KGB spoke to him, is that correct?
19 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.
20 Mr. Klein. You also tetified to the extensive resources
21 that were devoted to put physical and technical surveillance
22 on Oswald. You told us the men involved, the time involved,
23 the facilities involved?
24 Mr. Nosenko. Right.
25 Mr. Klein. Do you find great contradiction
NW 50955 DocId:32277209 Page 18

1 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.
2 Mr. Klein. -- in the fact that, on the one hand, you
3 put all these resources into following Oswald around, trying to
4 see who he talked to and what he does and, on the other hand,
5 you don't even have a person go and talk to him and ask him,
6 "Tell us your background; tell us about yourself."
7 Is there any contradiction?
8 Mr. Nosenko. Even in the United States, yes, sure, for
9 you, for me just now American citizens, yes, sure, but there,
10 no.
11 Mr. Klein. They don't talk to people there?
12 Mr. Nosenko. They can talk and cannot to talk, but I
13 don't see contradiction there. Anyone, any foreigner who will
14 be staying, even if this defector not on his own, but, let's
15 say, KGB pushed him to stay, to defect, he still will be watched
16 and on him will be put this same type of work that was
17 put on Oswald, not less.
18 Mr. Klein. You talk about their society is different than
19 ours. Is it unusual that they allow an American to defect
20 and live there without ever questioning him, to ask him if he
21 is an intelligence agent?
22 Mr. Nosenko. On the contrary, no doubt, let's say he
23 was intelligence agent, what he will tell them that he was.
24 sent with mission as intelligence agent? Why to scare him?
25 Let him live how he wants. We will be watching him. He
NW 50955 DocId:32277209 Page 19

1 will show by his behavior, by his action.
2 Mr. Klein. They purposely don't speak to him; is that
3 your testimony?
4 Mr. Nosenko. In this case they didn't speak with him
5 because he didn't present interest for the KGB and because
6 he was mentally unstable.
7 Mr. Klein. You testified that you read the reports of
8 two psychiatrists who examined Lee Harvey Oswald at the
9 hospital after he cut his wrist, is that correct?
10 Mr. Nosenko. Right.
11 Mr. Klein. You said both found him mentally unstable?
12 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.
13 Mr. Klein. You told us in great detail how this
14 decision was made to have these psychiatrists examine him.
15 I would ask thaththis document be marked for
16 identification.
17 The Chairman. The clerk will identify for the record
18 the number appearing on the document.
19 The Clerk. It will be JFK-F-4.
20 (The document referred to was
21 marked as JFK Exhibit No. F-4
22 for identification. )
23 Mr. Klein. Have you ever seen that document before?
24 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir. I haven't seen it.
25 Mr. Klein. Were you aware that the Soviet Government
NW 50955 DocId: 32277209 Page 20

1 provided certain documents to the Warren Commission in 1964?
2 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir. I wasn't aware of this.
3 Mr. Klein. Looking at that document in front of you
4 Mr. Nosenko. Right.
5 Mr. Klein. is that a hospital record?
6 Mr. Nosenko. Oh, yes, sure. It is a hospital record.
7 Mr. Klein. And whose hospital record? Does it have a
8 name on it?
9 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir. It is from Botkin Hospital.
10 Mr. Klein. Whose name is it?
11 Mr. Nosenko. Lee Harvey Oswald.
12 Mr. Klein. Does it say what date he was admitted?
13 Mr. Nosenko. Discharged, admitted 23rd, discharged
14 28th.
15 Mr. Klein. What year is that?
16 Mr. Nosenko. October of 1959.
17 Mr. Klein. And does it have on the bottom the diagnosis
18 why he was in the hospital?
19 Mr. Nosenko. Incised wound of one-third of the left
20 forearm.
21 Mr. Klein. And that date, October of 1959, is that when
22 Oswald first came to the Soviet Union and cut his wrist?
23 Mr. Nosenko. I cannot tell you dates, sir. I do not
24 remember.
25 Mr. Klein. You have in front of you the other document
NW 50955 DocId:32277209 Page 21

1 which told - Number 8 what date he came to the Soviet Union.
2 Is that still there?
3 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir. This is admittance to the hos-
4 pital and dischargement.
5 Mr. Klein. Number 8?
6 Mr. Nosenko. Arrival, October 16.
7 Mr. Klein. And the date on the hospital admittance is
8 what date?
9 Mr. Nosenko. Twenty-third of October.
10 Mr. Klein. And would you turn to the hospital admittance
11 form, the one I just gave you, to the third page, please?
12 Mr. Nosenko. Yes.
13 Mr. Klein. And do you see where it says "History of
14 Present Illness"?
15 Mr. Nosenko. No, I don't see.
16 Mr. Klein. On the third page?
17 Mr. Nosenko. I have the third page.
18 Mr. Klein. It has Number 6 on the top of the page, but
19 it's the third page on the document.
20 Mr. Nosenko. Oh, Number 6, History of Present Illness.
21 Yes. Just a second.
22 Mr. Klein. Would you glance through that and would you
23 tell us if this is the hospital report from when Lee Harvey
24 Oswald cut his wrist and was taken to Botkin Hospital?
25 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.
NW 50955 DocId: 32277209 Page 22

1 Mr. Klein. Now, would you turn to the next to the last
2 page. It has a 13 on the right hand side.
3 Do you see that page?
4 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir..
5 Mr. Klein. The next to the last page.
6 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.
7 Mr. Klein. And do you see where it says, two-thirds
8 of the way to the bottom, "Psychiatric Department" underlined?
9 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.
10 Mr. Klein. Would you read what is said under that?
11 Mr. Nosenko. "His mind is clear; perception is correct;
12 no hallucination or deliriums. He answers the questions
13 legible and logically; he has a firm desire to remain in the
14 Soviet Union; no psychiatric symptoms were noted; the patient
15 is not dangerous for other people, his condition permits him
16 to stay in Psychiatric Department by an order of the Assistant
17 to the Chief Physicians, Dr. Kornika. The patient is
18 transferred to the Seventh Ward."
19 Mr. Klein. Is there anything in there to indicate he is
20 mentally unstable?
21 Mr. Nosenko. Here I do not see.
22 Mr. Klein. Does that report indicate that he was normal?
23 Mr. Nosenko. Here I do not see what I have seen. But
24 this you receive from the Soviet Government, and if you think
25 you received the true things, what was in file, you are wrong,
NW 50955 DocId: 3180-10143-10100
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

-2000
SECRET

meticulous files
memo to Legat at same
time as cable.

SET

10143-10100

Goldsmith
3
2
Notes re Hardway summary of am.c.
tapes, transcripts, & cables. - preassessination
SECRET
transcriptions generally are summaries
rather than verbatim.

not
2. previously translated materials are
in the materials that Hardway examined.
3. marginal notations are common.
4. Spanish transcripts are of poor
quality. - why would there even be
any Spanish Transcripts.

are missing.
that [intercept] activity
weekend.
5. transcripts for 9/5 & 9/16/63
Holmer' explanation is
two may have been shut down on
0002451

translated
6. 9/27/63
Shinich
transcription
1. M.D. seeking visa to Odessa
۶. Same person calls back at 10:37 4.m.
3. another call 1:25

CHO 4:05pm
4:16 pm
4. Duran to Soviet emb. - Conversation
Spanish w. LHO, who was then at
Cuban encl. apparent that CHO was talking at amb cord
Y. Sovemb→ Duran re LHO. (CHO
still at emb)
9/28/63.
Win South serige to il Copa andereted in 2000

applicable to 9/60
K. Duran Jovenib; CHO talks to S.O.
(CHO to join in camb

8. 10/1/63. apparent that who was talking at foramb
1. 10:31 am - possibly CHO calling women
for info re teley. from Wish.
re teley. - who used in reference
[Tor previously translated

ALW
نابل
9. 10/3/63
0002452
Call to
10. 10/1/65
10/3/18
DIR 72527

SECRET
Sou emb: re viva
[previously translated]

#6344 re Phillips
6374 Missing - again
re Phillips

11. Correct dates of phots 10/1 + 10/4 or 10/4+10/4.
10/8/63 cable 64TS MCS→ HQ
repts CHO visit.
abolition of routing slip on cable
10/10/63
BIR 74830 19 MCS re background on
wind LHO & instructed MCS - re LHO & persing
info to all agencies loudly...
10/13/63 DIR ihe continued
description.
13. What was Excommun w/
Comppt?

14 of Scottis vuggetion of a @ file on
CHO.

15.18. 10/10/63 - HQ dissemination to other agencies,
#54673 re CHO

16. 10/15/63 MLJ 6534 requesting pouched
photo of CHO
- No response to Lis cable.

Obthin
Mann
10/16/63 Scott meno to Som. re
17 LHO ; no mention of visar aspect.
The O file - all data re LHO
Obtain Sout Contacts file - is 1+2
Alisence of routing tips on some cable

0002453
LAISON
SECRET [unphrased?
Is
is this marginal notes
TP.T
LAINTING - transcript, etc/ time

[unilateral] operation
[demonstration] Agents.

first trans. t action (consult?)-

Post Ass'nu:
Nature of checks. -DIR 84886
Μεχί 7023 ECASURE/date correc
"nat recorded this date"
7024 - All info reported
[prior to 27th codis etc]
by [Liaison]
SECRET
IMPORTANCE
Bishop.
P.T.

SECRET
70.25- report of 9/28 +10/1
cano by A. Q.
0024048-Call [Mexican] pick-up
: af 9/28

:
when first realized photos!
~ LHO

7033 reports all calls.
2034 recheck of all photos,

0002455
I General.
A. duties
B. typical day.
II People
list
SECRET
←
III the survellance opsi

SECRET
2/14118
*
09892456 Briefing on 201's.
Bill Donley - former op off
Lee Coul]
Virginia Jones
basis for opening
a. operational interest
(access) (trace)
b. tracking
c. CIS (threat)

generally amassed material
in indexes brought together
into 201. - actual process
of opening only takes an
hr.on or so.
came in in
When MC report
10/9 there was a respon~
tere is there a document re
this trace?

opened by
A. case offiken.
-
Mick secenario - judgement
call by officer - there may
that be a 201 opened event
through a reliable source
suggest counter intelligence
that type problem.
most 201's are on people
who are being considered
for recruitment.

-2-
-
0002457
:
SECRET
MH ~ necessarily
but would go into an
20,1 open
index
Info would be disseminated.

There are criteria for opening
high lebel commies.
recruiters.
sually opened by operations
3 HANdbook

offices
TEABEarch
↓ zdays?
desk (decision)
HQ
There are yes y tramit
case the co iothe
desk officer.

the 201 is indigenous to DDO.
-Required for clearance.
PRQ part I -Réquisites 201
Part Ⅱ- extended as assesments,
detailed bkgrd analysis,
operational
bjections.
has no need for fan't Th
ميد
kept in 201.
MAINLY Age essentially correct?
IN FIELD. bifurcated files
ce between them.
Index check should lead to
bath.
201- true Name- PRQ It
reference to second.
σερεσετε file PRQ I

-3-
0002458
201 mar
mainly
nat to
of 2015.
SECRET
inly bio-try hand
operations
reason for opening
necessarily in it
~
out
would be a reference to a
cable or document.

201 signed chronologically
as the name comes in.
ywould have this picture ibt
he one could be goutten
required. would you right in
there should be a table of
contents list on a 201 &
computerized.

green list - winbolt subject
compiled as
a
unications
intelligence
signal/commun
may also
go from
"fig leaf" to fully integrated

ongsect files - Policy Coordi
Inpikom Desk - coordi
other agencies a project bile on desk if
seliores agen agency involvement

graphics file do obtain a
great pleal of photos of thin
of food things

SECRET
0002459 intelligence value
be determined might be photos of individus
of pagming nee

Graphics bile not in D.DO.,
in DDI

OCR-office of Central Reference.
Po Part of compartimentation system
refers to cases in top lilee.
opened buy one of top blee
crypt can't be assigned co

is then that is abitamatic
report folet off defection
aloreporting
54.7A form. /1896 form.
Classification: SECRET 1 of 9 pages

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)

INTERVIEW OF THOMAS CASASIN
AUGUST 17, 1978
AMERICAN EMBASSY/ PARIS, FRANCE

By Surell Brady

Casasin stated that he retired from the Central Intelligence Agency in 1973. At the time of the assassination of President Kennedy in November, 1963 he was stationed in Paris; he was working in the area of Soviet operations, but had no official cover. He arrived in Paris in September, 1962.

24 He stated that in September, 1960 he was assigned [defense cover] as Branch 6 Chief. He worked for two years in Section.

Casasin said that during his assignment in Paris he had not infrequent contact with the CIA station in Paris. He estimated that the contact occurred every two and a half weeks. The contact was made on the outside by telephoning a person with official cover. He said he never made written contact with the station.

Casasin explained that the function of Section 6 was operations in support of the Soviet Russia Division of the CIA. He said the work consisted of amassing information in support of the SR Division; he characterized that work as classical espoinage work against the USSR. He said it involved penetration for the purpose of espionag and included cartography, demography, sociology, and experts in the fields of science and political science. He stated that the section was in a "down" phase when he entered and that it consisted of only 20-25 persons.

Casasin worked in Japan from February 1955 to June 1960. He served as Chief of the Soviet Base of the North Asia Command. He said his unit was attached to the Far Eastern Command of the Armed Forces. He explained that his unit was one of four bases: Soviet, Japan, North Korea and Red China. Each of those geographical areas was a target. The Soviet base in which he worked was therefore targeted against the Soviet Union. He was assigned head of that base in 1955.

He said the operations out of the Soviet base included espionage. The covert operations consisted of psychological warfare and radio transmission to internal Soviet audiences. He said the espionage also included spying against Soviet naval and industrial targets in Soviet ports, using mainly Japanese operatives who had access to the ports.

Casasin said that his base had extremely limited work with the

Classification: SECRET RETURN TO CIA Background Use Only Do Not Reproduce Classified by derivation:

Classification: SECRET 2 of 9 pages

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)

military. He said it consisted primarily of briefing the military on items of mutual interest. He said the CIA had tried to work with clan- destine units of the military, including the Army (he said the Navy had no clandestine units), but it was the opinion of the CIA that the military had too low a degree of professionalism for the successful operation of clandestine projects. Casasin stated that during this time the military said it was actually running operations, but it was never confirmed by the CIA and they found no evidence of such military operations.

Casasin identified two military intelligence personnel in the area when he was stationed in Japan: Captain Perez, OSI, and John B. Stanley, Army head.

Casasin said, however, that the Navy did provide some operational support for his base. It consisted of providing [cover] for persons running operations against the Soviets.

Casasin said he cannot recall any specific information that the military was using American military personnel in any of its operations He said, however, that there was occasional rumors that an American serviceman was trafficking with suspected foreign subversives. He said the individual intelligence agencies would have handled any such cases. He stated that he never heard any concrete information of American contact with the Soviets.

Casasin could not recall the name of the Chief of the North Asia Command in 1955; he believed the man was a retired vice admiral and that his last name began with the letter "0." Harry Little succeeded that person in 1957.

Casasin said that most of his communications during that time from Japan went back to headquarters. He explained that the North Asia Com- mand at that time was tied up with the situation of Korea and Japan.

Casasin said that he does not know who had the oversight responsi- bility or authority for the U-2 program. He cited that as an example of how well compartmentalized their work was. He said he never learned who was in charge of the U-2 program out of Japan. He said that he assumed it was some type of paramilitary operation. He said the North Asia base ran no paramilitary operations and that most such smaller units usually did not.

Casasin said he does not recall any discussions concerning the possible use of American defectors to penetrate the Soviets. He said one reason for no interest in such use was probably that the First

Classification: SECRET Classified by derivation:

Classification: SECRET 3 of 9 pages

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)

Chief Directorate of the KGB would suspect any such American from the beginning as being CIA connected. He said the CIA at that point knew a lot about the KGB and its thinking because they had had experience with displaced persons from the communist bloc.

Casasin explained further that American intelligence interests were much more short range than the type of slow, long-range project of working an American defector into some sensitive or intelligence- productive position within the Soviet Union. He said that was simply not the American way of conducting intelligence and that that thinking precluded such programs.

