WHO HOLDS THE POSITION OF DEPUTY PROVINCE CHIEF FOR ECONOMIC MATTERS,
A POSITION NOT NORMALLY FOUND IN PROVINCIAL ORGANIZATIONS, IS THE
REAL POWER IN THE PROVINCE. CAC WAS ASSIGNED TO THE PROVINCE BY
NGO DINH CAN, BROTHER OF PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM AND POLITICAL
LEADER OF CENTRAL VIETNAM, FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF BRINGING ALL
MAJOR PROVINCIAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES UNDER THE CONTROL OF CAN AND
HIS FACTION IN THE CAN LAO PARTY BO DESCRIBED THE DEPUTY PROVINCE
CHIEF FOR ADMINISTRATION, YANG (FNU), AS A GOOD MAN BUT COMPLETELY
LACKING IN AUTHORITY.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM CINCPAC
PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION.

CONFIDENTIAL
END OF MESSAGE
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
176-10036-10079
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10079
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE: Possible severence of Cambodian
DATE: 9/17/1962
PAGES: 1
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 196: Vietnam, 9/62. Box 2
---
TELEGRAM IN.ORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENG GRACENESTROY
RETAIN U
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Tille
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
(When Filled In)

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM CAMBODIA.
REPORT NO. TDCS-3/522,837

SUBJECT POSSIBLE SEVERANCE OF CAMBODIAN-.
SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
DATE DISTR. 17 SEPTEMBER 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE SLUTCH BUNDI
DUNGAN
DATE OF INFO. MID-SEPTEMBER 1962. REFERENCES KAYSEN
INLDYSEI
PLACE & VIETNAM, SAIGON (14 SEPTEMBER 1962). PETERSEN
DATE ACO. SCHLESINGER
APPRAISAL 3 FIELD REPORT NO. FVS045LUB
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE
SOURCE A SENIOR OFFICIAL (B) IN THE GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF VIETNAMESE LABOBINSON
KLEIN
KOMER
RASKIN
SAUNDERS

1. LE VAN DONG, FORMER MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE, SAID ON
14 SEPTEMBER 1962 THAT HE HAS BEEN ADVISED BY A RELIABLE SOURCE
IN CAMBODIA THAT THE ROYAL CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT /RKG/IS
PLANNING TO SEVER RELATIONS WITH SOUTH VIETNAM. THE DECISION
IS TO BE FORMALIZED AT A CABINET MEETING ON EITHER 19 OR 20
SEPTEMBER, AT WHICH TIME THE RKG MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
WILL REQUEST THE SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

2. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM
CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION.

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION. CONTROLS
END OF MESSAGE
GROUP I
Excluded from automaht
downgrading and
declasufication

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS -SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR: ORR 081 00 ΕΧΟ
STATE/DIR

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FORM
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176-10036-10085
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AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10085
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE: Vietnamese Communist Analysis of Efforts
DATE: 6/13/1962
PAGES: 2
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 196: Vietnam, 6/62. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
7
RETAIN OR DESTR

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information. affecting the National Dafensa of the United States within the moaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18 U.S.C. Secs.
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL 8MITH BUNI
DUNGAN
GILDNER
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM REPORT NO. TDCS -3/513,760- KAYSEN
:
DATE DISTR. 13 JUNE 1962
SUBJECT VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS
OF INCREASED US MILITARY AID TO
GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM
DATE OF 5 MAY 1962
INFO..
:
PLACE & VIETNAM, SAIGON (20 MAY 1962)
DATE ACO-IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THIS IS AN ACCURATE
APPRAISAL TRANSLATION OF A GENUINE COMMUNIST DOCUMENT
PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
REFERENCES
FILE
IN
FIELD REPORT NO.
FVS-7504,
PETERSEN
SCHLESINGE
TAYLOR
BELK
FORDDOTAT
KOMER
RASKIN
SAUNDERS
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
SOURCE AN OFFICIAL (C) IN THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, FROM A SOURCE DESCRIBED
AS HEAD OF AN INTELLIGENCE NET REPORTING DIRECTLY TO THE DEPUTY. MINISTER OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE.
Bundy
1. SET FORTH BELOW IS A TRANSLATION OF AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION
IN SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) AS VIEWED BY THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC). THE AUTHOR
OF THE ANALYSIS, WHICH WAS WRITTEN IN EARLY MAY 1962, IS A VC COMPANY COMMANDER
IN BA XUYEN PROVINCE..
:
::
2. THE REVOLUTION IN SVN IS PASSING NOW INTO THE PREPARATORY PHASE FOR
A GENERAL OFFENSIVE TO LIBERATE IT (SVN) AND SET UP A PEOPLE'S UNION DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNMENT, BUT AMERICAN INTERVENTION HAS POSTPONED THAT PHASE. THE US' HALF
SUCCESS IS DUE TO USE OF COUNTERGUERRILLA TACTICS, BUT MOPPING UP OPERATIONS WILL
LEAD TO DEFEAT BECAUSE (INDISCRIMINATE) KILLINGS WILL PUSH THE PEOPLE TOWARD THE
REVOLUTIONARY PARTY. IN THE FUTURE THE FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SVN, WITH

STATE
VTF
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
ARMY/ACSI
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
::
NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF
NSA
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL
NIC USIA
OCI
ONE
GROUP 1
Excluded frem automatich
downgrading and
declassification
OCR ORR 00 AID DIA
EXO)
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL TDCS-3/513,760 IN
PAGE TWO
ITS HIGH-SACRIFICE SPIRIT AND ITS HATE-AMERICA IDEALS, WILL GET. 90 PERCENT SUPPORT
FROM THE PEOPLE. ON THE MILITARY SIDE, THE US HAS USED ULTRA-MODERN MECHANIZED
WEAPONS TO DESTROY ARMED UNITS BY TACTICS OF AREA PACIFICATION. THUS HARRASSED,
THE VC ARE NEVER SECURE. THEIR POLICIES MUST NOW AIM AT THE INTERNAL SITUATION AND
AT UPHOLDING THE HARDSHIP-BEARING SPIRIT. MEANWHILE, VC ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS
DO NOT YET EXIST, BUT THE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN INSPIRED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT OF
THE PARTY. ECONOMICALLY, VC AGRARIAN REFORMS HAVE SOLVED THE LAND PROBLEM FOR THE
PEASANTS AND NOW CONSTITUTE THE FOOD SOURCE FOR THE TROOPS AND CADRES. (SOURCE
COMMENT. VC AGRARIAN REFORMS" REFER TO THE DE FACTO LAND EXPROPRIATIONS CONDUCTED
BY THE VIET. MINH DURING THE 1945-54 WAR.) FOREST AND SEA RESOURCES ARE STILL
SECONDARY AND BRING IN ONLY SOME SUPPORT IN THE FORM OF TAXES. THE VC ARE MEETING
GREAT DIFFICULTIES AT THE PRESENT TIME, BUT THE SVN PROBLEM WILL BE SOLVED BY
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND INTERNAL MILITARY MEASURES, I.E. STRONG ATTACKS. (SOURCE
COMMENT. THE SOLUTION THROUGH "INTERNATIONAL POLITICS" REFERS TO THE BELIEF THAT,
IF THE VC CAN MAINTAIN THE PRESENT RELATIVE STALEMATE LONG ENOUGH, THE US WILL TIRE
*:
OF THE STRUGGLE AND SEEK SOME KIND OF NEUTRALIST SOLUTION.)
4
3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY. NAVY AIR USMACV MAAGAID CINCPAC PACAF
PACFLT ARPAC
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
END OF MESSAGE
:
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER: 176-10036-10086
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM:
TO :
TITLE: Views... Possible Coup D'Etat
DATE: 6/15/1962
PAGES: 2
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 196: Vietnam, 6/62. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains Information affecting the National Defense of the United States, within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title: 18, U.S.C. Secs.
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which. In. any manner to an unauthorized: person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
V
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L.
COUNTRY
SOUTH VIETNAM
DUNGAN
REPORT NO. TDCS -3/513,973
SUBJECT
VIEWS OF COLONEL TON THAT XUNG KONYTHEN
GILDNER
POSSIBILITY OF A COUP D'ETAT PETERSEN
DATE DISTR. 15 JUNE 1962
SCHLESINGEIPRECEDENCE ROUTINE
DATE OF
INFO.
RETAIN LOR DESTROY
BELK
REFERENCES FILE IN
PLACE &
KOMER
DATE ACQ.
VIETNAM, SAIGON (3 JUNE 1962) AL
APPRAISAL
SEE BELOW
RASKIN FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-7484
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGSAREDEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
SOURCE AN AMERICAN OBSERVER (B); FROM COLONEL TON THAT XUNG.
APPR. IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT XUNG HOLDS THE VIEWS STATED; HOWEVER, THE CONTENTS OF.
THE STATEMENTS ARE CONSIDERED POSSIBLY TRUE.

1. COLONEL ΤΟΝ THAT XUNG, COMMANDER OF THE RANGER COMMAND, DURING A
3 JUNE 1962 LUNCHEON MEETING WITH TON THAT CHU, CHIEF OF PLEIKU PROVINCE, SAID
THAT THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM WERE GETTING TIRED OF THE PRESENT SITUATION AND
THAT SOME ACTION WAS GOING TO BE TAKEN TO CHANGE IT. THIS TIME, HOWEVER, THE
PLANS WERE NOT GOING TO BE COMMUNICATED TO THE AMERICANS BECAUSE THE UNITED
STATES, A BASICALLY LAW-ABIDING NATION, IS OPPOSED TO UNLAWFUL ACTS. SINCE A
COUP D'ETAT IS CONSIDERED BY AMERICAN OFFICIALS TO BE AN UNLAWFUL PROCESS, THE
US IS FORCED TO DISCOURAGE SUCH ACTIONS, AND THEREFORE, THE AMERICANS WILL NOT
HE NOTIFIED OF ANY FUTURE ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF THE VIETNAMESE TO UPSET THE
CURRENT REGIME UNTIL THE ACTION IS ACCOMPLISHED.

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL
STATE.ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF "NSA NIC USIA OCI ONE OCR LORR
EXO
VILF
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT ELEGRAM

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL TDCS-3/513,973
IN
PAGE EWO
2. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID CINCPAC
ARPAC PACFLT PACAF.
END OF MESSAGE
?

YELVIM OK DEZДВОД
:
BADEBA
CI DRES
DRЙСУИ
27112 ИВА
:
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-ALL
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL
176-10036-10087 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER: 176-10036-10087
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE: Vietnam Communist Activities
DATE: 8/23/1962
PAGES: 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 196: Vietnam, 8/62. Box 2

IYCK 146.6.1.0
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains Information affecting the National Dofonse, of the United States within the meaning of The Espionage Lake Titlo 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
FILE
REPORT NO. TDCS-3/520,365 SMITH-BUNI
SUBJECT : VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN THE DATE DISTR. 23 AUGUST 1962 LUNGAN
SAIGON AREA KILDUFF
PETERSEN..
DATE OF JUNE-JULY 19 RETAIN OR DESTROY PRECEDENCE ROUT INE IN-SCHLESINGE
INFO. 102.97
PLACE & VIETNAM, SAIGON (2 AUGUST 1962) REFERENCES BELK
DATE ACQ. FORRESTAL
APPRAISAL 3 FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-7843 JOHNSON
SOURCE THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVEN
AN OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM MILITARY SERVICE WHICH RECEIVED THE ITEMS KOMER
SEPARATELY FROM OTHER OFFICIAL SERVICES. RASKIN
SAUNDERS.

1. DURING THE LATTER HALF OF JUNE 1962 MORE THAN FIVE HUNDRED
UNARMED VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC) ENTERED THE SAIGON AREA AND WERE
LIVING IN THE HOMES OF FELLOW VC IN THE FOURTH AND EIGHT DISTRICTS
OF SAIGON. (FIELD COMMENT. THE ULTIMATE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION
MAY BE THE SAME AS THAT OF FVS-7681 (TDCS-3/517,156) WHICH REPORTED THAT
BETWEEN THREE AND FIVE HUNDRED VC TERRORISTS AND SABOTAGE AGENTS HAD BEEN
INFILTRATED INTO THE CAPITAL AREA.)
":
2. THE VC DISTRICT COMMITTEE FOR GO VAP (N 10-49, E 106-40) SENT
AN ARMED PLATOON TO THE CITY TO OPERATE AS SPECIAL OPERATIONS CELLS.

3. A VC CADRE, AFTER TAKING A TRAINING COURSE IN LOC THUAN, ΤΑΥ
NINH PROVINCE, WAS SENT TO SAIGON TO SET UP A BASE AMONG LABORERS
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CONFIDENTIAL
: NO FOREIGN DISSEM
GROUP I
Excluded from evtencils
downgrading and
STATE ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO DIA EX
A ID
TELEGRAM INFORMATION. REPORT TELEGRAM

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CONFIDENTIAL IN 1.0297
(When Filled In) NO FOREIGN DISSEM TDCS-3/520,365 PAGE 2

TO BE USED FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS.
4. FORTY VC GUERRILLAS BETWEEN 14 AND 16 YEARS OF AGE HAD COME
TO SAIGON TO CONDUCT SABOTAGE AND KIDNAPPINGS OF GOVERNMENT OF
:
VIETNAM AND U.S. PERSONNEL.

5. AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT SAID THAT BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN
TRONG DINH HAD BEEN APPOINTED COMMANDER OF THE SOUTH VIETNAM
LIBERATION ARMY IN ORDER TO LAUNCH A LARGE-SCALE ATTACK DURING THE
VC FALL AND WINTER CAMPAIGN. (FIELD COMMENT. POSSIBLY MAJOR
GENERAL NGUYEN TRONG VINH, DEPUTY OF NGHE AN PROVINCE TO THE SECOND
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE PEOPLES GOVERNMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM,
IS MEANT.)

6. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM
CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

CONFIDENTIAL END OF MESSAGE
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
176-10036-10088
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10088
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE: Indication of Planning
DATE: 11/20/1962
PAGES: 2
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 11/62. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
COUNTRY
SOUTH VIETNAM/NORTH VIETNAM
REPORT.NO. TDCS-3/528,813
SUBJECT
INDICATION OF PLANNING FOR THE
REOCCUPATION OF NORTH VIETNAM
DATE DISTR. 20 NOVEMBER 1962
PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE

DATE OF
INFO.
LATE OCTOBER 1962
REFERENCES
IN

PLACE &
VIETNAM, SAIGON (2 NOVEMBER 1962)
DATE ACO.
APPRAISAL 3
FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-8188
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
SOURCE A VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL (C) IN THE DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF INFORMATION; FROM A
VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL (F) IN THE MINISTRY FOR CIVIC ACTION.

1. ON 20 OCTOBER 1962 MINISTER FOR CIVIC ACTION NGO TRONG HIEU TOLD THREE OF
HIS ASSISTANTS THAT HE HAD BEEN DIRECTED TO ASSIST IN PLANNING FOR THE REOCCUPATION
OF NORTH VIETNAM. THE PLANNING WOULD PROGRESS THROUGH MANY STAGES, BUT THE THREE
ASSISTANTS WERE FIRST TO DRAFT A QUESTIONNAIRE THAT WAS TO BE FILLED OUT BY SELECTED
PEOPLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM. IN ADDITION TO THIS FORM, PEOPLE WHO FORMERLY LIVED IN
NORTH VIETNAM WOULD BE REQUIRED TO COMPLETE A SECOND QUESTIONNAIRE, WHICH WAS TO
PROVIDE INFORMATION ON ALL ACQUAINTANCES STILL KNOWN TO BE IN NORTH VIETNAM. THE
DRAFT QUESTIONNAIRE WAS LATTER SUBMITTED TO HIEU.

2. FIELD COMMENT. FVS-8137, TDCS-3/527,406, REPORTED, IN PARAGRAPH 3,
NGO DINH NHU'S STATEMENT AT THE 5 OCTOBER MEETING OF THE INTERMINISTERIAL
COMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC HAMLETS THAT THE SELF-DEFENSE CORPS MUST BECOME PART OF A

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
ONE
OCR
ORR
081
00
EXO
STATE INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA. NIC AID US IA OCI
STATE/DIR

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 1Kb OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS,
5-62
.::
(15-20)

CLASSIFICATION-DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
IN
TDCS -3/528,813
PAGE
TWO
REARMED POPULACE, WHICH WOULD CARRY THE BATTLE FORWARD INTO LAOS, CAMBODIA, AND
NORTH VIETNAM. FVS-7934, TDCS-3/522,275, REPORTED THAT NHU, COMMENTING ON HIS
17 AUGUST REMARKS AT QUI NHON ABOUT A "MARCH TO THE NORTH" ASSERTED THAT THIS DID
NOT IMPLY A MILITARY MARCH, BUT WAS HIS CONCEPT THAT THE SUCCESS OF THE SOCIAL,
ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL REVOLUTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM WOULD BE AN ATTRACTION FOR THE
PEOPLE IN THE NORTH AND WOULD GRADUALLY UNDERMINE THE COMMUNIST DICTATORSHIP THERE...
PARAGRAPH 4 OF FVS-7867, CS-3/522,559, REPORTING A NEW VERSION OF VIETNAMESE HISTORY
TO THE IN THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM WITH THE FLIGHT OF THE MOUNTAIN PEOPLE FROM
THE HIGH PLATEAU OF CENTRAL VIETNAM, STATED THAT THE THIRD EPOCH OF VIETNAMESE
HISTORY WAS OCCURRING, AND THAT THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WERE NOW RETURNING TOWARD
THE NORTH THROUGH THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS.

3. FIELD DISSEM, STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMAGV MAAG AID 9TH FIELD STATION
CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION-DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C_O_N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
---
176-10036-10094

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER: 176-10036-10094
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM:
TO:
TITLE: Ngo Dinh Nhu's Statement on Withdrawal of
DATE: 4/20/1963
PAGES: 4
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE:
CLASSIFICATION:
RESTRICTIONS:
CURRENT STATUS:
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA:
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 4/63-5/63. Box 2

---

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Vietnam

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs.
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited. by law.

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
REPORT NO. TDCS-3/544,531

SUBJECT NGO DINH NHU'S STATEMENTS ON WITHDRAWAL
OF AMERICAN AID
DATE DISTR. 20 APRIL 1963

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF
LATE MARCH-EARLY APRIL 1963.
REFERENCES IN 21850
INFO.

PLACE &
VIETNAM, SAIGON (1 AND 12 APRIL 1963)
DATE ACO.

APPRAISAL SEE PARAGRAPH 7
FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 8804
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE... APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE
PARAS 1 & 3: AMEDIUM LEVEL OFFICIAL (C) OF THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE.
PARAS 2 &4: A FIELD GRADE OFFICER (F) OF THE VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE.

1. AT THE 5 APRIL MEETING OF THE INTERMINISTERIAL COMMITTEE
ON STRATEGIC HAMLETS, NGO DINH NHU MADE THE FOLLOWING REMARKS CON-
CERNING AMERICAN FOREIGN AID:

A. THE AMERICANS HAVE STATED THAT THEY ARE GOING TO REVISE
THEIR POLICY ON FOREIGN AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM; WE WILL REVISE OUR
POLICY ON RECEIVING SUCH AID. WE MUST MARCH TOWARD THE ULTIMATE
OBJECTIVE OF TERMINATING AMERICAN AID AND THE PEOPLE SHOULD LEARN
TO DO WITHOUT SUCH ASSISTANCE.

B. AMERICAN AID SHOULD BE PLACED IN THE FOLLOWING CATE-

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OC I ONE OCR ORR 081 00 EX0

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM
5-62
1 Κα OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

---

CLASSIFICATION-DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CONFIDENTIAL
FURCION DISSEM

TDCS -3/544,531
IN 21850
PAGE 2

GORTES OF PRIORITY. FIRST, AID WHICH WE MUST CONTINUE TO RECEIVE
INDEFINITELY, SPECIFICALLY THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION; WE WILL NOT SEEK
A REDUCTION IN THIS CATEGORY, NOR WILL WE REQUEST AN INCREASE. SECOND
AID WHICH CAN BE EVENTUALLY PHASED OUT. THIRD, AID WHICH CAN BE
TEMINATED IMMEDIATELY.

C. ALL SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED ON THE ABOVE LIST OF
PRIORITIES BUT IT SHOULD ALSO BE MADE CLEAR THAT THIS. POLICY IS NOT
INTENDED TO BE ANTI FOREIGN. FOREIGN AID WILL PROVIDE WITH THE MEANS
OF PRODUCTION SO THAT WE CAN EVENTUALLY DO WITHOUT CONSUMER GOODS
ASSISTANCE. WHETHER WE LIKE IT OR NOT, FOREIGN AID WILL CEASE
SOONER OR LATER, AND SO WE MUST STRIVE TO BECOME SELF-SUFFICIENT.
MEANWHILE WE MUST MAKE PROPER USE OF THE AID WE RECEIVE.

2. DURING THE LAST WEEK OF MARCH 1963 THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ON
ORDERS FROM NHU, ISSUED TO ALL PROVINCE CHIEFS INSTRUCTIONS TO
ENCOURAGE PEOPLE TO START PRODUCING WEAPONS, LAND MINES AND AMMUNITION
IN HOME WORK SHOPS WITH THE AIM OF ATTAINING A DEGREE OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY.

3. ON ABOUT 5 APRIL PHAM DUC TIEN, CHIEF OF CIVIC ACTION IN PHUỌC
TUY PROVINCE, ATTENDED A CONFERENCE ON STRATEGIC HAMLETS IN BINH TUY
PROVINCE AT WHICH NGO DINH NHU SAID THAT THERE WERE TOO MANY AMERICAN
ADVISORS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THAT BOTH THE NUMBER OF THESE ADVISORS
AND THE AMOUNT OF AMERICAN AID SHOULD BE REDUCED.

4. AT A MEETING OF VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE (VNAF) OFFICERS ON 18.
CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION-DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

---

CLASSIFICATION-DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CONFIDENTIAL
SOOR DISSEM

TDCS-3/544,531
IN 21850
PAGE 3

APRIL 1963, VNAF COMMANDER COLONEL HUYNH HUU HIEN SAID THAT NHU HAD
INSTRUCTED HIGH-RANKING GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) OFFICIALS AT A 5
APRIL MEETING TO PREPARE FOR A COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN AID;
NHƯ SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS USING AID AS A MEANS OF PRESSURING
THE GVN AND WAS IMPINGING ON GVN SOVEREIGNTY. AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE
USE OF AMERICAN AID TO PRESSURE A RECIPIENT COUNTRY, HIEN CITED THE
CUTOFF OF DELIVERIES OF GASOLINE TO THE ROYAL THAI AIR FORCE WHEN THE
THAI GOVERNMENT REFUSED TO AGREE TO SOME (UNSPECIFIED) POINT;
HIEN SAID THAT THE DELIVERY OF GASOLINE RECOMMENCED ONLY AFTER STRONG
THAI GOVERNMENT PROTESTATIONS. (FIELD COHMENT. PRESUMABLY HIEN
REFERS TO THE REDUCTION AND EVENTUAL TERMINATION BY THE END OF
FISCAL YEAR 1965 OF U.S. SUPPORT OF MILITARY AID PROGRAM POL AND
MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO THE THAI GOVERNMENT.)

5. AFTER THE MEETING SEVERAL VNAF OFFICERS, INCLUDING MAJOR DANG
DINH LINH, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MATERIAL, MAJOR TRẠN DO CUNG,
ASSISTANT TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF, AND CAPTAIN HẠ DUONG DOẠN, DEPUTY CHIEF
OF STAFF FOR BUDGET AND FINANCE, AGREED THAT THE VNAF WOULD BE UNABLE
TO CONTINUE OPERATIONS WITHOUT AMERICAN SUPPORT AND THAT, IN FACT,
ANY WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN SUPPORT WOULD RESULT IN COLLAPSE OF THE
REGIME.
::
6. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM USIS 9TH
FIELD STA 2ND AIR DIV CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PACFLT.....

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION-DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

---

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION
DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM
TDCS -3/544,531
IN 21850
PAGE 4

7. APPRAISAL: IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT NHU MADE THE STATEMENTS CONTAINED
IN PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 3 AND THAT INSTRUCTIONS WERE ISSUED AS DESCRIBED IN
PARAGRAPH 2. IT IS POSSIBLY TRUE THAT NHU MADE THE STATEMENTS IN PARAGRAPHS
4 AND 5 CONCERNING THE UNITED STATES USING AID. TO PRESSURE THE GOVERNMENT
OF VIETNAM BUT IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT HE TOLD GVN OFFICIALS TO PREPARE FOR A
COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN AID. THE REACTION OF THE VIETNAMESE AIR
FORCE OFFICERS TO HIEN'S VERSION OF NHU'S STATEMENTS IS PROBABLY TRUE.

CONFIDENTIAL
END OF MESSAGE
CLASSIFICATION
DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
176-10036-10095 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER: 176-10036-10095
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM:
TO:
TITLE: Central Intelligence Agency Information Report
DATE: 4/22/1963
PAGES: 2
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE:
CLASSIFICATION:
RESTRICTIONS:
CURRENT STATUS:
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA:
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 4/63-5/63. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Titia 12, U.S.C Socs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibiled by law.

