ONCY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING GREE 3

2018
14-00000
104-10097-10170
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION: WE 6
INFO DDP, CI/OPS, 0/0A, WH 7, SAS 8, VR
SECRET 1400352
DIR INFO STOC CITE MEXI 7384
HEYVAY PBRUMENTICRYSTAL
PEF DIR 84498

LETTERS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO: ANGEL GUADALUPE RIVERA, HAMBURGO
78, DEPT. 302, MEXICO, D.F.
SECRET
C/S COMMENT: REQUESTED MEXI PROVIDE LETTER DROP FORTI CRYSTAL-1.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
3X SECRET
ROUTING
1
4
2
5
3
16

14380448

14-00000
1.5.

TO
ECTOR
FROM
ة
MEXICO CITY
ACTION DODS 4.
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET
KOUIING
5
INFO DODS/L, CI/OPS, EE 4, WH 76 VR
SECRET 1420132
DIR CITEMEΧΙ 7333
804 39
170804
SOLOC VUIRIN BEDOX OKROW
RF MEXI 7218 (2835)
1. JERZY PLEBANSKI GOING DALLAS 15 DEC ATTEND INTERNATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM ON GRAVITATIONAL COLLAPSE AND OTHER TOPICS IN
RELATIVITIAL ASTROPHYSICS. SYMPOSIUM UNDER AUSPICES OF
TY
SOUTHWEST CENTER FOR ADVANCED STUDIES OF DALLAS AND MEETINGS TO
६
BE HELD AT STATLER-HILTON. PLEBANSKI PLANS RETURN MEXI 18 DEC.
SOURCE: PBSWING.
2. NO INDEX.
SECRET
6
C/S COMMENT: REVIEW GOBERNACION FILE JERZY PLEBANSKI REVEALS SUBJ
GRANTED PERMISSION LEAVE MEXI TO ATTEND CONFERENCES U. S.
14-00000
104-10097-10360
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET

FROM: DIRECTOR
• MEXICO CITY
ACTION: C/WH.5.
INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, RI/AN DUMMY, C/TSD 3, C/SAS 5, (VR)

SECRET 2221007
DIR CITE MEXI 7006
KAPOK PERUMEN
REF A DIR 82999
B MEAL 6967 (in) (64813)
21.366059

1. PRO DATA ON LICRAFT-1 AS FURNISHED BY BROTHER 28 NOT BEING
POUCHED.
2. BROTHER FEELS SUBJ VILLING REMAIN INSIDE FORSEEABLE FUTURE.
IS SEND ING SUBJ ANGT HER LETTER FOR DEFINITE DECISION AND VILL
INDICATE INTERESTED PARTY BEHIND AMSEVER--2 WILLING ESTABLISH TWO
HUNDRED DOLLAR KONTHLY ESCROW ACCOUNT.
3. CONTACT VILL BE MAINTAINED USING PRESENT CHANNEL THROUGH
|| NET HEMBASSY DIPLORATIC POUCH. STATION FEELS SUBJ SHOULD BE TRAINED
12. THROUGH THIS CHANNEL ASAP IN SU SYSTEN TO ENHANCE COMMO SECURITY.
08. SUBJ HAS ACCESS TO ALL SIGNIFICANT PLANS ACTIVITIES MINISTRY
INDUSTRIES IS FREQUENTLY CONSULTED BY ERNESTO "CHE GUEVARA AND
SITS IN ON ALL HIGH LEVEL PLANNING SESSIONS AT EINISTRY. WHILE
KNOWN AS NOT FAVORING REGIME, IS CONSIDERED BY GUEVARA AND
ASSOCIATES AS HIGHLY QUALIFIED AND CAPABLE ENGINEER WHO WILL NOT
KESITATE EVALUATE SOVELOC MACHINERY AS SUPERIOR TO AVAILABLE
WESTERN ITEMS IR THUS CONVINCED.

COU
SUBJ

DATE
INFO
PLAC
DATE

SOUR
RE
CA
11
TH
FA
CA
TW

STATE
STATE
13532 21BR
14-00000
CLASSIFIED JANSSACE
9. KUBANK COTROL VAL DE COMBINATIO
"CLEAR" SUBJ OF INVOLVEMENT WITH RELIE AFTER THE
EROT HER SAYS SUBJ STRONGLY PRO-PBPRIME AND FORESAN ADVENT
:
COMMUNIST REGIME AS EARLY AS 1959 VIEN BROTHER HIMSELF WAS NOT YET
CONVINCED CASTRO COMMUNIST.
6. SURJ LOOKS LIKE EXCELLENT DIRECT LINE INTO CHE AVAR
AND CHORD
CROTHER EMPHASIZED REPEATEDLY THAT SURJ SHOULD NEVER DE USED FOR
CONTACT UN CIERS DE O MATTER HOW VELL SUCH PERSUAS TRUSTED BY
EDYCHE.
23
7. IDEX 201-356
SECRET
C/S COMMENTS
EAST OF BARK CONTROL,
S
SE

13532 (p2)
VBR
# 104-10098-10072  2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

## DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO: 

FROM: Chief, WN Division

SUBJECT: LIENVOY-8

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCE: 

- [X] NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- [] ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

1. As a result of the recent review done of the LIFEAT and LIENVOY Project, it came to Headquarters attention that LIENVOY-8, who was believed to have been terminated, was still covered by the LIENVOY Project.

2. According to MONA-14576, LIENVOY-8 was the cause of a security problem for LIENVOY in February 1960 when he requested release from LIENVOY and a transfer to his parent organization, the [General Staff of the Presidency] LIENVOY-8 was described as a "sour" nationalist who disapproved of ODYOKE's (sharing of the LIENVOY take.

3. Headquarters now notes that LIENVOY-8's clearance has never been cancelled and there is no Agent Service Record or termination report in his file. LIENVOY-8 was included in the LIENVOY Project renewal request for the 1961/62 project year, but not for the 1962/63 year. The field project renewal request for the 1963/64 year included him again.

4. It is requested that the Station inform Headquarters of the present status of LIENVOY-8 (201-118406). If he has been terminated, please forward an Agent Service Record. If he is still being used, please provide a current analysis of his reliability and comments on any security probeles present in light of his actions and reputation in 1960.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution: 081 - COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO:  DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMWM-12027 DATE: 23 October 1963

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-118406

#15469
31 Oct 63

ORIGINATING
#4-00000
104-10098-10264 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DISPATCH

SECRET/KAPO
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

TO: Chief, WE Division
INFO:
FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City
SUBJECT: FEQ Part I - Alfonso Dibtido Torres
ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

XX MARKED FOR INDEXING
PROCESSING ACTION
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

Attached herewith is FEQ Part I on Subject. Provisional Operational Approval is requested, along with 201 number. Subject's cryptonym, assigned 15 October 1965 by the Station, follows under separate cover.

Willard C. Curtis

Distribution:
3 - WHQ, w/att. h/w and u/s/c
2 - Files

CROSS REFERENCE TO

SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER:
HIMMA-22488
CLASSIFICATION:
SECRET

DATE: 13 November 1963
HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-

15694
104-10098-10328 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DIRECTOR

M MEXICO CITY
TION,
LM 8

CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/CA, VR
ECRET 171636Z
HORITY TEGU INFO DIR CITE MEXI 7416
DIR 89728X
170382479

AT 16 DEC ATG [S\LUCK/] SAID WIFE WROTE SHE ARRIVING MERIDA 23
SC BY AIR AND WILL COME ON MEXI CITY SPEND XMAS WITH HIM.
ELIEVES SHE BRINGING CHILDREN AND WANTS 30 MERIDA MEET HER.

[S/] REQUESTED 190 DOLLARS IN VIEW VIFE'S VISIT AND TO PURCHASE
ANTA CLAUS FOR CHILDREN. ALSO MENTIONED XMAS DCIUS BUT DID NOT
ESS POINT.

REQUEST TEGU DECISION ON ANCUNT DE GIVEN/[S/]. ALL PAYMENTS
CRE VILL BE MADE IN PESOS.

[S/] ASSIGNED BY PARTY LEADERS HERE LIVE ALONE IN MORE OF
ELIODORINA GARCIA, PCM MEMBER, CALLE NO. 17, COLONIA MONTEZUMA.

RCIA IS DIRECTOR OF NEARBY SCHOOL WHERE FIVE POA HERBERS TEMPORARIL
ARTERED. [S/]'S WIFE AND CHILDREN WILL LIVE WITH HIM AT ABOVE
CDRESS WHILE MEXI.

NEXT OP ATS WITH[S/] SCHEDULED 23 DEC.
C/S CONVERT, SUBMITTED INTO PRECON STATUS SLUCK / I
AST CUT/ GOA FOR NEXT SEVERAL
104-10098-10380 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/SP. 2 (SR NOTIFIED AND COPY ISSUED AT:1125, 20 DEC 63 OJ)

INFO • ADDP, C/CI, C/FI/D, CDC, VR

SECRET 201548Z
PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 7458 20DEC 63 IN 84770
REDWOOD REDSKIN

REF DIR 90368.

WELCOME HOS C/O. PLS PROVIDE IDEN AND ETA SO CAM HEET AIRPORT.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO CSSOP 210-53 CABLES.

**STAFFER IDENTIFIED SELF AS RICHARDSON PHONED/MANUILA WHO WAS AWAITING CALL AND WHO CONFIRMED CALL FROM MEXI.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSING OFFICE 15 PROSTED
104-10098-10391 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET

MEXICO CITY

EE 6

C1/CA, CCS 3,

CADALETRACE
CHET 202255Z

CITE MEXI 7479

CKASSAY LPSHRINK

MEXI 7403 (IN 85185)

IDEN IS AR. GEORGE STEENS.

SECRET

SECI.T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
Copy No.

14722
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ROUTING
22 SECRET
1 2 3 4 5 6

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: MEXICO CITY

ACTION: 8

INFO: V, ADDP, DODS/L, DODS 4, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/C 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 2, 16. LE 4, WE 4, WH, OD/1, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, AD/RR 3, VR.

TDCS

SECRET 2100302 DEC 21 01472 63 IN 85247

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 7489

INTEL TYPIC DESIGNET

REF DIR 70123

SUPDATA SOURCE DESIGNET FROM [ITALINA] AND [FRENCH] AMBASSADORS TO CUBA, CUBAN MERCHANTS AND SUGAR EXPERTS

FILED 21/00352

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM HMM-8185 SUBJECT EFFORTS OF CUBAN GOVERNMENT TO INITIATE COMMERCIAL BARTER WITH WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES DOI DEC 63 PADA MEXICO MEXICO CITY 20 DEC 63 APR 3 SOURCE WESTERN EUROPEAN BUSINESSMAN WHO TRAVELS FREQUENTLY TO CUBA WHERE HIS COMPANY MAINTAINS COMMERCIAL INTERESTS.

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACH
TO FORTION OF
MADE CU THE AGENCY FOD
RELEASE BY THE ACI ON UNIT.

TDCS
PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE
PRIORITY

RELEASING OFFICER DATE DISTRIBUTED BASED ON
SECRET

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

COUNTRY CUBA
SUBJECT

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

REPORT NO. TDCS
DATE DISTR.
PRECEDENCE

DATE OF INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
APPRAISAL
REFERENCES
IN 85247

FIELD REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

END OF MESSAGE

1. THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT HAS RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE PAYMENT OF DEBTS RESULTING FROM EXPROPRIATIONS MADE FROM CERTAIN WESTERN EUROPEAN BUSINESS INTERESTS. THE CUBAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE IS TRYING TO INTEREST WEST GERMANY, ITALY AND FRANCE IN COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES SO THAT A FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE WILL PREVAIL AT THE TIME OF THE COMPLETION OF THE SUGAR CROP HARVEST IN MARCH 1964, WHEN THE COMMODITY IS NORMALLY MARKETED. NEGOTIATIONS FOR REPARATIONS ARE TAKING FORM IN CUBAN OFFERS TO SELL TOBACCO AT DISCOUNT PRICES.

2. IN ORDER OF PRIORITY, THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT IS TRYING TO OBTAIN

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

ACTION
INFO.
FERTILIZER, TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES, AND CHEMICAL PRODUCTS IN EXCHANGE FOR SUGAR ON A STRAIGHT BARTER DEAL. THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT EXPECTS A BUMPER CROP IN 1964 WHICH, IF SOLD AT THE AVERAGE WORLD PRICE OF 8 CENT A POUND (US CURRENCY), SHOULD PRODUCE ABOUT $80 MILLION DOLLARS (US) IN CREDITS.

3. FIELD COMMENT. SOURCE SAID THAT EXAMINATION OF THE CROP CONFIRMS THAT IT IS ONE OF THE BEST CUBA HAS HAD IN YEARS.

4. FIELD DISSEM STATE ECON CINCSO.

SECRET
14-00000
104-10098-10404 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET

DIRECTOR.
NICO CITY
CAC 3
ON, ADDP, C/0004, CINT, C/FE 6, C/SAD, CAM, BASS

SIJRET 2101037 7492
INTO HAVE SOME CITE MOVE 7400
211CBIN05224

:. 13 70123
2. 078 69575.02
02
WALE AMALTINO RECEIPT R
[7
GET ALONG LINES

1. FOLL REYED TO REF B:
REPORT A:
1. DAY BEFORE HURRICANE CYNTHIA HIT CUSA, DETWEEN 900 AND
500 SOVIET TECKS LEFT BY SHIP FROM SANTIACÓ DE CURA. ON 10 NOV
APPROK 200 SOVS VERE SZEN WALKING STREETS MADARA WITH SUITCASES
05
PRIOR DEBARCATION. (SOURCE REGISTO REMIGIO NE E DOI: 9 DEC).
02
08
ALL SOUS APPEAR TO BE TECHS, ALTINO YOUNG, BOST OBSERVED
USSIANET HAD NO MILITARY BEARING, IN SLOPPY PHYSICAL SHAPE,
HIS ASSUMPTION THEY CIVILIANS. FRIEND ERIC BORSIONEM

LIVES ON ROAD TO PINAR DEL RIC, TOLD PA DA SIX MONTHS
THE SOUS, DID NOT PERME ARYOPET TO THEIR CAMP NEAR EL
PUT FOR THE LAST ST THREE RES SONTHE DUPAN OFFICIALS ENTER IN LARD
RER OF SOUS HAD BEEN REDUCED BY THO
IN SOROA CLOSED DOUN ABOUT SIX NONTES
URCE NENITA ROCA,
RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

14-00000
:
ORIGINAL CONTIGOUT OF
LIVING WITH FAMILIES. (SOURCE: ANG
APPARENTLY CUBAN HADE.
:
YMBOLIC OF PLAYBOYS. IN A SAFE
IS OF VARIOUS
RAS, OF COURET, SINCE
CHINESE.
02
ALLITE TYPES.
02
:
☑H SAM ON 13 DEC του το
THREE I
CURED AS SOVIET TYPE ON
FROM KATANZAS TO VERASERO, 24 DE THEY HAD 5. LARO
:
AND OF SMALLER WHEEL RAISED OFF GROUND. DOUBLE TURRETS.
LARGE WAKION O
.:
CEN GOING SAME DIRECTION.
SAMS LARGE TRUCKS DRIVES FY SOVE AND CARRYING FIVE
7 AREA TOWARDS THE INTERIOR.
ALL SAY
ROA 250 DURING
2005 82-88 NI SAOSTI ISI
4. SEE TWO, ABOVE.
5. FLOW OF SOVS IS CONSISTENT WITH NEEDS CASTRO GOVT, MANY
HARY MORE WILL COME AS NEED ARISES. TYPICAL ATTITUDE OF MAN
PREET IS "SOVS HERE TO STAY".
6. TO INFO SOUS IN CUBAN KILITIA UNIFORMS.

1561494 2ICA RIVO

14-00000
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET PAGE 3
LIFE: NO GOC OFFICIAL OPPOSES FOR FEAR OF OWN LIFE. IN ANY EVENT
OPPOSITION WOULD HAVE NO VALUE OR HEATING. COMMON GUOTE: "FIDEL
MACE Y FIDEL DESHACE".
3. SEE ONE, ABOVE.
4. NOT KNOWN, BUT CUBAN POSITION IN DISPUTE VERY INDEPENDANT,
UNARFECTED.
PART C
1. FOST OF THE FILITIA PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN CONVERTED TO
ARMY REGULARS PAST SIX HONTHS.
2. UNKNOWN
02
3. D IMPRESSION IS THAT CURAN ARMY NOW VELL TRAINED AND
CRARIZED.
4. ON TEN DEC. FAR SOROA, ALL CARS HALTED ON ROAD WHILE
CONTINENT CUBAN TROOPS SURROUNDED A CANE FIELD AND SPRAYED IT
VITN GUNFIRE, SEARCHED IT, EUT FOUND NO ONE. TROOPS VELL FED AND
SUPPLIED. (SOURCE: FRUITA ROCA 9 DEC). SORCA AFFROX 80 KMS
FOCH PARINA TOWARDS PINAR DEL RIO.
SECRET
:
•
02
CICES RETURI CUBA AS COCORVER SINGLETCH.
14-00000
104-10100-10034

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

BAL
6153
21 NOV.

200-120-47

MULTI - ADDRESSES CABLE SER BELOW

FROM: DIRECTOR

Conr. SAS O

INFO CC, C/DC, DDP, ADOP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, EE
NE 4, CE 6, WH (POUCH FRAN 9 BONN 5, BRLN 5, MUNI
ATHE 6, ALL OTHER BTA'S 3)

15-20 15-13 15-8 15-21
MULTI-ADDRESSEE CABLE

85387

PERUMEN (ZRPRIMA
99
LOND PARI BRUS HAGU COPE STOC OSLO MADR
[ SOME

CABLE SEC: IPLS POUCH CABLE TO FOLLOWING:) (WRENCH POUCH 99

FRAN FROB BONN HAMB BRLN MUNI VIEN ATHE

BERN GNVA CAIR BEIR TEHE TELA RIOD SAOP

HRID SAGO KONT BUEN CARA LAPA LIMA

QUIT GUAT SNTO TOKY HONG WAVE BARC

HELS LISB MILA OTTA TRIE 99

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICE
SECRET
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

14-00000

ORIGD. FONIS:jd
SAS/FOR
EXT 6153
A: 21 NOV, 63

RAO INDEX
NO INDEX.
SECRET
FILE IN OS FILE NO.
TO CERTAIN STATIONS AND BASES

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONFI

INFO:

200-120-47

ROUING

22 Nov 63 17 832

SIG CEN
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO MULTI-ADDRESSEE CABLE INFO
02
PERUMEN (ZR)PRIMA

REF: DIR 22218 *

CITE DIR
85387

1. RECENTLY CONCLUDED HOS REVIEW OF (ZRPRIMA PROGRAM SHOWS
2
THAT KUDAR EFFORTS HAVE NOT ACHIEVED ANY SIGNIFICANT RESULTS AND
CONTINUATION OF PROGRAM AS SUCH NO LONGER WARRANTED. MAIN REASON
FOR KUBARK FAILURE IS THAT CUBAN TECHNICIAN RECRUITING PROGRAM
2
FIDEL'S
EAS BEEN MISERABLE FAILURE WHEY MEASURED AGAIN/ORIGINAL
OBJECTIVE OF 2000 TECHS FROM WESTERN EUROPE ALONE. THOUGH OUR
FIGURES NOT COMPLETE, WE ESTIMATE PROBABLY LESS THAN FIFTY
CANDIDATES HAVE RECEIVED CONTRACT APPROVAL AND WE ABLE CONFIRM
22
ABOUT TEN WEC HAVE ACTUALLY MADE IT TO THE ISLAND, KUBARK
SUCCEEDED IN INSERTING ABOUT THIRTY RECRUITED TECES INTO THE
VARIOUS BIRING CHANNELS, BUT SO FAR ONLY TWO HAVE RECEIVED CONTRACT
APPROVAL FROM HAVA.