Casasin said lessening of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union from such things as the Spirit of Camp David did allow some shallow penetration. This consisted primarily of using short-term tourists and foreigners on legitimate business within the Soviet Union. But he said these projects had no direct or obvious effects on our intelligence gathering against the Soviet Union.

I referred Casasin to CIA Document 435-173-A, which is a memo dated 25 November 1963 from Thomas B. Casasin to Walter P. Haltigan on Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald. Casasin says he does remember the memo. I asked him to explain the cover memo dated 12 December 1963 by Robert G. Lamprell to Chiefs of SR and WH re: GPFLOOR-Lee Harvey Oswald.

3 Casasin explained that Lamprell (whose real name was William Rober Sinclair he died of cancer a few years ago) was one of Casasin's contacts in Paris. He said that Lamprell was the Senior Officer in the Soviet Office in the Paris Station, and served as the second_in 3 command. Casasin said that Walter Haltigan (whose real name was James Flint was his normal contact in Paris. He surmised that his memo was sent out by Lamprell because Haltigan might not have been available He does not know the reason for the delay between the date of his memo, 25 November, and the transmission by Lamprell, 12 December.

Casasin said he recalls that he wrote the memo spontaneously when he heard a news cast about Oswald after the assassination. He recognized Oswald when he heard the news information that Oswald had lived in Minsk in the Soviet Union and had married a foreigner. He remembered those details from State Department information he had seen.

Casasin explained the cryptonym REDWOOD as clandestine operations; the Chief of the SR Division was responsible for that project. He explained that was separate from the REDCAP program, which was operation against Soviets outside of the USSR.

Casasin explained the relationship of the Counterintelligence

Classification: SECRET Classified by derivation:

Classification: SECRET 4 of 9 pages

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)

staff to other divisions. He said Counterintelligence had primary responsibility for staff review, but supposedly no command voice. However, they did have their own closely held operations. Counterin- telligence gave approval on every operation. Casasin said that it was possible or even probable that Counterintelligence ran operations in his geographical target.

Casasin said research was one of the functions of the 6 Branch. But he cannot recall research's exact mandate within the 6 Branch. He listed the branches besides 6 Branch: (1) Scandinavia; (2) Western Europe; (3) Middle East and Latin America; (4) ? ; (5) Far East; and the Inter-Branch.

Casasin said the the research unit of Branch 6 would get information from defectors about Soviet realities and details about Soviet life which could be used to assist persons working inside the Soviet Union. He said such defectors were normally pumped about personal life in the USSR. However, Casasin said he does not personally know of any defectors being used as a source in his brief time in the SR Division. He said the agency also benefitted from FBI debriefings of such defectors. In part this was due to the CIA's limited charter domestically in the United States. But the Contacts Division (00) did have a domestic mandate within the U.S. Casasin said he thought the American defector to Czechoslovakia, Fields, had been debriefed by the agency. Casasin said he believed the agency also got information on Americans in the Soviet Union from State Department information about visas or from the press.

Casasin said he cannot remember who served as Chief of the Section 6 research branch while he was there. He said the deputy chief was an older woman near the age of retirement. He said that Rudolf Balaban worked with him and is still at the agency; he could probably remember the names of the others in the section.

I asked when Casasin recalled the discussion took place which he refers to in his memo. He said it was the last days of his work with the section; he assumes it was the third or fourth week of July, 1962 when he left the section, so he believes the conversation about Oswald took place the first week of July, 1962.

Casasin said at the time he assumed Oswald had been sent out of the Soviet Union by the KGB, so he exercsied caution and did not attempt to debrief Oswald.

Casasin gave the following dates in an effort to pin down when the conversation took place. He said he left Japan on June 25, 1960 and

Classification: SECRET Classified by derivation:

Classification: SECRET 5 of 9 pages

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)

travelled through Europe on leave with his family until Spetember, 1960. He said therefore the conversation could not have taken place in the summer of 1960 as the memo states. He said he used the wrong year in the memo.

Casasin identified KUJUMP as the Operations Division. He said it had a contacts division for debriefing persons. He said the "suitable channels" for debriefing referred to in the memo were the Immi gration and Naturalization Service and the FBI. He said he believed he had received maybe one State Department dispatch on the returning American. He said the dispatch probably originated if Oswald had given up his passport at the Embassy in Moscow and had had to reapply to the embassy to be able to return to the United States. Casasin said he believes Oswald's contacts with the Embassy in Moscow were initiated by Oswald. Casasin said he only knew whatever appeared in the State Depart- ment dispatches about Oswald.

He said his statement in the memo that Oswald looked "odd" was the CIA's evaluation of Oswald. This was based on the fact that he was allowed to live in the Soviet Union and permitted to marry a Soviet citizen. Casasin said he believed some type of controlled intelligence station should approach Oswald; they would be able to contact and talk to him in a perfunctory manner for debriefing purposes.

Casasin said that during the period 1945-60 no more than 10 American defectors came to their attention from the State Department and the military.

Casasin identified the REDSKIN cryptonym as the legal travellers program. It involved using persons to give information about the Soviet Union who had a "very legitimate" presence in the Soviet Union, such as scientists, etc.

Casasin said the agency which conducted the debriefing of these people and defectors would write the information and pass it on. He believes therefore that if Oswald had been debriefed he would have seen the information in that form.

Casasin said he believes it is inconceivable that Oswald would have been any type of operative of the CIA. However, he also gave his opinion that the nature of KGB operations made it conceivable that Os- wald could have been a "lay-low" Soviet operative.

I asked about the CIA interest in Minsk which is reflected in Casasin's memo. Casasin said it was known that there were some type of special design plants in Minsk which were of interest to the CIA.

Classification: SECRET Classified by derivation:

Classification: SECRET 6 of 9 pages

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)

Casasin said that type of special design plant dealt with aviation, nuclear energy, bacterialogical warfare, etc. He said that he cannot remember specifically which type of plants were located in Minsk, but the city was of interest for that reason. Additionally, anyone in the area of those plants was of interest to the agency. Casasin said he is confident that Oswald was not working in any type of security faci- lity. He said even with the presence of the design plants, Minsk was not identified as a security or military priority area. Casasin said also that he believes they had some type of encyclopedic information at the agency on the radio factory in Minsk where Oswald worked. He said that kind of information was maintained in the Office of Research and Reporting. Casasin said he was not aware of a KGB facility in Minsk.

Casasin said the Legal Travellers Program was headed at the time of his memo by Alexander Sokaloff (phonetic) of the Soviet Russia Division. He said the program began pre-1960 with the lessening of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. He said Soka- loff had come out of the Soviet Union with his parents as a child. He explained that defectors such as Sokaloff were kept at arms length for security reasons by the agency.

The Legal Travellers Program operated in such a way that the agency contact was in touch with the traveller well before the pro- posed trip and would be informed as to which areas would be visited, what he would be doing in the country, etc. The agency contact would then be able to give the traveller the agency's "requirements" for information while he was abroad. Casasin said he was not involved in the program. He said he was opposed to it because it was too short- term to justify the investment of resources and the risk involved. He said he believes the travellers were told that their contacts were CIA, but he doesn't know for sure. He said cover may have been used by the contact.

I asked Casasin what the reference to the "Harvey Story" in the last line of his memo referred to. He said at first that it must have been some kind of cryptonym he was using at the time. He pondered a while. Then he said he would need some kind of prompting of his memory. He said he doubts that it would have been someone's true name.

Casasin said he has never been contacted by anybody, including the Warren Commission, about the memo.

He said that his interest in Oswald as expressed in the memo was just a lead. He said the fact of no follow-up on that lead was not unusual. He said Oswald's going to the Soviet Union was unusual, but that left him open to the possibility of KGB contact. He therefore

Classification: SECRET Classified by derivation:

Classification: SECRET 7 of 9 pages

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)

ultimately was of only marginal interest to the agency.

Casasin said it was normal to not make a check for a 201 file on a person like Oswald, meaning that it was not unusual that he did not check for Oswald's 201. He said this was epsecially not unusual since they had made the decision not to use Oswald. It's possible that a colleague of Casasin's might have checked, but Casasin said he doesn't recall any such check.

Casasin said his subordinates in the Branch 6 were, Balaban, a man named Richard, last name possibly [Wink] and [Charles Cox, who was the liaison with the Technical Supports Division (i.e., concealment devices). He said deputies in the branch were David Chachavadze (in 1960 for three or four months), A.T. Stewart (possibly Averill); Stewart stayed on in the branch and Casasin believe he could be of more help in remébering details about the branch; also, Becky Balaban, who is married to Rudolf Balaban.

Casasin said that the purpose of a 201 is to indicate that a request had been made for provisional operational approval. He said the file would indicate operational interest and would then refer one to the specific office with the interest in the individual. He said he doesn't know that actual criteria for opening 201's. He said also that after initial interest was shown in an individual by the opening of a 201, the number might remain with the individual without the persen actually being developed as an asset.

Casasin mentioned that agency people were assigned to the military base at Atsugi.

Casasin referred agin to the "Harvey Story" reference in his memo. He sated that "Whatever I meant by Harvey had nothing to do with him (Oswald)."

I showed Casasin the Personality (201) File Request form from Oswald's 201 file. He said he had never seen it before and did not know there actually existed a 201 file on Oswald. Referring to the source of the form, CI/SIG, Casasin said Ci stood for Counterintelligence. He said he thought SIG stood for Signal Intelligence, but he was not sure. He said that notation would mean that NSA or the military had picked up Oswald's name in some type of transmission. He asked if Oswald had access to any type of radio transmissions. He said he thought the 201 section of the Registry Office could answer questions about the notations on the form.

Referring to the "AG" notation in the Other Identification

Classification: SECRET Classified by derivation:

Classification: SECRET 8 of 9 pages

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)

block on the form, Casasin said he does not know what it stood for. I asked him if he understood why some of the notations were crossed out and new notations had been made; he said he could not explain that. He said he thought the Permanent Charge notation meant that the file would stay in the Office of Registry and that the file therefore had no operational significance. In this file he said he thought it would be routine to open a file on defectors such as Oswald, so it may have had some other office charge because of that. He said Branch 6 did not have an interest in the Oswald file.

I asked how he would have come across the State Department commu- nications on Oswald. He said the normal distribution of such State Department information would mean that the dispatches would be circu- lated for information and then routed back to registry where they would be kept on file as Third Agency documents. He said he believes from the dispatches he saw on Oswald that they were in a consecutive series as received from the State Department. He believes from the memo that he must have seen several such dispatches with information about Os- wald.

Casasin explained the operational interest various divisions within the agency might have in this way:

DDO

Foreign Counter- intelligence Psychological Political Paramilitary

Line Divisions

He said he believes the 201 Personality form in Oswald's file is passive and not operational and sees nothing to indicate operational interest. He said the above scheme means that only the line divisions would carry the operations, and he does not see any indication of such an interest on the form. The fact that only Counterintelligence is indicated on the form seems to preclude any operations.

Casasin talked further about suspicions about Oswald. He expressed the feeling the Oswald and Marina got their visas to leave the Soviet Union too easily. He expalined the "unusual behavior" of Oswald as being his defection: his reasons were unknown, he seemed disoriented, he married a Russian. Casasin said that while he does not believe Os- wald was sent back to the United States by the Soviets, he cannot pre- clude that possibility.

I asked if the Americans were able to follow Oswald's activities

Classification: SECRET Classified by derivation:

Classification: SECRET 9 of 9 pages

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)

while he was living in the Soviet Union. Casasin said he doesn't believe we were able to monitor him inside the USSR. He said it would have been too risky to run the chance of exposing any operatives inside the country.

I asked if Oswald's threat at the Embassy in Moscow to reveal military secrets to the Soviets wouldn't have made Oswald of more intelligence interest. Casasin said if he had revealed secrets he would have been of interest for security.

I asked Casasin if a memo would have existed from the time of the conversation referred to in his 1963 memo about interest in Oswald. He said he doesn't think so; he said it was not customary to write memos about such leads which were discussed and not follow up. He does not remember preparing any such memo.

Classification: Classified by derivation:
194-10012-10030 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

Date: 02/09/98
Page: 1

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10012-10030
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : AC643360W - PAGES 15-16

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : CIA
TO :
TITLE : CIA INFORMATION REPORT
DATE: 01/04/63
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS: PFUNTNER, JORDAN J.
UNDIMINISHED PRESTIGE OF FIDEL CASTRO IN LATIN AMERICA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/22/97
OPENING CRITERIA : COMPLETION OF REVIEW BY CIA.
COMMENTS : COORDINATION WITH CIA HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND
DETERMINED TO BE RELEASABLE, PER LTR DTD 23 SEP 97.

NW 68037 Docld:34517486 Page 1

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs.
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

COUNTRY CUBA/LATIN AMERICA
REPORT NO. TDCS-3/532,860
SUBJECT UNDIMINISHED PRESTIGE OF FIDEL CASTRO DATE DISTR. 4 JANUARY 1963
IN LATIN AMERICA

DATE OF-
INFO. DECEMBER 1962 PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
PLACE & REFERENCES IN
DATE ACO. ENGLAND, LONDON (3 JANUARY 1963) RD-W-2107 44195

APPRAISAL 3 FIELD REPORT NO. OEL-34,413
SOURCE THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
AN OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE FROM "A REGULAR SOURCE, QUOTING A
YUGOSLAV JOURNALIST WHO RECENTLY TOURED LATIN AMERICA."

1. FIDEL CASTRO HAS LOST LITTLE PRESTIGE AMONG HIS SUPPORTERS
IN LATIN AMERICA AS RESULT RECENT CRISIS. IN EYES OF HIS DISCIPLES,
THE UNITED STATES FAILED TO EXPLOIT AN OPPORTUNITY TO UNSEAT HIM,
AND CASTRO REMAINED IN POWER.

2. LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY
DIVIDED BETWEEN VIOLENT AND NON-VIOLENT FACTIONS. THIS CONTROVERSY
IS LIKELY TO RESULT IN INDIVIDUAL COMMUNIST PARTIES ADOPTING MORE
INDEPENDENT AND FELXIBLE POLICIES. THERE IS A GENERAL TREND AGAINST
POLICIES "DICTATED FROM OUTSIDE

PAR OBJECTION TO
HOTING
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT.
AS SANITIZED,

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS GROUP I
downgrading and

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC USIA OC I ONE OCR ORR O INS
STATE/DIR FBI EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
DA IN 4722 15

FORM 1K
5-62 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. 0000

USA050/8354

NW 68037 Docld:34517486 Page 2

CLASSIFICATION-DISSEMINATION CONTROLS IN 44195
TDCS-3/532,860
PAGE 2

3. BRITISH COMMENTS.

A. THE IMPRESSION DESCRIBED IN PARA 1 DOES NOT
AGREE ENTIRELY WITH INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES BUT IT IS
AN INTERESTING POINT OF VIEW. ToWHOM?! B

B. SOURCE SAYS THAT CUBAN EXILES IN VENEZUELA
ARE "DISILLUSIONED" OVER THE OUTCOME OF THE CUBAN CRISIS BUT
THAT THE DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL (DRE,
REVOLUTIONARY STUDENT DIRECTORATE) AND ALPHA 66 INTEND
TO CONTINUE PROMOTING SMALL-SCALE ATTACKS ON CUBA.

4.
FIELD DISSEM: STATE, CINCLANT, CINCARIB.
END OF MESSAGE

ACTION: ACS, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO: DCS OP
DA IN 4722

CLASSIFICATION-DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

0000

NW 68037 Docld:34517486 Page 3
197-10002-10190
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

Date : 05/20/97
Page : 1

AGENCY : USA
RECORD NUMBER : 197-10002-10190
RECORDS SERIES : HEADQUARTERS FILES, PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : CIA TDCS-3/566,305
DATE : 00/00/63
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS : WEST GERMANY: SOVIET MILITARY ALERT FOLLOWING KENNEDY
ASSASSINATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : / /
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS:

[R] ITEM IS RESTRICTED
NW 50955 DocId: 32281398 Page 1

ELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CODERET (SSR/LAST CERMANY/KASTERN ECHOP
SECRET
SLECT HIGHLIGHTS OF MILITARY WEEKLY
SUIDIARY NO. 48
DATE OF
DIFOL 20-26 NOVEMBER 1963
PLACE B
FO FOREIGN DISSEN
REPORT NO. TOCS-3/366,305
DATE DESTE
PRECEDEDICE
REFERENCES
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
2m 5/14/97
DATE ACO, GERMANY, MUNICH /29 NOVEMBER 1963/ IN TEXT.
APPRAISAL 3, EXCEPT WHERE OTHERWISE INDICATED/ FIELD REPORT NO. EGK-27396
SOURCE THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION SOURCE CRADNICS ARE DEFOUTIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
OFFICIAL TEST GERMAN SERVICE FROM INFORMANTS OF VARYING
RELIABILITY.

FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE GERMAN SERVICE MILITARY
WEEKLY SUMMARY NO 48/63, COVERING THE PERIOD OF 20-26 NOVEMBER 63.

1. DURING THE WEEK UNDER REVIEW, THERE WERE NO INDICATIONS
OF PREPARATION FOR ATTACK BY SOVIET BLOC FORCES.

2 PART A. GENERAL.

LAST WEEK'S EXERCISE AND TRAINING ACTIVITIES IN THE SOVIET BLOC
ARMED FORCES WERE NORMAL AND WERE THUS IN KEEPING WITH THE
GENERAL PACE OF TRAINING AT THIS TIME OF YEAR.

SOVIET AND SATELLITE FORCES REACTED TO THE ASSASSINATION OF
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, NOV 22ND, WITH PRE-
CAUTIONARY MEASURES OF A GENERAL NATURE WHICH MAY BE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
000
GROUP!
DR DIA AGWV/ACDI NAVY A10
:
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
DA IN 157472
SECRET

10-3/560,203
2
INTERPRETED AS A REACTION TO CORRESPONDING STAND-BY
MEASURES OF THE U.S. FORCES.
IT IS EXPECTED THAT IN THE PRESENT SITUATION SOVIET TACTICS
IN THE FIELD OF MILITARY POLICY WILL BE MARKED BY CAUTION.
3. PART B. ARMED FORCES.
A. USSR/EAST GERMAN.
1/ ON THE NIGHT OF 22/23 NOVEMBER, SPECIAL ALERT
MEASURES WERE ORDERED IN THE ORANIENBURG GARRISON FOR NVA
UNITS AND POSSIBLY ALSO FOR SOVIET ARMY UNITS_/SEVERAL BAF-31.
GERMAN COMMENT- THE MEASURE WAS PRESUMABLY TAKEN IN
CONNECTION WITH THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY. IT
APPARENTLY WAS CONFINED TO THE BERLIN AREA.
B. EAST GERMAN.
1/ SINCE MID-OCTOBER 1963, CONTROL POSTS /SO-CALLED
HINTERLANDPOSTEN/ HAVE BEEN STAGGERED IN DEPTHS OF UP TO
1 KILOMETER FROM THE INTERZONAL BORDER DURING WEEKEND NIGHTS.
/SEVERAL F-3/.
PART C. GROUND FORCES.
A. SOVIET.
1/ SUMMAP GERMAN COMMENT ON TRAINING OBPS/.
TRAINING AT LOCAL TRAINING GROUNDS AND NUMEROUS DRIVING
SCHOOLS IS INDICATIVE OF RECRUIT TRAINING. FROM 14 TO 10
MAER BLENENTS OF
GUARDS TANIR AMMY CONGESTED
Page

NW
1001 -1/168.203
EXERCISES, PRESUMABLY AT REGIMENTAL LEVEL, AT IML LETLLINGEA
HEIDE AND ALTENGRABOM TROOP TRAINING GROUNDS.
SINCE 24 NOVEMBER, THERE HAVE BEEN TENTATIVE INDICATIONS
OF ACTIVITY OUTSIDE GARRISONS OF ELEMENTS OF THE 34TH
ARTILLERY DIV. NO OBSERVATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE AS YET
INDICATIVE OF EXERCISES WITH FULL UNITS PARTICIPATING.
5. PART D. AIR FORCES. NO HIGHLIGHTS PROVIDED.
6. PART E. NAVY.
A. SOVIET.
1/ ON 25 NOVEMBER 1963, ONE F-CLASS SUBMARINE, WITHOUT
PT-NUMBER, PASSED NORTHWARD THROUGH THE GREAT BELT. /B-2/
7. PART F. LOGISTICS, AND PART G. PSYCHOLOGICAL
NO HIGHLIGHTS PROVIDED.
FIELD DISTRIBUTION: ARMY, AIR, NAVY, USEUCOM

END OF MESSAGE
ACTION ACCI, SAVY, AF, JCK, C30
IKO, DOSOP
1
DA IN 157472
CLASSIFICATION = DIESEMRAKON CONTROL
198-10004-10076 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System Date: 6/24/201
Identification Form

Agency Information
AGENCY: ARMY
RECORD NUMBER: 198-10004-10076

RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Information
ORIGINATOR: ARMY
FROM: JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.
TO:

TITLE:

DATE: 00/00/1963
PAGES: 123

SUBJECTS: EXAMINATION OF PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF POLICY AND
CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON CUBA
NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIONS ON CUBA
U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE CUBAN BRIGADE

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Secret
RESTRICTIONS: 1B; IC
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/24/1997

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS: Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 6. Indexed collection of CIA, DOD, DOS, and NSC reports.

JFK Assassination Records
Department of the Army EO 13526
Declassify Exclude Exempt
Authority
Refer To
Review Date 12/8/2015 By K. Emer

v9.i 2

NO. SUBJECT DATE
1 CIA Report No. CS DB-3/652, 924 17 Jan 63
(SECRET-NOFORN)

2 Memo fr McGeorge Bundy to NSC Exec Comm(C) 22 Jan 63
w/6 Incls: 1(S); 2(TS);3(S); 4(S); 5(S) and 6(S)

3 Drft Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj: US Policy 23 Jan 63
Towards Cuba (TOP SECRET) (in dupe)

4 Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj as above (TOP SECRET) 23 Jan 63

5 Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj as above, from 23 Jan 63
DoD Rep on ICCC (TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE)

6 DepSecDef ltr to Mr Vance, subj: US Policy Towards 23 Jan 63
Cuba, Cy 2 of 6, Control #559 (TOP SECRET) w/1
Incl, Coord of Cuban Affairs Memo for NSC Exec Comm,
Subj: US Policy Toward Cuba (TOP SECRET)

7 Dept of State Memo for Mr Bundy, subj: Papers for 24 Jan 63
NSC Exec Comm Mtg, 25 Jan. 63. (TOP SECRET)

8 National Security Actions on Cuba (Pending and Undtd
Closed) (TOP SECRET)

9 Memo to Mr Cottrell from Mr. Ford, subj: Examina- 4 Feb 63
tion of Principal Sources of Policy and Contingency
Planning on Cuba (TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE)

SECRET - SENSITIVE
February 4, 1963

: ARA - Hr. Cottrell
FRON : S/P - John W. Ford
Subject: Examination of Principal Sources of Policy
and Contingency Planning on Cuba

In accordance with your instructions, over the week-end
I have reviewed the main sources of policy on Cuba. The problem
as I define it as follows:

The Problem:

Prior to the establishment of the Interdepartmental Coordinat-
ing Committee of Cuban Affairs, much work bed been done on Cuba,
both in the policy and contingency fields. The purpose of the
current exercise is to review and identify the main sources of
such policy and contingency planning in an effort to determine
if any of the work previously done will be of value to the
officers of your committee as we go forward with implementation
of the newly stated Cuban policy and objectives.

Sources of Policy and Contingency Planning:

The principal sources of policy and contingency planning
which may or may not be of value to the work of your committee ere
as follows:

1. The National Security Action Hemorenda emenating
from the White House.

2. The Actions of the National Security Council.

3. The Eesia National Security Policy of the U.S.
(now avaiting final stages of formal elecrance
before presentation to National Security Council).

4. The Records

SECRET - - BENSITIVE
4. The Records of Action of the Executive Committee
of the National Security Council as they pertain
to Cuba.

5. The Reports of the Sub-Committees of EXCOM -
curing the Cuban Crisis.

6. The Resolutions of the Organization of American
States and the Punta del Este Conference.

7. Public Statements of Government Officials, in
Particuler Press Conference of President Kennedy
of September 13, 1962.

8. Meeting of Secretary Rusk with Foreign Ministero
of Latin America during Cuban Crisis.

9. Recently Approved New Policy Statement and
Objectives en Drews Up by the Interdepartmental
Comittee of Cuban Affairs.

10. Ouben Guidelines Paper.
(A guidelines paper es such does not exist on
Cuba os is the case in a majority of other
countries.)

CONCLUSIONS:

There are well over eight volumes of material concerned with
Cuba, perticalerly thet generated during the recent October crisis.
This review is nearing completion, and I en segregating particular
reports which may be of value to the members of your comittee
as we go forward with implementation of the new policy and
objectives. In the attached documentation, I have segregated
those National Security Council decisions and National Security
Action Memoranda which are carried es pending or closed in the
files of the Department of Stete. Where action on a particular
MSC decision or NASAM has been transferred to EXOOM, action
responsibility on these decisions would appear now to be within
the purview of your Coordinating Committee. From my review
to date,

CRET - SENSITIVE
to date, it appears that all of these decisions call for actions
which have already been considered by your Committee. You will
note that in some instances cction responsibility on an NSC
decision or NASAM has been transferred to the Special Group
(Mr. Alexis Johnson).

Attachment:
List of Pending and Closed
NSC and NASAM decisiona
concerning Cuba.

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIONS ON CUBA
(PENDING AND CLOSED)

NSC Action No. Substance Status
483 NSC 2422a Agreed that US policy toward (Pending)
5/5/61 Cuba should sim at the downfall According to
of Castro regime. files, out of
thia NSC direct-
ive grew a policy
paper, to be
handled different
ly from regular
guidelines papers
on each country.
As of 9/4/62, White House
was informed that action on this
NSC directive would be reported
in compliance with NSAM 181
which transferred certain NSC &
NASAM actions to special group
(Alexis Johnson).

483 NSC 2422d Importance President (Pending)
5/5/61 attaches to obtaining Action to be
adequate intelligence reported in
on Cuban military compliance with
capabilities. NASAM 181
(Johnson channel)

483 NSC 24226 Importance President (Pending)
5/5/61 attaches to publication Action trans-
in free world press of ferred to EXCOM
terrorist actions of
Castro regime, etc. and
to possible political action
to end current terror.

483 NSC 24228 Relations with Cuban (Pending)
5/5/61 Revolutionary Council Action trans-
should be improved. ferred to EXCOM

483 NSC 24221 Cuban refugees to be given (Pending)
5/5/61 refugee status; refugees in Action trans-
Hiami to be relocated; ferred to EXCOM
refugees to be eligible to
apply for travel privileges.

483 NSC 2422k Initiation of negotiations (Pending)
5/5/61 to enlarge willingness of Action trans-
other American states to ferred to EXCOM
join in action against Castro.

NSC Action No. Substance Status
483 NSC 2622m USIA will expand L.A. (Pending)
5/5/61 program, but not initiste Action trans-
electronic warfare against ferred to
Castro, means of propaganda Johnson channel
should be madeavailable Per NASAM
to non-US groups. 4181.

483 NSC 24228 US military officers under (Closed)
5/5/61 general guidance to be completed action
prepared by Dept of State, as of 11/28/61.
would discuse Castro threst
to all L.A. with L.A. officers.

483 MSC 24220 Dept of State should prepare (Closed)
5/5/61 a report on a possible new S/P paper
juridical basis for effective "possible new
Basis for Anti-
Communist Action"
7/24/61
anti-comunist action.

483 HSC 2422p Robert Woodward's assumption Closed.
5/5/61 of responsibility of Task Force
on Cuba on announcement of
appointment.

483 NSC 24226 No US military intervention Closed.
5/5/61 now. Do nothing which would
foreclose possibility military
intervention in future.

483 NSC 24226 No naval blockade or airwar Closed.
5/5/61 against Cuba.

483 NSC 2422f Detailed study to be made Closed.
5/5/61 by CIA with other Departments Bissell memo to
of possible weaknesses and Achilles
vulnerabilities in elements 11/21/61 re:
which control Cuba. "Situstion and
Prospects in
Cube by Sherman
Kent 11/3/61.

HSC Action No. Substance Status
483 NSC 2422h No separate Cuben military Closed.
5/5/61 forces should be organized DEF recomended
in U.S. Cuben natinels would to Pres.draft
be encouraged enlist in US program be
Armed Forces. terminsted
6/30/62 due to
codest results.

483 NSC 24225 No inmediate trade embargo Closed,
5/5/61 on Cuba. with President's
sction of 2/3/62
declering total embargo on trade
with Cuba with exception
medicine and food on humanitarian
grounds.

483 NSC 24221 Allience for Progress to be Closed.
5/5/61 strengthened. Weekly report
now from AID

ASAN 194 Policy Toward non-bloc Pending.
10/2/62 ships in Cuban trade (Action Action trans-
US Government proposes to ferred to
take with regard to EXCOM.
shipping to Cuba.)

NASAN 100 Contingency Planning for Pending
10/3/61 Cuba. Action trans-
ferred to
Johnson channel.

CUBA NASAM 431 US Government must have ready Closed.
3/11/61 a White Paper on Cuba and be Paper prepared
ready to give assistance to and translated:
Cuban Patriots in similar "The Castro
effort. Regime in Cuba"
9/61

CUBA NASAM #181 Eyes only Limited Distrib- Closed.
8/24/62 ution. Reporting to be through
another channel and handled
personally by Deputy USecy
Johnson (understand this authorized response
90 certain pending NSC Actions, 2 NASAMs thru
Johnson channel)

NSC Action No. Substance Status
CUBA NASAM 196 Establishment of NSC Executive Closed.
10/22/62 Committee

CUBA NASAM 208 Cuba Overflights. (This Report Submitted.
12/6/62 Presidential directive
EYES ONLY approved an attached
Guidelines for the Planning
of Cuben Overflights, and
requested CIA to come up with
en estimate of the adequacy of
such a system of intelligence
collection to meet the criteria
set forth, on assumption it is
supplemented by energetic collection
of information by all other evailable
means.)

CUBA NASAM 213 Interdepartmental Organization Closed.
1/8/63 of Cuban Affairs - wich
responsibility vested in a
Coordinator of Cuban affairs
in Department of State.

TOP SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
January 24, 1963

:

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Papers for NSC Executive Committee
Meeting, January 25 at 4:00 p.m.

Attached are two revised papers "Summary of
Coordinator's Recommendations" and "United States:
Policy Toward Cuba" which are being transmitted to
members of the NSC Executive Committee for considera-
tion at the meeting of the Committee on Friday,
January 25 at 4:00p.m. Also attached is a new page 8
for the paper entitled "United States Policy Toward
the Cuban Brigade." The other two papers transmitted
on January 22 remain unchanged and will also be con-
sidered at the Friday meeting. They are "United States
Policy in Cuba in the Organization of American States"
and "Current Problems Concerning Cuba."

Attachments: William H. B
As stated. Executive Secretariat
Copy No.

TOP SECRET ATTACHMENTS

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guide-
lines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the
following words:

"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are
removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in
the future, under adequate verification and safeguards,
and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive
communist purposes, there will be peace in the
Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall
neither initiate nor permit aggression in this
hemisphere.'

"We will not, of course, abandon the political,
economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt
subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that
the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But
these policies are very different from any intent to
launch a military invasion of the island."

