8
A
Yes.
9
Q
And the situation in the Cuban community in Miami?
10
A
Yes, sir.
11
Q
During the nine years you were with DDO's Cuban
12
operations, who was who were the chiefs of the Miami
13
Station?
14
A
I think in 1963 Ted Shackley was the Chief and he
15
16
was followed by I can't think of his name. I should know
it. Well, I will come back to that.
17
Then, the next Chief of Station was Paul Henze.
18
Q
What years was he Chief?
19
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
A
I think Paul was there about a year and a half. He
20
left in 1968 when we reduced the size of the Station.
Let's
21
say Henze was there from 1966 to 1968. And then Jake Esterling.
22
He was Chief of Station from 1968 to 1973.
23
Q Now, what was the formal title of the group to which
24
you were assigned for the 9-year period?
25
A
Well, when I first came in it was known as the
NW 50955 DocId: 32203851 Page 7
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4

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2

SECRET
5
Special Activities Staff. It was headed by Desmond Fitzgerald.
And then, I believe after that it became the Cuban Operations
Group.
Q
5
Now, was this a special group within the DDO or was
it attached to one of the area divisions?
6
A
No.
Following the Bay of Pigs, they created a thing.
7
8
called Task Force in which was headed by Bill Harvey. And
that when Harvey left, the went to Chief of s Chief of Station, Rome
!
9
mama Fitzgerald took over, it became Special Activities Staff.
10
11
It wasn't attached to anything except it reported to the
Deputy Director, Plans.
12
WARD & PAUL
Q
And that was Mr. Karamessines?
13
A
Yes. Well, it was Helms at that time back when it.
14
was first created. Helms was DDP at that time.
1.5
Q
And Task Force W was created immediately after the
16
Bay of Pigs?
17
A
Well, not immediately.
I think sometime around
18
19
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
in the Bay of Pigs was in April. I think this was created in
September, something like that, 1961.
20
Q
And that subsequently became the Special Activities
21
Staff?
22
A
23
24
Special Activities Staff and consequently became the
Cuban Operations Group. As the Cuban Operations Group it went
back into the Western Hemisphere Division.
25
Q
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And what was the date of that reorganization?
SECRET

SECRET
6
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
2.
A
Well, let's see. I would say that was probably around
1965 because Fitzgerald then became Chief, W.H., and then
later DDP.
Q
5
Now, Mr.Harvey do you recall what position Mr.
Harvey held after he left Task Force W?
6
A
Yes. He was Chief of Station, Rome.
7
Q
And is he still with the Agency?
S
A
Oh, no. He retired a long time ago.
9
Q
Do you know where he lives at the present time?
10
A
Frankly, I don't. I have an idea where he lives.
11
He went to work for a
friend of mine who had a law firm.
12
Harvey is a lawyer.
WARD & PAUL
13
Q
Indianapolis area?
14
A
Yes, some place around there. It is in the midwest,
Indiana.
15
Q
16
What was the role that was assigned to Task Force
W?
17
A
It was the overall Cuban operations.
18
Q
Did the Miami
when was the Miami Station estab-
19
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
lished?
20
A
Well, I think they had a forward operatio-s base down
21
there about 1960 which was small, in Coral Gables.
22
Ω This was, then, prior to the Bay of Pigs?
23
A
24
Oh, yes.
Q
Now, in addition to Task Force W, was the Miami
25
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6

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Station running any operations against Cuba?
A
You mean prior to the Bay of Pigs?
Q
Yes.
7
A
it was a
I really don't know. It was a small
forward base and it was more or less as I recall, a support type
thing.
7
Q
Well, after the Bay of Pigs when Task Force W was
8
established, did it have sole responsibility for Cuban
9
operations?
10
A
Yes.
11
Q
Or was that shared with the Miami base, Miami
12
WARD & PAUL
Station?
13
A
No. The Miami Station was under Task Force W.
14
Q
All right. Would that also be true of the Special
15
Activities Staff, the Cuban Operations Group?
16
A
Right, except that at the present time the Station
17
has no Cuban operations.
13
Q I understand that. When were Cuban operations termi-
19
nated?
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
20
A
At the Station? Let's see.
Sternfield went down
21
there in 1972. It was during fiscal year '72. I think it was
:
22
in early 1973. It was a gradual reduction.
22
Q
And have those operations been terminated entirely
24
or are they now run out of the Washington area?
25
A
All Cuban operations are run out of Washington.
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8
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There are no more paramilitary operations, that type of thing.
ハン
2
Q
But there are some Cuban operations being run out of
the Washington area?
A
Right.
Q
Is that correct?
6
A
Right.
Worldwide.
7
Q
Mr.Sturbitts, in the last couple of weeks you may
1
8
have seen some allegations in the press about possible assassina-
9
tion attempts that have been mounted or alleged assassination
10
attempts that have been mounted
11
A
Right.
12
WARD & PAUL
Ω
against Fidel Castro. In the course of your
13
activities with respect to Cuba, did you ever learn of any such
14
attempts?
15
A
Well, let me answer it this way. I wouldn't say
16
attempts. I know there was discussion.
"Attempts" is too
17
strong a word.
18
Q
Well, can you place in time your first knowledge of
19
any such discussions?
410 First Slucet, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
20
A
Well, the first knowledge I had of any discussions,
21
22
23
24
I was on TDY and this was October, November, 1963, with Fitzgeral.
in Paris. And I knew that he was going to meet let me put
it another way. I had overheard that discussions were going on
with a member of Castro's military but that he wanted, as
25
I recall, he wanted some British -- I mean Belgian grifles and
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4

SECRET
a telescopic sight.
Q
Who wanted them?
A
This military guy that was in Fidel's I think
9
از
6
7
8
at one time he was a commandante. Now, I knew that was going
on. I didn't participate in it because I was there for another
reason. And I know that subsequent to that time that Fitzgerald
met with him again and as I recall, as the personal representa-
tive of the Attorney General, Bobby Kennedy.
9
I provided all those files. There are 19 valumes that
10
we gave to your people. But I don't know who was reviewing
11
them.
I think Belin was going to do it himself.
12
WARD & PAUL
Q
Yes. He is. He is doing it himself.
13
You said there were 19 volumes of documents with
14
respect to this.
15
A
19 files, manila.
16
Q
All having to do with possible assassination?
17
A
All having to do with this whole time period and
18
19
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
can we go off the record for a minute?
(Discussion off the record.)
20
BY MR. MANFREDI:
21
Q
The first knowledge of such conversations that you
22
23
had, I take it you obtained on a trip to Europe with Mr.
Fitzgerald?
24.
A
I simply overheard it, that is right.
25
Q
And who were the parties to the conversation you overr
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10
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1
heard?
2
A
A fellow named Nestor Sanchez.
Q
And Mr. Fitzgerald?
4
A
Yes, and I really can't recall some of the other
5
6
7
8
9
people. We were we had just moved the Station at that time,
in Paris, out of the Embassy into the old Rothschild Palace
and we felt that it was probably bugged, so all conversations
took place we walked around the garden and tyat type of
thing, and, you know, I was walking with somebody, somebody
10
was in front of me, and you just overhear conversations.
11
Q
This was in Paris?
12
WARD & PAUL
A
Yes.
1.3
Q
I see.
14
Mr. Sanchez-- was he a member of the military?
15
A
No. Mr. Sanchez was in the Special Activities Staff.
16
He was stationed in Washington. And he was in contact with
ここ
Cuban military type.
|
13
Q
Was it your understanding that the Agency had received
19
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
instructions with respect to this activity from another
20
component of the Government?
21
A
22
23
24
25
Well, let me put it this way. I don't know whether
they received instructions.
I have to assume, and I am pretty
positive, that this was a result of a Special Group decision.
And at this time you have to remember that Bobby Kennedy was
overseeing this deal, presumably for his brother, and he was
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WARD & PAUL
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

SECRET
م
三
part of that Special Group. He called the meetings, he presided,
he did a number of things.
Q
Were there any other occasions that you can recall
in which the possibility or the subject of assassination of
5
Fidel Castro was discussed?
6
A
'No, not really.
7
Q
You referred to this as the first occasion.
8
A
This is the first
9
Q
Was there a second?
10
A
the first time I knew about it or even heard it
11
discussed.
12
Q
Well, prior to the investigation that is currently
i
13
underway
I am referring now to our Commission's investigation
14
were there any other occasions in which this subject came
15
to your attention after this discussion in the garden in
16
Paris?
17
A
The only other thing that came to my attention was
18
that the decision was made not to provide him with this st
1.9
that he wanted.
Whether that is right or wrong, I don't know,
20
but that is what I was told.
21
Q
When did you learn that?
22
A
Oh, I would assume in
must have been early 1954,
23
around February, something like that.
24
Ω
Off the record.
25
(Discussion off the record.)
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2

SECRET
MR. MANFREDI: On the record.
12
BY MR. MANFREDI:
i
Q
Mr. Sturbitts, are you familiar with a gentleman by
the name of Frank Sturgis?
Ci
A
Indeed.
6
Q
Is your familiarity based on what you have read in
7
the press?
8
A
No. It is what is contained in the files.
9
Q
Have you caused a search to be made of CIA files,
10
11
12
WARD & PAUL
particularly the files of the Western Hemisphere Division,
in an attempt to determine whether Mr. Sturgis ever had any
connection with the Agency?
13
A
I have.
14
Ω
What were the results of that search?
15
A
Absolutely no connection, never has been.
16
Q
When we talk about connection, are we talking about
17
an employment relationship?
18
A
That is what I am speaking of.
19
Q
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
Was Mr.Sturgis ever an independent contractor of
20
the Agency?
21
A
No.
22
Q
Was he ever a contract employee?
23
A
No.
24
Q
Was he ever a regular employee of the Agency?
25
A
No.
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13
Ω
Was he ever hired to do any piecework for the
Agency?
A
Not to my knowledge.
고
Do you know whether or not Mr. Sturgis ever partici-
5
pated in any type of paramilitary or other operation against
6
Cuba?
7
A
On his own behalf he did, not on behalf of this
S
Agency.
9
Q
How did you learn of those operations?
10
A
12
Ω
Through the newspaper. And through FBI reports.
Now, are these recent FBI reports?
12
A
13
Oh, no. These go back I know at one time, the
thing that comes to mind, I think he made a leaflet drop
14
over Cuba and this was subsequently reported in the press and
15
by the Bureau office in Miami.
16
Q
Do you know who financed his activities?
A
I have no idea.
18
Q
Is it possible that Mr. Sturgis' activities were
13
indirectly financed by the Agency through
1
20
A
21
I don't see how. Frank Sturgis is a soldier of
fortune; has been. He has constantly tried to associate himself
22
with the Agency. When I went through his file they wanted me
23
24
to classify the file and the way I classified it was "don't
destroy it, he is an intelligence nuisance."
25
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
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Q
Off the record.
SECRET

WARD & PAUL
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
2
3

SECRET
(Discussion off the record.)
MR. MANFREDI: Or the record.
14
BY MR. MANFREDI:
Q
Have you caused the Agency records with respect to Mr.
5
Sturgis to be assembled in any one location?
6
A
Yes. Ihave custody of them.
7
Q
And what is the volume of that material?
8
A
As I recall, there are five volumes.
Your Committee
9
called for them the other day after the article in the paper,
10
I guess it was last Saturday. They called for them Monday and
11
they returned them Monday afternoon.
12
Q
Do you know who examined those files?
13
A
No, I don't.
14
Q
You indicated a moment ago that Mr. Sturgis contacts
15
the DCD office in Miami with some frequency, is that correct?
16
A
Well, not great frequency but he does with tidbits
1
of so-called information.
13
Q
Is this information limited to narcotics, alleged
19
narcotics traffic?
20
A
Recently it has been.
21
Q Has Mr. Sturgis been encouraged by the DCD office
22
in Miami?
23
A
Mr. Sturgis has been told by the DCD office in Miami
24
to take his information to the Drug Enforcement Agency or the
25
FBI.
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
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Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
established contact?

SECRET
2
Do you know whether or not they consider him an
A
No manner.
Ω
Do they have any do they periodically seek to
5
collect information from Mr. Sturgis?
6
A
7
8
9
10
I can't speak to that but the records that we have
don't reflect anything like that. Before they would contact
somebody in that context, knowing that there is a 201 file
on Sturgis, they would have to coordinate with the Latin
American Division before they did anything since we do hold
11
the file.
12
Q
Would you briefly explain what a 201 file is?
13
A
A 201 file is a personnel file. It consists of any
14
information relating to an individual appearing in the press
15
16
Q
as a result of other agency reporting and that type of thing.
Personnel or personality file?
17
A
Personality file, I should say. Excuse me.
18
Q
Do you know whether or not there is any connection
19
or relationship between Eugenio Martinez and Mr. Sturgis?
20
A
Well, I will say this. Obviously, they do
know
21
each other. They have to know each other from their days
22
in Cuba.
23
Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Sturgis ever partici-
24
pated with Martinez in raids against Cuba?
A
No. As I recall, we employed Martinez around 1961,
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
25
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4
い?
10
μ

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16
I guess, and he was in our maritime activities. He was a
boat captain eventually. And he did participate in infiltrations
and exfiltrations and perhaps one or two raids, hit and run,
sabotage-type actions against Cuba. Sturgis never engaged in
5
6
7
any of these things. He never did it for us nor did he ever
do it on any of our boats, planes, or anything that belongs
to the Agency.
8
Q
When Martinez would run such an operation or captain
9
10
a boat on such an operation, would he be charged with putting
together his own crew?
11
A
12
WARD & PAUL
No. ile had an assigned crew and every boat had a
Case Officer operating either out of the probably out of
!
13
the Miami Station. Sometimes I would assume that we did have
14
15
some people in the key Westbase. But he, Martinez, would recei
his instructions and briefings from his Case Officer.
16
Q So it is likely that he could have brought Sturgis
1.7
along on any of these operations?
18
A
Absolutely unlikely. Oh, the guy whose name I
WIS
19
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
trying to think of, Chief of Station, John Dimmer.
20
Q
And that would be for a period of time between
21
Shackley and Wenze?
22
A
Yes.
23
Q
1964 to 1966?
24
A
Something like that.
25
Q
Would you describe briefly for me the nature of the
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17
activities conducted by the Special Activities Staff during
your and subsequently the Cuban Operations Group during
your 9-year tenure with those groups.
A
Well, there was
it was an across-the-board
5
6
7
8
9
Q
10
A
11
Q
12
WARD & PAUL
operations.
intelligence operation consisting of collection of foreign
1: positive intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary
activities, covert action, economic activities. That is about
the breadth of the thing.
Now, these were all conducted through the DDO?
Right.
Now, let's speak for a moment about the paramilitary
Were these operations run out of southern
13
Florida?
14
A
Right.
15
Q
And in particular out of the Miami Station?
16
A
Yes.
17
Ω Were there any other CIA facilities in that area of
18
the country that participated in these activities?
19
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
A
Not to my knowledge.
とつ
Q
Were there any southern harbors other than Miami
21
that were used in these activities?
221
A
Well, we had activities down in the Keyshalso. Ast
23
I said we did have a key West base.
24
Q
Were there any other bases in that area of the
25
country that were utilized in these operations?
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SECRET
18
7
A
Well, not that I would call a base. We did have
:
training facilities for the UDT teams,
3
٢٠:
li
Q
What is a UDT team?
A
Underwater demolition。
-51
Q
Where were those bases located?
A
I frankly don't know. They were down along the Keys
Lalong that long peninsula going down there. There were, a
8
number of sites: I really can't recall them.
9
Q
Were there any other sites within the United States
10
11
in which paramilitary training was conducted, for people
participating in these activities?
12
WARD & PAUL
A
Not to my knowledge.
13
Q
Where were these people trained?
14
A
What do you mean?
15
Q
Well, Cubans who participated in these activities.
16
A
We trained them at these places we had in the Keys
Now, there also -- some of them were brought up here and trained
18 at the Domestic Training Station.
19
Q
Where is that located?
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
20
A
That is down in Virginia.
21
Q
Were any CIA personnel actually involved in these
22
raids?
23
A
Occasionally, I would think that you have got to
24
25
understand at this time that we had a great many contract
employees, independent contractors and this type of thing.
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i
Most of the paramilitary operations and the training was
conducted by the Special Operations Group which is another
entity of the
Q
DDO?
5
A
DDO.
Q
Now, the facilities that we have been talking about,
7
>
1:
training facilities, were manned, then, by the Special
8
Operations Group, or at least supervised by the Special
9
Operations Group, is that correct?
10
A
11
12
1.3
14
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System 
Identification Form
Date: 7/8/2015

Agency Information
AGENCY: SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER: 157-10014-10109
RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 07-M-15

Document Information
ORIGINATOR: SSCIA
FROM: 
TO:
TITLE: 
DATE: 06/25/1975
PAGES: 19
SUBJECTS: 
HARVEY, WILLIAM
ZRRIFLE
OPERATION MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT
CLASSIFICATION: Declassified
RESTRICTIONS: IB; 1C
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 03/08/2000

OPENING CRITERIA: 
COMMENTS: CCBOX 418

---

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

Date: 08/06/95
Page: 1

AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY: SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER: 157-10014-10109
RECORDS SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 07-M-15

DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR: SSCIA
FROM:
TO:
TITLE:
DATE: 06/25/75
PAGES: 19
SUBJECTS: HARVEY, WILLIAM
OPERATION MONGOOSE

ZRRIFLE

DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT
CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS: REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS: POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 01/05/99
OPENING CRITERIA:
COMMENTS: CCBOX 418

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

---

Box 418
MEETING 25 JUNE 75

---

AGENDA

TWENTY-FOURTH MEETING OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
10:00 A.M. ON JUNE 25, 1975 IN 457 RUSSELL BUILDING

Testimony by Mr. William Harvey

---

TOP SECRET

WILLIAM HARVEY
Short Chronology*

Biographical
1940-47 Counterespionage work as FBI agent
1947 Joined CIA as head of Soviet Intelligence Branch
1948 Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Special Operations (which became DDP)
1952 Chief of Station, Berlin (Berlin Tunnel operation)
1959 Became Chief of Foreign Intelligence staff Division D (FI/D) which handles communications intelligence and sensitive methods of obtaining it (e.g., surreptitious entries)

1960
August 16 DR. EDWARD GUNN (Office of Medical Services) receives box of Cuban cigars to be treated with lethal poison. (21)

1961
Late January EDWARDS and O'CONNELL ask for development of POISON PILLS. (24)
(approx.)
February BISSELL (DDP) asks HARVEY to establish an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability under project ZRRIFLE. Harvey's
(approx.) notes are quoted as saying that Bissell said he had been "twice urged by the White House" to establish such a capability. (37) Harvey is briefed, probably by both BISSELL and EDWARDS, on the Phase I assassination plot run by Sheffield EDWARDS and James O'CONNELL (Office of Security) which involved criminal syndicate connections. (37)

HARVEY uses agent QJWIN (recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in an assassination operation against LUMUMBA) as the principle asset for ZRRIFLE. (38)

Edwards has the POISON PILLS tested. (25)

* Page references in parentheses are from the 1967 Report of the Inspector General of the CIA.