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET
(When Filled In) NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/NO DISSEM ABBOAD

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM REPORT NO. TOCSDB-3/654,285
SUBJECT INDICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM DATE DISTR. 22 APRIL 1963
PLAN TO REQUEST REDUCTION OF AMERICAN
PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF MID-APRIL 1963 REFERENCES IN 22329
INFO.
PLACE & VIETNAM, SAIGON (18 APRIL 1963)
DATE ACO.
APPRAISAL SEE BELOW FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-8806
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE.: APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
SOURCE A VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL (F), WITH EXCELLENT CONTACTS AT THE PRESIDENCY.
APPR IT IS POSSIBLY TRUE THAT BOTH DIEM AND NHU HAVE BECOME AT LEAST PARTIALLY UPSET
OVER CERTAIN AMERICAN ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND OVER THE LARGE NUMBER OF
AMERICAN PERSONNEL CURRENTLY IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

1. BY MID-APRIL 1963 A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF TENSION HAD
DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
OVER OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. BOTH DIEM AND NGO DINH NHU WERE
CONCERNED OVER RECENT "INFRINGEMENTS" OF VIETNAMESE SOVEREIGNTY.
MAAG WAS CITED AS A VIOLATOR IN THIS CONNECTION, BUT THE U.S.
SPECIAL FORCES WERE SINGLED OUT AS THE MAIN IRRITANT. DIEM IS
ALLOWING ADDITIONAL TIME FOR FURTHER BLUNDERS AND, AFTER BUILDING
UP A STRONG CASE, HE PLANS TO CONFRONT AMBASSADOR NOLTING AND
USMACV CHIEF GENERAL HARKINS WITH IRREFUTABLE EVIDENCE OF U.S.
RESPONSIBILITY, DEMANDING A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF U.S.

SECRET
STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR
STATE/DIR

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/NO DISSEM ABROAD

JCS SECDEF NSA NIC XXX XXXKOC ONE OCR XXX XXXX XX EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM
5-62 IK OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-30)
SANITIZED MK.01.197.6.6.3 1/15

CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET
(When Filled In) NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/NO TDCS DB-3/654,285
: DISSEM ABROAD

22329
PAGE 2

PERSONNEL IN SOUTH VIETNAM ON THE BASIS THAT THE FORCE IS TOO
LARGE AND UNMANAGEABLE.

2. SOME VIETNAMESE INVOLVED IN CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIPS
WITH AMERICANS WERE BEING QUESTIONED IN DETAIL BY PRESIDENCY
STAFF MEMBERS AS TO U.S. ACTIVITIES. SOME OF THE INDIVIDUALS
QUESTIONED HAD INDICATED TO THE PRESIDENCY THAT THE U.S. MILITARY,
AND PARTICULARLY THE U.S. SPECIAL FORCES, ALTHOUGH GENERALLY
WELL. MOTIVATED, DID NOT SEEM TO UNDERSTAND THE NECESSITY FOR
COORDINATING THEIR ACTIVITIES WITH APPROPRIATE VIETNAMESE
AUTHORITIES.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR NOLTING), USMACV
(GENERAL HARKINS), MAAG (GENERAL TIMMES), CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC
PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/NO DISSEM ABROAD
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER: 176-10036-10097
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM:
TO:
TITLE: Central Intelligence Agency Information Report
DATE: 4/25/1963
PAGES: 2
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE:
CLASSIFICATION:
RESTRICTIONS:
CURRENT STATUS:
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA:
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 4/63-5/63. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

S. Vietnam
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18. U.S.C Secs
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L  NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM REPORT NO. TDCS-3/544,961
SUBJECT VIET CONG CONCENTRATION ON DATE DISTR. 25 APRIL 1963
TERRORIST AND MILITARY
SUBVERSION ACTIVITY IN THE
CAPITAL AREA
DATE OF EARLY APRIL 1963 PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
INFO. REFERENCES IN

PLACE & VIETNAM, SAIGON (8 APRIL 1963)
DATE ACO.
APPRAISAL 3 FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-8792
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM INTELLIGENCE SERVICE; FROM SOURCES
-
DESCRIBED AS VIET CONG PENETRATIONS.

1. IN EARLY APRIL 1963, WARD-LEVEL OFFICIALS IN THE VIET CONG (VC)
SAIGON-CHOLON-GIA DINH SPECIAL ZONE WERE INFORMED THAT TERRORIST AND
MILITARY SUBVERSION ACTIVITY WOULD BE INCREASED. THE AREA TERRORIST
ORGANIZATION WOULD OPERATE UNDER DISTRICT ORGANIZATIONS, WHEREAS
PREVIOUSLY IT HAD BEEN DIRECTLY AND SOLELY RESPONSIBLE TO THE SPECIAL
ZONE COMMITTEE. EVERY DISTRICT MUST DEVELOP ONE OR TWO TERRORIST
GROUPS CONSISTING OF THREE CELLS EACH. OPERATIONS OF THESE GROUPS
WOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO THEIR OWN DISTRICTS BUT COULD BE EXPANDED
THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE ZONE, AS OPPORTUNITIES AROSE. AMERICANS WERE
:
TO BE THE PRIMARY TARGETS OF ALL OPERATIONS.
:
::

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L  NO FOREIGN DISSEM
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declasufication

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA. NIC A.ID USIA OC I ONE OCR ORR OBI 00 IDII
STATE/DIR EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
5-62
FORM 1Kb OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS, (15-20)
SANITIZED MK. 01.197.6.8.11/15

CLASSIFICATION-DISSEMINATION CONTROLS IN
TDCS-3/544,961
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L  NO FOREIGN DISSEM PAGE TWO

2. VC COUNTERPROPAGANDA PERSONNEL OF THE SAIGON-CHOLON-GIA DINH
SPECIAL ZONE RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO SUSPEND ALL ACTIVITY AND AWAIT
TRANSFER ORDERS. THEY UNDERSTAND THAT MANY WOULD BE TRANSFERRED INTO
MILITARY SUBVERSION ORGANIZATIONS IN THE AREA.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV AID MAAG
USIA CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELDSTATION 2ND AIR
DIVISION.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION-DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L  NO FOREIGN DISSEM
176-10036-10098 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10098
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM :
TO:
TITLE: Central Intelligence Agency Information Report
DATE: 5/18/1963
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 4/63-5/63. Box 2

---

NLK-81-327
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

3. Vietnam

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains Information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C.Secs.
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
(When Filled in)
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
REPORT NO. TDCS-3/547,672
SUBJECT
PLANS FOR A COUP D'ETAT IN CENTRAL
DATE DISTR. 18 MAY 1963
VIETNAM BY THE REFORMED VNQDD

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF
INFO. EARLY MAY 1963
REFERENCES IN 141761
PLACE &
DATE ACO. VIETNAM, SAIGON (13 MAY. 1963)

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 8959
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
SOURCE A VIETNAMESE NEWSPAPERMAN (C) WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS IN PRESS AND POLITICAL CIRCLES.

APPRAISAL: IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THE VNQDD IS BEING REFORMED ITS CAPABILITIES
IN CENTRAL VIETNAM CANNOT BE JUDGED.

1. SHORTLY AFTER THE 8 MAY 1963 INCIDENT IN HUE, NGUYEN VAN
LUC RECEIVED A PLAN FOR A COUP D'ETAT IN CENTRAL VIETNAM FROM THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CENTRAL VIETNAM THOẠT XAC PHONG TRAO
(TXPT). (SOURCE COMMENT.. TXPT DOES NOT TRANSLATE MEANINGFULLY
INTO ENGLISH. THOAT HAS THE CONNOTATION OF GOING OUT IN MIND AND
SPIRIT: XAC MEANS BODY, I.E., PHYSICALLY; PHONG TRAO MEANS MOVEMENT
THUS, THE MOVEMENT OF MIND, SPIRIT, AND BODY MIGHT BE ONE TRANSLATION;
A BETTER ONE WOULD BE VNQDD.) THE TXPT HAS BEEN DEVELOPING SINCE
VIETNAM QUOC DAN DANG (VNQDD) VIETNAMESE NATIONALIST PARTY)
1958 FROM THE PARTICULARLY THOSE ELEMENTS IN CENTRAL VIETNAM,

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCB SECDEF NGA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR GAR
STATE/DIR
GROUP I
Excluded fram suiematit
downgrading and
declassification
081 00 EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

MIKA OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SANITIZED MK.01.197.6.10.2

---

CLASSIFICATION-DISSEMINATION CONTROLS.
CONFIDENTIAL
10 FOREIGN DISSEM
IN
TDCS-3/547,672
41761
PAGE 2

THE VNQDD STRONGHOLD. THE TXPT, ALTHOUGH COMPOSED ENTIRELY OF FORMER
VNQDD MEMBERS, WAS ESTABLISHED ESSENTIALLY AS A BUDDHIST ASSOCIATION
AND HAS BEEN LEGALLY ENGAGED IN CIVIC AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES SINCE
ITS FORMATION. CLANDESTINE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION HAS PROCEEDED
FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEVELOPING NEW, YOUNGER LEADERS, AND OF DENYING
THE OLDER PASSIVE TENETS OF BUDDHISM AS WELL AS THE OLDER LEADERS
OF THE VNQDD, THE ULTIMATE INTENT BEING A REVITALIZED REVOLUTIONARY
SPIRIT. (FIELD COMMENT. LUC IS THE FATHER AND ACCOMPLICE OF NGUYEN
VAN CU, ONE OF THE TWO PILOTS WHO BOMBED THE PRISIOONTIAL PALACE
ON 27 FEBRUARY 1962.)

2. THE TXPT CENTRAL COMMITTEE REMINDED LUC THAT THE ORGAN1-
ZATION WAS IN A POSITION TO HANDLE A COUP ACTION IN CENTRAL VIETNAM
EFFECTIVELY, POINTING OUT THAT THOSE MILITARY UNITS NOT CONTROLLED
COULD BE NEUTRALIZED AND THAT THE AIR BASE AT DA NANG COULD BE
CONTROLLED THROUGH THE AIR FORCE. THE COMMITTEE STATED THAT, AFTER
THE ANTI-BUDDHIST ACTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE PEOPLE WERE READY
FOR AN UPRISING. BY TAKING NGO DINH CAN AND ARCHBISHOP NGO DINH
THUC INTO CUSTODY AND BY GAINING MILITARY CONTROL OVER THUA THIEN
AND QUANG NAM PROVINCES, SUCCESS COULD BE ASSURED IN CENTRAL VIETNAM.
THIS WOULD PLACE THE TXPT IN A POSITION OF USING PRESIDENT DIEM'S
TACTICS OF NEGOTIATIONS AGAINST HIM, I.E., HAVING GAINED CONTROL
OVER CENTRAL VIIETNAM THEY WOULD OFFER TO NEGOTIATE WITH DIEM

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION-DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
ND FOREIGN DISSEM

---

CLASSIFICATION-DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CONFIDENTIAL
IN
FOREIGN DISSEM
TDCS-3/547,672
41761
3
PAGE

AND AT THE SAME TIME, THEY WOULD BE MOUNTING A COUP AGAINST THE
REGIME IN SAIGON, WHICH WOULD TAKE PLACE NO LATER THAN THREE DAYS
AFTER THE ONE IN CENTRAL VIETNAM.

3. LUC SENT A TRUSTED FOLLOWER, ONE VIET TO SAIGON TO DISCUSS
THE PLAN WITH AN OPPOSITIONIST SYMPATHIZER AND GET HIS VIEWPOINT.
VIET WAS ADVISED TO TELL LUC THAT ANY SUCH ACTION WAS PRECIPITATE
AND DANGEROUS. ALTHOUGH IT WAS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THE FORMER VNQDD
MEMBERS IN CENTRAL VIETNAM HAD THE POWER CLAIMED, A COUP THERE,
WITHOUT SIMULTANEOUS ACTION IN SAIGON, WOULD LEAVE A VACUUM WHICH
THE VIET CONG (VC) COULD IMMEDIATELY USE TO THEIR OWN ADVANTAGE.
VC REACTION PROBABLY WOULD TAKE THE FORM OF GAINING CONTROL OF ALL
AREAS NOT EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLED BY THE COUP GROUP, WITH THE
ULTIMATE POSSIBILITY OF PARTITIONING CENTRAL VIETNAM, OF BEING IN A
POSITION TO FORM A REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT, AND FINALLY, OF BEING
ABLE TO CALL FOR NEGOTIATIONS. THEMSELVES. ACCORDING TO VIET, THIS
FOLLOWED LUC'S THINKING, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE HIS FOLLOWERS WERE NOT
IN A POSITION TO ACT IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY. VIET
THOUGHT THAT LUC WOULD INSTRUCT THE TXPT CENTRAL COMMITTEE IN.
CENTRAL VIETNAM TO TAKE NO ACTION AT THIS TIME, AND THAT LUC'S
ADVICE WOULD BE ACCEPTED.

4. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV USOM MAAG USIS
CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC 9TH FIELD STATION AND AIR DIVISION.
CONFIDENTIAL
END OF MESSAGE
CLASSIFICATION-DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
176-10036-10099 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10099
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE: Central Intelligence Agency Information Report
DATE: 5/18/1963
PAGES: 5
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 4/63-5/63. Box 2
NCK-21.307+phold by
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY S. Vietnam
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs.
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
(When Filled In)
COUNTRY VIETNAM
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
REPORT NO. TDCS-3/547,646
SUBJECT APPREHENSIONS OF VIETNAMESE CONSUL GENERAL DATE DISTR. 18 MAY 1963
IN SINGAPORE REGARDING RECENT EVENTS IN
VIETNAM
PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF 17 MAY 1963 REFERENCES IN 41548
INFO.
PLACE & SINGAPORE (17 MAY 1963)
DATE ACQ.

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW FIELD REPORT NO: FSS 12881
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
SOURCE AN AMERICAN OBSERVER (B) FROM VIETNAMESE CONSUL GENERAL TRAN KIM PHUONG...
APPR: CONSUL GENERAL PHUONG HAS BEEN AN ARDENT AND DEVOTED SUPPORTER OF THE
PRESIDENTAND OF "NGO DINH NHURS CAN LAO PARTYHETSEA CATHOLIC AND A FRIEND AND SUPPORTER
OF DR. TUYEN. THIS REPORT IS BELIEVED TO REFLECT ACCURATELY HIS VIEWS WHICH ARE FELT TO
BE REASONABLY OBJECTIVE AS WELL AS SINCERE..
1. SUMMARY, VIETNAMESE CONSUL GENERAL TRAN KIM PHƯƠNG CONSIDERS
THAT THE COMBINATION OF THREE UNWISE POLITICAL ACTS IN THE PAST MONTH
MAY ULTIMATELY PROVE FATAL TO THE REGIME OF PRESIDENT
NGU DINH DIEM DESPITE ITS GAINS IN THE MILITARY STRUGGLE AGAINST
THE VIET COMMUNISTS (VC). THESE THREE ACTS WERE: DISMISSAL OF
HUYNH VAN LANG OF THE OFFICE OF EXCHANGES FROM HIS POSITION OF
POWER IN THE SOUTHERN FACTION OF THE CAN LAO (REVOLUTIONARY WORKER'S)
PARTY; THE DENIGRATION AND REMOVAL FROM POWER AND AUTHORITY OF
DR. TRAN KIM TUYÊN, DIRECTOR OF SEPES:; AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE
HUE INCIDENT ON BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY 8 MAY IN WHICH BUDDHIST PARADERS

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC
STATE/DIR AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR 081 00 EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 5-62 IK OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SANITIZED 124.01.197.6.9.0

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
SECRET
(When Filled In)
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
TDCS -3/547,646
IN 41548
PAGE 2
WERE KILLED BY THE CIVIL GUARD. EACH OF THESE SEPARATE ACTS HAS
SERVED TO WEAKEN THE MOTIVATION OF DIFFERENT SEGMENTS OF VIETNAMESE
AND TO FURTHER NARROW POSSIBLY TO A FATAL DEGREE, THE BASE OF
SUPPORT FOR THE REGIME.
2. CONSUL GENERAL PHUONG FEARED THAT TUYEN'S DISMISSAL IN
PARTICULAR WOULD CAUSE CONSIDERABLE INSECURITY AMONG LOYAL SUPPORTERS
AND PUBLIC SERVANTS OF THE REGIME WHO KNOW DR. TUYEN'S RECORD OF
LOYAL SERVICE TO THE PRESIDENT AND ESPECIALLY TO HIS BROTHER, PRESI-
DENTIAL COUNSELOR NGÒ DINH NHU. THESE OFFICIALS CAN CERTAINLY
QUESTION WHETHER ANYONE'S POSITION IN THE REGIME IS SAFE IF TUYEN
COULD FALL FROM FAVOR. PHUONG STATED THAT SEVERAL FRIENDS OF HIS
WITH LONG RECORDS OF SERVICE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN)
AND TO THE PRESIDENTIAL FAMILY HAVE ALREADY WRITTEN TO HIM DESPONDENT-
LY ALONG THESE LINES. TUYEN HAD A BAD REPUTATION WITH MANY
OFFICERS IN THE VIETNAMESE ARMY AND BUREAUCRACY AS THE HATCHETMAN
AND TROUBLESHOOTER FOR NGO DINH NHU BUT NO ONE DOUBTED HIS
DEVOTION TO NHU. YET NHU HAS STRIPPED HIM OF ALL REAL AUTHORITY
SUPPOSEDLY BECAUSE OF A SILLY WOMEN'S TIFF BETWEEN
MADAME NHU AND MADAME TUYEN. ANY OBJECTIVE GVN OFFICIAL MIGHT
QUESTION THE FRIVOLITY, INGRATITUDE AND LACK OF PERSPECTIVE OF A REGIME
THAT ACTS THUS.

3. FURTHERMORE TUYEN WAS ONE OF THE FEW REMAINING GVN OFFICIALS
IN HIGH POSITION RESPECTED BY OPPOSITION LEADERS AND VIETNAMESE
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
SECRET
(When Filled In)
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
TDCS-3/547,646
IN 41548
PAGE 3
INTELLECTUALS PARTICULARLY THOSE FROM NORTH VIETNAM. THOSE WHO
DID NOT LIKE HIM AT LEAST TRUSTED HIS FAIRNESS AND BASIC EMPATHY
WHEREAS THEY NEITHER TRUSTED NOR LIKED NHU EVEN THOUGH NHU HIMSELF
WAS AN INTELLECTUAL.

4. WITHIN THE CAN LAO PARTY, WHICH IS STILL ONE OF THE SECRET
MA INSPRINGS OF SUPPORT IN VIETNAM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE NGO
FAMILY, THE PARALLEL REMOVAL FROM AUTHORITY OF HUYNH VAN LANG HAS
OCCASIONED SIMILAR DOUBTS AMONG THE PARTY'S RANK -AND-FILE. AS IN
TUYEN'S CASE, CAN LAO MEMBERS CAN QUESTION WHAT VALUE IS LOYALTY.
AND SERVICE IF A MAN LIKE LANG CAN LOSE HIS. POST.

5. THE EVEN MORE SERIOUS MISTAKE WHICH MAY NARROW THE BASE OF
SUPPORT FOR THE GVN TO A FATAL DEGREE WAS THE SHOOTING OF BUDDHIST
THE HUE
REGIME OF CENTRAL VIETNAM COUNSELOR NGO DINH CAN HAS ALWAYS OPERATED
LIKE AN AUTONOMOUS POLICE STATE AND HAS BEEN NOTORIOUS FOR ITS
FAVORITISM TOWARD CATHOLICS, BELYING PRESIDENT DIEM'S
PARADERS AT HUE ON THE OCCASION OF BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY.

EARLIER REPUTATION FOR RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE. MANY VIETNAMESE
CATHOLICS FEAR THAT THE GVN'S INCREASING PRO-CATHOLIC BENT WILL BE
HARMFUL TO THE CHURCH AS WELL AS TO THE REGIME. CERTAINLY THE
STUPID SUPPRESSION OF BUDDHIST RELIGIOUS FLAGS AT HUE ON 8 MAY (ON
PRETEXT THAT THEY MIGHT BE CONSTRUED AS CONNECTED TO VC COMMEMORATION
OF THE DIEN BIEN PHU VICTORY)
AND CONSEQUENT FATALITIES WILL AROUSE THE ANTAGONISM OF PREDOMINANTLY,
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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(When Filled In)
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TDCS-3/547,646
IN 41548
PAGE 4
BUDDHIST VIETNAM AGAINST BOTH THE REGIME AND THE CATHOLICS.

6. FROM REPORTS REACHING HIM PHUONG FOUND IT PARTICULARLY
SIGNIFICANT THAT WHEN CENTRAL VIETNAM AUTHORITIES ORDERED POLICE
TO EXECUTE THE DIRECTIVE BANNING FLAGS, INITIALY THE POLICE MERELY
RESTATED THE ORDER BUT WOULD NOT RIP DOWN ANY BUDDHIST FLAGS.
FINALLY SEVERAL CATHOLIC POLICE DID SO, BUT SOME BUDDHIST POLICE-
MEN REFUSED, SAYING THAT BUDDHIST FLAGS SHOULD BE PERMITTED JUST
AS CATHOLIC FLAGS ARE FLOWN ON SAINTS DAYS. SUCH DEFIANCE OF ORDERS 1
AT HUE IS QUITE RARE, PHUONG SAID.

7. THE CROWNING INSULT TO BUDDHISTS WHICH WILL FURTHER ENFLAME THEM
AND ALSO REVIVE THE OUTCRY AGAINST NGO FAMILY RULE WAS
THE NEWS OF HUE ARCHBISHOP NGO DINH THUC'S PLAN THAT THE PRESIDENT
ASK BUDDHIST ASSOCIATIONS ELSEWHERE IN VIETNAM TO CONDEMN THE
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND DISORDER OF THE HUE BUDDHISTS. ARCHBISHOP
THUC REPORTEDLY WENT TO SAIGON TO DEMAND. THIS. THE VC COULD NOT
HAVE A BETTER PROPAGANDA WEAPON IF THEY HAD LAUNCHED THE IN-
CIDENT AND DIRECTED THUC'S REACTION THEMSELVES.

8. BY SUCH ACTS THE REGIME IS DESTROYING CONFIDENCE AND LOYAL
MOTIVATION OF PUBLIC SERVANTS, INTELLECTUALS, PARTY SUPPORTERS, AND
THE MASS OF NON-CATHOLIC PEASANTRY IN ITS MOST CRUCIAL TIME.
IF THIS CONTINUES ONLY SYCOPHANTS AND XENOPHOBES WILL
PREDOMINATE IN THE GVN AND ITS RELATIONS WITH ITS PEOPLE, BUREAU-

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SECRET
(When Filled In)
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
TDCS-3/547,646
IN 41548
PAGE 5
CRACY, ARMY AND FRIENDLY ALLIES WILL DETERIORATE IN A WELTER OF
PETTY JEALOUSIES, FEUDS, AND PREJUDICES.

9. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (CONGEN. ONLY) CINCPAC PACAF PACFLT
ARPAC.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
176-10036-10102 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10102
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO:
TITLE: CIA Information Telegram
DATE: 3/19/1963
PAGES: 3
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 2/63-3/63. Box 2

Sanitized via brth RACS HIS

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
Vietnam
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM/CHINA (TAIWAN) REPORT NO. TDCS-3/540,863
SUBJECT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT DIEM AND DATE DISTR. 19 MARCH 1963
VICE PRESIDENT CHEN CHENG OF NATIONALIST
CHINA
DATE OF 4-9 MARCH 1963 PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
INFO. REFERENCES IN 89258
PLACE & VIETNAM, SAIGON (5-12 MARCH 1963)
DATE ACO.
APPRAISAL SEE BELOW FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-8661
FILE
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
SOURCE A HIGH-LEVEL MEMBER (B) OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENT IN
SAIGON WHO IS BELIEVED TO REPORT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS GOVERNMENT, A
CHINESE BUSINESSMAN (F) WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS IN THE CHINESE COMMUNITY, AND A
MEMBER (F) OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENT IN SAIGON.