2. CUBAN FAILURE TO RECRUIT IN SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS APPEARS
DUE LARGELY TO RELUCTANCE FOREIGN MINISTEY AND FOREIGN SERVICE
OFFICERS PURSUE TECH RECRUITING MISSION AGGRESSIVELY, BUREAUCRATIC
INCOMPETENCE IN HAVANA, FEAR OF INFILTRATION OF HOSTILE AGENTS

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
SECRET
SROUP 1
declassification
Samagrading and
REPRODUCTION BY OIMER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
CONT
16318

14-00000
104

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF

INFO:

INDEX
NO INDEX
ONLE IN CEFALE NO.
PAGE THO
INFO
ROUTINE

CITE DIR 85387
శ్రీ

AND PROBABLE LOSS OF INTER ST IN THE PROGRAM ON PART OF CASTRO
HIMSELF. THESE FACTORS WHICH KAEROE FRON OUR STUDY OF THE CUBAN
PERFORMANCE ACCOUNT FOR LACE OF RESPONSE FROM EMBASSIES TO
APPLICATIONS, LOBU DELAY IN GETTING LORD BACK FRON HAVANA AND
SMALL NUMBER OF TECHS ULTIMATELY HIRED, LONG TIME LAG BETWEEN
INITIAL APPLICATION AND ULTIMATE APPROVAL FRON HAVA, WHICH RUNS
SIX TO HINK MONTHS, HAS COST CUBANS NUMBER OF TECHS NHO VERE
INITIALLY EAGER BUT SUBSEQUENTLY LOST INTEREST OR TOOX OTHER
JOBS.
-WISH STREES

3. IN FACE OF FOREGOING WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT WORTHWHILE
02/1
TO CONTINUE INTENSIVE SEARCH FOR (ZRPRIMA CANDIDATES FOR INSERTION
INTO CUBAN HIRING CHANNEL. /STATIONS WITH ACTIVE LEADS SHOULD STAY
WITH THEM IN THE HOPE THEY MAY STILL BE HIRED, BUT CEASE EFFORTS
TO GENERATE LEADS FROM SCRATCH. ON OTHER HAND, THERE ARE PAIR
NUMBER NON BLOC TECHS IN CUBA AND IT LIKELY CUBANS WILL CONTINUE
TO RIVE NEELS
021
TO (GEPRIMA PROGRAM.
ON LIMITED SELECTIVE BASIS AS THEY DID PRIOR
STATIONS THEREFORE ARE URARD 10 wat
ALERT FOR SICH OPPORTUNITIES AND TO EXPLOIT THEM IN SAME HANNER
ALL OTHER OPPORTUNITIES TO PLACE RESIIRNT AGENTS IN CUBA,
RELEASING
COORDINATING OFFICERS
GROUP 1
CONT...
APTHENTICATIN
PEPRODUCTION STO
BLUET
SUING OFACE BETICAL
OFFIGER
16318

14-00000

CON

0.

TO
PAGE THREE
INFO
ROUTINE
CITE DIR
85387
:
3
IN THIS CONNECTION WE NOTE THAT KOST PERUMEN OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE
FOR RECRUITING TECHS TEND TO RELY HEAVILY ON LOCAL CP STAMP OF
APPROVAL OF OTHER STRONG INDICATION THAT CANDIDATE IS POLITICALLY
ACCEPTALLE. LACKING THIS THEY MAY EITHER IGNORE THE APPLICATION
CR REJECT IT.
071
41
4. RESPONSE OF MOST STATIONS IN IMPLEMENTING (ZEPRIMA HAS
BEEN MOST GRATIFYING. WE PROVIDED CUBANS WITH GOOD NUMBER HIGHLY
QUALIFIED ENGINEERS AND TECENICIANS WHICH THEY FOR REASONS CITED
UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO ACCEPT. KUBARK HAS MADE A RESPECTABLE
EFFORT TO EXPLOIT THIS OPPORTUNITY AND FACT THAT WE HAVE NOT
ACHIEVED SIGNIFICANT LESULTS IS MARELY REFLECTION CUBAN CONFUSION
2
AND INEPTITUDE WITH RESULTANT, FAILURE ACHIEVE THEIR OWN GOALS.
1
5. DISCONTINUE USE USA (ZAPA
Σ
PRIMA SLUG AND FILE 200-120-47.
END OF MESSAGE
CIS COMMENT. Cahia pre-dates CS files. Copy may be seen in GIA
reference file.

MELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
GROUP
Loctuded from Butomatie
SECRET
AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

16318

14-00000

FROM: DIRECTOR

INFO
float' more
pri
VILLIY O'RTAR
PAGE JOUR
INFO

CITE
85387

SAS/BOB
SAS/NOB
berr
WE/S BC Loebe
cros me hele
لمعلوا لنا میں
Cillingill

CAZAS
عني
16318
# 104-10100-10065

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET

TO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR

ROUTINE

INFO: CI/AP, WI/AM DUMMY, C/WH 2, D/OS 2,/V4

TO: MEXI INFO CITE DIR

KUDESK ZROCKAN 5974

RE DIR-

IDEN A RUPEK DUDIN 201-83827.

IDEN B ARLETTE FRANCOISE HEZARIFEND ALIAS CARTIER BORN 2 MARCH 36 PARIS FRANCE.

END OF MESSAGE

(Please cross-ref to attached outgoing)

C/S COMMENT: DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT ZROCEAN CABLES.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICERS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

16349
104-10100-10086 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

UNIT: DC/WE/4/X SECRET
EX: 5559
DATE: 30 SEPT 1963

TO : MEXICO-ROME HAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/WE 2 RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, C/SAS 5, RF, VR

TO NEXI INFO ROME WAVE CITE DIR

KAFOK KEYWAY PERUMEN 72346

REF: ROME C534 (IN 28856)* (NOT SENT MEXI)

1. DESIGNET (IDEN A), FORMER LONG TERM RESIDENT FERUMEN, WILL REVUTU
PERUMEN ON BUSINESS TRIP FOR IDEN B. LATTER IS FIRM JE REPRESENTED ALONG
OTHERS. FLANS DEPART ITALY 6 OCT TO VISIT FRIENDS SUISSE TIEN PROCEEDING MADRID

TO TAKE IBERIA FLIGHT DIRECT PERUMEN 11 OCT HAS [ITAL] SERVICE PASSIGEM. WILL
ATTEMPT EXIT PIRUMEN APPROX TWO WEEKS AFTER ARRIVAL FOR BRIEF TRIP EXI FOR
DEBRIEFING BRIEFING EY KUBARKER. HOPES RETURN PENUNEN FOR TWO OR THREE MONTHS
MORE.

2. PER MEXI CABLE ROME CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS FOR PASSAGE DESIGNET PRIOR
HIS DEPARTURE. KQS FORWARDING MEXI FULL DETAILS THIS OP.

END OF MESSAGE

* DESIGNET will travel PERUMEN; requests contact Mexico City for brief exit.
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

ORIG: STEPHEN I. MUNGER AVH
ORIG
DC/WE/4/2
5559
DATE: 30 SEPT 1963

SECRET

TO MEXICO ROME HAVE
FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WE 2
INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, C/SAS 5, RF, VR

TO
ΚΑΡΟΚ ΚΞΥHAY PERUSE
REF: DIR
72346

CITE DIR
72347

IDEN A [GIULIO MONDELLO BORN 26 FEB 1917

IN ITALY ITAL CITILEN, FORMERLY

AGENT IN CUBA FOR FIAT AND OWNER TV
TUBE FACTORY.

IDEN B [NERIOLO (LINOTYPE) FIRM, TURIN

END OF M

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SLWH

15345
104-10100-10090 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TRIG: W. OLAERI/DIA
INIT: SAS/106
7646
INDEX SECRET
ONO INDEX
YTE: 30 8457 63
201-733547
201-338838
C: JESIAVE MEXICO CITY 1 OCT 452
ROM: DIRECTOR

ONF: C/SAS 5

IFO: DOP, ADDP, C/CI, RI/AN DUMMY, C/WH 5, RF, VR

HAVE INFO MEXI
CITE DIR 72383
RYBAT TYPIC

REF: WAVE 4369 (IN 20073)*
04 08
[JOSE LUIS (ZALA)] SUBJ PARA 4 REF, RESIDENCE [ULTIMAS NOVEDADES S.A.]
-ly
37-219 MEXI IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH [JOSE LUIS (ZALA)] 201-338838, SAME
ADDRESS WHO CURRENTLY REGISTERED AFOZEER SERVICE. 201 FILE CONTAIRS INC

OTHER INFO.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS/COMMENT: "Ref is RYBAT.

SAS/FOB
SAS/KOB
GAS/CI (in draft)
26
WH/3/TEXI (by phone)

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

-03/5348

C/
RELEASING OFFICER

1-1 COORLINATING OFFICERS

ARCRRA

C/BAS/TYISI
AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER

ML
104-10100-10152 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

03
Manuel Aragon
CA/35
5352
8 October 1963

PARIS/L/PIPIT INFO: REALT

PALP
XXII
74043

02
MEDURIC EXPITODE

REF: DIR 74042

IIDENTITY
06 08
IDSA A (ALFONSO BIBILIOX) FRADIOMERE OLE

See basis
for release

C/CA
DELTASINS OFFICES:
COORDINATION OFFICERS

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce i
Gul!
C/CA/DS
AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER
15538
DM4
104-10100-10157

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DRIG D.FONIS: tw
UNIT SAS/EOD
EXT $6172
DATE :8 OCTOBER 1963
TO MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SAS 8
INFO: DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT. 2, WH 7, RF, VR

TO PRITY MEXI INFO
CITE DIR
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
S-E-C-R-E-T
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-6-78
1
2
3
12-62
ROUTING
4
5
6

00CT 33 12 25Z
DERIVE FEW
ROUTINE

14184

TYPIC AMLONG

IDENTITY:A ALFREDO DAVINS
RONIS

END OF MAGR

J.C. ZING
C/UHD
26

RETURN TO CIA.
Background Use Only
De Nat Racroduce

C/DASTOO
15543

Ini3
104-10100-10186 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Q
B. Lets/XB
S/
455
10 163

MEXICO CITI

INFO: UF, CI/CA, WH 7, RF, VR

TIPIC ANSOUR
SECRET
201-
SUBOS

SIG CEN
DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

CITE DIR 74976

1. LETTER TO AMSOUR-2 BEING POUCHED MEXI BY HON ACCOUNTABLE MANIFEST
06
NO. 57705L FOR MAILING TO SR. JUAN GOMEZ BLANCO IN PERUMEN.

2. REQUEST MEXI MAIL O/A 1 NOVEMBER AND ADVISE HUS ACCORDINGLY.

END OF MESSAGE

J.S. KNO
C/WE

10-10
SECRET
E. A. KANEL
C/SAS/ROB

Copy No.
15871
104-10100-10192 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

106/14 OCT 63/cs 03 CLASSIFED MESSAGE
INDEX SECRET/EYS ROUTING
NOINDEX
11 OCT 63 FILE IN CS FILE NO. 1 4
2 5
3 6

HAMBURG FRANKFURT HAGUE MADRID PARIS 1 OCT 53 22 117
LONGI
FROM DIRECTOR
DEFERKEY
/GAS 5 ROUTING
10 OP: ADCP, C/SOD 4, C/CI, C/FIA, C/TSD 3, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, RF
ADDED: C/AF 3, C/WH 5, RF, VR

ERUS INFO HAND PLAN BAGU ADR (ROUTER 75124
PART LOND
RILAT KLYLAY PERUNEN ZR7AGON

KET: BRUS 3460 (IN 38151)* (NOT SENT PARIS LS LOND)
1. HURRICANE FLORA DAMAGE TO CURA WILL PROBABLY RESULT
LEAVY CONCENTRATION FOOD AND MEDICINE IN MARITIME CARGOES TO
CUBA, THUS ALTERING PERCENTAGES AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT AND
SABOTIGE OPS AGAINST CUBAN SHIPPING. DISH EFFECT CORATORIUM
SABOTAGE OPS UNTIL THIS FACTOR DISAPPELES AND USE INTERVAL TO
MAKE CERTAIN CHANGES IN APPROACH.

2. FURTHER GUIDANCE FORTECOMING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
END OF LESSAGE

SAS/Comments: * Plans for sabotaging Rio Cronso.

DESIOND FITZGERALD SHS/ENG
C/SAS 03
TSD/CAD Tislly Jones by phone
03 WE/2 Jack Dolency by phone
THOMAS THIRLE WE/5 Vaugh/Luman on duy
CAE/INT WE/3 Roger Ruin by phone
03
WE/SC Yoin4 (Py
COORD OFF W
RETURN TO CIA
SECRET/RYBAT Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce
KURARD A. MARELIUS
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
15928
104-10100-10199 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

ORI:
UNIT FE/CIOP
EXT 5602
DATE: 12 OCTOBER 1963

TO: MEXICO CEY

FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
C/FL 6

INFO: ASP-CICT, CTFT 2, C/WH 5, D/OS 2, RF, IVR

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
INDEX
NO INDEX
FILE IN CS FILE NO.201-736751
ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

IMMEDIATE MEXI
INFO
CITE DIR 75338
TO
KAPOK LOHARVEST
REF MEXI 6483 (IN 38148)

1. LIANG SZU CH'ENG 2733 1835 2052, 201-736701 TY

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH. MEMBER CCP.
BACKGROUND:
1923 BA TSINGHUA UNIV
28 BA, MA UNIV PAIN
29 MA HARVARD
28-31 PROF AT NATIONAL NORTHEASTERN UNIV, ORELIA
RESEARCH
30-41 UNVERSIEN ARCHITEC UE
32-33 PROF NATIONAL PEKING UNIV; PROF NATIONAL TSINGHUA
UNIV, PEKING
RESEARCH
41-43 RESEARCH FELLOW, ACADEMIA SINICA
10 PROF NATIONAL TSINGHUA UNIV, PEKING
47 HONORARY FED YALE: VISITING PROF YALE
MEMBER OF TSINGHUA UNIV
53-61 HEAD OF DEPT OF CIVIL ENGINEERING AND ARCHITECTUR
TSINGHUA; VICE PRESIDENT ARCHITECTURE SOC!
COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET
AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. 15912

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
TO:

DATE:
FROM:

CONF:
INFO:
IMMEDIATE

56 ASSOC, DEPT DEPTIVER CIVIL AND ARCHITECTURAL
NOV 58
CHINA DEMOCRATIC LEAGUE
SEP 50 NATIONAL COMMITTEE
APR 52
CHINA SCIENTIFIC AND
TECHNICAL ASSOC
DEPUTY SECOND NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS FROM
THIRD NATIONAL
COMMITTEE CPPCC
OCT 62 VICE CHAIRMAN CHINA ARCHITECTURAL SOCIETY
SEP 63
DEPUTY LEADER OF CPR DELEGATION TO SEVENTH INTER-
NATIONAL CONGRESS OF ARCHITECTS, HAVANA
2. RE SELF CRITICISM FOLLOWING EXTRACTS FROM LIANG'S SPEECH TO THE
RPC, JULY 13, 1957 ENTITLED "WHY I LOVE OUR PARTY." DEPUTY LIANG, AFTER DESCRIBING
"THE BRILLIANT INDUSTRIAL, AGRICULTURAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL ACHIEVEMENTS
OF OUR NATION," TOLD OF HIS PAST ANXIETY AND PERPLEXITY IN HIS OWN WORK. HE
SAID THAT AT THE TIME HE HAD USED OUT-DATED ARCHITECTURAL THEORIES TO TEACH THE
YOUNG INSTRUCTORS AND STUDENTS OF THE TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY BECAUSE HE WAS BOTHERED

COORDINATING OFFICERS
SECRET
AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

ORIG
UNIT
EXT:
TO
DATE:

FROM:
CONF:
INFO:
INFO
ROUTING
5661
12 OCTOBER 1963

MEXICO CELTY

DIRECTOR
:
PAGE THER
:
CITE DIR

INFO:
DOEDIATE
BY
FOR REPUTATION
I WAS DOWNER
WITH THE PARTY
I WAS SURE I WAS BEI
DID NOT FIT INTO THE
THAT OF A CHILD BEING
PARTY AS MUCH AS I HAD
WITH ME. AFTER I CALI
SAID: "I WAS A PRODIGAL SON.
PARTYUT EVEN A JEEP
AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

ORIGIN FRANK
UNIT:FE/CIOP
EXT 5661
DATE: 12 OCTOBER 1963

TO:
FROM: DIRECTOR

CON!
INFO
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
INDEX
NO INDEX
FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

TO:
INFO
CITE DIR
75338

3. BEFLATE 1 (INFO) WAS

OPINION THAT LIANG WOULD
IN PLACE BUT THERE IS CHANCE
HE WOULD ERFACE IF OFFERED CHANCE. FOR FURTHER LIANG,
CANDIDATE FOR

COULD MAKE GOOD IN PLACE MORE.
4. SEEKING BEFLATE 1

BRIDGE TO LIANG. SEFLAER 1

OFFICER. HAS
FOR HUMARK COMPACT BUT

FURTHER BACKGROUND.
5. 3TPLATE 1 WILL USB TOURERY COVER AND WILL REMAIN ONLY THO DAYS DUE
HEAVY PERSONAL COMSIONS FUNCTION WILL
ATTEMPT ESTABLISH CONTACT LIANG AND DETERMINE
IF SO STATION SHOULD BE PREPARED SAFEHOUSE UNTIL FURTHER STEPS CAN BE TAKEN.

6. STPLATE 1 ARRIVING MEXI 12 OCTOBER 2145 HOURS VIA EASTER
AIR LINES FLITE 305. HAVE BRIEFED HIM

BEFDUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

FRANK
FE/CIOP
ORIG
EXT
DATE
ΤΟ
5661
12 OCTOBER 1963
INDEX
NC FILE NO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET

12-62
ROUTING
PAGE FIVE
CITE CUR
DEFERRED
ROUTINE
INFO
DOORDIATE MEXI
WILL WEAR RED WITH BLUE TIE. IT CONTACT KISSED STPLATE 1 TO PROCEED
CITY AND CONTACT MARINE GUARD AT EMBASSY ASKING FOR (SAMSEED). AUTHORIZE
STATION ADVANCE OPERATIONAL FUNDS AND PER DIEM AS HECESSARY TO STPLATE i
SINCE NO OPPORTCHITY DO 80 HERE CHARGE LCHARVEST COA.
END OF MESSAGE
RAPOED .HERRER
PI Staff Lloyd George (by phone)

DC/PED/08 Steve Kuhn (by phone)

CI Staff . Mertz (by phone)

DCFE(C)

C/WH/3 J. Whitten (by phone)

William C
CPE
SECRET104-10100-10200 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

PL/CLOP
0733

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
......
.....201-73071

MEXICO CITY

FE 6
DEP, CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, D/OS 2, R, VR

INFO CITE DIR 75339
IMMEDIATE MEXI
KAPOK LCHARVEST
REF DIR 75338

Chairman, DEPARTMENT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
RICHARD WALKER, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Fl Staff Lloyd George (by phone)

DC PSO/06 Steve Kisha (by ph.ue

CI Staff Mr. Mertz (by phone)
phone)

15913
104-10100-10223
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

FRANK/WICKUM:bl

INDEX
:
5661
NO INDEX
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET
ROUTING
1
4
2
3
16 OCTOBER 1963  CS FILE NO 10-120-11

RIO DE JANEIRO, MEXICO CITY
16 OCT 63 22
FM: DIRECTOR
SIG CEN
CONF:
DEFERRED
ROUTINE
INFO:

100, C/CI, C/12, 0/1/4, CCC, C/WH3, RF, VR

TO PRIORITY RIOD
INFO PRIORITI MEXI
CITE DIR 6166
KEF: MEXI 6550 (IN 40823) (NOT SENTRIO)
LCHARVEST KAPOK

1. FOR PIO: SOME MEMBERS OF CHICOM DELEGATION TO THE SEVENTH CONGRESS
OF INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ARCHITECTS (UIA) HELD HAVANA 29 SEPT 3 OCT AFTERWARDS
WENT MEXI TO ATTEND UIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON
ARCHITECTURE. MEXI GROUP NOW SCHEDULED LEAVE MEXI 0100 HOURS 19 OCT FOR RIO.
FOLLOWING BIO DATA ON THREE MENSERS OF GROUP KNOWN TO HE MEXI:
A. YANG TING-PAO 2799 1694 1405, 201-735346; B. 20 AUG 1901, HONAN;
U.S. EDUCATED; MBR NPC; MOR ACADEMIA SINICA; VP, UIA.

B. LIANG SZU-CHENG 2733 1835 2052, 201-736781; B. 1901, TOKYO; U.S.
EDUCATED; MBR CCP; DEPUTY NPC AND CPPCC; VICE CHAIRMAN CHINA ARCHITECTURAL SOCIETY.

C. WU CHING-HSIANG 0702 2529 4382, 201-736317; B. CIRCA 1919, MANCHUPIA;
FRENCH EDUCATED; CHAIRMAN ARCHITECTURE DEPT TUNG CHI UNIV, SHANGHAI

2. DURING STAY GROUP MEXI UNILATERAL APPROACHES MADE TO YANG TING-PAO
AND LIANG SZU-CHENG FOR PURPOSES OF ASTESSMENT AND POSSIBLE DEBLIEFING,
DEFECTION OR FECHUTIMENT IN PLACE. FOLLOWING CONTACTS WITH YANG DI FORMER
PARTNER IN ARCHITECTURAL FIRM CHINA AND BY MBR U.3. FIRN YANG PREVIOUSLY
ASSOCIATED WITH, YANG ACCEPTED INTERVIEW WITH KUBARK STAFFER WHO USED COVER
CONTINUED

16074

ORIG:
UN!! :
EXT :
DATE:
YLARK/NICKING
INDEX
NO INDEX
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET
ROUTING
4
5
FILE IN CS FILE NO.