---

TOP SECRET

1961 (cont'd)
Early Feb. According to Dr. GUNN, HARVEY asked about the pills he tested. Gunn briefed Harvey, who told him to brief SIDNEY GOTTLIEB about techniques but not targets. (27)

Late Feb. Pills given to ROSELLI by O'CONNELL are passed to TRAFFICANTE. (27) ROSELLI reports to O'CONNELL that pills reached ORTA in Cuba. ORTA returns pills in couple weeks. (27)

March-Early April O'CONNELL gives pills and money to ROSELLI who passes them to VARONA. (32)

Mid-April Bay of Pigs invasion fails; JFK appoints Taylor Committee.
November 15 Beginning of PHASE II: BISSELL instructs HARVEY to apply the ZRRIFLE assassination capability to Castro. (39) Harvey takes over the criminal syndicate contacts developed in Phase I. (39) HARVEY is told by HELMS that he is to take over the CIA Cuba task force. (39)
November 29 MC CONE replaces Allen Dulles as DCI

1962
February EDWARDS briefs HARVEY on Castro operation. (40)
February 7 EDWARDS meets with FBI to ask them not to prosecute the Rowan wiretap case because of CIA concern. (60)
February 19 HELMS (DDP nominee) authorizes HARVEY to handle ZRRIFLE project with unvouchered funds. (38)
April 8-9 HARVEY, ROSELLI, O'CONNELL, and perhaps MAHEU meet in New York to plan Phase II. (43) (Harvey disputes O'Connell's recollection that Maheu was there and knowledgeable of Phase II.) Both Edwards and Harvey check with HELMS before the meeting is arranged and HARVEY obtains Helm's approval not to brief MC CONE (41). Harvey thereafter begins regular reporting to Helms on Phase II. (41)
April 14 HARVEY, ROSELLI, and O'CONNELL meet in Miami. (46)
April 18-19 Pills are delivered to Harvey in Washington. (46)

---

TOP SECRET

1962 (cont'd)
April 21 HARVEY passes the pills to ROSELLI in Florida. (47) Roselli was to give the pills to Varona, who had an asset in Cuba with access to Castro's restaurant. At this point Roselli is using Tony VARONA and "MACEO" as contacts with Cuba rather than Trafficante. (47-8)

Late April HARVEY, with help of Ted SHACKLEY (Chief of JMWAVE station in Miami), loaded arms and equipment in a U-Haul truck which was left in a parking lot for Roselli, who delivered it to a Cuban contact. (49-50)

Throughout May Intense contact between HARVEY and ROSELLI. Roselli reports that pills are in Cuba at the restaurant frequented by Castro awaiting the opportunity to use them. (50)

May 7 EDWARDS and HOUSTON brief ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT F. KENNEDY on PHASE I of the assassination operation. (62a)*

May 14 Edwards tells HARVEY of the briefing of RFK. (65) Harvey says that he briefed HELMS about this and advised against briefing McCone (DCI) or Carter (DDCI); Helms agreed. (65)

HARVEY is told by EDWARDS that the "tacit approval" of the DCI should be obtained if Roselli was to be used any further. (65) Harvey told Edwards that Roselli would not be used any more. (According to Edwards' memorandum of 5/14/62.) (42)

June 21 ROSELLI tells HARVEY that VARONA has sent three men to Cuba to recruit others for the pill plot. (51)

August 10 Special Group (Augmented) meets on OPERATION MONGOOSE. HARVEY and MC CONE said that MCNAMARA raised the subject of assassinations at this meeting in regard to new plans.

August 13 General LANSDALE'S memorandum assigns to HARVEY the drafting of an outline of intelligence, political, economic, and paramilitary activities for the implementation of MONGOOSE. The task includes planning for "splitting the regime, including liquidation of leaders".

* RFK asks to be told before the CIA works with the Mafia again. (62a)

---

TOP SECRET

1962 (cont'd)
August 14 HARVEY writes a memorandum to DDP HELMS saying that he advised Lansdale's aide FRANK HAND to excise the words "including liquidation of leaders" from the LANSDALE memo because of "the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document". Harvey also tells Helms that he has "careful notes" on MC NAMARA'S discussion of assassination at the Special Group meeting of August 10.

September Pills still in place; HARVEY learns that VARONA is ready to send another team to Cuba. (51)

October CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

1963
February HARVEY and ROSELLI agree in Los Angeles to call off the operation, although not to break precipitously with VARONA. (52)

June HARVEY and ROSELLI have last dinner in Washington and are observed by SAM PAPICH of the FBI, who has ROSELLI under intensive surveillance. Harvey asks Papich to let him know if HOOVER is going to call MC CONE. (53-4) Harvey briefs Helms and Helms agrees not to brief McCone unless it appears that McCone will receive a call from Hoover. (54)

August 16 Spurred by a Chicago newspaper story of the same day, HELMS sends MC CONE the Edwards memo of 5/14/62 of the RFK briefing. (69)

---

SEGRET
EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:
SUBJECT: John Rosselli

14 May 1962

EdWARDS EXI
5/30175

INVENTORIED:
MAR 1977
BY

1. In early April Mr. William Harvey asked me to arrange a contact with Subject. The meeting in New York City was arranged for 9 April. I explained to Mr. Harvey that the undersigned would take no part in future operations proposed for Subject.
2. In the interim I have kept Mr. Harvey fully informed reference to my briefing of The Attorney General on the former project and cautioned him that I felt that any future projects of this nature should have the tacit approval of the Director of Central Intelligence.
3. On this date Mr. Harvey called me and indicated that he was dropping any plans for the use of Subject for the future.

Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security

EVES CALY
SEGRET

---

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

13 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HARVEY, CIA
ROBERT HURWITCH, STATE
GEN. BENJAMIN HARRIS, DEFENSE
DON WILSON, USIA

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Alternate Course B

INVENTORIED:
MAR 21 1977

In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the 10 August policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce an outline of an alternate Course E for submission. The CIA paper "Operational Plan (Reduced Effort)" will be used as the starting basis.

Since this is to be a bare outline, to permit further policy guidance to be developed, I believe the paper need contain only a statement of objectives and a list of implementing activities. The list of activities will be under the headings of: Intelligence, Political, Economic, Psychological, Paramilitary, and Military.

We will hold an Operational Representatives work session in my office, at 1400 hours, Tuesday, 14 August, to complete the outline paper for submission. Fach of you is to bring 5 copies of completed assigned work to this work session, to permit each of us to work from a full set of crane.

Papers required from each of you for the Tuesday meeting:

Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime,
1, Daonomic (cabotage, limited deception), and Paramilitary. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the.

Mr. Hurwitch: Statement of Objectives, Political, and Economic. Also, any sutions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

SEC DEF CONTR No. X-
1.CP SECRET-NOFURN
ICTERIN FANDLING
EXCLUDED FROM GDS
EXCLUDED FAC
REGRADING; DOD DIT 200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

This document contains
Copy No. of CO

---

SECRET
SENSITIVE
EVES ONLY
HELMIS EXZ..
6/13/75

14 August 1962

MAR 21 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Operation MONGOOSE

1. Action. None. This memorandum is for your information.

2. Reference is made to our conversation on 13 August 1962, concerning the memorandum of that date from General Lansdale. Attached is a copy of this memorandum, excised from which are four words in the second line of the penultimate paragraph on page 1. These four words were "including liquidation of leaders."

3. The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's ofice on 10 August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record. I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point.

4. Upon receipt of the attached memorandum, I called Lansdale's office and, in his absence, pointed out to Frank Hand the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document. I advised Frank Hand that, as far as CIA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it. I strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he excise the phrase in question from all copies of this memorandum, in-cluding those disseminated to State, Defense, and USIA. Shortly thereafter, Lansdale called back and left the message that he agreed and that he had done so.

SEERST EVES ONLY
SENSITIVE

---

SENSITIVE
EYES UILY

5. For your information also, in your absence and since the attached memorandum already had been distributed and in view of the possibility that this might come to the Director's attention, I informally briefed Walt Elder on the above.

Attachment
lucky
WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

Memo fr Gen Lansdale dtd 13 Aug 62

EVES ONLY

Excluded

---

SECRET
Project ZRRIFLE

R371

ON MAR Z 1977

1. Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use agent assets for Division D operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The project will be operated against third-country installations and personnel.
2. Objectives: The objective of this project is the procurement of code and cipher materials, and information concerning such materials, in accordance with requirements levied on the Clandestine Services, primarily by the National Security Agency. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as needed.
3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements for the operational procurement of foreign code and cipher materials, Division D in 1960 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity.
During the same period requirements from NSA became more refined and in many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions.

Classified by
RECEIVED FROM
SECRET JUN 24 1975
CIA

Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11252
exemption schedule 53 (1), (2), (3)
Automatically declassified on
Date Impossible to Determine

---

control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D, which is
in closest touch with NSA on procurement requirements, could best conduct the
activity. The spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify
removing from the OOA category.

4. Operational Assets:
(1) Personnel: QJWIN is under written contract as a principal
agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJWIN was first
contacted in 1958 through the Chief of the Luxembourg I. S. by the Chief of
Station, Luxembourg, in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into
the United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contacted
sporadically by COS, Luxembourg, in behalf of the Bureau of Marcotics.
Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJWIN. In
October 1960,

SECRET
RECEIVED FROM
JUN 24 1975
CIA

---

SECRET

QJWIN annual salary: $7,200

Travel & ops expenses for QJWIN & other agents & agent condidates: 2,000

Fees for services by and standby of agents and agent candidates: 2,000

Travel of staff employees engaged in ARRIFLE activity: 2,500

Hire of safehouses, automobiles and other operational expenses: 1,000
$14,700

Pay for agents on completion of jobs?.

1) Legal, ethical-morale, operational problems; political: non-attributability.
2) Our own experience (Bangkok) (and effect on DDP) and experiences with
KGB (Crossup, Bandera groups, Khokhlov) - require most professional,
proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable, CE-experienced ops
officers (few available), able to conduct patient search and with guts to
pull back if instinct or knowledge tells him he should, and w/known high
regard for operational security. Assessments are all-important.
3) Maximum security:

a. Kubark only (e.g., what does Siragusa now know?); no approach to other Government agencies.
b. Within Kubark, one focal point for control, search, training case officering, etc. DDP authority in this focal point mandato
RECEIVED FROM
SECRET JUN 24 1975
CIA

---

SECRET

DCI officially advised?

c. Max. security cable commo for innocuous cables only; no
restrictions on travel; possibility of one-man overseas (Europe) control
base with own (non-Station) commo. Word of mouth and no bashfulness
re trips.

d. No PA's (except for search) or intermediaries; rigid case-officering, from start to finish.

e. No approach to officials of foreign governments.

f. No use of any agent who ever worked for a U.S. Government agency.

Training by opposition would

g. Use of already tested assets (e.g., Manuel in the search.

h. Stand-by list of Rubarkers who can pass as foreigners.

i. Pretext: Kutube/D search; this established (e.g., Rome).

j. No discussions in Stations.

k. No "team" until ready to go, if at all.
4) Blackmail:

a. No American citizens or residents or people who ever obtained
U.S. visa.

b. No chain of connections: strictly person to person; singleton ops.

c. No meeting any candidate in house territory.

d. Exclude organization criminals (e.g., Sicilians) those with record
of arrests, those with instability of purpose as criminals.

SECRET
RECEIVED FROM
ANN 24 1975
GIA

---

SEGRET
e. Staffers -selection.

5) Cover: planning should include provision for blaming Sovs or Czechs
in case of blow.

6) Should have phoney 201 in RI to backstop this, all documents therein
forged and backdated. Should look like a CE file.

7) Testing of moninees essential: re following directions, security,
blackmail.

8) Former resistance personnel a possibility.

9) Useady nobody who has ever dealt with criminals;
otherwise will not be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such as freedom
to travel, wanted lists, etc.

10) Possible use of staffers for the action.

11) Silverthorne.

Keeping of files.

SECRET
RECEIVED FROM
JUN 24 1975
CIA

---

SECRET
Freedom to travel

Khokhlov case.

Legal, operational & ethical-morale problems.

1) Maximum security & within Kubark only (e.g., how much does Siragusa
now know?). Limitation on number code clerks for enciphering &
deciphering. Guise of Louvide objection. Siglen not secure enough.

2) One focal point for search, control, training, case-officer & PA
selection. Complete DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. Overseas
one-man control base with own (non-Station) commo.

3) Every operation to be rigidly case-officered; no silk-shirt PA's.

4) Non-attributability: No American citizens or American residents for
direct action; possibly for approach to foreign elements. No criminal who
tainted by use by another American agency. Use of case officers who can
and limited official reference.
pass as foreigners

5) No chain of connections/permitting blackmail.

6) Don't meet any selecter in house territory.

7) Avoid discussion w/foreign officials until all possibility of search
through private citizens (e.g., QJWIN) has been examined.

8) Planning should include provision for blaming Soviets (or Czechs)
in case of blow. /4 above essential.

9) Exclude organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those
who have engaged in several types of crime.

SECRET
RECEIVED FRO...
JUN 24 1975
CIA

---

SECRET
10) Corsicans recommended. Sicilians could lead to Mafia.

11) Former resistance personnel offer possibilities. (OSS) archives.)

12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each selectee.

13) All Kubark personnel involved should have some CE experience.

14) Silverthorne & stable in Paris.

15) What are limits on team or individuals selected? No "team" until
ready to go.

16) Danger of Standbys.

SECRET
RECEIVED FROM
AN 24 1975
CIA

---

SECRET
Scd G - 25/1 Exec Actions

Narcotics Bureau
"for a living"
RIS 201 cover
caution Bankruptcy No star eyes Jim A. Contradestinct from U-2
Not a TSD problem
Apply brakes
Last resort beyond last resort & a confession of weakness.

--El Benefactor assumptions
Examples of 3 "wrong"

Framework of Sid's job. Ledford
Ehut R&D memo.

"Translating machines" of E basic sounds project.
pherious (V with CB)

comment Gear

Anathesia

26/1 AS Fanforn DCI Matter
No file
Never mentions word assassination.

1. Select proper oern to run 2
Max as
2. Place a cover BWKH - AS-
3. Security Rules Sid Reserv.
4. Guide leves Substitute What next
5. Last Resort Brakes -
6. No other agencies
7. No projects or papers except per cover.
8. Principal agent (Mankel) ?
AF Project draft LCH tested 1500 from NB.
Mask spat rqm. stall AF project cler Dbieke
SECRET
RECEIVED FROM
JUN 24 1975
CIA

---

SECRET

9. Disposal
10. Targets who & where Must know before we can spot
11. Case officering
12. Cover file create to provide RIS or xxxtobel it. non Sov
13. Note dangers of RIS counter action and monitor if they are blamed
Fd J list Remember

SECRET
RECEIVED FROM
制 24 1975
CIA
157-10014-10242
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date: 7/7/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY: SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER: 157-10014-10242
RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 07-M-147

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: SSCIA
FROM:
TO:
TITLE:
DATE: 00/00/1975
PAGES: 690
SUBJECTS: ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
ORGANIZED CRIME
CIA
ASSASSINATION, KENNEDY, JOHN
DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT
CLASSIFICATION: Declassified
RESTRICTIONS: 1B; IC; 3
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 03/31/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: CCBOX 441

v9.1
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 1
1
---

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10242
RECORDS SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-147

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE
:
DATE: 00/00/75
PAGES: 690
SUBJECTS: ORGANIZED CRIME
Date : 08/09/95
Page : 1

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
CIA
ASSASSINATION, KENNEDY, JOHN
DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS: REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS: POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/21/99
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: CCBOX 441
[R]
ITEM IS RESTRICTED
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 2
---

Ny Daily
SUNDAY NIS, A1 075
SECRETS OF THE CIA!!!