APPR. IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT LENGTHY DISCUSSIONS OCCURRED BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS AND
POSSIBLY TRUE THAT THE SUBJECTS INDICATED WERE COVERED.
:
1. DURING THE VISIT OF NATIONALIST CHINA'S (CHINAT) VICE PRESIDENT CHEN CHENG
TO SOUTH VIETNAM FROM 4 TO 9 MARCH 1963, HE AND PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM CONVERSED
IN EXCESS OF TWENTY HOURS, CHIEFLY IN PRIVATE WITH ONLY AN INTERPRETER PRESENT.
THE SERIOUS NATURE OF THE CONVERSATIONS WAS EVIDENCED BY THE EXPRESSIONS ON THE
FACES OF THE TWO MEN FOLLOWING THEIR VARIOUS CONVERSATIONS. THE CONTENTS OF THE
CONVERSATIONS DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE ADVISORS OF EITHER
PARTICIPANT.
:
:
r
2. CHEN DELAYED HIS SCHEDULED DEPARTURE FROM SAIGON FOR 24 HOURS TO PERMIT
HIM TO TRAVEL WITH DIEM TO DALAT, WHERE, EXCEPT FOR A BRIEF
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AİR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR
STATE/DIR
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
dectasufication
ORR
OB
00
EXO
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

SANITIZED 12K.1.197.5.5.5

CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM TDCS-3/540,863 89258
PAGE 2

VISIT TO THE MILITARY SCHOOL, THE ENTIRE TIME WAS. DEVOTED TO PRIVATE
TALKS. MEMBERS OF THE CHEN ENTOURAGE WERE NOT NOTIFIED UNTIL THE
LAST MOMENT OF THE REVISED SCHEDULE NOR WERE THEY GIVEN ANY INDICATION
AS TO THE CONTENT OF THE DISCUSSIONS.
::
3. MEMBERS OF THE CHINAT DELEGATION AND OF THE CHINAT DIPLOMATIC
COMMUNITY SPECULATED THAT THE TWO MAIN TOPICS OF CONVERSATION WERE.
GREATLY INCREASED CHINAT MILITARY SUPPORT FOR SOUTH VIETNAM, AND THE
USE OF SOUTH VIETNAM AS A BASE FOR CHINAT MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST
THE CHINA MAINLAND. CHEN IS BELIEVED TO HAVE OFFERED DIEM UNRESTRICTED
MILITARY TRAINING AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT, PLUS UP TO ONE DIVISION OF
COMBAT TROOPS TO FIGHT IN VIETNAMESE ARMY UNIFORMS. CHEN IS ALSO
THOUGHT TO HAVE ASKED DIEM TO CEASE DRAFTING OVERSEAS CHINESE IN
VIETNAM, WHICH IS CAUSING THE CHINATS EMBARASSMENT, I.E., DEMONSTRATIONS
BY THESE LOCAL CHINESE AGAINST THE CHINAT EMBASSY IN SAIGON AND
APPEALS TO THE CHINAT AMBASSADOR. CHEN PROBABLY ASKED DIEM TO PUB-
LICLY SUPPORT THE CHINAT MAINLAND COUNTERATTACK THEME AND TO GRANT AIR-
FIELD AND COASTAL BASES FOR CHINAT MILITARY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SOUTHERN AND WESTERN PORTIONS OF CHINA.
OTHER LIKELY TOPICS OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE TWO MEN WERE THE
CONDUCTING OF JOINT OPERATIONS INTO NORTH VIETNAM AND LAOS, THE
MATTER OF THAILAND'S MOVEMENT TOWARDS NEUTRALITY, AND JOINT EFFORTS
TO UNSEAT CAMBODIA'S SIHANOUK, WHOM THE CHINATS FEEL ISA LACKEY OF
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DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
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PAGE 3
:
PEIPING. CONCENSUS AMONG THE CHINAT COMMUNITY AND CHEN'S DELEGATION
WAS THAT SOME ACCORD WAS REACHED BY THE TWO LEADERS, AS CHEN WAS IN
EXCELLENT SPIRITS AT THE CONCLUSION OF HIS VISIT.
4. -ALTHOUGH SOMEWHAT SLOW IN GETTING STARTED, THE VISIT DID
RESULT IN BRINGING THE TWO GOVERNMENTS CLOSER TOGETHER, PARTICULARLY
THE COUNTERPARTS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES. THE VISIT ALSO SERVED A
USEFUL PURPOSE IN EFFECTIVELY IMPRESSING THE LOCAL CHINESE POPULATION,
WHICH TURNED OUT MORE OR LESS SPONTANEOUSLY IN AN ESTIMATED ONE HUNDRED
THE
THOUSAND ALONG THE ROUTE TO/AIRPORT TO CHEER CHEN WHEN HE
DEPARTED. THE APPARENTLY GENUINE ENTHUSIASM OF THE USUALLY APATHETIC
VIETNAMESE CHINESE CAME AS A SURPRISE EVEN TO THE LOCAL CHINAT
DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY.
5. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID USIA
CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION 2ND AIR DIVISION.
CONFIDENTIAL END OF MESSAGE
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
176-10036-10103 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10103
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE: CIA Information Telegram
DATE: 3/20/1963
PAGES: 3
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 2/63-3/63. Box 2

VERSION NUK-81-325 6
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Vritnam
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18. U.S.C Secs
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM REPORT NO. TDCS -3/541,020

SUBJECT THE SEEKING OF AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR DATE DISTR. 20 MARCH 1963
THE OVERTHROW OF THE DIEM REGIME FILE

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
DATE OF MID-MARCH 1963
INFO. REFERENCES IN 89614

PLACE & VIETNAM, SAIGON (14 MARCH 1963)
DATE ACO.
APPRAISAL SEE BELOW FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-8662
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
SOURCE A HIGH-LEVEL GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL (C), WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS AT THE PRESIDENCY.

APPR THIS REPORT IS. TYPICAL OF VIEWS HELD BY CERTAIN OPPOSITIONISTS, INCLUDING THOSE
IN THE FELLOW-TRAVELLING CATEGORY. COMMENTS OF THIS NATURE HAVE ALSO BEEN MADE
BY GOVERNMENT PROVOKERS SEEKING TO PROVOKE AMERICAN REACTION. THE LINE THAT
DIEM IS ACCEPTABLE, BUT THAT HIS FAMILY, ADMINISTRATION, AND PROGRAMS ARE NOT,
IS ALSO CHARACTERISTIC OF VARIOUS OPPOSITION ELEMENTS AS WELL AS SOME SEGMENTS
OF THE LEFT. THE ESTIMATE CONTAINED HEREIN ON A NUMBER OF SUBJECTS, INCLUDING
THE APPRAISAL THAT THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM IS HIGHLY DANGEROUS TO THE
GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM OR TO AMERICAN OBJECTIVES, IS NOT ACCEPTED.

1. AMERICAN AID IS ESSENTIAL TO AN OVERTHROW OF THE DIEM REGIME,

ACCORDING TO THE STATEMENTS MADE BY TWO REPRESENTATIVES OF A COMMITTEE OF
NATIONALIST ANTI-COMMUNIST POLITICAL OPPOSITIONISTS IN MID-MARCH 1963, IN
THE PRESENCE OF AN OFFICIAL OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (SEPES),
WHO MAY ALSO BE A MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE. THE COMMITTEE IS ENGAGED IN A
STUDY OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND MAKING PLANS FOR ITS
IMPROVEMENT. ALTHOUGH SEPES' CHIEF TRAN KIM TUYEN IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE
COMMITTEE, BECAUSE OF HIS POSITION, HE HAS PROVIDED CERTAIN SUPPORT FROM TIME TO TIME.
:

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OC I ONE OCR ORR OBI 00 EXO
STATE/DIR
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

SANITIZED 12K.01.197.5.7.3
5-62 FORM 1Kb OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
89614
PAS TWO,
IN
CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM TDCS -3/541,020

THE TWO REPRESENTATIVES INDICATED THAT, IF AMERICAN AID IS NOT
FORTHCOMING, OTHER SOURCES WILL BE CONTACTED. IF THE AMERICANS
HELP THE NATIONALIST CAUSE OF THE OPPOSITIONISTS, THEY WILL
:
HAVE SOME MEASURE OF CONTROL OVER THE RESULTS; OTHERWISE,
THEY WILL HAVE NONE. (FIELD COMMENT. FVS 8654, TDCS-3/540,447, REPORTEC
AN EARLIER DISCUSSION BY THESE INDIVIDUALS.)
2. ACCORDING TO THESE OPPOSITIONISTS, THE COUNTRY HAS
REACHED A COMPLETE IMPASSE AND SOMETHING MUST HAPPEN SOON.
DIEM SHOULD DIE SUDDENLY, THE RESULT WOULD BE CHAOS, OUT OF
WHICH THE COMMUNISTS WOULD EMERGE AS THE ONLY BENEFICIARIES.
DIEM REMAINS IN POWER ONLY AS THE RESULT OF AMERICAN MILITARY
SUPPORT, WITHOUT WHICH HE WOULD BE COMPLETELY LOST. THE DIEM
GOVERNMENT IS WORSE THAN IMPOSSIBLE. THERE ARE
IF
A NUMBER OF GROUPS IN THE COUNTRY, SUCH AS THE HOA HÀO AND THE
CAO DAI, THAT ARE COMPLETELY OPPOSED TO COMMUNISM BUT CANNOT
POSSIBLY SUPPORT THE PRESENT REGIME, WHEREAS THEY COULD SUPPORT
SOME OTHER NATIONALIST TYPE OF GOVERNMENT. PRESIDENT DIEM
:.IS PERSONALLY A DECENT AND HONORABLE MAN, BUT NGO DINH NHƯ AND
HIS WIFE MUST BE ELIMINATED; WITHOUT THEM, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE
TO RE-ORIENT DIEM...
3. THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM IS HIGHLY DANGEROUS BECAUSE,
ALTHOUGH THE AMERICANS AND THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM ARE EITHER

CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

1
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CONFIDENTIAL IN 89614
NO FOREIGN DISSEM TDCS -3/541,020
PAGE THREE

UNAWARE OF OR UNWILLING TO FACE IT, THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS ARE
HEAVILY INFILTRATED WITH VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC), WHOSE
PRESENCE WILL MAKE ITSELF KNOWN IN DUE COURSE. THE REPUBLICAN
YOUTH MOVEMENT IS ONLY A LONG SERIES OF MEETINGS AND IS
COMPLETELY LACKING IN DEPTH AS AN ORGANIZATION; IT IS A
SUPERFICIAL VENEER, GOING THROUGH VARIOUS FRUITLESS MOTIONS.
THE PRINCIPAL CRITERION FOR SELECTION OF PROVINCIAL AND
DISTRICT LEADERS IS PERSONAL OBEDIENCE TO THE REGIME; COMPETENCE
IS ONLY AN AFTERTHOUGHT.
4.
IF THE SITUATION CONTINUES IN ITS PRESENT VEIN, THERE
WILL BE A RENEWED VC OFFENSIVE ON A LARGER SCALE SOON AFTER
THE ONSET OF THE RAINY SEASON, WHEN BAD WEATHER REDUCES THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF HELICOPTERS AND AIR CAPABILITY IN GENERAL.
THIS WILL BEGIN NEAR THE SAIGON AREA, AND, AT THE SAME TIME
THE VC WITHIN THE "STRATEGIC HAMLETS WILL GO INTO ACTION.
:
5. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACY MAAG AID
USIA CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION 2ND AIR DIVISION.

END OF MESSAGE
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
176-10036-10104 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10104
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE: CIA Information Report
DATE: 6/19/1963
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 6/63. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized Derson is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled in,
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
REPORT NO. TDCS - 3/550,953

SUBJECT GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM WHITE PAPER ON THE DATE DISTR. 19 JUNE 1963
BUDDHIST ISSUE AND AMERICAN PRESENCE AND
POLICY IN SOUTH VIETNAM
PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF 12-17 JUNE 1963 REFERENCES IN 62883
INFO.
PLACE & VIETNAM, SAIGON (17 JUNE 1963)
DATE ACO.
APPRAISAL 3 FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 9171

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
SOURCE A WESTERN BUSINESSMAN (B) WITH CONTACTS IN PRESS AND POLITICAL CIRCLES.

1. ON 17 JUNE 1963 GENE GREGORY OF THE TIMES OF VIETNAM SAID
THAT HE HAD JUST RETUNED FROM DALAT WHERE HE HAD SPENT FIVE

DAYS WORKING ON A WHITE PAPER SETTING FORTH THE GOVERNMENT
OF VIETNAM POSITON NOT ONLY ON THE BUDDHIST ISSUE BUT ALSO

ON THE ENTIRE QUESTION OF AMERICAN PRESENCE AND POLICY IN
SOUTH VIETNAM. GREGORY SAID THAT MADAME NGO DINH NHU HAD

ASKED HIM TO PREPARE THE PAPER AND, IN FACT, HE LIVED IN THE NHU
VILLA IN DALAT WHILE HE WORKED ON IT.

2. GREGORY SAID THAT ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL POINTS WHICH MADAME

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CONFIDENTIAL GROUP I
NO FOREIGN DISSEM Excluded from automatie
downgrading and
declassification
STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NIC NSA AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR 081 00
STATE/DIR

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

SANITIZED MK.9.197.7.2.6

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN) NO FOREIGN DISSEM
IN 62883
TDCS 3/550,953. PAGE 2

NHU SUGGESTED BE INCLUDED IN THE PAPER WAS A COMPARISON OF SOUTH VIETNAM
WITH THE UNITED STATES WHERE GANGSTERISM AND RACE RIOTS EXISTED,

THE CONCLUSION BEING THAT THE DIEM REGIME WAS NOT REALLY TOO BAD
AFTER ALL.

3. GREGORY STATED THAT THE WHITE PAPER CONSISTED OF OVER TWENTY
PAGES, WAS NOT FOR LOCAL CONSUMPTION, BUT WILL BE DISTRIBUTED

INTERNATIONALLY, DIRECTED PRIMARILY AT THE UNITED STATES BUT POSSIBLY
ALSO FRANCE AND ENGLAND.

4. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM USIS
9TH FLD.. STA. 2ND AIR DIV. CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE...
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN) NO FOREIGN DISSEM
FORM IK-1 MFG. 2-63
1-63
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
CONTINUATION OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT
176-10036-10113 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10113
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE: CIA Information Telegram
DATE: 7/12/1963
PAGES : 4
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 198: Vietnam, 7/1/1963-7/20/63. Box 2

2. Vietman 50
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws Title 18, USC Sect 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CLASSIFICATION DISSENIBITION CONTROLS
SECRET NO FORELEN DISSEA
(When Filled In) E20NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE GULY
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETN NAM
SUBJECT COUP D'ETAT PLAN OFONGO DINH NHU OF

SEE SANITIZED VERSION
NUX-81-269; NLK-89-15+ DOWNGRADED
CREPORT NO. TDCS DB-3 3/655,517-
DATE DISTR. 12 JULY 1963

PRIORITY MONED
DATE OF Downen BIND THVL THE COTREFERENCES DE 2170ED IN 78592
INFO. 11-12 JULY 1963
PLACE & VIETNAM, SAIGON (12 JULY 1963)
DATE ACO.
APPRAISAL SEE BELOW
FIELD REPORT-NO EVS9305aar
METHIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE., APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTÄTIVE
SOURCE A GENERAL OFFICER (B) WHO EITHER ATTENDED THE MEETING OR WHO ACQUIRED THE
INFORMATION FROM AN OFFICER WHO ATTENDED THE MEETING.
APPRAISAL NGO DINH NHU UIS PROBABLY PLANNING A COUP, HOWEVER, THE TIMING OF THE ED COUP ATTEMPT AND THE GENERALS WHO, ARE SPECIFICALLY INVOLVED ARE UNKNOWN
ПОГАСНУ Eb8 ancCE22, THE VOL 26158 THE 1800ВГЕ КУКんだと
SUMMARY.BENGO DINH NHU PROPOSED TO ARMYCGENERALL OFFICERSE
DE ON JULY 11,963 ТНАТVITHEY STAGEZA COUPOD'ETATUASE SOON AS WWED IV.
POSSIBLE THIS COUP MUST BE I STAGED OVERNIGHT AND THEVARMYMOND
SHOULDOTURN OVEROCONTROL TO CIVILIANSEON THEW NEXTEDAY)
D2ANGO DINH NHUZIOLDYA GROUP OF GENERAL OFFICERSOONLI
JULY 11963 THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS MAKING NO PROGRESSEIN THE WARDA
AGAINST THE VLET CONG OR IN OTHER PROGRAMS AND ATHATOTHEUGENERAL
OFFICERS MUSTORROVIDE THE ACTION REQUIRED. THT,HERGENERALCOFFICERS
HAVE BEEN CONTINUALLY HUMILIATED HIN-THE YEYES IOFITHELPEOPLE MAND IN
ORDER TO REGAIN POPULAR RESPECT THEY MUST MENGINEER A COUP D'ETAT.
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRETHE MONTO
NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
STATE/INDIA ARMY ACSI NAVY AIR UCS SECDEF INSA NIC
STATE/DIR
OCIONE OCRS
GROUP
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE TO: DIRNSA PRODWO
STATE (RCI)(FOR HUGHES)
CS
(OP. 922 1 1
CNOOP 2
AFSSO WHITE T WHITE HOUSE
DIACTIC SIT ROOM
NIC DFIACS

FORM 10-62 IK OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

212000

1. 50
SECRET
(When: Filled In)
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION-CONTROLS7
KO FORCIER DISSE CENTRU
NO BISSEM ABROAD/BACKEROUND USE ONLY
YYAFFECTAT
F1
TDCSDB-3/
B-3/655,517
PAGE
NHƯ SAID THAT HE WOULD SUPPORT THE COUP IN RESPONSE TO A QUERY
NHU SAID THAT THE GENERAL OFFICERS. MUST SUPPORT HIM.COM

HAB BENHU SAID THAT HE WAS NOTO INAACCORD WITH THE PRESIDENTHOLI
OR WITH THE ADMINISTRATION IN GENERALE ALTHOUGH MANY PROBLEMS
HAVE BEEN HANDED TO HIM, HE HAS HAD NO REAL POWER TO FORCE THE
PRESIDENT OR OTHERSSTO MAKE DECISIONSIOR TO TAKE NECESSARY ACTION
ONLY WITHIN THE PAST YEAR,CUN FACT, CHASCHE HAD TANY COFFICIAL
POSITIONS. ETDIRECTOR OF THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM
Seat:OrNHU SAID THAT THE ARRIVALCOF) AANEW1UWS.YAMBASSADORAWOULD
BRING ABOUT CHANGE'S LANDETHAT FAST ACTION WAS INECESSARY IMMEDIATE
DECISIONS MUST BE REACHED WROTHECGOURDISOTO LOGCURMET KTHIS WASETHE
ONLY CHANCE FOR SUCCESS THE ARMY MUST. SEIZE THE TROUBLE MAKERS
CONGEFUGE VUD THE CERESVKE AHQ 162 2БЕСТЕТЕОГРА
FOR EXAMPLE, THE BUDDHIST MOVEMENTS MUSTIBBER QUELLED SIC: NHU QUALIFIED
my IC VM OFL THEK AND VILENGED THE HEELIие
قاعد THIS STATEMENT BY ADDING THAT, HTHAT THE DID NOT MEAN THE BUDDHISTS PER SE
BUT THE FIVE RINGLEADERS, WHO-WE-RE-TO-BLAME BECAUSE THEY HAD TUSED
13 JABIARRA
DYLE
どらってまой скупог2 YHE DELISH KITS DE CALEA 10 EXILIME
1:
VOTHEIR RELIGION TO FURTHER THEIR OWN AMBITIONS AND DESIGNS
15. NHU CONTINUED BY SAYING THAT THE COUP MUST BE STAGED
OVERNIGHT; IT MUST BE LIGHTNING FAST AND PROBABLY ALLICTHAT WOULD
BE NEEDED WOULD BE A SHOW OF FORCE ON THE FOLLOWING DAY, THE
GENERAL OFFICERS MUST TURN THE GOVERNMENT OVER TO CIVILIANTבינ
CONTROLIN RESPONSE TO A STATEMENT FROM MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN
NGOCLE CHIEF-OF--VE-TERANS AFFAIRS THAT SUCH AN ACT-ION REQUIRED
SECRET
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

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(When Filled In)
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- TDCS DB-3/655,517
IN 78592
NO DISSEIN ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE CALY
PAGE
3
MAJOR DECISIONS AND A PLAN, NHƯ SAID THAT HE AND HIS WIFE AND
THE GENERAL OFFICERS WOULD HAVE THE REQUIRED PLAN. NHU COMMENTED
THAT HE REALIZED THAT HIS WIFE WAS NOT LIKED BY MANY PEOPLE BUT
THAT SHE HAD TRIED TO HELP IN THE FIGHT FOR VIETNAM AND THAT
SHE HERSELF REALIZED THAT: SHE HAD MANY SHORTCOMINGS.
6
GENERAL LE THEN SAID TO NHU: "YOU SAY THAT YOU DO NOT
AGREE WITH THE GOVERNMENT BUT THE PEOPLE SAY THAT YOU ARE.
CONCERNED WITH ALL DECISIONS MADE" NHU REPEATED HIS COMMENTS
ON LACK OF POWER, FAILURE TO HAVE HIS ADVICE ACCEPTED, AND HIS
NMENTPOCA (CENЕВОТ НУВК ТИР)
LACK OF OFFICIAL POSITION IN THE GOVERNMENT
COM COMVIDER OF THE Y
7. GENERAL LE COMMENTED ON 12 JULY THAT ALTHOUGH NHƯ MIGHT BE

WILLING TO OVERTHROW THE DIEM GOVERNMENT LE THOUGHT THAT THEY BELE
Бестоби 140
БЕСТОИТ НО ТИ ДЕНЬ COUNT APLUPHAT THE ONHUS WANTED
SHOULD PROCEED WITHOUT NHU, ADDING THAT
АТЕЙ КЕНЕТOMED
TO DO WAS TO SAVE THEMSELVES
(SOURCE COMMENT
ВЫТСИОТЕВ СЕМЕВУГ ИСПЛЕЙ КНУИН СОШ
ADDLOFITHEANHUICE
CHILDREN. HAVE BEEN BROUGHT INTO SAIGON AND WERE UNDER HEAVY GUARD
ВВІСУОТЕВ СЕИЕВОЕ ИСПЛЕЙ ЛИИ ГУССКИЕ СУЫ BEY VID
THE NHUS ALSO HAVE AN ESCAPE PLAN.
СЕЙЕРУСА
В совЬИ: СОГОЛЕГ Нолин
8 BRIGADIER GENERAL PHAM XUAN CHIỀU CHIẾU SÁNDON 925 JULY THAT
соль егоийние сколь: BHTOVDIES СТИСКУ ТО
ANY COUP D'ETAT ACTION MUST BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY IMMEDIATELY AND THAT VALU
ERS SHOUNEN OLLICEBE МЕВЕ ГЕРОЕВ
GENERAL OFFICERS SHOULD COOPERATE
MYWLED
BE
9. COLONEL LE QUAN VIEN SAID ON 12 JULY Y THAT HE HAD INOT
수
И ДНЕ
ETING BUT WAS AWARE THAT SOMETHINGEWAS
ATTENDED THE 110 11 JULY MEETING
LGOINGON, ADDING THAT NHU AGREED WITH DIEM THAT SOME CHANGES-SHOULD.
BEMAD
CLASNO FOREREN OPSSEEMINATION OONTROLS
SECRETNO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

(13)
50
La
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
IN 78592
SECRET
עם לביתTDCS DB-3/655,517
PAGE
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED
(When Filled In)NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
FLLENDED THE ΤΗΣ ΤΩΓΙ ΜΕELION
BE MADE BEFORE AMBASSADOR DESIGNATE LODGE ARRIVED; NHU, HOWEVER,
-СОГОИСТ ГЕ ОЛТИ ЛИ
WANTED TO GO FURTHER AND HAVE A COUP D'ETAT WITHOUT DELAY
CLILEFT OLLICENS PROЛГО
VIEN SAID THAT THE FOLLOWING GENERAL OFFICERS WERE LEADERS IN. THE
FIA CONG DIEIVE VELIOM ΜΑΣ Ε
NA
COUP PLANNING GROUP: BRIGADIER GENERAL TON THẤT ĐỊNH, COMMANDING
GENERAL, 111. CORPS; COLONEL HUYNH VÀN CAO, COMMANDER, IV CORPS;
BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN VAN LA, COMMANDER, CAPITAL AREA; AND
CHIIDBEN HAM BEEM BRONCHI TALO 240
BRIGADIER GENERAL: NGUYEN KHANH, COMMANDING GENERAL TISCORPS..סיהם
10 DO MY2 10 2ME THENРЕГЛЕГ (20Ойсе совсе
VIEN MENTIONED ANOTHER GROUP THAT WOULD SUPPORT A COUP PLACINGHVICE
ИНОСГО БУОСEED MICHOAL ИНО" YODIVA
PRESIDENT THO IN TEMPORARY CONTROL AS INCLUDING MA INCLUDING MAJOR-GENERALWWLED
АТЕРТИС 10 СЛЕВІНКОЛTHЕ DIEW СОЛЕВИШЕЙЕ
DUONG VĂN MINH, MILITARY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT BRIGADIERIE
GENERAL TRAN VAN DON, COMMANDER OF THE ARMY; AND TWO OTHERS.CHI DE
10. FIELD, DISSEM STATE (AMBASSADOR), USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS)
ON TVCK OF LONES LINGE LO TUNE HIZ VOAICE
CINCPAC-ARPAC PACAF PACELT
a
M16 VTT DECISIONS WIDE WHO KESEVIED H12 CONNEW12
VONTE MILK THE СОЛЕВИНЕТ ВЛI THE DEMISTE 20 VI 100 ME
ГНЕ НЕВЗЕГЕ KEVPISED
ИАМ ДАН ЭНГ ТАНГА
HVD H
20
1
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THVL THE HAD IKTED 10 HEFS IN THE FIGHT LOS ALELNOW WUD HEL
IHTI HE BELTISED INVU HIC NILE MHZ MOI FRIED BE BL
HAMA CHA 21012
HE WID HIS MILD VID
END OF MESSAGE
י7
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROL'S 21
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NO FOREIEN DI
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NO BISSEM APROAD/BACKGROUND-

C

3
F10205
176-10036-10115 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10115
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO:
TITLE: CIA Information Telegram
DATE: 7/16/1963
PAGES: 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 198: Vietnam, 7/1/1963-7/20/63. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
REPORT NO. TDCSDB-3/655,558
SUBJECT STATUS OF COUP D'ETAT PLANS DATE DISTR. 16 JULY 1963
OF TRAN KIM TUYEN'S GROUP
PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
DATE OF
INFO. 15 JULY 1963 REFERENCES IN. 80366
PLACE &
DATE ACO. VIETNAM, SAIGON (15 JULY 1963)
APPRAISAL 3 FIELD REPORT NO EVS 9309
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A HIGH-LEVEL VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL (C) WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS AMONG GOVERNMENT
LEADERS.