FM: DIRECTOR

CONF:
DEFERRED
ROUTINE
INFO:
PAGE TWO

INFO
CITE DIR 76166
RESEARCH SCHOLAR CHINA. CONVERSATION FRIENDLY AND INCLUDED DISCUSSION MAINLAND
SITUATION. LIANG APPROACHED BY KUBARK CONTROLLED U.S. SIROLOGIST WHO WAS STUDENT
LLANG AT YALE 1947. CONTACT WITH LIANG KNOWN TO OTHER CHICOMS IN DELEGATION,
ALTHO LIANG LEFT ALONE WITH OUR MAN FOR HALF HOUR. LEANG ATTITUDE FRIENDLY BUT
SEEMED TO FOLLOW PERARRANGED LINE AND LIANG PROFESSED COMPLETE BELIEF CHINESE
CONURISH. LIANG CLADIED CONTACT BETWEEN CHINESE AND AMERICAN "FRIENDS" CONSIDERED
HIGHLY DESTRABLE BY CHINESE. CONTACTS WITH BOTH LEANG AND YANG LIMITED TO
FRIENDLY DISCUSSIONS SINCE OPERATIONAL DISCUSSION DID NOT SEEN APPROPRIATE IN
EITHER CASE.

3. MU'S HROTHER, U.S, CITIZEN, ARRIVING MEXICO 16 OCTOBER TO TALK WITH
WU AND ASK HIM IF WISHES REMAIN IN FREE WORLD.
4. REQUEST RIOD MOLITOR ACTIVITIES GROUP BRAZIL AS FEASIBLE AND ATTEMPT
DEVELOP FURTHER BIO AND ASSESSMENT DATA IF NATURAL ACCESS TO GROUP CAN BE FOUND.
DO NOT RECOMMEND FORCED APPROACH TO ANY OF GROUP, SINCE OUR COVER FOR THIS
ACTIVITY WEARING THIN AND THERE IS LONG RANGE COAL OF FUTURE FOLLOW UP THESE
CONTACTS WHEN APPROPRIATE ACCESS CAN BE ARRANGED.

CONTINUED

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

PRANK/MICKUM: bl
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
ROUTING
INDEX
SECRET
4
5
NO INDEX

FILE IN OS FLE NO
6

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF:
DEFERRED
ROUTINE
INFO:
PAGE THREE

INFO
CITE DIR
76166
5. FOR MEXI: PLS IDENTIFY OTHER MARS OF MEXI GROUP ENROUTE RIOD AND
FORWARD TO RIOD ARY ADDITIONAL INFO ON PURPOSE TRIP TO RIOD. ALSO INFORM RIOD
OF RESULTS VU MEETING WITH BROTHER.

A/DCFE(C)
END OF MESSAGE
WH/3
WH

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE GOUNG OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
104-10100-10237 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

WH/LOG
7282
16 Octobes 1963

Mexico City

DIRECTOR
F:
8
ة
OL 4, RF, VP
MEXI
CLASSIFED VESSAGE
SECRET
(18 Oct 63) 15 272
SIGCEN

76566

REF: MEXI 6547 (IN 40710)*
MIDW 3207 (NOT SENT MEXI)
MIDW ADVISES CARTRIDGES DELIVERED CORPUS CHRISTI 1 OCTOBER
ONE BOX FIFTY POUNDS CARGO 64-M51104 DIF.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COMMENT: Requests Hdas advise taken on Rean 559-5-64.

C/WH/3
Telecoord:
OL/TD/CB, Mr. Dalye.

WILLIAM E. BROOKS
CHIEF, WH SUPPORT

Charles Reimer
CHARLES F. REINER
ACTING CUTE LOGISTICS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

16102
104-10100-10239 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

IG: CR.BANSEN
UNIT SAS/BOB
6172
18 OCT 1963

INGEX
SECRET

201 77541

MEXICO JMWAVE

SIG CEN
X

C/OPO, CI/PA, FI, NE 4, WH

INFO HAVE
70695
MEXI
TYPIC
REF DIR: 76694 05
IDEN IS MICHEL CHIDIAC, LEBANESE CHARGE IN HAVANA. SEK
MEXI 5954 AND 6008 FOR RECENT TRAVEL.

SAS/MOB Cue Earling (in draft)
RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
degradaung and
Declassication
IRAQ A. MARELI
C/SAS/BOS
AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER

#15408
# 104-10100-10247 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

L.G. HORK 18:
WH/3/Mexico
5940
21-Oct 1963

MEXICO CITY

PRIORITY ΜΕΣΙ

LILING

RRF DIR 77179

27021
SIS CEN

77180
محطة

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1. IDEN A: ASH & COMPANY [420 LEXINGTON AVE]
NEW YORK, Ν.Υ.

2. IDEN B: OVERSEAS RIRALTY SURVEY ASSOCIATES SEATTLE
BASHINGTON KUVEST LOTIONAL,

END OF MESSAGE

J.C.

BELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICES

26.
CSH/3
ΑΝΤΗΕΟΤΙCAFINS
OFFICER

Cope
1549415
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

03
JANET NIXON
SAS/EOB.
3152
22. DCT. 33
X
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRETARYP
200-120-50

MADRID JHEAVE FOME CASABLANCA RABAT FARIFUIT
HAMBURG BRUSSELS MAGUL LONDON MILAN OTTA PARIS
DIRECTOR MEXICO CITY

C/SAS 5

INFO DOP, ADDP, C/SODC/CI, C/P 2, C/TSD 3, C/AF 3, C/EE 3,
C/WE 2, C/ 5, RF VR

IMMEDIATE MADP. INFO HAME BRUS LGU SOND CASE
(FOUTINE) OTTA PARI MEXI
WAVE ROMЕ КАБЕХИЛЕХ 77347
RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce
FRAN HILLA

RYBAT ZRWAGON T-C

1. POLLOWING IS FBIS TICKER ITEM FROM CASTRO'S 21 CCTO
SPEECH: "CASTRO REVEALS THAT HIS SECURITY FORCES HAVE JUST
DISCOVERED AN ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE OF THE CUBAN MERCHANT SHI
LAS VILLAS. CASTRO CLAINS THAT THE CIA PLACED A BOMB AБOAD
VESSEL IN GANOA, ITALY, BUT THAT IT WAS DEFECTIVE AND WIDT
GO OFF. THE BOND HAS FOUND, HE SAYS, IN THE SHIP US Em
UNLOADED."

2. KUBARK DEX POLICY IS NO COMMENT AND COMPLITE JERIAL
IF SPECIFICALLY ASKED.

END OF MESSAGE
DESMOND PWPACKRALA
C/SAS
ER/G West Parker by phone WE/BC/CR. Joyner pho

VB/2Jack Delaney by phone
WR/4 Steve Bunge by phone Pierr

PICKARD P. BANES
C/VB/X
B/s (Vaughn Sherman) by phone
Mr.

Canjare Aus
EDUARD A. MELLIUS
phone C/SAS/ZOB

GROUP 1
L
#15498
104-10100-10319 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

B E. Reichnardt
ACVI/3

30 Oct 63

ICO CITY

RYBAT

SECRET

192

79355

1. HDOS HAS DIPO TO EFFECT ON HOTELS INTERNATΙΟΝΑΙ ΕΞΣΧΙΝG
سكت تشتهي PASSON AB PUEREL DIRECTOR FOR MEXICO AED CENTRAL AMERICA.
GOOD FOSSIBILITY ME ASIA FIR SEAT POSITION

2. GATION CO THEB COVERS
SAAB AND CALIFICATIONS AND CGPICS OF SUITABLE
GRICA SO FILL COVER POST。

R. HERBERT

RELEASING OFFICER

CCG/C - Mr. Corange (rhone)

Can/Fers. Cechest (phone

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Cimly
Do Not Reproduce

B. B. TKICA
AC/W/3

AJTHEN ICA ING
OFFER
Copy Na
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
104-10100-10357 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce
81033

RYBAT TYPIC ANQUAR MAPRON
REFS: A. DIR 78270
B. DIR 78271

STATE...A.......
FAMIL, RESIDENT
MEANS: AFERISNG THE FILE
WHERE ORIGINALLY APFLICC

PLS PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO ANQUAR 1 AT REF ADDRESS AND
PROVIDE HIM SECURE CUNHO CHARREES HE DESIRES SEND
TO HIS HOS CONTACT MATTHEW E. ONTRICH SHOWN TO ANQUAR 1 AS
"DAVID BAAS".

"1. BE ASSURED NOTHING VILL BE DONE IN REGARD CONTACTING
DAVID TIL CLEARITH YOU. REQUEST YOU ALSO DO NOTHING UNTIL
COORDINATED WITH US. BEST SOLUTION WOULD BE FOR YOU TRY ARDANGE
THREK TO SIX MONTHS LEAVE OF ABSENCE WEICH YOU SAN EXTEND IP MECES-
SARY.

2. HAVE ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH LUIS CASAS CAMPA WRO SAILING
ON CUBAN SHIP. XXXT TIME LUIS AVAILABLE FOR CONTACT IN PORT OUTEIR
CUBA DESIRE YOU BE PREPARED TRAVEL TO THAT LOCATION FOR PUSOHAL
CONTACT FIX.

3. PERSON WHO DELIVERS THIS MESSAGE WILL ALSO PROVIDE A
BBCURE COMMO CHANNEL TO MK.
5-8
Clw/3rdti
WH/3/MEXI Bustee
COORDINATING DVVTERNS
A-R-CR-B-T
END OF MESSACE 3
EDWARD A. HAREL
SAB/EOD

AUTHENTICAT.MO
eo. No
16/14
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

8.
C

5940
6 NOVEMBER
BRIDA MEXICO CITY

INFO: CEF, ADDP, C/CI, C/SAS S, VR Y

MRID INFO CITE DIR 8:481

KAPOK PBRUMEN
REF: MRID 0312 (IN 53124)

1. ODCOIL MEXI SHOULD BE GIVEN LEAD ON MILTON LYWN, AVOID-
ING KUBARK INVOLVEMENT THIS CASE.

2. NO TRACES ERNESTO ABREU GOMEZ AGREK HE IS TARGET FOR
DEVELOPMENT FOR PERUKEN OPERATIONS. INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH
ABREU GOMEZ ON LYNN CASE AND POSSIBLY LATER INTRODUCTION TO
ODCOIL AGENT MAY PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY POR ASSESSMENT AND DEVELOPING
RAPORT.

END OF MERRAGS

*WH COMMENT: Ref reported U.S. citizen LINK told herida police
chief of drugs case. Chief suggested U.8. agent be inserted in
net. Merida vishes develop Chief ABRES for PEROMEN ops.

SAS/BOB Ronis (In Draft)

J. C. KING
C/VED

2. REICHEZARDT
AC/WB/3

AUTHENTICATING
104-10100-10396 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

TO: DIRECTOR
FROM: MEXICO CITY, DOLORS CITY, AND WE INDICATED
COMP: WH 8
RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce
INFO: CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/O VR
TO: MEXI FOR GEREEN INFO PACY RIOD (ROUTINE) CITE DER: 81525
(IMMEDIATE)
02 06
1. [REINBEING TOLD BOIZELLE] HE PROVIDING CR$ 5,999,999 TO
08
ARI CAMPISTA PRESIDENT GUANABARA CHEMICAL WORKERS FEDERATION
16-20-70 02 09
THRU RIO TEHOODCAP OFFICE FOR USE IN DECEMBER CSTI ELECTIONS.
04 10
CAMPISTA USING FUNDS GAIN SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC SLATE, HOWEVER
DEMOCRATIC GROUP HOT ABLE AGREE ON SLATE FOR WHO TO HEAD IT.
02 03
2. REQUEST OF DETAILS FROM REINBEING AS RIOD DEVELOPING
PARALLEL ELECTION OF AND ANXIOUS AVOID CONFLICT OR COMPETITION
02
AMONG DEMOCRATS. BELIEVE REINBEING OF FOT NECESSARILY COUNTERING
RIGO PLAN BUT KERD CLARIFICATION.
06
3. FTI RIOD PREPARING PROVIDE FUNDS TO HUGO GOMES DA COSTA,
08 04
OF ALCOHOL AND SUGAR WORKRES WHO HANED AS MEMBER OF CAMPISTA'S
DEMOCRATIC GROUP.

END OF MESSAGE

CA/4 Mr. Ozga (in draft)
WE/3/Mexico Richert
WH/CA

J. C. KIND
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER
C/WR/6
AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

15247
104-10100-10411 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

201 160161

CITI
SIO CEN
CHER 81778

PBRUMEN
REFS: A. WMA-22285*
B. DIR 69900**

1 RE PARA THREE & REF A LAQUEL PEDROSA BE LEIVA WHO NOW
RESIDING MEXI AND FRIEND OF LIFANIL 2) FAMILY, VERY PROBABLY WIFE OF
XIO LAYVA FUENTES AND CUBAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER PREVIOUSLY REPORTED
BY AND IMPORTANT RECRUITMENT/DEFECTION TARGET. AMTIP 1
OFFICER MENTIONED PARA ONE REF
FORMER CLOSE FRIEND OF DESCRIBES MIX AS OR COMUNIST AND
PROBABLY WILLING COOPERATE WITH ANTI GOC ELE.

2. REQUEST NEXT RELOASE POSSIBILITY UTILIZING PRESOSA AS LEAD
TO ERYVA

3. NOS TRACES PEDROGA NEGATIVE.

END OF MESSAGE
SAB Comment: *LITAMIL- Report
**Ref KYBAT

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce
AC/BAB/CI
SAS/SOB Ronis (in draft) DERMOND FITZGERAL
3/201

AC/SAS
OFFICER

152-53
104-10100-10419 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

1. PMBO
2. OKAD
3. PEC OG
(SEE BELOW)

PREPY ABON BOOO BRIL BUK
COBO GUAT CAYA LAPA LIMA
MANA MEXI KRID PRIN CUFF
RECI BAGO SALV SAOPS JOS
SDON TEGO

OOLONG

BOOK MESSAGE ANCA NER

YOGU PACY

COTE DIR
PRIORITY

91024

WITH CHIEF MISSION AND COS CONCURRENCE, ADDEES MAY OBSERVE SAME
OFFICE HOURS AS COVER MISSION. SET SEICAL PLUS MONITOR YOGU CO/GRA
AT 232. STATIONS WITHOUT SELCAL MONITOR 23002 CQ. ALL STATIONS WITH
RESIDENCE TO WITHIN CAPABILIFY DURING CLOSURE PERIOD

#15729
104-10100-10424 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SBC

26х63 16 26z

91222

ΣΥΣΑΤ ΤΥΡΙΟ

*FYI:* JOURNALIST NAMED FRANK PILGRIN REPRESENTING

AND **MANCHESTER GUARDIAN** PLANNING ATTEND CUBAN ANNIVERSARY
CELEBRATIONS 1 JANUARY. PLAFS LEAVE CURA FIRST WERK OF JAN
PROBABLY CUBANA TO MEXICO. **EMOTH** RAS REQUESTED KUBARK NOT
ATTEMPT CONTACT. KUBARE WILL RECEIVE DEBRIEFING RESULTS, IF
ANY, FROM **SEOTH**.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

#1.5734
104-10101-10054 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

BONE PRIORITY 136022 45z
SIB CEN
INFO
CITE CIR 83692
FRIORITY ROBE MEXI, SALV

REF: SALY 4839 (IN 63096)

IF PCI DOES NOT GIVE DEVISTA-1 CONTACTS IN SALY, STATION

SHOULD PASS TO DEVISTA-1 ONLY FIRST FOUR NAMES OF ABOVE REF.

END OF MESSAGE
RETURN TO CIA
Background Uso Only
Do Not Reproduce

WH/COMMENT: Suggested Communists as possible contacts DEVISTA-1

C/WH/3
WE/Italy Hunger My
WH/3/NEXI Ber

WH/3/CAN
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSLING DEFICE IS PROJE
157721
DW5
104-10101-10109 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

MEXICO CITY

RYBAT TYPIC
REF: DIR 86283 86284

IDEN A: FERNANDO PALENZUKIA VAQUET
SON OF MATEO AND JOSEFA
DPOR 9 NOV 1903 ARTEMISA, PINAR DEL
RIO, CUBA, 5'7" BROWN EYES, GRAY
HAIR, PASSPORT No. 45809, RESIDENT OF
AVENIDA 35 No. 9809, MARIANAO, CUBA

IDEN B: MARIA FRANCISCA CRESPO FALCON
DAUGHTER OF ARTURO AND JOSEFINA
DPOR 28 NOV 1914 GUIRA DE MELENA, HABANA, CUBA
5'0" BROWN EYES/HAIR PASSPORT No. 28149,
RESIDENT OF AVENIDA 35 No. 9809
MARIANAO, CUBA

IDEN C: HOWARD ANDERSON

SAS/SEC: MKN for G.L.

JU/3/MEXI

C/WB/3

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

15935
104-10101-10124 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SAS/HOR/PA/PROP/C-DEX
6055 N SECRET

2 DECEMBER 1963 FILE IN CS FILE NO.

MEXICO CITY BOGOTA LIMA
GUATEMALA JEHAVE

DIRECTOR

COSAS 18

INFO: UDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, WH 7, VR

TO: MEXI BOGO LIMA GUAT INFO WAVE CITE DIR

REF: DIR 816693 86694

IDEN: GRACE HOLMES, P.O.BOX 1767, CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA.

END OF MESSAGE

15951
104-10101-10129 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

BOM: DIRECTOR

CONF: FE 8

INFO: DOP, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CCS 3, WW 7, SAS 8,

INFO TOBY CITE DIR

STUAR PBHI 86803
REP DIR 86802

1. IMA NR. ΚΑΝΣΑHI WATANABE.

2. IN BAR. KENNETH K. SUZUKI, TRANS PACIFIC COMMERCE
CONSULTANTS, SUITE 315, 450 SUTTER STREET, SAN FRANCISCO,
CALIFORNIA. TELEPHONE DOUGLAS 2-6534.

END OF MESSAGE

ADPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

AUTHENTICATING
OPFICER
15958
14-00000

104-10101-10134 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Manuel kragpr.
UNIT: CA/95 INDEX
EXT: 5852 DATE: 5 December 1963
TO : PARIS/LCPIPTI
FROM: DIRECTOR I.FO: MEXICO CITY

INFO: CẢ 2, CA/PESCA 2.

PALP
87038

DIDORIC ΗΒΕΡΙΤΟΜΕ
KEY: MONT 8437 (IN 72721) RELATED MEI

1. FOR MEXI: HAS ANS TO REF SAID: A) AGROKE PROJ UACCEPTABLE AS HOST FOR
E CULHOLLLED ET OF OTI SE LETTER HAS TU
OPEN POSSIBILITY MOVING EVER EN FUT 10 YET DETERMINED STE, C) COSEC LETIER
WAS AUTHORIZED BY SEPT SUPERVISION COMMITTEE (SUPCOM) MEETING WATCH BLANED FEUU
FOR FALLURE HOLD EVENT AND TOLD COSEC TO SEEK ANOTHER SITE.

2. FOR PALP: FOLL SUMMARIZES QS UNDERSTANDING LATIN AMERICAS STUDY SECIHAR
(LABS) TACTICS DISCUSSED WITH KORON STEP REGARDLESS WHETHER
LASS ULTIMATELY HELD IS SEIZING LATTIATIVE ON SITE IN ORDER HONOR SUP CON DECISION
AND OFFERT POSSIERE INVIDATION FROM UNFRIENDLY SITE. THIS NOW ESPECIALLY DOPORTANT
INTR NOS SABI KOT E CONTROL AND
FLEXIBILITY. IN THIS RESPECT KORNELOS AND AYZIA (a)
BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE EUR. BRIEF HIM ON TASS SPATENY AND CAIR E SUPPORT AT
: CHS OFFER INVITATION ACT AS HOST

ASSO MI INVITE LASS CAN BE HELD IF FOLL CONDITIONS SATISFIND
A) PARTICIPATION MULTIMUN 7 DEMOCRATIC UNIORS VITE CLEAR EVIDΕΝΟΣ ΑΙΣ
EV DES LOCKOR TIA SGOTEO JETPORNTVO

SECRET
15963

14-00000
ORIG
UNIT:
1
EXT
DATE :

INDEX
NO INDEX
FO 1
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF
INFO:

TO
10
PAGE TWO
CITE DIR
47036
8) ENOUGH COORDINATION WITH UFUCH TO AVOID THEIR ACTIVE BOBIILITY LABS
AND COSEC AND PREVENT PORCING THEM INTO CLOSER ALLIANCE WITH EXTREMISTS ON OTHER
WE YESUES.