American Mata Hari Who Duped Castro

Marie Lorenz: spied on Fidel.
-
:
:
Its clandestine operations now ondergoing e sometimes painful official
estuting, the Central Intelligence Age y rainte.ns, as always, a tight lip. Lat.
from interviews with the egents who i redout te do the CIA's clock-and-dagger
work. News reporter Post Meskil tells here for the first time of the intrigue
thut surfaced in the Cuban miscile e. is, controllation that pushed the US
to the brink of war with the Su iet Union. First of a scries.
!
DY PAUL MICKIL
છે
:
A I EAUTIFUL German-American copiongee agents, Caribbean conspira-
tors, aid Cuban freedom fighters were
girl scored an intelligence coup fo
interviewed for this series, on CIA
thể CLA by stealing sceret paperderations in the Caribbean and the
chored vth Fidel Castro
!
1
merican of their clandestine ac-
takice are sold here for the first time,
we are being investigated by the
• A fantastic scheme to scize a
Soviet ship and use it to chtain the
release of the captured American spy
ship Pueblo.
• Secret deals with American mob
sters who had lost their multiniillion-
dollar Cüben gambling casinos....
• Armed raids on Cuba and many
shipments of guerrilla fighters, weap-
ons, explosives and other wer materi
als to the island before and after the
Day of Pigs ficsco.
Marie Lerema played a temall but
Caribbean conspiracies.
er the prere, the tollice on Intelli-important role in the labyrinth of
New were mens showing th ٢٠
sclested; aer Soviet missile installations
En Caba.
peace and Vice President Rockefeller's
Commission on CIA Activities.
red Marie Dosen to cred
whbors quictly in New York, was th
Ec of the Caribbean cold war,
She was one of the most clamorous
members of a spring recrc.ued for.
the Central Indigence Arc
Frank isomni, a cactime triple agent
whe later became became known to the ameris
can public as Watergate burgler Frack
Sturgis.
According to sources, the CIA was,
dar or another, involved in:
Chcesassinate foreign heads
mcluding, Castro of Cuba,
Papa Doc Muvalier or Haiti and Pafael
Trojilo of Me Dominican Repai
of state,
Singa Certroite attempt to
invade Papama and sabotage the Pana-
rma Canal.
:
• The explosion of a munitions ship
Ms. Lorenz, Sturgis, other formet it Havana harbor.
:
Her Culan adventures begen on
balmy event, in Tehreer cary 1950, when.
a lanch C Caben scrolution-
palied clemmede the gleaming
ary flag palic
-white luxury Her Lelin, anchored in
Havana harber on the next-to-last stop
ofa Caribbean
م
In the launch were 20 or so heavily
arned Cubans, all wearing beards and
rumpled live-green fatigues. The
Iner's, accommodation lauder was
(Continard en reje 35).
Box 441
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 3
---

> **
,
(Continuad from 2)
lowered and the bisbal (bearded
... dalhard like pirates, kro
nades d dangling from their belts and
thachira xuns uns swinging from their
shoulders
and ran for cover with their dinner-
women in evening themed
Jacketed husbandal Lelieving the ship
was twing raided by andit Lut otler,
Arwerwan' tearists recognized the leader
of the sinister-looking laral as Fidel
Castro, the new pedime pdime minister of Cuha,
Hari Who Duped Custo
the lull, chari afic dictator, luther
airborne illusions were shattered doon
after the plane Linded.
"I was ved Idealistic she
said. "I was going on an adventure and
to
to my first Jo I 1 was going to help
the new goverit punt. Instead, I betame
Castro's play thi
"I was dris in from the airport to
the Havana Ilton, where Fidel had
taken over the 4th floor. For the next
four months, hardly ever got qt of
the Hilton. When I did get out, was,
Pind they crowded around him for: auto-muler guard. I'd wanted to go down to
coffee shop, two burundus
graphi.
"I'm a friend," "The shoute! obviously
enyrying the commotion lepiad caused.
"I like Americans."
The Berlin's shopper, former Gerbian
Nivy Capt. Heinrich Lorenz, lagited
the barindos to stay for cocktail and
dianer, and he introduced Qustro this
vifarious 18-year-old ear-old daughter, Mori
"My father spoke Spanish and he
it along well with Castro," Marie Jold
this reporter. "lle took Castro and his
nen on a tour of the ship, then alked
them to please leave their guns of dide
11:3 dining room before they sat hown
fof dinner.
છ
"Castro said they didn't feel safe
vithout guns, so my father all wed
Gem to keep their pistols, but he iande
Livem legve the machine guns, automat
ic' rifles and grenades in the smoking
Caste sat at the captain's table,
between Lorenz and Marie. During the
meal, he smiled frequently at Marie,
nad she was as impressed as any nor-
nal techage girl would be by compli
ments from, the flamboyant hero of the
Caban revolution.'
She spoke German and English,
which she had learned from her Ameri-
can mother. Castro said he needed a
sacretary who could write lettera in
these languages. Before the moal was
over, he offered the job to Marie.
1
Took Offer As Joke
"He asked me to stay in Havana
and work for him," she said. "My fa
ther and I both laughed. My father
said I was going back to Germany to
finish my education."
promised to write to her, 80
Castro pro
the pool or coffee
would go with me."
'I Wat His Priloner
Asled to refine her relatio hip
with Castro dujing this period. Maria
said: "I want prisoner. I was Arap-
ped."
"Were youlover in love with
Fidel?"
"No; never. How can you be in love
when you're afraid, when you're treated
like a piece of furniture, when pou're,
sleeping with a live hazooka, unde the
hed, when you're living in a
guns on every table and cigar butik all
over the floor?"
she conting
room
with
"My way of thinking was gwas Gerijan,"
"Everything, in my life
had been orderly, very neat, and
estcial-
ly a prime minister, could be so disor-
canized. I thought he would have
clean never really any
I
several offices, with desks, chairs and
telephones. All he had, at this foint,
was B suite of rooms at the ton,
where he lived and worked. I was kept
in one of the rooms. The door to the
hall
locked from the outside.
Barbudos anul visitors were in thespext
rooln, but the door between the toms
was kept locked.
"All I could do was read loks,
study Spanish, walk back and forth,
hsten to the radio or go on the balcony
and look out over Havana. I was
miserable. My father tried to find out
what had happened to me. He contact-
ed the American Embassy in Havana
Marie was born un American citizen)
but nothing; happened.
"The only clothes I had were what I
brought with me from New York. I
couldn't go out to buy anything. Fidel
had me measured for a uniform so 1
would look like a member of the 26th
of July Movement. An olive-green uni-
form with a lieutenant's star.
she gave him two addresses-her par-
ents home in Bremen, Germany, and
her brother's apartment in New York,
where she planned to stay when the
Caribbean cruise ended. She never ex-of
pected to see or hear from Fidel again.
About two weeks later, two Cuban
"That way, when I was allowed out
officers called on Marie in New York. I under guard, he thought people would
They carried a message from Castro,
saying he was in desperate need of an
English-German translator. lie had sent
Cubana Airlines plane to bring her
back to Havana.
"I made a big mistake," Marle said.,
"I got on that plane."
During the flight to Havana, she
tried to imagine her life in Castroland.
She thought she wohlt have a deck in
the premier's seculatial pool and a
staall apartment of her own. She may
even have dreamed of a romance with

Source of Tarrabscci
Sturgis says SAL Garcia
momo
think I was of his officers. But
almost every Havana housewife heard
rumors that Castro was keeping a for-
eigner, an American girl, at the fiilton.
I was becoming a problem to him.
"One day two barbudos came to the
rooid while Fidel was out. They said
they were there to help me. They took
me on a 20-njinete Lane ride to the
whowed me the
beautiful black and bouch there and
then drove me hy jeep to this huge
prison complex. They showed me a cell
NW 50955 DocId:32423630 Page .4..
---

(Continued from smire 2)
lowered and the bisbal (bearded
... dalhard like pirates, kro
nades d dangling from their belts and
thachira xuns uns swinging from their
shoulders
and ran for cover with their dinner-
women in evening themed
Jacketed husbandal Lelieving the ship
was twing raided by andit Lut otler,
Arwerwan' tearists recognized the leader
of the sinister-looking laral as Fidel
Castro, the new pedime pdime minister of Cuha,
the lull, chari afic dictator, luther
airborne illusions were shattered doon
after the plane Linded.
"I was ved Idealistic she
said. "I was going on an adventure and
to
to my first Jo I 1 was going to help
the new goverit punt. Instead, I betame
Castro's play thi
"I was dris in from the airport to
the Havana Ilton, where Fidel had
taken over the 4th floor. For the next
four months, hardly ever got qt of
the Hilton. When I did get out, was,
Pind they crowded around him for: auto-muler guard. I'd wanted to go down to
coffee shop, two burundus
graphi.
"I'm a friend," "The shoute! obviously
enyrying the commotion lepiad caused.
"I like Americans."
The Berlin's shopper, former Gerbian
Nivy Capt. Heinrich Lorenz, lagited
the barindos to stay for cocktail and
dianer, and he introduced Qustro this
vifarious 18-year-old ear-old daughter, Mori
"My father spoke Spanish and he
it along well with Castro," Marie Jold
this reporter. "lle took Castro and his
nen on a tour of the ship, then alked
them to please leave their guns of dide
11:3 dining room before they sat hown
fof dinner.
છ
"Castro said they didn't feel safe
vithout guns, so my father all wed
Gem to keep their pistols, but he iande
Livem legve the machine guns, automat
ic' rifles and grenades in the smoking
Caste sat at the captain's table,
between Lorenz and Marie. During the
meal, he smiled frequently at Marie,
nad she was as impressed as any nor-
nal techage girl would be by compli
ments from, the flamboyant hero of the
Caban revolution.'
She spoke German and English,
which she had learned from her Ameri-
can mother. Castro said he needed a
sacretary who could write lettera in
these languages. Before the moal was
over, he offered the job to Marie.
1
Took Offer As Joke
"He asked me to stay in Havana
and work for him," she said. "My fa
ther and I both laughed. My father
said I was going back to Germany to
finish my education."
promised to write to her, 80
Castro pro
the lull, chari afic dictator, luther
Marie was born un American citizen)
but nothing; happened.
"The only clothes I had were what I
brought with me from New York. I
couldn't go out to buy anything. Fidel
had me measured for a uniform so 1
would look like a member of the 26th
of July Movement. An olive-green uni-
form with a lieutenant's star.
"That way, when I was allowed out
I under guard, he thought people would
say, "I'm of his officers. But
almost every Havana housewife heard
rumors that Castro was keeping a for-
eigner, an American girl, at the fiilton.
I was becoming a problem to him.
"One day two barbudos came to the
rooid while Fidel was out. They said
they were there to help me. They took
me on a 20-njinete Lane ride to the
whowed me the
beautiful black and bouch there and
then drove me hy jeep to this huge
prison complex. They showed me a cell
Discovery of missile
sitęs in Cuba provokod
a cold-war showdown
bolwaan tian Prezident
Jolin F. Kennedy and
thhon Soviat Premier
Nikita Khrushcliov, a
confrontation that had
the world holding
iis breath.

A chance meeting in Havana harbor aboard a cruise ship captained by her
fathor brought Marie Lorenz and Fidel Castro logether. It began a
liaison destined to have international repercussions.
where dictator Fulgencio Batista had
imprisoned Fidel and Raol (Fidel's
brother) years before. I went into the
rell to look at a bronze plaque on the
wall. They shut the door and locked me
in the coll. Then they went away.
She Wasn't Pampered
"I spent a
week there, eating the
same food as the other prisoners
blacks beans, rice, stale bread and cof-
fee. As far as I know, I was the only
woman there.
"Every morning we would hear the
firing squads. As soon as it got light,
the birds would start singing. Then the
guns would go off. Then marching and
quiet. Then breakfast and cell checks.
The guards would check to see if you'd
hanged yourself during the night or if
you'd done something; wrong in there
where there was hardly room to turn
around. It was hourible.
"After seven days, I was taken out
and flown back to Havana."
Mevin was never told why she was
jailed. She now believes Castro had her
locked up to make sure she didn't es-

NW 50955 DocId:32423630 Page .4..
---

Date: 08/09/95
Page: 2

cape while he was out of the count v
visiting the United States and South
Anterica.
One night she was with Castro, and
his bodyguards 111 the lobby of the
Riviera Hotel when a handsome, wav-
haared man aproached her. He wore
the obve-green rehel uniform and the
msignia of a captain m the Cuban Bir
force.
While Castro
was conferring with
his sides on the other side of the
lobby, the captain mingled with the
barbudos around Marie and whispered
to her in English: "I know about you."
"Can you help me?" she responded.
"I'an you get me out of here?"
"Yes. I'm with the American
Embassy. I'll get you out."
This was her introduction to Com-
mandante Frank Fiorini (later known
as Frank Sturgis), Castro confidant
and hired agent for the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency.
Agrees to Spy on Fidel
For the next few weeks Frank kept
in contact with her in person and
through Castro officers who were
working for him. Marie agreed to spy
on Castro. She filched secret documenta
and reported Castro's conversations
with important visitors overheard
through the hotel, walls. Ily now, she
could read and speak Spanish fairly
well.
Thee kuite was full of guns and
papers," she said. "Fidel had papers
atrewn all over the tables, the floor,
the bed, the dresser. He had one filing
cabinet that was never locked. It was
full of money, papers, documents,
maps. I took papers out and slipped
them to Frank. Fidel never missed
them.
"Frank said, 'Get all the data you
can, and I did. I was a regular Mata
Hari."
Then Marie became sick, and Frank
arranged her escape. Two Cuban offi-
cers took her out of the hotel while
Castro was away and put her on a
Cubana Airlines flight to New York.
i
About that time, Frank also set up
the escapes of two top Cuban air force
officers, a project that forced him to
leave Cuba. He moved his luse of
operations to Miami, bat he kept in
touch with his agents on the island and
his CIA contacta in Havana and Wash-

When she recovered from her ill-
ness, Marie jo ned him in Florida and
volunteered for a mission that meant
certain death if show were caught.
Early in 1960, Castro went t
---

SECRETS OF THE CIA!!!
American Mata Hari Who Duped Castro
Nw bouly SUNDAY NIS, A1075
50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 3
---

SUNDAY NEWS, JUNE 185 1976
:
CIA Sent Bedmate
3
To Kill Castro in '60
By PAUL MESKIL
WY
The Central Intelligence Agency sent a shapely Mata Hari to Cuba in
1960 to kill her former lover, Fidel Castro.
Its
Details of this case were uncovered by The News and a Senate Intelligenes
a
Committee investigator who
learned that a mystery
woman had been involved
in
assassination plot
against the Cuban dictator.
It
was the first of several
CLA-sponsored attempts to exe-
cate Castro.
The mystery woman has now
been identified by the committee
and The News as Marie Lorenz,
an attractive German-American
brunette who shared Castro's
Havana hotel suite for soveral
months in 1959. When a commit-
tee investigator confronted her
with evidence linking her to the
assassination plot, she admitted
that she had been recruited for
the attempted hit.
Exclusive Account
Then, last week, she gave this
reporter an exclusive account of
mission SO secret that she
never mentioned it to anyone for
ith yearg.
Ms. Lorenz, who now lives in
New York, is the daughter of
the late German Navy Capt.
Heinrich Lorenz and his Ameri
can wife. After World War 11,
Lorenz became skipper of the
luxury liner Berlin. He took
Marie along on Caribbean
cruise in Folmary
month aft۰۰
the Cuban
nt.
Isро
1959,
a
145PO
a
the Berlin in
Havana harbor and dined with
the captain and his vivacious
teenage daughter. He later per-
suaded Maric to return to Hava-
na to work as his personal inter-
preter. When she arrived she
was installed in Castro's 24th-
floor suite at the Havana Hilton.
She soon realized she was
virtual prisoner.
Quizzed by FBI
a
Frank Fiorini, an American
who had become a Cuban Revo-
Lutionary Army officer and a
CIA agent, contacted her and
persuaded her to photograph
Castro's secret papers. He later
helped her escape.
She left Havana in January
NW 50955 DocId; 32423630 Page, 5.
The Memo That Started It
"f far left"
On Dec 11, 1959 Col. J. C. King, head of the EA
Western Hemisphere Division, wrote a memorandum to
Director Allen Dulles, according to a Semate commit....
report Noting cer the "far left" regiime
11:
Cuba, com
corage other Latin American countrics against US intercsts
he recommended tha
consideration in piven to the elimination of Fidel Castra
Fone of the co Sose to Fidel, such as as his brother Kano
compamon, Che Guevara, have the same mesmeri appeal to
the passes. Man informe intorned people believe that te dapper
ance of Fidel would greatly accelerate a fall of the prisom
government
Dulles ant Deputy Director Director of P Plams Ricans B
approved the recommendation, and the CLA inched a pon
assassination campaign a gainst Castro that lasted at Dast
five years. This is the excinsive story of the first try.
---

SUNDAY NEWS, JUNE 18,
CIA Sent a Bedmate
TO
Kill Castro in '60
(Conanied om page 3)
in
Fronini
1103
York
was the York
Hospita for
1. illness
the 111
incuba and told
V:1
Her
i-
the:
and the 11
11
F11
In:
1102
111
111
11
several more
Yat
Were disci
on the 11
1
11
"
she to
he-171
-
said the C
"111
-2-
gave
her two capsules
full of poison powder. She was
to sprinkle the powder in
Castro's coffee.
"I guess the company (CIA)
supplied them. Frank said it was
a company operation."
form that Castro had given her,
Wha
work.
site Cabar
.
:
Designating her a lieutenant in
the Revolationary Army, Ms
161
and the FBI.
Missions she
"asked about my atti-
1: de towar Castro
:
sa-id:
in atid
"
"
1.
Lii
"
111
to and
-
4213.1 Why do-n't you kill
"
1311 don't know how,
"
11
in and
""
:
1
"
(he and Frank Flach.

There is in the fast cleans
-aid there was
1. meetings, at which
"
A few
visited the suite a
previously and stolen his secrets.
And he certainly didn't suspect
she had come back to kill him.
11e
"
"
and
'Not the rest it comes, he
fell asleep on the bed, in his
fatigues and with a cigar in his
mouth. I had no confidence left,
1
but I knew this was the chance
to do it.
"I went into the bathroom and
opened the jar of cold cream. I
stuck my finger in it and the
whole thing came out like yuck.
couldn't find the capsules.
They had melted.
1710
-6137
4.
---
176-10011-10152
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date: 5/5/2016

Agency Information
AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER: 176-10011-10152
RECORD SERIES: NSF
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Information
ORIGINATOR: WH
FROM:
TO: THE RECORD
TITLE: MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE: 06/08/1961
PAGES: 4
SUBJECTS: ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Secret
RESTRICTIONS: 1C
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 05/08/1998

OPENING CRITERIA: UPON AGENCY REVIEW
COMMENTS: NSF:M&M:SPECIAL GROUP(CI) MEETINGS:6/61-10/62:BOX 319:PENDING NLK-92-104

3

SECRET - EYES ONLY

8 Juno 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 6 June 1961
PRESENT: Messrs. Bowles, Gilpatric, Bundy, Ralph Dungan, Dulles

Mr. Dungan, Special Assistant to the President, participated
in the Special Group meeting for the first time.

1. Congo

Messrs. Bowles and Gilpatric agreed with the plan for the
Congo. Mr. Bowles conditioned his approval on the acceptance of
the three provisions set forth in the State Department internal
memorandum dated 6 June 1961 (copy attached). Mr. Dulles indicated
that these conditions were accepted by the Agency but he pointed out
that the condition which prescribed the inclusion of Gizenga or his
representative in the Leopoldville Government involved the danger
of bringing in a representative of Moscow who would attempt to
subvert and control the government. Mr. Bundy felt that he could
not approve this program without reference to higher authority.

Note was made of the possibility that if Gizenga decided to
participate in a new Leopoldville Government or Parliament, he had
ample resources and a chance eventually to win control of the government.

2. Review of Political Action Projects

Mr. Bundy stated that because of the special sensitivity of
programs involving covert support to political parties and leaders
in friendly countries, higher authority wished to review them.
Mr. Bundy proposed Thursday or Friday, June 15th or 16th, for
this purpose.

Mr. Bowles suggested that we might ask to have a general
policy enunciated regarding this subject. Other members of the Group

SECRET - EYES ONLY

SECRET - EYES ONLY

suggested that a general policy statement might not be sufficiently
flexible to take care of special situations which might arise.