Objectives SECRET
-2-

Accordingly, the objectives of United States
policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States
and the other states of the Organization of
American States (OAS) by assuring that
offensive weapons are not reintroduced into
Cuba;
2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive
military action against other Caribbean states;

4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime
to direct and support subversion and insurrection
within the other Hemisphere states;

5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within
Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing
the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-
Soviet Communist purposes;

6. Encouraging and supporting any developments
within Cuba that offer the possibility of
replacing the Cuban Government with a regime
that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc,
it being understood that our ultimate
objective is replacement of the regime by
one fully compatible with the goals of the
United States;

SECRET
SECRET
-3-
7. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of
supporting the Castro regime;

8. Maximizing the political isolation of the
Castro regime from other free world states,
and especially from states of the OAS.
Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba
should be multilateral, preferably based upon
the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact)
or on resolutions adopted by the Organization
of American States. The newly-won hemispheric
solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be
jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal
value and which might split the hemisphere;

9. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of
appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or
logistical support, the wide variety of
military contingencies that may arise from
pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and

10. Producing comprehensive intelligence related
to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the
U. S. Government will be prepared to increase
the political economic, psychological and
military pressures, as appropriate opportunities
present themselves or can be created. The
actions listed below are those requiring immediate
approval and would be initiated in the sequence
set forth below. Recommendations for further

SECRET
SECRET
-4-

actions based upon the re-examination of
existing programs and upon the development
of new programs related to the foregoing
objectives will be forthcoming.

1. In addition to current covert program, such
as intelligence collection, recruitment of
Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts,
support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council(CRC)
and other exile group activities and infil-
tration of propaganda materials:
a. Intensify covert collection
of intelligence within Cuba, especially
within the regime;

b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban
exiles, who are associated with
the original aims of the 26 of July
Movement and who believe that the
Castro regime can be overthrown from
within in order that they may:
1) cause a split in the leadership
of the regime at the national or
provincial levels; and 2) create a
political base of popular opposition
to the regime; and, 3) secure
intelligence;

c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a
capability to launch balloons carrying
leaflets and other propaganda materials
from international waters into Cuba.
Launch propaganda balloons after an
operational capability has been
established.

SECRET
SECRET
-5-

2. With respect to the actions listed below,
the results of Mr. Donovan's imminent
negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing
the 20-odd American prisoners should first
be ascertained. If these actions were taken
before the conclusion of the negotiations
they could jeopardize the release of the
Americans.

3. If these negotiations fail, or when the
prisoners are recovered, proceed on the
following timetable:

4. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance
of the proclamation of the four point
shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for
the orders to go into effect in five days).
These orders:
a. Close United States ports to all
vessels of a country whose vessels
engage in carrying arms to Cuba;

b. Close United States ports to any ship
which has carried goods in the Bloc-
Cuba trade within 120 days of the time
it seeks to enter a United States port;
c. Prohibit all United States flag ships
and all ships owned by United States
nationals or residents from entering
any ports of Cuba and from carrying
any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

SECRET
SECRET
-6-
d. Prohibit any cargo sponsored by any
department of the United States from
being shipped on vessels owned or
controlled by persons who own or
control vessels engaged in the trade
between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.

5. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of
Mission Conference - January 20-30, or at
a later date dependent on the Donovan
mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or
another representative of the President
will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico
and Brazil to convey to them the importance
President Kennedy attaches to maintaining
hemispheric solidarity by their supporting
the following resolutions:
a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for
its actions which continue to endanger
the peace, deploring refusal to allow
inspection, condemning the presence of
Soviet troops, recommending continued
surveillance and continued vigilance
against subversive activities, and
terminating the invocation of the Rio
Treaty on the missile crisis, together
with

b. An OAS resolution which would
recommend 1) extension of arms embargo
to all items of trade except food and
medicine (fall back position: extension
of arms embargo to all strategic items);

SECRET
SECRET
-7-
2) prohibition of ships of OAS
member states from transportating
embargoed items and deny use of
ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;
3) denial of Soviet over-flights and
transit rights for flights to Cuba;
and 4) a call on other states to
take similar action.

6. After obtaining the maximum possible
support of the key countries of Mexico,
Chile and Brazil, the other OAS
members will be approached in Washington
and in their respective capitals,
simultaneously. It should be possible
for this consultation and OAS action on
the resolutions to be completed within
ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval
of the resolutions, we will inform our
NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

7. At the first NATO meeting after formal
OAS action on the resolutions, we will
request that NATO include Cuba on the
list of countries to which shipment
of COCOM list (strategic) items prohibited.

8. After NATO decision on our COCOM request,
we will seek to get agreement from Free
World industrial nations to prevent
shipping of critical spare parts and
equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

9. In addition to the four point shipping
resolutions, and action under Section
107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue
to press Free World nations to keep their
shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

SECRET
SECRET
-8-

B. Contigency Planning

New opportunities for accomplishing our
objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc
action in other parts of the world; as a result
of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions)
by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a
result of uprisings or internal conflict within
Cuba.

Our contingency planning, which will be
undertaken immediately, should include preparations
for increased multilateral and/or bilateral
political and economic measures, large scale use of
Cubans who are now inside Cuba; more extensive
air activity including both high and low level
flights primarily directed toward surveillance
and collection of intelligence, and which may also
have the effect of embarrassing the Castro
government and keeping the Castro forces on
continual alert; retaliatory measures, as
appropriate, including the imposition of a
POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in
other countries; severance of communications
to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping
destined for Cuba and on key installations to
Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately,
the use of U. S. military force. To the extent
feasible, U. S. military forces employed against
Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-
trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of
those Latin American nations desirous of
participating in the U. S. effort.

SECRET
SECRET
8

Our programs should be designed to encourage
the Brigade members to melt back into the exile
community and engage in constructive pursuits
pending the liberation of Cuba. We should offer
them some special assistance but not to the extent
that they become a perpetual privileged class
within the community. Presidential action on their
behalf would single them out unnecessarily.

SECRET

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 23 JAN 63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, 10 a. m.)

FROM : Department of Defense Representative on the Inter-
departmental Coordinating Committee on Cuba

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

Policy

Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the
overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement
by one compatible with the objectives of the U. S. and, where
possible, sharing the aims of the Free World. To achieve this
objective, the U. S. Government will apply increasing degrees of
political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as
appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created,
until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown. Our immediate
objectives are to isolate the Castro/Communist regime from the Free
World and from the Bloc; weaken it economically; promote internal
dissension, erode its domestic political support; frustrate its sub-
versive activities; negate its influence in the hemisphere; increase
the cost to the Bloc of sustaining the regime; and obtain the withdrawal
1. of Russian troops from Cuba.

Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist
regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic,
psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives
and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance
toward our ultimate objective.

We should be in a position to respond with open military sup-
port (to include such items as material, advisors, training, and
Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of
military forces), to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/
Communist group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability
to survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are
compatible with those of the U. S.

Invasion of Cuba by U. S. military forces, as distinguished
from military support upon request of indigenous forces, should
not be undertaken in the absence of aggression or other Castro/Communist
and/or Soviet actions that threaten the peace or security of the
hemisphere. This does not preclude appropriate U. S. retaliation
for isolated hostile acts by the Castro/Communist or Soviet forces.

To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed
against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained
free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations
desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.

Intensive, comprehensive and continuing intelligence
gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified as a primary objective
of the national intelligence effort.

Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be
multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization
of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the
Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of
marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

Overt and covert annexes of specific actions in support of
this policy will be prepared.

Discussion

The active pursuit of our ultimate objective involves a
phased and controlled series of political, economic, psychological

198-10004-10207
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date: 6/24/201

Agency Information
AGENCY: ARMY
RECORD NUMBER: 198-10004-10207
RECORD SERIES: CALIFANO PAPERS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Information
ORIGINATOR: ARMY
FROM: JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.
TO: MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS
TITLE: INTERDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE OF CUBAN AFFAIRS: REPORT ON THE STATUS OF ACTIONS DESIGNED TO COUNTER SUBVERSION
DATE: 01/10/1964
PAGES: 62
SUBJECTS:
COUNTERINSURGENCY
CUBAN SUBVERSION
LATIN AMERICA SECURITY
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Secret
RESTRICTIONS: 1C
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 10/07/1997
OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS: Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 10. Army memo from Joseph Califano to Mr. Crimmins on status of
actions to counter Cuban subversion in Latin America with other related documents.

JFK Assassination Records Review
Department of the Army EO 13526
Declassify Exolude Exempt
Authority,
Review Date 8/12/2015 By Kestover, ADA

v9.1
NW 50955 DocId:32276192 Page 1

5

SECRET
Lt Col Haig/78029/8 Jan 64/md

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Department of State
JAN 1964

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban
Affairs: Report on the Status of Implementation of
Actions Designed to Counter Subversion

Enclosed herewith is the Report on the Status of Implementation
of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion for the period 1 December
1963-1 January 1964. The format of this report adheres to the topic
outline disseminated at the meeting of the Subcommittee on Subversion,
September 13, 1963.

It is requested that this office be provided with 12 copies of the
final report. It is assumed that each of the representatives will have
an opportunity to consider the final report before it is forwarded.

Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel
Enclosure
As Stated

Mr. Califano
Lt Col Haig
ASG
OSA 353-CUBA
1/10/64
FW 1/30/63

OSA. ASG. CONTROL NO. 3051-10
SECRET
FILE
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEM? INTERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

NW 50955 DocId: 32276192 Page 2

SECRET
STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS TAKEN
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO
COUNTER SUBVERSION FOR THE
PERIOD 1 DEC 63 - 1 JAN 64

3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms.

a. General A. P. O'Meara, USA, Commander-in-Chief, US
Southern Command, met with Vice Admiral Ray C. Needham, USN,
Chief of Staff to Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic and members of their
respective staffs during the period 11 to 15 December 1963. Discus-
sions encompassed methods of improving the existing surveillance/
intercept system throughout the Caribbean. Existing US plans were
reviewed, continuance of the ship visit program instituted in Novem-
ber 1963 was agreed upon, and combined exercises to test country
capabilities to intercept simulated intruding ships were planned for
early execution. Discussions by General O'Meara were continued
with the Secretary of the Army and with representatives of the State
Department, CIA and the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Commander Mine Division 44 with minesweepers USS
STURDY and USS SWERVE completed visits to Central American
ports in Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Guatemala. Deficiencies in the
capabilities of all three countries to counter subversive infiltration
were reported. Additional visits, designed to assist in correcting
deficiencies, are planned. USCINCSO also plans, through Commandera
of US Military Groups, to assist in developing existing capabilities.

c. Based upon information from CAS Panama representative
on 8 November, USCINCSO directed US operations to find a small
boat which reportedly left the Colon Free Zone with a cargo of arms
destined for the vicinity of the Colombian-Venezuelan border. Day-
light visual aerial surveillance flights were instituted immediately,
with radar-equipped aircraft taking over surveillance during hours
of darkness. Colombian and Venezuelan authorities were notified
through US diplomatic channels, but no direct communications
between US surveillance aircraft and Colombian forces in the
vicinity of the probable landing area were established before termi-
ation on 14 November. This effort, though not successful, has
evoked considerable effort by US State Department, Defense Depart-
ment and CIA activities to improve capabilities and procedures.
SECRET
DOWNGRADED A 3 FR TERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

NW 50955 DocId: 32276192 Page 3

SECRET
d. Action was commenced in the Colon area to provide means
to keep track of ships and boats entering or leaving the Colon Free
Zons in order to monitor the movements of those suspected of carrying
contraband. Assistance to USCINCSO was provided from the continental
United States in carrying out surveys as to equipment required on as
secretive a basis as possible, and special optical equipment to include
probable night television was approved by the Secretary of the Army
for expedited delivery to USCINCSO.

e. A joint survey and mobile training team from USCINCSO
continued assistance to Venezuelan authorities in improving indigenous
capabilities for surveillance and interception of intruders.

f. A US Southern Command Operations Plan 50-63 was developed
to provide for three levels of operational assistance to Venezuela in
surveillance and intercept operations. Representatives of the US Strike
Command and the Air Defense Command visited USCINCSO to assist in
developing detailed supporting plans.

g. Information was obtained by USCINCSO concerning in-country
communications capabilities of Colombia and Venezuela to receive and
disseminate surveillance information provided by US forces.

5. Strengthening of Counterinsurgency Capabilities.

a. US Army training included the following: 13 students from 6
countries completed CI operations course in the Canal Zone; 8 students
from 5 countries completed CI orientation course in the Canal Zone;
24 students from 8 countries completed Military Intelligence course
in the Canal Zone; 11 Chilean studente completed special Military
Intelligence orientation course, three Canal Zone-based CI Mobile
Training Teams (MTT) carried out training programs in Ecuador,
Peru and Venezuela; and one Canal Zone-based CI MTT commenced
a training program of Panamanian National Guardsmen.

b. US Navy training included the following:

(1) The Small Craft Inspection and Training Team
(SCIATT) completed training the third claes of Central American
nationals, bringing to 63 the total number of students trained since
May 1963.
NW 50955 DocId: 32276192 Page 4
2
SECRET

SECRET
(2) The semiannual maintenance check of two
Panamanian 40 foot Coast Guard Utility Boats (CGUBS) was com-
menced on 16 December by an on-the-job training (OJT) program.
Work should be completed by 10 January 1964.

(3) Work was temporarily suspended on two 40 foot
COUBs in Costa Rica due to the lack of critical epare parto. It is
anticipated work will be completed by 15 January 1964.

c. Increases in the stock levels of the Canal Zone stockpile
of riot control equipment were directed on 20 December 1963. In-
creases will enable USCINCSO to respond to urgent requests from
Latin American governments. Buildup concerned primarily tear
gas grenades, gas masks, carbines and shotgun ammunition.

d. Final arrangements were made with the Bertram Boat
Company of Miami for delivery of 10 outboard-inboard fiber glasa
boats to Cabamis, Venezuela for use in the Lake Maracaibo area.
Boats, spares and an MTT will be delivered to destination by
14 January 1964.

e. Action has been taken to expedite the shipment of radio-
electronic gear to Jamaica for use in the joint surveillance program
designed to combat Castro-inspired insurgency in the Caribbean
area. Equipment should arrive in Jamaica within the next few weeks.

1. A US Air Force Air Commando MTT demonstrated in
Asuncion, Paraguay.

8. Other Special Actions.

a. Latin American Military Communications System (LAMCS)
in Ecuador and Nicaragua and the Ground-to-Air facilities in Ecuador
have been completed.

b. Authority to proceed with the LAMCS in Honduras was
received from the US State Department on 17 December 1963. This
facility should be completed within 120 days.

c. Emergency power units to improve reliability of US Army
and Air Force Mission radio stations in Colombia and Venezuela,
shipped from the United States, arrived in Bogota and Caracas res-
pectively.
NW 50955 DocId: 32276192 Page 5
3
SECRET

353
CUBA
091.411
020
Staff
031.2
201
JCS
Reynolds, John
12
SECRET
ASGOSA
1-2-63

From: John Reynolds, KCS
To: C/Staff
Subj: Interdepartmental Coordinating Comte of Cuban Affairs: Rpt on Status of
Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion (U)

rw Incl: None
Dis: Col. Haig 1-3-64
FW 1-30-63
OSA FORM 3
31 MAY 49
OSA 3004
THIS PAPER BELONGS TO:
Administrative Support Group Division, Office of the
Secretary of the Army
NW 50955 DocId: 32276192 Page 6
OSA
353
Cuba
1-2-63
FW 1-30-63
* U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963-683865

CONFIDENTIAL
SAOGC/LtColHaig/lc/59856/18Dec63.

December 18, 1963
OSA 353 CUBA
12-18-63
FW 1-30-63

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL WADE ROBERT
Office of the Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)
SUBJECT: State Paper Entitled "Terrorism in the Latin
American Countries on the Critical Insurgency List"

Enclosed herewith is a paper prepared by a member of the
Cuban Coordinating Committee at the Department of State (Mr.
William Bowdler, 182-3736) for use by the Department of State
representative at the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) meeting on
December 19, 1963. The paper was provided to this office by State
on December 18 with the request that Department of Defense
comments, particularly on the basic memorandum, be obtained.
Although this office is very much concerned with the aspects of the
paper which deal with the problem of Castro-inspired subversion,
the broader implications of the paper pertain to the Latin American
area and the military assistance programs related thereto. These
are, of course, matters of primary concern to your office. There-
fore, the attached paper is forwarded to you for appropriate action
with the request that your comments, if any, be coordinated with
this office so that they can be correlated to actions currently under
the purview of this office.