1. ON 15 JULY 1963 AN INDIVIDUAL ASSOCIATED WITH THE COUP D'ETAT
GROUP HEADED BY DR. TRAN KIM TUYEN, CURRENTLY AN ADVISOR AT THE PRES
IDENCY, SAID THAT THEIR NATIONALIST, ANTI-COMMUNIST COUP WOULD OCCUR
"SOON." HOWEVER, AS THE VIET CONG WERE REPORTEDLY PLANNING TO INTEN
SIFY THEIR ACTIVITIES DURING THE WEEK PRIOR TO THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE
GENEVA ACCORDS (20 JULY), THE COUP WOULD NOT BE STAGED UNTIL AFTER THAT
DATE THE COUP WOULD BE DIRECTED AGAINST PRESIDENT DIEM AS WELL AS
THE NGO DINH NHUS, AND THE GROUP PLANNED TO ESTABLISH A CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS:
HR
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM BACKGROUND USE ONLY

STATEZDIR
Excluded from automatie
downgrading and
declassification

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
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FORM IK
OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SANITIZED AUG. 09.15

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
BACKGROUND USE ONLY
IN
TDCSDB-3/655,558
(16)
57
80366
PAGE 2

REGIME BEHIND VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN NGOC THO (FIELD COMMENT FVS-
9286 GDCSDB-3/655,471), FROM ANOTHER SOURCE, REPORTED DETAILS OF TUYEN'S
PLAN AND THAT HE WANTED TO MOVE BEFORE THE END OF JULY.)

FIELD DISSEM STATE (AMBASSADOR) USMACY (GENERAL HARKINS)
CINCPAC PACFLT ARPACO PACAF CORS Ponto HOLLE ALYOED OMLJE VLIES DIT

JAZIANEGA
7. OE
TUEMARE YOU OHOMA BSSALO (1) 4500 езика и
-BVITATUBT 21 TUSTHOD JAPAN 330242 VILAGO DUI MOITANACH 031AU JAVSKU UHT

SKAJR TATEO
EUTATE

SECRET
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AGENCY: NARA
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ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE: CIA Information Telegram
DATE: 7/17/1963
PAGES: 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 198: Vietnam,7/1/1963-7/20/63. Box 2

---

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This-material-contains information "aflecting the National Defense of the United States within "States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Titio $18. IBU.S.C
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation, revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by l

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-ON-FI-DE-N-TI-A-L
NO. FOREIGN DISSEM
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
REPORT NO. TDCS-3/553,724
SUBJECT POSSIBLE CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT OF
VIETNAM FOREIGN POLICY IN LIGHT OF
APPOINTMENT OF AMBASSADOR LODGE
DATE DISTR. 17 JULY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
DATE OF MID-JULY 1963
REFERENCES IN 80437
INFO.
PLACE & VIETNAM, SAIGON (15 JULY 1963)
DATE ACO.
APPRAISAL SEE BELOW
FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-9314
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
SOURCE: A. HIGH-LEVEL VIETNAMESE SECURITY OFFICIAL (C) WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS AMONG
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

APPR IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM HAS RECALLED SOME OF ITS
FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES; HOWEVER, WHETHER THE REASON IS TO DEFINE A NEW
SED FOREIGN POLICY IN LIGHT OF AMBASSADOR LODGE'S APPOINTMENT IS UNKNOWN
HEADQUARTERS COMMENT PARAGRAPH 2

WELL NET21KECUBY MID JULY 1963 PRESIDENT. NGO DINH DIEM WAS CONSIDERABLY DISTURBED

ES OVER THE DESIGNATION OF HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR. AS AMBASSADOR TO THE GOVERNMENT

OF VIETNAM (GVN) THE APPOINTMENT SUGGESTED TO THE PRESIDENT THAT THE UNITED
LEVISTATES PLANNED TO WIELD A BIG STICK AND THE GVN RECALLED A NUMBER OF ITS

END DIPLOMATS FOR CONSULTATION. AMONG THEM WERE THE REPRESENTATIVES IN KUALA

AVE LUMPUR AND SINGAPORE NEW DELHI, DJAKARTA, TOKYO, RANGOON, AND SENEGAL AND

VAE SEVERAL OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS THE REPRESENTATIVES WERE RECALLED OSTENSIBLY

SO THAT THEY COULD ATTEND A SEMINAR ON THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM WHICH
WE WOULD ENABLE THEM TO EXPLAIN THE PROGRAM ABROAD: HOWEVER, THE GVN ACTUALLY
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS TOR ГОРС
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM
STATE INR DIA ARMY ACSI NAVYAIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC
STATE/DIR
GROUP
Excluded, fram automatic
AID USIA OCI ONE OCR
ORR
downgrading, o
declassification
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM1Kb OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS,

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM TDCS-3/553,724 IN 80437
PAGE TWO

YJWANTED TO DISCUSS ITS POSITION IN REGARD TO THE BUDDHIST SITUATION AND TO
ATTEMPT TO DEFINE A NEW GVN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE LIGHT OF THE LODGE
ΑΡΡΟΙΝΤΜΕNT

9.2.1 HEADQUARTERS COMMENT TDCS-3/552,830 REPORTED THAT BUU HOI, GVN
AMBASSADOR TO THE IVORY COAST, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, UPPER VOLTA, AND SENEGAL
WAS EXPECTED IN SAIGON ON 15 JULY CS-3/533,307 REPORTED THAT NGO ĐỊNH NHU
HAD STATED AT AN INTERMINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC HAMLETS' MEETING
THAT THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAD FAILED TO ENROLL HIS PERSONNEL IN
THE COURSE AT THE THI NGHE STRATEGIC HAMLET CENTER, AND THAT IF NECESSARY,
THE MINISTER SHOULD RECALL HIS PERSONNEL FROM EMBASSIES ABROAD IN ORDER TO
MEET THIS REQUIREMENT

3. FIELD DISSEM STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID USIA
2ND AIR DIVISION 9TH FIELD STATION CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

COARBINETAL CREIOTVIS END OF MESSAGE
ZOBCE Y KICH-TEAST 
 END OF MESSAGE (C) MIJI EXВТАЕ СООД
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CLASSIFICATION-DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
HOITAOP22AJO
NO ELENIGN DICEN
C=O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CENLEVT HAITFIORACE VACHCA
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AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE: CIA Information Telegram
DATE: 7/18/1963
PAGES : 4
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 198: Vietnam, 7/1/1963-7/20/63. Box 2

SEE SANITIZED VERSION + DOWNGRADED NLK-84-15 . (18) 65
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
1. This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the. Espionage Laws, Title.U.S.C-Secs:-
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
SECRET
S. Vietnam
(When Filled In) NO FOREIGN, DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM COMREAL ONTWQE2 REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/655,605
SUBJECT
MAJOR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH COMMENTS ON
THE CURRENT SITUATION AND ON THE NEED FOR
A CHANGE IN THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM MY
DATE DISTR 18 JULY 1963ЕССИИ
PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
DATE OF13 216 JULY 1963 OIKEUL 1812 12 THE REFERENCES LENNE 82003
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACO.
APPRAISAL
VIETNAM, SAIGON (17 JULY 1963) LY 1963 42 17 MIN BECYSD 10 THE
-..
SEE. BELOW
FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-9322
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE' GRADING'S ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE
SOURCE AN, AMERICAN OBSERVER (B); FROM A UNITED STATES ARMY FIELD-GRADE OFFICER; FROM
GENERAL DUONG VĂN MINH.
וד
APPR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH PROBABLY HOLDS THESE VIEWS AND TADE TIRSES T
IS KNOWN TO O HAVE BEEN DISGRUNTLED WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM SINCE 1960, D
EVEN THOUGH HE HAS NOT SO EXPRESSED HIMSELD PREVIOUS LYET OFSOURCE (SEE PARA. 2.B).
SUMMARY ON 16 JULY 1963 MAJOR GENERAL DUONG VĂN MINH,
BADDH1212
OAHI
MILITARY ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT DIEM, CRITICIZED THE PRESIDENT, SAID
BELLIODE
DIEW LORD WIPE OF 15 PAA YL THE BLИН ХОЛЕЙ THE HOV
THAT HE LACKED THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE, AND ADVOCATED A CHANGE IN
THE BADDH121 1231E 12 и главVIION OF DIEN 2 155YLIGHT
THE REGIME, BUT ASSERTED THAT NGO DINH NHU COULD NOT TAKE OVER THE
MOGE ורטודוע
GOVERNMENT. HE ALSO SAID: THẬT BRIGADIER GENERAL DO CAO TRI WOULD
BEWVISKE ON І ПОГА МНЕЙ НЕ 2410 197 THE CONUIBA MYR ENIDED BA
REMA IN IN COMMAND OF THE IST DIVISION,
>
:
AW
СЬЕЗУІТИС ОNDEY WORDYJE EBOW HEYЛЕЙ 1812 МVE VEOMEEMI пижиг
2. GENERAL MINH MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS:
VLIES FORD DIEN CHVUCED CОЛЬГЕЛЕГА ВЕСОННИС СОИЛЛИСЕD THVL HЕ MVC
A. PRESIDENT DIEM HAS CHANGED SO COMPLETELY THAT IT IS NO
LEOLEE HET WE HOME BEEN THE LINE 10 HYAE CHVUCED THE СОЛЕУИНЕЦ
LONGER POSSIBLE TO REASON WITH HIM. IN THE EARLY DAYS HE HAD THE
асисбитие неЗЕГЕ ТИ МИО 31 1020 HE HVD ГОД СОМЬПЕΙΕ LONCH MITR THE
SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE AND WAS VERY POPULAR THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM.
LOVани12 LOB WHEATBIONе воскалеOL THE СОЛЕЦINERL
CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
THEN HE 260VW
1:40 1609902
SECRETEN FOREIGN NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE
ONLY
STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SEGDEF. NSA NIG AID YSIA OG1. ONE OGR
STATE D'I'R
CIB
"GROUPI
Excluded from automatis
% dewagredike GRS
00.100 880
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
стигавши поM-DRESWIATION COULEOR
FORM
10-62
82 IK OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
(18-20)

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313
TDCSDB-3/655,605 82003
INT
PAGE
:
:
PORUCE
R
IT WAS A SIMPLE MATTER AT THAT TIME TO GAIN THE SUPPORT OF THE
PEASANTS FOR THE VARIOUS PROGRAMS OF THE GOVERNMENT. THEN HE BEGAN
:
SCREENING HIMSELF IN AND BY 1959 HE HAD LOST COMPLETE TOUCH WITH THE
PEOPLE. THAT MAY HAVE BEEN THE TIME TO HAVE CHANGED THE GOVERNMENT..
AFTER 1960 DIEM CHANGED COMPLETELY, BECOMING CONVINCED THAT HE WAS
:
OPERATING UNDER A MANDATE FROM HEAVEN. THIS WAS APPARENT IN HIS
REMARKS ON 7 JULY WHEN HE SAID THAT THE COUNTRY WAS GUIDED BY
GLUOW AT DAG. ОД ЈАЯЗИТЕ ЯЗICADIES TANT QUIA
::
"INTUITIVE WISDOM."
THE
AN OF
INVI HEO DIИН ИНО, СОЛГΩ ΚΟΥΚΕ
SECINE SEGIME BOY
B. THE BUDDHIST ISSUE IS AN ILLUSTRATION OF DIEM'S IRRATIONAL
НЕ ГУСКED THE 20650BL OF THE SECOND YOMOCY LED CHИСЕМИ
ATTITUDE. DIEM TOLD MINH ON 13 JULY THAT THE BINH XUYEN, THE HOA
AYDAL 208 NL DIENT CSILICISED ISED THE SBЕЗІ СЕНІ 20
HAO, AND THE CAO DAT WERE ALL STRONGER THAN THE BUDDHISTS. THEY
EVGA YRATLAM
:
BUT THE GOVERNMENT WAS
HAD REGULAR ARMED TROOPS BUT THE GOVERNMENT WAS STILL ABLE TO 58)
DEFEAT THEM, SO WHY CANNOT THE GOVERNMENT ALSO DEFEAT. THE MONKS,
2
t
WHO HAVE NEITHER ARMS NOR MILITARY ORGANIZATION? MINH WAS UNABLE
TO CONVINCE THE PRESIDENT THAT THE SITUATIONS WERE NOT THE SAME
LASIASIA
CYLE VOOR
KANE ZHE
BECAUSE OF THE TRIGIDESTAND DIEM HAS TAKEN WITH. I. REGARD TO THE
YLE BUDDHIST.ST (SOURCE COMMENT. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME MINH HAS MADE
SUCH STRONG, STATEMENTS AGAINST DIEM.) SECEDENCE YONGTHE
E CORRAL PELAVITO
THE BUDDHIST PROBLEM IS FAR FROM SETTLED TIS BECOMING
WORSE AND UNLESS THE GOVERNMENT CHANGES ITS POLICY. THERE WILL BE
ADDITIONAL BUDDHIST SELF GIMMODATIONSTEN BODIVOKOSE 23 СИГА
:
ひろの七つ
DTHERE-MUST BE A CHANGE IN THE GOVERNMENT SOUTH VIETNAM
ام
mar
14 :עם שיר טמו CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
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:
:

SECRET
(When Filled In)
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TDCSDB-3/655,605
(18)
IN 82003
PAGE
3
}
IS LIKE A YOUNG TREE; IT HAS FIRM ROOTS AND IS GROWING BUT IT MUST
HAVE A PROPER ATMOSPHERE SO THAT ITS LEAVES, I.E., THE PEOPLE, CAN
BREATHE THI'S SLACKING IN SOUTH VIETNAM.
EINGO DINH NHU CAN NEVER ER TAKE TAKE OVER OVER THE GOVERNMENT; (SHOULD
THE SUCCEED IT WOULD PROVE THAT THE VIET CONG (VC) ARE RIGHT IN
CLAIMING G THAT THE VCARE THE ONLY ONES WHO REALLY FIGHT, FOR THE
PEOPLE (SOURCES COMMENTE MAJOR GENERAL TRANG VAN DON, COMMANDING
GENERAL OF THE ARMY NAND BRIGADIER GENERAL LE VAN KIM, MINISTRYWHпа
OFNNATIONAL DEFENSE, TAREMMINH SECLOSE FRIENDS!)
ACHA BIMONO
WORE! BEVICEOPRESIDENTINGUYEN NGOC THOSTOLED! MINH ION195 JULYHTHATH
NTHWAS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLEMATOJOBTAIN AN AGREEMENTYBETWEENITHEIN V
BUDDHISTSIAND THE GOVERNMENT BECAUSE THE SELFERRIDE OF GERTAIN KEYAVI
INDIVIDUALS, OVDET THEENHOSDANDY ARCHBISHOP NGOV DINH THUC THADOL THE
BECOME L'INVOLVED. THO HAS BEEN WANTING TO RESIGN BUT WAS NOT EVEN
PERMITTED 2TOLSUBMIT ALLERTEROOF IRESIGNATION HESTILLIANTENDSCOSH
GOMTHROUGH AWITH LIIT, CHOWEVEROL (FIELDYCOMMENTO ALEVS 9243, (TDCS25/552,503,
HKREPORTED THAT DILEM HA'DEREFUSEDITO ACCEPT LTHOIS WRITTEN
RESIGNATION, SUBMITTED CONYIKJULY FVS-9256, TDCS-3/552,565, REPORTED
THO'S STATEMENT THAT HEEWANTED TOERESIGN BUTIWAS UNCERTAINDASOTO THE
TIMINGE)112 112 THE MГИИТИЗ ОЕ HE IS YOVIE THE AC12 101 21
G. IF THE MILITARY PRESSURE AGAINST THE VC CAN BE CONTINUED
AT THE PRESENT RATE FOR CALYEAR, OTHE ARMY CAN DISRUPT THE VC ARMED
-
SECRET
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO-FOREIGN DISSEM/NO-DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND-USE ONLY

CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD TDCSDB-3/655,605
BACKGROUND USE ONLY
SECRET
(When ruled in) 695831
IN 82003
PAGE
4
INSURGENTS. THE WINNING OF THE WAR AGAINST THE VCIS NOT SIMPLY A
MILITARY: PROBLEM, HOWEVER, BUT ONE THAT REQUIRES THE SUPPORT OF THE
THE PEOPLE, AND THISIS LACKING
KELOUISO
H. NO TROUBLELIS ANTICIPATED FROM THE VC ON THE 26 JULYJEM
ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS, BUTITHE STUDENTS
MIGHT CAUSE TROUBLE BECAUSE OF THE SUICIDE OF OPPOSITIONISTONGUYEN
TUONG TAM OTAED THO HAS BEEN питека SERIEGONS 112 101 ΕΛΕ
IMCOBRIGADIER GENERAL DO CAO TRI WILL REMAIN IN COMMAND OF THE
STEINFANTRY DIVISION FOR THE TIME BEING. AND BRIGADIER GENERAL L'EVAN
NGHIEM WIELOREMA INNINECOMMAND OF CORPS, WHICH PLACES NGHIEMEIN AN
IMPOSSIBLE POSITIONDA'S THE TWO MEN DO NOT GET ALONG WELL WITH LEACH
OTHER OTRISEPROMOTIONEWAS DESERVED BECAUSE HE IS A VERY STRONG
FIGHTER, OF(FIELD2COMMENT), EFVS-9302, DOBDB-3/655, 512,
REPORTED NHU'S
STATEMENT THAT OTRICHAD BEEN PROMOTED AND NAMED/COMMANDER COFILCORPS
FVS-9267, (TDO8-3/550/409185 REPORTED-NGHIEM! BESTATEMNT OF HIS DESIRE
TO RESIGN FROM THE TARMYCETHVL THE ATEL Cole (AC) V6E BICHI IN
3. E'FIELD DISSEMIN STATEIE (AMBASSADOR ENOLTING), USMAEV (GENERAL
HARKINS ONLY)? CINEPACK PACFLT ARPAC PACAF!***
!
БУЛЕТ ЕЗОБЕВ УДПОЛЬНЕВЕ 20 Η ΕΛΕЭ" ТЕ НЕ БЕОЬГЕ СУИ
12. ΠΙΚΕ ν λεпие 18ЕЕ! 11012710 12060тие 801 11 721
END OF MESSAGE
3
SECRET
MESSACE
CLASSIFICATION B199EMINATION CONTROLS
CNCTION-COMΙΚΡ
NO O FORDION DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
3
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10131
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO:
TITLE: CIA Information Telegram
DATE: 9/19/1963
PAGES: 2
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam,9/17/1963-9/21/63. Box 2

---
VERSION NLK-82-60
NLK-02-320, 1103
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains, information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs.
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL
SOUTH VIETNAM
COUNTRY
SUBJECT
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE.ONLY
REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/656,739
: GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH PLANS TO MAKE HIS
FINAL DECISION SOON ON ANY ACTION AGAINST
THE DIEM REGIME
DATE DISTR. 19 SEPTEMBER 1963
PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
DATE OF
15-16 SEPTEMBER 1963
INFO.
PLACE &
VIETNAM, SAIGON (16 - 17 SEPTEMBER 1963)
DATE ACO.
APPRAISAL
SEE BELOW
REFERENCES
IN 22714
FIELD REPORT NO. FVS- 9660
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS, ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
SOURCE A COMPANY-GRADE OFFICER (F) ON THE STAFF OF GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH.
APPR KHANH MAY STILL BE THINKING ABOUT ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTION, BUT WITHOUT ASSURANCES
FROM THE UNITED STATES OF SUPPORT, HE WILL PROBABLY NOT INITIATE ANY ACTION.
NEVERTHELESS, THE POSSIBILITY OF HIS MOUNTING A COUP D'ETAT CANNOT BE COMPLETELY
DISCOUNTED SINCE AN INDIVIDUAL CONNECTED WITH THE TRAN KIM TUYEN COUP GROUP HAS
SAID THAT KHANH MIGHT TAKE ACTION AGAINST THE DIEM GOVERNMENT, AND SINCE KHANH'S
NAME HAS BEEN MENTIONED AS ONE OF A NUMBER OF ALLEGEDLY DISSIDENT GENERALS.

1. ON 15 SEPTEMBER 1963 BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH, LI
CORPS COMMANDER, SAID THAT HE WOULD DECIDE IN A DAY OR TWO

WHETHER OR NOT TO PROCEED WITH PLANNING ACTION AGAINST THE DIEM
REGIME. (FIELD COMMENT. SEE FVS-9634, TDCSDB-3/656,637, FOR: PREVIOUS
REPORT ON KHANH'S PLANNING.) HE REMARKED THAT IF HIS DECISION WERE
NEGATIVE, HE WOULD CEASE ALL PLANNING AND NOT REVIVE THE PROJECT. ON 16
SEPTEMBER KHANH SAID THAT HE HAD CHANGED HIS MIND AND WOULD MULL
OVER THE SITUATION FOR ANOTHER WEEK BEFORE GIVING HIS FINAL
DECISION. KHANH PLANNED TO RETURN TO THE 11: CORPS AREA ON 18
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
RU FORT
CIB
GROUP I
Excluded Iram automatic
downgrading and
declassification
CONFIDENTIAL NO-FOREIGN DISSEM/NO-DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND:
USE ONLY
ROCKO
STATE IN DIA ARMY ACSI NAVY PAINT TUCSI SECDEF NSA NIC XAXXXXXX OC ZONEOCR XXXXXXXXXXXXXX
STATEVOIR
EXO
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
PORM
1...4-63 1Ka OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS:
E
(15-20)

---
حا
CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD TDCS DB-3/656,739
BACKGROUND-USE ONLY
IN.
PAGE
22714
2
:
SEPTEMBER

2. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR. LODGE) USMACV (GENERAL
HARKINS) CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

LEMAE
20760
20
:
+302
END OF MESSAGE
:
PIA BOCE COMTET ZE LIENG TRA
?
T
A
ONTACT
TO JARIOS
CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN
FORMIK-USE: PREVIOUS
EDITIONS:
1-63
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE
CONTINUATION OF TDCS. INFORMATION REPORT
ONLY
MFO
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10134
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE: CIA Information Telegram
DATE: 9/21/1963
PAGES: 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam,9/17/1963-9/21/63. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs.
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/656,771

SUBJECT PHAM NGỌC THAO, AND TUYEN GROUP DATE DISTR. 21 SEPTEMBER 1963
READY TO LAUNCH COUP D'ETAT PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF 18-19 SEPTEMBER 1963
INFO. REFERENCES IN 24185

PLACE & VIETNAM, SAIGON (18-19 SEPTEMBER 1963)
DATE ACO. FIELD REPORT NO.. FVS. 9674
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
SOURCE A. VIETNAMESE NATIONALIST (B) WITH EXCELLENT CONTACTS IN LEGAL AND POLITICAL CIRCLES
WITH PARAGRAPH 1 FROM DUONG AND WITH PARAGRAPH 2. FROM LINH,
APPRAISAL PLANS BY THE TUYEN GROUP TO LAUNCH A COUP D'ETAT ARE PROBABLY CONTINUING,
BUT THE PRECISE TIMING AND CAPABILITY ARE DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE..

1. THE MOVE TO OUST THE NGO FAMILY FROM POWER WAS SCHEDULED FOR
THE WEEK BEGINNING 22 SEPTEMBER 1963, ACCORDING TO NGUYEN HUU DUONG,
GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY IN THE SAIGON MUNICIPAL COURTS AND MEMBER OF THE
TRAN KIM TUYEN COUP GROUP. DUONG SAID ON 19 SEPTEMBER THAT LIEUTENANT
COLONEL PHAM NGỌC THAO, STRATEGIC HAMLET INSPECTOR FOR NGO DINH NHU
AND MEMBER OF BOTH THE TUYEN GROUP AND THE GROUP LED BY HUYNH VAN
LANG, ECONOMICS PROFESSOR AT SAI GON UNIVERSITY, HAD GIVEN HIM THIS
INFORMATION. THAO HAD ALSO TOLD DUONG THAT GENERALS DUONG VAN MINH,
MILITARY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT, AND LE VAN KIM OF THE MINISTRY OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, WERE INVOLVED IN THE PLANS.

CONFIDENTIAL

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACS NAVY AIR SECDEF JCS NSA NIC OCI ONE OCR

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

2, BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH, COMMANDING GENERAL, 11 CORPS,
WOULD MOVE ON HUE AT THE SAME TIME THAT THAO LAUNCHED HIS MOVE IN
SAIGON, ACCORDING TO A STATEMENT BY LIEUTENANT NGUYEN NGOC LINH,
KHANH'S AIDE, ON 18 SEPTEMBER. LINH ALSO SAID THAT THAO WAS
READY TO MOVE WITHIN A WEEK TO OVERTHROW DIEM.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE AMBASSADOR LODGE, USMACV (GENERAL
HARKINS), CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PÁCFLT.

END OF MESSAGE

CONTINUATION OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT
176-10036-10135 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER: 176-10036-10135
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM:
TO:
TITLE: CIA Information Telegram
DATE: 10/4/1963
PAGES: 2
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE:
CLASSIFICATION:
RESTRICTIONS:
CURRENT STATUS:
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA:
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam, 10/6/1963-10/14/63. Box 2

TELEGRAM ORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs.
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation on of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM REPORT NO. TDCS-3/560,871

SUBJECT PLANNED SUICIDE OF AMBASSADOR DATE DISTR. 4 OCTOBER 1963
BUU HOI'S MOTHER, DIEU HUE PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF 3 OCTOBER 1963 REFERENCES IN 32958
INFO.
PLACE & VIETNAM, SAIGON (3 OCTOBER 1963)
DATE ACO.
APPRAISAL SEE BELOW FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 9731
SOURCE THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL DE CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
A VIETNAMESE BUSINESSMAN (F) WITH GOOD CONTACT'S AMONG BUDDHISTS.