Mr. Dulles noted that the pertinent NSC paper authorized
programs such as that under discussion, but emphasized that he
would only undertake this type of activity if it was fully supported
by the Department of State and higher authority. He stated that he
fully appreciated the sensitivity of this type of activity. Mr. Dulles
said, however, that he felt the Special Group should have some
latitude to make decisions on those matters within the general policy
which might be laid down by higher authority without referral of
each specific case for approval.

Mr. Bundy stated that he would like Mr. Dungan to work with
our people to the preparation of the briefing to be given higher
authority next week.

3. Release Procedures - Francis Gary Powers

Because of the contingency nature of the proposal and because
of the crowded agenda, discussion of this matter was deferred to the
next meeting.

4. STPOLLY Flight, Vietnam

This flight was approved with Chinat personnel. There was some
discussion as to the desirability of having South Vietnamese conduct
these missions but it was pointed out that they did not have the
competence.

5. Covert Annex, Vietnam

This annex was approved. It was noted that a progress report
had just been received and it was suggested that this report be
distributed to members of the Group.

6. Covert Annex, Korea

Mr. Bundy reiterated the decision that covert annexes should
not be processed through the NSC machinery. Because of the interest
of higher authority in political action operations in friendly areas (see
Item 2) and since this annex was written in rather broad terms, he
would like to check it further.

2
SECRET-EYES ONLY

SECRET - EYES ONLY

7. TACKLE

Mr. Dulles stated that while he wanted to open discussion of
this matter at this meeting, he did not expect a final decision to to
made until the next meeting. Mr. Bundy noted the previous reserva-
tions of the State Department and the fact that this matter had been
considered but not approved three times previously. Mr. Gilpatric
supported the need for current Information which TACKLE would
produce and suggested the possible use of U.S. personnel for the
TACKLE mission. Mr. Dulles stated his opinion that the use of
American personnel would raise serious problems in the event of
an accident. The use of well qualified Chinat crows, in his opinion,
would mitigate the risks involved. It was agreed that the proposal
would be resubmitted later.

8. Nicaragua

Mr. Dulles outlined the nature and value of the equipment
remaining at Puerto Cabezas and of the need for negotiating with
Samoza to effect its recovery. He indicated that some quid pro quo
would probably be involved in achieving an agreement with Somoza.
Mr. Bundy stated that this was a matter that should be negotiated
between the Agency and the Department of State and need not be again
referred to the Special Group.

9. Cuba

Mr. Dulles stated that he wanted to raise in a general way at
this meeting the problem of the Agency's relations with the exile groups,
the payment to dependents of the strike force and the publications
which the Agency has been supporting. He emphasized that these
involved a considerable amount of money and that the matter should
be resolved at an early date. It was agreed that the Agency should
discuss this matter with Deputy Assistant Secretary Morales-Carrion
and submit a formal proposal to co early meeting of the Special Group.

10. Minutes of Special Group Meetingo

Mr. Bundy requested that copies of the minutes of Special Group
meetings be forwarded to members of the Group for approval and
3
SECRET - EYES ONLY

SECRET - EYES ONLY

retention. Mr. Gilpatric noted the very close relationship between
his office and the Agency and felt that he could obtain all the
information he needed without receiving a copy of the minutes.
Mr. Dulles suggested that because of the sensitivity of these records
and because some of the references contained therein involved the
use of pseudonyme, the need of the Group might be satisfied by
having copies of the minutes of each meeting made available at the
subsequent meeting for approval. Messrs. Bundy and Dungan agreed
to the submission of the minutes for approval at a subsequent meeting
but stated that they might have a need for a complete record immediatoly
at hand to answer any questions put to thers by higher authority.

THOMAS P. SCHREYER
4
SECRET-EVES ONLY
176-10030-10422 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10030-10422
RECORD SERIES: Sorensen Papers
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
ORIGINATOR :
FROM: Schlesinger, Jr.
TO: President Kennedy
TITLE: Memo to President CIA Reorganization
DATE: 6/30/1961
PAGES: 15
SUBJECTS: CIA
DOCUMENT TYPE: Memoranda
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: 1C
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 8/21/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: Sorensen Papers: Classified Subject Files 1961-64 Box 47, CIA,
Document 1a.

NW 49061 DocId: 32622644 Page 1

SECRET

June 30, 1961

SEE SANITIZED
VERSION
NLK-84-149
ARABIC.C. 9/02

MEMORANDUM FC. THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: CLA Reorganisation

I submit the following views as one who worked in CSS during the
war and served as a periodic CIA consultant in the years since.

Un balance, CIA's record has probably been very good. In the
nature of clandestine operations, the triumphs of an intelligence
agency are unknown; all the public hears about (or should hear
about) are its errors. Put, again in the nature of the case, an
ayency dedicated to clandestine activity can afford damned isw
visible errors. The important thing to recognise today, in my
judgment, is that the CIA, as at present named and constituted, has
about used up its quota. Es margin for future error is practically
non-existent. One more CIA debacle will shake faith considerably
in US policy, at home as well as abroad. And, until CIA is visibly
reorganised, it will (as in the Algerian instance) be widely blamed for
developments of which it is wholly innocent.

The argument of this memorandum is that CIA's trouble can be traced
to the autonomy with which the agency has been permitted to operate,
and that this autonoray is due to three main causes: (1) an inadequate
doctrine of clandestine operations; (2) an inadequate conception of
the relationship between operations and policy; (3) an inadequate

Or should be -- a gross and repeated. CIA failing has been its
occasional readiness to succumb to the temptations of favorable
publicity. The The Guatemalan and Iranian operations were almost
nullified by the flood of self-congratulatory publicity which followed
them (e. g., the articles by Richard and Gladys Harkness, "The
Mysterious Doings of CIA," Saturday Evening Post, bet 30, No.
13, 1954).

NW 49061 DocId:32622644 Page 2
SECRET

2.

conception of the reintionship between operations and intelligence.
The memorandum also suggests ways in which some of these prob-
lems can perhaps be llevinted

L CLA Autonomy
:
CIA conducts three : main forms of secret work, clandestine intelli-
gence collection: comert political operations; and paramilitary
activities. It carries on these functions with relative autonomy.
The reasons for the autonomy are historical.
:
When CIA began, the State Department, still thinking too much in
terms of its traditional missions in foreign affairs, losked on this
new venture with suspicion and renounced the opportunity to seize
firm control of CIA operations. it did not, for example, try to
establish any effective system of clearance for CIA activities; and
some ambassadors frankly preferred not to know what CIA was up to
in their countries. After 1953 the fact that the Secretary of State and
the Director of Central Intelligence were brothers further confirmed
CIA's independence from supervision by State Department desks.

In the meantime, CIA grew in size and power. During the fifties it
began in some areas to cutstrip the State Department in the quality of
ite personnel. Partly because CIA paid higher salaries and even
more perhaps because Allen Dulles gave his people courageous pro-
tection against MicCarthyite attacks, CIA was able to attract and hold
a larga number of able and independent-minded men. The mere it
added brilliant activists to its staff, the mere memestum its operations
developed, and the greater role it played in the initiation of policy.

By the time that Stato had begun to be fully aware of the problems
created by an active and autonomous CIA, it had long since missed.
the chance to establish its own ultimate authority. While State re-
tained a nominal supervision over covert political operations, this was
to some degree offset by CIA's tendency to present a proposed operation
simost as a fait accompli; State never had title to central overt
clandestine intelligence collection; and it bad lost ground in such
areas as overt political reporting and even in the maintenance of
evert diplomatic contacts.

NW 49061 DocId: 32622644 Page 3
SECRET
:

SECRET:

For its part. CIA had developed a whole series of functions paral-
leling already existing functions of the State Department, and of
the Defense Departsant as well. Today it has its own politicai
desks and military #ale; it has in effect its own foreign service;
it has (or hes had) the own combat forces), it even has its own sir
force. As annual budget is about times that of the State Depart-
iment. The contemporary CIA possesses many of the characteristica
of a state within a stato.

II Doctrine

Though CLA's autonomy developed for historical reasons, it has been
able to endure because there is no doctrine governing our conduct of
clandestine operatione. The problem of doctrine for CIA to the extent
to which its various clandestine missions are compatible with a free
and open society.

Yot
It is idle to argue that, because the Communists can do such-and-sech,
we are free to do it too. Communism is a creed nurtured in con.
spiracy: and the whole point of Communist social and political organi
sation is to make conspiracy effective. f 'fighting fire with fire' means
contracting the frecioms traditionally enjoyed by Americans in order
to give more freedom to CIA, no one seriously wishes to do that.
I do not feel that we have tried rigorously to think through the limits
which the maintenance of an open society places on secret activity.
Until this is done, CIA's role will not be clearly defined and under-
stood. The problem which must be faced is: what sort of secret
activity is consistent with the preservation of a free secial order?
:
We must begin, I believe, by accepting the fact that the United States
will continue to be a nation in which politicians will ask questions and
make speeches, reportere will dig out stories, newspapers will pub-
lish editorials, individuals, driven by promptings of conscience, will
blurt out things harmful to the state, and so on. We do not wish to
change these things and could not do so without violating the essence
of our society. These things make up the framework in which CIA
must operates. In abort, they constitute the problem; and, as
General Marshall used to say, "There's no point in fighting the
problem."

Dame 4
SECRET

SECRET

Thers follows from ads, I would think, the conclusion that secret
activities are permissible so long as they do not corrupt the
principles and practices of our society, and that they cease to be
permissible when their effect is to corrupt these principles and
practices.

Each form of secre: activity presents its own problem. Clandestine
intelligence collection has been a traditional function of the national
state. ts rules and usages are fairly well established in the
main, espionage, if conducted with discretion, should present no
great problem. However, when conducted with an open checkbook
and a broad mandate evan espionage can begin to push against the
limits of secret activity in an open society. I consider later, for
example, the question of the Controlled American Source (CAS) sid
whether the overdoing of CAS is not beginning to harm other ar
of the government.
4
Covert political operations present a trickier problem. Occasions
arise when it is necessary to subsidise newspapers, politicians and
organisations in other countries. But corruption of the political life
of another nation is not a responsibility to be lightly assumed. I'
wonder whether CIA has not done too much of this for the joy of it.
Paramilitary activities create an even more difficult problem, if
only because the problems of concealment are so much more difficult.

In general, I would suggest that any secret operation whose success is
dependent on the suppression of news, on lying to Congressmen and
journalists and on the deception of the electorate should be undertaken
only when the crisis is so considerable that the gains really seem to
outweigh the disadvantages. This suggests that the sise of the pro-
posed operation may be of crucial importance. Small operations can
be done with a minimum of accompanying corruption. The greater.
the visibility of the operation, the more its success depends on
thwarting the impulses and denying the values of an open society,
the riskier it becomes, and the more urgent it is that an overwhelming
casa be made for its necessity.

In short, when confronted with a proposed operation, we must not only
ask whether the operation is technically feasible in its own terms; we
must ask whether its success requires our open society to be in قه
serious way false to its owa principles.
:
นพ 10061 Docta 32622644 Page 5

.M..
SECRET

5.

III. Operations and olicy
Clandestine activitie should be assessed not only in the context
of their relationship to an open society but also in the context of thei:
relationship to United States foreign policy.

CIA operations have not been held effectively subordinate to U. S.
foreign policy.

1. Clandestins satelligence collection is, by charter, free from
State Department control. This fact exposes American foreign policy
to a multituds of embarrassments when CIA is discovered recruiting
agents or developing sources in a friendly country. The recent
Singapore case, when CIA, without notice to the Consul General,
tried to subvert a member of the Special Branch of the Singapore
Police provides an instructive example. After complications of
Indicrous complexity, including an attempt to subject the recruit to
a lie-detector test, it turned out that the recruit had long since
informed his superiors of the CIA approach and was leading CIA
into a trap which, when sprung, produced considershie embarrass-
ment to relations between the US and the Singapore government.
There have been troubles of a comparable sort in Pakistan and in
Japan (where a group of Chinese Nationals were smuggled into Sasebo
to work in a CIA-NSA operation).

CIA has said that, in such cases, neither the Embassy nor the Depart-
ment in Washington is normally informed of this type of operation.
In short, no one knows how many potential problema fer US foreign
policy -- and how much potential friction with friendly states -- are
being crested as this moment by CIA clandestine intelligence operations.
Surely there is an argument for permitting State to decide whether the
advantage to be gained by the operation (o.g., the information derivable
from an agent within the Special Branch of the Bingapore Police) out-
weighs the risk (e. g., exasperating the local government and shaking
its confidence both in pur purposes and in our sonse), Clandestine
intelligence operations should plainly be cleared bath with the Depart-
ment of State and (save for exceptional instances and on agreement of
the Secretary of State) with the local U.S. Ambassador,

10061 DocTa-32622644 Page 6
SECLEC

:
SECRET

2. Covert political operations technically require State
Department clearance. In practice, however, CIA has often been
able to seize the initiative in ways which reduce State's role almost
to that of a rubber האם :

This has been partly De consequence of the superior drive and
activism of CIA personel, especially as compared with the diffider.ne
of State Department personnel. For example, when men come to CIA
with the assignment of developing covert political campaigns or
organising coups or prepazing for paramilitary warfare, those men
naturally fall to work with ingenuity and seal; they probably feel that
they are not earning their pay unless, say, they organise as many
coupe as possible. The concept of 'contingency planning' has
legitimatized the concrete preparation of operations still presumabiy
in a hypothetical stage; people did not at first notice that 'contingency
planning.' when carried to the stage of recruitment and training cá
personnel, creates a vested interest which often transforms contin-
gencies into apparent necessities. Thus, if a group is assembled
and revved up on a contingency basis, then the failure to carry the
project through (it is ergued) will invite the disappointment and
alienation of the group; so the pressure increases to follow through
on what bad started sa a pure apoculation. This was a central factor,
of course, in the Cuban decision -- the fact that disbandment of the
Cuban force in Guatemala just seemed to creste too many problems and
embarrassments. Having entered into relations with personalities in
foreign lands, CIA has sometimes seemed to feel that we must thoro
after do pretty much what they want -- or else they will blow security
or even go over to the Communists. This approach has made us on
occasion the prisoners of our own agenta. *
:
We become prisoners of our agente in another sense too. The Cuba
episode leaves the strong impression that CIA is not able to control ita
own low-level operatives. While the CIA people in Washington are mon
of exceptionally high quality, the men attracted to field jobs are some
times tough and even vicious people motivated by drives of their ow
and not necessarily in pelitical or even moral sympathy with the purpos
of the operation. Such actions as locking up the Revelationary Counci
such enterprises as Operation 40 in Miami where CIA agents reportech
trained Cubans in methods of torture, such opisodes as the detention and
third degree reportedly administered to Dr. Rodolfa Nodal Tarets and
16 other democratic Cubans this February -- all these suggest that things
go on under CIA sponsorship with which CLA in Washington to only dierly
acquainted.

H49061 Docid: 32622644 Page. 7

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7. ...
It has meant too the the State Department, often apprised of an
operation only in its ater stages, is under great pressure to
endorse the operatie, as already mounted because of the alleged
evil consequences a exercising a veto. I well remember Tom
Mann's remark the way the decision was made to go ahead on Cuba:
"I would never have isvored initiating this operation; but, since it
has gone as far as it has, I do not think we can risk calling it off. "
Moreover, at a time when there is incrossing premium en activism,
State, when it questions CLA operations or initiatives, casts itself in
a prissy, sissy, negative rods. The advocate of clandestine activities
seems 'tough' and realistics the opponent has to invoke such intangibles
as the reputation of the United States, world public opinion, "What
do we say in the United Nations?", etc., and seems hopelessly
idealistic, legalistic and 'soft.'

The result of CIA's Landtiative in covert political operations has been
to create situations shich have forced policy on the State Department.
This was not the original idea behind CIA. As Allen Dulles wrote
in his 1947 memorandum to the Senate Armed Services Committee,
"The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy."
Yet, in the years siace, CIA has, in effect, 'made' policy in many
parts of the world. A number of governments still in power know
that they have even tren targets of CIA attempts at overthrow -- not
a state of mind calculated to stininlate friendly feelings toward the
United States. Indonesia, of course, is a prime szampis.

This experience suggests that the present system by which CLA notifica
State of a projected covert operation is inadequate te protect US
Interests. There must be some means by which State can be informed
of such operations at an early enough stage to affect the conception
and preliminary planning of the operation. Otherwise CIA will con-
tinue to confront State with propositions having potential impact on
foreign policy but at too late a point to subject that impact to reason-
able control.

3. The Controlled American Source (CAS) represents a particular
aspect of CLA's encroachment on policy-making functione. CIA.today
has nearly as many people under official cover overseas as State --
3900 to 3700. About 1500 of these are under State Department covar

мы 10061 nootd 32622644 Page 8

(the other 2200 are resumably under military or other nen-State
official cover). Orginally the use of State Department cover for
CLA personnel was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary.
The Ealles-Corrsa-ackson report stated in 1948, "The CIA should
not use State Department cover as a simple answer to all its problenia,
but should proceed to develop its own outside cover and eventually in
this way and through: tzcreased efficiency of its overseas personnel,
find a way to tempe: its dersands upon the State Department." Non-
theless CIA has stently locreased its requisitions for official cover.

There are several wasons vary CLA has abandoned its original intentio
of developing systems of private cover. It is easier to arrange cover
through State; it is less expensive, it is quicker, it facilitates tha
security of operations as well as of communications; it insures a
picasanter life for the CIA people. But the effect is to further the
CIA encroachment on the traditional functions of State.

In some missions, I understand, CAS personnel outnumbers regular
State Department personnel. In the American Embassy in Vienns,
out of 20 persons listed in the October 1960 Foreign Service List Re
being in the Political Section, 16 are CAS personnel; of the 31 officers
listed as engaging in reporting activities, over half are CAS. Of the
13 officers listed in the Political Section in our Embassy in Chile,
11 are CAS. On the day of President Kennedy's Inauguration 47 percent
of the political officers serving in United States Embassies were CA5.
Sometimes the CIA mission chief has been in the country longer, bas
more money at his disposal, wields more influence (and is abler) than
the Ambassador. Citen be bas direct access to the local Prime
Minister. Sometimes (as during a critical period in Laos) he pursued
a different policy from that of the Ambassador. Also he is generally
well known locally as the CIA representative. !