Signed:
A. M. Haig
Lt Colonel, USA
Moseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel
Enclosure
As Stated

OSA, ASG
Mr Califano
LtCol Haig
CONFIDENTIAL
NW 50955 DocId: 32276192 Page 7

CONFIDENTIAL
SAOGC/LtColHaig/lc/59856/18Dec63

December 18, 1963
OSA 353 CUBA
12-18-63
FW 1-30-63

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, DDR&E
Office of the Secretary of Defense
SUBJECT: Anti-Sabotage Operations in Latin America

The Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban
Affairs (ICCOCA) has recently considered a CIA proposal to provide
guidance to US firms in Latin America confronted with Castro-
communist inspired sabotage of their facilities and assets. CIA has
contracted for the preparation of a report which will consolidate the
experiences of several US firms in Latin America in combatting
sabotage. After consideration by the ICCOCA this report will be
furnished through our country teams in Latin America to local US
firms to assist them in instituting appropriate anti-sabotage programs.

I would be most grateful if you would prepare a brief report
designed to supplement the CIA project which would include enumera-
tion of general guidelines which might be adopted by US firms in the
Latin American area in combatting sabotage. In particular, an
enumeration of known appropriate anti-sabotage devices available on
the commercial market together with the manufacturer's names would
be most helpful.

A member of my staff has discussed this project with Mr.
Phelps of your staff, who has indicated that DDR&E might be of assist-
ance in this matter based on a recent field trip to Venezuela where
problems peculiar to that area were studied at the request of the US
Ambassador. It is also possible that commercial devices developed
for South Vietnam would have applicability in Latin America. Весаиве
this project is designed for distribution to several Latin American
countries, it is requested that where possible guidelines be developed
which might have general application throughout Latin America, but
with emphasis on key subversive target areas. Present plans antici-
pate finalization of this project by December 23, 1963.
OSA, ASG
Mr Califano
LtCol Haig
Signed:
A. M. Haig
Lt. Colonel, USA
Joseph Toseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel
forsa
CONFIDENTIAL
NW 50955 DocId: 32276192 Page 8

SECRET
17 DEC 1966
A
OSA 353 CUBA
12-17-66
FW 136063
1-30-63

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHNH. CRIMMINS
SUBJECT:
Coordinater of Cuban Affairs
Department of State
Interdepartmental Coordinating Conimittee of Cuban
Affairs: Report on the Status of Implementation of
Actions Designed to Counter Subversion

Enclosed herewith is the Report on the Status of Implementation
of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion for the period I November-
1 December 1963. The format of this report adheres to the topic out-
line disseminated at the meeting of the Subcommittee on Subversion,
September 13, 1963.

It is requested that this office be provided with 12 copies of the
final report. It is assumed that each of the representatives will have
an opportunity to consider the final report before it is forwarded.

Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel
Enclosur
As Stated

Mr. Califano
Lt Col Haig
ASG
PECBELVBA OF THE VYWA
OLLIGE
DEC 1882 VW.03.
OLLIGE
DOUNGRANDA 3 MAR COERVALS
AIE SECRETICIPA
OSA, ASG Control No. 29758
NW 50955 DocId:32276192 Page 9
DATE 10 VEERS
DOD DER 5200.10

SECRET
STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS TAKEN
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO
COUNTER SUBVERSION FOR THE
PERIOD 1 NOV - 1 DEC 1963

3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms.

a. On 9 November 1963 the Commander-in-Chief, US
Southern Comunand (USCINCSO) advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) of reports concerning suspected subversive arme smuggling
into Venezuela or Colombia from the Colon Free Zone, Panama.
USCINCSO initiated surveillance at first light on 9 November 1963
to detect and track surface vessels which might be engaged in the
subversive traffic. The JCS directed the Commander-in-Chief,
Atlantic (CINCLANT) to commence surveillance with radar equipped
aircraft and to keep USCINCSO advised of all information. Sus-
pected craft were not positively identified or intercepted; however,
there were indications that an unidentified surface vessel off the
Rio Hacha area of Colombia and in Colombian watere was probably
in contact with small boats operating from the Colombian coastline
at night.

b. As directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USCINESO
developed a plan under which the United States could provide assist-
ance to Venezuelan forces, on three levels of participation, designed
to prevent the surreptitious movement of Castro-Communist arms
and personnel into Venezuela. To be fully effective, the plan calls
for US elements operating from Venezuelan territory which is not
considered a likely subject for approval by the Government of
Venezuela at the present time.

c. A joint survey and mobile training team of eleven men was
provided by USCINCSO to Venezuela on 22 November 1963, upon
approval of the concept by the Government of Venezuela. The purpose
of the team is to train Venezuelan military personnel in organizing
and operating a joint operations center; in improving capabilities
in the plotting and coordination of intelligence data, and aerial photo-
graphy; and in coordinating all Venezuelan military and paramilitary
organizations involved in surveillance and intercept operations.
NW 50955 DocId: 32276192 Page 10
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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

SECRET
1
5. Strengthening of Counterinsurgency Capabilities.

a. Two minesweepers from the US Atlantic Command, USS
STURDY and USS SWERVE with Commander Mine Division 44 em-
barked, commenced a schedule of visits to Caribbean perts in Costa
Rica, Nicaragua and Guatemala. Visits are intended to assist each
country in improving its coastal and off-shore surveillance effort,
to improve intercept capabilities with respect to the prevention of
infiltration of arms and subversive personnel through the countries'
territorial waters, and to establish procedures which would provide
for US assistance in final interception when requested. Visits in
November, under the supervision of USCINCSO, covered Puerto
Limon, Costa Rica; Bluefields and Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua; and
Puerto Barrios, Guatemala.

b. Seventy-eight Latin American officere, previously en-
rolled, were in attendance during November at courses stressing
counterinsurgency conducted by the US Army Canal Zone school.
Two officers graduated from the US Army Counterinsurgency Course
at Fort Bragg, North Carolina on 12 November 1963 and two addi-
tional officers are now in attendance.

c. Seven US Army Counterinsurgency Mobile Training Teams
based in the Canal Zone, consisting of twenty officers and thirty-five
enlisted men, provided training in seven Latin American countries
during November.

d. Nine enlisted men from Chile were in attendance at
Marine Corps schools at Camp Pendleton, California in November.

US Coast Guard training in small boat operations was
provided in the Canal Zone for fifteen students from five Caribbean
countries in the operation and maintenance of forty-foot Coast Guard
utility boats. A Coast Guard mobile training team of one officer and
two enlisted men, based in the Canal Zone, provided training in
Costa Rica for the reconditioning of Coast Guard utility boats. Five
members of the Costa Rican Guardia Civil are receiving on-the-job
training in connection with reconditioning of the boats.
NW 50955 DocId: 32276192 Page 11
2
SECRET

SECRET
LA US Air Force counterinsurgency team of five officers
and eight enlisted men, based in the Canal Zone, provided training
for Ecuadorian Air Force personnel in Ecuador.

g. At the request of USCINSO, and with the enthusiastic
support of the Venezuelan Government, a small boat program has
been initiated to provide security for the Lake Maracaibo region.
Arrangements have been made through the US Navy under Military
Credit Sales agreement for the manufacture of six (6) 25-foot and
four (4) 31-foot inboard-outboard, fiberglass hull boats by Bertram
Boat Company, Miami, for delivery in December 1963 or early
January 1964. A SEAL-trained Mobile Training Team (MTT) of
one officer and five enlisted men will be provided by the Navy and
will report to the equipment supplier in time to become fully ac-
quainted with the boats by 15 December. The MTT will accompany
the boats to Venezuela and will remain up to two months in country
to provide necessary familiarization training.

6. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Surveillance.

a. Upon receipt of intelligence pertaining to suspected arms
smuggling from the Canal Free Zone, Panama into Colombia or
Venezuela, the USCINCSO relayed this information to Colombia and
Venezuela by the Military Alerting System. The US Ambassador to
Colombia conveyed the information to the Government of Colombia.
Colombian Navy and Air Force elements were assigned increased
surveillance missions in the Caribbean coastal area of Colombia by
Colombian military authorities and results of their surveillance
activities were provided to USCINCSO by the US Military Group
Commander in Colombia. The results of US air surveillance of
the expected route and landing area, undertaken by US Air Force
and Naval air elements were transmitted to the US Military Group
Commander in Colombia for passage to the Colombian military
authorities.

b. The motor vessel BLUE STAR, of Panamanian registry,
was apprehended by Ecuadorian authorities in November 1963 as
it was attempting the clandestine introduction of contraband articles
NW 50955 DocId: 32276192 Page 12
SECRET
1

SECRET
into Ecuador. Ship movement information had been provided to the
US Naval Attache Bogota by the District Intelligence Officer of the
Fifteenth Naval District. There was no apparent involvement of
Cuban arme or Cuban trained personnel in this instance.

7. Other Special Actions.

a. Construction is now in progress on the Latin American
Military Communications System (LAMCS) in Quito, Ecuador; the
terminal station is expected to be completed in December 1963.
The station in Nicaragua is expected to be completed in early
December 1963.

b. In response to a request by USCINCSO, action was taken
on 15 November 1963 to expedite delivery of communications equip-
ment required to implement a Jamaican integrated coastal surveillance
system. The system was originally approved as part of the $500
thousand one-time grant of Military Assistance material directed
by the President in April 1963, but world-wide shortages of specific
items threatened to delay shipment in some cases until FY 1965. In
view of the urgency of this requirement, priorities were adjusted
to provide delivery by 1 January 1964. The items include:

12 AN/CRC radios and installation kits
3 AN/ARC 3 radios
1 AN/PSM 6
1 Wattmeter

c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of Public Safety,
State-AID, are studying the possibility of increasing the stock level
of certain items of Riot Control Equipment in the Canal Zone, in order
to meet rapidly and effectively multiple contingencies that may occur
in Latin America. In the past, the size of some requests have neceesi-
tated shipment of certain items directly from the United States, with
resultant increase in cost and time. USCINCSO has been asked for
his recommendations on stock levels.
NW 50955 DocId: 32276192 Page 13
SECRET

RTMENT OF DEFENSE
30 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
2 DEC 1963
In reply refer to:
1-28596/63
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., THE GENERAL COUNSEL,
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs:
Report on Status of Implementation of Actions to Counter
Subversion (U)

The enclosure to your Memorandum No. 81, subject as above, dated
26 November 1963, has been received. The report appears to be
complete and appropriate for submission to the President.

SIGNED
Frank K. Sloan
Deputy Assistant Secretary

t
Any-Ma Calland
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10
OLLICE
PECKELVKA OF THE VBWA
CONFIDENTIAL
DEC 11 Je W.23
OLLICL
Сооногих пои & UEC०४०
C125VLCHED
NW 50955 DocId: 32276192 Page 14
OSA 353 Cuba 12-2-63 f/w 1-30-63
ΑΣΕ

SECRET
26 NOV 1963,
OAA 353 Cuba 11-26-63 f/w 1-30-63
MEMORANDUM NO. 81 FOR GENERAL EARLE G. WHEELER (JCS)
SUBJECT:
MB. FRANK K. SLOAN, Dep Asst Sac/Def ISA
(Regional Affairs)
MAJOR GENERAL J. D. ALGER, USA
REAR ADMIRAL W. F. A. WENDT, USN
MAJOR GENERAL J. W. CARPENTER, HI, USAF
BRIGADIER GENERAL C. J. QUILTER, UGMC
Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs:
Report on Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to
Counter Subversion (U)
DA Meme 964, subject as above, dated September 19, 1963
Reference:
the Subcommittee on Coban Subversion on Progress Made During September
Attached herewith is a Anal draft of the Report to the President of
1963 ia Curbing Cuban Subversion in Latin America.
It is requested that comments, if any, be provided this office by
1200 hours, 2 December 1963. The Department of Defense portion of
subject report is based on submissions provided in response to referenced
MOMOTAndum.
Enclosure
As Stated
Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel
i
cc:
Mr. Yarmolinsky (OSD)
Lt Col Haig
Mr. Califano
ASG-
SECRET FILE
OSA, ASG Control No. 27071
NW 50955 DocId: 32276192 Page 15
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

H
DRAFT
11/13/63
SECRET

REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE
on CUBAN SUBVERSION
 ACTION TAKEN DURING SEPTEMBER 1953 IN CURBING
CURAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

SECRET

SECRET
DRAFT
11/13/63
Control of Travel to and From Cuba

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Tunis to call to the attention
of the Foreign Ministry our concern at increased evidence
of Aeroflot attempts to establish North Africa routes to
Cuba, especially through Algeria, and our conviction that
Tunisie has a valid case in thwarting any Bloc civil air
penetration of Africa.

Instructed Embassy Conakry to contact Guinean Coverm
ment officials, reminding them of their past assurances
that no Aeroflot flights to Cuba would be permitted to
use Conakry facilities, and to express our concern et
recent indications that Aeroflot was preparing to establish
service to Cuba via Conakry.

C
Instructed Consulate Fort au France to investigate
and report on alleged landing and refuelling of Cubana
sircraft at Guadeloupe. Also double-checked directly
with the Shell Company, the supplier of the fuel.

Instructed Embassy Paris to query the French Goverment
about alleged Cubens use of the Guadeloupe facility, and
12
to express our concern at this evidence of Cuba's attempt
to use French Caribbean dependencies for flights to and
NW 50955 DocId: 32276192 Page 17
SECRET
From

SECRET
2
from Latin America.

d. Instructed Embassy Rio to make a new approach to
the Brazilian Foreign Ministry to express our concern
at Cuba's continuing use of "charter" flights to Brazil
and the laxity of Brazilian officials in the control of
passengers. During the course of the month the Brazilian
Goverment began tightening controls against Cubana
flights. Specifically, all requests for landing permission
vere henceforth to be processed by the Foreign Office,
with appropriate delays. Also tighter passenger, crew
and cargo controls were to be instituted when a Cubana
flight is permitted to use Brazilien facilities.

Determined that the U.K. had specifically werned
Cubana that no aviation fuel was available in Barbados and
that H.M.G. would, in the future, respect Shell Company's
decision to deny fueling to Cubana planes.

f. Continued inter-Departmental efforts to prevent
resumption of ferry service between Cuba and the U.S.
which a British citizen, Herold Derber, has been attempt-
ing to establish during the past several month.
NW 50955 DocId: 32276192 Page 18
SECRET

SECRET
3
Instructed Consul Georgetown to investigate and
report on evidence the Department received which indicates
that Cuba is planning to sell merchant vessels to British
Guiana in order to facilitate the establishment of
regular service for passengers and cargo.

i
Central Intelligence Agency
In connection with the Seventh Congress of the
International Union (UIA) held in Habana September 29 -
October 3, 1963 the Buenos Aires Station:
(1) encouraged the Argentine National Federation
of Architects to oppose Argentine attendance at the
Habane meeting, with the result that 25 of the 39
practicing architects who had planned to attend can-
celled their participation;

(2) arranged to prevent the attendance of any
officially authorized Argentine delegation at the Habana
meeting, but encouraged the attendance of an official
Argentine delegation of anti-Communist coloration at an
international architects meeting to be held in Mexico
ià October;
NW 50955 DocId: 32276192 Page 19
SECRET
(3)

SECRET
(3) delivered a nemorandum to the Minister of
Interior concerning Cuban charter flights to Brazil which
supported the Ambassador's request that the Argentine
government express concern over such flights.

1
b. Rio de Janeiro Station continued to furnish
the Embassy with data on Cubana flights to Brazil used
in representations to the Brazilian Foreign Office.
Also induced Rio airport officials to impose stringent
passport control and baggage efforts. These efforts
contributed to the Brazilian Covernment's failing το
issue landing permits for Cubana flights on September
21, 24 and 25, 1963 forcing their cancellation. When
Cubana, because of harassment at Rio, began using the
landing facilities in Sao Paulo where controls were
non existent, CIA initiated and obtained a local liaison
egreement for similar harassment in the event of future
Cubana flights to Sao Paulo.

c. Mexico City station inspired a press campaiga
of hoof and mouth and smallpox epidemics in Cuba, prior
to the Architects Congress to discourage participation
in the Habana meeting. The resulting quarantines and
innoculations
NW 50955 DocId:32276192 Page 20

SECRET
innoculations were a factor in discouraging 52 of the
60 Mexican professional architects who were expected to
go to Habana from attending the Congress.

II. Control of Movement of Propaganda
Mectures to countant
NW 50955 DoeId: 32276192 Page 21

III. Control of Clandestine Novement of Guerrillaa
and arms
Department of State
Made the necessary arrangements through Embassy
Tegucigalpa with the Government of Honduras for the
dispatch of three U.S. helicopters to give logistical
assistance to the Honduran Army in its effort to locate
and eliminate the band of guerrillas allegedly operating
in the Fatuca River area along the Honduran-Nicaraguan
border.

Department of Defense
Three OH-13 helicopters from USSOUTECOM supported
Honduran armed forces conducting counter-insurgency
operations in the Patuca River area. A total of 27 sorties
were flown resulting in delivery of 3928 pounds of supplies,
evacuation of 12 sick Honduran soldiers, airlift of 19
passengers to points in the operational area, and
recovery of 400 pounds of supplies from the operational
area.
NW 50955 DocId:32276192 Page 22
SECRET
IV.

SECRET
7
IV. Control of Transfer of Funds

Department of State
Instructed Embassy Mexico City to inform the
Mexican airline SAESA that their proposal to purchase
surplus Cuban aircraft would in fact result in the
accrual to Cuba of a significant amount of hard currency,
and the U.S. would have to oppose the transaction.
Further, if dollars were involved in the purchase,
it would be a violation of the Cuban Assets Control
Regulations.

b. Informed Department of Treasury, Foreign Assets
Control Office, of the activities of Sowondelp Enterprises,
a Miami fira engaged in sending remittances to persons
in Caba in violation of the Cuban Assets Control
Regulations.

Instructed Consulate, Belize to inform
Mr. Richard Joyce, an American national, that his
comercial transactions with Cuba were in violation
of the Cubea Assets Control Regulations and that he
 is prohibited from engaging in such trade.
NW 50955 DocId:32276192 Page 23
:

SECRET
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System Date: 6/24/201
Identification Form

Agency Information
AGENCY: ARMY
RECORD NUMBER: 198-10005-10017
RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Information
ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM:
TO:
TITLE: CUBA PROJECT PROGRESS REPORT

DATE: 04/10/1962
PAGES: 6
SUBJECTS:
ANTI-CASTRO CUBANS
MRR GROUP
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Secret
RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 10/07/1997

OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: Califano Papers, Box 3, Folder 2. Draft copy of Cuba Project Progress Report, 4-11 April 1962,
regarding clandestine resistance groups in Cuba.

Department of the Army EO 13526
Declassify Exclude Exempt
Authority_
Refer To
Review Date 12AUGIS By Wilhel

DRAFT
SECRET 10 APR 1962

CUBA PROJECT PROGRESS REPORT
4-11 April 1962
OPERATIONAL
1. An internal leader of the Movimiento Recuperacion Revolu-
cionario (MRR) who was infiltrated into Cuba on 29 December 1961, and
exfiltrated on 29 March 1962, said at a debriefing on 7 April that he
considers only five clandestine resistance organizations in
Cuba of national importance: The Directorio Revolucionario Estudantil
(DRE), Movimiento Democratt/Cristiano (MDC), Movimiento Revolu-
cionario del Pueblo (MRP), Movimiento Recuperacion Revolucionario
unit.
(MRE), and the 30th of November Only these groups have the
necessary motivation and discipline to coordination among them-
selves. There are a large number of other underground revolutionary
units which claim to be of national importance but which have no more
than two or three dozen men at most and can beffound only in the area
0798tions.
where they were established. Most of the small appear to have
been established by self-named leaders for personal reasons, financial
gain through the sale of 'bonds, " or for future political opportunity
when
Fidel Castro is overthrown. Although the
small groups are relatively inactive, their claims to importance have
attracted numerous dissidents who could be more useful if they were
members of the few larger and more effective organizations. Because
SECRET

SECRET

of the boundless personal ambitions of the respective leaders and the
howeven
geographic dispersion of the units, these small groups could never be
Coresnization,
effectively merged into a centrally directed larger To use them
into
effectively we would have to try to siphon off the membership te mo
controlled groups. If this is not possible, they may serve a useful
purpose by providing unwitting diversionary harrassment while the
larger groups work toward the major goals.
2. A unilaterally recruited senior officer of the diplomatic
service of a neutralist African country has been briefed and given
training in secret writing and communications to assist him in reporting
on our objectives in Cuba., He is now in Havana from where he plans
to travel to read of interest to us.
The Chief of the Danish Intelligence Service has agreed to
cooporate with us on Cuban intelligence operations. He has identified
several sources aboard ships transitting Cuban ports and has arranged
for their periodic briefing and debriefing.
4. The Norwegian Intelligence Service has also agreed to cooperdre
Usin establish
se officer "centers" in Norway and Kiel, Germany, to
handle Norwegian Merchant Marine sources who call at Cuban ports.
7
5. The Madrid Station Cuban refugee debriefing center is now
in operation and results of the first interrogations are being reviewed
SECRET

at
SECRET
3
for dissemination. The most interesting and Informative refugee thus
far is the brother of Amando Hart, the Cuban Minister of Education and
member of the twenty-five man ORI Central Committee. The center is
also collecting travel and personal documents which may be used for
agent operatione.
6. We received valuable data on Cuban trade from the debriefing
of a former official of the Ministry of Commerce who defected in Canada
wane informed in
the end of March We had beening February by CIA sources
that this official was disaffected and wished to work against Castro. We
contacted him and attempted unsuccessfully to induce him to return to
Cuba as our agent. We have since expedited his travel to Miami where
he is being interrogated.
7. We are in contact with Eva Matos, the sister of Huber Matos,
former associate of Fidel Castro, who broke with Fidel and has been
in jail on the Isle of Pines since 1960. Although there is no practical
method of effecting the escape or release of Huber at present, we will
continue contact with his sister, who maintains correspondence with
Huber through his father and his wife who are in Cuba.
CAC INFORMATION REPORTS
Following are highlights from selected interrogations of Cuban
refugees processed through the Caribbean Admission Center (CAC) at
SECRET
AS
ward
porBlin

SECRET
Opa-locka, Florida This information is secured entirely from un-
trained observers and is presented partly as original unconfirmed data
and partly as a supplement to intelligence already received from controlled
reliable sources All CAC information is screened for use in the daily
During the past week
1309
and weekly Cuban summaries
Qwere proreeand
Cuban refugees through Miami, prepared 263 preliminary interrogation
reports and disseminated 135 information reportsшек
8. Numerous reports confirm that all towns have been partitioned
15.
into 'blocks" infiltrated by communist informants under the direction of
also
block chiefs of the Comite de Defensa." The informant system
utilizes
hampion data procured from the telephone monitoring switchboards
established in the telephone centrals of every town. One refugee from
the Cuban Telephone Company described a switchboard panel in the
''Principe plant" in Havana which was monitoring "20 or 30 positions."
These informants, their chiefs, members of the militia, G-2, "chivatos"
(provocation agents), and other Castro supporters are now generally
labeled by the populace as communists rather than Castroists.
9. While the network of informants protects the home front,
officials of the National Directorate of the Integrated Revolutionary
Organization (ORI) are increasingly occupied with the export of Castroist-
communism to the Western Hemisphere. Flight manifests of Cubana
Airlines show that 'hundreds of Latin Americans are being brought to
SECRET

SECRET
5
Cuba for training and indoctrination." In addition to regular commercial
transportation, charter flights to service these persons are being run
thrice monthly throughout South America. In order to avoid Cuban visas
and entry-exit stamps in their passports, these persons are given visas
on a separate sheet of paper. In Cuba all arrangements are made for
them by the Instituto Cubano de Amistad con los Pueblos (ICAP).
10. Soviet. military equipment has been reported in increasingly
larger quantities and wider disbursement. One refugee said that he
saw 20 or 25 wheel-mounted Soviet 100 mm field guns M-55 (identified
from photographs) at a militia camp at Miranda near Camaguey.
. Shortages of certain essential food items have resulted in
widespread protests and, in a few instances, to open action by those
directly affected. A group of '13 to 15 women" reportedly waylaid a
milk truck, overpowered the driver, and each carried off two liters
of milk.
12. Refugees described the existence of three resistance organiza
tions, allegedly widespread in membership but limited in action. One,
- the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionario Militar (MRRM) is a
group which has broken away from the Movimiento de Recuperacion
Revolucionario (MRR). Reportedly, its objective is to apprehend key
MRRM is organized in
Castro leaders when the time is appropriate
all provinces except Matanzas and Camaguey where the movement has
SECRET

SECRET
now begun to develop a following. The second organisation, the Movi-
miento Democratico Cristiano (MDC), is described as oriented along
traditional Christian democratic lines. It is said to have a national
coordinator, a national executive, provincial, military and political
coordinators, and resistance chiefs." They claim that military and
counter-revolutionary activities have been limited because of lack of
equipment. A third organization, the Unidad Revolucionario (UR),
is reported to be carrying out the sabotage of sugar fields by burning,
using a small incendiary device made of gelatin, match heads, potassium
permanganate tablets, and glycerine.
SECRET198-10005-10018
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form Date: 6/24/201

Agency Information
AGENCY: ARMY
RECORD NUMBER: 198-10005-10018
RECORD SERIES: CALIFANO PAPERS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Information
ORIGINATOR: MULTIPLE
FROM:
TO:
TITLE:
DATE: 00/00/0000
PAGES: 123
SUBJECTS: ARMS SMUGGLING, CUBA
LATIN AMERICA SECURITY
CUBAN SPONSORED SUBVERSION
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Secret
RESTRICTIONS: 4
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 10/07/1997
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 30. Assorted documents related to Cuban material support of
Communist subversives in Latin America.

v9.1
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 12
Page 1

AND FROM CUBA
ARMS SHIPMENTS
TO

NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 2
SECRET
ARMS SUTPИT
General:
Arms smuggling is one of the "facts of life" in Latin
America and has been engaged in by dissident elements for many years..
Reports of Castro involvement in these activities have been frequent since
Aly after his seizure of power early in 1959. None of these reports
er been proven. With the arrival of large quantities of Soviet Bloc
arms in 1959, Cuba recovered all U.S. arms in the hands of the populace
arms in the hends of the populace
and made it a crime punishable by death to have possession of weapons of
U.S. manufacture. The U.S. aras furnished under the MAP to forser Cuban
governments with large stocks which could be shipped to subversive groups
Identification of these arms with Cuba would be
extremoly difficult.
TAB
1
Revorte of Method of Operation
This Tob contains five items: (1) Two reports alle@ging arms
amiggling by fishermen and by means of food products shipped to
Latin Azerica; (2) A report which indicates that a Cuben erma
enche discovered in Brasil to not of Cuban origin; and (3) Tvo
reports concerning a Cuban arsenal purportedly being used to
supply arms for an invasion of some Caribbean country or an
invasion of South America.
2
Reports of Arms Smuggling
This Tab contains a number of items reporting arms smuggling to
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Venezuela, British Cuiona and
Prasil. Note particularly the top item in which the British
indicate the numerous reports on ams smuggling to British
SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 3
SECRET
Qulana are without foundation and the second iten which
refutes the report contained in the Life Magazine article
of 8 February.

NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 4
SECRET
O
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 5
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs.
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is, prohibited by law.
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CLATAAC-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
EXPORTIN
COUNTRY CUBA/LATIN AMERICA REPORT NO. TDCS DB23/653,152
SUBJECT POSSIBLE CONCEALMENT OF WEAPONS DATE DISTR. 6 FEBRUARY 1963
FOR SHIPMENT TO LATIN AMERICA

DATE OF LATE 1962 PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
INFO.
REFERENCES IN 62553
PLACE & UNITED STATES (4 FEBRUARY 1963) 35871
DATE ACO.
APPRAISAL 6 FIELD REPORT NO.
-3
8

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
SOURCE U.S. OWNER (C) OF A MARINA, FROM A FORMER CUBAN AIR FORCE OFFICER,
FROM THE BROTHER OF AN EMPLOYEE OF A CANNERY IN SAN CRISTOBAL.

1. IN LATE 1962 A DAY-SHIFT EMPLOYEE AT A CANNERY IN SAN
CRISTOBAL, PINAR DEL RIO PROVINCE, FOUND A HAND GRENADE WRAPPED
IN NYLON AND BEDDED IN SHREDDED COCONUT IN A CAN WHICH HAD FELT
UNUSUALLY HEAVY. (FIELD COMMENT: IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE
CAN HAD GONE THROUGH THE CANNING PROCESS AND HAD BEEN SEALED.)
AS A RESULT OF HIS DISCOVERY THE WORKER WAS ALMOST FIRED. ONE
OF THE MILITIA GUARDS AT THE CANNERY SAID THAT AMMUNITION AND
OTHER EQUIPMENT IS REGULARLY CANNED AND SHIPPED TO LATIN
AMERICAN COUNTRIES. A SPECIAL NIGHT SHIFT WORKS AT THE PLANT.
2. (FIELD COMMENT: AN UNTESTED SOURCE REPORTED IN EARLY
OCTOBER 1962 THAT IN JULY 1962 A STORY WAS CIRCULATING IN SAN
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS GROUP I
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L Excluded fram automatic
downgrading and
CONTROLLED DISSEM declassification
STATE/INRD ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC YATI USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR 081 00 FBI
STATE/DIR REPCINCLANT INS EXO
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
FORM (15-20)
5-62 1Kb OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 6
C
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS IN 62553
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L TDCS DB-3/653,152 35871
PAGE 2
CONTROLLED DISSEM

ANDRES, AN ISLAND POSSESSION OF COLOMBIA, THAT A PISTOL HAD
BEEN FOUND EARLIER CONCEALED INSIDE A FROZEN CHICKEN WHICH
HAD BEEN PART OF A SHIPMENT RECEIVED FROM CUBA.)
3. FIELD DISSEM: CINCARIB, CINCLANT.

NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 7
END OF MESSAGE
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
CONTROLLED DISSEM
SECRET
NO FOR CISSEM
An arms cache of weapons and ammunition recently discovered at the
Idgas Camponesas guerrilla training center in the interior of the
Brasilien state of Goias is believed by US Embassy and CAS officers to
be of Brazilien rather than Cuban arms, despite a Brazilien newspaper
suggestion that they were Cuben. There were also discovered about 125
copies of Communist publications including Che Guevara's well-known
treatise on "Querrilla Warfare". The training center was described as
organized according to that book. A confidential report on the discoveries
added that "members of the center went to be the Brazilian equivalent
of those who fought in the Bierre Maestra and so bring the hard Chinese-
Cuban type revolution to Brazil." Some 90 to 95 persons in the locality
are reported members of or sympathetic to the Ligas Camponesas activities,
but only 2 of the 24 for whom warrents were issued have yet been taken
into custody. (Am Emb, Rio de Janeiro 1122, 10 December, CONFIDENTIAL,
and CIA, Brasilia, IN 33026, 11 December, SECRET NOFORN)

NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 8
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
INFORMATION!
ORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Export Rev.
The material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Lava Tie
18, U.8.0. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM Wit Proce
COUNTRY Cuba/USSR/Latin America REPORT NO. CS-3/530,898
SUBJECT 1. Use of Soviet Fishing Boats DATE DISTR. 11 December 1962
to Transport Arms to Latin
America
NO. PAGES 1
2. Belgian Arms Dealer in Habana
REFERENCES RD-W-2107
Paras. 1 & 2: October 1962; RD-ACQ-01258
DATE OF Para. 3: August 1962
INFO... Paras. 1, 2: France, Paris;
PLACE & Para. 3: Spain, Madrid 38957
DATE ACQ. Paras. 1, 2: 23 November 1962; FIELD REPORT NO.
Para. 3: 12 October 1962
BOURCE:
1. Paras. 1 & 2: An official French service; Para. 3: CC-1197,
2.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
Cuban refugee (F), a former employee of the Cuban diplomatic
service, who visited Santiago de Cuba in August 1962,
Appraisal of Content: 3.