APPR: EARLIER ALLEGED INTENTIONS OF DIEU HUE TO COMMIT SUICIDE IN SUPPORT OF
THE BUDDHIST CAUSE WERE WIDELY PUBLICIZED. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SHE
MIGHT DO SO.

1. BY 3 OCTOBER 1963 THE BUDDHIST NUN, DIEU HUE, MOTHER OF
BUU HOI, VIETNAMESE SCIENTIST, AMBASSADOR TO SEVERAL AFRICAN
COUNTRIES AND CURRENTLY THE GOVERNMNT OF VITNAM (GVN) OBSERVER
AT THE UNITED NATIONS (UN), AD DECIDED TO COMMIT SUICIDE, PROBABLY
ON 5 OCTOBER. THREATWAS TIMED FOR IMPACT ON THE UN BUT WAS NOT
TO BE BY BURNING.
2. DIEU HUE HAD PREPARED A LETTER DENOUNC ING HER SON AND
CLIMING THAT BUDDHISM WAS STILL BEING PERSECUTED IN VIETNAM,
COPIES OF WHICH WERE TO BE DISTRIBUTED TO THE FORIEGN PRESS AND
TO THE "CLANDESTINE" OPPOSITION BY HER COMPANION AND ATTENDANT, A

CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM
STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC A10 USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO EXO
STATE/DIR

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
IMMEDIATE TO: STATE (RCI) (FOR HUGHES: PLS PASS TO MR. HILSMAN)

FORM 1
4-63 Ka OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS, (15-20)

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CONFIDENTIAL IN 32958
(WHEN FILLED IN) NO FOREIGN DISSEM TDCS-3/560,871 PAGE 2.

YOUNGER NUN.
3. JUST PRIOR TO THE SUICIDE, THE COMPANION PLANNED. TO.
DELIVER A COPY OF THE LETTER TO THE U..S EMBASSY FOR AMBASSADOR
LODGE AND TO SEEK ASYLUM THERE. SHE BELIVED HER LIFE WOULD BE
IN DANGER AS THE GVN WOULD KNOW THAT ONLY SHE COULD HAVE DISTRIBUTED:
THE LETTER.
4. THICH THIEN HOA, PRESIDENT OF THE PRO-GVN UNION COMMITTEE
FOR THE DEFENSE OF PURE BUDDHISM AND MOST OF THE OTHER MONKS AND
NUNS AT THE AN QUANG PAGODA, WHERE DIEU HUE AND HER COMPANION
RESIDE, WERE UNAWARE OF THE SUICIDE PLAN.
5. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM
USIS 9TH FLD. STA: 2ND AIR DIV. CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)
END OF MESSAGE
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS.
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM 1K-1:
1-63
MFG.. 2-63 (15-20-44-47)
USE- PREVIOUS:
• EDITIONS
INUATION OF TDCS INFORMATION REPO
176-10036-10137
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10137
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM:
TO :
TITLE: CIA Information Report
DATE: 10/8/1963
PAGES: 5
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam,10/6/1963-10/14/63. Box 2
:

SER NIKITIZEN
NLK-87-554
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs
293 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND
USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM
COUNTRY
SOUTH VIETNAM
REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/657,133
SUBJECT
SITUATION APPRAISAL AS OF 5 OCTOBER 1963
DATE DISTR. 8 OCTOBER 1963
::
:
PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
REFERENCES IN 33775
DATE ACO.
APPRAISAL
VIETNAM, SAIGON (5 OCTOBER 1963)
COMMENTARY
FIELD REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
SOURCE STAFF OFFICERS OF THIS ORGANIZATION.
1
:
::
1. THIS IS A FIELD APPRAISAL OF THE CURRENT SITUATION. IT IS NOT AN
OFFICIAL JUDGEMENT BY THIS AGENCY OR ANY COMPONENT. IT REPRESENTS THE
OBSERVATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF STAFF OFFICERS BASED ON INFORMATION AVAILABLE
TO THEM AT THE TIME OF ITS PREPARATION. PREPARED FOR INTERNAL USE AS A GUIDE TO
THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT, THIS COMMENTARY IS DISSEMINATED IN THE BELIEF THAT
IT MAY BE USEFUL TO OTHER AGENCIES IN ASSESSING THE SITUATION FOR THEIR OWN
PURPOSES.
:
2. THE MOST STRIKING FEATURE OF THE INTELLIGENCE REPORTS FOR THE WEEK OF
:
29 SEPTEMBER-5 OCTOBER 1963 HAS BEEN A GREATER DEPTH OF REPORTING ON COUP
PLOTTING, PROVIDING INFORMATION IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL AS TO THE PERSONALITIES
INVOLVED AND THEIR ALLOTTED ROLES. STILL LACKING, HOWEVER, IS SOLID INFORMATION
e
AS TO THE COHESIVENESS OF VARIOUS GROUPS REPORTED READY TO LAUNCH A COUP AND TO
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
JCS
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINO DISSEM AEROAD/BACKGROUND
USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM
SECDEF
NSA
NIC
XXXK
CCI
ONE OCR

GROUP I
Excluded from me
down.grading and
declassicshon.
STATE INF DIA ARMY ACSI NAVY AIR
STATE DI
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORTLEGRAM
FORM
2
OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
(15-20:

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD
BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED
IN. 33775
TDCS DB-3/657,133
PAGE
DISSEM
TWO
THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY ENJOY FIRM LEADERSHIP AT THE TOP OF THE ICEBERG OF WHICH
WE ARE STILL GETTING ONLY TANGENTIAL GLIMPSES
3. THE GENERALS MEANWHILE ARE NOW PRESSING PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM FOR A
REPLY TO THE DEMANDS MADE SEVERAL WEEKS AGO DURING THE HEIGHT OF THE MARTIAL
LAW PHASE. AS DESCRIBED BY GENERAL TRAN VAN DON, THE LIST OF DEMANDS ARE QUITE
EXTENSIVE, INCLUDING THE ASSIGNMENT OF MILITARY MEN TO THE POSTS OF MINISTERS
OF DEFENSE, INTERIOR, CIVIC ACTION AND EDUCATION. THEY ALSO ASKED FOR CONTROL
OF THE SAIGON/CHOLON POLICE AND. THE PLACEMENT OF THE CAPITAL REGION UNDER A
PERMANENT MILITARY GOVERNORSHIP. DON SAYS THAT HE AND HIS FELLOW GENERAL OFFICERS
DO NOT EXPECT DIEM TO ACCEDE TO THIS PACKAGE OF PROPOSALS, ACCEPTANCE OF WHICH
WOULD INDEED AMOUNT TO A VIRTUAL SURRENDER ON. THE PART OF DIEM AND NGỌ DINH NHƯ.
THE LATTER WILL PROBABLY GO PART WAY, HOWEVER, IN MEETING THE DESIRES OF THE
MILITARY IN AN EFFORT TO DETER THE LATTER FROM ATTEMPTING AN EARLY COUP. THEIR
TACTIC IS LIKELY TO BE ONE OF SEEKING TO ENMESH THE GENERALS IN TIME-CONSUMING:
NEGOTIATIONS RELATED TO THE PROSPECTIVE REVAMPING OF THE GOVERNMENT WITH A VIEW
TOWARD GAINING TIME IN WHICH TO MONITOR AND BREAK UP ANY COUP COMBINATION WHICH
MAY BE DEVELOPING. THE OUTCOME OF MANEUVERING BETWEEN DIEM AND NHU AND THE
MILITARY DURING THE COMING FEW WEEKS, OR POSSIBLY EVEN DAYS, IS LIKELY TO BE
OF DECISIVE IMPORTANCE TO FUTURE COURSE OF EVENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

4. DESPITE THE IMPRESSION OF THE RETURN TO NORMALITY THAT IS BEING FOSTERED
BY THE REGIME, THE ATMOSPHERE IN SAIGON CONTINUES TO BE PERVADED TO A CONSIDERABLE
DEGREE BY FEAR AND UNCERTAINTY. ARRESTS REPORTEDLY ARE CONTINUING, AS WELL AS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/
CONTROLLED DISSEM
!
:
:
:

:
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD
BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED TDCSDB-3/657,133
DISSEM
SEARCHES OF PRIVATE HOMES BY THE SECURITY FORCES.
IN 33775
PAGE THREE

5. THERE ARE SCATTERED INDICATIONS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) IS
PLANNING TO SPRING SOME SURPRISES ON THE 26 OCTOBER NATIONAL DAY CELEBRATIONS.
NHU, FOR EXAMPLE, IS REPORTED TO HAVE TOLD THE GENERALS THAT IN A FEW WEEKS HE
WOULD UNDERTAKE AN UNSPECIFIED ACTION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL NATURE WHICH NEITHER
"THE WEALTHY NOR THE AMERICANS WOULD LIKE..". WE ALSO HAVE A REPORT THAT SWEEPING
CHANGES IN THE POLICE AND CIVIL INTELLIGENCE COMPLEX WILL OCCUR. MORE FRIVOLOUS
BUT PERHAPS SUGGESTIVE OF THE DESIRE BY THE REGIME TO EASE THE CURRENT ATMOSPHERE
NATIONAL DAY
WOULD BE THE LOGICAL TIME FOR DIEM TO ANNOUNCE REVAMPING OF HIS GOVERNMENT, PROVIDEI
IN SAIGON ARE THE RUMORS THAT THE BAN ON DANCING WILL BE LIFTED.

THIS DELICATE OPERATION CAN BE COMPLETED IN TIME.

6. A STRIKING THING ABOUT THE ELECTIONS WAS THE FACT THAT THEY WENT OFF
VIRTUALLY WITHOUT INCIDENT, EITHER IN SAIGON OR IN THE COUNTRYSIDE
:
THERE HAD
BEEN SEVERAL INDICATIONS. THAT THE VIET CONG (VC) INTENDED DISRUPTION AS A COMPANION
TACTIC TO THEIR PROPAGANDA CALL FOR THE BOYCOTT OF THE ELECTIONS. NEITHER DURING
THE ELECTIONS, NOR DURING THE PRECEDING BUDDHIST CRISIS, DID THE COMMUNISTS SEEM
ABLE TO CAPITALIZE ON THEIR IMMEDIATE OPPORTUNITIES. ESPECIALLY LACKING WAS THE
EXERCISE OF THEIR MUCH VAUNTED CAPABILITIES FOR TERRORISM, RAISING SOME QUESTION
WAS
IN OUR MINDS AS TO WHETHER VC ABILITY TO USE TERRORISM IN CITIES/AS GREAT AS WE
HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE. IT WAS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO MEASURE THE SUCCESS OF
THE VC BOYCOTT APPEAL. SINCE THE GVN IN MANY AREAS MORE OR LESS FORCED THE ELECTORATE
TO VOTE AND IN AREAS WHERE ITS CONTROL WAS NOT THAT STRONG, THE REGIME ALMOST...
CERTAINLY FALSIFIED THE PERCENTAGES OF THE VOTE.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/
CONTROLLED DISSEM

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS.
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/ TDCS DB-3/657,133
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM
IN 33775
PAGE FOUR
7. ONE INDICATION OF THE REGIME'S INCREASED CONFIDENCE THAT IT HAS THE
SITUATION UNDER CONTROL IS THE FACT THAT COLONEL TUNG HAS RELEASED TWO COMPANIES
OF SPECIAL FORCES TROOPS FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VC.
..

8. ALTHOUGH MOMENTARILY QUIESCENT BECAUSE OF THE HEAVY GVN SECURITY CONTROLS,
THE STUDENTS CONTINUE THEIR ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES AND ARE DEVELOPING. PLANS FOR
FURTHER ACTION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. THERE APPEARS TO BE CONSIDERABLE DIVISION
OF OPINION AMONG THE VARIOUS STUDENT GROUPS, SOME OF WHICH EXISTED PRIOR TO THE
BUDDHIST CRISIS AND SOME HAVE SINCE EMERGED. REPORTING RECEIVED TO DATE WOULD
INDICATE THAT THE VC HAVE NOT YET MADE SIGNIFICANT INROADS INTO THE STUDENT MOVE-
MENT, ALTHOUGH THIS IS OF COURSE AN INCREASING POSSIBILITY IF RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE STUDENTS AND THE GVN LONG REMAIN IN THEIR PRESENT UNSATISFACTORY STATE. IN
PARTICULAR, WE HAVE LITTLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE THESIS THAT THE STUDENTS ARE
TO
FLEEING/THE COUNTRYSIDE TO JOIN THE VC ALTHOUGH SOME REPORTEDLY DID LEAVE SAIGON
AND HUE TO AVOID ARREST DURING THE PERIOD OF THE GOVERNMENT CRACKDOWN. VIL:
::

9. A REPORT FROM A VIETNAMESE TRADE UNION OFFICIAL PROVIDES ADDITIONAL..
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE NHU-MANELI MEETING IN EARLY SEPTEMBER AND ON. THE
GENERAL SUBJECT OF POSSIBLE GVN-DRV RAPPROCHEMENT. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION
RECEIVED BY THE SOURCE FROM A FRENCH EMBASSY OFFICER, HO CHI MINH HAD AT ONE TIME
INDICATED TO A FORMER FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE IN NORTH VIETNAM HIS DISCOURAGEMENT
OVER CASUALTIES SUSTAINED IN THE WAR IN THE SOUTH, HIS DISTASTE FOR THE CHINESE
PRESENCE IN THE DRV, AND HIS RESTIVENESS OVER SOVIET "INTERFERENCE" OF AN
UNSPECIFIED NATURE. LALOUETTE WAS REPORTED TO HAVE PASSED THIS ON TO NHƯ WHO,
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSÉM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/
CONTROLLED DISSEM

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD TDCS DB-3/657,133
BACKGROUND. USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM
IN 33775
PAGE FIVE
ACCORDING TO THE FRENCH, LEAKED IT TO JOSEPH ALSOP, THUS BETRAYING THE CONFIDENTIAL
FRENCH CONVERSATION WITH HO. THE FRENCH ALLEGEDLY FEEL THIS PUT LALOUETTE IN AN
UNTENABLE POSITION; HENCE, HIS FAILURE TO RETURN TO SAIGON. IT IS DIFFICULT TO
BELIEVE THAT THE FRENCH REALLY CONSIDER NHU'S "INDISCRETION" AS SERIOUS, AS THEY LET:
ON. SOURCE CLAIMS, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT MANELI TOLD NHU PRRCTICALLY THE SAME STORY
ABOUT HO'S PREOCCUPATIONS.
:
10. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR, DCM), USMACV (HARKINS), CINCPAC, PACFLT,
PACAF, ARPAC.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
;
END OF MESSAGE
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/
CONTROLLED DISSEM
176-10036-10138 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10138
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM: CIA
TO: Dirnsa
TITLE :
DATE: 10/9/1963
PAGES: 3
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam, 10/6/1963-10/14/63, CIA
Reports. Box 2

SF1010 ..... 1963 OCT 9 15 33
00 ESF
DE ESI 09/1520Z OCT
Ο 091448Z ZYH
FM CIA
TO DIRNSA
STATE RCI (HUGHES)
JCS
CNO (OP922Y1)
AFSSO USAF
DIA/CIIC
NIC 17702
DFI/ACSI
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
ZEM
SECRET NOFORN
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM NO SIDDEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
SUBJECT PLANS OF GOVERNMENT TO ASSASSINATE AMBASSADOR
LODGE, OTHER HIGH EMBASSY OFFICIALS, AND THICH
TRI QUANG, AND BURN THE CHANCERY
DATE OF INFO. 8 OCTOBER 1963
PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (80CTOBER 1963)
APPRISAL SEE BELOW
REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/657,149
DATE DISTR. 9 OCTOBER 1963
PRECEDENCE PRIORITY
RIELD REPORT NO. FVS 9753

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE.
APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
SOURCE A MEDIUM LEVEL GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL (C) WITH EXTENSIVE
CONTACTS AMONG GOVERNMENT LEADERS.

ITS REPRESENTATIVES. STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS, EITHER GVN-SPONSORED
OR INDEPENDENTLY ORGANIZED, MAY TAKE PLACE. THE OTHER ASPECTS
OF THIS REPORT ARE VIEWED WITH SKEPTICISM.
1. SUMMARY. ON 8 OCTOBER 1963 NGUYEN DUY BACH, CHIEF OF THE
POLITICAL BUREAU, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (SEPES), SAID THAT
GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) AUGHORITIES WERE PLANNING TO ALLOW A
STUDENT DEMONSTRATION IN FRONT OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY CHANCERY
UNDER COVER OF WHICH ABOUT 100 GVN AGENTS WOULD ATTACK THE EMBASSY
AND ASSASSINATE AMBASSADOR HENRY CABOT LODGE AND OTHER HIGH-RANKING
EMBASSY OFFICIALS AFTER WHICH THE CHANCERY WOULD BE SET AFIRE.
2. ON 8 OCTOBER 1963 BACH SAID THAT EARLIER ON THE SAME DAY
A DELEGATION OF STUDENTS HAD INFORMED HIM THAT THEY WERE ORGANIZING
A DEMONSTRATION WHICH THEY HOPED WOULD TAKE PLACE IN FRONT OF THE
AMERICAN EMBASSY CHANCERY WITHIN "THE NEXT FEW DAYS" DURING OFFICE
HOURS AND PROBABLY IN THE MORNING. THE STUDENTS PLANNED TO PRESENT
A STATEMENT TO AMBASSADOR LODGE PROTESTING THE REPRESSION OF
STUDENTS AND OTHER YOUNG PEOPLE BY THE GVN. (FIELD COMMENT.
FVS-9749, (NOT YET RECEIVED), FROM A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE,
REPORTED THE ARREST OF 130 SAIGON STUDENTS ON THE NIGHT OF 7 OCTOBER
BY SPECIAL POLICE.) THE STUDENTS ALSO TOLD BACK CAND BACH SAID
THAT HE HAD CONFIRMATION FROM OTHER UNIDENTIFIED SOURCES) THAT
NGO DINH NHU, MINISTER OF CIVIC ACTION NGO TRONG HIEU, AND COMMANDER

OF EMBASSY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS MELVIN L. MANFULL, AND SPECIAL
ASSISTANTS MESSRS. FREDERICK W. FLOTT AND JOHN M. DUNN, AS WELL
AS THICH TRI QUANG, BUDDHIST LEADER CURRENTLY LIVING IN THE CHANCERY.
THE GUN AGENTSWOULD THEN BURN THE CHANCERY.
3. BACH REMARKED THAT NORMALLY THE GUN PERMITTED NO DEMON-
STRATIONS BUT, BECAUSE OF THE PLANNED INFILTRATION OF GVN AGENTS,
THE GUN WOULD ALLOW THIS PARTICULAR (PORTION GARBLED BEING
SERVICED)(X) DEMONSTRATION BUT THEY WERE CONFIDENT THAT THEY COULD
CONTROL THE SITUATION.

4. (FIELD COMMENT. AN UNTESTED SOURCE REPORTED ON 8 OCTOBER
THAT A NUMBER OF POLICE WERE GOING TO MASQUERADE AS STUDENTS
AND DEMONSTRATE IN FRONT OF THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION SERVICE
BUILDING.)
5. FIELD DISSEM. STATE CAMBASSADOR LODGE), USMACV (GENERAL
HARKINS), CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PACFLT.
6. (X) HEADQUARTERS COMMENTAC MISSING PORTION WILL BE DIS-
SEMINATED ONLY IF IT MATERIALLY AFFECTS THE SENSE OF THIS REPORT.
SCP-1
5000
SECRET NOFORN
NNNN
176-10036-10139
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10139
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE: CIA Information Report
DATE: 10/15/1963
PAGES: 2
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam, 10/6/1963-10/14/63, CIA
Reports. Box 2

suninzed via boill Kils 1/15
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs.
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by low.
CONFIDENTIAL
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SUBJECT RECOMMENDATION BY CABINET OFFICERS THAT
NHƯ BE MADE PRIME MINISTER
REPORT NO. TDCS-3/562,014
DATE DISTR. 15 OCTOBER 1963.
PRECEDENCE ROUT INE
REFERENCES IN 39851
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACO.
APPRAISAL
SOURCE
EARLY OCTOBER 1963
VIETNAM, SAIGON (8 OCTOBER 1963)
SEE BELOW
FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-9764
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
APPRAISAL:
A WESTERN BUSINESSMAN (B) WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN VIETNAMESE POLITICAL, CIRCLES,
FROM CUONG..
THE CABINET OFFICERS MAY HAVE MADE SUCH A RECOMMENDAT ION.

1. SUMMARY, ON 8 OCTOBER 1963 NGUYEN HOANG CUONG,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL, SAID THAT
ON 5 OCTOBER VICE PRESIDENT MOUYEN NGOC THO TOLD HIM THAT AT A
MEETING OF CABINET OFFICERS IN EARLY OCTOBER IT WAS DECIDED TO
RECOMMEND TO PRESIDENT DIEM THAT NGO DINH NHU BE APPOINTED
PRIME MINISTER. CUONG SAID THAT THIS PROPOSAL WOULD REQUIRE A
CONST I TUTIONAL AMENDMENT WHICH WOULD BE VOTED BY THE NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY WITHOUT DIFFICULTY.
هر
2. ON 5 OCTOBER VICE PRESIDENT THO TOLD CUONG THAT IN EARLY
OCTOBER HE HAD CALLED A MEETING OF ALL CABINET MEMBERS TO

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI
STATE/DIR
GROUP I
Excluded from automaτις
downgrading and
declassification
ONE
OCR
ORR
ODT
00 EXO
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
FORM IKA OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS,
:
(15-20)
(13.
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CONFIDENTIAL
IN 39851
(WHEN FILLED IN)
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
TDCS-3/562,014
PAGE2
DISCUSS THE STATUS OF NGO DINH NHU IN THE GOVERNMENT. THO
SAID THAT THE CABINET DECIDED TO RECOMMEND TO PRESIDENT DIEM THAT
NHU BE APPOINTED PRIME MINISTER, REASONING THAT IF THE PRESIDENT
DID NOT INTEND TO REDUCE NHU'S INFLUENCE IN GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
THE LATTER'S APPOINTMENT TO AN OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT POST WOULD
AT LEAST MAKE HIM ACCOUNTABLE FOR HIS ACTIONS.
2.
ON 8 OCTOBER CUONG SAID THAT IF THE PRESIDENT ACCEPTED
THIS SUGGESTION, A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT WOULD BE REQUIRED BUT
THAT THIS WOULD POSE NO PROBLEM AS THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WOULD
VOTE THE CHANGE WITHOUT DIFFICULTY.
3.
FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM
USIS 9TH FLD STA 2ND AIR DIV. CINPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)
FORM IK-1
1-63
ÚSE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
:
END OF MESSAGE
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CONUATION OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT
MFG. 2-63
(15-20-44-4
176-10036-10142 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER: 176-10036-10142
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE: CIA Information Report
DATE: 9/24/1963
PAGES: 4
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam,9/22/63-10/6/63, CIA
Reports. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs.
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
(When Filled In)
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGH DISCEGINO DISSEN ADROAD
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
SUBJECT HUYNH VAN LANG COUP MOVE TIMING
DATE OF
INFO.
24 SEPTEMBER 1963
PLACE &
VIETNAM, SAIGON (24 SEPTEMBER 1963)
DATE ACO.
APPRAISAL SEE BELOW
BACKGROUND USE ONLY
REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/656,830
DATE DISTR. 24 SEPTEMBER 1963
PRECEDENCE PRIORITY
REFERENCES IN 25834

FIELD REPORT NO. Fvs-9691
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
SOURCE A CLOSE ASSOCIATE (C) OF HUYNH VAN LANG, FROM LANG.
APPRAISAL:

THERE HAVE BEEN MANY REPORTS INDICATING THAT A COUP IS BEING PLANNED AND
SOME OF THE INFORMATION HERE IN AGREES WITH THAT IN OTHER REPORTS. CLAIMS OF
SUPPORT INDICATED HEREIN CANNOT BE ACCURATELY APPRAISED AT THIS TIME, NOR CAN
THE ACTUAL TIMING OF THE COUP.

1. SUMMARY. HUYNH VAN LANG, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS AT
SAIGON UNIVERSITY, SAID ON 24 AUGUST 1963 THAT HIS COUP GROUP
WAS GOING TO LAUNCH A COUP BEFORE 5 OCTOBER AND PROBABLY ON 26
OR 28 SEPTEMBER BECAUSE TROOPS WILL BE IN SAIGON AT THAT TIME.
THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE NOW INCLUDES GENERALS TRAN THIEN
KHIEM, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF, NGUYEN KHANH,
COMMANDING GENERAL OF 11 CORPS, AND DUONG VAN MINH, MILITARY ADVISOR
TO THE PRESIDENT. EVERY EFFORT IS BEING TAKEN TO REDUCE THE
POSSIBILITY OF EXTENSIVE BLOODSHED. LANG CLAIMS TO HAVE. SIX DIVISIONS
SECRET
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINO DISSE ABROAD
BACKGROUND USE ONLY
STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC
STATE/DIR
CIB
AID USIA OC I ONE OCR ORR EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
FORM
10-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
(15-20)
SECRET
(When Filled In)
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
IN 25834
TDCS DB-3/656,830
PAGE 2

PLUS AIRBORNE, MARINE, AND ARMOR ELEMENTS READY TO PARTICIPATE IN
THE COUP. BRIGADIER GENERAL DO CAO TRI IS ALSO WORKING WITH THE
GROUP.
2. LANG MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON THE STATUS OF THE COUP:
A IT IS TO BE INITIATED BEFORE 5 OCTOBER, POSSIBLY ON 26
OR 28 SEPTEMBER. TROOPS WILL BE BROUGHT INTO SAIGON ON 26 SEPTEMBER
FOR THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION. MILITARY UNITS WILL REHEARSE
ON 28 SEPTEMBER FOR THE 26 OCTOBER NATIONAL DAY PARADE, AND THESE
TROOPS WILL REMAIN UNTIL 5 OCTOBER. GENER AL KHIEM WAS TRYING TO
ARRANGE THAT HE TROOPS BROUGHT TO SAIGON WOULD BE THOSE WHO WOULD
SUPPORT A COUP.