In the Paris Embassy today, there are 128 CIA poople. CIA in Paris
has long since begun to move into areas of political reporting normally
occupied by State. The CIA men doing overt internal political reporti
outnumber those in the Embassy's political section by 10-2. Cines
even sought to monopelise contact with certain French political perecaiz
ties, among them the President of the National Assembly. CIA C
the top floor of the Faris Embassy, a fact well known locally; and on
:
NW 49061 DocId: 32622644 Page 9

the night of the Generals' revolt in Algeria, passers-by noted
with amusement the the top floor was ablase with lights. (I am
Laformed that Ambassador Cavin was able to secure entrance that
night to the CIA off: es only with difficulty.)

CLA is apparently Dos firmly committed to the CAS approach as a
permanent solution or its problems. It is pressing to have CLA
people given the rank of Counselor. Before State loses control of
more and more of its presumed overseas personnel, and before СА
becomes permanentiy integrated into the Foreign Service, it would
seem important (a) to assure every ambassador the firm control
over the local CAS station nominally promised in the NSC Directive
of January 19, 1961, and (b) to review the current CAS situation with
an eye to a steady reduction of CAS personnel.

4. Paramilitary warfare, I gather, is regarded in some quarters
as a purely technical matter, easily detachabis from policy and there-
fore a proper function of the Department of Defense. Yet there is
almost no CIA function more peculiarly dependent on the politica!
context than paramilitary warfare.

us.
There are several reasons for this. For one thing, a paramilitary
operation is in its nature a large and attributable operation and therely.
as suggested above, clashes with the presuppositions of our open
society. (These considerations need not apply, however, to the
training of, say, the South Vietnamese in guerrilla tactics er to the
suppert of already existing guerrilla activitisa,) For ansther, the
moral and political price of direct paramilitary failure is acute for
Communists, when they stimulate paramilitary activity, are
doing what the world expects from them; when we do it, we appear
to betray our own prodessed principles and therefore cannot afford to
compound delinquency by defeat. Moreover, as the recent Algerian
episode showed, once we convince the world that we are committed to a
paramilitary endeavor, we will be blamed for all sorts of things. And,
as the recent tractors-for-prisoners episode showed, when we do send
men to possible death, we cannot lightly write them off and close the
books. The Communists, on the other hand, have no scruples about
liquidating a losing show,
:
NW 49061 DocTd: 32622644 Page 10

:
SECRET

10.
Moreover, guerrilla warfare is fought, much more than military
men ordinarily realize, in an ideological context. The guerrilla
succeeds when his program enlists grassroots supports and it is
very difficult indeed to beat him when the countryside is with hirn.
Van Mook told General Marshall in 1946 not to worry about the
guerrillas in Indonesia; "we are sanding 50,000 men out there
and will clean the situation up in the three months." Marshall,
who had had experience fighting guerrillas in the Philippines,
replied, "It won't be so easy. You will find that they will bleed
you to death." Cyprus and Algeria illustrate the difficulty of over-
comeing guerrilla resistance through sheer weight of military force.
:
-
Serious guerrilla movements have been defeated only three times since
the end of the Second Worid var: in Greece, because Tite's defectica
closed the corthara vorder; in the Philippines; and in Malaya.
the last two cases the guerrilla resistance ended because of the
combination of political and military countermeasures. The struggle
in Malaya, as Field Marshal Templer understood (and said), was for
the minds and hearts of the people; it therefore involved not only
paranmilitary operations but a vast educational program, organisation
of trade unions, political reform and an offer of national independence.
If the guerrilla's power lies in his revolutionary program, the answer
lies in part in meeting the needs which enable the guerrilla to rouse
the countryside. "Without a political goal," wrote ise Tee-tung,
"guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do.
not coincide with the aspirations of the people and if their sympathy.
cooperation and assistance cannot be gained," He added, "Do we
want the support of the masses? If we do, we must go among the
masses; arouse them to activity; concern caresives with their weal
and woe.."
For these reasons, paramilitary warfare cannot be considered as
primarily a military weapon. It is primarily a political weapon and
must therefore be subjected to close and careful political oversight.
It probably should be retained in a reconstituted CIA rather than
transferred to Defense.

DocId:32622644 Pade 11.
RET

11.
..
5. How to Esta dish Policy Control? Here I wonder whether the
British experience :ight not be of value. The notable feature of the
Eritish intelligence system is the determination to keep clandestine
activity under etric Foreign Office control. This control is achieved
in a number of ways
:
a) Secret telligence Service (MI-6) itself operates under
the direction of the Joint Intelligence Committee, which has a
Foreign Office chairman (until recently Sir Patrick Dean, who
is now the Eritica representative at the UN) and which includes
the Service Intelligence directors and representatives of the
Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office as well
as the Chief of S.

b) basic poltical warfare directives are eriginated, not
by SIS, but by the Information Research Department in the
Foreign Office, often in consultation with an interdepartmental
Working Group co International Communist Fronts, and under
the ultimate control of the Superintending Under-Secretary of
the Permanent ader-Secretary's Department in the Foreign
Office.

c) SIS covert political action campaigns must not only con-
form to Foreign Office directives but must be cleared with the
appropriate Foreign Office geographical desko.

d) working groups under IRD chairmanship govern opera-
tions in special areas, such as, for example, Sine-Soviet rela-
tions or the World Youth Festival.
:o) a Foreign Office Staff Liaison Officer ofte sent to the 815
Chief, and Foreign Office officials serve tours of duty in SIS
sections.

All these devices might be adapted for use by the State Departement.
Organizationally, this would mean that the intelligence agency would
retain operational autonomy but that its operations would be at all
points subject to State Departmeat clearance -- a clearance to be
NW 49061 DocId: 32622644 Page: 12
E
:

ke
12.
enforced by directives, by State Department chairmanship of
working groupe, and by the infiltration of State Department
personnel into the felligence agency.

Cbviously this set would not succeed, however, unless the
State Departmeat itself were prepared to overcome its inbred
hatito of diffusion, egativism and delay and to take a firm and
purpossful grip on ne situation.

IV. Cperations and intelligence
The relationship between operations and intelligence raises partion-
larly perplexing questions. 'Intelligence' includes two separable
activities: clandestine cellection; and research, analysis and
evaluation. The first deals with that small portion of raw intelli-
gence procured by secret means (Mr. Dulles estimated in 1947 that
"a proper analysis of the intelligence obtainable by...overt,
normal, and aboveboard means would supply us with over 80 percent,
I should estimate, of the information required for the guidance of our
national policy"); the second invelves the colistion and interpretatior:
of all forms of intelligence, however obtained and the production of
estimates.

Under the British system, clandestine collection is entrusted to the
Secret Intelligence Service. The research, analysis and estimating
function is located in the Foreign Office Research Department.

Under the American system, CIA has responsibility for beth
clandestine collection and research and analysis. The State Depart-
ment's Bureau of Intelligence and Research siso hes ressarch and
analysis responsibilities, but, in practice, CIA has established
control over the machinery for producing antional estimates in such
a way as to reduce State's contribution to subraitting its viewe to CLA
for acceptance or rejection, in other words, where in Great Britain
the Foreign Office plays the coordinating role in the intelligence fiabi,
in the United States that role has been assumed by CIA,
NW 49061 DocId:32622644 Page 13

SECRET
13,
The argument agains: incorporating the research and estimate
function in State was made by Dulles in 1947: "For the proper
judging of the situation in any foreign country it is important that
Information should processed by an agency whose duty it is to
weigh facts, and to araw conclusions from these facts, without
having either the facts or the conclusions warped by the inevitable
and even proper proudices of the men whose duty it is to determine
policy and who, havis-g once determined a policy, are too likely to
be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the policy to be
faulty."
..
Precisely the same argument can be used with equal effect against
the incorporation of the research and estimate function in CIA
1.e.. if intelligence is too closely connected with operations, then
those committed to particular operation will tend to select out the
intelligence which validates the operation.
:
Obviously both arguments conclude in a case for the establishmeat ef
a fairly independent esearch and estimate group. But, if the R&
group is too independent, one runs into the opposite danger: that is,
that neither policy or operations will be subjected to adequate
intelligence checks.
The trouble with the Cuban operation, for example, was not that
intelligence and operations were combined, but precisely that the
Cuban operation evaded systematic intelligence judgment. The in-
salligence branch (DD) of CIA was never informed of the existence
of the Cuban operation. The Office of National Estimates was never
asked to comment on the assumption, for example, that discontent
had reached the potut in Cuba where a successful landing operation.
would provoke uprisings behind the lines and defections from the
Militia, In December and February, the Office of National Estimates
produced general appraisals of the Cuban situsties, but these were
whally independent of the Cuban operation. I gat
opinion had been invited, DDI would have given quite a different
estimate of the state of opinion in Cube from that on which the opera
tion was based. There existed, in short, the ridiculous situstion
gather that, f
:
NW 49061 DocId:32622644 Page 14

SEUNCI
:
14.
that knowledge of the Cuben operation, flaunted in Miami bars
by aay cumber of ice-level agents in the operations branch of CIA,
: was denied to even see top officials of the intelligence branch. The
Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State
know oven lass about the Cuban operation.

The problem, then, is to have an R&E group sufficiently independent
of both policy and cuerations to resist the pressure to make the case
for vested ideas and interests -- yet sufficiently close to be able to
subject projected operations or policies to the most intense and
searching scrutiny.
:
Where could this group be located? If the CIA were to become
subordinate to State, as ki-o is to the Foreign Office, then the .....
function might be vested in a coordinate subagency, somewhat inde-
pendent of both Stats and CLA, yet closely connected with both in dr
to-day operations. The R&F. subagency would receive intelligence
from CIA and from State, as well as from the services and, of course,
from public sources. It would represent, in effect, a fusion of CLA/D
and State/Intelligence and Research. might also take over certain
of the service functions now confided to CIA -- photographic interpre-
tation, biographical data, foreign broadcast monitoring, overt collec
tion, maps, etc. There might be in addition a Joint Intelligence Ecara
with representatives from all the intelligence agencies and with a
State Department or White House chairman

V. Conclusion.
The argument of this memorandum implies a fairly drastic rearrang
rment of our present intelligence set-up. It also implies the capacit
of the State Department to assume command of the situation and to co
so in an effective and purposeful way. If the State Department as a
present staffed is not capable of assuming effective command, this to
not. In my judgment, an argument against a rational reorganisationa
intelligence. It is an argument for a drastic overhaul of the State
Department.
:
:
:

LO
JW 49061 DocId:32622644 Page 15
:

SECRET
15.
The structure which would meet the criteria suggested in this
memorandum would e as follows:
:
:
1) The Star Department would be granted general
ciearance authority over all clandestine activity. This
raight be effectuated on the British model by the appointment
of a Deputy Unresecretary of State for Intelligence, who
would act for t! Secretary in these matters and who might
serve as chairrea of a Joint Intelligence Ecard.

2) The Jour. Intelligence Board would include repre-
sentatives from ail elemente in the intelligence community
and aleo from te bite House.

3) The operating branches of the present CIA would be
reconstituted under some blameless titis (the National Informa-
tion Servico). This new agency would be charged with responsi-
bility for clandestine collection, for covert political operations
and for paramilitary activities. It would submit projects to the
Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence for clearance.
In general, the agency would bear somewhat the same relation.
ship to State as the Disarmament Administration and ICA
presently do.
:
4) A second sensi-independent agency would be sat up, again
bearing a blameless title (the Foreign Research Agency), coordi-
nate with the operations agency. This agency would be charged
with responsibility for collation and interpretation. would
include CLA/DDL the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in
State, and the various service functions now carried on by CLA
(photographic interpretation, biographical files, foreign broadcast
inonitoring, scientific intelligence, maps, overt collection, etc.).
It might well be located in the CIA building in McLean.
cc: The Attorney General
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Dungan
..
SECR
Arthur Schlesinger, jr.176-10033-10145 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10033-10145
RECORD SERIES: Church Committee
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
ORIGINATOR : WH
FROM: Schlessinger, Jr.
TO: Kennedy, John F
TITLE: CIA Reorganization
DATE: 6/30/1961
PAGES: 15
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE: Paper, Textual
CLASSIFICATION: Declassified
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 2/14/2001.
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

FINITILED ML. 11. 2612 5/12
SECRET

June 30, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: CIA Reorganization
..
CIA.
}
I submit the following viewe as one who worked in OSS during the
war and served as a periodic CIA consultant in the years since.

On balance, CIA's record has probably been very good. In the
nature of clandestine operations, the triumphs of an intelligence
agency are unknown; all the public hears about (or should hear
about) are its errors. But, again in the nature of the case, an
agency dedicated to clandestine activity can afford damned few
visible errors. The important thing to recognize today, in my
judgment, is that the CIA, as at present named and constituted, has
about used up its quote. Its margin for future error is practically
non-existent. One more GIA debacle will shake faith considerably
in US policy, at home as well as abroad. And, until CIA is visibly
reorganized, it will (as in the Algerian instance) be widely blamed for
developments of which it is wholly innocent.

The argument of this memorandum te that CIA's trouble can be traced
to the autonomy with which the agency has been permitted to operate;
and that this autonomy te due to three main causes: (1) an inadequate
doctrine of clandestine operations; (2) an inadequate conception of
the relationship between operations and policy; (3) an inadequate
*Or should be a gross and repeated CIA failing has been its
occasional readiness to succumb to the temptations of favorable
publicity. The Guatemalan and Iranian operations were almost
nullified by the flood of self-congratulatory publicity which followed
them (e.g., the articles by Richard and Gladys Harkness, "The
Mysterious Doings of CIA," Saturday Evening Post, Oct. 30, NN. 6,
13, 1954).
SECRET

SECRET
8.
conception of the relationship between operations and intelligence.
The memorandum also suggests waye in which some of these prob-
lems can perhaps be allevinted.

CIA Autonomy
CIA conducts three main forms of secret work: clandestine intellt
gence collections covert political operations; and paramilitary
activities. It carries on these functions with relative autonomy.
The reasons for the sutonomy are historical.

When CIA began, the State Department, still thinking too much in
terms of ite traditional missions in foreign affairs, looked on thie
new venture with suspicion and renounced the opportunity to seize
firma control of CIA operations. It did not, for example, try to
establish any effective system of clearance for CIA activities, and
some ambassadors frankly preferred not to know what CIA was up to
in their coustries. After 1953 the fact that the Secretary of State and
the Director of Central Intelligence were brothers further confirmed
CIA's independence from supervision by State Department desks.

In the meantime, CIA grew in size and power. During the fifties it
began in some areas to outstrip the State Department in the quality of
ite personnel. Partly because CIA paid higher anteries and aven
more perhaps because Allen Dulles gave his people courageous pro-
tection against McCarthyite attacks, CIA was able to attract and hold
a large sumber of able and independent-minded men. The more it
added brilliant activists to its staff, the more momentum its operations
developed, and the greater rote it played in the loftiation of policy.

By the time that State had begun to be fully aware of the problems
crested by an active and autonomous CIA, it had tong since missed
the change to establish its ava ultimate authority, While State re-
tained a nominal supervision over covert political operations, thia vạn
to some degree offset by CIA's tendency to present a proposed operation
almost as a fait accomplis Gtate never had title to control overt
clandestine intelligence collections and it had lost ground in such
arese as overt political reporting and even in the maintenance of
overt diplomatic contactor
SECRET
4

SECRET
3.
For its part, CIA had developed a whole series of functions paral-
leling already existing functions of the State Department, and of
the Defense Department as well. Today it has its own political
desks and military staffes it has in effect its own foreign service,
it has (or bas had) its own combat forces; it even has its own air
force. Its annual budget is about _ times that of the State Depart-
ment. The contemporary CIA possesses many of the characteristics
of a state within a state.
-
Doctrine
Though CIA's autonomy developed for historical reasons, it has been
able to endure because there is no doctrine governing our donduct of
clandestine operations. The problem of doctrine for CIA is the extent
to which its various clandestine missions are compatible with a free
and open society.

It is idle to argue that, because the Communists can do such-and-such.
we are free to do it too. Communism is a creed nurtured in con-
spiracy, and the whole point of Communist social and political organi-
zation is to make conspiracy effective. If 'fighting fire with fire' means
contracting the freedoms traditionally enjoyed by Americane in order
to give more freedom to CIA, no one seriously wishes to do that. Yet
I do not feel that we have tried rigorously to think through the limits
which the maintenance of an open cociety places on secret activity.
Until this te done, CIA's role will not be clearly defined and under-
stood. The problem which must be faced ion what sort of secret
activity is consistent with the preservation of a free social order?

We must begin, I believe, by accepting the fact that the United States
will continue to be a nation in which politiciane will ask questions and
make speeches, reporters will dig out stories, newspapers will pub-
lish editorials, individuels, driven by promptinge of conscience, will
blurt out things harmful to the state, and so on. We do not wish to
change these things and could not do so without violating the essence
of our society. These things make up the framework in which CIA
must operate, In short, they constitute the problems and, ae
General Marshall used to say, "There's no point to fighting the
problem."
SECRET
6

SECRET
There followe from this, I would think, the conclusion that secret
activities are permissible so long as they do not corrupt the
principles and practices of our society, and that they cease to be
permissible when their effect is to corrupt these principles and
practices.

Each form of secret activity presents ite own problem. Clandestine
intelligence collection has been a traditional function of the national
state. Es rules and usages are fairly well established. In the
main, espionage, if conducted with discretion, should present no
great problem. However, when conducted with an open checkbook
end a broad mandate, even espionage can begin to push against the
limits of secret activity in an open society. I consider later, for
example, the question of the Controlled American Source (CAS) and
whether the overdoing of CAS te not beginning to barm other activities
of the government.

Covert political operations present a trickier problem. Occasions
arise when it is necessary to subsidico newspapers, politicians and
organizations in other countries. But corruption of the political life
of another nation is not a responsibility to be lightly assumed. I
wonder whether CIA has not done too much of this for the joy of it.
Fazamilitary activities creato an even more difficult problem, if
only because the problems of concealment are so much more difficult.

In general. I could suggest that any secret operation whose success to
dependant on the suppression of newe, on lying to Congressmen and
journaliste and on the deception of the electorate should be undertaken
only when the cristo to co considerable that the gains really seem to
outweigh the disadvantages. This suggests that the gise of the pro
posed operation may be of crucial importance. Small operations caa
bo done with a minimum of accompanying corruption. The greater
the visibility of the operation, the more ite success depends on
thwarting the impulses and denying the values of an open society.
the riskier it becomes, and the more urgent it to that an overwhelming
case be mede for ite necessity.