C) LIKELIHOOD THAT LASS CAN BE USKYL FUNUN EXPRESSION DEMOCRATIC VIEWS
OR BOCIAL ECONOMIC QUESTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT GROUNDMORK NECESSARY FOR ISC TACTICS.

D) EVENT DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH MEXI STATION OPERATIONS.

4. LASS SHOULD NOT HE HELD IF ALL OR ANY PARA 3 CONDITIONS FAIL PERDAIN AND
ALSO IP:
A) EARLY EVTEENCE WELL ORGANIZED EXIRENIET COUNTERACTION (POSSIBILITY
OF WHICH RAISED BY VEHENENCE FEUU RESPONSK COSEC LETTER REPORTED IN REP.)

B) PAIP HQS JUDGEMENT THAT THE EFFORT NIISIIND SUNTATY BOLDLI EVENT
RECONES COUNTERPRODUCTIVE DIVKKSION RESOURCES FROM OTHER ELEMEНТІВ КНЕРІТОМE PROGRAM,
DEVELOPNKHT OF IBC TACTICS, OR HARMFUL KURARK LAYC COUNTERACTION.

5. I PARA 4 SITUATION UNFOLDS CNE COULD WITHDRAW INVITATION ON GROUNDS
INADEQUATE PARTICIPATION (ASSUMING BOYCOTT) OR CONTINUE AS HOST BUT CITE SUNDRY
TECHNICAL REASONS REQUCHE POSTPONEMENT LASS.

6. FOR PALP: PARA ONE BRIEFING CORDERO WHICH CORTIERAT ALFREEIPT
MEXT COMMENTS, SHOW CLINE CARDIO OUTLINE PARA 2-5 THINKING SO THAT CHE

RELEASING OFFICER
SECRET
GROUP:
deriassicalon
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
:
Copy No.
::

14-00000

to
10

PACK
F7036
AGREEMENT ISSUE INVITATION ACT AS HOST CLUTIK AWARENESS OF AND COHIDE.T
TO ALL CONTINENCIES. MOREOVER, CORDERO SHOULD BE ASSURED CONTINUING COSEC
SUPPORT LITERACY SEMINAR AND DESIRE HOLDING THAT EVENT AT EARLIEST DATE CONVENIENT

7. POR MEXI: HOS BELLEVES IT UNLIKELY THAT FARA 3 CONDITIONS CAN BE MET
ALTHOUGH POSSIBLE THAT THIS EVENT COULD BE USEFUL HQS DISPATCH WILL INCLUDE
BACKGROUND AND DETAILS LASS STRATEGY. SINCE CORDERO HAY LEAVE EUR SHORTLY
REQUEST COMMENTS TO PALP ASAP.

RELCACAOFFICER
WH/CA Scott Σολομών (
WE/3/MEX
BER (in draft)

i
REPRODUCTION BY K
ASCET
1.
MESSAGE
KURIBD.GABLE
LUNG
ناء
به
104-10101-10135 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

OPIC: Manuel Ar..
UNIT: CA/25
EXT: 5052 SECRET
DATE: 5 December 1963 200-124-73/3
TO: PARIS/LOFTMEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR

CONE: CA/04

INFO: CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PRCP, CI/IC 2, Fi, FI/INT 2, WE 4, WH 7, WR
5 DEC 18492 63
DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

TO: MEXI CITE DIR
87037

DTDORIC HERPITONE
REF: DIR 87036 *

IDENTITIES

A. DONALD EMERSON - NORTH AMERICAN SECRETARY COSSC
B. RAUL AVILA - LATIN AMERICAN SECRETARY COSEC

ME/CA

15964
14-00000
104-10101-10175
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

PRIORITY BOOK CADIL
CARA MARA WAVE LODS.
MEXI LIMA PACY GUAT
BUEN MONT DOGO QUIT
LAYA RIOD SAOP SAGO
LAPA SANJ SDOM

REYS: A. DIR 23577
B. DIP 83638

88205

1. THERE AUR INDICATIONS THAT BANT FLOITATION HOOT DAS
HAVING BENEFICIAL EFFECT IN THAT HIGH INTEREST CREATED AMONG PEOPLE
IS ENCOURAGING AND/OR CAUSING SOME GOVERNMENTS ADOPT STRON SR PO
VENEZUELA POSITION IN OAS. VIEW THIS, SUGGEST ADDEE ACTIVITIES
CONCENTRATE PRIMARILY (BUT NOT EXCLUSIVELY) THIS ASPECT, I.E. EFFORTS
DEMONSTRATE TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS THAT PUBLIC OPINION IS IN FAVOR
VENEZUELAN POSITION OF TAKING FIRM STAND AGAINST CASTRO.
EMPHASIZE
THAT CURRENT ISSUE BEFORE OAS RAISED BY SISTER REPUBLIC, VICTIM OF
SOVIET AND CHICOM SUPPORTED AGGRESSOR; IMPLICATION BEING THAT ODYOKE
PLAYING NO MORE THAN SUPPORTING ROLE.

2. CONTINUE USE "NO COEXISTENCE WITH CASTRO" THEME. CONSIDER
HAVING LABOR, STUDENT, OTHER ORGS SEND TELEGRAMS TO LOCAL GOFTS AND
OAS IN SUPPORT VENEZ POSITION: FOLLOW BEY UP BY PUBLICIZING TELEGRAMS
IN PRESS. VIA MEDIA SPECULATE WHAT SEEPS LOCAL GOVT MIGHT FAVOR
IN
SUPPORT VENEZ, INCLUDING.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
AVENENTICATIN
OFFICEN

Copy No.
16006

DATE
PCA
DIRECTOR

CONF
INFO

TO
INFO
ROUTINE

CITED 80205
A. BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CURA ET ALL LA COUNTRIES
B. CURTAILUENT ECONOMIC RELATIONS,
C. ALL POSSIBLE COMMUNICATIONS BREAK,
D. COOPERATIVE SHHYBILLANCK OF AUTHORING CUBAN CARRIERS.

3. WHERE THERS RELUCTANCK ATTACK CASTRO ON POLITICAL GROUNDS
SUGGEST USE PBG THAT CASTRO'S EXPORTING OF REVOLUTION OVERTAKEN
BY NEWER EXPORT COMMODITY, SAMELY CRIME. THIS EXEMPLIFIED BY ACTS
OF ARSON, DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY, MURDER, KIDRAPING, ETC., AND
THẤT CUBA TRAINING OF 80-CALLED REVOLUTIONARIES FROM FROM THROUGHOUT
HEMISPHERE NOTHING MORE THAN SCHOOL FOR CRIME.

4 FOR MONT GUAT BOGO SDOM: ADVISE WHAT ACTION TAKK
END OF MESSAGE
REPS

C/VH/1
C//2
C/WE/3
C/3
C//6
COL
SAS/CA
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

MEXI

RYBAT TYPICH, ANROD
REP Δ. 7317 (IN 76917)
B: 7295 (IN 75860)
C 22410, Para 2

1. PER REF A IT LIKELY A MEET WILL BE HELD WITH СТБАН NEXT WEEKS.

2. HENCE DESIRE LIFEAT COVERAGE ON ID SOON AS PRACTICABLE SINCE EX BELIEVED LOCAL CASE OFFICER.

3. IF NECESSARY TO EFFECT COVERAGE ON IDEN, STATION MAY
SUSPEND COVERAGE AMBESS/1 BUT PREFER MAINTAIN BOTH.

4. REQUEST STATION TRACES ONLY OF SUBJECTS EXY B AND C. NO HEADQUARTERS RECORD ON EITHER.

5. PLEASE RENEW THE TWO POST BOXES SERVICED BY LIKAYAK/2 IN LOWAS AND MIGNEL SHULTZ.

6 PLRASK HAVE GERENDE OR SCANTLING TRANSLATE AND SEND MARQUEZ FOLLOWING TELEGRAM TO MANUEL VEGA Y SOCIO, FRANCISCO MAREAMEZ

160. COLONIA CONDES A F "RECRIVED YOUR KIND LETTER ТПП NO MONEY SALUDOS. JULIO RODRIGUEZ." RETURN ADDRESSEK TO ΠΕ JUL10 RODRIGURA AI LAMAS HUA

(cont)

SECRET
14-00000
ORIO
UNIT
EXT
DATE
MM
FROM DIRECTOR,
CONFI
WORK
NO INDEX
PALE IN OS FILE NO
PAGE THO
INFO
PLEASE HAVE THIS TELEGRAM SINT 14 OR 16 DEC, EVEN IF
MOKKY HAS ИККИ RECEIVED.

END OF MESSAGE
14-00000
104-10101-10215 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SEARPOVICH: ing
NIT: BR/OL/X
INDEX
NO INDEX
SECRET
2
63
PILE IN CS FILE NO.
D
1
BOOK CABLE (SBB-BELOW)
ROM: DIRECTOR
ONE:
X
FO:
ALL COS, &COB
REDWOOD LCIMPROVE

1. 20 DECEMBER 18 FORTY-SIXTH ANNIVERSARY OF FOUNDING OF SOVIET
STATE SECURITY ORGANΙΣΑΤΙΟΝ, THIS "CHKIST BIRTHDAY" IS TRADITIONALLY
CELEBRATED BY KGB RESIDENCIES AROUND THE WORLD BY DISCREET GATHERING
IN EMBASSY OR OTHER OFFICIAL ENSTALLATION, OR IN HOME OF REZIDENT
OR OTHER REZIDENTURA MEMBER.
2. ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS SOME STATIONS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAKE
NEW IDENTIFICATIONS OR TO CONFIRM PREVIOUS TENTATIVE IDENTIFICATIONS
ON BASIS OF ATTENDANCE THIS PARTY. SUGGEST ADDRESSEES MOUNT UNILATERAL
SURVEILLANCE AND/OR ALERT LIAISON SERVICES TO THIS DATE AS
APPROPRIATE.

KND ESSAGE

SECE..
6051

14-00000
८.
1/12/18
BATH
1
18 DECEMBER 63
16
SKE BELOW
41
P
,
3
SECRET
A
M
:
٦٠٠
AF EE FB NE WH
ALGI VIEN VELB KABU BRUS GORG
OPAI SBUR CNBR COLO OTTA SAGO
UMBU MECA ENGO COPE BOGA
YAOU FRAN PENH LOND 8J08
ADDI BRLN HELS SDON
ACCH CONN TAMI PARI QUIT
CNRY DORF HULA
GAYA
ABID FROB DJAK QUAT
NOBI HAMB SURA PRIN
MNEV HEID TOKY TEGU
TPLI MUNI SEOU KING
WHEL STUT KSAN
GAZI ATHR THAR KAVA LUXE
PARA SLON CASA BERN O OBLO PACY
GIVA
LAGS ZURI INVA LIMA
BRAZ SING SJAN
LEOP BANG STOC SALV
KLIZ SAIQ PIBO
STEY UDOR COBA PRIN
BAKO LAPA LNOR
PRET RIOD CARA
CAPT BLEM DURB BELO
BRIL
CURI
LGRE
AL RECI
ATVS
TAIZ SAOP
89383

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
UNIT:
:
DATE:
TO
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO:
TO
SECR
NO INDEX
LE IN CS FILE NO.

X
PAGE TWO
POUTING
6
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

I certify that this cable must go to all stations and bases.
C/SR/CI
BR/O/ATA
SRVO DW. Scholec
SR/O/TE
SR/O/WE
88/0/
4
"
C/AT
CAT
C/SR
(C/BR)
C/SR
CaNa
104-10101-10227 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

GAN:
DATE: 17 Dec 63

TO:

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: DOP, DODS/L, DODS 4, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2, SAS 8,

TO: PRIORITY ROME CABLE INFO
CARA WAVE
CARLY INFO
DOOS
QUAT
LAPA
CITE DIR 89778

RE: DIR

FYI. ACTION-INTENDED PARA 2 REF WAS

FACING VIA MEDIA. DO NOT DESIRE AS THIS

OR INDIRECT OVERTURES TO LOCAL OFFICIALS

RECTION

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: REQUESTED ADDEES TO CONSIDER SURFACING ANY EVIDENCE CASTRO FINANCING TERRORIST AND PRO CUBAN ACTS, ETC.

16160
14-00000
104-10101-10239

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Kary Parrish
7861
CA/PROP/G
19 Dec 63

SEE BELOW

D.SECTOR

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET

OS FILE NO.

ROUTING

19DEC 63 15 282
DEFO1GOCEN

ROUTINE

INDEX

NEC

CITE 0168
LAGO ABEJ PRAR SOL
MORY EKAR MOGA PRET SER LEOP THAR

16172

14-00000

CITE DIR
90168

1. REUTERS, UPI, AP REPORT FROM MOSCOW EIGHTEEN DECEMBER
THAT APPROX FIVE HUNDRED AFRICAN STUDENTS GATHERED AT GHANA
EMBASSY, FOUGHT THEIR WAY PAST POLICE BARRICADES AND MARCHED
TO KREMLIN TO PROTEST ALLEGED KILLING GHANA STUDENT ASARO ADDEO.
STUDENTS CARRIED PLACARDS "STOP KILLING AFRICANS", SKULL AND
CROSSBONES LABELLED "RUSSIAN FRIENDSHIP", "FRIENDS TODAY, THE
DEVIL TOMORROW" "MOSCOW IS SECOND ALABAMA", STUDENT DELEGATION
PRESENTED MEMO TO MINISTRY HIGHER EDUCATION CHARGING "OUR FREEDOM
BEING THREATENED HERE BECAUSE STUDENTS ARE BEING BEATEN IN
DIFFERENT PARTS OF SOVIET UNION AND ONE WAS KILLED RECENTLY IN
KALININ, WE WANT THE POLICE TO TAKE STRONGER ACTION". SOVIET
OFFICIALS CLAIM ADDEO DIED OF EXPOSURE WHILE INTOXICATED.
STUDENTS BELIEVE HE KILLED BY RUSSIAN BECAUSE HE WANTED MARRY
RUSSIAN GIRL.

2. USING FIRE SERVICE, FBIS SOURCES PLAY STUDENT ACTION
ALONG LINES:

INCIDENT
BEING IS EVIDENCE OF RACIST ATTITUDES.

DESPITE SOVIET PROPAGANDA EFFORT

14-00000

KNISH MEANS BROTHERHOOD

NOLES

AKA PLATH PROBABLY ONLY SPARK SETTING OFF
SANG SHOULDERING STUDENT RESENTMENT OF
POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION, SEGREGATION,
EXPLOITATION FOR PROP PURPOSES

TIE INCIDENT TO RECENT CONGO EXPULSION OF
SOVIET DIPLOMATS AS ANOTHER FACET SOVIET
LONG RANGE PLAN TO DUPE, EVEN TAKEOVER,
NAIVE AFRICAN STATES BY MEANS OF SUBVERSION,
STUDENT INDOCTRINATION AND CONTROL, ECONOMIC
AID
WITH POLITICAL STRINGS

SEE BIWEEKLY GUIDANCE SEVEN HUNDRED NINETEEN FOR FURTHER
ACTION AND BACKGROUND. WATCH STUDENT GROUPS FOR DEMONSTRATIONS,
FOR
ARTICLES AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS DE REPLAY, INTERVIEW COMMUNET
TRAINED STUDENTS. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, EDUCATORS FOR REACTION.

SEND CLIPS HOS

END OF MESSAGE

14-00000
DATE:

TO
FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

INDEX
NO INDEX.
FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTINE

CITE DIR
90161

Coordination
AF/CA Wayne Murphy (in draft)

EE/OPB/CA-4 debet

NE/OP/PA heartesi Harris (phone)
TE/OP/PA Willem Deurt pho
T/30/Joka Istill phone

BR/CA Convent phone
104-10101-10247 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

4218
19 Dec 63

MEXICO CITY

18-134-37A

КУВАТ ТҮPIC YOBITE AMWORLD
ROUTINE
CITE DIR
90383

1. PLEASE ADVISE IF SAMBORA LEGEND COMPLETED AND ALL
PERTINENT PAPERS POUCHED TO HQS.
2. SUBJECT HMM 12212 DIRECTED TO APPLY FOR MEXI VISITORS
VISA.

END OF MESSAGE

CABLE SEC: Please add C/WH to distribution.

• Intonio de Jesus (Pineda) Cabrera
201-297754

19-13
104-10101-10256 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

COMERICAY

LOTE DODO ASSUM BOGD
MUDI CARA QUAT LINA
MA MORT PRIN QUTT
RIOD 3AGO BJOB SDOK
YOU MELI LAPA BALD
PACY GAZA GORG RECI
WAVE KOLA OTTA

HADHOTE

BOOK MESSAGE

BRIL SAOP

210 2

588

1. PETRY HOW ACTIVE NMBER AXANET AND AUTHORIZED HANDLE ODTOKE

CLASSIFIED CLEAR TEXT. ROUFING DEDICATOR BUSIN ASSIGNED.

2. OTTA HOW ACTIVE MINIMER AXAMET. ROUTING INDICATOR RUSION ASSIGNED.

ONLY KUBARK TRAFFIC HANDLED BY OTTAMA.

OC-8-

OC-AD
RFI ASING OFICER
COORDINATING OFFICER
SECRET

GROUP
downgrading
declassification
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

OC-AD
AUTHENTILATING
16191
Coor No
14-00000
104-10102-10224
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET SENSITIVE
Draft Memorandum to the DCI from William Harvey
Dated 27 November 1962
This is not a controlled item
RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce
913

14-00000
Prafti
13 Nov, 1952
SECRET
SENSITIVE
OPERATIONAL PLAN - СТВА
Z. SITUATIONS
A. The purpose of this plan is to outline the action to wa
undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency against the Castro/
Commmist government of Duba during 17-63 and for such longer
period
D. For the purpose of this plan the following assumptions
are nada:

THIS DOCUMENT IS
A SCUFCE REFERENCE
IN CS HISTORICAL
PAPER NO.
-DO NOT DESTROY-
National objectives wit
essentially as follows
Cuba Aze
a. Isolate Castro/Commmion from other Western
Hemisphere nations.
b.Discredit the Castro/ Communist regime La Cuba
the Hemisphere.
1.
moderata economic and political pressara
the Castro/Communist regins to retard develop
ment of the OCuba economy and maintain a drain
on Bloc resources.
d. Maintain maximum coverage of Cuban intelligere
requirements.
Be prepared to capitalise on any significant
uprising, split in Cubanр, от splin
:
SECRET
Excluded from autematic
Swagrading and
ilcation
SENSITIVE

14-00000
MISSION:
تاینRET
ENSITIVE
-2-
on Cuban-Blou relationships.
Covertly support the above-cited V. 8. national
objectives with respect to Cuba.

the maximen intelligence coverage of Coba
with particular emphasis on the following:
Capabilities and intentious of the Castrα
government
Activities of Cuben 0-2.
:
Soviet activities in Cuba,
:
State of resistance including the tone and
temper of the population.
Military and militia order of battle.
Lotus of power and/or stress and strain scre
the "power centers" in the Cuban govern
8. Soviet/Cuban and Chinese/Cohen relationships.
h. Economic.
Political:
Assist and support Stats in any feasible action to
develop active OAS and Latin-American country suppor
for the containment, or overthrow of Castro.
SECRET
SENSITIVE
CROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
Sc ingrading and
daciassification
-

14-00000
TOP SECRET
SENSITIVE
tate in the development of post-Ca
political groupe.
to such schwe
of the Cubm
splitting the
1. Participate in inter-agency economic action planning
and execution,
2. Prevent essential mat
tial material and supplies from reaching
Kazass Free World Trade with Guba.
evelop, maintain ain, and exploit loit the will of the Caphen
people to resist Castro/Communit
2. Discredit the Castre regime in Ovba, in the Mastere
and elsewhere.
3. Develop and exploit tensions between Coba and Sar
bloc assbers.
Resistance:
Be prepared to covertly provida limited personal.
MOSECRET supporto any significant int
SENSITIVE
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000
a.
resia
SECRET
SENSITIVE
Be prepared
group or uprisi
to
Pport approved D. S. military :
against Caba.
DOLB
تو
ESCZA would be r
Intelligence
elligencs
of intel
The foll
mos asseta
Loving types
of nati
ruiting/training of legally establ
Cubans in Cuba
mmisations will become mors critical es
state cont
κολs increase
2 spotting/recruiting/traini
23 of th
Governm
poli
Cusan?
third country
astionale
s resident in Cuba.
?
32 Spotting/recruiting/training
of legal travelers
who have
mtial access
45 Expansion
on who can pro
Lon of commicati
cam provide significant operational sport,
to sis significant informat
Intelligence particula
Ay in th
the G-2, police, and adlitia nets. (This
primary
problem)
SENSITIVE
CROUP 1
Exclude: fr: automatic
dow rat ng and
sing

14-00000
SEC
SENSIT
34 Maintain refuges
Maximize utilization
Psychological Warfar
The progran must pri
reach the Cuban populati
warfare activities are
ball
pol
he program will b
2
maintaining a minimaa
event of a significant
implementation of
:
The following prog
1. Maintain the
SENS

14-00000
SENSITIVE
amounts of
2. Maintain sufficient covert assets to mat raqala
nents levied on CIA in approved U. S. Militanzy
Where internal asseta Axa
ESTIMATED COST TO GIA:
my be held externally.
SECRET
SENSITIVE
ARGUP 1
Excluded from automatic
pho...