B. NO COUP HAS BEEN INITIATED AS YET BECAUSE EVERY EFFORT
IS BEING TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT IT BE RELATIVELY BLOODLESS.
LONE ATTEMPT WAS CANCELLED AT THE POINT OF EXECUTION BECAUSE IT
WAS THOUGHT THAT FURTHER PREPARATION WOULD PREVENT BLOODSHED.

C. A MAJOR PROBLEM IS THE LACK OF SUITABLE EXPLOSIVES TO
BLAST A CONCRETE BUNKER WHERE PRESIDENT DIEM IS EXPECTED TO HIDE.
THE ONLY OPENING TO THE BUNKER, OTHER THAN A HEAVY DOOR, IS THE
VENTILATION SYSTEM AND THE COUP GROUP HESITATES TO USE FLAME
THROWERS OR POISON GAS BECAUSE THEY PREFER TO TAKE DIEM ALIVE.

D. THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE NOW INCLUDES LANG AND GENERALS
KHIEM, KHANH, AND DUONG VAN MINH. GENERAL TRI HAS AGREED TO JOIN
SECRET
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET
(When Filled In)
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
TDCSDB-3/656,830
4
IN 25834
3
PAGE

THE COUP ATTEMPT. COLONEL BUI DINH DAM, SEVENTH DIVISION COMMANDER,
IS BELIEVED READY TO SUPPORT THE COUP BUT HAD NOT BEEN CONTACTED.
COLONEL NGUYEN HUU HANH, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE IV CORPS, WHO IS A
COUR GROUP MEMBER, BELIEVES THAT BRIGADIER GENERAL HUYNH VAN
CAO IV CORPS COMMANDER, WOULD SUPPORT THE COUP SUT OTHER GROUP
MEMBERS ARE NOT CONVINCED.
Ε. GENERAL KHIEM WILL COMMAND THE COUP FORCES. MAJOR LAM
TRANG THO, FORMER SECOND ARMOR SQUADRON COMMANDER AND NOW WITH THE
JOINT GENERAL STAFF, WILL COMMAND ARMOR UNITS, INCLUDING SOME ELEMENTS
OF 115 OLD SQUADRON PLUS THE FIRST TANK COMPANY AND THE FIFTH
MECHANIZED RIFLE COMPANY OF THE FIRST ARMOR SQUADRON.

F. THREE BATTALIONS OF THE AIRBORNE BRIGADE UNDER A MAJOR.
WILL. JOIN ARMOR UNITS IN THE SHOCK FORCE.

G. THE THIRD MARINE BATTALION UNDER CAPTAIN MAHVIET BANG
WILL SERVE AS A BLOCKING FORCE TO PREVENT REINFORCEMENT OF THE
PRESIDENTAL PALACE BY THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD.

H. 110EANT COLONAL PHAM NGOC THAO, STRATEGIC HAMLET
INSPECTOR FOR 10 DINH NHU, WILL NOT COMMAND THE SHOCK TROOPS BUT
WILL HAVE AN IMPORTANT MILITARY FUNCTION DURING THE COUP.

1. LIEUTENANT COLONEL NGUYEN DINH PHAT, KIEN PHONG PROVINCE
CHIEF, WILL COE TO SAIGON AND ALSO HAVE AN IMPORTANT
ROLE
SECRET
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
۳۰۰۱
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
SECRET
(When Filled In)
TDCSDB-3/656,830
44
IN 25834
4
PAGE

J. MAJOR NGUYEN VAN TU, COMMANDER OF THE EIGHTH REGIMENT,
FIFTH DIVISION, WILL SUPPORT THE COUP WITH HIS FORCES. ALSO INVOLVED
IS THE FIFTH RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY OF THE FIFTH DIVISION.

K. GENERAL KHANH WILL COMMAND SIX DIVISIONS, ASSISTED BY
GENERAL TRI. THESE DIVISIONS INCLUDE THE FIRST, SECOND, TWENTY-
SECOND, TWENTY-FIFTH, TWENTY-THIRD, AND THE NINTH. ACCORDING TO
KHANH, COLONEL BUI DZINH, NINTH DIVISION COMMANBER, IS NOT
IN AGREEMENT WITH HIM BUT WILL SUPPORT HIM IN THE COUP.

L. TIMING FOR THE COUP WILL PROBABLY BE 1000 HOURS, 1400
HOURS, OR Ø500 HOURS, SO THAT FAVORABLE UNITS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
GUARD WILL BE ON DUTY. THESE HOURS ALSO FALL BETWEEN THE NORMAL
HOURS FOR CHANGING THE GUARD.

M. ARRIVAL OF HIGH-LEVEL UNITED STATES DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
OFFICIALS DISCOURAGED THE COUP GROUP WHICH IS RELUCTANT TO PROCEED WITH
THEM PRESENT IN SAIGON. THE GROUP HAS EVEN SPECULATED THE ARRIVAL
OF THESE INDIVIDUALS MIGHT SIGNIFY THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS
PREPARING A COUP OF ITS OWN; ARTICLES IN THE VIETNAM PRESS WERE
CITED AS EVIDENCE OF THIS POSSIBILITY.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR LODGE) USMACV (GENERAL
HARKINS) CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PACFLT.

SECRET
END OF MESSAGE
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
176-10036-10143 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10143
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM :
TO : 1
TITLE: CIA Information Report
DATE: 9/24/1963
PAGES: 4
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam,9/22/63-10/6/63, CIA
Reports. Box 2

Sanitized vla PACSIS NCK-82-36 د
TELEGRAM IN.ORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information: affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title. 18, U.S.C Secs.
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIEN DISSEMINO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/656,842
SUBJECT 1. NGO DINH NHU INTENTION TO DEAL WITH VC DATE DISTR. 24 SEPTEMBER 1963
2. ATTEMPTS OF PHẠM NGỌC THẠO TO TARRANGEYKES
AIR FORCE SUPPORT FOR A COUP D'ETAT PRECEDENCE ROUT INE

DATE OF 9-20 SEPTEMBER 1963 REFERENCES NI. 26062
INFO. : 1
PLACE & VIETNAM, SAIGON (22 SEPTEMBER 1963)
DATE ACO
APPRAISAL SEE BELOW FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 9684
SOURCE
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
A FIELD GRADE VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE OFFICER (F).
IMLEBATER VONALLED THAT HE HVD Веси „сомелесетио деуге

!!
APER: IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THAO HAS PLANNED A COUP AND HAS SOUGHT VNAF
HOD SUPPORTAS REPORTED THE SUBSTANCE LOG THẠO STACKS WITH DIEM AND NHU CONCERNING
NHUS CONTACTS WITH THE VIET CONG AND NHU'S PLANS FOR MAJOR CHANGES IN THE SOUTH
1HYL: VIETNAMESE FECONOMY) CANNOT BE ACCURATELY JUDGEDOEITI IS DOUBTFUL THAT NHU WOULD
MAKE A DEAL WITH THE COMMUNISTS ALTHOUGH THAO IS APPARENTLY CONVINCED THAT NHƯ
1
A
OD IS CONSIDERING SUCH ACTION CITA IS NOT TRUC THAT AMBASSADOR LODGE TALKED WITH THAO
SUMMARY ON 20 SEPTEMBER 1963 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHAM NGỌC
0410-2556ВЕК ИНО ЭПИНОМЕД ИНУЮ TWD ¥OKED MIN ARA HE HED
THAO, ASSIGNED TO THE PRESIDENCY AS AN INSPECTOR FOR THE STRATEGIC

HAMLET PROGRAM, SAID THAT HE HAD TALKED SEPARATELY WITH PRESIDENT
Коншизои мие СОМНОЙГА НЕГО BA CHAIT BЕКЛУЙТЕ НЕ СЕИЕВУГ БОВric
DIEM AND NGÔ ĐÌNH NHU ABOUT NHU'S CONTACTS WITH THE VIET CONG (VC)
ΚΟΙΤΑΜΡΟΛИ THE CAT QUOT, OAH OHW WOWA OF
BIHT TANT 0311938 CAHT
AND THẬT NHU HAD ADMITTED THAT HE WAS "CONSIDERING DEALING WITH
JM CORDYCE WITH THE AC LAYO 2019 THVL DIEN MY VROZBED VID DENVIIDED
THE COMMUNISTS." THAO CLAIMED THAT NHU WAS PLANNING MAJOR
THVL THE SEDUCE DIEMIKED ИНП ВЕСУЛGE THEX DEFІЕЛЕД 1HVL ини муг
CHANGES TO MAKE THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ECONOMY MORE SIMILAR TO
TUS SAJ0909. УЛАМОВАЗа. Јалта за TH3012389 3КТ. ТАНТ Оאבינוכ
THE ECONOMIES OF COMMUNIST NATIONS.
THAO HAS SOLICITED VIETNAMESE
Элчисига. YEYED MIN HOA THE SCOTEN OTO e BEOWUDED BA LHE БЕЛЬГЕ
AIR FORCE (VNAF) SUPPORT FOR A COUP D'ETAT AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME.

CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINO DISSEN ABROAD BACKCROOND USE ONLY
ليم الدايت
M
C.I B
GROUP..
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
STATE INR DIA ARMY/ACS NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF INSANIC XXXXXXXCONOCRXXXXXXXXXXXXXEXO
STATE/DIR
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
4-63
FORM 1Ka OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS,
(15-2

55
CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)
DVIS
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS"
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY
TDCS DB-3/656,842
THAO SAID THAT NHU'S PLANS TO DEAL WITH THE COMMUNISTS MUST BE
FORESTALLED
2
IN. 26062
PAGE
2
THAO-SAID THAT DURING THE WEEK. 9-15 SEPTEMBER-PRESIDENT DIEM
SUMMONED HIM AND ASKED HIM HOW HE, DIEM, WAS REGARDED BY THE PEOPLE.
THAO REPLIED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS STILL PERSONALLY POPULAR BUT
THAT THE PEOPLE DISLIKED NHU BECAUSE THEY BELIEVED THAT NHU WAS
IN CONTACT WITH THE VC. THAO SAID THAT DIEM WAS ANGERED AND DEMANDED
TO KNOW WHO HAD TOLD THAO THIS INFORMATION. THAO REPLIED THAT THIS
OPINION WAS COMMONLY HELD BY CIVIL SERVANTS, THE GENERAL PUBLIC,
AND THE AMERICANS
:
こ
3.
ON 16 SEPTEMBER NHU SUMMONED THAO AND ASKED HIM WHY HE HAD
TOLD THE PRESIDENT OF NHU'S CONTACTS WITH THE VO THAO BELIEVED:
THẬT NHƯ HIMSELF HAD TOLDA AMERICAN: AMBASSADOR LODGE AND THAT LODGE D
!.
1.
HAD SUBSEQUENTLY INFORMED THAO NHU CALMED DOWN AND LATER IN THEСЕБИТЕ
INTERVIEW ADMITTED THAT HE HAD BEEN "CONSIDERING DEALING WITH
THE COMMUNISTS." THAO CLAIMED THAT HE TOLD NHU THAT NHUUDID NOTE
METO SEXC
UNDERSTAND THE COMMUNISTS AND THAT HE WOULD BE PLAYING A DANGEROUS
57
GAME IN DEALING WITH THEM. (FIELD COMMENT. AMBASSADOR LODGE HAS
LO
さいま
NEVER MET THẠO.)
4
THAO SAID THAT NHU PLANNED TO MAKE MAJOR CHANGES DURING THE
COMING MONTHS, INCLUDING THE NATIONALIZATION OF BANKS AND PRIVATE
ENTERPRISES, WHICH THAO SAID WOULD MAKE SOUTH VIETNAM'S ECONOMY
MORE SIMILAR TO ECONOMIES OF....COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
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IN. 26062
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PAGE
3
COMMENT. THẠO DID NOT STATE THE SOURCE OF HIS INFORMATION CONCERNING
NHU'S PLANS.) ACCORDING TO THAO, NHU'S CONTACT WITH THE COMMUNISTS
WAS VIA THE POLISH DELEGATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION.
THAO SAID THAT NHU'S PLAN TO DEAL WITH THE COMMUNISTS MUST BE
FORESTALLED.
5. ON 20 SEPTEMBER 1963 THAO SPOKE TO A RANKING VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE (VNAF) OFFICER CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE VNAF
SUPPORTING A COUP D'ETAT AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME. THAO SAID THAT:
A. THE VNAF WOULD NOT BE INVOLVED IN ANY FIGHTING BECAUSE
RESISTANCE BY GOVERNMENT FORCES WOULD BE OVERCOME IN THREE. HOURS.
B. THE COUP LEADERS WANTED THE VNAF TO HINDER OR STOP THE
FORCES OF BRIGADIER GENERAL HUYNH VAN CAO, IV. CORPS COMMANDER
FROM ASSISTING FORCES LOYAL TO THE DIEM REGIME.
6.
THAO WANTED VNAF SUPPORT TO, STOP CAO ALTHOUGH HE BELIEVED
THAT. CAO MIGHT NOT NOW SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT AS STRONGLY AS IN
9 LEO 012250 21716 7487204
THE PAST. HE GAVE THE FOLLOWING REASONS FOR THIS JUDGEMENT:
:
A. CAO DID NOT ESTABLISH MARTIAL LAW IN THE IV CORPS AFTER
THE PROCLAMATION ESTABLISHING MARTIAL LAW IN THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY
ON 21 AUGUST.
B RECENTLY, CAO HAS KEPT HIS TROOPS HEAVILY..COMMITTED IN.
OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VC..
NE
C. CAO APPEARED TO BE REMAINING ALOOF FROM EVENTS. IN, SAIGON.
DCAO HAS MADE REPEATED REQUESTS TO THAO TO VISIT HIM AND
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HAS OFFERED HIS PRIVATE AIRCRAFT TO THAO FOR SUCH A VISIT
7. THE VNAF OFFICER WHOM THAO APPROACHED REPLIED THẤT COLONEL
HUYNH HUU HIEN, VNAF COMMANDER, WAS COMPLETELY LOYAL TO THE REGIME
AND, PARTICULARLY, TO NGÔ ĐÌNH NHU. HE ALSO TOLD THAO THAT IT
WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO PREDICT WHAT ACTION VNAF OFFICERS WOULD TAKE
C
1.7
IN THE EVENT OF A COUP THAO: REPLIED THAT IF IF HIEN FAILED TO
COOPERATE, HE COULD EASILY BE KILLED.
8. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR LODGE) USMACV (GENERAL
THE DAS TAST
HARKINS) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC, PACAF.
LOUCER OL 281940:
:
ОБЕЗУГ НПЛИН АУИ со А Совь сониниров
ВАНЕ СОЛЬ ГЕЛОЕВЕ МУЙЦЕD THE AUVE TO HIDE
:
دن
206 THE
MBA ДОЛЕНИМЕНТ ЕОНСЕР МОПГО ВЕ ОЛЕКСОНЕ ТИ ІНЬЕЕ, нопае
ΣΗΕ ΑΥΤΕ ΜΟΝГо из Е ГИЛОГЛЕД ТИ ТИЛ Етечение всстMBE
VIK LOUCE (ANYL) OLLICES СОИСЕВИтие не дозатрат ILA OF THE ANNE
2710 18:35
:
ALTH THE COwn
:
CCNEAL HVO DID WOL TITLE THE BONICE OF HIS LOLIви соистине
END OF MESSAGE
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(15-20-44-4:
176-10036-10149 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10149
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM :
TO : -
TITLE: CIA Information Report
DATE: 10/2/1963
PAGES: 6
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam,9/22/63-10/6/63, CIA
Reports. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs..
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
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COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
SUBJECT FURTHER PLANNING OF LANG COUP GROUP
DATE OF 26-30 SEPTEMBER 1963
INFO.
PLACE &
VIETNAM, SAIGON (30 SEPTEMBER 1963)
BACKGROUND USE ONLY
REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/657,031
DATE DISTR. 2 OCTOBER 1963
PRECEDENCE PRIORITY
REFERENCES IN 31.379
FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 9725
DATE ACO.
APPRAISAL SEE BELOW
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
SOURCE A CLOSE ASSOCIATE (C) OF LANG, FROM LANG.

APPR: LANG MAY BE MAKING COUP. PLANS AS REPORTEDBUT THE DEGREE TO WHICH.. OTHER IN-
DIVIDUALS NAMED MAY BE INVOLVED CANNOT BE JUDGED. GENERAL TY PROBABLY HAS SUPPORTED THE
GENERALS' DEMANDS ON PRESIDENT DIEM. THE MEETING OF DIEM WITH THE TROOP COMMANDERS POS-
SIBLY TOOK PLACE AS REPORTED. LANG PROBABLY HOLDS THE VIEWS CITED.
1. SUMMARY. ON 30 SEPTEMBER 1963 HUYNH VAN LÀNG, PROFESSOR
OF ECONOMICS AT SAIGON UNIVERSITY SAID THAT LIEUTENANT. GENERAL
L'E VAN TY CHIEF, JOINT GENERAL STAFF (JGS), HAD REINFORCED THE
GENERALS' DEMANDSFFOR GOVERNMENTAL REFORMS BUT THAT SOME
GENERALS WERE CONVINCED THAT THE COUP SHOULD TAKE PLACE
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER DIEM INTTIATES REFORMS BRIGADIER GENERAL
TRAN THIEN KHIEM, CHIEF OF STAFF, JGS, WASCOONCERNED ABOUT
VIET CONG MILITARY ACTIVITY NEAR SAIGON. HE AND OTHER GENERALS
WANTED TO BE ASSURED OF UNITED STATES SUPPORT IN THE EVENT THAT
A COUP SUCCEEDED. COLONEL DO MAU, CHIEF, MILITARY SECURITY
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STATE/DIR
CIB
:
GROUP I
Excluded from autematic
downgrading, and
declassification
OCR XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX_EXO
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
FORM
10-62
1K:
OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
(15

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2
SERVICE, HAS ATTEMPTED TO INFLUENCE VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE (VNAF)
OFFICERS TO ATTACK GIA LONG PALACE. THE COUP PLOTTERS WERE
CONCERNED ABOUT PRESIDENT DIEM'S MEETINGS WITH ARMY OFFICERS
DURING WHICH THE LATTER RECEIVED GIFTS OF MONEY. LANG'S PLAN FOR
REORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT FOLLOWING THE COUP HAS BEEN
ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE BY THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE AND HE HAS
STARTED SELECTING MEMBERS OF A SHADOW GOVERNMENT, LANG HAS
ADVISED POSTPONING THE COUP UNTIL HIS GOVERNMENTAL PLANNING
HAS BEEN COMPLETED.
i
2. LANG MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS ABOUT MILITARY
DEVELOPMENTS:
A. LIEUTENANT GENERAL LE VAN TY, RECENTLY RETURNED FROM
THE UNITED STATES, MET WITH OTHER GENERALS ON 26 OR 27
SEPTEMBER AND THEN SAW PRESIDENT DIEM TO URGE GOVERNMENTAL REFORMS.,
INCLUDING THE APPOINTMENT OF GENERALS TO THE MINISTRIES
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND INTERIOR.
B. GENERAL KHIÊM AND OTHER GENERALS WERE BECOMING
CONVINCED THAT REFORMS ALONE WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT AND THAT
THE ENTIRE NGO FAMILY HAD TO BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE.
C. KHIỆM WAS CONCERNED ABOUT INCREASED VIET CONG (VC)
MILITARY ACTIVITY NEAR SAIGON AND THE COUP PLOTTERS FEARED
POSSIBLE VC EXPLOITATION OF AN ATTEMPTED COUP D'ETAT.
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3
i
:
D. KHIEM AND OTHER GENERALS DID NOT WISH TO ATTEMPT A
COUP, UNTIL IT WAS DETERMINED. THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD
SUPPORT THEM IF THEIR COUP SUCCEEDED.
E. COLONEL DO MAU, WORKING THROUGH LIEUTENANT COLONELS
NGUYEN CAO KY, 1ST TRANSPORT GROUP COMMANDER AND DO KHAC MAI,
VNAF CHIEF OF STAFF, HAS INDEPENDENTLY ATTEMPTED TO INFLUENCE
VNAF OFFICERS TO MOUNT A COUP AND ATTACK GIA LONG PALACE.
LANG'S GROUP BELIEVED THAT MAU WAS TOO INDISCREET BUT PLANNED
TO CAPITALIZE ON THE SITUATION IF THE VNAF DID BEGIN A COUP.
(FIELD COMMENT. IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT MAI AND MAU WERE
DISAPPOINTED THAT NO ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN AGAINST THE REGIME.)
:
F. GENERAL KHIEM CLAIMED THAT HELICOPTER UNITS WERE
INCLUDED IN THE LANG COUP GROUP.
G. PRESIDENT DIEM RECENTLY SUMMONED MILITARY OFFICERS,
:
:
WITH THE RANK OF CAPTAIN AND ABOVE, WHO COMMANDED TROOP UNITS IN
AND NEAR SAIGON AND GAVE THEM SUMS OF MONEY RANGING FROM
30,000 το 100, ØØØ PIASTERS. THE MONEY OSTENSIBLY WAS SEIZED
:
FROM THE VC. COLONEL NGUYEN VAN THIEN, VIETNAMESE ARMOR COMMANDER,
RECEIVED 10, ØØØ PIASTERS, WHICH APPARENTLY HAS CAUSED HIM то
RENEW HIS ALLEGIANCE TO DIEM. SOME JUNIOR OFFICERS COUNTED ON
TO SUPPORT THE COUP HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY THEIR MEETING WITH THE
PRESIDENT, BUT OTHERS WERE NOT AND HAVE JOINED THE COUP GROUP.
(
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4
(FIELD COMMENT.. SEE FVS 9712 (TPCS-3/560,375 ) FOR THAO'S STATEMENT T
THẠT NHƯ HAD GIVEN LARGE SUMS OF MONEY TO MILITARY OFFICRS.)
H. DIEM HAS GIVEN LARGE SUMS OF MONEY TO COLONEL HUYNH
HUU HIEN, VNAF COMMANDER. ACCORIDNG TO GENERAL KHIEM, DIEM HAS
GIVEN HIEN ORDERS TO USE THE VNAF FOR COUNTERCOUP ACTION AND
FOR EVACUATION OF THE PRESIDENT IF NECESSARY.
1. DIEM OFFERED LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHAM NGOC THAO,
INSPECTOR OF STRATEGIC HAMLETS, THE POSITION OF DIRECTOR
GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE WHILE NHU OFFERED HIM COMMAND OF THE
SPECIAL FORCES. THAO, HOWEVER, HAS NOT WAVERED IN HIS SUPPORT
OF THE COUP.
:
3.
LANG SAID THAT HE HAS URGED DELAY IN MOUNTING THE
COUP UNTIL HE HAS COMPLETED HIS PLANS FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT
SO THAT THERE WOULD BE NO VOID FOR THE VC TO EXPLOIT. HE
SAID THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE HAS ACCEPTED IN
PRINCIPLE HIS IDEAS CONCERNING ORGANIZATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT.
(FIELD COMMENT: IN LANG'S PROPOSED GOVERNMENT THE REVOLUTIONARY
COMMITTEE WOULD REPLACE PRESIDENT DIEM. THE TERM MINISTER WOULD
BE USED INSTEAD OF COORDINATING SECRETARY OF STATE AND
MINISTER OF SECURITY AND MINISTER OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS WOULD
BE ADDED TO THE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE, WHICH WOULD NOT
DIFFER DRASTICALLY FROM THE PRESENT ONE.) LANG HAS SELECTED
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THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS AS MEMBERS OF A SHADOW CABINET:
A. GENERAL KHIEM, MINISTER OF SECURITY
B.
JUSTICE.
VO VAN HIEN, CURRENTLY A SAIGON LAWYER, MINISTER OF
C. LANG, EITHER MINISTER OF ECONOMY OR DEPUTY MINISTER
OF ECONOMY FOR FINANCE.
D. NGUYEN TON HOAN, PROMIENT OPPOSITION LEADER IN
EXILE, MINISTER OF CULTURAL AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS.
:
E. NGUYEN THAI, OPPOSITION LEADER IN THE UNITED STATES,
EITHER MINISTER OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS OR DEPUTY MINISTER OF
POLITICAL AFFAIRS FOR CIVIC ACTION.
F. MAJOR GENERAL TRAN VAN MINH, DEPUTY MINISTER OF
SECURITY FOR DEFENSE.
G. NGUYEN HUY NGHIA, GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN)
AMBASSADOR TO TOKYO, DEPUTY MINISTER OF SECURITY FOR INTERIOR.
H. NGUYEN HUU CHAU, FORMER MINISTER OF INTERIOR UNDER
DIEM CURRENTLY IN EXILE, DEPUTY MINISTER OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
:
1
:
AU TRUONG THANH, PROFESSIONAL ECONOMIST, DEPUTY
MINISTER OF ECONOMY FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS.
J. LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHAM NGOC THAO, DIRECTOR GENERAL
OF NATIONAL POLICE.
:
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LANG. HAS CONTACTED ALL OF THE ABOVE EXCEPT NGHIA, CHAU AND HOA,
HE HAS SENT A CATHOLIC PRIEST TO PARIS TO CONTACT CHAU AND
WAS PLANNING TO CONTACT THE OTHERS EVENTUALLY.
4. LÀNG SAID THAT HE WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE
INCLUSION OF TRAN KIM TUYEN, RECENTLY ASSIGNED AS GVN CONSUL
GENERAL TO CAIRO, IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT. NEVERTHELESS, THAO
HAS ASSURED TUYEN'S SUPPORTERS IN SAIGON THAT TUYEN WILL BE A
MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE IN ORDER TO ASSURE
THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE COUP.
5.
FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR LODGE) USMACV (GENERAL :
HARKINS) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.
PAGE
1
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14
31379
6176-10036-10173 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10173
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :.

ORIGINATOR : WH
FROM: Bundy
TO: Lodge
TITLE :
DATE: 10/30/1963
PAGES: 4
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 201: Vietnam, 10/29/63-10/31/63, CIA
Reports. Box 2

(
104
CAS. 79407
SER SANITIZED
VERSION NUK10-330
+ DOUNIGRADED TO
SECRET
October 30, 1963

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE
FROM MCG. Bundy, White House

1. Our reading your thoughtful 2063 leads us to believe a
significant difference of shading may exist on one crucial point (see
next para) and on one or two lesser matters easily clarified.

2. We do not accept as a basis for U. S. policy that we have
no power to delay or discourage a coup. In your paragraph 12 you say
that if you were convinced that the coup was going to fail you would of
course do everything you could to stop it. We believe that on this same
basis you should take action to persuade coup leaders to stop or delay
any operation which, in your best judgment, does not clearly give
high prospect of success.
We have never considered any betrayal
of generals to Diem, and our 79109 explicitly rejected that course. We
recognize the danger of appearing hostile to generals, but we believe that
our own position should be on as firm ground as possible, hence we cannot
implied in YOUR MESSAGE
limit ourselves to proposition that only conviction of certain failure
justifies intervention. We believe that your standard for intervention
should be that stated above.

3. Therefore, if you should conclude that there is not clearly a
high prospect of success, you should communicate this doubt to generals
in a way calculated to persuade them to desist at least until chances are
TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

تم
TOP SECRET EYES ONLY
-2-

better. In such a communication you should use the weight of U. S. best
advice and explicitly reject any implication that we oppose the effort of the
generals because of preference for present regime. We recognize heed to
bear in mind generals' interpretation of U. S. role in 1960 coup attempt, and
your agent should maintain clear distinction between strong and honest advice
given as a friend and any opposition to their objectives.
if castoanel
4. With respect to money for coup-group you are authorized to
make such clandestine disbursements as you consider secure and effective
from-available-GAS piaster
/
4. We continue to be deeply interested in up-to-the-minute
assessment of prospects and are sending this before reply to our CAS 79126.
We Want continuous exchange latest assessments on this topic.

5. To clarify our intent, paragraph 7 of our 79109 is rescinded
and we restate our desires as follows:

a.
While you are in Saigon you will be chief of country
team in all circumstances and our only instruction is that we are
sure it will help to have Harkins fully informed at all stages and to
use advice from both him and Smith in framing guidance for coup
contacts and assessment. We continue to be concerned that neither
Conein nor any other reporting source is getting the clarity we would
like with respect to alignment of forces and level of determination
among generals.

b. When you leave Saigon and before there is a coup, Truehart
will be chief of the country term. Our only modification of
existing procedures is that in this circumstance we wish
104

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY
-3-
10/30/63
Ob
100
all instruction to Conein to be conducted in immediate
consultation with Harkins and Smith so that all three know
what is said to Conein. Any disagreement among the three on
such instructions should be reported to Washington and held
for our resolution when time permits.
১
C.
If you have left and a coup occurs, we believe
that emergency situation requires, pending your return, that
direction of country team be vested in most senior officer with
experience of military decisions, and that officer in our view
is Harkins. We do not repeat not intend that this switch in final
responsibility should be publicized in any way, and Harkins will of
course be guided in basic posture by our instructions, which follow
in paragraph 7. Thus we do not believe that this switch will have
the effect suggested in your paragraph 8.

6. This paragraph contains our present standing instructions
for U. S. posture in the event of a coup.

a. U. S. authorities will reject appeals for direct
intervention from either side, and U.S.-controlled aircraft and
other resources will not be committed between the battle lines
or in support of either side, without authorization from Washington.

b. In event of indecisive contest, U. S. authorities may
in their discretion agree to perform any acts agreeable to both sides,
TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

TOP-SECRET EYES ONLY
-4-
10/30/63
ون
1.00
such as removal of key personalities or relay of information.
In such actions, however, U. S. authorities will strenuously avoid
appearance of pressure on either side. It is not in the interest
of USG to be or appear to be either instrument of existing
government or instrument of coup.

C.
In the event of imminent or actual failure of coup,
U. S. authorities may afford asylum in their discretion to those
to whom there is any express or implied obligation of this sort.
We believe however that in such a case it would be in our interest
and probably in interest of those seeking asylum that they seek
protection of other Embassies in addition to our own. This point
should be made strongly if need arises.

d. But once a coup under responsible leadership has
begun, and within these restrictions, it is in the interest of the U.S.
Government that it should succeed.

70. We have your message about return to Washington and
all public comment!
announcement has not already been made, we suggest that it be kept
as low-key and quiet as possible, and we also urge that if possible
you keep open the exact time of your departure. We are strongly
sensitive to great disadvantage of having you out of Saigon if this
should turn out to be a week of decision, and if it can be avoided.
we would prefer not to see you pinned to a fixed hour of departure now.
#####
11
TOP SECRET EYES ONLY176-10036-10179
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10179
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
ORIGINATOR: DOS
FROM :
TO :
TITLE: Status Report on Southeast Asia
DATE : 7/11/1962
PAGES: 10
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 203: Vietnam Status 7/11/63. Box 1

SEE SANITIZED VERSION NUK-81-235
SECRET

STATUS REPORT
ON
SOUTHEAST ASIA

JULY 11, 1962

PREPARED BY:
TASK FORCE SOUTHEAST ASIA
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRET

SECRET

VIET-NAM

Current Overall Evaluation

The general trend appears slightly favorable, with the GVN continuing
toimprove its military, and to a limited extent, its political and econo
mic position. Basic problems are being eroded but quick and decisive
action is rare. There were no major breakthroughs or important victories
and nore appear likely in the immediate future. The Viet Cong show no
weakening in strength or determination despite reportedly heavy losses.

On the military side, Operations Binh Minh and Hai Yen continued
well. Viet Cong casualties were up and their activities down (there is
an unconfirmed news report that a major battle took place July 3, however,
in which the VC defeated a regular army battalion): This may be due to
reorganization and weather rather than GVN successes. The GVN took several
good but minor steps to increase popular support for the war effort, and
several rural social and economic programs moved ahead significantly. On
the international front, there were some favorable responses to our efforts
to set up an aid coordinating group of donor nations. Economic conditions
improved somewhat, with stable prices, credit a little less tight, consu-
mer goods sales and tax collections up, and rice deliveries continued good.

Fearing that the prospective Lae settlement will facilitate Viet Cong
activities and that it may presage a U. S. move to neutralize Viet-Nam it-
self, the GVN has made difficulties at Geneva over several issues and
threatens to boycott the conference. President Kennedy has sent Diem a
personal letter stressing the importance we attach to a Laos settlement
and our determination to continue to help Viet-Nam defend itself. There
is no response as yet.

1. VC Activity
Progress on Action Program

Viet Cong activity continued at a relatively low level, with armed
attacks falling to the lowest point over a year, 60, for the period 20-27
June and rising only slightly to 75 for the period June 27 - July 4. The
lack of VC aggressiveness is likely due to the rainy season and their
efforts to regroup in order to counter the improved mobility and perfor-
mance of the GVN forces. Observing that this appears to be a period of
VC reorganization and assimilation of recent infiltrators, COMUSMACV ro-
ports indications that VC units which previously operated as separate
platcons and companies are now being formed into battalions. Infiltration
evidently continues, but good intelligence is scarce. MACV J-2 estimates
intiltration in May at 800-1,000 and 800 for the first three weeks of June,
but this information is unconfirmed and there are no reports of infiltre-
tion since.
SECRET

SECRET
-2-

In spite of reduced VC activity, VC casualties were high and included
some main force personnel. For the period 20-27 June the VC suffered a
reported increase of casualties of almost 25 per cent over the previous
reporting period. Killed in action for the two week period were 865 VC
and 141 friendly forces.

Reports continue to indicate a critical VC shortage of medical supplies.
Unconfirmed reports raise the possibility that the VC are attaining an anti-
aircraft capability

(Following items are keyed to the Viet-Nam draft action program of
July 3)
2. Strengthen populer support. The GVN took several steps to generate
more popular support in the last two weeks. These include the July 7 release
of 794 prisoners in connection with the celebration of the "double seven"
holiday (anniversary of Diem's coming to power), a stepped-up drive to root
out low-level corruption and abuse of power by GVN officials, and a Presiden-
tially proposed amendment to the Constitution permitting the questioning of
Cabinet Ministers both by Committees of the National Assembly and by the
National Assembly in plenary session. The prisoners released may include
leading oppositionist Phan Quang Dan, who has been in prison since his par-
ticipation in the attempted 1960 coup. We have urged the last item on Dien
in the past in an effort to increase the powers and prestige of the National
Assembly.

Another favorable development is increased emphasis on working with and
for the people in the current training program for strategic hamlet cadres.
Ngo đỉnh Nhu (President's brother in charge of the strategic hanlet program)
is concerned that the program win genuine popular support. He favors the
election of hamlet officials by secret ballot instead of by customary show
of hamis. This is now being done in some hamlets.
4. Seek International Support
(4) Cambodian Relations. The GVN replied mildly to the Cambodian
note concerning the ARVN border incursions of June 16, but did not apologize
or offer indemnities. The note insists that all precautions were taken to
avoid crossing the poorly marked frontier, admits that in spite of these pre-
cautions the frontier may have been violated, points out that any such inad-
vertent crossing was not motivated by hostility toward Cambodia, denies the
arrest of or harm to Cambodian inhabitants, and proposes a mixed border con-
trel committee to study frontier incidents and provide for future border
cooperation.

Another source of GWN-RKG friction, disputed coastal islands,
was the subject of an exchange of notes which threatened to stir up further
trouble between Cambodia and Viet-Nam.
SECRET

SECRET
(b) Third Country Aid. The United States has suggested a
Saigon, and possibly a later Washington meeting of donor country repre-
sentatives to coordinate aid to Viet-Nam. The intention is to stimulate
more third country aid if possible, and to make sure that current third
country contributions are being effectively applied. To date, Australia
and New Zealand have indicated willingness to participate in such meetings,
Germany will take part in informal Saigon meetings but would not attend
any formal Washington gathering, and the Japanese are "proceeding with
caution" because of the expressed fear that too close identification
with the U.S. will open up Japanese technicians in Viet-Nam to Viet Cong
reprisals. Canada has declined to participate because of its membership
on the ICC. The Belgians. French, Italians and the UK have not yet
responded.

Negotiations for the integration of Australian trainers into
our MAAG appear near completion. The GVN has indicated its willingness to
receive a New Zealand medical team at any time and the details are being
worked out with Wellington and Saigon.
10. Military Civic Action

The 31st Engineer Battalion assisted the local population at
Cheo Reo in Pleiku Province in the construction of a Buddhist temple.
In addition to the 150,000 copies of a news sheet distributed weekly by
soldiers to the local civilian population, 35,000 copies of the sheet
were also air dropped.
12. Develop and Implement Mutually Agreed Plans

Operations Binh Minh and Hai Yen. Saigon reports both clear-
and-hold operations continuing to make progress without serious VC reaction.
Increased contact with the VC is reported in the Hai Yen area, however, as
the military move into VC territory.

Hamlet Councils have been elected in the Hai Yen area, but the
Embassy notes a serious problem in the fact that a hamlet Council member
receives only 300 piasters (about $4.00) per month for what is theoreti-
cally a full time job. In Operation Bình Minh, an effort will be made to
induce the people to move voluntarily into the fourth village to be set
up there. The plan calls for extensive propaganda and explanations in
advance of the move establishment of military control over the area so
that the people will be free to move voluntarily, and up to 15 days to
accomplish the move itself (previous regrouping actions allowed only a
very short period for the physical move).

Montagnards. Latest information developed as a result of joint
surveys indicates the Montagnard situation is more a long term problem
than an emergency. There has in fact been a movement of some 17,000 Mon-
tagnard as a reaction to VC pressures, and this movement will probably
continue, particularly if the GVN provides adequate food and security.
SECRET

SECRET
-4-

Almost all Montagnard refugees are at least temporarily resettled and re-
ceiving minimum food, shelter and secürity.

The Embasey comments that while this information somewhat reduces
the urgency of the problem, it does not change the problem's magnitude or
importance. Difficulties stemming from the absence of a well directed,
national Montagnard relief program, limited relief resources, and the Viet-
namese prejudice against the Montagnard continue. But the principal and
most encouraging aspect is the fact that the Montagnard have fled the VC
pressures and more may do so.

Strategic Hamlet Program. The second ten day training course for
490 strategic hamlet cadres was inaugurated by Ngo dinh Nhu in Saigon July 2.

Future Plans. According to CAS, General Dinh's plan for the paci-
fication of Binh Dinh province has been approved by Diem and will soon be
presented to the Embassy. The First Corps Commander is also reportedly de-
veloping plans for two provinces in his area; these plans are said to stem
from the U.S. interest and support for Hai Yen.
15. Provide Increased Technical Assistance.

Village Radios. As of July 4, 817 of the planned 2500 village
radios were installed and operating Tests of radios for use on trains
were started.

Defoliation. The Embassy has proposed a test of the effectiveness
of defoliants against VC food patches in the mountainous area of Operation
Hai Yen. Governor Harriman opposes the use of defoliants on food crops be-
cause of the effect on Asian opinion. Decision and action will be delayed
until the Governor's return from Geneva.
20. Integrate Economic Measures with Counterinsurgency Effort.

Agricultural Extension. A pilot training program for agricultural
efforts associated with counterinsurgency plans opened July 3 in Qui Nhon.
One hundred farmers will study farming and stock raising methods for one
month, including the use of fertilizers and pesticides.

Provincial Hospitals. Construction of four of the 25 planned
hospital surgical suites began on schedule.

Anti-Rat Program. The USOM-supported rat destruction campaign was
carried out in ten northern provinces June 12-22, resulting in the destruction
of an estimated 15-20 million rats or 20,000 per village.
25. Publicize the War Within Viet-Nam and Internationally.

Viet-Nam Photo Service. USIS Saigon is sending out a weekly packet
of photos designed to enlist third country interest and support for the GVN
SECRET

SECRET
-5-

war effort. Eight posts have reported favorably on the effort, indicating
no difficulty in placing the photos in leading newspapers.
28. Establish Network of USIS Sub-posts.

The GVN has agreed to the establishment of virtually any number
of USIS sub-posts throughout the country. Negotiations on locations and
physical arrangemente are underway.
SECRET

SECRET
-6-
THAILAND

Current Situation Evaluation

The RTG has accepted the International Court decision awarding the
disputed Phra Viharn Temple to Cambodia. Thai delegates attended the
Geneva Conference on Laos, which reconvened on July 2, but the RTG has
not yet announced its intention to attend the next meeting of the SEATO
Council of Representatives in mid-July..

On July 2 the US began the redeployment of 1,000 Merines from the
Third Marine Expeditionary Brigade at Udorn. Possible Thai concern over
this move was lessened by our informing them at the same time of a US-
financed program to improve logistic facilities in Thailand (see below).

On June 29 police arrested one suspected Communist in Chiengrai and
one in Lampang, both in the North of Thailand. The Thai press reports
that subversive documents were confiscated at both locations. According
to unconfirmed reports these documents originated from a Communist pro-
paganda ring operating out of Northeastern Burma.

Progress on Action Program
1. Improved Logistic Facilities

We have outlined to the RTG our proposed program to improve
logistic facilities in Thailand. The program would consist mainly of
a POL pipeline to Korat in the northeast, rolling stock, airfield im-
provement, storage areas, and prepositioning of heavy military engineer-
ingequipment. The Thai have agreed to the proposal in principle although
Sarit reserved his decision on our request that the RTG provide the right-
of-way for the pipeline and in-country transportation.
2. Internal Security Plan

We have instructed Embassy Bangkok to cable summaries of those
portions of the plan which will not have been pouched in time to reach
the Department by July 11. This will permit consideration of the basic
components of the entire plan during Secretary McNamara's forthcoming
trip to Honolulu.
SECRET

SECRET
-7-
LAOS

Current Situation Evaluation

The principal remaining issues before the Geneva Conference, including
SEATO, having been resolved, it is anticipated that the new Accords may be
signed next week. There is nevertheless one serious stumbling block, which
endangers the satisfactory conclusion of the Conference, i.e., the possible
refusal of the GVN to sign. The GVN's position stems from its belief that
so many concessions have been made to the Communists that the security of
SVN is gravely threatened. We are, however, hopeful that Diem will still
be persuaded that we have achieved the best obtainable compromise for Laos
and that we stand firm on our commitments to SVN.

Progress on Action Program

There has been little progress on our action program. We are con-
centrating at present on the following problems:
1. Economic Assistance. Elaboration of our future aid to Laos awaits
the visit of Souvanna Phouma to Washington, tentatively scheduled for
July 25-27. In the meantime, we seek to spread the burden of providing
Souvanna with the material assistance he requires by enlisting contribu-
tions from other Free World nations.
2. RLG Diplomatic Relations. The RLG's decision to recognize 5 bloc
countries and accept an exchange of Ambassadors poses a major problem with
respect to the GVN. GRC, Federal Republic of Germany and the ROK. Further
action by the RLG is deferred until Souvanna's return to Laos. In the in-
terim we are attempting to assist the pro-Western countries involved in
establishing or maintaining satisfactory representation in Laos.
3. ICC. We have asked our Geneva delegation to request the ICC to
prepare a detailed budget and list of equipment needs so that we will be
prepared to meet quickly our share of the requirements. With regard to
the essential heavy equipment - helicopters and light aircraft - we are
taking steps to make it immediately available to the ICC.
4. MAAG Withdrawal. With the signing of the Accords, we will seek
Canadian cooperation in utilizing to the full the 75-day period for the
withdrawal of foreign military personnel. This will give us the maximum
possible opportunity to determine whether the DRV is abiding by its
commitments and whether the Soviets as Co-Chairman are carrying out
their undertaking.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
-8-

BURMA

Current Situation Evaluation

The internal situation remains unstable. This fact was highlighted
by incidents on July 7 and 8 when student demonstrations led by pro-
Communist organisations were ruthlessly repressed by the police and army.
These incidents could well lead to increased public disaffection with the
Ne Win regime and to a rift between the regime and the opportunistic
leftist groups who have, heretofore, been its only outspoken civilian
political supporters.

Internal security conditions are apparently continuing to deteriorate,
though not dramatically. A special Government amnesty offer expired June 30
without producing significant response from the insurgents.

Progress on Action Program
1. Political
It has been confirmed that Brigadier Tin Pe of the Union Revolutionary
Council will come to Washington for medical treatment as planned probably
in late July, although precise dates have not been determined.
2. Economic (AID)

No new developments.
3. Military
a. The Burmese are ready formally to accept the FY 1962 military
"sales" program. State and DOD have agreed to accelerate deliveries of M2
carbines as requested by the Burmese, to the extent production facilities
permit, in order to contribute to planned post-monsoon counter-insurgency
operations. This action will also, hopefully, earn some political credit
for the United States.
b. Embassy Rangoon has confirmed that United States training
117
for Burmese officers will be continued under the FY 1962 program.
prospective students have been processed for the coming year.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
-9-
CAMBODIA

Current Situation Evaluation

Cambodia's differences with neighboring Thailand and South Viet-Nam
continue, but they have so far not significantly affected the presently
generally satisfactory relations between the United States and Cambodia.
Thai moves concerning Preah Vihear temple are being watched closely, and
it appears likely that if the announced decision to respect the World
Court's award is not implemented by September the matter may be brought
by Cambodia to the attention of the UNGA. The dispute between Cambodia
and Viet-Nam over the ownership of islands off the Cambodian shore has come
to the fore again, with the GVN rejecting a Cambodian protest against Vietna-
mese naval movements near them on the grounds that they belong to Viet-Nam.
Organization of a new Cabinet has been postponed pending religious rites
celebrating the World Court decision. New evidence of anti-Sihanouk plotting
in Bangkok has developed.

Progress on Action Program
1. RKG-GVN Border Commission (Pol. 8). The GVN reply to the RKG's pro-
test against the June 16 border violations is not entirely satisfactory, but
Phnom Penh believes it may allow progress on the border commission proposal
and has raised this possibility with the Foreign Ministry.
2. Force Increase (Mil. 1). The initial reaction of the RKG to approval
of the request for a force increase of 3,184, for MAP support only, is one of
disappointment that military budget support was not included.
3. New Aircraft (Mil. 5). Four T-28 aircraft, first increment of six-
teen, have arrived in Cambodia. Formal turnover awaits the arrival of
Ambassador Sprouse.
4. Highway Repairs (Econ. 9). Invitations to bid have been sent out,
and the repair contract is scheduled to be awarded by August 15. Contractors
would be scheduled to commence work November 1, under the proposed contract.
SECRET
176-10037-10120
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10120
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files: Robert W. Komer
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE: CIA Information Telegram
DATE: 12/00/1963
PAGES: 3
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 430: Kennedy, Reactions to Death
Miscellaneous, 11/22/63-6/18/64. Box 5

TELEGRAM IN ORMATION REP RT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs.
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
SECRET
(When Filled In) NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY SOVIET BLOC / YUGOSLAVIA REPORT NO. TDCS-3/566,658
ALEXANDER
SUBJECT COMMENTS OF YUGOSLAV. AND BLOC DIPLOMATI DATE DISTR. 6 DECEMBER 1963
ON THE PROBABLE EFFECT OF KENNEDY ASSASGEMAN
BELK
SINATION ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS DUNGAN PRECEDENCE ROUT
BRUBECK
DATE OF INFO. 25-29 NOVEMBER 1963. LECKEL
PLACE & DATE ACQ. GREECE, ATHENS (28 NOVEMBER, 2 DECEMBER 1963)
APPRISAL 2 (THAT STATEMENTS ARE ACCURATELY REPORTED?) FIELD REPORT NO. EKA 4230
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGSAARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
SOURCE A GREEK POLITICAL OBSERVER (B) WITH CONTAGINGMONG BLOC DIPLOMATS IN ATHENS,
FROM THE DIPLOMATS MENTIONED BELOW-SMITH, WM. Y.

FOLLOWING ARE EXAMPLES OF (PORTION GARBLED-BEING SERVICED) BEING TAKEN BY SOVBLOC
AND YUGOSLAV DIPLOMATS IN GREEK CIRCLES:
1. ON 25 NOVEMBER 63, YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR TO GREECE PЕКО
DAPCEVIC EXPRESSED HOPE THAT ASSASSINATION OF KENNEDY WOULD NOT
CHANGE THE INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE, ADDING THAT HE IS CERTAIN
SOVIET UNION IS WELL DISPOSED TO CONTINUE FRIENDLY CONTACTS WITH
WEST. DAPCEVIC SAID THERE HAS BEEN "A GREAT PSYCHOLOGICAL CHANGE"
ON PART OF SOVIET PEOPLE IN PAST FEW YEARS FROM EARLIER ATTITUDE
THAT ALL AMERICANS AND PARTICULARLY AMERICAN GOVERNMENT ARE WAR
MONGERS TO CURRENT THINKING THAT AMERICANS, LIKE SOVIETS,

SECRET CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR DO EXL
STATE/DIR
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
10-62 1K

SECRET CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
(When Filled In) NO FOREIGN DISSEM TDCS-3/566,658

REALLY WANT PEACE. ZENITH OF THIS CHANGE CAME WHEN UNITED STATES
ANNOUNCED IT WAS WILLING TO SELL WHEAT TO SOVIET UNION, ACCORDING
TO DAPCEVIC, THIS ANNOUNCEMENT MADE TREMENDOUS IMPACT ON SOVIET
PEOPLE AND THEIR FEELING IS NOW SO FAVORABLE TOWARD AMERICANS
THAT EVEN IF SOVIET LEADERSHIP WANTED TO REVERSE THIS FEELING,
IT COULD NOT EASILY DO SO.
2. ON 26 NOVEMBER, CZECH FIRST SECRETARY VAKLAV SVESTKA
STATED THAT CZECH EMBASSY IN ATHENS HAD NOT YET RECEIVED REACTION
OF PRAGUE TO THE ASSASSINATION, BUT FEELING OF CZECH EMBASSY
PEOPLE IN ATHENS WAS THAT US POLICY WOULD NOT CHANGE MATERIALLY,
SVESTKA EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT ASSASSINATION WILL HAVE DELAYING
ACTION ON IMPROVED EAST-WEST RELATIONS: UNDER KENNEDY THINGS
WERE MOVING QUICKLY TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING, AND CHANGE OF PRESIDENT
NOW WILL OF NECESSITY SLOW DOWN THE COURSE OF EVENTS BECAUSE
"PERSONAL FACTOR" IS NOW MISSING. KENNEDY HAD DEVELOPED CONTACTS
WITH SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND ACHIEVED ACCEPTANCE OF SOVBLOC (PORTION
GARBLED) *P POPULATIONS IS AS PEACE LOVING MAN, JOHNSON HAS TO ESTABLISH
THIS FOR HIMSELF NOW, AND IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME.
3. ON 29 NOVEMBER, SOVIET FIRST SECRETARY VITALIY NOVIKOV
STATED THAT SOVIETS DO NOT EXPECT IMMEDIATE CHANGE IN US FOREIGN
POLICY BECAUSE WITH ONLY ONE YEAR BEFORE ELECTIONS JOHNSON AS
NON-ELECTED PRESIDENT IS NOT LIKELY TO CHANGE BASIC KENNEDY

SECRET CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET
(When Filled In)
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
TDCS-3/566,658

POLICIES, SOVIETS ARE ANXIOUS, HOWEVER, OVER FUTURE EAST-WEST
RELATIONS. ASSASSINATION CLEARLY SHOWS RADICAL RIGHT-WING ELEMENTS
ARE STRONG, HAVE SUPPORTERS IN LOCAL POLICE AND POLITICAL CIRCLES
AND ARE WILLING TO FIGHT FOR THEIR IDEALS. IT ALSO REVEALS,
NOVIKOV SAID, STRENGTH OF REACTION IN AMERICA TO KENNEDY POLICIES
SOVIET PEOPLE FEAR THAT RIGHT-WING WILL BE DOMINANT.