In short, when confronted with a proposed oporation, we must not only
ask whether the operation to technically fensitie in its own termen we
must ask whether ite succese requires our open society to be in any
serious way false to its own principled,
SECRET

4000
SECRET'
6
5.
III. Operations and Policy
Clandestine activities should be assessed not only in the context
of their relationship to an open society but also in the context of their
relationship to United States foreign policy.

CLA operations have not been held effectively subordinate to U. S.
foreign policy.

1. Clandestine intelligence collection is, by charter, free from
State Department control. This fact exровев American foreign poltey
to a multitude of embarrassmente when CIA is discovered recruiting
agents or developing sources in a friendly country. The recent
Singapore case, when CIA, without notice to the Consul General,
tried to subvert a member of the Special Branch of the Singapore
Polico provides en instructive example. After complications of
ludicrous complexity, including an attempt to subject the recruit to
a lie-detector test, it turned out that the recruit had long since
informed his superiore of the CIA approach and was leading CIA
into a trap which, when sprung, preduced considerabis embarrase.
ment to relations between the US and the Singapore government.
There have been tronbies of a comparable sort in Pakistan and in
Japan (where a group of Chinese Nationals were smuggled into Sasebo
to work in a CIA-NGA operation).

CIA has said that, in such cases, neither the Embassy nor the Depart-
ment in Washington is normally informed of this type of operation.
In short, no one knows how many potential probleme for US foreign
policy -- and how much potential friction with friendly states -- are
boing created at this moment by CIA clandestine intelligence operations.
Surely there is an argument for permitting State to decido whether the
advantage to be gained by the operation (eg, the information derivable
from an agent within the Special Branch of the Singapore Police) out-
weighs the risk (c.ge, azasporating the local government and shaking
ite confidence both in our purposes and in our sense). Clandestine
intelligence operations should plainly be cleared both with the Depart-
ment of State and (save for exceptional instances and on agreement of
the Secretary of State) with the local U.S. Ambassados.
SECRET

SECRET
6.
2. Covert political operations technically require State
Department clearance. In practice, however, CIA has often been
able to seize the initiative in ways which reduce State's role almost
to that of a rubber stamp.

This has been partly the consequence of the superior drive and
activism of CIA personnel, especially as compared with the diffidence
of State Department personnel. For example, when men come to CIA
with the assignment of developing covert political campaigns or
organising coups or preparing for paramilitary warfare, these men
naturally fall to work with ingenuity and zeal, they probably feel that
they are not earning their pay unlese, say, they organize as many
coups se possible. The concept of 'coatingency planning' hae
legitimatized the concrete preparation of operations still presumably
in a hypothetical stage, people did not at first actice that 'contingency
planning.' when carried to the stage of recruitment and training of
personnel, creates a vested interest which often transforme contin
gencies into apparent necessities. Thus, if a group is assembled
and revved up on a contingency basts, then the failure to carry the
project through (it is argued) will invite the disappointment and
allenation of the groupt to the pressure increases to follow through
on what had started as a pure speculation. This was a central factor,
of course, in the Cuban decision the fact that disbandment of the
Cuban force in Guatemala just seemed to create too many probleme and
embarrassmente. Having entered into relations with personalities in
foreign lando, CIA has sometimes seemed to feel that we must there.
efter do pretty much what they want -- or else they will blow security
or even go over to the Communists. This approach has made us on
occasion the prisoners of our own agents.

We become prisoners of our agente in another canse too. The Cuban
opisode leaves the strong impression that CIA is not able to control ite
own low-level operatives. While the CIA people in Washington are men
of exceptionally high quality, the men attracted to field jobs are some-
times tough and even vicious people motivated by drives of their owa
and not necessarily in political or even morel sympathy with the purposes
of the operation. Such actions as locking up the Revolutionary Council,
such enterprises as Operation 40 in Miami where CIA agents reportedly
trained Cubans in methods of torture, such episodes as the detention and
third degree reportedly administered to Dr. Rodolfa Nodal Tarafa and
16 other democratic Cubans this February -- all these suggest that things
go on under CIA sponsorship with which CIA in Washington is only dimly
acquainted.
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It has meant too that the State Department, often apprised of en
operation only in its later stages, is under great pressure to
endorse the operation as already mounted because of the alleged
evil consequences of exercising a vetc. i well remember Tom
Mann's remark the day the decision was cando to go ahead on Cubat
"I would never have favored initiating this operations but, since it
• bas gone as far as it has. I do not think we can risk calling it off. "
Moreover, at a time when there is increasing premium on activie
Etate, when it questions CIA operations or initiatives, caste itself in
a prissy, cissy, negative sole. The advocate of clandestine activities
seems 'tough' and realistic; the opponent has to invoke such intangibles
ae the reputation of the United States, world public opinion, "What
do we cay in the United Nations?", etc., and seems hopelessly
idralistic, legalistic and 'soft.'

The result of GIA's initiative in covert political operations has been
to create situations which have loveed policy on the State Department.
This was not the original idea behind GIA. As Allen Dulles wrote
in his 1947 meraorendum to the Genate Armed Bervices Committee,
"The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy."
Yet, in the yeere since, CIA hae, in effect, 'made' policy in many
parts of the world. A number of governmente still in power know
that they have aven bean targets of CIA attempts at overthrow - not
a state of mind calculated to stimulate friendly feelinge toward the
United States. Indonesis, of course, is a prime example.

This experience suggests that the present systems by which CIA notifice
State of a projected covert operation te inadequate to protect UB
Interests. There must be some means by which State can be informed
of such operations at an early enough stage to affect the conception
and preliminary planning of the operation. Otherwise CIA will con
tinue to confront State with propositions having potential impact on
foreign policy but et too late a point to subject that impact to reason.
able control
3. The Controlled American Source (CAS) represents a particular
aspect of CIA's encroachment on policy-making functions. CIA today
has nearly to many people under official cover oversese as State -
3900 to 3700. About 1500 of these are under State Department cover
49061
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8.
(the other 2200 are presumably under military or other non-State
official cover). Originally the use of State Department cover for
CIA personnel was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary.
The Dulles-Correa-Jackson report stated in 1948, "The CIA should
not use State Department cover as a simple answer to all its problems,
but should proceed to develop its own outside cover and eventually in
this way and through increased efficiency of its overseas personnel,
find a way to temper its demands upon the State Department." None-
theless CIA has steadily increased its requisitions for official cover.

There are several reasons why CIA has abandoned its original intention
of developing systems of private cover. It is easier to arrange cover
through State, it is less expensive; it is quickers it facilitates the
security of operations as well as of communications; it insures a
pleasanter life for the CIA people. But the effect is to further the
CIA encroachment on the traditional functions of State.

Of the
In some missions, I understand, CAS personnel outnumbers regular
State Department personel. In the American Embassy in Vienna,
out of 20 persons listed in the October 1960 Foreign Service List 60
being in the Political Section, 16 are CAS personnels of the 31 officers
listed as engaging in reporting activities, over half are CAS.
13 officere listed in the Political Section in our Embassy in Chile,
11 are CAS. On the day of President Kennedy's Inauguration 47 percent
of the political officers serving in United States Embassies were CAS,
Sometimes the CIA mission chief has been in the country longer, has
more money at his disposal, wields more influence (and to abler) than
the Ambassador. Often he has direct access to the local Prime
Minister. Sometimes (as during a critical period in Laos) he pursues
a different policy from that of the Ambassador, Also he te generally
well known locally as the CIA representative.

In the Forte Embassy today, there are 128 CIA people. CIA in Parto
has long since begun to move into areas of political reporting normally
occupied by State. The CIA men doing overt internal political reporting
outnumber those in the Embassy's political section by 10-2. CIA bao
even sought to monopolice contact with certain French political personali
ties, among them the President of the National Assembly. CIA occupies
the top floor of the Paris Embassy, e fact well known locally: and on
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9.
the night of the Generals' revolt in Algeria, passere-by noted
with amusement that the top floor was ablase with lights. (I am
informed that Ambassador Cavin was able to secure entrance that
night to the CIA offices only with difficulty.

CIA is apparently now Armly committed to the CAS approach as a
permanent solution for its problems. It is pressing to have GIA
people given the rank of Counselor. Before State loses control of
more and more of its presumed overseas personnel, and before GAS
becomes permanently integrated into the Foreign Service, it would
seem important (a) to assure every ambassador the firm control
over the local GAS station nominally promised in the NSC Directive
of January 19, 1961, and (b) to review the current CAS situation with
an eye to a steady reduction of CAS personnel.

4. Paramilitery warfare, I gather, is regarded in some quartere
as a purely technical matter, easily detachable from policy and there-
fore a proper function of the Department of Defense. Yet there to
almost no CIA function more peculiarly dependent on the political
contaxt than paramilitary warfare.

There are several reasone for this. For one thing, a paramilitary
operation to in ite nature & large and attributable operation and thereby.
de suggested above, clashes with the presuppositions of our open
society. (These considerations need not apply, however, to the
training of, say, the South Vietnamese in gusseilla tactics or to the
support of slready existing guerrilla activities.) For another, the
mozel and political price of direct paramilitary failure is acute for
us. Communists, when they stimulate paramilitary activity, are
doing what the world expects from them, when we do it, we appear
to betray our own professed principles and therefore cannot afford to
compound delinquency by defest. Moreover, 80 the rodent Algerian
episode showed, once we convince the world that we are committed to a
paramilitary endeavor, we will be blamed for all sorts of things. And,
as the recent tractors-for-prisonere episode showed, when we do send
men to possible death, we cannot lightly write them off and close the
books, The Communists, on the other hand, have no scruples about
Uquidating e losing show,
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10.
Moreover, guerrilla warfare is fought, much more than military
men ordinarily realize, in an ideological context. The guerrilla
succeede when his program enlists grassroote supports and it is
very difficult indeed to beat him when the countryside is with him.
Van Mook told General Marshall in 1946 not to worry about the
guerrillas in Indonesia; "we are sending 50,000 men out there
and will clean the situation up in the three months." Marshall,
who had had experience fighting guerrillas in the Philippines,
replied, "It won't be so easy. You will find that they will bleed
you to death." Cyprus and Algeria illustrate the difficulty of over
coming guerrilla resistance through sheer weight of military force.

In
Serious guerrilla movements have been defeated only three times since
the end of the Second World War: in Greece, because Tito's defection
closed the northern border: in the Philippines; and in Malaya.
the last two cases the guerrilla resistance ended because of the
combination of political and military countermeasures. The struggle
in Malaya, as Field Marshal Templer understood (and said), was for
the minds and hearts of the people; it therefore involved not only
paramilitary operatione but a vast educational program, organisation
of trade unions, political reform and an offer of national independence.
If the guerrillas power lies in his revolutionary program, the anewer
lies in part in meeting the aceds which enable the guerrilla to rouse
the countryside. "Without a political goal," wrote Mao Tse-tung.
"guerrille warfare must fall, as it must if ito političal objectives do
not coincide with the aspirations of the people and if their sympathy,
cooperation and assistance cannot be gained." He added, "Do we
want the support of the meeses? If we do, we must go among the
masses: arouse them to activity; concern ourselves with their weal
and woe."
For these reasons, paramilitary warfare cannot be considered as
primarily a military weapon, it te primarily a political weapon and
must therefore be subjected to close and careful political oversight
It probably should be retained in a reconstituted CIA rather than
transferred to Defense.
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11.
5. How to Establish Policy Control? Here I wonder whether the
British experience might not be of value. The notable feature of the
British intelligence system is the determination to keep clandestine
activity under strict Foreign Office control. This control is achieved
in a number of wayer

a) Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6) itself operates undes
the direction of the Joint Intelligence Committee, which has a
Foreign Office chairman (until recently Sir Patrick Dean, who
is now the British representative at the UN) and which includes
the Service Intelligence directors and representatives of the
Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office as well
as the Chief of 815.

b) basic political warfare directives are originated, not
by 818, but by the Information Research Department in the
Foreign Office, often in consultation with an interdepartmental
Working Group on International Comosunist Fronts, and under
the ultimate control of the Superintending Under-Secretary of
the Permanent Under Secretary's Department in the Fareiga
Office.

c) SIS covert political action campaigns must not only con
form to Foreign Office directives dut must be cleared with the
appropriate Foreign Office geographical degke

d) working groups under IRD chairmanship govern opere.
tions to special areas, such es, for example, Sino-Soviet rela-
tions of the World Youth Festival,

c) a Foreign Office Staff Lisicon Officer sito nest to the 818
Chief, and Foreign Office officials serve toure of duty in 819
sections
All these devices might be adapted for use by the State Departments
Organizationally, this would mean that the intelligence agency would
retain operational autonomy but that its operations would be at all
points subject to State Department clearance → à clearance to be
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12.
enforced by directives, by State Department chairmanship of
working groups, and by the infiltration of State Department
personnel into the intelligence agency.

Obviously this set-up would not succeed, however, unless the
State Department itself were prepared to overcome its inbred
habits of diffusion, negativism and delay and to take a firm and
purposeful grip on the situation.

IV. Operations and Intelligence
The relationship between operations and intelligence raises particu-
larly perplexing questions. Intelligence' includes two separable
activities: clandestine collections and research, analysis and
evaluation. The first deals with that small portion of raw intelli-
gence procured by secret means (Mr. Dulies estimated in 1947 that
"a proper analysis of the intelligence obtainable by...overt,
normal, and aboveboard moans would supply us with ever 80 percent,
I should estimate, of the information required for the guidance of our
national policy"); the second involves the colletion and interpretation
of all forms of intelligence, however obtained and the production of
estimates.

Under the British system, clandestine collection is entrusted to the
Secret Intelligence Service. The research, analysie and estimating
function is located in the Foreign Office Research Doparimont.

Under the American gyetem, CIA has responatbility for both
clandestine collection and research and analysis. The State Depart
ment's Bureau of Intelligence and Research also has research and
analysto responsibilities, but, in practice, CIA has established
control over the machinery for producing national estimates in euch
e way as to reduce State's contribution to gubmitting ita views to CIA
for acceptance or rejections in other words, where in Great Britain
the Foreign Office plays the coordinating role in the intelligence field,
in the United States that role has been assumed by CIA,
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13.
The argument against incorporating the research and estimate
function in State was made by Dulles in 1947: "For the proper
judging of the situation in any foreign country it is important that
information should be processed by an agency whose duty it is to
weigh facte, and to draw conclusions from those facte, without
baving either the facts or the conclusions warped by the inevitable
and even proper prejudices of the men whose duty it is to determine
policy and who, having once determined a policy, are too likely to
be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the policy to be
faulty."

Precisely the same argument can be used with equal effect against
the incorporation of the research and estimate function in CIA..
Le.. if intelligence is too closely connected with operatione, then
those committed to a particular operation will tend to eclect out the
intelligence which validates the operation.

Obviously both arguments conclude in a case for the establishment of
a fairly independent research and estimate group. But, if the R&E
group is too independent, ane runs into the opposite dangers that te.
that neither policy nor operations will be subjected to adequate
Intelligence checke,

The trouble with the Cuban operation, for example, was not that
intelligence and operations were combined, but precisely that the
Cuban operetion evaded systematic intelligence judgment. The in
telligence branch (DDI) of CIA was never informed of the existence
of the Cuban operation. The Office of National Estimates was never
salted to comment on the assumption, for example, that discontent
had reached the point in Cube where a succosefal tanding operation
would provoko uprisings behind the Haco and defections from the
Militia. in December and February, the Office of National Estimates
produced general appraisals of the Cuban situation, but these were
wholly independent of the Cuban operation I gather that, if ite
opinion had been invited, DDI would have given quite a different
estimate of the state of opinion in Cube from that on which the opera
tion was based. There existed, in short, the ridiculous situation
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1.
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14.
that knowledge of the Cuban operation, flaunted in Miami bare
by any number of low level agents in the operations branch of CIA,
was denied to even the top officials of the intelligence branch. The
Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State
knew even less about the Cuban operation.

The problem, then, is to have an R&E group sufficiently independent
of both policy and operations to resist the pressure to make the case
for vested ideas and interests -- yet sufficiently close to be able to
subject projected operations or policies to the most intense and
searching scrutiny.

Where could this group be located? If the CIA were to become
subordinate to State, as MI-6 is to the Foreign Office, then the R&E
function might be vested in a coordinate subagency, somewhat inde-
pendent of both State and CIA, yet closely connected with both in day
to-day operations. The R&E subagency would receive intelligence
from CIA and from State, as well as from the services and, of course,
from public sources. It would represent, in effect, a fusion of CIA/DDI
and State/Intelligence and Research. It might also take over certain
of the service functions now confided to CIA →→ photographic interpre-
tation, biographical data, foreign broadcast monitoring, overt collec-
tion, mape, etc. There might be in addition a Joint Intelligence Board
with representatives from all the intelligence agencies and with a
State Department or White House chairman.

V. Conclusion..
The argument of this memorandum implies a fairly drestic rearrange.
ment of our present intelligence set-up. It also implies the capacity
of the State Department to assume command of the situation and to do
so in an effective and purposeful way. If the State Department es at
present staffed is not capable of assuming effective command, this ise
not, in my judgment, an argument against a rational reorganization of
intelligence. It is an argument for a drastic overhaul of the State
Department.
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JA0061
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15.
The structure which would meet the criteria suggested in this
memorandum would be as follows:

1) The State Department would be granted general
clearance authority over all clandestine activity. This
might be effectuated on the British model by the appointment
of a Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence, who
would act for the Secretary in these matters and who might
serve as chairman of a Joint Intelligence Board.

2) The Joint Intelligence Board would include repre-
sentatives from all elements in the intelligence coramunity
and also from the White House.

3) The operating branches of the present CIA would be
reconstituted under some blameless title (the National Informa
tion Service). This new agency would be charged with responsi-
bility for clandestine collection, for covert political operations
and for paramilitary activitice. It would submit projects to the
Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence for clearance.
In general, the agency would bear somewhat the same relation.
ship to State as the Disarmament Administration and ICA
presently do.

4) A second semi-independent agency would be set up, again
bearing a blameless title (the Foreign Research Agency), coordi
nate with the operations agency. This agency would be charged
with responsibility for collation and interpretation. It would
Include CIA/DDL the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in
State, and the various service functions now carried on by CIA
(photographic interpretation, biographical files, foreign broadcast
monitoring, scientific intelligence, mape, avert collection, etc.).
It might well be located in the CIA building in McLean.

cc: The Attorney General
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Dungan
Arthur Schlesinger, jr.
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TITLE: Withdrawal of United Nations Troops
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COUNTRY
UNITED NATIONS/CONGO
Congo
SUBJECT
WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED NATIONS TROOPS FROM THE CONGO
DOI
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PADA
NEW YORK, 7 AUGUST 1963
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ADOULA, S PLEAS TO THE CONTRARY. THE ONLY WAY OF COUNTERACTING THE WITH-
DRAWAL WOULD BE TO FIND A NEW METHOD OF FINANCING THE CONGO OPERATION.
UNDER SUCH A PLAN, THE IDEAL WOULD BE THE MAINTENANCE OF 40-50 PERCENT
STRENGTH. ALTHOUGH THERE IS TALK IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT OF
FUNDING METHODS, THE ABILITY OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO ACCEPT SUCH
OUTSIDE FUNDS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO DEBATE.

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ORIGINATOR :
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TITLE: Fidel Castro's Coming Visit to Moscow and Algiers
DATE: 4/23/1963
PAGES: 1
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OCI No. 1427/63
23 April 1963

Fidel Castro's Coming Visit to Moscow and Algiers

1. The initial report on Fidel Castro's forthcoming visit to Moscow came from a usually reliable source with excellent contacts in Cuban government, circles who obtained the information from a Cuban government official who has been an intimate acquaintance for many years and who has excellent high-level contacts throughout the Cuban leadership. The usually reliable source obtained the information on 25 March. The report was disseminated to the intelligence community on 27 March and reported in the Current Intelligence Bulletin dated 29 March.

2. The substance of the report was that, despite his strong criticism of the Soviet Union, particularly concerning its actions during the missile crisis, Fidel Castro is not blinded to the need for Cuba to maintain good diplomatic relations with the entire "socialist camp." Castro was planning, according to the report, to go to Moscow for the May Day celebrations. He was planning, however, to remain in Moscow only three days. It was his intention, according to the report, to tell Khrushchev, in effect, that the USSR must assist Cuba but must at the same time understand that Castro does not intend to be a "docile satellite.".

3. Information from the same source and sub-source was disseminated to the intelligence community on 30 March indicating that Castro was intending to visit Algeria on the same trip that took him to Moscow. This was reported in the Current Intelligence Bulletin on 1 April.

4. The substance of the second report was that Castro "plans to visit Algeria in connection with" the visit to Moscow and that Algeria and the USSR are the only two countries he was planning to visit on that trip. The Algerian visit was planned in view of the "special relationship" that is said to exist between Castro and Ben Bella and also between Castro and Algerian Defense Minister Boumedienne.

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COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 48: Cuban Subjects: Exiles information
report. Box 1

SANITIZED MK-01.048.4.3.3
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Culan exles
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs.
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
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COUNTRY CUBA NICARAGUA
REPORT NO. TDCS -3/556,052
:
SUBJECT POSSIBLE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CUBAN DATE DISTR. 10 AUGUST 1963
EXILE BASE IN NICARAGUA
PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
Ss
DATE OF
INFO. 24 JULY 1963
REFERENCES IN 97132
TDCS-3/555,529
PLACE &
DATE ACO. ENGLAND, LONDON (9 AUGUST 1963)
APPRAISAL 3
SOURCE
FIELD REPORT NO. OEL 35,970
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE FROM A SOURCE DESCRIBED AS "WELL-KNOWN AND EXPERIENCED
IN REPORTING, PROBABLY RELIABLE, QUOTING ROMANI."
ON
1. IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION/24 JULY 63, SALVADOR ROMANI, REPRESENT-

ATIVE IN VENEZUELA OF CUBAN EXILE ORGANIZATION COMANDO UNIFICADO
DE LA LIBERACION EN CUBA (UNITED COMMAND OF CUBAN LIBERATION CULC),
CLAIMED THAT A SMALL NUMBER CUBAN EXILES HAD ALREADY MOVED FROM
MIAMI TO NICARAGUA. IN EXILE CIRCLES IT IS BELIEVED THIS ACTION
REFLECTS A PREVIOUS AGREEMENT BETWEEN PRESIDENT SOMOZA OF NICARAGUA
AND MANUEL ARTIME, SECRETARY GENERAL OF EXILE GROUP MOVIMIENTO DE

RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA (MOVEMENT OF REVOLUTIONARY RECOVERY
MRR). ROMANI DID NOT KNOW DETAILS OF AGREEMENT. IF IT ENTAILS
ESTABLISHMENT OF A LARGE-SCALE EXILE MILITARY BASE IN NICARAGUA,
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00. EXO
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
FORM
10-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
(15-20)

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PAGE 2

OTHER EXILE GROUPS WILL AWAIT REACTION OF UNITED STATES BEFORE
DECIDING THEIR OWN COURSE OF ACTION.
OF
2. NUCLEUS/SUCH A BASE WOULD BE DRAWN FROM THREE TO FOUR THOUSAND
OF
EXILES WHO, ACCORDING TO ROMANI, HAVE PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED MILATARY
TRAINING FROM MEMBERS/U.S. ARMED FORCES. ROMANI CLAIMED U.S.
TO
POLICY IS TO FERMENT INTERNAL RESISTANCE IN CUBA AND/STRENGTHEN THE
RESISTANCE BY INFILTRATION OF TRAINED COMMANDO GROUPS OF EXILES.
FOR THIS REASON THE U.S. CONTINUES/GIVE TACIT SUPPORT FOR TRAINING
OF EXILE MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS.
..
TO
3. ROMANI MADE FOLLOWING REVIEW OF POLICIES OF PRINCIPAL EXILE
PARTIES:
OF
(A) CULC IS CONCENTRATING ON DISSEMINATION/ANTI-CASTRO
PROPAGANDA IN CUBA TO PREPARE GROUND FOR INSURRECTION. IT FAVORS
INFILTRATION/SMALL MILITARY GROUPS BUT REJECTS A GENERAL INVASION.
OF
(B) JURE (JUNTA REVOLUCIONARIA), LED BY MANUEL RAY, CONSIDERS THE
PRINCIPLE REQUIREMENT IS TO SECURE SUPPORT OF DISCONTENTED ELEMENTS
IN CUBAN MILITIA AND ARMED FORCES.
(C) ALLIANCE OF MRP (MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO POPULAR),
SECOND FRONT OF ESCAMBRAY AND ALPHA 66, SUPPORTS CONTINUATION OF HIT-

AND-RUN RAIDS ON CUBAN MAINLAND IN ORDER/MAINTAIN MORALE OF RESISTANCE
FORCES IN CUBA.
TO
THE.
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
TDCS-3/556,052
IN 97132
PAGE 3
(D) SEVERAL GROUPS, INCLUDING UMC (UNIDADES MILITARES CUBANAS),
CLC (COMANDOS LIBRES DE CUBA) AND A SECTION OF MRR CONSIDER THAT ONLY
A GENERAL INVASION WILL OVERTHROW THE CUBAN REGIME.
OF
(E) FUR (FRENTE UNIDO REVOLUCIONARIO), LED BY AURELIANO
SANCHEZ ARANGO, IS WORKING PRIMARILY TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT/LATIN
AMERICAN GOVTS FOR COORDINATED POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON
BA
FIELD DISSEM: STATE, CINCLANT CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SS
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10052
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE: Central Intelligence Agency Information Report
DATE: 6/28/1963、
PAGES: 2
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 48: Cuban Subjects: Exiles information
report. Box 1

TELEGRAM INCORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
BUNDY-SMITH

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage to BEK, U.S.C Secs.
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
(When Filled In)
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CUBA
COUNTRY
REPORT NO. TDCS-3/551,86ORRESTAL

SUBJECT
CUBAN EXILE PLANS
DATE DISTR.
28 JUNE 19630HNSON
PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
KILDUFF
KLEIN
KOMER
SAUNDERS
SCHLESINGER

DATE OF
INFO.
:
MID-JUNE 1963

ENGLAND, LONDON
PLACE &
DATE ACO.
(27 JUNE 1963)
REFERENCES
APPRAISAL 3
FIELD REPORT NO. OEL 35668MITH
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENTS FESTNEVE.
SOURCE
AN OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE FROM A SOURCE DESCRIBED AS "WELL KNOWN AND
EXPERIENCED IN REPORTING, PROBABLY RELIABLE, QUOTING THE PERSONS MENTIONED".

1. AMAURY FRAGINALS ALONSO, ONE OF THE LEADERS IN THE ALLIANCE
BETWEEN THE MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO POPULAR (POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY
MOVEMENT - MRP), THE SECOND FRONT OF ESCAMBRAY AND ALPHA 66, CLAIMED
IN CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSION QURING A VISIT TO VENEZUELA IN MID JUNE 63
THAT THE ALLIANCE WILL CONTINUE TO ATTACK THE CUBAN MAINLAND.

AT THE SAME TIME, PLANS ARE GOING AHEAD TO LAUNCH PLAN OMEGA.

FRAGINALS SAID THAT PLAN OMEGA HAS THREE STAGES: (A) REORGANIZATION
AND ARMING OF GUERRILLA GROUPS THROUGHOUT CUBA WHICH WILL BE LED BY
LOCAL MEN WHO KNOW THEIR AREA;

(B) INCESSANT GUERRILLA ATTACKS AGAINST RUSSIAN BASES, THE CUBAN
SECRET
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CHOUP I
Excluded from avtomatic
downgrading and
declassification
:

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR
TATE/DIR
I&NS
FBI
JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID.. USIA
TREASURY
OC I
ONE OCR
ORR
OBI
00
EXO
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

ORM
IK
OBSOLETE FREVIOUS EDITIONS.
:
(15-20)

CLASSIFICATION- DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
4
SECRET
(When Filled In)
:
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
IN
TDCS-3/551,866
69083
PAGE
2
ARMY AND THE MILITIA. THE PURPOSE OF THESE WILL BE TO CAUSE MATERIAL
i
DAMAGE TO THE CUBAN ARMED FORCES, UNDERMINE THEIR MORALE AND RAISE
THE MORALE OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN PREPARATION FOR AN INSURRECTION;
(C) COORDINATION AND CONTROL OF A GENERAL INSURRECTION.
:
2. FRAGINALS REMARKED THAT THE REORGANIZATION OF GUERRILLA GROUPS
IS PROGRESSING SATISFACTORILY BUT THAT THERE IS AN INSUFFICIENCY
OF FUNDS. HE REVEALED THAT THE ALLIANCE IS RECEIVING BLUE-PRINTS,
FROM INSIDE CUBA, OF MAJOR PLANTS. THEY INCLUDE INFORMATION ABOUT THEIR
FUNCTIONS, SHIFTS, AS WELL AS THE NUMBER AND DEPLOYMENT OF GUARDS..
THE BLUE PRINTS ARE TRANSMITTED BY COURIER OR LETTER AND WILL BE
USED FOR PLAN OMEGA,
::
:
:::
:
3. FRAGINALS DESCRIBED THE LATEST ADHERENT TO THE ALLIANCE,
THE FRENTE ANTI-COMMUNISTA DE LIBERACION (ANTI-COMMUNIST LIBERATION
FRONT - FAL), AS A CLANDESTINE GROUP WITHIN THE CUBAN ARMY. HE
REFUSED TO GIVE FIGURES BUT ALLEGED THAT THE GROUP WAS EXPANDING AND
WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE "FORTHCOMING WAR" IN CUBA.
HE CONFIRMED THE ALLIANCE'S DETERMINATION TO WAGE WAR ON FIDEL CASTRO'S
REGIME, EVEN AT THE RISK OF PRECIPITATING A NUCLEAR CONFLICTEYNUDEB
i
4. FIELD DISSEMI STATE, CINCLANT, CINCSO.
::
TESKER
LYSPOLL
KUGLEB
:
SECRET
END OF MESSAGE
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
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ТИТЕЛИ
:
INDOLA
176-10036-10058
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AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER: 176-10036-10058
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO: Director, CIA
TITLE: Activities of Cuban Trained Peruvian Guerrillas
DATE: 4/11/1963
PAGES: 5
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 51: Cuba, Subjects intelligence material
6/63-7/63. Box 1

Janitized
NLK
09795 (SECRET

EYES ONLY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

11 April 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Activities of Cuban-Trained Peruvian Guerrillas

1. The information in this memorandum comes from an extremely
sensitive source who is currently a member of a group of Cuban-trained
Peruvian guerrillas. No other dissemination has been made of the re-
ports he has provided, in order to protect him and to insure that a
channel is kept open to him. The information is being forwarded in
this restricted manner at this time to furnish an insight into the
extent of Cuban efforts to assist Latin American revolutionary move-
ments. The Agency directed asset is working inside a network which is
now assisting Cuban-trained Latin Americans to re-enter their own
countries illegally, and to join with leftist revolutionary groups to
overthrow the established governments.

2. The Agency asset was a member of a group of more than 70
Peruvians trained in Cuba from June until December 1962. His contingent
traveled in small groups by way of Mexico. He received his first
special assignment when he was appointed to stay behind in Mexico
temporarily and to act as a clandestine contact with a Cuban Embassy
official there. The Cuban gave him instructions and funds, and he
directed the later groups which transited Mexico.

3. The Peruvian group was ostensibly in Cuba only to attend the
July 26 celebrations. According to our agent, some of the members them-
selves did not know in advance they were to be given training. The
Cubans set the Peruvians up as self-contained units in secret train-
ing sites in Habana, where they were given political indoctrination
and weapons. Later they were moved to rural hill areas for guerrilla
training. The agent has described in detail these secret training
sites, giving address of the houses and the locations of the guer-
rilla areas.

4. The agent was removed from his group for several weeks to
undergo special training in secret communications techniques, in
preparation for his current assignment.

5. At present, the agent acts as coordinator, helping the
Peruvians to return illegally to Peru. He is in correspondence with
SECRET

SECRET

2
persons in numerous points of entry in Latin America and with contacts
in several European capitals who assist the group on their clandestine
return. Although many left Peru openly on valid papers, they are coming
back illegally. Some have false documentation from other countries,
primarily from Colombia; some have Peruvian passports issued in the
names of persons now deceased; some are crossing the borders from
neighboring countries clandestinely without showing any papers; and
some go by small boats to isolated areas.

6. The agent is a member of the Movimiento Izquierda Revolu-
cionario (MIR) of Peru which now plans to join with other leftist
revolutionary groups to bring about a coup before the elections
scheduled for June 1963. The agent knows of some 200 Peruvians who
have received Cuban training, only a small percentage of whom are
actually Communist Party members.

7. Approximately 300 persons have been named by the agent as
being connected with the ring helping the Peruvians to reinfiltrate
secretly. Attempts are being made to learn whether some of these,
particularly those used as "Co-ordinators" or "Correspondence points"
in Europe and the United States, are also connected with the illegal
return of Cuban-trained guerrillas to other countries.

8. Paris has emerged as the center of the network. Groups of
ten arrive weekly from Cuba to be sent on to various Latin American
countries for eventual re-entry into Peru. The man in charge of the
Peruvians is headquartered in Paris. From there, he has been direct-
ing the travel, sending instructions to his scattered subordinates,
and receiving reports and information from contacts throughout the
world, and handling funds.

9. Correspondence between members of the group is by cable and
by letter. The security of communications is protected by several
alternate systems of code and secret writing. Each of the trainees
has been assigned a number, and letter and number designations are
given to hotels and pensions. In cable correspondence, the ring uses
these numbers to indicate which persons are traveling and where they
may be reached. The content of the messages appears to relate to
business matters, covering shipment dates and invoice numbers for
example. Letter correspondence contains secret writing with
relatively sophisticated systems, interspaced between lines of innocuous
friendly or business letters. A dictionary is used for coded mes-
sages in either cables or letters, with page and word number refer-
ring to clandestine key words.
SECRET

SECRET

10. The ring takes great precautions to prevent tracing of the
addressees. One of the important links is a woman whose Paris home
has entrances on two different streets. She and her husband use the
principal street address for their normal lives, but the back street
address for the receipt of clandestine correspondence.

11. In this Cuban-sponsored subversive operation, routes of
travel are planned to escape easy detection of the fact that a person
has left his home, been trained, and returned to his country.
Most of the travel has been by way of Mexico and thence to Cuba,
since it was possible to escape detection of the travel. The Cubans
issued loose leaf inserts for the travelers' passports, rather than
stamping a record of the travel in the document itself. The Mexican
Government has recently begun measures to control this travel, but a
large number have managed to enter and leave Cuba for Mexico without
detection. Some of the travel to Cuba is by way of the Dutch and British
West Indies.

12. Many of the returning trainees go through Paris and Prague.
From Paris, the travelers fan out to a number of different Latin
American countries, from which they attempt clandestine re-entry into
Peru. Ecuador, Colombia and Brazil have been used extensively as
Latin American entry points as the travelers leave Paris.

13. The agent reports that money for this extensive travel
program has been deposited in Swiss banks by the Chinese Communists,
via Cuba. MIR trainees were told not to ask for aid from the Soviets
to avoid straining relations with China, "since it is backing them".
Our asset was responsible for the safekeeping of approximately $15,000
when he arrived in Paris. The money had been parceled out among a
number of trainees during the trip, and they handed it to the Paris
coordinator there. Our asset was given $1,000 when he left Paris,
which he was to use for documentation when he was ready to re-enter
Peru. He reported that the cost of the travel of his group from
Peru to Cuba was approximately $25,000, and that this money was
brought to a local leader from Paris by courier before the trip.

The MIR plans to establish a cover importing company repre-
senting a French firm which exports cheap agricultural equipment.
The branch in Peru will serve as a cover for activities involving
the travel of MIR members and the transfer of funds. It will also
be a clearing house for information and instructions. When the
current group of trainees is back in Peru, another group will be
sent out, and funded through the cover firm. The agent reports that
SECRET

SECRET

the next group will number approximately 100 men and that they will
receive instructions in Algeria, North Vietnam, Laos, and China. The
top leader of the Peruvian group has told his lieutenants that he will
soon go to Algeria to start arrangements for this training.

15. The MIR has planned four fronts in Peru in its proposed
revolution. One is in the south with headquarters in Cusco, another
is in the central region in the Sierra, a third is in Lima, and the
fourth is in northern Peru. The agent has named the leaders in charge
of each of the four fronts.

16. Our asset makes frequent reference to internal disputes in
the MIR between the old line Communists and those referred to as
Trotskyites. The MIR leaders in Cuba felt that some of their own
groups had joined with the Trotskyites and they discussed this problem
with Fidel Castro. Castro promised not to let the so-called Trotsky-
ites return to Peru until the others were already in place and in
command of the several fronts. Some of the avowed Trotskyites were
among the first to be sent back, however, and the MIR leaders are
highly incensed. The leaders fear that the Trotskyites will endanger
the movement, and they have been especially disturbed to find that
two Cuban officers, who are known to be Trotskyites, had accompanied
them from Cuba.