14-00000
!
SECRET SENSITIVE
F
T
27 November 1962
Note: Discussed 27 November
1962 by DD/F with IFCI
and approved genera
in principle by ICI.
Fully concurred in
by DD/P.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence.
THROUGH:
SUBJECT:
Deputy Director (Plans)
Operational Plen for Continuing
Oporrtions Against Cube
1. Action: This memorandua is for your information
and pursuant to your request. Recommendations for action rre
contained in Paragraph V below. The purpose of this memor
is to delineate an operational plan for the action which wr
believe should be taken by CIA against Cubs for the predictable
future. In summary the plan provides for continuing, even
intensifying, the intelligence effort against Cuba and for
the reorientation of the current effort into & long term
denied area type of operation of the highest priority.
I. ASSUMPTIONS:
A. The United States Government will give public
assurances that, provided no nuclear or offensive weapers
present or re-introduced into Cuba, and provided Cube doen
not take action to threaten the perce and security of the
Western Hemisphere, the United States does not intend to
invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba.
1.
SECRET
-
SENSITIVE
THIS DOCז דיזיי
A SCUTOR
IN CS
PAPER NO.
-DO NOT ROK

14-00000
:
B. These assurances will preclude any meaningful CIA
action on
"on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cuba, since
unless there are major changes in operational and internal con-
ditions in Cuba, such a revolt if provoked would be totally
destroyed by Cuban counteraction in a matter of hours or, at
most, a few days unless supported by a major United States
Military commitment. In addition, the non-invasion assurances
as a practical matter will preclude invading Cuba on the pretext
of a contrived provocation such as an attack on Guantanamo.
C. CIA operations involving a high noise level and a
distinct element of attributability, particularly paramilitary,
guerrilla, and commando type operations will be unacceptable
as a matter of policy.
D. The Castro-communist regime will remain in power for
the indefinite future with its security and control apparatus
relatively intact and with the capability not only of crushing
unsupported resistance activity, but of making operational
conditions in Cuba increasingly difficult. While it is
possible that recent and future developments including the
Soviet action in removing the offensive weapons from Cube may
serve to weaken and discredit Castro, there is as yet no hard
indication that the control of the Castro-communist regime over
Cuba has been substantially weakenod.
E. The United States assurances of no invasion and no
support of an invasion will, in effect, constitute giving to
Castro and his regime a certain degree of sanctuary. This will
!.
-2-

14-00000
i
i
severely damage the morale and motivation of anti-regime Cubene
both inside and outside of Cuba, which will make it incressingly
difficult for us to recruit agents, maintain agents already
recruited, and continue or intensify our intelligence and other
efforts against Cuba and the Castro-communist regime.
...
٠٠
F. Despite the above factors, Higher Authority probably
will continue heavy pressure on the CIA for a maximum effort
against Cuba and may even continue to contend that the ultimate
objective is the overthrow of the Castro-communist regime.
This is an unrealistic objective, however, except, on a very
long-term basis as the United States Government, we believe,
will be unwilling in the immediate future to commit troops
to support such an overthrow. The United States Government
in its overt dealings with the Cuban exiles probably will not
express the above factors to them in the context or with the
bluntness stated here.
G. In view of these factors, the so-called "Track Two",
course of action, 1.6., unlimited support of Cuban exiles
and exile groups with no real control or objective purposes
in the hope that these groups will be able to shake the
Castro regime will, although unrealistic, become increasingly
attractive at various levels in the United States Government.
H. As a matter of policy, political pressures and
economic pressures short of blockade, raids, and aggressive
sabotage against Cuba will be continued.
!.
-3-

14-00000
:
4
I. In view of the above assumptions prramilitary, comman
and sabotage operations, except in rare selective instances
will serve little purpose; also they will be counter-productive
since, if undertaken, they will make the collection of intelli-
gence more difficult and should only be undertaken in those very
few instances. where an unusually high return can be demonstrated.
Regardless of what other pressures are placed on CIA for
action against Cuba, it would appear clear that Higher Authority
will insist on a continued, even intensified, intelligence
coverage of Cuba.
J. In view of the policy factors, an increased use of
facilities, real estate and basing outside the United States,
particularly in Latin America, will be both necessary and
desirable.
K. Adequate aerial reconnaissance of Cuba will continue.
II. OBJECTIVES:
:
Based on the above sssumptions, the following objectiven
appear to be proper for continuing CIA operations against
Cuba:
A. Take all feasible clandestine action to isolate
and assist in isolating the Castro-communist regime in Cuba
from the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the
Free World.
B. To the maximum extent possible, discredit the Castro-
communist regime in Cuba and in the Western Hemisphere and the
rest of the world.
:

14-00000
C. Maintain through clandestine means, short of commando
and guerrilla type operations, the maximum economic and
political pressures on the Cuban regime and economy not only
for the purpose of hampering the Cuban regime, but for the
additional purpose of insuring the maximum possible drain on
Bloc resources used to support Cuba.
D. Maintain maximum possible intelligence and counter-
intelligence coverage of Cuba, including particular emphasis
on:
1.. Capabilities and intentions of the government.
2. Activities of the Cuban G-2 and its other
security organs.
3. Soviet and Bloc activities in Cuba.
4. State of potential resistance, including the
morale and temper of the populace.
5. Militia and military order of battle and equip-
ment.
8. The loci of power and of possible stresses
and strains in the power centers in the Cuban government.
7. Relationships between Cuba, USSR, Red China,
the Bloc, Latin American nations and other Free World
and uncommitted nations.
8. The level of and the weaknesses in the Cuban
economy.
-5-

14-00000
:
R. Iske maximum action to induce a split in the Cuben
regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately
through clandestine means to the extent possible on any
significant uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regime,
or strains and stresses among Cuban leadership or in Cuben/
Bloc relationships.
III.
OPERATIONAL PLAN:
A.. Espionage and Intelligence Collection - All feasible
effort should be undertaken to continue and intensify intelli-
gence collection concerning Cuba. The status of our intelli
gence collection and related operational activity at the
present time and its development during the past six months
is delinested in detail in Attachment A, which was preprred to
serve as the basis for the IG's report on this particular
matter to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign
Intelligence. You will note that this lengthy document
breaks down under numerous sub-beadings the intelligence
coverage which has been developed by the Clandestine Service.
Set out below are specifics of operational action it is
proposed to take to continue and, as possible, increase In-
telligence coverage of Cuba.
1.
Intelligence Exploitation of Refugees: As you
know, with the quarantine and the cessation of air
travel the heavy flow of Cuban refugees has dwindled
almost to nothing. In view of this and in connection
-6-
1.

14-00000
١٢١٠
with the contingency planning for supporting any ponsible
military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locka Interrogation
Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel
of the Center have been retained intact. In order to
re-establish. the flow of intelligence from refugees,
it is proposed that Pan American Airways and KLM be
induced to reinstitute their regular flights from
Havana to Miami. This should be done as soon as
possible after the settlement of the current negotiations
and UN discussions. Coincident with this, the Opa-Locka
refugee interrogation center will be re-established
with the same personnel.
2. Resident Agents in Cuba: Every effort will be
made to continue to exploit to the fullest, preserve the
viability of and, where necessary, re-establish communica-
tions with the 131 recruited agents now resident in Cuba.
To an extent, the speed and effectiveness of this effort
will of course depend upon the stringency of future
Cuban security and control action, which it is impossible
as yet to accurately forecast.
3. Third Country Operations: The priority on re-
cruiting agents in third countries for dispatch to Cuba
will be reiterated and strengthened and every effort
will be made to increase this coverage, both through
the development of additional resident agents in Cuba
-7-

14-00000
:
and through the development of additional legal travellers.
24:
Liaison Operations: We will continue to press
24
the liaison services who are assisting us in the effort
against Cuba for additional coverage, including the
recruiting of agents within their own areas for joint
24
dispatch to Cuba. The [services most effectively co-
operating at this point in this connection are the
24
British, British, Dutch, French, Spanish, Italian, Greek,
Norwegian, Danish, West German, Mexican, Argentinian,
24
Uruguayan, Canadian, Chilean, and Israeli. Direct
approaches to several of these services] either by you
personally or in your name, as you prefer, are
24
being separately recommended. Personal representation
by you to the services underlined above would be useful.
24
In addition, we will re-survey all other liaison services]
with which we are in contact and reiterate to those
appearing to have any assets usable against Cuba our
24
extreme interest in maximum coverage of this problem.
In connection with the liaison] problem generally, we will
endeavor to induce all of the lia [Liaison services to make
24
24
greater use of their [national] assets, both inside and
24
outside of Cuba. Particular attention will be given to
possible utilization of the (Vatican
5. Maritime Operations: In addition to increasing
efforts to get at seaman agents and other maritime
24
assets through liaison services, we will continue our
1..
unilateral third country efforts to recruit seamen and

14-00000
prrticularly Cuban seamen, to increase the twenty
officers and crew members aboard six Cuban vessels we are
now running as controlled agents.
6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad: At
the present time we are running 12 Cuben diplomats
stationed outside Cuba as controlled agents and have viable
operations aimed at an additional 20 Cuban diplomats.
We propose to continue and intensify the current progrem
of attempting to recruit or defect every Cuban official
representative abroad to whom we can gain access and
concerning whom we have any reason to believe a
24
susceptibility to approach exists. These additional
penetrations will be attempted both through unilateral
operations and where appropriate in conjunction with
[liaison services.]
7. Audio Penetrations of Cuban Installations
Abroad: At the present time we have audio and/or
telephone tap coverage of Cuban officiel installations
24
in Chile, Italy, Mexico, The Netherlands, England,
Uruguay, Greece, Spain, France, and Canada, No
major expansion of this coverage is presently
contemplated, but we will continue to survey additionsl
targets of opportunity and wherever possible install
coverage in those cases where the additional intelli-
gence from this type of source over and above what we
1
are now receiving would appear to make such installation
! worthwhile.
-8-
3
羞

14-00000
;
n.
Communications Intelligence: Wo will continu
our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA
10
station in Mia in Miamist at the same level and will continue
to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communion.
tions. As the current situation "normalizes" it should
be possible for NSA to reinstitute and perhaps even
'increase their seaborne intercept coverage of Cuban
communications.
9. Communist Party Operations: A complete survey
has been made world-wide of all Communist Party
penetration operations and wherever any such penetration
can be directed against Cuba either by dispatching the
agent to Cuba or by pointing the agent against Cuban
targets, this will be done, except in those cases where
such action would result in unacceptableprejudice to
the operations in the area where the agent is now based.
It is believed that the most lucrative field for the
redirection of such operations to the Cuban target will
be Latin America where there are 65 penetrations of
various communist parties. Of this 65, the survey
we have conducted indicates that 23 have some direct
pertinent access to Cuban targets. All of these 27 wi!!
be directed against these targets unless in any case
The
there are overriding reasons to the contrary.
::
remaining cases in the total of 65 are bein individually
examined to see if they can be diverted to Cuban targets.
-10-
m

14-00000
10. Illegally Infiltrated Agents: The two
successful black infiltrated teams (COBRA and ANTORRID)
which have produced substantial intelligence will be
continued, resupplied, and reinforced but pointed
primarily at continued intelligence collection and at
the recruitment for intelligence collection purposes of
other Cubans who already are legally resident in Cuba
in the areas where the teams are operating (Pinar del
Rio and Oriente). In addition, on the most carefully
selected basis, where it appears feasible, additional
agents and teams will be infiltrated black into Cuba
in an effort to duplicate the performance of the COBRA
and AMTORRID teams and particularly to recruit and, es
possible, train additional agents legally resident in
Cuba.
11. Exfiltration: As feasible, agents and potentirl
recruits now in Cuba will be exfiltrated for
training, indoctrination, supplying with communications,
and motivation. They will then be re-infiltrated intr
Cuba, primarily on intelligence missions. Where possible,
this will be done through legal travel channels, but
where this is not possible, it will be done wherever
feasible through our black infiltration-exfiltration
facilities, primarily our maritime assets.
-11-

14-00000
B. Much of the above effort as noted will be primarily
directed towards developing all possible evidences of stress
or strain within the regime and between the regime and other
antions, particularly the Bloc. An intensive program will
be continued to take advantage of any possible opportunity
to weaken, subvert, or split the regime in any possible.
fashion. This is basically a long term effort. A great deal
of work slready has gone into this and the current
status of this program and the proposed further expldtation
of the numerous leads we have developed is being made, in
the interests of brevity in this memorandum, the subject of
a separate compilation. The effectiveness of assets aimed at
actually splitting the regime, i.e., a palace revolt, will of
course depend, to an extent, on the willingness of the United
States Government to support them and it is entirely possible
that any such effort might fail unless supported with militery
forces which on the basis of the assumptions in Paragraph I
above would appear unlikely.
C. Sabotage: On the basis of the assumptions set cut
above, commando type sabotage, minor sabotage, and other
acts of sabotage inside Cuba would appear to serve little
purpose and should not be undertaken except in the rare
instances where an opportunity is presented with acceptable
risk to do major damage to the Cuban economy. It is proposed
to continue searching for such limited opportunities, but
no active or wide scale program is contemplated.
1.
-12-

14-00000
:
D. Paramilitary, Commando, and Guerrilla Type Operations:
Given the assumptions in Paragraph I above, no wide scale
program of such activity should be undertaken. However, we
propose to maintain in being our present facilities and
the capability of undertaking such operations in order to
"fully exploit any substantial change in internal Cuban con-
ditions or any substantial revolt or uprising which might occur.
:
E. Economic Warfare: It is proposed to continue and
intensify the program already undertaken to deny through
clandestine and covert means critical materials to the Cuben
economy. This consists primarily of denial operations, possibly
some preclusive buying and inducing friendly U.S. and allied
firms and governments to prevent the shipments of strategic
materials to Cuba.
F. Counterintelligence: The current counterintelligence
and counterespionage program against the Cuban G-2 and
related services will be continued and as possible intensified.
This program has developed substantially and it should be
possible within the coming months to increase its effectivenesa
considerably in countering not only Cuban but Bloc intellt.
gence operations mounted against United States interests
from Cuba.
G. Political Action, Propaganda, Psychological Warfare:
In this field the following tasks will be continued and where
appropriate intensified:
!.
1. Assist and support State in any feasible action.
-13-

14-00000
to develop and exploit current OAS and Latin American
attitudes favorable to the containment and/or overthrow
of the Castro-communist regime.
2, Assist State in the development of post-Castro
concepts, leaders, and political groups.
3. Stimulato, support and guide covertly the
propaganda and political action activities of the CRC
and other Cuban political groups and individuals, es
appropriate, who offer a potential for impact inside
Cuba.
1
4. Develop, maintain and exploit the will of the
Cuban people to resist Castro-communism, making maximum
use of the downgrading of Castro and his regime during
the missile crisis.
5. Discredit and ridicule Castro and his regine
in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere, with emphasis
on the theme the missile crisis demonstrated con-
clusively that Castro is nothing but a mere pawn of
Soviet imperialism.
6. Continue "Radio Americas" and other CIA-
sponsored Cuban exile radio broadcasts &s appropriate.
7. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational
capability has been established and policy authority is
granted to conduct propaganda balloon operations.
8. Continue the infiltration of propaganda material
into Cuba via open mails, legal travellers and couriers,
'with special emphasis on selective black operations.
-14-

14-00000
H. Exploitation of Exile Groups: We will continue
the clandestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence
collection, psychological warfare and other approved missions.
As feasible, we will act to mount as much of this effort as
possible from areas outside the continental United States, and
particularly from Latin America. If Higher Authority decides
on a "Track Two" concept or on any similar concept which
contemplates heavy uncontrolled and only generally directed
action operations of Cuban groups against Cubs, it is believed
that efforts should be made to transfer as much as possible
of the responsibility for this non-clandestine, non-intelligence
type operation into the political field, which is the province
of the Department of State. In this connection, it is believed
it would be advisable to press for the creation within the
Department of State of an office of Cuban Exile Affairs to
handle the overt government relationships with Cuban exile
groups.
IV, ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES:
Maximum implementation of the above plan which provides
for the most intensive feasible collection of intelligence,
the implementationof related programs as outlined, and the
maintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity
as well as take advantage of any future substantial changes
in internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit
and make advisable the following:
1.
-15-

14-00000
M
:
A. A gradual but substantial reduction in the expenditures
and personnel of Task Force W.
B. Consideration of the re-positioning of Task Force W
within the Clandestine Service, possibly as a major component
of the WH Division under different direction.
C. The abolition of the operational Mongoose mechanism.
D. The removal of the past framework which required
detailed consideration by the Special Group (Augmented) of
even minor operational details and decision by committee on
points which it is believed are completely within the purview
of the DCI and those officers to whom he delegates decision.
V.
RECOMMENDED ACTION:
A. Your concurrence in the above general operational plan
is recommended.
B. It is recommended that you discuss this plan with
the Special Group (Augmented) and secure its concurrence.
C. It is recommended that you secure from the Special
Group (Augmented) policy approval to attempt to induce Fan
American Airways and KLM to resume their flights between Miaal
and Havana at the appropriate time.
D. It is recommended that if any "Track Two" concept
is proposed, you endeavor to transfer to the Department of
State all possible overt aspects of this type of uncontrolled
-16-

14-00000
subsidy and support of Cuban exile groups.
B. It is recommended that the Mongoose operational
mechanism be abolished.
1. If you concur in this concept, specific recommendation:
vill be made to you concerning the re-positioning of Task Force
W within the DD/P.
1.
-17-
WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W
7
14-00000
104-10102-10233. 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

TO
Chief, WHD
Chief, EE

INFO
FROM
Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro
BEDOX/Operational
SMEDIFY Information Concerning
Tad SZULC (201-050539)

ACTION REQUIRED
FYI.

SUBJECT
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HBRA 9438

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
201-050539

DATE
20 June 1962

RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED
BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)
ΑΠ.Α - Το

1. Attached is a SMEDIFY report concerning Tadeusz SZULC which includes SMEDIFY's traces on SZULC.

2. Station has the following information regarding Ignacy SACHS, who is mentioned in the attachment.

ALBICUSPID from ALBICUSPID-5, 4 May 1961 (ultimate source: Henryk HRANKROWSKI, former member of the Polish Commercial Mission, in Brazil)

Ignacy SACHS, upon his return from India, will not work in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but will be reassigned to the Latin American section of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Trade. He recently wrote a report on Latin America based upon material contained in the South and Central American press. He reportedly had a falling out with his superiors in the Foreign Ministry, hence the transfer.

ALBICUSPID from ALBICUSPID-5, 30 May 1961 (ultimate source: Czeslaw SLOWAKIEWICZ, Polish diplomat)

Ignacy SACHS, after a period of disgrace, has a new job, economic assistant for underdeveloped countries in Department III of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

Distribution
1- WHD w/attachment
1- EE w/attachment
1- Sao Paulo
2- Files
-200/thi WH
19 June 1962/bej

the attached infor - evan sent to the FBI
Seca am. TO RIDICE 5 Fel 63 Hatte
In connection with our Rose & Afee of in
R. Helme, we are not to send any wife and
on the Angey
2buld be l
Directed - slumed be reprated to th.
FRI
e. Hephant

PAGE NO.
1

2nd June, 1961.

Tadeusz SZULC

The Station copies of the original reports on SZULC have been destroyed. I attach, however, a memorandum consisting of selected entries from his card.

2. All the information is from the same source, a Polish emigre who knew SZULC personally and also had, informants in the Polish Embassy.

3. There is little doubt that SZULC was pro-communist at the time, and that he co-operated with Ignacy SACHS, a cousin who was employed by the Press Section of the Polish Embassy, and provided him with "information". It would, however, be unwise. to jump to the conclusion that this collaboration took the form of espionage, since SZULCE does not seem to have made any secret of the relationship.

4. I can find no evidence that Ignacy SACHS was an intelligence officer, but he seems to have been an active propagandist. He returned to Poland in 1954. A report from the same source, dated June 1956, stated that he then occupied the Brazilian desk at the Polish Institute for International Affairs.