4. ON 29 NOVEMBER, RUMANIAN AMBASSADOR MIRCEA BALANESCU SAID
HE WAS CERTAIN THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE IN BLOC POLICY VIS-A-VIS
WEST AND ANY INCREASE IN TENSION WOULD BE RESULT OF CHANGED
AMERICAN POLICY.
5. FIELD. DISSEM STATE ARMY NAVY AIR EUCOM CINCNELM CINCSOUTH
(PERSONAL).
6. *HEADQUARTERS COMMENT:
PAGE
MISSING PORTIONS WILL BE DISSEMINATED ONLY IF
THEY MATERIALLY AFFECT THE SENSE OF THIS REPORT.

SECRET

END OF MESSAGE
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
## JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM

*   **AGENCY:** NARA
*   **RECORD NUMBER:** 176-10037-10440
*   **RECORD SERIES:** Personal Papers of Richard Goodwin
*   **AGENCY FILE NUMBER:**

*   **ORIGINATOR:** CIA
*   **FROM:**
*   **TO:**
*   **TITLE:** Information Report Re:
*   **DATE:** 9/3/1961
*   **PAGES:** 2
*   **SUBJECTS:**
*   **DOCUMENT TYPE:**
*   **CLASSIFICATION:**
*   **RESTRICTIONS:**
*   **CURRENT STATUS:**
*   **DATE OF LAST REVIEW:** 9/10/2000
*   **OPENING CRITERIA:**
*   **COMMENTS:** Goodwin Papers: Cuba, Meetings on Refugees, Box 4. Box 7.

---

## TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States, within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

**SECRET** (When Filled In)

*   **CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS:** NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL
*   **COUNTRY:** BRAZIL CHINA CUBA
*   **REPORT NO.:** TDCS-3/485,732
*   **SUBJECT:** OFFER OF SUPPLIES AND MEN TO THE GOVERNOR OF RIO GRANDE DO SUL BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF COMMUNIST CHINA AND CUBA
*   **DATE OF INFO.:** WEEK OF 27 AUGUST 1961
*   **PLACE & DATE ACQ.:** BRAZIL, RIO DE JANEIRO (2 SEPTEMBER 1961)
*   **APPRAISAL:** 3
*   **DATE DISTR.:** 3 SEPTEMBER 1961
*   **PRECEDENCE:** PRIORITY
*   **REFERENCES:** IN 23204
*   **FIELD REPORT NO.:** HBR 2529

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

*   **SOURCE:** A BRAZILIAN PROFESSOR (C) WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG COMMUNIST STUDENT LEADERS.

1.  DURING THE WEEK OF 27 AUGUST PARTY CHAIRMAN MAO TSE TUNG OF COMMUNIST CHINA AND PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO OF CUBA BOTH OFFERED MATERIAL SUPPORT, INCLUDING QUOTE VOLUNTEERS UNQUOTE, TO LEONEL BRIZOLA, GOVERNOR OF RIO GRANDE DO SUL, WHO WAS LEADING THE STRUGGLE IN BRAZIL TO ASSURE THE SUCCESSION TO THE PRESIDENCY OF VICE PRESIDENT JOAO GOULART UPON THE RESIGNATION OF PRESIDENT JANIO QUADROS. BRIZOLA DID NOT ACCEPT THE OFFER, ALTHOUGH HE APPRECIATED THE MORAL SUPPORT, BECAUSE HE DID NOT WISH TO QUOTE CREATE AN INTERNAT-IONAL AFFAIR UNQUOTE OF BRAZIL'S POLITICAL CRISIS. (FIELD COMMENT: BRIZOLA OBVIOUSLY WAS AFRAID THAT IF THE OFFERS WERE ACCEPTED THE UNITED STATES MIGHT INTERVENE. THE OFFER OF AID BY CASTRO LEAKED

**SECRET**

*   **CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS:** NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL
*   **DISTRIBUTION:** STATE ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO EXO FBI I&NS TREASURY

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

---

*   **CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS:** S-E-C-R-E-T NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL
*   **REPORT NO.:** TDCS -3/485,732
*   **REFERENCE:** IN 23204
*   **PAGE:** 2

TO THE PRESS; THAT OF MAO DID NOT).

2.  FIELD DISSEM: STATE, FBI, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, CINCARIB. CINCIANT

END OF MESSAGE

*   **CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS:** S-E-C-R-E-T NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL
176-10037-10452 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10452
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM :
TO:
TITLE: Information Report Re: Views
DATE: 8/1/1962
PAGES : 4
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 196: Countries, Vietnam, General 8/1/62-
8/14/62. Box 6.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYECANCOD
RETAIN OR
ИСТСКИХСOTTEED COATOZO0010
This material contains Information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage
793 and: 794; the transmission or revelation of which in any mannerst
S-E-C-R-E-T
COUNTRY
SOUTH VIETNAM
SUBJECT
DIELY
DATE OF
INFO..
PLACE &
150AIGCA מבוסון קנאה
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
Laws Title 18, U.S.C. Secs..
FECGE C
WUY
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/650,938
A
DATE:DISTR
T WEARD THET OMO HYD TIEDE AR
WARNING TO PRESIDENT DIEM OF A POSSIBLE
COUP D'ETAT ON NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962
PRECEDENCE
1
1. AUGUST 19 מיום
PRIORITY _ DUNGAN
CEDESED TO CRYER Yт вьютер уолаLISE VAD TO BURBEЕ ВОВ БОРТ КKAYSEN
1 AUGUST 1962
:
ECO-VIETNAM SAIGON AUGUST 1962
:
REFERENCES.
IN KILDUFF
PETERSEN
1895 THE AG 19 JHE VIOON VE FISCHLESINGER
(1
DATE ACQ: DED HOT FELIX JЬЕ ОВІСТИУЕCE OL CAN FEEE(енталньше.
APPRAISAL
SEE BELOW
FIELD REPORT NO.
BELK
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION: SOURCE GRADINGS:ARE DEFINITIVE: AP.PRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTANT
NOSNHO
KLEIN
SOURCE PARAS 2-4 AN AMERICAN OBSERVER; FROM LIEUTENANT COLONEL NGUYEN VAN CHA!
PARA
PARAS AVIG 5-8 CAN AMERICAN OBSERVER; FROM MAJOR LONGAT AC NETITBALL KOMER
9: AN OFFICER OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (C), WHO IS
BELIEVED TO REPORT WITHOUT THE THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS GOVERNMENT RASKIN
A TEUDUA I
ال است. اما انة مكة المالية لا تق SAUNDERS
СОФТИТСУБЛIMP OLLICER OF THE GIV DIИЯ БОАТИСІМІ СОЛЕВUNEAL HYD ILLESCELLED
HEADQUARTERS COMMENT. ALTHOUGH THE COUP D'ETAT DESCRIBED IN THIS
SRT 10 ЧИГHO DON ROLAN TEDOUA IVO BRUCH COSTARЛОЛЧКА ТА
-БЛЕТ ЛАЯНИНО А ТАНТ CETATE (22) DIVA YTDAUJA YRЯАТЫМ ИСПЛЕЯ ЛАТЕЧАЈ
REPORT DID NOT OCCUR ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962, THIS REPORT IS BEING
DISSEMINATED SINCE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED MIGHT EVOLVE
THAOTAED HE DID HOL ЕКГути лав 8312 он иге сомTEGULE
A PLAN FOR A FUTURE COUP AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME. SEE FIELD APPRAISAL IN
ER ΤΟΛΟΓARD CHO CONTECIOMED JHVL MOL WOHE JHVA JAO VYAN HALVГТСИЗ НЕЯ
PARAS. 10 THROUGH 14.
PARASOTA
2
CHWM CORNERLIED MILHOOL KOLHER ЕХЫГУИЛON LHVL THЕ ВЫБИСК МICEL это
ON 1 AUGUST 1962 LIEUTENANT COLONEL NGUYEN VAN CHAU, CHIEF OF THE
TISLIEKA TON QMA JАСТИЧНЕВИЙ EAW TRENOVE EMAUX TAHT UPPSTUM
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SERVICE, STATED
AT APPROXIMATELY 2100 HOURS THAT HE HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT PRESIDENT NGO DINH
X
A
OOO HOME ТЧУПИТИС СВИЛЕН ИТ 720 HE TMAOTARD GTA
Сино утер SVJED JE HE BETTEAED IREL PHIONDEY CELESYT NVI Hη
DIEM HAD BEEN WARNED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A COUP D
COUP D'ETAT OCCURING ON THE NIGHT
FREAM CATEL OF ATHED COMMEND KYOK OSTANMUNT DOOBO
(SOURCE COMMENT
CHAU DID NOT NAME THE INDIVIDUAL-FROM
pactpeciftention
Guwagrading and
Excluded from autocratic
PRATHAM LJOEN
OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962.
ة للالاتدبا لاشASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
S-E-C-R-E-T
ماه ELAED THE
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
STATE ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NICAM OCI ONE 120XX 288X 109 DIA CIB
VIDE
EXO
TELEGRAM INFORMAT TION REPORT TELEGRAM
ИСLОНИ CORLIMCED COMBOT BYCKOKONALD ASE

S-E-C-R-ET
ATE
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/BACKGROUND USE
ONLY/NO DISSEM ABROAD
YWAMI POA YUSA
ابی
IN
-TDCS DB-3/650,938
PAGE TWO
DIV
-
:
WHOM HE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION)
YMIO, ZEU: THE
3-CHAU-ADDED THAT THE COUP WAS ALLEGEDLY-BEING-PLANNED-BY-A-GROUP-OF
HORT JADE MAN
SENIOR ARVN OFFICERS LED BY ARVN CHIEF OF FIELD COMMAND MAJOR GENERAL DUONG
VAN MINH CHAU ALSO STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT BRIGADIER GENERAL MAI HUU
XUAN, CHIEF OF THE QUANG TRUNG TRAINING CENTER, MIGHT ALSO BE INVOLVED. CHAU
INDICATED THAT XUAN'S INVOLVEMENT WAS INFERENTIAL AND NOT EXPLICIT.
S
זמזוזה TJES PIROTRIVE CONCURE AGOM ATM CRVD CETEL OL JHE
CHAU COMMENTED WITHOUT FURTHER EXPLANATION THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT ALSO
TO LEECOGU It"
ΕΜΙΟΣЯ МHIC ENT TERTARA 4000 WHOTOS A FOR ANY A
ИТ ЛАЗТАЯНЧА СМЕНЯ Э
BE INVOLVED. CHAU CONJECTURED THAT NOT MORE THAN TWO ARVN BATTALIONS WERE
INVOLVED. HE DID NOT EXPLAIN THE BASIS OF HIS CONJECTURE.
DIRANIHVTED STICS TJ 12 500RIETE THVL THE INDIAIDOVIE THAOTAED NICHE ΕΛΟΓΛΕ
5
AT APPROXIMATELY 2200 HOURS ON 1 AUGUST, MAJOR LONG, CHIEF OF THE
.ТИЕММОЗ SANTHAUSCAR
:
:
CAPITAL REGION MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE (MSS) STATED THAT A CENTRAL TELE-
T
VEALPONCH LEE COME DIEJIVI DECKTEED DЕHТа
COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER OF THE GIA DINH PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT HAD INTERCEPTED
ON 1 AUGUST A VIETNAMESE, COMMUNIST (VC) RADIO MESSAGE, IN, PLAIN TEXT ADDRESSEDADES
ANAY
المنامة لمنة
OW (3) EDIVER YTIHUJER JAITивная ант го изогино HA
ni
TO THE VC SAIGON/CHOLON ZONE COMMITTEE INSTRUCTING ALL VC MILITARY UNITS TO B
بعد جدلت من ابط
محافات
BONUCE L5 ימ- RUTOWA OBASKET LEON TIROLEMMUL СОГОМЕТ ИСОКИ ЛУИ е
КЛЕТИ
PREPARED-FOR-AN-UPRISING AT MIDNIGHT-ON-1-AUGUST (SOURCE COMMENT MAJOROНИГОЙ
Inlet WLED DIDI YOELECEIPTILIAS VODSVI
ДАТАЛГА
HFTO BELOW HO
LONG DID NOT IDENTIFY THE ORIGINATOR OF THE MESSAGE) HEADQUARTERS COMMENT'K
DVIEWCO
LYCE
(SRI TEUERA I
IMO TDCS-3/518,127 REPORTED THAT ON 23 JULY 1962 THE VE IN THE SAIGON AREA WERTHPЕЗІИСЕВ
SORI TOUDUA ΤΟ ΣΤΑΘ
KELERENCE
ORDERED TO CEASE ALL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND TO PREPARE FOR A POSSIBLE COUPONEL
YETVUCO
КУЛГЕЙ
:
D'ETAT
COOL DIENG OF MICHE OF T-S MOTEL Toes
6.
MADHUC VIDE
DVIE D1215
FENGOBE TO
MAJOR LONG ADDED THAT GENERAL XUAN HAD INFORMED THE VIETNAMESE
POOLE AIRT
-GOVERNMENT ON-25-JULY-1962-THAT-HIS-INTELLIGENCE-SECTION-HAD-INTERCEPTED-A-
ان معراج منك
1
КЕБОВИО
1203-608
ΠΟΣΗ COALIGEDI GOALHOCHO DIPARK VEHOLD BECKOLONED ΠΡΕ ΟΤΑ
VC DOCUMENT INSTRUCTING VC PERSONNEL TO BE READY FOR AN UPRISING IN ABOUT ONE
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
MAR230
16 επίτπου οι ιερ
S-E-C-R-E-T
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
با تشكر يا صدهاءت
RI
20

S-E-C-R-E-T
C
FICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/NO DISSEM
ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLYшся сонцет
\DWORCHIOD 223 INFR
TDCS DB-3/650,938
PAGE THREE
EDARBER TOG
WEEK. (SOURCE COMMENT.
T
MAJOR LONG DID NOT KNOW THE ORIGINATOR OR THE ADDRESSEE
OF THE INTERCEPTED DOCUMENT, NOR DID HE STATE TO WHICH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT
AGENCY GENERAL XUAN HAD REPORTEDEID IN DEN
IMAJOR LONG ALSO REVEALED THAT AN MSS AGENT PENETRATION OF THE VC OF
UNTESTED RELIABILITY HAD REPORTED ON 1 AUGUST THAT HIS VC SUPERIOR IN CHAU HIEP
(THIRTY KILOMETERS WEST OF SAIGON) HAD INSTRUCTED HIM ON 31 JULY TO BE ALERT
مة.
FORVA COUP, AND TO MEET HIS VC SUPERIOR IN SAIGON FOUR HOURS AFTER THE COUP
BEGANA CONE УЕМЫ ИХСЕL ACK THE VIEVE OF CEE OR INE CAR ELEMENA AMIED D
AT
つ
ΤΙΑΣ
vrao
:
85 MAJOR LONG ALSO STATED THAT A HAND HAND GRENADE GRENADE HAD EXPLODED IN THE GO
FIELD COPHTAL
VAP AREA OF SAIGON ON THE NIGHT OF TAUGUST INJURING SEVEN VIETNAMESE WOMEN
YBA
AND CHILDRENE (SOURCE COMMENT THE RELEV CLEVANCE OF THE EXPLOSION TO A COUP
ATTEMPTHIS NOT CLEAR, BUT MAJOR FLONG HELIEVED THAT THE
E-EV
EVENTS MIGHT BE
CONNECTED F-5 IONEL POMEAEY НА УБНОКІЛЕГX JHE SWE LIAR THE MOUNT
TALETO TUE THE PRESIDENTIAL (SECURITY SERVICE (SEPES) LI INTERCEPTED CODED RADIO
MESSAGES ON AUGUST ON FUNUSUAL FREQUENCIES THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGES WHEN
TH THE
DECODED WERE IN VIETNAMESE AND FRENCH AND AND STATED THAT A COUP WOULD OCCUR ON
THE NIGHT OF ET 2 AUGUST
ARVN UNITS HAVE BEEN ALERTED IN THE SAIGON AREXEDED
ГOAG FOR FIELD COMMENT
CHAU IS CONSIDERED TO BE A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE,
WHO HAS PREVIOUSLY STATED THAT OF ALL THE ARVN OFFICERS GENERAL DUONG VĂN MINH
WAS THE MOST LIKELY TO LEAD A COUP ATTEMPT GENERAL MINH HAS BEEN VOCAL CRITIC
OF THE DIEM REGIME INSOFAR AS DIEM'S EFFICACY AGAINST THE VC IS CONCERNED.
GENERAL MAI HUU XUAN, FREQUENTLY RUMORED TO BE A MEMBER OF_VARIOUS_COUP GROUPS,
2--SEC-R-E-T
VABOND LA CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION. CONTROLS
150
NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
ממוח

S-E-C-R-E-T
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/NO DISSEM
ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY UK Con
IN
TDCSDB-3/650,938
PAGE FOUR.
IS KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN DISSATISFIED WITH HIS PRESENT ASSIGNMENT AND TO HAVE
HARBORED RESENTMENTS AGAINST DIEM FOR ALLEGED SLIGHTS DESPITE THE FACT THAT
DIEM PROMOTED-HIM FROM COLONEL TO BRIGADIER GENERAL SEVERAL YEARS AGO MAJOR
LONG HAS EXHIBITED PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE IN HIS PRESENT POSITION
ה
11 FIELD COMMENT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ALL OF THE INFORMATION PROCEEDED
FROM A SINGLE -SOURCE OR FROM TWO SOURCES AND THE VARIATION IN DETAIL WAS IN THE
ORAL ACCOUNTS OF DIFFERENT SOURCES THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCES ORGANIZATION (CIO) WAS UNAWARE OF ANY POSSIBLE COUP SHORTLY AFTER
MIDNIGHTON 1-2 AUGUST. HOWEVER, AT APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TIME, THE NORMAL
PRESIDENTIAL GUARD HAD ALREADY BEEN REINFORCED AND POLICE CHECK POINTS ALSO
SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN REINFORCED. GIVEN THE ADVANCE LALERT BY THE GUN MILITARY
AND SECURITY ELEMENTS, JAIT IS PROBABLE PROBABLE THAT ANY INTENDED INTENDED COUPL COUP WOULD BE ABORTIVE
FIELD COMMENT
12. AT10200 ON 2 AUGUST SAIGON WAS QUIET AND THERE E WERE NO SIGNS APPARENT
OF ANY COUP ATTEMPT, EXCEPT FOR THE ALERT OF SOME OF THE GVN ELEMENTS STATED IN
PARAY 10B VAD LO WEEL Eте ас альIOS IN SVICOM HOME Horse VLEN JE COль
(JHTB13 KIFIELD COMMENT.THE INTERCEPTIOFLA INTERCEPT OF AL PLAIN PLAIN TEXT TEXT VE RADIO MESSAGE REFERRED
TOLIN PARA FIVE IS NOT CONVINCING CHAND RAISES THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE VC MIGHT
HE ENGAGED IN A CONFUSION MANEUVER. SEPES CAPABILITY TO INTERCEPT AND DECODE A
MESSAGE IN THE SAME DAY, AS REPORTED IN PARA. NINE
E, IS QUESTIONABLE
CS I4LFIELD DISSEM-ESTATE CINCPAC CARPACICPACARE PARENTABRE COMPASHAL
8-D-O-KE-L
S-E-C-R-E-T
(Эспись СОЛЕLL MYLOS FONG DID HOL RMON LE OFICIRVICE
END OF MESSAGE
WEBOYD EVCKED CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
JEE VODKECAER
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
לי
176-10037-10453
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10453
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE: Information Report Re: Views
DATE: 8/14/1962
PAGES: 5
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 196: Countries, Vietnam, General 8/1/62-
8/14/62. Box 6.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Vietnam
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18,
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
SECRET NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/BACKGROUND USE ONLY RETAIN OR DES

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM DATE OF INFO HOW BREPORT NOT DCSDB-3/651,039
SUBJECT VIEWS OF BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH DATE DISTR. 14 AUGUST 196AH-BUNI
VIETNAM, H.A.F. HOHLER, ON A NEUTRALIST DUNGAN
DEB SOLUTION FOR SOUTH VIETNAM DA TEL/DEAL PRECEDENCE ROUTINE KAYSEN
KILDUFF
EARLY AUGUST 1962 REFERENCES HOGE ELGON 43629 ERSEN
PLACE &
DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (7) AUGUST-1962) TAYLOR DYLINO INVI 11 12 2002 100

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW FVS-7782 FODDESTA
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE
SOURCE CAN INDEPENDENT VIETNAMESE JOURNALIST (C) WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS; FROM ANOTHER EN
VIETNAMESE JOURNALIST.
APPRALTHOUGH IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THE STATEMENTS SET FORTH IN THE REPORT WERE MADE AS
INDICATED, IT IS CONSIDERED DOUBTFUL THAT AMBASSADOR HOHLER ACTUALLY HOLDS THE VIEWS
2001 ATTRIBUTED TO HIM

THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH VIETNAM, HTA.F. HOHLER, TOLD A VIETNAMESE
JOURNALIST 2 AUGUST 1962 THAT HE HAD BEEN READING SOME OF THE JOURNALIST'S ARTICLES
AND WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN A LATE JUNE ARTICLE ON THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE
VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS AND THE SOVIETS OVER NORTH VIETNAM, MAFTER DISCUSSING THESE
1 DIFFERENCES AT LENGTH THE AMBASSADOR-STATED HIS BELIEF THAT, A THIRD FORCE IN VIETNAM
VIS NOT ONLY POSSIBLE, BUT ACTUALLY EXISTS, AND THAT SUCH A THIRD FORCES IN NORTH VIETNAM,
COMBINED WITH NEUTRALIST ELEMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, IS THE ONLY HOPE FOR VIETNAM.
HOHLER EMPHASIZED THAT THE ONLY SOLUTION FOR SOUTH VIETNAM ISTA NEUTRALIST COALT ALON
FROM OLICES VI THE

THE COMLE OF GELE

CLASSIFICATION LASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS.
SECRET
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
STATE ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC USIA OCI ONE OCR ATD DIA EXG
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
RECBEL

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
SECRET 43629
TDCS DB-3/651,039
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/BACKGROUND USE
ONLY
THAT WORKED OUT FOR LAOS THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THE AMERICANS

TARE NOT TRAINED IN GUERILLA WARFARE AND CAN NOT WIN THE WAR AGAINST
THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VG) IN SOUTH-VIETNAM.

2. THE CONVERSATION TOOK PLACE AT THE HOME OF PETER ROBERTS,
INFORMATION OFFICER AT THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN SAIGON, WHERE
JOURNALIST
ROBERTS ARRANGED MEETING BETWEEN THE AND AMBASSADOR HOHLER
JOURNALIST
THE HAS KNOWN ROBERTS FOR SOMETIME THROUGH PRESS CONFERENCES AI
AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS AMONG JOURNALISTS. THE WAS SURPRISED TO LEARN
THAT ROBERTS THAD ARRANGED THEY MEETING AT THE REQUEST TO IN A
JOURNALIST.
AMBASSADOR WHO HADO EXPRESSED A DESIRE TOLTALK WITH HIM.
JOURNALIST.
THE REVIEWS DURING THE CONVERSATION THE ASSURED THE AMBASSADOR
THAT IFARE FROM BEING NEUTRALIST MINDED, HE FEARS NEUTRALISMOFORESTE
SOUTH VIETNAM MORE THAN ANY OTHER SOLUTION. SINCE HE BELIEVES

INDICUTED IN THAT THE COINNEIDER 30839 LEND NEVEETEOS FOR CITA
NEUTRALISM TO BE NO MORE THAN A MAJORISTERIATOWARD ULTIMATE TAKEOVERY
AND CONTROL BY THE COMMUNIST ROBERTSPOINTEDLY DISAGREED ON

VISTHYAMBASSADOR HOHLER'S STATEMENT THAT THERE IS NO CHANCE OF
EWING THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM, INDICATING THAT IT IS MUCH TOO

LEARLY TO MAKE SUCH A BLUNT STATEMENT, ALLUDING TO THE HUGE EFFORT

UNDER WAY AND THE GAINS DALREADY APPARENT ROBERTS DID SAY,
HOWEVER THAT THE SURFACING OF THE OPERATIONS IN NORTH VIETNAMESE