17. The Agency asset had first estimated that it would take at
least two months for all of the Peruvians to return. The re-entry
program had fallen approximately a month behind schedule because of
unexpected problems of transferring funds and obtaining documents.
Moreover, a Communist group in one of the neighboring countries which
was to help them began to charge exorbitant amounts for its assistance.
The Peruvians were obliged to wait until additional money was brought
to them by courier.

18. The agent also estimated that at least another month or
two would be required to complete plans for the revolution after all
of the trainees were back. The leaders of the trainees complained
that the MIR had not made adequate plans to receive the groups and
had not developed its revolutionary plans soundly.

19. Recently, however, the operation has been increasing in
tempo. The leaders of the MIR have been putting additional pressures
on our asset and on others in the chain to speed up re-entry. A
number of the trainees have spread out to small neighboring towns,
ready to cross the border into Peru clandestinely. False documenta-
tion of these nearby countries is also being procured to assist others
to cross into Peru "legally."
SECRET
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AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER: 176-10036-10065
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE: Draft Briefing Notes: Funding
DATE: 2/18/1963
PAGES: 5
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 59: Cuba Subjects, Cuban Subversion,
2/18/1963. Box 1

SECRET

DRAFT BRIEFING NOTES 18 February 1963

FUNDING

I. Cuban financing of subversive operations in Latin
America is easy to ascertain and hard_to_document.
Our evidence shows that it is generally effected
by couriers carrying cash.

A. A Venezuelan politician, Fabricio Ojeda, re-
turned from Cuba in March of 1962, and was seen
by several witnesses to have large quantities
of US currency stuffed in a false-bottomed com-
partment of his suitcase. There is no law
against bringing currency into Venezuela, so
that authorities could not even determine how
much he had brought in. Ojeda later was cap-
tured, tried, and sentenced for guerrilla ac-
tivity.

B. A Nicaraguan exile, Julio Cesar Mayorga Porto-
carrera, was flying from Mexico to Honduras in
September, 1961, when weather forced the plane
to overfly Honduras and land in Nicaragua.
He was found to be carrying $3,600 in cash from
Cuba for Nicaraguan rebels in Honduras.

C. Last March Ecuadorean troops raided a guerrilla
training camp in the mountains west of Quito and

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SECRET

arrested some 48 members of the URJE (Union of
Revolutionary Ecuadorean Youth) The leaders of
the group admitted having received guerrilla
training in Cuba, but there was no other evidence
at the time of any Cuban involvement. The URJE,
however, was a Communist-front group whose leaders
had thrown off the discipline of the regular Com-
munist party, and this January the Communists man-
aged to have a URJE convention, run by Young Com-
munists, expel the leaders. They were accused,
according to published accounts, of having wasted
$44,000 supplied by Cuba for guerrilla activities.
One of our reliable sources in the Communist Party
((a regional Communist leader in contact with the
Cuban chargé in Chile, and a member of the PCE
inquiry commission)) has informed us that the
next-to-last Cuban chargé in Quito blamed the
fiasco on the fact that his successor had passed
the money to the URJE without coordinating with
the regular Communist party.

D. A highly placed Guatemalan Communist who defected
last November has given us a specific account of
procedures by which Cuba sent cash to Mexico to
buy weapons which were then smuggled into Guate-
mala.

-2-

SECRET

SECRET

E. We also have considerable evidence of involved
bank transfers by which Cuban money eventually
reaches Latin American front groups to pay for
political and propaganda activity. In some
countries where the Cubans still have diplomatic
missions, we have obtained photostats showing
that Cuban diplomats paid for printing of front-
group propaganda.

F. Just last month, one of the first Brazilians to
receive guerrilla warfare training in 1961 was
picked up with a suitcase full of ammunition. he
was carrying to some of those same guerrilla
training camps exposed when the Varig plane
crashed in Peru. Interestingly enough, the
Brazilians believe that the money Cuba had been
providing for the camps actually came from Com-
munist China. Since the exposure of the Varig
documents--and probably since the guerrillas
first reached the Cuban embassy in Rio with
their complaints about mismanagement, confusion,
and corruption--the Cubans have apparently
stopped financing this operation, but the evidence
shows it is still limping along. The man with'
the suitcase full of ammunition said that a woman
attorney in Rio had given him the money to buy a
large hacienda as a new guerrilla camp. We know

-3-

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SECRET

that this woman is a cut-out in the communica-
tions between the pro-Communist Peasant Leagues,
which have run the camps, and the Cuban embassy.

II The principle that guerrillas must be self-sustain-
ing has obviously been applied to finances as well.
Communists have staged waves of bank robberies in
Venezuela, Peru, and Argentina.

A. The most spectacular hold-up was that of a bank
in a Lima suburb last year which netted almost
$100,000. Some of the participants have been
caught and are being tried in the mass trials
of more than 200 Communists just starting in
Peru. We know that the hold-up was carried out
by a combination of guerrillas and ordinary
criminals, who divided the loot fifty-fifty.
г.
Some of the share of the common criminals has
been recovered, but the Communist half is be-
lieved to have reached the sizeable guerrilla
forces of Hugo Blanco in the Cuzco Valley.

B. Just last week a bank in an outlying Venezuelan
:-
town was robbed of $25,000 by men wearing FALN
armbands.

C. Argentine police last July raided a Buenos Aires
warehouse and found evidence that it had been
the headquarters for a gang of terrorists--ap-
parently working with both the Peronists and the

-4-

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Communists--responsible for a wave of hold-ups,
burglaries, and attacks on police posts designed
to obtain funds, weapons, and explosives.

-5-

SECRET
176-10036-10073
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AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10073
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
ORIGINATOR :
FROM: Johnson
TO: Rostow
TITLE: Meeting of Vietnam Task Force June 19 1961
DATE: 6/20/1961
PAGES : 5
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 193: Vietnam General 6/19/1961-
6/30/1961. Box 1

2 SECRET
June 20, 196122 Sanitized
NLK-75-26
NLX 02-310, 1103
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW
SUBJECT: Meeting of the Task Force on Viet Nam on June 19, 1961

Intelligence Briefing

Among the interesting items reported in the intelligence
briefing was a response from Embassy Saigon on the Cambodian
border problem. Embassy Saigon did not agree with the view of
Embassy Phnom Penh that this is an insignificant problem. At
present, Saigon reports, Cambodia is used primarily as a safe
haven by guerrillas in Viet Nam rather than as an area from
which operations are mounted. The Embassy provided specific
information on VC activity in Cambodia which, it suggested,
should be shown to Sihanouk. There was also a report that the
Indian member of the ICC has stated in the ICC that that body
should investigate subversion. This was said to have caused
the Polish member to ask for a recess of the ICC in order to
permit him to prepare a reply. (This report, if confirmed, is
in line with an earlier TDCS indicating that instructions
along these lines had gone to the Indian member of the ICC.).

It was also reported that on Friday there may have been a
clash between Pathet Lao and South Vietnamese forces just in-
side Laos on the highway connecting Laos and South Viet Nam.
(South Vietnamese forces have been in this area for some time.)
The following table on operations for May was also presented.

Killed		Captured		Surrendered		Deserted
Viet Cong		824			30			37		none
GVN			240			158			none			41
The Local Currency: Costs Problem

Mr. Cottrell reported on the current status of the
problem of meeting the local currency costs of the 20,000 man
increase. A message has been sent to Saigon requesting the
Embassy to undertake negotiations with the GVN and offering
three alternatives in descending order of preference:

a. The U. S. would commit $5.1 million equivalent in
piasters, provided the GVN proceeds without delay with
mobilization and meets the balance of the local currency
costs from its own resources..

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1
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C
SECRET
b. If the proposal under a above is not adequate to
obtain GVN agreement, we would offer an additional $4.85
million in piasters. This is estimated to be sufficient
to cover local currency costs in 1961 of the call-up of
the additional 20,000 men.
If neither of the above proposals proves accept-
able, the U. S. would offer an additional $4.55 million in
assistance in 1961 which, if the GVN would accept a dollar/
piaster rate of 73, would be sufficient to meet the piaster
cost for 1961.

As of yesterday afternoon, no reaction had been obtained
from Saigon. In a long conversation with Ben Wood, the Deputy
Director of the Task Force, Thuan was told before he left the
U. S. of our offer under a above. On the basis of this offer,
he indicated that he would send instructions to Saigon to in-
itiate the call-up of the 20,000 men, even in the absence of a
final agreement. This problem, therefore, seems on its way
toward solution.
The Situation in Laos in Relationship to South Viet Nam

A large part of the meeting was devoted to discussion of
a draft memorandum that Cottrell read to the Task Force con-
taining his ideas with respect to the situation in Laos and
what should be done about it. You are generally familiar with
his ideas as a result of your conversation yesterday with him.
I did not attempt to take detailed notes on the memorandum, but
his proposal runs along the following lines.
:
1

Cottrell does not believe that any arrangement to create
a neutral Laos will be viable. He does not believe that we
should withdraw in favor of the French in Laos. The French
cannot be depended upon to do a good job and the reestablishment
of their presence will be deeply resented throughout the former
Indo-Chinese states. The military situation in Laos is alarming.
The Pathet Lao are now posing a serious threat in southern Laos.
Cottrell proposes that we seize upon some plausible excuse to
break off the Geneva Conference. The failure of the ICC to
stabilize the situation would provide such an excuse. He would
then introduce Thai special forces and "hunter-killer" forces
now being trained in South Viet Nam into southern Laos in an
effort to clean out the Pathet Lao "infection" there. In the
discussion of his proposal, the question was raised as to.
whether the introduction of U. S. forces would not be necessary.
Cottrell acknowledged that this was a real possibility and
emphasized the importance of our not letting our friends in
Southeast Asia down by refusing to use force if that should
prove necessary.

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2
-

SECRET

i
1
1
SECRET
Members of the Task Force were asked for their reactions
to the paper. There was a rather surprising degree of agree-
ment that something along this line must be done or it will be
virtually impossible to deal with the situation in South Viet
Nam. (There was no State Department representative present at
the time except Cottrell himself.). The ICA member and the
representative of Jack Bell's office did raise questions as to
whether political and economic action by the Diem regime was
not a more important precondition to solution in Viet Nam than
military action in Laos.

I made the following points about the proposal: First, I
observed that this would seem to me to raise important questions
of policy which had been considered and decided in the past at
the highest levels of government. I indicated that I would be
unable to take a personal stand on the issues raised. I ex-
pressed some surprise about the apparent unanimity of view that,
unless we undertake military action in Laos, it would be
virtually impossible to deal effectively with the situation in
Viet Nam. I said that, while I could see no objection to the
Viet Nam Task Force raising these questions, it seemed to me
that they should be raised much more clearly in the context of
the Viet Nam problem. That is, the proposed memorandum should
make clear why the present situation in Laos will make it
difficult, if not impossible, to carry out an effective program
against the Viet Cong in Viet Nam. Cottrell agréed to take
account of this suggestion (with which there seemed to be some
: agreement in the Task Force)...
understand some of
the feeling of frustration which has
prompted Cottrell to produce his memorandum. I specifically
share his doubts with respect to getting the French back into
Laos. (I had thought that this proposal had been dropped as a
result of adverse reaction from various sectors.) The Cottrell
proposals, however, raise very directly the question of U. S.
military intervention in Laos. It seems to me inconceivable
that his objective could be achieved without such intervention.
The proposals also would have the effect, it seems to me, of
merging the war in Laos with the war in Viet Nam. I do not
think that this would be a good idea.

I think that there is a serious question as to whether the
situation in Laos is not deteriorating sosoniously that any
likely political solution will not leave it as a serious source
of infiltration into both Viet Nam and Thailand. But I wonder
whether this question cannot be better reviewed in the context
of contingency planning for Laos itself. In this connection,
I do feel that the military contingency plan that we have seen.
for Laos is based upon too narrow a contingency -- i.., a
clear failure to achieve a cease fire or the breaking of a
cease fire by the Communists. We need to plan against the
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possibility that the Geneva Conference will be prolonged in-
definitely and that meanwhile the PL will take over Southern
Laos piece by piece and bit by bit as it appears to be doing.
I wonder whether you want to check again with Alexis Johnson
on the status of contingency planning? I wonder whether it
isn't about time to have the NSC and the President review the
Laos situation?
Other Matters
:-

I raised the question as to the next step in consideration
of Diem's proposal for a 100,000 man increase in GVN forces. I
was told that the matter was being studied in Defense. It was
the view of the DoD representative that the possibility of such
an increase was academic until some time in 1963 because it
would take until then to raise the 20,000 men already authorized
and the 30,000 currently under consideration. (The 30,000 would
be a part of the 100,000 since Diem was using a 170,000 man base.).
:

I also raised the question of whether food supplies were
being cut off by the Viet Cong (as suggested to you by a
Vietnamese.) I was told that the only evidence of Viet Cong
action in this area was the recent seizure of seven barges
carrying sugar. However, it was also stated that the GVN has
given this fear as an explanation for reduction in rice ex-
ports. That is, the GVN has withheld rice from international
markets because of a fear that the rice may be needed in Viet
Nam if the VC should begin to cut food supply lines.
may be related to the argument about GVN foreign exchange
revenuesy eserves."
Thus it

There seemed to be no great concern in the Task Force
with this as a current real problem. Following the meeting I
talked to the ICA representative about whether it would be de-
sirable to build up Vietnamese rice stocks to relieve them of
their fear that rice supplies may be cut off and thus to per-
mit them to sell more of their rice abroad. He indicated that
politically it was very difficult to justify export of rice to
Viet Nam which was itself a rice exporter.

(Today I talked with Jack King of CIA (ONE) about this
question. He had not made a specific study of it, of course.
It was his impression that, while there was some VC interference
with rice movements, the problem was not one of independently
serious proportions. That is, it was a reflection of the
general VC problem which was serious, but not in itself a cauве
for alarm. It was also his impression that GVN exports of rice
had been surprisingly well maintained..)
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Finally, I raised the question of what planning was being
done to internationalize the border problem. In response
Cottrell simply referred to his plan for dealing with the
situation in Laos. Today I talked with Bob Cleveland in State
about the same point. He referred to the arrangements that are
being made for a meeting of MAAG and USOM Chiefs of countries
in the area sometime in July at which the border problem,
among others, will be discussed. He also referred to the fact
that Ben Wood is currently working on a counter insurgency plan
to cover all of Southeast Asia. Defense had earlier been asked
to prepare such a plan but had failed to do so. (I find a
great inertia, apparently rooted in a basic lack of sympathy,
whenever I attempt to raise the question of finding some means
to involve the international community in the border question.
Neither Cottrell nor the State Department representatives.seem
very much interested. Have you ever discussed this question
with Alexis Johnson? I think it might be useful to do so.)

Following the meeting I followed up with Cottrell on the
conversation you had had with him in the morning, asking him
whether he didn't think it would be desirable to send General
Taylor to South Viet Nam to consider the request for a100,000
man increase and also to make sure that our military activities
in South Viet Nam were really being reoriented. He reacted
negatively to this proposal, taking the view that it was un-
desirable to continue sending missions out to inspect the work
of people in the field. In a later conversation with someone
else in State I got a much more favorable reaction to this idea.
The more I think about it the more I am convinced that it would
be highly desirable. I very much share your uneasy feeling about
the situation.
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Robert H. Johnson
SECRET2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10078
RECORD SERIES: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM :
TO:
TITLE: Opposition in Khanh Hoa Province
DATE: 9/13/1962
PAGES: 2
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS:
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 196: Vietnam, 9/62. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY
SOUTH VIETNAM
REPORT NO. TDCS-3/522,229
SUBJECT
1. OPPOSITION IN KHANH HOA PROVINCE TO ARMING DATE DISTR. 13 SEPTEMBER 1962
MOUNTAIN TRIBESMEN AND TO THE STRATEGIC
HAMLET PROGRAM
2. CONFLICT AMONG PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES
PRECEDENCE ROUTINE SMITH-BUNDY
DUNGAN
KAYSEN
DATE OF
INFO.
LATE AUGUST 1962 INKILBOOF
PETERSEN
PLACE &
DATE ACO. VIETNAM, SAIGON (3 SEPTEMBER 1962) SCHLESINGER
TAYLOR
APPRAISAL 3
FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 7923 PRIK
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE
SOURCE
A MEDIUM-LEVEL OFFICIAL (C) IN: THE GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF VIETNAMESE JOHNSON
KLEIN
KOMER
RASKIN
SAUNDERS

1. ON 29 AUGUST 1962 BUI BO, GENERAL SECRETARY, KHANH HOA PROVINCE

COUNCIL, GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF VIETNAMESE LABOR (CVTC), AND MEMBER
OF THE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE, REPORTED TO CVTC HEADQUARTERS THAT KHANH
HOA PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES ARE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE AMERICAN POLICY
OF ECONOMIC AID, TRAINING, AND ARMS FOR THE TRIBAL PEOPLE. THESE
AUTHORITIES FEAR THAT THE TRIBESMEN MAY INDISCRIMATELY KILL INNOCENT
VIETNAMESE, ESPECIALLY IN CASES WHERE THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS
MINGLE WITH THE LOCAL POPULACE.

2. BO ALSO SAID THAT THE PEOPLE IN THE PROVINCE ARE OPPOSED
TO THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM, BECAUSE THEY ARE REQUIRED TO

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION.CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN. DISSEM

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR EXO
STATE/DIR

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 5-62

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

TDCS-3/522,229
PAGE 2

PROVIDE TOO MUCH WORK, MATERIAL, AND MONEY. THIS OPPOSITION HAS
BECOME SO STRONG THAT PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES HAVE ISSUED ORDERS
FORBIDDING ADDITIONAL DEMANDS FOR LABOR, MATERIAL, OR CASH.

3. BO REPORTED CONFLICT BETWEEN COMPETING FACTIONS IN THE
PROVINCE, WHICH THE PROVINCE CHIEF, MAJOR LE TAP, IS UNABLE TO
HANDLE. THE DEPUTY PROVINCE CHIEF FOR SECURITY, BA (FNU), A
CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF BRIGADIER GENERAL TON THAT DINH, COMMANDING
GENERAL, 11 CORPS, IS MORE INFLUENTIAL THAN TẠP. TRUONG DINH CAC,