Tadeusz SZULC
Born: c. 1926.
Nationality: Pole. Naturalised U.S. citizen
1955.
Occupation: Journalist.

June 1947: Used to work for the "Brazil Herald" and now for FRANCE
PRESSE. Is, on good terms with the Polish Legation whom
he supplies with information on Brazil. One of the party
who accompanied Raul FERNANDEZ on his mission to Montevideo.
He is the son of Seweryn SZULC.

Dec, 1947: Re subject's efforts to find employment in American press
sub-source: circles. Mr. HORAN tried to help him, due to a letter of
Harold HORAN of introduction from SZULC's uncle, John WILEY, American
New York: Ambassador in Lisbon, but desisted on finding that SZULC
had been connected with the Rio de Janeiro communist paper
"Diretrizes".

Feb. 1948: Further details of subject's efforts to find a job in the
United States. He is to work on the Palestine Commission
of the U.N.O. as from middle of February.

March 1948: Subject still in New York and writing regular reports on
U.S. political affairs and personalities to the Polish
Legation in Rio de Janeiro. Trying to get a job with
U.S. Press through the influence of Mrs. J. WILEY.

Sept. 1949: Subject at present in New York, married to an American
girl, and working in one of the American News Agencies.
Since arrival of new Legation (Warsaw) he was in touch
with the Minister, the Secretary and the ex-Press Attache,
the late Wikinski. Told by Warsaw Poles in Washington
that to be useful he cannot have a job with the Press Dept.
of the Washington Polish Embassy or the Polish Press Bureau
in New York. Using his "Uncle" introduction letters (the
U.S. Ambassador John Wiley married to Polish born, Irene
BARUCH, who is the sister of the first Mrs. SZULC), he
obtained a job with Americans on orders from the Poles.
Subject is helped financially by the Polish Legation in
Rio de Janeiro. Thanks to introduction letters from the
WILEYS, SZULC penetrated several circles in New York. He
is writing reports to Rio de Janeiro and working with people
in New York and is considered useful for future tasks.

June 1951: Nephew of newly appointed U.S. Ambassador in PANAMA, he is
now trying to get a job in Panama as American correspondent.
He has a job with U.P. in New York. In Rio de Janeiro in
1947/48, was fellow traveller and informer of communist
nucleus on the staff of the communist newspaper "Diretrizes".
Also worked for FRANCE PRESSE and reported regularly on the
Polish colony in Rio de Janeiro.

June 1951: Visited Rio de Janeiro from 11.6.51 to 27.6.51 when he
returned to New York. Whilst in Rio, he was in touch with
Igancy SACHS to whom he brought information from the USA.
The two are relatives and boyhood friends and subject writes
personal letters to SACHS containing matters of interest to
the Polish Legation. Subject also has useful contacts in
New York in political and artistic circles, obtained through
his Aunt. Is believed to be trying to obtain American
citizenship through having married an American woman.

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Sept. 1951: Personal reports on the U.S. Ambassador to Panama,
John WILEY, continue to be forwarded by the Polish
Legation in Rio de Janeiro to Warsaw via subject.

March 1952: Source met subject in America recently. Subject
volunteered that he obtained much information on
the differences of policy between the British and
American Governments on the Persian problem through
his aunt, the wife of John WILEY, and that he kept
the Polish Government informed through Ignacy SACHS.
He boasted acquaintance with Drew PEARSON and the
Shah of Persia.
14-0 104-10102-10237 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
DISPATCH
CLASSIFICATION
PROCESSING
TO
Chief, Special Affairs Staff
INFO.
FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE
SUBJECT Operational/TYPIC/AMTRUNK
Project AMTRUNK Operational Review
PRO-
POSED
ACTION
ACCOM
PLISHED
MARKED FOR INDEXING X
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED
HEADQUARTERS DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
ABSTRACT
MICROFILM.
ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
PRIORITY
ACTION: Request Headquarters decision on continuation or termination of Project AMTRUNK.

1. Attached herewith is an operational review of and progress report on the AMTRUNK team for the period of 4 through 31 March. Station views on the operation are summarized below.

2. The AMTRUNK operation has the following disadvantages or weak- nesses:
MPIRENO
A. The AMTRUNKers admit to being anti-KUBARK and to be working
"with" KUBARK now only because there was no other alternative if they were to accomplish their mission. In other words, these agents will cooperate with KUBARK only when it is to their advantage. It is believed that if the operation were to develop, control would diminish rather than increase in the advanced stages of the operation, since the need for KUBARK assistance will decrease as operational successes increase. It is believed that AMICE/27 would have no hesitation "selling out" the operation to any one of the major re- fugee political groups at any time that he felt it advantageous to do so. It is believed that, if he is not already doing so, he is most likely to collaborate with either the Segundo Frente del Es- cambray, headed by Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, or the MRP faction headed by Manuel Ray. In the meantime AMICE/27 will attempt to have his own way with the operation. He believes that he is receiving special attention because of his ZRMETAL connections, and he will not hesi- tate to go behind KUBARK's back to AMTRUNK/1, AMCAPE/1, and ODACID or higher authority, if the operation or KUBARK handling of the AMTRUNKS does not progress to his liking. Since AMTRUNK/1, according to AMCAPE/1, "masterminded" this operation in the first place, it may be assumed that the AMTRUNKS will withhold nothing from AMTRUNK/1.
Fred from Erogest ANTRUNK 19-6-5
siris 19-6-843 191 STATE
168-496/16
Distribution: C/SAS w/attchs.7
3
-
Must: VOLSKY
-6-1
CROSS REFERENCEITOS...
DESENSITIZED
543-43
Cawapraalne end tesalicetion
LASSIFICATION
SECRET
DATE TYPED
DATE DISPATCHED
APR
15 April 1963
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-8381
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
#12922

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH
CLASSIFICATION
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
SE UFGA 8381

AMTRUNK/1 in turn may be expected to keep AMCAPE/1 fully informed. There is no KUBARK control over AMTRUNK/1 or AMCAPE/1

B. This operation has a very high "flap potential" if any AMTRUNK agents are picked up by the opposition in Cuba. Not only will KUBARK stand to suffer, but ODACID will be tied directly in to the operation, as may also QKFLOWAGE, by whom AMTRUNK/1 is employed, and AMCAPE/l and his newspaper. The latter could prove to be most embarrassing and should be fully recognized as a possibility, if not a probability, in the event any of the AMTRUNK team fall into Castro's hands.
C. The security of this operation has certain questionable aspects. At least six people were told about the operation in varying degrees prior to the time the team was safehoused. Two of the agents, AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, did not satisfactorily resolve the question of their security during LCFLUTTER tests. It is believed that AMICE/27 is withholding information of an unknown nature from his KUBARK con- tacts. An undercurrent of friction has recently developed between AMICE/14 and AMTRUNK/3 which manifested itself in a fistfight on 29 March. This was precipitated by AMTRUNK/3 who called AMICE/14 the Cuban term for a homosexual, the ultimate insult to a Cuban. This in turn gives rise to the question whether AMICE/14, with a possible history of homosexual activity (see UFGA-8411), has made such an approach to AMTRUNK/3.

D. The commitments made to AMICE/27 or which AMICE/27 claims were made to him are a matter of concern to the Station. This is an : area over which future misunderstanding or aggravation might easily develop.

E. The Phase I landing point appears highly risky. It is within five miles of a cruise missile site radar, and in an area frequently patrolled by sea.
RABEL LUMEZ
F This operation appears possibly competitive with AMLEO/3 opera- tions aimed also at penetrating high military levels for the same purposes. Given the lack of control in the AMTRUNK operation, the possibility of the two operations crossing or targetting on the same individual will be present.

3. In examining the strengths of the AMTRUNK operation, the AMTRUNK group as a whole represents superior agent materiel. Three of the four have been outstanding in training. They appear to have a number of fairly well placed contacts on the inside whom they ex- pect to be able to call on for assistance. Although they have been out of direct touch with a number of these contacts for periods ranging up to two years, this is frequently the case in this type of operation. The objective of the operation is worthwhile.

4. Based on the attached operational review and the advantages and disadvantages outlined above, it is the recommendation of JMWAVE Station that this operation be terminated at the earliest possible moment. Since this operation originated at the Headquarters level, it is requested that Headquarters advise JMWAVE as to its decision. In the meantime, training and planning will continue. If Head- quarters' decision is to continue with the operation at this time, operational plans for Phase I and Phase II will be submitted as formulated.
END OF MESSAGE
See DIR 3:748
FORM 5-60 530 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. 1401
CLASSIFICATION SECRET
CONTINUED
PAGE NO.
2.

SMERCRED
31 March 1963
PROJECT AMTRUNK OPERATIONAL REVIEW
I. STATUS REPORT ON TRAINING AND PROCESSING, 4-31 MARCH.

The AMTRUNK Team, consisting of AMICE/27, AMICE/14, AMTRUNK/2, and AMTRUNK/3 were safehoused on 4 March 1963 at Safesite #164. on Plantation Key. Andrew S. PARMERS, KUROAR instructor from headquarters, was already at the training site when the team was brought there by the two case officers, Irving N. PEGGINS and Hobart J. VANDEBORN. PARMERS remained at the safesite until 16 March during which time he conducted training in clandestine methods and techniques. This training included security, cover and compartmentation, clandestine communica- tions, agent spotting, selection, recruitment and management, and operational planning and reporting. The training included group discussion and participation in a series of appropriate operational situations, several problems, and daily physical training. During this two week period, either PEGGINS or VANDEBORN visited the safesite every day, spending an average of two or three hours with the group in operational dis- cussions and processing. During the week of 18 thru 23 March, both case officers spent a majority of the time with the group, debriefing them in detail on their operational contacts, workin out operational details of their infiltration, and continuing their training on an informal basis. The week of 25 through 30 March was spent in PM-type training with emphasis on compass and map reading, including two night problems, and on weapons familiarization and firing. During the period under dis- cussion the AMTRUNK group were all LCFLUTTERED, were assessed by the KUROAR assessment team, were given an initial series of immunizations, were issued clothing, were processed for alias documentation, were processed for disguises, and were further processed on cover and finance problems. The re- sults of the LCFLUTTER examinations were sent to headquarters under cover of UFGA-8111, on 13 March 1963. Based on DIR 26430, no further LCFLUTTER is planned at the present time. Transmitted as attachment "A" to this dispatch is PARMERS report on his training of the AMTRUNK group, transmitted as attachment "B" are the results of the assessments of the AMTRUNK group, and transmitted as attachment "C" is the training report for the week of 25 March.

II. AMTRUNK MISSION OBJECTIVE.
The project AMTRUNK Mission objective is to overthrow the existing Cuban government by means of a conspiracy among high level military and civilian leaders of the government culminating in a coup d'etat which will oust both Castro and

DESENSITIZED per CSH-43-49
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208168-496/16
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the Communists from power. A secondary and subordinate mission is to determine the climate prevailing among the populace in Havana for organizing resistance elements capable of either passive or active sabotage. This secondary mission is exploratory in nature only, through the first phases of the project. In order to accomplish the foregoing missions, the operation has been split into two initial phases, which will be compartmented from each other. Phase One _involves the black infiltration of AMTRUNK/2 and 3 on the north coast of Havana province. These two individuals plan to go into Havana for a period of approximately two weeks, and then exfiltrate black from the same point at which they infiltrated. Phase Two, involving AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, will consist of black infiltration through the keys area on the north coast of Matanzas. These two individuals will likewise go into Havana for a period of several weeks and then exfiltrate black These two phases are discussed in detail in following para- graphs. Phase One and Phase Two are preliminary infiltrations designed to set up infiltration/exfiltration routes and to make initial contacts among_certain select high level military figures in Havana. The following paragraphs discussing these phases are not designed to be operational plans. Detailed operational plans for each phase will be forwarded as de- veloped.

III. PHASE I.

A. AMTRUNK Personnel
1. AMTRUNK/2 is a 21 year old Cuban who is mature for his years, and in some degree experienced in clandestine opera- tions. He attended Catholic Social University in Havana for two years, majoring in Social Studies. Prior to Fidel's takeover A/2 was allied to student elements of the Partido Autentico which upheld the constitution of 1940. He supported the revolution against Batista till it became apparent that Castro had cast his lot for a Communist regime. During his university years from 1959 to 1961 he was actively engaged in supporting anti-Castro groups with weapons and materials. Following the Playa Giron invasioná great many in the Havana underground were rolled up but A/2 avoided compromise. He continued in this work through 1961 and finally left Cuba via air in January 1962. Although A/2 does not consider himself an ally of KUBARK he has been cooperative throughout histraining. He is a pensive individual who displays good judgement. His present attitude towards KUBARK appears to be one of "wait and see". In the meanwhile, he is con- scientiously applying himself in preparation for his mission.
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2. AMTRUNK/3. a 225 year old Cuban,in contrast to A/2, is volatile, immature and impulsive On the other hand he is quite loyal to A/2 and his quick wit is appealing to his fellow team members. He worked under A/2 in the underground as an action type, principally engaging in sabotage. His underground work began while he was in secondary school when in 1958 he supported the revolution against Batista. In late 1960 he sided with the counter-revolutionaries and began full time anti-Castro activities. After the crack down following the Bay of Pigs invasion he avoided detection and continued to engage in underground activities. Finally when the situation became hopeless he left Cuba by air for Miami in August 1962. While A/3 has performed satisfactorily in his training up to date, his performance falls far short of the other three members. A/3 feels KUBARK should only function as support for this operation and should not inter- fere in the actual plans of the operation. Fortunately his role in this operation is comparatively minor and he appears willing to comply with whatever A/2 decides. Nevertheless, direct control of A/3 offers_problems in the future.

B. TASKS
1. Conduct black infiltration landing at Punta La Jijira (AMS 3785 I) and establish contact with the farm manager at A73s father's farm in the Galera section CAMS 3
Coords 993694

2. Through contacts of A/3 obtain transportation for A/2 to Guanaba or Havana.

3. Although not definite, A/3 may remain at his father's farm and train assets in maritime reception and clandestine communications. Having completed this he would then be ex- filtrated at Punta Jijira.

4. A/2 will go to Havana and obtain safehouse and operational support through his contacts.

5. A/2 will contact and develop two potential assets with high level connections within the Rebel Army.

6. A/2 will train support and operational assets in clandes- tine communications as well as arrange for transportation for his exfiltration..

7. Exfiltration of A/2 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido (AMS 3885 II).

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C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS
1. The tentative date for the infiltration of A/2 and 3 at Punta La Jijira is 18 May 1963. The infiltrees will make their way to A 3s father's farm one kilometer from the coast and from there A/2 will be provided with transportation to go to Guanabo or Havana.

2. The exfiltration of A/3 will occur three days after his infiltration. This arrangment, as yet, is not definite.

3. The exfiltration of A/2 is tentatively planned for 31 May 1963 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido. A/3 feels that Puerto Escondido would afford a more secure point for exfiltration but that a reconnaisance of the area would be necessary before final decision is reached. Prearranged telegram signal would indicate his preference.

4. The above dates fall within a favorable moon phase for maritime operations. In addition the infil-exfil schedule will allow for an extra margin beyond the 10 days which A/2 considers the minimum acceptable period of time to make his contacts..

D. OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA
1. Following the successful infiltration of A/2 and 3 the two men will work their way to a farm owned jointly by A/3s father and Santos SUAREZ, located kilometer from the point of infiltration. They will make contact with the manager of the farm named Pedro CRUZ. CRUZ is 35 to 40 years of age, is married and has an elementary school education. He has no record of underground activity. A/3 will depend upon CRUZ to make the following contacts in order to obtain transportation to Guanabo or Havana:

a. Roman HERNANDEZ, who lives a few kilometers away in Sierra del Arzobispo. ENDEZ owns a small farm and a butcher shop in the area and also owns a truck. He is 37 to 40 years of age, married with six or seven children. He was jailed for a brief period in the past for counter- revolutionary activities.

b. If CRUZ is unsuccessful in getting HERNANDEZ truck he will contact Augusto MACHON who operates a farm next to 1/3's father's farm. He is 45-50 years old, married, no children, wife's name is Alicia. He was the mayor of Santa Cruz del Norte in 1954. He owns a jeep.
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Another contact of A/3 is Ramon (CANVAADIEREB, age 21, single, 8th grade education. He provided support in the form of food and safehousing to underground workers in the past. His home address is Co Havana. He owns a butcher shop in the Cotorrò section of Havana. Subject will be contacted by A/3 if he needs to be safehoused in Havana.

The following assets would be contacted by A/2 after arriving in Havana. They will be contacted in the order listed. Their function will be to provide safehouses and vehicles for A/2.

a. Elsa Marela NEGRON, 25 years of age, born in Havana. A/2 first met her when she was a student at the University of Havana majoring in Social Sciences. Presently she lives with her aunt in Havana and A/2 has maintained cor- respondence with her. She has helped previously in providing safehousing for the underground. She also has a car.

b. Pedro IGLESIAS Betancourt, age 55, born in Havana. He is a physician who lives and practices medicine in Havana. IGLESIAS has helped A/2 in underground activi- ties previously. He has a brother, two daughters and a son now residing in the U.S. His daughters live in' New Jersey and were last seen by A/2 about six months ago. Subject was a member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano, an anti-Batista group, and was a professor of medicine at the University of Havana up until 1961 when he re- signed. IGLESIAS is also a close friend of Elsa NEGRIND

c. Sergio MENDEZ, age about 50 born in Cienfuegos, a former senator (1954 as well as the former head of the Railroad system in Cuba Subject was originally a member of the Autentico Party and claimed to be a KUBARK con- fidante during Castro's takeover. MENDEZ has an apart- ment and two cars and has previously helped A/2 in under- ground activities. He has a daughter who works for the government but is not sympathetic to the regime. The husband of this daughter, however, works for Che Guevara. A/2 has maintained correspondence with MENDEZ

d. Isabel MENOCOL, age about 35, born in Havana, single. Subject is an English teacher who runs a small private (tutoring school in English in Havana. She was A/2's English teacher and offered support to the underground. MENOCOL lives by herself, has an automobile and is a close friend of A/2 and his wife.
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e. Gloria ВАМСТАLLA age 23-24 born in Havana, single, mother and father deceased. She attended the University of Havana and Villanova from 1959 to 1960. She became a close friend of A/2 during their student days in Havana. She has no record of underground work. She lives in Guanabo Beach during the summer. A/2 felt he might attempt to contact her if she was living at (Guanabo Beach in order to safehouse A/3 there if necessar

3. The following two operational assets will be contacted by A/2 after he is safehoused in Havana. Their function will be to spot Army officers disaffected with the Castro Regime.

a. Jorge VALS age late 30s early 40s married. Subject holds the rank of Captain in the Rebel Army but is not presently on active duty. He was a friend of Castro's during the revolution and A/2 claims he still maintains some contact with Fidel. He also claims VALS has been working in a limited fashion against Fidel and was originally associated with the MRR and Monte Cristo groups. VALS primary interest has been trying to or- ganize his friends within the Rebel Army against Fidel. A/2 feels VALS is a very discreet individual who has not been identified as an anti-Castro organizer by the G-2. A/2 claims to be a close friend of CVALS and trusts him completely. A/2 saw and talked to VALS in 1962 prior to his flying out of PBRUMEN as a refugee.

b. Jose DUARTE Oropesa, age early 40s, served in the U.S. Army during World War II. According to A/2, QUARTE was made commander of the 5th Military District by Camilio Cienfuegos. Following the disappearance of (Cienfuegos, DUARTE was removed from the post and pre- sently lives on an Army pension as well as royalties from_property confiscated by the government. He said QUARTE started working against Castro within the MRP under Manuel RAY. For a timehe was the military secretary of the MRP and became quite involved in plotting against Fidel. A/2 also stated that it was rumored at the time that DUARTE was working for the MRP that he was also a KUBARK agent. Eventually DUARTE was placed on a G-2 suspect list, but according to A/2 DUARTE was able to evade detection. Subject has good connections within the Rebel Army and re- volutionary government. A/2 trusts this individual and has confidence in him as a potential operational lead in spite of conflicting reports which mention DUARTE as an opportunist.
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A/2 may also attempt to contact the following operational asset if he has an opportunity to make contact.

Lester RODRIGUEZ, age late 30s early 405, married, former member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano. He fought with Raul Castro in the Sierra Cristobal Area. Following the Castro takeover he served as head of one of the military zones within Havana province. Eventually he was given lesser assignments and A/2 thinks he is now working in INRA in Oriente Province. He claims RODRIGUEZ assisted his underground group during 1961 by supplying trucks for transporting weapons and materials.

E. COVER AND COMMUNICATIONS

F.
1. Cover

A/2 will be issued documentation claiming he is an employee of a local brewery in Havana. A/3 on the other hand will be issued documentation as a bus driver within the city of Havana. Both will also be issued drivers licenses and additional items such as immunization certificates, Cuban receipts, etc. The two men will also be outfitted with disguises.