1. Soviet fishing boats, under cover of fishing Atlantic waters,
are transporting contraband arms to Latin American countries.
The boats are met outside the territorial waters of those
countries, and arms are transferred in small quantities.
On board the Soviet boats are only Soviets and a very few
Cubans or other Latin Americans who talk with those who
pick up the arms. The arms being delivered are of American
manufacture, including those obtained during the Batista
regime and those taken during the Playa Giron invasion. The
Soviet fishing boats also carry propaganda and pamphlets
containing, military instructions, the same type of material
being sent by diplomatic pouch from Mexico.
2. A Belgian in Habana who says he represents a Belgian firm,
has offered the Cuban Government any type and nationality
of arms for payment in dollars. The Belgian has made a
similar offer of sale of arms to a representative of an
anti-Castro group in Habana.

3. In August 1962 a fisherman in Santiago de Cuba said that
on several occasions he had been forced by the Government
to use his boat for transporting small groups of men, in
civilian clothes, and supplies of arms. He also knew of
other fishermen who had been forced to do the same. The men
and arms were carried to small islands or transferred to other
boats at sea. Such trips sometimes lasted as long as four or
five days. The fisherman did not know the purpose or final
destination of the men and arms.

STATE X ARMY X NAVY S-E-C-R-E-T GROUP I
NO FOREIGN DISSEM Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
X AIR XINSA X OCR X DIA X FBI 2
COAST GUARD X XANA X
REPCINCLANT CINCARIB #
(Notes Washington distribution indicated by "X", Field distribution by "#")
NFORMATION DIVORT
ARAMA DNWORT
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 9
COUNTRY: CUBA
SECRET
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CIA INFORMATION REPORT
Eyplant & Rev
CS-3/532,138
26 December 1962
SUBJECT: IDENTIFICATION OF CUBAN VESSELS ALLEGEDLY PREPARED TO INVADE A
CARIBBEAN COUNTRY
DATE OF INFO: 28 NOVEMBER 1962
SOURCE: TRAVELING SALESMAN (F)
APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 3
HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ACCORDING TO TDCS-3/530,589, DATED 6 DECEMBER 1962, AS
OF MID-NOVEMBER TWO CUBAN SHIPS LOADED WITH PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT WERE SAMY
SAID TO BE PREPARED FOR AN INVASION OF HAITI. SOURCE SAID HE WOULD PROVIDE THE
NAMES OF THE SHIPS AND THEIR DEPARTURE DATE.
THE FRUCUBA AND THE FUNDADOR, CUBAN-FLAG VESSELS, WERE DOCKED AT THE ARSENAL
DOCKS IN CASABLANCA (HABANA) IN LATE NOVEMBER. THESE KEKS VESSELS WERE SCHEDULED
:
TO PARTICIPATE IN AN INVASION OF SOME CARIBBEAN COUNTRY.
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 10
SECRET
CUBA
ARMS SHIPMENTS
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL Eyport
Stockpile of War Hateriel for Latin 19 Jamary 1962
America (C)
1 of 1
Barly Janmory 1962 Nane
Habana, c/a 7 January 62 DIJ
LUJ 316/36-6-62 DUJ
BUJ-43-62
1. Source reports an arsenal or stockpiling of war materiel at Casablanca, a
Wabma District, northeast shore of Hebana Bay, Mebana Province.
2. Source has heard this materiel is targeted for an invasion of South America.
CONFID'EN TIAL
OPNS
BRANCH
CONFIDENTIAL
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEARS
NTAVUS NOT AUTO
MATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 11
Venezuela Uncovers Communist Arms Cacne-
The Venezuelan Government in a raid on a small
village near Caracas on 5 January -- uncovered a
large cache of arms and equipment which it claims
belonged to the pro-Castro Armed Forces of National
Liberation, reputed to be emerging as a para-
military arm of the Venezuelan Communist Party.
Several tons of explosives and large quantities
of hand bombs, arms, and ammunition were seized as well
as a nearby clandestine Communist radio
transmitter. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
SOURCE: TDCS 533,071 (S/NFD); FBIS (OUO); PRESS

10 Jan 63
DIA Intelligence Bulletin
(REVERSE BLANK)
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 12
Page 9
2
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 13
ARMS SHIPMENTS
12 Feb 63 "All the information available to Her Majesty's Government
and to the British authorities in British Guiana indicates that there is
no truth whatever in the continuing reports that arms are being shipped
to the colony from Cuba. Similar stories have appeared from time to time
in the past, but upon examination all have been found to be without
foundation."
(British Embassy in US to Reuters, AP and UPI),

NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 14
N
12 February 1961
Sighter:
shipe put out from Mariel (Cuba) only last week with holds
loaded with weapons sent by Castro to British Guiana."
A debrief report of a Cuban national who arrived at Port Everglades
on 25 January (90) Comitted time following statement:
I was told by an assistant only trapactor for the fort of Havana
that on 14 January 1963 two launches caprained by a man with what
appeared to be an Italien accent had departed from the Le Coubre
wharf (Marana).
Anifest on ship indicated the dentination was
However, the ship inspector had been told by the
Launches were loaded with ar

TD/00-K-3249316 DTG 2818052
3. The following information may refer to this arme shipment. Aen
tested CLA course, a member of the Communist Party of Colombia in
Call, has stated hat daring a conversation on 5 January 196) betwe
Amado de Jeans Zapata, member of the Department of Valia Regional
Committee of the Communist Party of Colombia (PCC), and P.1, Plata,
& Cuban deep-cover agent working with the seventh of January Worker-
Student - Peasant Movement (MOEC), in Colombia and Vonszuela, Plata
said that the MOLC ta not a ceal movement but rather a part of Latin
American concept which is twing assisted by Castro and the Cuban Govern
meat, to saidho has been in Call for one year on a ajocial assignment
from the top leadara in Cuba to nes that artos, propaganda, and instruc
tions from Vanesuela, originating in Cuba, get into the hands of the MOEC
groups
at for MOCC in due to arrive from
(Greats, capital of the Departe
In on the Venesuelan bordar and
en two countries.j
Ref RD-0-2107
CLA Report
0

SECRE
5. Another report may a100 zlos to thio asmo shipment, According
to information dated | February 1969 from a CIA searce and appraicod
by the CLA preparing dlico as possiblo true, Pedro MATOS, who
together with the throomsumber ragional command committee of tho
Partido Comunieta de Vonarsela (PCV) in the stato of Zulia is
responsible for PCV arme mattero in thai state, said recently that
the party is awaiting a chipment of arms from Cuba and Praemi bat
that the cast date of arrival is still minowa.
CIA Report TDCS-3/936,941, ad 9 Feb 63 Aof IN 64876

6. Replies to DIA SICR's ca thie cubject from NSA and CNO do not
Indicate any vessels departing Havana on or after 14 Jasmary beand
for British Cuians, nor do Kate Department queries to Georgetowi,
British Guiana indicate the arrival of any arme.. No reperts havo
been received from service attaches in Venesuela er frem curces in
Panama concorning this particular mater.

Project Officer!
CDR Barton

SECRE

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
CORIOLINTIME
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, The 18, U.S.C Socs.
3 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized
CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled Ing
COUNTRY NICARAGUA
authorized person is prohibited by low.
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

NICARAGUA HONDURAS/COSTA RICA / CUBA
SUBJECT PLANS TO LAND ARMS FROM. CUBA IN HONDURAS
DATE OF 9 JANUARY 1963
INFO.
REPORT NO. TDCS, -3/534,035
DATE DISTR. 16 JANUARY 1963 A
PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
REFERENCES IN50511
FIELD REPORT NO. NM-729
PLACE & NICARAGUA, MANAGUA (15 JANUARY 1963)
DATE ACO.
APPRAISAL 3

SOURCE THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
A NICARAGUAN JOURNALIST (C) FROM A NICARAGUAN OFFIC ANISAN JOSE FROM
CESAR AUGOSTO VILLAREAL CABEZAS
ACTION COPY
OPERATIONS AREA

1. ON 9 JANUARY 1963 CESAR AUGUSTO VILLAREAL CABEZAS, A NICARAGUAN
REVOLUT I ONARY LIVING IN SAN JOSE, SAID THAT HE WAS AWAITING INSTRUC
TIONS TO GO TO PUERTO CORTES, HONDURAS TO RECEIVE A SHIPMENT OF ARMS
WHICH WILL COME FROM CUBA ON THE "CORK_C", A MERCHANT VESSEL OF UNKNOWN
REGISTRY. HE SAID THAT THE INSTRUCTIONS TO GO TO PUERTO CORTES WILL
COME FROM CUBA THROUGH DR. EMILIO ORTEGA TAΡΙΑ.

2. THE "CORK_C" WILL UNLOAD THE ARMS AT CAYO COCHINO WHERE THEY
WILL BE RECEIVED BY GRIFFIN (FNU), WHO LIVES IN PUERTO CORTES.
GRIFFIN WILL DELIVER, THE ARMS TO VILLAREAL AT PUERTO CORTES.
3. THE ARMS WILL BE TAKEN FROM PUERTO CORTES TO PUEBLO NUEVO,
CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
こ
GROUP I
Excluded from automathe
downgrading and
declassification
STATE/INR DIA AF/MY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR 081 00
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
DA IN 8112

FORM
1Kg OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
CONFIDENTIAL
0000
NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 17
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
TDCS-3/534,035
IN 50511
PAGE
2
NICARAGUA BY VILLAREAL, JULIO VELASQUEZ VELEZ, AND 'DR. HERNAN SILVA
ARGUELLO WHERE, THEY WILL BE TURNED OVER TO DR. EMILIO FLORES OBREGON,

4. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE DATE OF ARRIVAL OF THE "CORK C" IS UN_
KNOWN. CARLOS FONSECA AMADOR, NICARAGUAN COMMUNIST GUERRILLA LEADER
IN HONDURAS, HAS RECEIVED ARMS FROM CUBA BY THE SAME SYSTEM.)
FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY CINCARIB CINCLANT.
ACTION ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO DCSOP
DA IN 8112

CONFIDENTIAL
END OF MESSAGE
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CONFIDENTIAL
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 18
0000
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information criecting the Natione Datense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title is us. Secs.
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which-in any hanner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
MI SECRET
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
(When Filled In) 1963 FEB 9 11 41

NTRY VENEZUELA REPORT NO. TDCS-3/536,942
DIAAP-3
JECT PCO BLE SHIPMENT OF ARMS FROM CUBA AND DATE DISTR. 9 FEBRUARY 1963
PANAMA TO WESTERN VENEZUELA
PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

OF
1 FEBRUARY 1963 REFERENCES IN 64876
10
VENT JELA, MARACAIBO (1 FEBRUARY 1963)
CE &
DATE ACO.
PPRAISAL 2 FIELD REPORT NO. HVC-2651
DURCE THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
A MEMBER (C) OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA IN MARACAIBO.
D

1. PEDRO MATOS, WHO TOGETHER WITH THREE MEMBER REGIONAL COMMAND
COMMITTEE OF THE PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE VENEZUELA (PCV, COMMUNIST PARTY
OF VENEZUELA) IN THE STATE OF ZULIA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PCV ARMS MATTERS
IN THAT STATE, SAID RECENTLY THAT THE PARTY IS AWAITING A SHIPMENT OF
ARMS FROM CUBA AND PANAMA BUT THAT THE EXACT DATE OF ARRIVAL IS STILL
UNKNOWN SOURCE COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THE LOCATIONS OF ARMS ARE KNOWN
ONLY ΤΟ ΜΑTOS AND THE REGIONAL COMMAND COMMITTEE, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE
REA AROUND LA CONCEPCION AND LA PAZ, TOWNS APPROXIMATELY SOUTHWEST
DND WEST, RESPECTIVELY, OF MARACAIBO CITY IN THE DISTRICT OF MARACA I BO,
SITES). (FIELD COMMENT: ACCORDING TO SOURCE, THE REGIONAL
ARE
SECRET GROUP
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS Excluded fram automatic
downgrading and
declassification
STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR 081 00
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
AAP-3
FORM
OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 19
(15-20)
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
SECRET IN 64876
:
An Filled In) TDCS-3/536,942
PAGE 2

OMMITTEE OF THE PCV IN THE STATE OF ZULIA HAD BEEN DISSOLVED AS OF EARLY
K
3'63 AND A THREE MEMBER REGIONAL COMMAND COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED).
2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT CINCARIB.
N
20
C
SECRET CLASSIFICATION
END OF MESSAGE
DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
AAP-3
CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION..
INCOMING MESSAGE
RETRANSMITTED TO: SAC, TAC,
CONAD, AFSC, MATS
AF IN: 50955 (24 Feb 62) K/eld... (per req Mr Kerp-CIN-
25Feb62)
ACTION: CIN-17 (18)
:
A/D: ARMY-2, NAVY-2, CMC-7, JCS-45, OSD-15
RC 41/24 FEB 62 OSD/SDLU-1, STATE-15, CIA-11, NSA-7
RO/RO/RO XPD-3, ISI-2, IDS-2 (112) (Risd by
PRIORITY. Mr Kerp-CIN-25Feb62)
231841Z
FM USAIRA MEXICO CITY
TO CSAF WASH DC
1127 USAF FAG FT BELVOIR VA//PROTECTED//
INFO CIARC ALBROOK AFB CZ
USAIRAS GUATEMALA BRAZIL VENEZUELA
BT
CONFIDENTIAL XX CITE CHARLIE DASH NINE SGD HARRIS: PARA
MILITARY REP OF EURHPEAN WESTERN NATION ACCREDITED MEXICO
REPORTED TWO TWO FEB HAVING RECD INFO FROM TWO DIFFERENT SOURCES
THAT CUBAN SHIPLOAD OF ARMS HAD DEPARTED EITHER SANTIAGO DE CUBA
OR BAHIA DE NIPE TWO XERO DEGREE FOUR FIVE MINUTES NORTH SEVEN FIVE
DEGREES FOUR XERO MINUTES WEST DURING WEEK OF ONE ONE TO ONE SEVEN
FEB PD SHIP REPORTEDLY HEADED FOR BRITISH GUIANA OR NORTHEAST BRAZIL
PD LOCAL EMB INTEL AGENCIES UNABLE CONFIRM PARA SCP DASH THREE
BT
AUTOMATICALLY CLASSIFIED
DOD DEM 5200:10

ACTION: AF, (ARMY ACSI)
INFO DCSOP ORD
DA IN 205836

AFHQ M 0-309a CONFIDENTIAL
NOV 30
PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM
MAY DE USED
SECRET
The British consul in Santiago de Cuba has informed Washington
and the Governor of British Guiana that two alleged US citizens,
John Allrem Johnson, aged 53, and his wife Margaret Frances Johnson,
were leaving Cuba on 31 December on the Cuban vessel BAHIA DE TANAMA
destined for Georgetown, British Guiana. On board with them were 17
cases in their name, including two large wood crates understood to be
"very similar to those recently unloaded from a Soviet Union ship
in Sentiago de Cuba." The British consul notes the unlikelihood of
US citizens' lesving Cuba in this manner, and the resulting doubt as to
their real identities and intentions. (British Foreign Office to
Washington, No. 9759, 31 December, 1962 (SECRET))
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 22
SECRET

INFORMATION LEPORT
INFORMATION REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National. Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage, Laws,: Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
COUNTRY Cuba/British Guiana REPORT NO. 00-K-3,210,102
SUBJECT Shipment of Weapons to British Guiana DATE DISTR. 21 Feb 62

NO. PAGES One
DATE OF
Dec 1962 REFERENCES
INFO. CD/00 Case 36159 H2/05676/G5
PLACE &
--; Dec 1962 Case 35662 78/IWW/DOM-81/CX
DATE ACQ.
SOURCE: THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
Cuban national, A 12 884 576, who arrived in the US on 3 Feb 1962.
Source is an electrical engineer and advisor to underground groups in Cuba.
[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office
of preparation.]

I was advised by a Cuban merchant marine officer that the Cuban freighter,
"Bahia de Nipe" left Cuba for British Guiana on 22 Dec 1961 with a cargo
shipment of weapons. The boxes containing this equipment were stored
in the bottom of the ship's hold and covered with mattresses and canvas.
A cargo of sugar bags was placed on top of the weapons.
-end-

NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 23
OUTCOING TELEGRAMY Department of State

INDICATE, COLLECT CHARGE TO 02147
FEB 6 10 16 AM "63
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE UNCLASSIFIED MESSAGE REFERRING
TO THIS MESSAGE BY CITE NUMBER
WILL BE DESIGNATED EFTO
36 Origia
ACTION: Anambassy GEORGETOWN 286
EUR
Info:
SS
G The Feb 8 edition of LIFE contains story on Cuba with following
SAL caption under photo of Russian freighter:
ARA
P
USIA QUOTE
SCA
NSC
INR But refugees aboard the Shirley Lykes said two ships put out from
CIA
Mariel (Cuba) only last week with holds loaded with weapons sent by
NSA
OSD Castro to British Guiana. UNQUOTE
ARMY
Would appreciate any available comment.
NAVY
END
AIR
RMR
1963

ACTION: STATE (ARMY ACSI)
INFO DCSOP, OSA, JCS
DA IN 827722
Drafted bys Telegraphie transmission and RUSK
EUR:BNA RTeppericje 2/5/63 classification approved by
Clearancesa
FORM DS-322 LIMITED OFFICIAL. USR REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED
UNLESS FUNCLASSIFIED".
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 24 000
INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State
54
Action CONFIDENTIAL Control: 4682
EUR 8 1013 Rec'd: February 7, 1963
1953 12:57 PM
13
Info
/SS
G FROM: Georgetown P
SAL TO: Secretary of State
ARA
P NO: 245, February 7, NOON
USIA
Reference: Department's 286 February 6.
SCA
NSC
Neither harbor master nor shipping companies have any
INR
knowledge Cuban ships en route Georgetown. Guiana Import-
CIA
Export agents for sales rice Cuba, states it is always
NSA
notified as soon as rice ships leave Cuba so that necessary
OSD
arrangements at RMB wharf can be made. It denies having
ARMY
received any notice recently. Governor also reports
NAVY
AIR negative results his inquiries.
MR
CONGEN has had numerous inquiries AP story mentioned TOUSI
18. Appreciate any clarification (not for release to press)
Department can give.
TEK/18 MELBY
CONFIDENTIAL REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 25
C
FBIS 84 OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PARIS AFP IN ENGLISH TO THE FAR EAST 1905 7 FEB 63 E
(EXCERPT) GEORGETOWN--BRITISH GUIANA IN A STATE OF NEAR PANIC
TODAY AFTER NEWSPAPERS AND RADIO STATIONS PUT OUT A
WASHINGTON NEWSPAPER REPORT THAT CUBA WAS SENDING TWO SHIPS
FULL OF SOVIET ARMS TO THIS COUNTRY. PREMIER CHEDDI JAGAN CALLED
THE REPORT FROM THE WASHINGTON EVENING STAR FANTASTIC AND UNFOUNDED.
LA SPOKESMAN IN THE HOME AFFAIRS MINISTRY SAID THE GOVERNMENT
EXPECTED NO ARMS FROM THE SOVIET UNION OR CUBA.
7 FEB 749P FG/OP

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State
INDICATE: COLLECT
Origia
GE TO CONFIDENTIAL 04289
CUDA
FEB 9 11 17 AM '63
59
ACTION: AmConGen GEORGETOWN 293

EUR
Info:
SS UrTel 245
SR intelligence
G Washington testdio agencies have no information to confirm
SP
alleged munitions shipments from Cuba to Georgetown.
SAL
ARA
E Story originated with caption current edition Life Magazine to
STR effect two Russian ships carrying munitions from Mariel, Cuba to BG.
P
USIA O'Leary of Washington Evening Star apparently seized on Life story
SCA
as basis Evening Star article. Unlikely any responsible US official
INR
CIA confirm story as O'Leary alleged in article.
NSA
If repeat if Department is asked by press, we plan say we have
OSD
ARMY no information but are making inquiries.
AVY
AIR
END
RMR
Drafted by: Telegraphic transmission and RUSK
EUR: ENA:RJTepper:ldd 2/8/63 classification approved by:
Clearances:
EUR/BNA - M.198-10007-10013
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date: 6/24/201

Agency Information
AGENCY: ARMY
RECORD NUMBER: 198-10007-10013
RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Information
ORIGINATOR:
FROM:
TO:
TITLE: CONTROL OF TRAVEL TO AND FROM CUBA
DATE: 00/00/0000
PAGES: 17

SUBJECTS:
CONTROL OF TRANSFER OF FUNDS
CONTROL OF MOVEMENT OF CUBAN PROPAGANDA
CONTROL OF CLANDESTINE MOVEMENT OF GUERRILLAS AND ARMS
EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION
SURVEILLANCE OF CUBAN DIPLOMATIC, COMMERCIAL AND CULTURAL MISSIONS
STRENGTHENING OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAPABILITIES
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Secret
RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 04/09/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: Califano Papers, Box 4, Folder 6. Draft report concerning control of access to and surveillance of Cuba.

NO STATE OBJECTION
TO DECLASSIFICATION
BY DATE 2/14/16

Department of the Army EO 13526
Declassify Exclude Exempt
Authority
Refer To
Review Date UGS By Wil

v9.1
NW 50955 DocId: 32424006 Page 1

22
1. Control of Travel to and from Cuba
Central Intelligence Agency
a. Developed highly useful information on frequency
2 of 9 copies
GROUP 1
xcluded from automatig
mgrading and
eclassification
of Cuban "chartered" flights to Brazil, names and nationalities
of passengers and crew, and lax measures of control followed
by Brazilian authorities. Transmitted this information to
dation chiefs in the Latin American countries of the non-
Brasiliens travelling on these flights.

b. Maintained close watch over travel to and from
Cuba. See Annex B for table of known travel of Latin Americans
during July and August.
As a result of information furnished by him by the
CIA Station in Buenos Aires and with the Station's urging, the
Argentine Minister of Interior indicated that he would make
every effort to prevent Argentine delegates from attending the
International Union of Architects Congress in Havana.

d. At the urging of the CIA Station and the Embassy
the Bolivian Minister of Interior issued in mid-July an order
prohibiting the granting of travel permits to Cuba on other
bloc countries to Bolivian nationals.

NW 50955 DocId:32424006 Page 2
C
SECRE

SECRET
e. Fartly as a result of the efforts of the CIA
station in Santiago, the Government of Chile prohibited the
entry into Chile of organizers of the Cuban sponsored Second
Latin American Youth Congress, which had been scheduled to take
place in Santiago in August. This no one of the factors which
led to postponement of the Congress.

f. After considerable prodding by the CIA Station
and the Embassy the Minister of Public Security of Costa Rica
bas presented legislative proposals to the Costa Rican Assembly
which will require ell persons intending to travel to Comunist
countries to have their travel approved by a newly created
Costa Rican security agency.

g. CIA Station in Mexico City developed information
concerning the clandestine arrival of passengers in Vera Crus
on Cuban merchant ships. Efforts are being made to obtain more
information and to encourage stricter controls by the Nexican
authorities.

Department of State
a. Instructed Embassy Conakry to try to persuade
Guineen authorities to deny use of airport facilities by flights
on Habana-Moscon route. These efforts achieved a temporary
withholding of permission for future regular flights, at least
NW 50955 DocId: 32424006 Page 3

SECRET
until such time as the Soviets develop their own refueling facilities
at Conakry.

b. Instructed Embassy Rio to approach Brazilian
authorities to express our deep concern at the growing frequency
of Cuban non-scheduled flights to Brazil and request their
cooperation in curbing then. Also instructed our Embassies
in several Latin American countries to work with CIA station
chiefs in furnishing the names of nationals of those countries
travelling on these flights to local authorities and urging
then: (1) to institute tighter controls on their own citizens
travelling to Cuba, and (2) to express their concern to the
LAN GOVERNMENT
Brazil'Over Cuban use of Brazil as a way station
for transporting subversives.

c. As a result of representations made to the British
government about Cuban flights to the Cayman Islands carrying
Latin American subversives, the British developed an administrative
scheme which will effectively prohibit the use of British
Caribbean dependencies by Cubana as transit points for passengers.
The British intend to require transit visas of passengers passing
through their areas, and to reject applications for such visas
except in certain special cases. Persons not possessing visas
would be prevented from leaving their aircraft, or would be
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returned to their point of origin.

d. Instructed Embassy Mexico City on August 29 to
inform the Mexican airline CA that the United States is
opposed to a proposal that CMA operate charter flights to carry
refugees from Havana to Central America. CA, as a result,
stated that they had no intention of proceeding further with
this project.

Instructed U.S. Nissions in Curaces and the la gue
to investigate a report that KIM was planning to renew eb
scheduled Curacao-Habana flights and to reiterate US opposition
to resumption of air service to Cuba, KIM assured our Embassy
that there is no plan to initiate service, scheduled or non-
scheduled, co Habans.

f. Instructed Embassy Octava to express our strong
objections to a proposal that a Cubang charter flight pick up
a second group of U.S. students in Montreal to fly then to Cuba,
The flight was not authorized.

g. Instructed Consulate Georgetown to investigato
Cubang approaches to secure flight facilities. Mission reported
on August 1 that the Governor had no knowledge of any talks
between the B.G. Ministry of Communications and the Cuban Govern-
ment regarding landing rights for Cubana planes. The Covernor
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C

Indicated his intention to inquire further and to keep ua
advised. London reported that neither the Cuban sor the British
Gulane Governments had raised the issue of landing rights with
H.M.C.

h. Urged
governments of Mexico, Canada, Jamaica
and the Netherlands to refuse to assist the Cuban governmen
in its efforts to find a short route for return of the 50 American
students who illegally travelled
uba. Also informed Pan
American Airways that we were opposed to e Cuban request for
a PAA charter flight to fly the students from Habana to New York,

1. Instructed our missions at Port of Spain and
Barbados on several occasions to approach these governmente to
the concern of the U.S. et indications of Cuban interest
in the use of their aviation facilities.

Embassy Port of Spain discussed with the Foreign Secretary
COTT to control move
of Trinidad various legal moves available that would enable
ts of aircraft within their territory,
citing examples of such controle instituted by Mexico, Canada
and Ireland. He indicated receptiveness to the proposal that
the list of suggestions be made available to the aviation officials

J. During a previous reporting period Embassy Santiago
C
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urged the government of Chile to refuse visas to Cuban delegatës
to a preparatory meeting planning for the II Latin Americon
Youth Congress scheduled for August in the Chilean capital.
Inability of Cuban delegates to obtain Chilean visas for this
announcing during August that the meeting had been postponed.
meeting is one of the contributing factors to the Cuban sponsors

k. Sent general instructions to our missions in countries
then to urge the cooperation of governmental authorities in
preventing or discouraging the attendance of their citizens to
which participate in the Internatioml Union of Architects asking
the VII UIA Congress in Habana, September 29-October 4, 1963.
Followed this up with instructions to individual posts to try
where feasible to dissuade architects from free world countries
from serving on the jury for the selection of a Bay of Pigs
monument.

1. Urged Canadian Government to block a plan to
commence food parcel shipments to Cuba, on a Cou
1 basis,
that would have required the establishment of scheduled weekly
charter flights by Canadian planes.
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2. Control of Movement of Cuban Propaganda
Contral Intellicence Agency
Responding to the urging of the CIA Station police
of the State of Guanabara seized large quantities of propa-
ganda brought into Brazil by passengers on the special Cubana
flights. For example, somm 50 pounds of printed propaganda,
vas taken from the various passengers who arrived on the 16
August Cubana flight.

3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas end Arms
Department of Defence
*
Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba
during the month of July at the same rate and with the same
cmphasis as prior to 1 July 1963.

b. Continued to maintain U.S. Forces, primarily from
within the Atlantic Command, available to assist other Caribbean
governments in the interception of suspicious craft in
territorial waters, as might be requested. No such requests were
received from any other government during the period covered by
this report. However, U.S. Forces did keep track of the
location of the Soviet merchant freighter MITCHURINSK, which
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was suspected of carrying subversives and arms from Cuba to
British Guiana in wid-July. MITCHURINSK was under U.8.
surveillance from its departure from Havana until United
Kingdom forces assumed the task of keeping this ship under
surveillance upon its approach to Georgetown, British Guiana.
Subsequently, British police search of MITCHURINSK in British
Gulane vaters revealed nothing of a suspicious nature.

Central Intelligence Agency
At the repeated urging of the CIA Station in Lima
the Peruvian Government late in August published a new anti-
terrorists lav providing a penalty of no less than five years
Imprisonment for persons who particiate in guerrilla activities
or in the illegal manufacture of weapons or explosives.

The Peruvian National Intelligence Service is working
on a lead furnished by the CIA Station in Lima concerning a
200 ton vessel reportedly involved in arme traffic.

Department of State
Instructed our Consulate General in Georgetown to
investigate reports that commercial cargoes (which could conceal
illicit arms traffic out of Cuba) bad developed between British
Gulans and Cuba. Investigations to date have been negative.
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4. Control of Transfer of Funds
Department of State
Cooperated with the Foreign Assets Control Office of
the Treasury Department in developing blocking controls with
respect to Cuba which went into effect on July 9, 1963.

5. Strengthening of Counter-Insurgency Capabilities
Department of Defence
*
Continued the installation of military comunica-
tions Facilities in Latin America. Operational dates for the
multi-channel radio stations to be installed in Managua,
Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa, Honduras have been delayed to 15
October 1963 and 15 December 1963, respectively because of new
engineering and contractual requirements. Negotiations are
continuing with Colombia and Ecuador for installation of U.S.
military radio facilities. Completion of a now commercial trans-
isthmian cable in the Panama Canal Zone within the coming month
is expected to improve military comunications within the
United States and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command.

b. Continued the surveillance of Cuba by U.S. Forces,
reporting as before to U.S. commanders, organizations and agencies.
SECRET
C
NW 50955 DocId: 32424006 Page 10

Reports
of surveillance have been disseminated to all who have
a requirement to know.

Established a 24 hour per day, 7 days per week duty
watch at the U.S. Military Groups in the Caribbean countries in
conjunction with implementation of the military alerting system.
Continued efforts to staff the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence
Center with properly cleared, trained personnel (this center is
the military focal point for relaying information concerning
the movement of subversives). Filled, partially, the authorized
billets in the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center and
cook under consideration the problem of an increase in the billet
structure in the Center. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern
Command together with his intelligence officer visited Honduras
and Nicaragua and determined that no significant problems existed
which would interfere with effective operations in those
countries.

d. Action previously initiated by the Commander, U.S.
Naval Forces, Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) to establish a Small
Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT) as a contribution to
the Caribbean Surveillance System is progressing satisfactorily.
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-11-
Permanent assignment of U.S. Coast Guard personnel to SCIATT
in the Canal Zone has been approved and the U.S. Coast Guard
has taken appropriate implementing sctions.

e. During the period of this report, the SCIATT con-
ducted an on-the-job training course at Puntarenas, Costa
Rica. Training was given to 13 members of the Guardia Civil
of Costa Rica who were either newly assigned to the 40 foot
Coast Guard utility boats (CGUBe) or were to be assigned as
replacement crew members.

4. A quarterly inspection and evaluation of the CGUBS
provided other Central American countries was conducted during
the period 17 to 31 August by a mobile training tean (MIT)
made up of SCIATT personnel.

g. Continued efforts to improve the internal security
of Latin American armies through the provision of Intelligence
Advisors. Presently there are such advisora assigned to 14
Latin countries, emphasizing counterintelligence and counter-
subversion.

h. During the reporting period MTTs conducted training
in counterinsurgency for the armed forces of Colombia, Bolivie,
Venezuela, Peru and El Salvador.
ECRET
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1. Civic Action HITs were sent to Guatemala, Bolivia,
Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica and Ecuador.

6. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion
Gontzal Intelligence Agency
CIA Stations throughout Latin America continued in a
great majority of countries to furnish to the local internal
security organizations with whom they are in liaison informa-
tion concerning travelers to and from Cuba, as well as such
information es came to CIA's attention concerning the movement
of funds, arms and propagande material. In many instances, the
furnishing of information to the internal security service by
the CIA Station was paralleled by the furnishing of similer
information to the foreign office by the Ambassador or his
representative. The response to this information has varied
greatly. The Central American countries, in general, began to
pay attention to the information and take action on it. At the
during the reporting period
other extreme, the Brazilian Government/showed little inclination
to follow up on the information.

Department of State