2. Communications

Primary communications will be established through an SW system. Both men will be given SW instruction and will be issued accommodation addresses in Miami. This instruction and these addresses in turn will be passed on to the recruited assets in PBRUMEN for use as the operation develops. Pre- arranged signals will also be devised for use by the team via telegram to indicate their progress and confirm their place and time of exfiltration. Both members will also be given an OWVL system to provide them with quick instructions in case of an emergency.

OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY EVALUATION
1. The operational aspects of Phase I portrays a mission which has considerable potential but also considerable risk. The area of infiltration is within five miles of a cruise missile site and its accompanying radar. In addition boat patrols are known to work this portion of the coast at frequent intervals. Once infiltrated the team will not have to travel far before their first contact. However, A/3 is leary of staying at his father's farm for any length of time and he does not want his presence in Cuba. For this reason the to serve as a safehouse. A/2 plans on
father to know of his farm will not be able
leaving the farm the same day he lands. This presents the problem of what to do with A/3. On approach is to take A/3
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to Guanabo or Havana and safehouse him. This, however, may jeopardize the operation because A/3 lacks the maturity and patience necessary to stay put while A/2 goes about his busi- ness. He may take advantage of his visit to Havana to under- take a clandestine assignment on his own. When A/2 and 3 step ashore in Cuba, control will vanish. Fortunately A/2 has a sufficient resource of judgement to go about his busi- ness competently. Unfortunately A/3 gives no such indication. For this reason an attempt will be made to steer A/3 towards developing assets around his father's farm with maritime reception capabilities.

In
2. A/2, on the other hand, appears to have a sufficient numbe of supporting assets to provide for his safety while in Havana However, he has not seen VALS and DUARTE for over a year. addition both men are presently outside of the Cuban Army organization and this position may dampen their effectiveness in recruiting within the Army. Station reports on DUARTE con- flict with A/2's evaluation of this man. While there is no evidence to verify that DUARTE is pro-regime, there has been a recent report on him from AMLEO/3 which claims DUARTE is an opportunist who might work for the highest bidder. A/2's rebuttal to these remarks is that DUARTE has assisted him in the past and when the chips were down he continued to aid him in his underground activities. This still leaves a question mark next to the worth of DUARTE which unfortunately can only be resolved by direct contact between him and A/2. There are other security implications which should be discussed in this evaluation. Both A/2 and A/3 cannot be considered truly se- curity conscious. While safehoused A/2 wrote a letter to a contact in Miami which was to be transmitted by his case officer. The letter gave an indication that A/2 was seeking contacts in Havana and conveyed the impression that a trip was in the offing. A/2 has written several other letters not seen by his C Os which might have given the same impres- sion. A/3 on the other hand talked quite freely about his operation to four friends in New York prior to coming to Miami and being safehoused, He explained that he was joining AMICE/27 and AMTRUNK/2 on an operation that would take them first to Miami and then to Cuba. Once there they would go to his father's farm and begin to make contacts. A/3 also stated that a man named DUARTE would be one of their con- tacts. This loose talk coupled with A/3's attitude that KUBARK exists only to serve him makes him a marginal candi date for this operation. However, if A/3 is exfiltrated three days after his entry into Cuba, the operation will gain his usefulness and eliminate some of the risk he presents.
SECR

3. The above evaluation stresses the operational and security weaknesses in this operation. In contrast to these weaknesses are the positive considerations of this mission. A/2 has the intelligence, competence, and confidence to approach and re- cruit two assets with the potential for developing anti-regime operations at a high level within the Cuban Army. The results which these anti-regime activities can accomplish is a matter for conjecture but it appears that they carry potential. Nevertheless, if the operation continues, it will bear close watching in terms of security and control for these factors will jeopardize the operation as well as KUBARK's position if not properly contained.

IV. PHASE II

A. AMTRUNK PERSONNEL
1. AMICE/27, senior member of the AMTRUNK group, is a 41- year old PBRUMEN citizen from a wealthy high class family. His father, now deceased, was a prominent individual in law and politics and was at one time a senator. A/27 himself graduated from law school in Habana and was a practising lawyer. In 1959 he became legal adviser to Camilio Cienfuegos. Following the disappearance of Cienfuegos in October 1959, A/27 began to engage in counter-revolutionary activities. In May 1961, at which time he held the position of Under- Secretary of Public Works, he felt that his underground activities had come to the attention of the government and he took refuge along with his wife in the Venezuelan Embassy. He was given safe conduct from the Embassy to PBPRIME in late 1961. Subject is intelligent, articulate, and highly moti- vated. He has some experience in counter-revolutionary activities and has demonstrated an excellent capacity for learning clandestine techniques. He has a very large ego, and aristocratic pride, is very sensitive, and is quick to take offense He is frank to state that he has a low opinion of KUBARK, that he is not a KUBARK agent and he deeply re- sents any implication that he is working for KUBARK. He states that he is working for the overthrow of the present regime in his own country and that he will accept KUBARK aid and advice but will not accept KUBARK control. His attitude although not hostile, is frequently critical, and he pre- sents a difficult handling problem.

2. AMICE/14 is a 26 year old Cuban citizen who is also a law graduate of the University of Havana. He has been in- volved much of his adult life in clandestine activities. Subject arrived by small boat in June 1961 in PBPRIME.He is highly motivated, is intelligent and objective, and has a very highly developed security consciousness, developed from his counter-revolutionary experiences. From January to July 1961 he made four black jafiltration/exfiltration trips to and from Cubarand PBPRIME, and has an excellent knowledge of the northewi Matanzas area. He is easy to work 19-6-8-/
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10 -
with and has evidenced little of the hostilities or anti- KUBARK feelings shown by AMICE/27.

3. AMTRUNK/4. Subject is a year old fisherman from the area who took refuge in PBPRIME in February 1963. He had previously assisted A/14 in infils and exfils and will be used as a maritime guide.

B. TASKS
1. Make preliminary black maritime infiltration by small boat onto Cinco Leguas Key (AMS Map 4085 III) to contact individuals who formerly assisted AMICE/14 in infil-exfil Toperations.:

2. Through contacts on Cinco Leguas Key, organize a ratline into the mainland, including making arrangements for trans- portation into Havana.

3. Through the mechanism established above, move to Havana and obtain safehousing and operational support.

4. Make all necessary arrangements for subsequent exfil- tration and future infiltrations.

5. Approach and recruit two key individuals with contacts among important military figures.

6. Establish internal and external communications.

7. Exfiltrate from Phase II.

C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS

It is tentatively planned to infiltrate AMICE/27, AMICE/14, and AMTRUNK/4 into the Cinco Leguas Keys area on or about 23 April. Subjects will take a small boat with silent motor into the Keys area and remain in the area for approximately three days, during which time they will remain black, keep the boat hidden in the mangroves, and contact individuals known to them on Cinco Leguas. They will make arrangements with contacts at that point to re-activate contacts of AMICE/14 on the mainland at Casualidad (Map 4085 III, Grid Square 1747) and contacts in the town of Marti and Cardenas. Plans will be worked out at this time with these contacts for a second in- filtration in the latter part of May, at which time AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 will again go into Cinco Leguas and expect to be passed on through these contacts to Havana. Subjects will exfiltrate by small boat on or about 26 April and will be met by the parent craft in open water to the north of Cayo Cruz del Padre (Map sheet 4085 IV).
SECRET
14-00000
104-10103-10038
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

UNCLASSIFIED INNAL
USE ONLY
CONFID TIAL
SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
Director of Finance
1212 Key Building
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)
DATE
OFFICER'S.
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED FORWARDED

1.
Inspector General
2 F 24 HQS
27
2.

3..
R
4.
Yvon Wate
5.
Sandy-avadel - White
6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.
RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce
14.

15.

14-00000

SECRET

27 FEB 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Howard Hunt

1. At the recent request of the Deputy Director for
Management and Services, the Office of Finance has searched
its records to determine if we could find any payment to
Mr. Hunt in an amount of approximately $30,000 that required:
no accounting.

2. We have searched the following records:

a. The expense runs for the period July 1964 tổ
June 1973 for the immediate Office of the DCI,
the immediate Office of the DD/P, FI Staff,
CI Staff, CA Staff and the Office of Security.
We have checked various items that were re-
flected in these expense records but have
identified nothing relating to Mr. Hunt.
15-2
b. The Madrid Station, JMWAVE and FR/Washington
Office accountings to determine if there were
funds passed by the Stations to Mr. Hunt during
the year he served under non-official cover in
Madrid. We could find no payment to Mr. Hunt
either in his true name or his two identified
pseudonyms.

c.
..
Mr. Hunt's travel claims for the period
1960-1972 and have found nothing in these
travel claims that were not consistent with
normal travel expenses, i.e., transportation,
per diem.

d. We made a specific analysis of Mr. Hunt's
advance account for the period he was under
non-official cover (July '65-Sept '66) and have

SENSITIVE DES
SECRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 006567
:
Rs

14-00000
SUBJECT: Howard Hunt
SECRET
determined that $33,500 was advanced to him
for travel and transportation of household
goods to and from Madrid with one trip to
Paris for he and his family to renew their
Spanish visas. All of this advance was fully
accounted for. However, in his accounting,
one item appeared unusual. It was an
expenditure of $1,600 for a sensitive
operation which was approved for write-off by Mr.
:
Desmond Fitzgerald on 1 June 1966 without
further accounting.

3. Also, we confirmed that no other Agency advance accounts
were established for Mr. Hunt during this period.

4. At the beginning of his non-official cover tour, it
The
was necessary to establish a bank account in his name.
EUR Division accordingly requested we open an account at the
Chase Manhattan Bank in Mr. Hunt's name to receive all non-
salary payments. (Mr. Hunt had an account at Riggs National
Bank to receive his salary and allowance payments). The
following deposits were made to the account during 1965 and
1966:

Account opened: 13 July 1965

13 July 1965 $10,000

22 July 1965 5,000

15 September 1965 5,000

6 October 1965 5,000

19 July 1966 5,000
$30,000

All of the above have been accounted for by submission
of travel and transportation accountings.

5. We feel at this time without specific guidelines that
further searching would be somewhat fruitless. One strange
aspect of the non-official cover assignment in Madrid is that
all the costs were charged to the support allotment of the
EUR Division which is not normal as non-official cover people
are usually assigned to a project. It is unusual to have a
case officer abroad for one year on an operational assignment
without him incurring operational expenditures.

-
2-
SECRET

14-00000
SUBJECT: Howard Hunt
SECRET
6. The Office of Finance has not found operational
expenditures except for the $1,600 mentioned above.
Therefore, it is suggested that Mr. Karamessines be questioned
as to a project or projects to which Mr. Hunt's operational
expenditures if incurred would have been charged.

7. Another possible course of action is to request the
Director to approve my asking a cleared contact at Chase
Manhattan Bank to provide a transcript of all entries into
Mr. Hunt's Chase Manhattan Bank account.

8. We are currently reviewing records of all cashier's
checks prepared and issued by Monetary to determine if any
were payable to Mr. Hunt. Hopefully this effort will be
finished by the end of the week.
3
Thomas B. Yale
Director of Finance
-
SECRET
104-10103-10079
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET - SENSITIVE

Draft Memorandum to the DCI from William Harvey

Dated 27 November 1962

This is not a controlled item

14-00000
SECRET SENSITIVE

27 November 1962
Note: Discussed 27 November
1962 by DD/F with DCI
and approved general
in principle by DCI.
Fully concurred in
by DD/P.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Operational Plan for Continuing
Operations Against Cuba

1. Action: This memorandum is for your information
and pursuant to your request. Recommendations for action are
contained in Paragraph V below. The purpose of this memorandun
is to delineate an operational plan for the action which we
believe should be taken by CIA against Cuba for the predictable
future. In summary the plan provides for continuing, even
intensifying, the intelligence effort against Cuba and for
the reorientation of the current effort into & long term
denied area type of operation of the highest priority.

I. ASSUMPTIONS:

A. The United States Government will give public
assurances that, provided no nuclear or offensive weapons rro
present or re-introduced into Cuba, and provided Cube does
not take action to threaten the peace and security of the
Western Hemisphere, the United States does not intend to
invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba.

SECRET SENSITIVIS
THIS DOCUMENT IS
A SOURCE
IN CS HIC CAS
PAPER NO.
-DO NOT DESTROY-

14-00000

B. These assurances will preclude any meaningful CIA
action on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cuba, since
unless there are major changes in operational and internal con-
ditions in Cuba, such a revolt if provoked would be totally
destroyed by Cuban counteraction in a matter of hours or, at
the most, a few days unless supported by a major United States
Military commitment. In addition, the non-invasion assurances
as a practical matter will preclude invading Cuba on the pretext
of a contrived provocation such as an attack on Guantanamo.

C. CIA operations involving a high noise level and a
distinct element of attributability, particularly paramilitary,
guerrilla, and commando type operations will be unacceptable
as a matter of policy.

D. The Castro-communist regime will remain in power for
the indefinite future with its security and control apparatus
relatively intact and with the capability not only of crushing
unsupported resistance activity, but of making operational
conditions in Cuba increasingly difficult. While it is
possible that recent and future developments including the
Soviet action in removing the offensive weapons from Cuba mey
serve to weaken and discredit Castro, there is as yet no hard
indication that the control of the Castro-communist regime over
Cuba has been substantially weakened.

E The United States assurances of no invasion and no
support of an invasion will, in effect, constitute giving to
Castro and his regime a certain degree of sanctuary. This will
-2-

14-00000

severely damage the morale and motivation of anti-regime Cubans
both inside and outside of Cuba, which will make it increasingly
difficult for us to recruit agents, maintain agents already
recruited, and continue or intensify our intelligence and other
efforts against Cuba and the Castro-communist regime.

F. Despite the above factors, Higher Authority probably
will continue heavy pressure on the CIA for a maximum effort
against Cuba and may even continue to contend that the ultimate
objective is the overthrow of the Castro-communist regime.
This is an unrealistic objective, however, except, on a very
long-term basis as the United States Government, we believe,
will be unwilling in the immediate future to commit troops
to support such an overthrow. The United States Government
in its overt dealings with the Cuban exiles probably will not
express the above factors to them in the context or with the
bluntness stated here.

G. In view of these factors, the so-called "Track Two".
course of action, 1.e., unlimited support of Cuban exiles
and exile groups with no real control or objective purposes
in the hope that these groups will be able to shake the
:
Castro regime will, although unrealistic, become increasingly
attractive at various levels in the United States Government.

H. As a matter of policy, political pressures and
economic pressures short of blockade, raids, and aggressive
sabotage against Cuba will be continued.
-3-

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i
I. In view of the above assumptions paramilitary, commando
and sabotage operations, except in rare selective instances
will serve little purpose; also they will be counter-productive
:
since, if undertaken, they will make the collection of intolli-
gence more difficult and should only be undertaken in those very
few instances where an unusually high return can be demonstrated.
Regardless of what other pressures are placed on CIA for
action against Cuba, it would appear clear that Higher Authority
will insist on a continued, even intensified, intelligence
coverage of Cuba.

J. In view of the policy factors, an increased use of
facilities, real estate and basing outside the United States,
particularly in Latin America, will be both necessary and
desirable.
i
K. Adequate aerial reconnaissance of Cuba will continue.

II. OBJECTIVES:
Based on the above assumptions, the following objectives
appear to be proper for continuing CIA operations against
Cuba:

A. Take all feasible clandestine action to isolate
and assist in isolating the Castro-communist regime in Cuba
from the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the
Free World.
!
r
B. To the maximum extent possible, discredit the Castro-
communist regime in Cuba and in the Western Hemisphere and the
rest of the world.

14-00000

C. Maintain through clandestine means, short of commando
and guerrilla type operations, the maximum economic and
political pressures on the Cuban regime and economy not only
for the purpose of hampering the Cuban regime, but for the
additional purpose of insuring the maximum possible drain on
Bloc resources used to support Cuba.

D. Maintain maximum possible intelligence and counter-
intelligence coverage of Cuba, including particular emphasis
on:

1. Capabilities and intentions of the government.
2. Activities of the Cuban G-2 and its other
security organs.
3. Soviet and Bloc activities in Cuba.
4. State of potential resistance, including the
morale and temper of the populace.
ment.
5. Militia and military order of battle and equip-

6. The loci of power and of possible stresses
and strains in the power centers in the Cuban government.

7. Relationships between Cuba, USSR, Red China,
the Bloc, Latin American nations and other Free World
and uncommitted nations.

8. The level of and the weaknesses in the Cuban
economy.
-5-

14-00000
i
:
E. Tako maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban
regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately
through clandestine means to the extent possible on any
significent uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regime,
or strains and stresses among Cuban leadership or in Cuban/
:
Bloc relationships.

III. OPERATIONAL PLAN:
::
i
-
A. Espionage and Intelligence Collection All feasible
effort should be undertaken to continue and intensify intelli-
gence collection concerning Cuba. The status of our intelli-
gence collection and related operational activity at the
present time and its development during the past six months
is delineated in detail in Attachment A, which was prepared to
serve as the basis for the IG's report on this particular
matter to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign
Intelligence. You will note that this lengthy document
breaks down under numerous sub-beadings the intelligence
coverage which has been developed by the Clandestine Service.
Set out below are specifics of operational action it is
proposed to take to continue and, as possible, increase In-
telligence coverage of Cuba.

1. Intelligence Exploitation of Refugees: As you
know, with the quarantine and the cessation of air
travel the heavy flow of Cuban refugees has dwindled
almost to nothing. In view of this and in connection
-6-

14-00000

with the contingency planning for supporting any possible
military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locks Interrogation
Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel
of the Center have been retained intact. In order to
re-establish the flow of intelligence from refugees,
it is proposed that Pan American Airways and KLM be
induced to reinstitute their regular flights from
Havana to Miami. This should be done as soon as
possible after the settlement of the current negotiations
and UN discussions. Coincident with this, the Opa-Locka
refugee interrogation center will be re-established
with the same personnel.

2. Resident Agents in Cuba: Every effort will be
made to continue to exploit to the fullest, preserve the
viability of and, where necessary, re-establish communica-
tions with the 131 recruited agents now resident in Cuba.
To an extent, the speed and effectiveness of this effort
will of course depend upon the stringency of future
Cuban security and control action, which it is impossible
as yet to accurately forecast.

3. Third Country Operations: The priority on re-
cruiting agents in third countries for dispatch to Cuba
will be reiterated and strengthened and every effort
:
will be made to increase this coverage, both through
the development of additional resident agents in Cuba
-7-

14-00000

and through the development of additional legal travellers.

4. Liaison Operations: We will continue to press
the liaison services who are assisting us in the effort
against Cuba for additional coverage, including the
recruiting of agents within their own areas for joint
dispatch to Cuba. The services most effectively co-
operating at this point in this connection are the
British, Dutch, French, Spanish, Italian, Greek,
Norwegian, Danish, West German, Mexican, Argentinian,
Uruguayan, Canadian, Chilean, and Israeli. Direct
approaches to several of these services) either by you
personally or in your name, as you prefer, are
being separately recommended. Personal representation
by you to the services underlined above would be useful.
In addition, we will re-survey all other liaison serviceв
with which we are in contact and reiterate to those
appearing to have any assets usable against Cuba our
extreme interest in maximum coverage of this problem.
In connection with the liaison problem generally, we will
endeavor to induce all of the liaison services to make
greater use of their national assets, both inside and
outside of Cuba. Particular attention will be given to
possible utilization of the Vatican./

_ 5. Maritime Operations: In addition to increasing
efforts to get at seaman agents and other maritime
assets through liaison services, we will continue our
1.
unilateral third country efforts to recruit seamen and

14-00000

particularly Cuban seamen, to increase the twenty
officers and crew members aboard six Cuban vessels we are
now running as controlled agents.

6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad: At
the present time we are running 12 Cuben diplomats
stationed outside Cube as controlled agents and have viable
operations aimed at an additional 20 Cuban diplomats.
We propose to continue and intensify the current program
of attempting to recruit or defect every Cuben official
representative abroad to whom we can gain access and
concerning whom we have any reason to believe a
susceptibility to approach exists. These additional
penetrations will be attempted both through unilateral
operations and where appropriate in conjunction with
liaison services.?

7. Audio Penetrations of Cuban Installations
Abroad: At the present time we have audio and/or
telephone tap coverage of Cuban officiel installations
in Chile, Italy, Mexico, The Netherlands, England,
Uruguay, Greece, Spain, France, and Canada, No
mejor expansion of this coverage is presently
contemplated, but we will continue to survey additions!
targets of opportunity and wherever possible install
coverage in those cases where the additional intelli-
gence from this type of source over and above what we
1
are now receiving would appear to make such installation
worthwhile.
-8-

14-00000

a. Communications Intelligence: We will continue
our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA
station in Miami at the same level and will continue
to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban comunic
tions. As the current situstion "normalizes" it should
be possible for NSA to reinstitute and perhaps even
increase their seaborne intercept coverage of Cuban
communications.

9. Communist Party Operations: A complete survey
has been made world-wide of all Communist Party
penetration operations and wherever any such penetration
can be directed against Cuba either by dispatching the
agent to Cuba or by pointing the agent against Cuban
targets, this will be done, except in those cases where
such action would result in unacceptableprejudice to
the operations in the area where the agent is now based.
It is believed that the most lucrative field for the
redirection of such operations to the Cuban target will
be Latin America where there are 65 penetrations of
various communist parties. Of this 65, the survey
we have conducted indicates that 23 have some direct
pertinent access to Cuban targets. All of these 23 will
be directed against these targets unless in any case
there are overriding reasons to the contrary. The
remaining cases in the total of 65 are bein individually
examined to see if they can be diverted to Cuban targets.
-10-

14-00000
:
:
10. Illegally Infiltrated Agents: The two
successful black infiltrated teams (COBRA and AMTORRID)
which have produced substantial intelligence will be
continued, resupplied, and reinforced but pointed
primarily at continued intelligence collection and at
the recruitment for intelligence collection purposes of
other Cubans who already are legally resident in Cuba
in the areas where the teams are operating (Pinar del
Rio and Oriente). In addition, on the most carefully
selected basis, where it appears feasible, additionя 1
agents and teams will be infiltrated black into Cuba
in an effort to duplicate the performance of the COBRA
and AMTORRID teams and particularly to recruit and, as
possible, train additional agents legally resident in
Cuba.
:
11. Exfiltration: As feasible, agents and potentirl
recruits now in Cuba will be exfiltrated for
training, indoctrination, supplying with communications,
and motivation. They will then be re-infiltrated into
Cuba, primarily on intelligence missions. Where possible,
this will be done through legal travel channels, but
where this is not possible, it will be done wherever
feasible through our black infiltration-exfiltration
facilities, primarily our maritime assets.
-11-

14-00000
1
:
B. Much of the above effort as noted vill be primarily
directed towards developing all possible evidences of stress
or strain within the regime and between the regime and other
nations, particularly the Bloc. An intensive program will
be continued to take advantage of any possible opportunity
to weaken, subvert, or split the regime in any possible
fashion. This is basically a long term effort. A great deal
of work already has gone into this and the current
status of this program and the proposed further expldtation
of the numerous leads we have developed is being made, in
the interests of brevity in this memorandum, the subject of
a separate compilation. The effectiveness of assets aimed et
actually splitting the regime, 1.e., a palace revolt, will of
course depend, to an extent, on the willingness of the United
States Government to support them and it is entirely possible
that any such effort might fail unless supported with military
forces which on the basis of the assumptions in Paragraph I
above would appear unlikely.
:
C. Sabotage: On the basis of the assumptions set out
above, commando type sabotage, minor sabotage, and other
acts of sabotage inside Cuba would appear to serve little
purpose and should not be undertaken except in the rare
instances where an opportunity is presented with acceptable
risk to do major damage to the Cuban economy. It is proposed
to continue searching for such limited opportunities, but
no active or wide scale program is contemplated...
-12-

14-00000
:
D. Paramilitary, Commando, and Guerrille Type Operations:
Given the assumptions in Paragraph I above, no wide scale
program of such activity should be undertaken. However, we
propose to maintain in being our present facilities and
the capability of undertaking such operations in order to
fully exploit any substantial change in internal Cuban con..
ditions or any substantial revolt or uprising which might occur.

E. Economic Warfare: It is proposed to continue and
intensify the program already undertaken to deny through
clandestine and covert means critical materials to the Cuban
economy. This consists primarily of denial operations, possibly
some preclusive buying and inducing friendly U.S. and allied
firms and governments to prevent the shipments of strategic
materials to Cuba.

F. Counterintelligence: The current counterintelligence
and counterespionage program against the Cuban G-2 and
related services will be continued and as possible intensified.
This program has developed substantially and it should be
possible within the coming months to increase its effectiveness
considerably in countering not only Cuban but Bloc intelli-
gence operations mounted against United States interests
from Cuba.

G. Political Action, Propaganda, Psychological Warfare:
In this field the following tasks will be continued and where
appropriate intensified:

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action.
-13-

14-00000
to develop and exploit current OAS and Latin American .
attitudes favorable to the containment and/or overthrow
of the Castro-communist regime.

2, Assist State in the development of post-Castro
concepts, leaders, and political groups.

3. Stimulate, support and guide covertly the
propaganda and political action activities of the CRC
and other Cuban political groups and individuals, is
appropriate, who offer a potential for impact inside
Cuba.
1
4. Develop, maintain and exploit the will of the
Cuban people to resist Castro-communism, making maximum
use of the downgrading of Castro and his regime during
the missile crisis.

5. Discredit and ridicule Castro and his regime
in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere, with emphasis
on the theme the missile crisis demonstrated con-
clusively that Castro is nothing but a mere pawn of
Soviet imperialism,

6. Continue "Radio Americas" and other CIA-
sponsored Cuban exile radio broadcasts as appropriate.

7. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational
capability has been established and policy authority is
granted to conduct propaganda balloon operations.

8. Continue the infiltration of propaganda material
into Cuba via open mails, legal travellers and couriers,
with special emphasis on selective black operations.
-14-
!
:

14-00000
H. Exploitation of Exile Groups: We will continue
the clandestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence
collection, psychological warfare and other approved missions..
As feasible, we will act to mount as much of this effort es
possible from areas outside the continental United States, and
particularly from Latin America. If Higher Authority decides
on a "Track Two" concept or on any similar concept which
contemplates heavy uncontrolled and only generally directed
sction operations of Cuban groups against Cubs, it is believed
that efforts should be made to transfer as much as possible
of the responsibility for this non-clandestine, non-intelligence
type operation into the political field, which is the province
of the Department of State. In this connection, it is believed
it would be advisable to press for the creation within the
Department of State of an office of Cuban Exile Affairs te
handle the overt government relationships with Cuban exile
groups.

IV, ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES:
Maximum implementation of the above plan which provides
for the most intensive feasible collection of intelligence,
the implementationof related programs as outlined, and the
maintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunit
as well as take advantage of any future substantial changes
in internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit
and make advisable the following:
-15-

14-00000
j
:
A. A gradual but substantial reduction in the expenditures
and personnel of Task Force W.

B. Consideration of the re-positioning of Task Force W
within the Clandestine Service, possibly as e major component
of the WH Division under different direction.

C. The abolition of the operational Mongoose mechanian.

D. The removal of the past framework which required
detailed consideration by the Special Group (Augmented) of
even minor operational details and decision by committee on
points which it is believed are completely within the purview
of the DCI and those officers to whom he delegates decision.

V. RECOMMENDED ACTION:
1
A. Your concurrence in the above general operational plan
is recommended.

B. It is recommended that you discuss this plan with
the Special Group (Augmented) and secure its concurrence.

C. It is recommended that you secure from the Special
Group (Augmented) policy approval to attempt to induce ran
American Airways and KLM to resume their flights between Mian1.
and Havana at the appropriate time.

D. It is recommended that if any "Track Two" concept
is proposed, you endesvor to transfer to the Department of
State all possible overt aspects of this type of uncontrolled
-16-
!

14-00000

subsidy and support of Cuban exile groups.

E. It is recommended that the Mongoose operational
mechanism be abolished.
;
f. If you concur in this concept, specific recommendations
will be made to you concerning the re-positioning of Task Force
W within the DD/P.
-17-

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

14-00000
Draftin
23 Nov, 1962
SECRET
SENSITIVE
OPERATIONAL PLAN - CUBA

1. SITUATION:
2.
A. The purpose of this plan is to outline the a action to
undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency against the Castrol
Commmist government of Cuba during 77-63 and for such longer
period an may be dis

B. For the purpose of this plan the following assumptiona
are madar
National
Caba Ave
}
ential
THIS DOCUMENT IS
A SOUF.CE REFERENCE
IN CS HISTORICAL
PAPER NO.
-DO NOT DESTROY-

Isolate Castro/Commmiem from other Western
Hemisphere nations.
ther
b.Discredit It the Castro/ Communist regime in Cuba
and in the Hemisphere.
atain modera modaxata economic and and political pressaro
:
the Castro/Commmist regime to retard develop-
ment of the Ouba economy and maintain a drain
on Bloc resources.
d. Maintain maximum coverage of Cuban intelligere
requirements.
Be prepared to capitalise on any signifionat
uprising, split in Cuban
ini, or split
SECRET
SENSITIVE
Excluded fram avtomatic
wingrading and
teilification
i

14-00000

II. MISSION:
SEGRET
ELASITIVE
-2-
;
on Cuban-Bloc relationships.
Covertly support the above-cited V. 8. national
objectives with respect to Cuba.

III. ZARKSI
Intelligence Counter Intelligence
1. Provide the maximum intelligence coverage of Cr
with particular emphasis ca the following:
Capabilities and intentious of the Castro
government.
Activities of Cuban 0-2.
Soviet activities in Cuba.
:
State of resistance indluding the tone and
temper of the population.
Military and militia order of battle.
2. Locus of power and/or stress and strain wor
the "power centers" in the Cuban government.
8. Soviet/Cuban and Chinese/Cohen relationships.
h. Economic

Political:
1. Assist and support State in any feasible action to
develop active OAS and Latin-American country supp
for the containment, or overthrow of Castro.
SEGRET
SENSITIVE
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

2. Assist
TOP SECRET
SENSITIVE
sist State in the development of post-
copcepts, leaders, and political groups.

3. Provide covert support to the Cac and to sech other
Cuban political groups as appropriata

Develop
or centers of the Cubon
of splitting the

C. Econcator
1. Participate in inter-agency economic action planning
and execution.

2. Prevent essential material and supplies from reaching
Cuba,

3. Harass Free World Trade with Guba,

D. Zayehologicals
1. Develop, maintain, and exploit the will of the Caphen
people to resist Castro/Communit

2. Discredit the Castro regime in Geba, in the Rabisphere
and elsewhere.

3. Develop and exploit tensions batusen Caba and Sav
blog members.

E. Resistances
1. Be prepared to covertly provida limited perseroal
JOR SECRET
SENSITIVE
fast tour any significant int
support for

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

SECRET
SENSITIVE

resistance group or uprising.

2. Be prepared to support approved D. 8. military plant
against Caba.

IV. DULITATION:

To undertake the above-listed tasks, CIA would be required
to develop the following program

Intelligence (2) Counter Intellig

The past build-up of intelligence assets must be
intensified and expanded. The following types of notions
Spotting/recruiting/training of legally matablished
Cubans in Cuba ta
mend.

Establishment and maintenance of reliable, a
2
communications will become more critical es police
stats controls increase.

Spotting/recruiting/training Cubbars in Government posts al
23 Spotting/recruiting/training of third country
nationale resident in Cuba.

37 Spotting/recruiting/training of legal travelern
who have potential access to significant informati
or who
con provide significant operational support,

Intelligence part
4. Expansion of consumications Intelligence
ly in the G-2, police, and nu litia nats. (Thin
tien MBA problem,)
SENSITIVE
GROUP 1
Excluded fr. 1 automatic
dow racing and
פח)

14-00000
B.
TID SECRET
SENSITIVE
Maintain refuges debriefing programs.
of lials on services for above progr
7. Maximize utilization of

Psychological 1 Warfare (CA

The program must primarily concentrate on and
reach the Cuban population. The following psychologlanl
warfare activities are considered essential:

1. A propaganda balloon Launching capability and
appropriate policy authority to conduct propagande
balloon lamching operations.

2. Contince and expand the present propaganda
oparations infiltrating material into Coba sta
the open mails, log gal travelers, or commiers,

3. Continus propaganda activities, utilizing political.
rogessional, cultural, student, and other groupe
which hava a potential for getting their meng
to their counterparts inside of Cuba.

The program will be basically for developing and
maintaining a minimums stand-by capability for was in
event of a significant up-rising or in the evans
implementation of U. 8. Military plans.

The following program is considered essent

1. Maintain the capability to infiltrate/enfiltr

SECRET
limited
paracel and/or li

SENSITIVE
GROUP 1
F 1 from automatic
da agrading and
rjassilication

14-00000

SENSITIVE

amounts of equipment,

2. Maintain sufficient covert assets to me
meats levied on CIA in approved U. S. Military
contingency plans. Where internal aspeto AX
not available, assets may be held externally.

BUPYOKA REQUIRED FROM OTHER AGENCIKS

Hone

VI. ESTIMATED COST TO CIA:

A. Personnel

B. Estimated Budget
FX-63
ய
64
TOD SECRET
SENSITIVE
GROUP 1
Fxcluded from automati
14-00000
104-10103-10103 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

ΑΠ.Α - Το

DISPATCH

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL
HBRA 9438

Chief, WHD 201-050539
Chief, EE 20 June 1962

Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro
BEDOX/Operational
SMEDIFY Information Concerning 77 SZULC mam
Tad SZULC (201-050539)

FYI

1. Attached is a SMEDIFY report concerning Tadeusz SZULC
which includes SMEDICEVA's traces on SZULC.

2. Station has the following information regarding Ignacy
SACHS, who is mentioned in the attachment.

ALBICUSPID from ALBICUSPID-5, 4 May 1961 (ultimate source:
Henryk HRANKROWSKI, former member of the Polish Commercial
Mission, in Brazil)

Ignacy SACHS, upon his return from India, will not
work in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but will
be reassigned to the Latin American section of the Polish
Ministry of Foreign Trade. He recently wrote a report on
Latin America based upon material contained in the South
and Central American press. He reportedly had a falling
out with his superiors in the Foreign Ministry, hence the
transfer.

ALBICUSPID from ALBICUSPID-5, 30 May 1961 (ultimate source:
Czeslaw SLOWAKIEWICZ, Polish diplomat)

Ignacy SACHS, after a period of disgrace, has a new
job, economic assistant for underdeveloped countries in
Department III of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

FREDERICK L. ROUZKY

Distribution:

1 - WHD w/attachment,
1 - EE w/attachment REC'D LIDIAN ARJUNG
2 - Sao Paulo
3 - Files

19 June 1962/bcj

the attached infor ewas not sinh to
ili
FBI CRg To RIOKE 5 Jel 63 Fathe
/son with
R. Helme
subgent. Ang
mtec
youe komm
we are not to sind
Afere of Mr.
shiveed be sephel

.ph
人
ATT. Α

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

1

14-00000

Tadeusz SZULC

2nd June, 1961.
(4)3(6)

The Station copies of the original reports on SZULC have
been destroyed. I attach, however, a memorandum consisting of
selected entries from his card.

2.

All the information is from the same source, a Polish emigre
who knew SZULC personally and also had informants in the Polish Embassy.

3.

There is little doubt that SZULC was pro-communist at the time,
and that he co-operated with Ignacy SACHS, a cousin who was employed
by the Press Section of the Polish Embassy, and provided him with
"information". It would, however, be unwise to jump to the conclusion.
that this collaboration took the form of espionage, since SZULCs does
not seem to have made any secret of the relationship.

40.

I can find no evidence that Ignacy SACHS was an intelligence
officer, but he seems to have been an active propagandist. He returned
to Poland in 1954. A report from the same source, dated June 1956,
stated that he then occupied the Brazilian desk at the Polish Institute
for International Affairs.

att. to
LBRA 94.38.

NOFORIN / Cote d t
attito HBRA 9438
CS COPY
20 JUNGZ
201-50537

14-00000
11
Tadeusz SZULC
Born: c. 1926.
Nationality:
Occupation:
(6)(3/4)
Pole. Naturalised U.S. citizen
1955.
Journalist.

June 1947:

Used to work for the "Brazil Herald" and now for FRANCE
PRESSE. Is on good terms with the Polish Legation whom
he supplies with information on Brazil.. One of the party
who accompanied Raul FERNANDEZ on his mission to Montevideo.
He is the son of Seweryn SZULC.

Dec, 1947:
sub-source:
Re subject's efforts to find employment in American press
circles. Mr. HORAN tried to help him, due to a letter of
Harold HORAN of introduction from SZULC's uncle, John WILEY, American
New York:
Ambassador in Lisbon, but desisted on finding that SZULC
had been connected with the Rio de Janeiro communist paper
"Diretrizes".

Feb. 1948:

Further details of subject's efforts to find a job in the
United States. He is to work on the Palestine Commission
of the U.N.O. as from middle of February.

March 1948:

Subject still in New York and writing regular reports on
U.S. political affairs and personalities to the Polish
Legation in Rio de Janeiro. Trying to get a job with
U.S. Press through the influence of Mrs. J. WILEY.

Sept. 1949:

Subject at present in New York, married to an American
girl, and working in one of the American News Agencies.
Since arrival of new Legation (Warsaw) he was in touch
with the Minister, the Secretary and the ex-Press Attache,
the late Wikinski. Told by Warsaw Poles in Washington
that to be useful he cannot have a job with the Press Dept.
of the Washington Polish Embassy or the Polish Press Bureau
in New York. Using his "Uncle" introduction letters (the
U.S. Ambassador John Wiley married to Polish born, Irene
BARUCH, who is the sister of the first Mrs. SZULC), he
obtained a job with Americans on orders from the Poles.
Subject is helped financially by the Polish Legation in
Rio de Janeiro. Thanks to introduction letters from the
WILEYS, SZULC penetrated several circles in New York. He
is writing reports to Rio de Janeiro and working with people
in New York and is considered useful for future tasks.

June 1951:
1.
June 1951:

Nephew of newly appointed U.S. Ambassador in PANAMA, he is
now trying to get a job in Panama as American correspondent.
He has a job with U.P. in New York. In Rio de Janeiro in
1947/48, was fellow traveller and informer of communist
nucleus on the staff of the communist newspaper "Diretrizes".
Also worked for FRANCE PRESSE and reported regularly on the
Polish colony in Rio de Janeiro.

Visited Rio de Janeiro from 11.6.51 to 27.6.51 when he
returned to New York. Whilst in Rio, he was in touch with
Igancy SACHS to whom he brought information from the USA.
The two are relatives and boyhood friends and subject writes
personal letters to SACHS containing matters of interest to
the Polish Legation. Subject also has useful contacts in
New York in political and artistic circles, obtained through
his Aunt. Is believed to be trying to obtain American
citizenship through having married an American woman.

/-2-
........

2
1
14-00000

2.

Sept, 1951:
*
Personal reports on the U.S. Ambassador to Panama,
John WILEY, continue to be forwarded by the Polish
Legation in Rio de Janeiro to Warsaw via subject.

March 1952:

Source met subject in America recently. Subject
volunteered that he obtained much information on
the differences of policy between the British and
American Governments on the Persian problem through
his aunt, the wife of John WILEY, and that he kept
the Polish Government informed through Ignacy SACHS.
He boasted acquaintance with Drew PEARSON and the
Shah of Persia.
104-10103-10112
DISPATCH

Chief, Special Affairs Staff

Chief of Station, JMWAVE
SUBJECT Operational/TYPIC/AMTRUNK
Project AMTRUNK Operational Review

PRIORITY
ACTION: Request Headquarters decision on continuation or termination of Project AMTRUNK.

1. Attached herewith is an operational review of and progress report on the AMTRUNK team for the period of 4 through 31 March. Station views on the operation are summarized below.

2. The AMTRUNK operation has the following disadvantages or weaknesses:

A. The AMTRUNKers admit to being anti-KUBARK and to be working "with" KUBARK now only because there was no other alternative if they were to accomplish their mission. In other words, these agents will cooperate with KUBARK only when it is to their advantage. It is believed that if the operation were to develop, control would diminish rather than increase in the advanced stages of the operation, since the need for KUBARK assistance will decrease as operational successes increase. It is believed that AMICE/27 would have no hesitation "selling out" the operation to any one of the major refugee political groups at any time that he felt it advantageous to do so. It is believed that, if he is not already doing so, he is most likely to collaborate with either the Segundo Frente del Escambray, headed by Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, or the MRP faction headed by Manuel Ray. In the meantime AMICE/27 will attempt to have his own way with the operation. He believes that he is receiving special attention because of his ZRMETAL connections, and he will not hesitate to go behind KUBARK's back to AMTRUNK/1, AMCAPE/1, and ODACID or higher authority, if the operation or KUBARK handling of the AMTRUNKS does not progress to his liking. Since AMTRUNK/1, according to AMCAPE/1, "masterminded" this operation in the first place, it may be assumed that the AMTRUNKS will withhold nothing from AMTRUNK/1.

Distribution:
3-C/SAS w/attchs

UFGA-8381

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce
