CLAIM NUMBER
Kartes, Floryan
63-097
There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and
Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim
File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness,
injury, or death incurred on 2.36 2. ruptund cartoo
This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder
i
as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.
DATE OF NOTICE
3 MAY
1843
२०१७
10.0, 1076
SIGNATURE ASD REPRESENTALLNE
B. Detalice
NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE
SECRET
14-31

14-00000
Pecsonnel, Actions
priür to Mexico City
Assignment

14-00000
SECERT
REPRODUCTION MASTERS
4
BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE
Handlé
With Care
CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)
NOTICE OF CREDITABLE SERVICE
[POR LEAVE. PURPOSES
PREPARE IN ORIGINAL FROM. STANDARD FORM NO. 144 AND PORWARD TO FINANCE OFFICE.
NAME tlast First, Midstor

OFFICE land Division!

DDP/TH
SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE:
10
24 Dao 1948
2 March 1985
1 MAR 34
SIGNATURE DA
37-157
(a)
Mar
POTET ON
Ur-4b
JOHN L. BISCHOFF, Chief/SCAPS
CHIEF, TRANSACTIONS AN RE
CONFIDENTIAL
BRANCH
(4)
T
SECRET

14-00000
-2
ORIGINAL BIDERA Phic Proof 16
Sanitized version in file)

14-00000
Personnel Hctions Afte
Mexico City Assignment

14-00000
WH

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI
MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956; SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS.
EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME
SERIAL ORGN FUNDS GR-ST OLD NEW
SALARY SALARY
009274 51 700 CF GS 12 3 $10.105 $10.640
KARTY, FLORYAN.

POSTED ON
0-40
8 JAN 1964
WH
Sorial Na 2. Name 3. Cost Center Number 4 (WOP Hours
KARTY, FLORYAN R
009274 64 700 CF

5. Grade 6. Last Elf Date 7. TYPE ACTION
Etep OLD SALARY RATE Grade Step NEW SALARY RATE Ellective Date PSI
Salary Salary IS1 ㅅОЈ.

GS 12 2 $ 9,790 11/29/62 GS 12 3 810.105 11/24/63
8 Remarks and Authentication

/ NO EXCESS LHOP
IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/LHOP STATUS AT END OF HAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY
11 NOV

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EXPLOYEE IS
OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.
SIGNATURE! DATE 765 1963
PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION
941
560 (4-31)
Obsolete Prenous
Edinge

14-00000
DLS:
13
XX SEPT 63
OCB
1. SERIAL NUMBER
009274
? NAME (LAST FIRST-MIDDLE)
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION
REASSIGNMENT
FUNDS
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS

DDP/WH
BRANCH 3
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION
11. POSITION-TITLE
OPS OFFICER.
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (65, 10, etc.) 15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES
GS
0136.01
18. RE
SECRET
(When Filled in)
NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION
KARTY, FLORYAN R.
4 EFFECTIVE DATE 5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
10.
DA
YR
091563
REGULAR
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
A OLA
VTO CF
C10 V
X
CF TO OF
4135 5700 1000
50 USC 403 J
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
MEXICO CITY
12. POSITION NUMSER
0418-
16. GRADE AND STEP
12 2
MEXICO
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION.
D
17. SALARY OR RATE
9790
POSTED O
SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNE
19 ACTION 20 Eπρίον 21.
OFFICE CODING
CODE
Code
22. STATION 23. INTEGREE
CODE
CODE
24. Mo, 25 DATE OF BIRTH
Code
NUMERIC
ALPHABETIC
DA
37
10
20. NIE EXPIRES
29. SPECIAL
REFERENCE
51400 WH 45075
30. REFIREMENT DATA
3
010612
NO
DA
1 CIC
FICA
E. NONE
CODE
31. SEPARATION
DATA CODE
7778
32. CORBELTION/CANCELLATION DATA
DA

24
11
13. Sersary 34, SEX
EOD DATA
35. VET PREFERENCE
CODE
OZONE
५०.
DA
١٠٥٢٢
2.10 PT
34. SERY, COMP. DATE 37 LONG COMP. DATE 38 (ABEER CATEGORY
39.
FEGLI/HEALEN INSURANCE
45 SECIAL SECURITY NO
DA
74,
८८८8
CODE
(AM
PROV
O WAJYE
1. YES
HEALTH Iねる じつらま
TEMP
41.
ていたも
PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA
O NO PALVIOUS SERVICE
NO BALAR IN SERVICE
& UPEAR IN SERVICE LESS THA
3OREAN IN SERVICE 3 IPS
42. LEAVE CAT. 43
CODE
SIGNATURE ON OTHER AUTHENTICATION
FEDERAL FAN DATA
44.
STATE FAX DATA
FORM ERECUTED CODE
1. rés
50 PAN EXEMPTIONS
FORM ERECUTED
2-40
POSTED
7/24/23
FORM
Use Previous
1150
SECRET
198EP
112
Ednion
(4.0))
たま
e
(When Füled in)

14-00000
SECRET
(When Filled in)
MHC: 31 JULY 63
OCB
1. SERIAL NUMBER 2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE)
009274
NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION
2. MATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION
REASSIGNMENT
FUNDS
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS
DDP WH
BRANCH 3.
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION
11. POSITION TITLE
OPS OFFICER
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (65, 18, etc.)
16. REMARKS
GS
CF TO V
KARTY FLORYA
R
EFFECTIVE DATE S CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
066963
VTO CF
1. LUST CERTER WO. CHARGEABLE
CF TO OF
REGULAR
B. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
4135 5700 1000 50 USC 403 J
TO. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
IS. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES
0136.01
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
12 POSITION NUMBER
0400
16. GRADE, AND STEP
12 2
13 SERVICE DESIGNATION
D
17. SALARY OR RATE
9790
SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
22 STATION 23. INTEGREE
CODE
CODE
45075
24. Mdqtrs 25 DATE OF BIRTH
Code
3
५०
YR
DA.
01106112
30. RETIREMENT DATA 131 SEPARATION 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA
26 DATE OF GRADE
MO
04
TR.
CODE
19 ACTION 20 Eraplay. 21.
Code
OFFICE CODING
MUMERIC
ALPHABETIC
32 1.0
28. NTE EXPIRES
64700 Wit
29 SPECIAL
REFERENCE
мо.
CA.
Y
くまこ
-PICA
35 YET. PREFERENCE
CODE
10PT
NONE
COPE
36. SERV. COUP DATE
17. LONG COMP. DATE
DA.
04
41
COOL
PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA
O. NG PREVIOUS SERVICE
NO BREAK IN SERVICE
#4244 14 2ERVICE LESS THAN
おまえスINDERVICE MORE THAN
FOK
1150
91 42
Use Previous
Edition
1951
1
DATA CODE
アリミ
38. CAREER CATEGORY
CODE
39.
८००४
CAS
२६७४
TEMP
FEDERAL TAN DATA
42 LEAVE CAT43.
300)
FORMELECUTED COOL
1.TES
NG 1963
27 DATE OF LEI
DA
33 SECURITY
REQ NO.
34. SEX
DA
EOD DATA
FEGLE/HEALTH INSURANCE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
0.
SEALEN INS COOR
44
FORD EXECUTEO
1-YES
STATE EAX DATA-
LODE NO TAK STATE CODE
SIGNATURE OF OTHER AUTHENTICATION
POSTED
E.D.ECHOLS/08/02/63
31
SECRET
104-10225-10035 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

INDEX
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES
SECRET
PERSON/UNIT MOTIFIED
REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ACTION INFO
RID COPY ADVANCE COPY
FILE Self CCS3(ICA)
SECRET 252311Z CITE JMWAVE 4480
DIRECTOR
TYPIC AMKUG
REFERENCE DIRECTOR 57011

1. JMWAVE RECORDS SHOW FROM ARRIVAL JMWAVE
LATE 64 TROUGH DECEMBER 65 AMMUG/1 UND AS STATUS COVER
INTER-UNIVERSITY COMMITTEE FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ACTION,
WHICH WAS PROVIDED BY HEAD QUAT.TERS. JOB TITLE WAS RESEARCH-
ER WITH SALARY $600 PER MONTH. AMMUG/1 CLAIMS NO KNOWLEDGE
OF THE BALTIMORE COMPANY, AND SEARCH JMWAVE FILES FAILS
PRODUCE ANY INFO THAT AMMUG/1 CONNECTED WITH ANY SUCH
COMPANY. BEQUEST HOS CLARIFY.

2. AS IN CASE XMBEROUS OT HER PERUMEN AGENTS, JMWAVE
REVISED 93/1 COVER 1 JAN 66 TO MEET TAX REQUIREMENTS AND
TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE STAT US COVER. STATION NEGLECTED INFORM
WOGAME RE THIS CHANGE. SCHEAFFER EMPLOYMENT THUS BEGAN
1 JAN SS THERE WAS NO INTER IM EM PAYMENT.

3. SEVERAL OTHER CRED IT CHECKS SINCE AMMUG/1 EMPLOYED
BY SCHEAFFER HAVE WORKED SMOOT HL Y. AMMUG/1 ATTEMPT ING
PURCHASE HOUSE LOCALLY WHICH APPEARS SE REASON FOR PRESENT
SECRET

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 4480 SECRET
CHECKS. APPRECIATE EARLY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT INQUIRIES TO
EX PED ITE CLOSING PURCHASE.
SECRET
BT

NNNN
SECRET
21 January 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovic NOSENKO

1. The DDP and Chief, SR met with Ambassador Thompson in his office to advise him of our plans to proceed to hostile interrogation in order to clarify the NOSENKO case. The DDP explained that this was we had reached a firm conclusion late last year that NOSENKO was a provocateur and that hostile interrogation was in order. we decided to review these conclusions with representatives of the FBI. After some considerable delay, a series of meetings was held with the FBI at the level of Deputy Director for Security, Mr. William C. Sullivan. The findings of the FBI, which agreed generally with our own views, were formulated in a letter to the Director signed by John Edgar Hoover. A copy of this memorandum was shown to Ambassador Thompson by the DDP with the comment that the FBI and ourselves do not have a common understanding on the case which was something both the DCI and the Director, FBI, agreed would be necessary.

2. DDP went on to say that we would hope to begin hostile interrogations in the near future but before we did, we wanted to discuss the case with Ambassador Thompson in light of the various contingencies which might arise during the course of these interrogations. DDP felt that it was preferable to advise Ambassador Thompson well in advance of our intentions so that if consultations with the State Department became necessary on a contingency basis, Ambassador Thompson would be in possession of the background. Ambassador Thompson first asked if we were sure that NOSENKO could not escape and turn himself into the Soviet Embassy. We told him that we had established him in a country house with a large security guard which we felt made escape improbable. Ambassador Thompson then asked if there was a possibility that NOSENKO might commit suicide. We said psychiatrists did not believe he was the type to do so and that our security surveillance was such that we were alert to this possibility and would try to prevent it. Ambassador Thompson also wondered if there had been any communications concerning NOSENKO from the

Soviet side. He replied there had been none since the confrontation last year following NOSENKO's arrival in this country. We then mentioned the attempts on several occasions by NOSENKO's wife and mother to contact him through the Embassy in Moscow but added that these attempts ceased in March 1964 and nothing has been heard from them since.

3. Ambassador Thompson then asked if NOSENKO had provided information which would discredit any American officials. We answered in the negative, pointing out that he had reported on former French and Canadian ambassadors. We later qualified the statement on Americans, pointing out that NOSENKO did provide information on a few Americans of lesser rank as well as private citizens.

4. The DDP then noted that after we reached a point of no return in our interrogations, we might decide that NOSENKO would have to be turned back. Ambassador Thompson expressed concern that the Soviets might use this action to discourage defections. We explained that when we came to the point that a turn-back appeared desirable, we would hope that a statement could be made by the U. S. Government which would establish NOSENKO as a provocateur. The DDP then described the AEJOYFUL case in brief terms to Ambassador Thompson, emphasizing the parallel planning and the possibility that a quadripartite statement by the governments might be considered. The DDP did note, however, that AEJOYFUL was in British hands and that they have the major responsibility even though we and other security and intelligence services had agreed on the handling of the case. The DDP then noted that in past cases where we had turned back people with intelligence backgrounds at their own request, the Soviets had not made publicity capital of these actions.

5. The earlier mention of our discussions with the FBI recalled to Ambassador Thompson some of the material on Soviet political issues which he has been receiving recently from the FBI. He commented that it was his very strong impression that the information was being fed to us by the Soviets. He said that it either consisted of information we already knew or that which the Soviets would not object to our having. He asked our views on this. The DDP commented that it was the opinion of several officers in the Clandestine Services that some of these FBI sources were under Soviet control whereas the FBI believed them to be genuine.

6. In summing up our position on the NOSENKO case for Ambassador Thompson, the DDP referred to the kinds of information the Soviets had given up through OSENKO. He made particular reference to the Johnson case and observed that if the Soviets were prepared to provide this kind of build-up to insure the success of NOSENKO's mission, it must then be very important to them. In conclusion, the DDP said that he would send a letter for the record to Mr. Hughes on the topic of NOSENKO to which Ambassador Thompson agreed.

David E. Murphy
Chief, SR Division
104-10226-10011 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

19-120-26
UR
6 April 1961

Chief, Counter Intelligence Division
Support
ATTN: Chief, Miami Office

Memorandum of Visit to: Julio Pablo RODRIGUEZ Reyes
3332 N.W. 2nd Avenue
Miami, Florida

1. Mr. Frank Waterston, representative of the US State Dept. in Miami,
advised this office that Subject arrived in the US on 21 Mar 61 as an exile
and that he might have information of interest to this office.

2. On 4 Apr 61, Louis H. Rodriguez interviewed Subject in Waterston’s
office. An examination of Subject’s passport disclosed that he was born on
23 Jan 1943 in Havana, Cuba.

3. Subject stated that he is a member of a clandestine organization named
United Revolutionary Movement (URM), which is composed of 15 underground groups. The
coordinator for military operations of it was Major Humberto BORIA Faria, who
was arrested recently. Among the leaders of UR are Rogelio GONZALEZ better
known by his name de guerre of “Tresletero”, and Rafael DIAZ aka “Ralph”. All
these individuals were arrested recently and UR is completely disorganized as
a result.

4. Subject also stated that his sister with URM was to serve as courier
between the organization and the Catholic Chaplain at the Cabana Fortress.
The liaison between the Chaplain and Subject was Fray Fabian, who is the sacristan
at the Jesus de Miramar Church, in the suburb of Miramar, near Havana.

5. Subject also made a trip to Sancti Spiritus in the Province of Las
Villas bringing a radio transmitter for the anti-Castro guerrillas operating
in the Escambray. Through the above mentioned priests, Subject obtained, some
information furnished by prisoners held in the Cabana fortress which is being
transmitted to support forces.

6. Subject intends to remain in the US indefinitely and has been instructed
to contact a Cuban national named “Barreto”, who resides at ........
Miami. Barreto is the UR representative in Miami.

7. No further contacts with Subject are anticipated.

JUANITA F. O’LEARY

Action Chief in the
security risk
(no discipline)
by
Rodriguez/cab
14-00000
104-10226-10045
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
4 May 1961

SUBJECT: Briefing of Mr. Maurice Oldfield, MI-6, by WR/4, Clark Simmons

1. In view of the request of Mr. Maurice Oldfield, MI-6
representative, for identities and further particulars regarding the
Robert Horton Geddes case a meeting was held on 2 May 1961 with WH/4/CI,
Clark Simmons, with Mr. Cleveland C. Cramer and John C. Roberts of WR/6
also present.

2. At the outset Mr. Oldfield provided the following information:

a. Robert Horton Geddes is a British subject born in
Lima, Peru, on 7 April 1932. He holds British passport No. C-34880,
issued at Nassau on 14 June 1956. He was not registered at the
British Consulate in Havana and was regarded as being American or
Canadian.

b. Two employees of the British Embassy, Havana, have visited
Geddes in the Havana jail (military G-2 section) on Sunday evening,
30 April 1961, and had a 15-minute conversation with Geddes alone under
circumstances which they felt were not monitored. Geddes stated to
them: (1) On 19 April he was arrested by the militia (in civilian
clothes) at his hotel; (2) He had been interrogated three times and
gave the impression that he had not disclosed anything of importance;
(3) He was accused of being a CIA agent, and told that he could be
shot because of the existence of civil war; (4) During the third
interrogation Geddes mentioned that there was a message in Spanish
signed by Geddes which was sent allegedly by him by radio-transmitter
asking that CIA send arms to Cuba.

c. The British Embassy in Havana learned on Saturday,
29 April 1961, that Geddes had regularly been "picked up" at the
Havana Airport on his trips to and from Miami. (Mr. Oldfield was not
certain what exact interpretation could be given to the term
"picked up").

3. After relating the above, Mr. Oldfield stated that his service
is interested in obtaining an estimate of the sort of story the Cubans
might use against Geddes or in provocation against the British Embassy,
perhaps to prove that the British Embassy had been in collusion with
the U.S. He referred to the following specific questions which he
had submitted earlier on 4 May and which were relayed by WR/6 to WR/4
to R. Hopkins for answers to be given in the afternoon session by Clark
Simmons:

SECRET

14-00000
SECRET
2

a. What was the identity of the agent guide in Cuba who gave GEDDES
the message he brought to the CIA contact in Miami on 11 March 1961;

b. What was the identity--or case name--used by the CIA case
officer in Miami;

c. Was Geddes given any means of clandestine radio-transmission;

d. What were the instructions given to GEDDES by his case officer.

4. Mr. Simmons replied as follows:

a. The only means of communication given to Geddes, besides his
open code phone contact with his wife in Boca Raton, was a very simple SS
system. Geddes was not given any means for clandestine radio-transmission.

b. Simmons then read and related the following chronology of
Geddes' activities from WH/4 files:

11 March: Geddes came to Miami on the night of 11 March and made contact
with Cabbage/4, a Cuban in Miami who was in contact with the CIA office.
Geddes had a message from Cabbage/1 a CIA contact inside Cuba. C-4 put
Geddes in contact with a CIA case officer in Miami on 12 March. Geddes
claimed to be an active member of the United Revolucionaria, a resistance
group inside Cuba of which C-1 was a member. At that time Geddes said the
Cuban Navy has a plan to attack all pro-Castro facilities and then flee
Cuba on or about 22 March. Geddes did not ask for any money. His motivation
was not known. The case officer's instructions to Geddes were related solely
to Geddes' report that the Cuban Navy might defect. Geddes returned to
Havana.

16 March: Geddes departed for Havana.

20 March: We heard indirectly - Geddes had phoned his wife and indicated
that the individual (C-1) with whom he had been collaborating in United
Revolucionaria was in trouble. The fact behind this was that one of our
agents (member of the CB) inside Cuba had against instructions visited his
wife in Cuba. As a result a net of United Revolucionaria persons was arrested including
C-1. Besides C-1, some of the others of this net knew of Geddes' activities.

21 March: Geddes returned to Miami.

23 March: Geddes came to Havana. He was given a simple SS system.
Beginning about 24 March we had reason to suspect Geddes as a possible
provocateur since the defection had not come off and possibility of keeping
the defection of the Navy secret in itself was implausible.

27 March: Geddes sent a SS message to Miami regarding the possible Cuban
NAVY defection.

28 March: Through open code telecon with wife said defection of Navy not
for 3 or 4 April.

29 March: Geddes called wife on telephone.

SECRET

14-00000
SECRET
-3-

1 April: Geddes sent an SS message which was hand-carried to
Miami by a courier. Geddes also had a telecon with his wife on
this day.

2 April: Geddes said in telecon to wife that Naval conspirators
would meet on 3 April and Geddes would give on on 5 April a final
date for the defection.

4 April: Geddes indicated in telecon to wife that the Naval
defection would take place "any day" now.

7 April: We received a message from Geddes delivered by a third
party (courier) that the Navy plans to defect on 5 or 7 April.
Geddes returned to Miami and said the date was now set for 8 or 9
April.

10 April: Geddes returned to Havana.

11 April: Geddes telephoned his wife that the defection could take
place on 13 or 14 April.

18 April: Geddes in telecon with wife reported that the defection
would be on 17 or 18 April.

c. During the account of the above chronology, Simmons
made the following comments:

(1) The CIA agent inside (C-1) vouched for Geddes but we here in
Headquarters do not know to what extent C-1 had probed into the back-
ground of Geddes and his contacts. We here CIA advise Miami not to
take any action until we had obtained British concurrence but by
that time Geddes had already returned to Havana. He reiterated that
Geddes was a walk-in and was never treated as an agent.

(2) Geddes and his forecast regarding the defection of the Cuban
Navy were suspect from the outset. He claimed to be a British
citizen but was already performing for the U.S.

(3) To Mr. Oldfield's question as to whether Geddes had any access
to a SW net, Simmons replied that to his knowledge Geddes only had
phone contact with his wife, SS and one of courier.

(4) No arms deliveries were involved in the contact with Geddes.

(5) Simmons said he would look into whom Geddes could compromise
or put the finger on.

(6) To Mr. Oldfield's repeated request for identities of
C-4, C-1, the Miami case officer, and the net that was arrested on
16 March, Simmons replied that only the DCI has the authority to
release such information.

(7) The Miami case officer never served inside Cuba.

SECRET

14-00000
SECRET
- 4 -

5. After Mr. Oldfield had put a number of questions to Simmons
the latter asked Oldfield whether Geddes is possibly a British agent
which Oldfield emphatically answered in the negative.

6. Mr. Oldfield said that he would recommend off a communication
to his service indicating that Geddes might be a glosser--a provocateur.
However, he asked that he be provided with the following:

a. CIA appreciation of the United Revolucionaria;

b. Identities of C-1, C-4 and members of the net with whom
C-1 was arrested on March 16 (sic). Simmons acknowledged that besides
C-1 conceivably several other members of this net might have known of
Geddes and his activities.)

c. Identities of the couriers who had contact with Geddes;

d. The identity of the CIA case officer--the name or names
used by him in contacts with Geddes;

e. Chronological summary of the visits of Geddes to Miami
and returns to Havana; also a list of the nature of his communications
to Miami (by telecon, courier, etc.) and communications sent to him in
Havana.

John G. Roberts
DC/WR/6

SECRET
104-10226-10067 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

# DISPATCH

A-B-C-D-E-F

To: Chief of Station, JIWAVE

From: Chief, Special Affairs Staff
DIVCUR/TIPIS/Operational
Reactions from WH to UR Propaganda and Desire to concentrate UR efforts on PSYWAR
ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

AR: As Indicated

RSP: UNGA 9274, 27 May 1963

1. Paragraph 3 of refs: Concerned elements at headquarters stated the attachments with interest; however, the material was not considered of special operational import to merit specific guidance to witting contacts in the UR.

2. Any additional effort by the UR to reach and influence FOREIGN audiences will be highly valued.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
3 - Addressees

Portf
1 - SAS/PROP
R - SAS/
1 - C/NR/CA

RID

RID/FI

DESTROY

CROSS REFERENCE TO: 19-127-25
DATE TYPED: 18 June 63 DATE DISTRIBUTED: 21 JUL 1963
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND REQUIRED

UFON - 277

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T COORDINATING NUMBER: 19-125-26

OFFICE: ORIGINATING
SAS/DCE/PA-PROF: Bruce MAS Master TYPE

OFFICE SYMBOL: DUT COORDINATING OFFICER
C/SAS/MOB: 097 A. S. Bishop

C/WH/CA: 18 June 1963

OFFICE SYMBOL: RELEASING OFFICER

DATE: DATE: RELEASE NUMBER: 45718
104-10226-10087
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

TRANSMITTAL
OF
TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
(When Filled in)

UNIT
Jane S. Ingle::jg
TFW/Intel/Reports
Ext.
5547
DATE
27 August 1962

ROUTING
Aug 28 13 44Z62

TDCS -3/520,846 SLCT.

CONFIRMATION COPIES
TFW 12

INFORMATION COPIES
CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 5, IW 2, CA 2, CA/PRG, OS, WH 6,
WE 4,

DATE DISTRIBUTED
27 August 1962

DISSEMINATION
TFW/Int 2 TFW/PROP-PA 1 WH/R 1
TFW/FI 2 TFW/SI 1 WE/3 3
TFW/CI 2 TFW/WAVE 1 WE/R 1
TFW/PM 1 WH/PACY 2 OS/SSD/Bauman 1

EVALUATION
REQUESTED STATE ARMY NAVY AIR

PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE

BASED ON (IM. Rpt. Prof.)
WAVE-7632 (IN-11670)
WAVE-7114 (IN-46173)
UFG-1396
UNION (UNION-11)
Liaison: G

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

DD/P INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
(When Filled in)

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
W.S. Compton
WE/3/RE (in draft)

RELEASING OFFICER
TFW/Intel

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
The material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Esplanage Laws, Title 18 U.S.C. Secs.
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
S-E-C-R-E-T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
COUNTRY
CUBA
REPORT NO. TDCS-3/520,846.
SUBJECT
PLANNED UPRISING BY OPPOSITION
GROUPS IN CUBA
DATE DISTR
27 AUGUST 1962

DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACO.
APPRAISAL
SOURCE
AUGUST 1962
FRANCE, PARIS (25 AUGUST 1962)

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
REFERENCES
RD-ACQ-01258
RD-W-2107
FIELD REPORT NO.
IN -46173
-11670

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE
AN OFFICIAL FRENCH SERVICE.

STATE
1. MEMBERS OF THE UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (UR) REPORTED TO THE
FRENCH EMBASSY IN HABANA THAT ON 10 AUGUST THEY WERE INVITED TO ATTEND
A MEETING ON 14 AUGUST ORGANIZED BY THE DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO
ESTUDIANTIL (DRE) AND THE MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO
(MRP), THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS FOR THE THREE GROUPS TO PLAN A
STAGE OF ACTIVE WARFARE. THE UR WAS ADVISED BY THE FRENCH EMBASSY
NOT TO PARTICIPATE, BUT THE UR COULD NOT CONVINCE THE DRE AND THE
MRP TO REVERSE THEIR DECISION FOR AN UPRISING SCHEDULED FOR THE LAST
DAYS OF AUGUST, WHICH WOULD RESULT IN A GENERAL UPRISING OF ALL
INTERNAL RESISTANCE GROUPS.

2. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCARIB

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
SE-C-R-E-T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
STATE ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OD DIA INS
REPCINCLANT
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
S-E-C-R-E-T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
TDCS -3/520,846
11670
47173
PAGE
2

3. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS, TELEGRAM
NO. 984, DATED 26 AUGUST 1962, REPORTED INFORMATION FROM THE FRENCH
AMBASSADOR IN HABANA ON THIS AGREEMENT FOR A GENERAL UPRISING
DURING THE LAST DAYS OF AUGUST.
END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
S-E-C-R-E-T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

TO : UFICO
FROM : JIAWAVE
ACTION: TFW 10 (MR. KAPPEL, TFW ISSUED TEMPO COPY 2315, 30 AUG)
INFO : DCI, DD/P, ADOP, SOD-5, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O
CI/OS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 2, IV 2, W 7,
DD/1, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, S/C 2

AUG 31 03102 62

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN14497
::INI 4497

OPIM DIR CITE WAVE 7916
GYROSE INTEL
REF A. WAVE 7983 (CM 14487).
B. WAVE 7986 (CM 14226).
1. REFS REFLECT MOST RECENT ACQUISITION INTEL RE TIMING
GENERAL UPRISING. DISTURBING ASPECT RECEIPT THIS INFO IS FACT
IT REACHING KUBARK VIA WIDE VARIETY SOURCES BUT ULTIMATE END
SOURCE ALWAYS UR. ANALYSIS THIS INFO INDICATES IT HANGS TOGETHER
RATHER WELL AND IN MANY INSTANCES VARIETY OF CHANNELS VIA WHICH
IT RECEIVED WOULD NORMALLY TEND SERVE AS CROSS CHECK OR CONFIR-
MATION. WE CONFIDENT THIS INTEL COMING FROM UR CHANNELS WHICH EXILE
UR REGARDS AS BONA FIDE. WAVE INITIALLY REGARDED INFO AS ACCURATE
REFLECTION WHAT UR EXPERIENCING IN CUBA. HOWEVER INVESTIGATION
AND REAPPRAISAL THIS INFO LEADS CONSLUSION INFO NOT ACCURATE AND
MAY BE REFLECTION 0-2 DECEPTION OR PROVOCATION OP.
2. COLLATION ALL INTEL WHICH OBTAINED FROM UR SOURCES RE
UPRISING CUBA HAS IDENTIFIED FOLLOWING GROUPS AS SCHEDULED
PARTICIPATE THIS REVOLT. OUR COMMENTS RE INQUIRIES WITH THESE
GROUPS REVEALS FOLLOWING

SECRET
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

A. DRE REPEAT DRE. PEDRO INTERIAN GARCIA STATES DRE HAS
NO INFO RE SCHEDULED REVOLT.
B. MRP REPEAT MRP. AMRAZZ-1 CLAIMS HAS NO INFO RE INTERNAL
REVOLT.
C. 30 NOV REPEAT 30 NOV. AMICE-8 REPORTS HIS FACTION
RECEIVED CODED CABLE 33 AUG FROM CUBA WHICH REQUESTED ARMS AS
SITUATION DESPERATE AND THEY NEED HELP. AMICE-8 SENT CODED REPLY
30 AUG STATING HOLD OFF FROM ANY PRECIPITOUS ACTION. AMICE-8 HAS
NO INFO RE TIMING ANY REVOLT.

D. JUVENTUD ANTICOMUNISTA CATOLICA REPEAT JUVENTUD
ANTICOMUNISTA CATOLICA. (CATHOLIC ANTI-COMMUNIST YOUTH) AMPAN-4
REPORTS THIS GROUP HAS NO INFO RE REVOLT.
E. MRR REPEAT MRR. CESAR BARO INDICATES HE HAS HAD COMMO
FROM CUBA LAST FEW DAYS BUT NO MENTION MADE ANY REVOLT.
F. ELN REPEAT ELN. (EJERCITO DE LIBERACION NACIONAL).
WE TRYING OBTAIN INFO FROM THIS GROUP.
G. FND REPEAT FND. WE TRYING OBTAIN INFO FROM THIS GROUP.
H. FAL REPEAT FAL. HAVE NO INFO OR READY ACCESS THIS GROUP.
I. SECUNDO FRENTE ESCAMBRAY REPEAT SECUNDO FRENTE
ESCAMBRAY. WE TRYING OBTAIN FROM THIS GROUP.
3. VIEW PAPA 2 INFO PLUS GENERAL KNOWLEDGE INTERNAL CUBAN
SCENE WHICH STEMS FROM DAILY CONTACT REFUGEES, RECEIPT AGENT
TRAFFIC, ETC. MUST CONCLUDE THAT BALANCED JUDGEMENT CONTINUES
INDICATE BONA FIDE POPULAR UPRISING NOT LIKELY AT THIS TIME.
4. HAVE NOT EXCLUDED PROVOCATION POSSIBILITY THEREFORE
HAVE ARRANGED FOR ANCORE-2 BROADCAST FOLLOWING STATEMENT 2008

SECRET

HOURS (VER VAL). WILL SUBSEQUENTLY REPLAY OVER ALL SPANISH
PROGRAMS WIF, VOES, AND WET. STATEMENT WILL READ AS FOLLOWS
"RELIABLE REFUGEE SOURCES AND INFO COMING OUT OF CUBA AS WELL
AS CUBAN RADIO REPORTS INDICATE CLEARLY THAT CASTROFORCES HAVE
BEEN ON A WAR FOOTING UNDER CONSTANT ALERT EVER SINCE THE
DRE ATTACK OF 24 AUG. THEY ARE PREPARED TO CRUSH ANY SIGN OF
UPRISING, RESISTANCE OR CUBAN INVASION FROM OUTSIDE. ALL TRUE
CUBAN PATRIOTS ARE URGENTLY WARNED NOT TO UNDERTAKE AT THIS
TIME AN UPRISING AS THIS IS DESIRED AND EXPECTED BY THE CASTRO
COMMUNIST FORCES. LOYAL PATRIOTS MUST FEAR AND EXPECT PROVOCATIONS.
LIBERATION WILL COME BUT NOW IS NOT THE TIME TO REVOLT."

END OF MESSAGE
CS Comment: Reported a general uprising in all of the Provinces of Cuba
is scheduled for 4:00 a.m. on 31 August.

SECRET
14-00000,

104-10226-10117
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CLA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: 100-5-1

INCLUSIVE DATES: AUG. 62- DEC. 63

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY MATERIAL

DATE  DATE
RECEIVED RETURNED REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME) SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000
Pre-dates
HSCA request

(all 3rd Agency)

14-00000
UNCLASSIFIED. INTERNAL CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
USE ONLY
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
DC/03/JPriebe

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
INITIALS to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED FORWARDED
1. DO/SR 30/7
2. DO/SAT
3. SR/CI/BBright AUG1 2- This information was sent to
Staff recently and has
probably been forwarded to you
for reply. Though you might
4. Joon be able to use this extra copy.
5.
6. CSR/CI/K ENLARGED FROM RID/FI
7. Dolores OR
8. EE/G/CE-Wagen 19/8 I sonate in memo...
Schroeden apparent BIND
approach a subsequent
9. SR/CI/K
Sou, ausach.Cous

10.
Felife bower
Spotid o

11. SR/CI/A IGB?

12. Joon 8 to 9: Looks like RIS was
on him first, but they
have sent Felt
(KJA 19
(or another)
at him for
they
for Secrintment attit elipt.
4
13.
RIDIAN
-RI/MIS
RID/files

14.

610
AISE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
SECRET CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL UNCLASSIFIED
USE ONLY. 100-5-1
14-00000
CLOFET SENSITIVE

5 July 1963
Chief, CI Staff/L
2 C 48 Про

Chief, Contact Division, CO

Attempted RIS Penetration of Bell Telephone Laboratories - BI-10612

1. Attached are two memorunda, dated 21 June 1963, from
car New York Field Office concerning apparent Ria interest
in Manfred R. Schroeder and Donald E. Thomas, Bell Telephone
Laboratories, Murray Hill, New Jersey. We believe this informa
tion should be passed to the FBI immediately. We would ap
preciate being advised the date this information is forwarded
to the Bureau.

2. For your information, permission to brief Dr. Schroeder
prior to his trip to the USSR was requested by our New York
Office but refused by FI Staff. In view of his employment, how-
ever, and previous CD/00 contacts with him, FI recommended he
be provided with a strong defensive and realities briefing.

3. Further inquiry may be directed to Mrs. Shirley Stetson,
cn/08, Depart Branch, Room 413, 1717 8 Street, H. W., extension
2268.
Canos. 7701
1816-3

Reales: As stated above
K. M. AIRCRAFT
SBStetson/m
80 100 100-5-1
Για

30 JULY 63
CS COPY 100-5-1

SECRET SENSITIVE - info
14-00000
SECRET
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum

TO Chief, Contact Division DATE: 1 July 1963
Attn Mc Connell/Czajkowski/Lincoln Staff
FROM Chief, New York Office
SUBJECT: Attempted R.I.S. Penetration of Bell Telephone Labs

Ref: II Reports 2988-3 and 2989-3

1. We thought the attached reports would be of interest to Lincoln
Staff from a Soviet realities standpoint. We also felt that they should
be brought to the attention of Division management because the M.O. out-
lined therein is becoming a major factor in dealing with sources who have
contact with Sovbloc nationals. It has been our experience that the type
of activity outlined has been on a marked increase, particularly since
the establishment of the KGB 10th Directorate. Although such activity
by Sov legals is taking place throughout the continental U.S., undoubtedly
its greatest impact is being felt in the New York and Washington, D.C.
areas because of the large Soviet Government establishments in both of
these cities. For this reason it would seem imperative that both WAFO
and NYFO be extremely vigilant for such activity in companies and insti-
tutions with which they are dealing in order that it may be recognized
in its earliest stages and appropriate CI/CE countermeasures instituted.
In order to assist other offices in this respect, we plan to write in the
near future an article for the Division Newsletter, outlining some of our
experiences along these lines.

2. We were somewhat disappointed in CI Staff's reaction to our
recent request for assistance in defensive briefing of the subject of
one of the attached reports. It seems to be quite clear now that our
original assumption concerning his being R.I.S. targeted was quite correct
and that there is a strong likelihood that his current trip behind the
Curtain vill be utilized by the opposition for provocation and/or an
actual recruitment attempt. We wonder in future cases of this nature
exactly what support we may expect from Angleton's shop. Although we
feel that we have a fair capability for handling such matters here in
New York, we do admit that, at least on this one, we would have felt
slightly more comfortable had a CI specialist been along, if for no other
reason than to preclude any possible Monday morning quarterbacking by the
"old pros."

SECRET 10612

14-00000
SECRET
-2-
Subject: Attempted R.I.S. Penetration of Bell Telephone Labs

3. Judging by the attached material, it would appear that, despite
established Bell policy (see our 16 May memorandum re Case 39,790), the
opposition has seen fit to deflower at least two of Bell's scientific
virgins. We serjously wonder at this point just how many other Bell
people might be in the same boat. Perhaps, as a result of all this,
some representation by Bell management to the KGB will be forthcoming,
spelling out to that organization, as was spelled out to our own, estab-
lished company policy pertaining to such matters. In any event, it would
appear that at least one or two Bell scientists, and there are probably
more, have been giving the R.I.S. more cooperation and reporting than the
Agency. Let's hope that in the near future Bell management takes some
effective steps to rectify this rather ludicrous, and patently dangerous,
situation.

Attachments: I Reports 2988-3
and 2989-3
JAY B. L. REEVES

Chagle/ng

10612
SECRET

14-00000

Memorandum
SEROBICE
TO
Attn
: Chier, Contact Division.
: Support (Chirley Stetson)
DATE. 26 June
FROM
Chief, New fork Office
Apparent KIS Interest in Manfred Pr
stapper:
Bell Telephone La>
201-734194
(201-734194)

1:
11 0930-1230 hours 14 June, Manfred A. Schroeder of Bell Labs
received a strong defensive briefing in correction with his June -
July trip to the USSK and sulguria (see our 7ay Coordination Out-
line for subject). During Schroeder's briefing, Nagle elicited
from him that prior to a trip to the USSR in 1959 he had been con-
tacted by an individual who represented himsel se a West Germaτι
Intelligence Officer. More important, we also learned that, ut
about the same time, RIS cultivation of Schroeder apparently began.

2. Concerning the West German approach, Schroeder indicated
that his mother, who resides in Hamburg, wa, telephoned in 1959 by
an individual who claimed to be an old acqur.intance of her son's
and who was interested in contacting hin concerning employment in
the US. The caller left a phone number and said that he would ap-
preciate il if Schroeder could call him neze time he was in Haaturg.
Schroeder's mother relayed the message to her con, and, as requested,
he telephoned the caller just prior to his ン USSR junket. The
individual he called identified himself as a West German intelligence
Officer and said that he would like to oder as coon as
possible. Schroeder agreed. When they met, the individual in question
(Schroeder does not recali his name) presented suitable credentiale
and expressed interest in Senroeder's trip to the USSR. According to
Schroeder's account, the West German Intelligence Officer gave him the
old "keep your eyes and ears open" pitch, and old him that he would
contact him in the first West German city in which he touched down
after his USSR trip. Schroeder was conducted in Stuttgart promptly
after returning to Germany from the US on his way back to the US.
Because of his US employment and the fact that Bell paid for his trip,
Schroeder became very apprehensive about any further contact with the
West German service and at the time of the call indicated that he had
nothing to say and wanted no further contact. Other than the cursory
examination of credentials (us reported above), Schroeder made no
attempt to establish the bona fides of the German who made the approach.
We pointed out to Schroeder the unlikely possibility that the approach
might not have been Lone fide and might, in fact, have been a provo-
cation.
* Cogheytached.

SECRET 10612
SENSITIVE

14-00000
SENSITIVE

A interest.

3. Apparently R.I.S. ultivation .

prior the above incident. According to him

received what appeared to be a routine invitation vis

acoustics Ocilities in Mosconti lengrad in a

connection witi. the invitin wrote. Sav
that during his visit he would like to m

Sov acoustics engineer who was very interest

and ind done sever Russian trainlong of

a result of this corresponience, Scaronder receives

ut his home a couple of days prior ti dejartcy
from an individual who lede

In New York. The caller told me

de haure
:i:

Tor delivery this spel

of the Stat
Cort.10.

caller, whose na Schect

Like to deliveα.
:
Schroeder in a
which he had t

thor comida
104-10227-10003  2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

Methodology:

1.  The portion of the 11 June 1962 tape in question
was provided to two employees, both of whom are professional
transcribers and native Russian speakers. They were provided
with the background of the difficulty, i.e., that previous
transcriptions of the tape quoted Nosenko as saying that
he had "also been in the States" and that he had used the
alias Nikolayev "both in England and 'u vas' i.e., in the
United States.

2.  Mr. Kozlov and Mr. Berest produced a transcription
which contains no statement of Nosenko's saying he had been
in the United States. In addition, their rendering of the
sentence pertaining to Nosenko's use of the alias Nikolayev
reads, with no equivocation, "both in England and 'u nas'",
i.e., "in the Soviet Union."

3.  Independently, the same portion of tape was given
yet another professional transcriber, a native Russian
speaker. She was given no background whatsoever on the
problem. Her transcript contained no statement of Nosenko's
saying he had been in the United States. In addition, her
rendering of the sentence pertaining to Nosenko's use of
the alias Nikolayev reads unequivocally as "both in England
and 'u nas'", i.e., "in the Soviet Union."

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
INVOLVED  E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340

SECRET
104-10227-10046 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DISPATCH
SEAT/AIR BAT
PROCESSING
FROM tellano Shiz Ara te He RD-1 o
ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES State Departemt iterat

ACTION REJIES None, I
1. An APOT sutsource, edcardo NUNEZ Garcia, reported on 12 December 1961
that he had that day, by chance, almal s ds, a Corror Gologate of
Dr. Aureliano SAN arane, al tuo kw orleans Airp 201284.30.3

2. U stato: that GEEGA said that he was retarding that eng from a
trip to Pommes and Guatemala. In Panama be had talisi te create GITAN
and had foune kada to co jaiadinti, int, to the contrar, shen he had Lalked
to Presiocol DRHORAS in Guateral a a no had femi hir ostrerely anch chon to have
CASTRO Mafiatal, DIGGAS hai asked CIRESIA about his visit to CHAT,
and then GrIPA expressed his opinion, YULES sale it was logical became
CHIARI was extremely cowaraly.

3. According to EZ, CTBRIGA further said that a short time ago
he had teen called by Er. Ob Hurwitch, Chief of the Cuban Desk in the
State Departout, and that Hurwitch hai told him not to fool around wi ti
SEZ or Julio Galecano the man she ind the support of the U.S.
was AMI-L, and that as ho, Hurwitch, had knowlsige of the great work done
ty GIGA, he did not want him to contiano lesin more time.
:

4. HUWEZ added that intia add that a few days later he received a
phong call from A-1. -1. TEINA told U that he will help
-1,
bocanso it was rostested, but he would never have done so by his own wich.
:

5. 10.2 add that GIOGA continued his travel en te dasidacton, wher
he resices at 1419-27th Street, .., Wasirington ?.

Distributions.
3-admarters
CS FILE COPY 19-124-25
CROSS REFERENCE TO
MD OF DISTATO
DATE TYPE
DATE DISPATCHED
19:00 18
DISPATLY SYMBOL AND NUMBER

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
Ar COM
14-00000
104-10227-10121 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

(TYPED O/DDF)
0710 L.B. KIRKPATRICK 173
UNIT. 1. G.
DATE. 8856 2 MAY 1961

TO SEE ATTACHED LIST
FROM DIRECTOR
CONF IG
INFO. DCI, D/OCI, DOP, COP, A2DP/A, EE 4, FC 5, 14,
AF 4, HE 4, WH 4, s/c 2

TO ΕΣΕ ΑΤΤAGHED LIST INFO CITE DIR
BOOK MESSAGE 
FROM ASCHAM

1. AS RESULT OF DEFEAT OF THE CUBAN OPERATION CONSIDERABLE
COMMENT CONCERNING KUBARK NOW BEING MADE IN PRESS AND IN CONGRESS.
MANY PROPOSALS ARE BEING AND WILL BE RAISED CONCERNING KUBARK AND
OTHER ACTIVITIES IN THIS AREA OF ODYOKE. ACTUALLY MUCH MIS-
INFORMATION GENERALLY REPORTED AND WHILE SOME PROPOSALS ARE FROM
RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUALS, THERE ARE MANY DISTORTIONS OF ACTUAL
SITUATION. DETALS OF CUBAN OPERATION ARE SUFFICIENTLY COVERED IN
DEPCIRTEL 1637 AND SUGGEST YOU OBTAIN THIS FOR YOUR INFO. IT IS MY VII V.
THAT KUBARK ACQUITTED ITSELF WELL IN MOST RESPECTS, ALTHOUGH I PLA
TO MEMIT ALL SEAL FALTS TO AS AVAILA
FULL REVIEW OF OPERATION AFTER REASONABLE PERIOD HAS FLAPSED IN
ΤΗΕ ΜΕΑNTIME PRESIDENT HAS DIRECTED GENERAL MAXWELL TAYLOR 10 TA
CLOSE LOOK AT ALL PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS IN AREA OF MILITARY AND
PARAMILITARY, GUERRILLA AND ANTI-GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES WHICH FALL
SHORT OF OUTRIGHT WAR. HE WILL GIVE SPECIAL ATTENTION TO LESSONS
RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERs AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copr
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET
ROUTING
SEFERRED
MAY 3012
ROUTINE
VRIORITY
OPERATIONAL
IMMEDIATE
OUT52128
OUT 57125
57347-
31917
14-00000

UNIT
EAT
DATE.
TO
FICMS DIRECTOR
COND
DUO,

10

FROM RECENT EVENTS IN CUBA. IN THIS EFFORT HE WILL BE ASSISTED BY
ATTORNEY GENERAL, CILLEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, AND MYSELF. HIS
REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT BY MAY 15.

2. WHILE IN NO WAY WISHING TO LESSEN THE SERIOUSNESS OF DEFEAT IN
CUBA BOTH FOR KUBARK AND PBPRIME, I WISH TO ASSURE EVERYBODY THAT
OUR PRIMARY EFFORT SHOULD BE TO LEARN FROM EXPERIENCE, GOOD OR EAD.
FURTHER, UNLESS INSTRUCTED BY COMPETENT AUTHORITY TO THE CONTRARY,
EVERYBODY SHOULD CONTINUE WITH HIS PRESENT ACTIVITIES AND PROJE CTS.

FOR YOUR INFO, WE HAVE FULLY BRIEFED APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF
CONGRESS ON THE CUBAN OPERATION AND IN FACT HAVE MORE THAN EVER
BEFORE DURING THIS SESSION OF CONGRESS KEPT THE ARMED SERVICES AND
APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES ADVISED ON DAILY BASIS OF VITAL INTELLIGENCE,
PERTINENT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES AND PROBLEMS. WE WILL ENDEABOR

TO ADVISE YOU PROMPTLY OF PERTINENT DEVELOPMENTS IN WASHINGTON
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET
ROUTING
PAGE TWO
CITE DIR DIR 37947
OUT 52188

TELPASING OFFICES COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICES
SECRET
Capy Na
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
..:
14-00000
DATE
10
FROM DIRECTOR
CONF,
INFO.
10
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET
IDINC
ROUTING
EFERSSOI
ROUTINE
INITIALS
PRIORITY
OPERATIONAL INMALL
IMMEDIATE
PAGE THREE
INFO
CITE DIR
OUT 52128

THAT AFFECT KUBARK, BUT STRESS THAT YOU RECOGNIZE THAT REPORTS
ARE OFTEN MISLEADING.
IN PUBLIC MEDIA DEOPIPPONIESTING
END OF MESSAGE

DDCI (in draft)
COPS (in draft)
ALLEN W. PULLES
RELEASING OFFIC
COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
SECRET Copy M
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROM.BITED.
:
14-00000
ני
n.
ONE
0:
DIRECTOR
SCART
الشركم
OPERATIONAL PITIALS
IMMEDIATE
OUT 52128
D1R 37947
ALGIERS
BRAZZAVILLE
ADDIS ABA BA
ACCRA
CONAKRY
ABIDJAN
NAIROBI
:
MONROVIA
TRIPOLI
RABAT
INFO
VIENNA
FRANKFURT
ATHENS
BERN
NICOSIA
MELBOURNE
RANGOON
PANOM PΕΝΗ
FONOLULU
HONG KONG
DJAKARTA
TOKYO
CITE DIR
::
OKINAWA
SAIPAN
SINGAPORE
ΤΑΙΡΕΙ
BANGKOK
SAIGON
VIENTIANE
KABUL
COLOMBO
NEW DELHI
TEHRAN
LAGOS
LEOPOLDVILLE
SEOUL
BAGHDAD
MOGADISCIO
KUALA LUMPUR
:
KHARTOUM
WELLINGTON
AMMAI
TUNIS
PRETORIA
MANILA
BEIRUT
FATMANDU
SECRET
ALIMENTICATING OFFICER
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
Copy Nio
14-00000
د
C
:
.
KARACH
MADRID
JIDDA
ANKARA
CAIED
BRUSSELS
OTTAWA
CA
COPENHAGEN
LONDON
1.
HELSINKI
PARIS
:
PARIS (LCPIPIT)
REYKJAVIK
ROME
:
LUXEMBOURG :)
....
THE RAGUE
OSLO
STOCI.HOLM
BUENOS AIRES
LA PAZ
SIO DE JANEIRO
SANTIAGO
...:
S.GOTA
SAN JOSE
::
::
CIUDAD TRUJILLO
COTTO
GUATEMALA CITY
ATAL PACE
IFOUCICALPA
CITY
PANAMA CITY
ASGUACION
LIMA
AJA GILY
SAN SALVADOR
A:CION
MON VIDEO
Li..A
CALACAS
SAN SALVADO
HOWVIDEO
CAS
NOSSIT
SEC...
REPRODUCTION E
C
104-10227-10150 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

10 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. MIRO Cardona on 6 October

1. Dr. MIRO arrived about 9:50 a. m. for the meeting we had set at 10:00; again he was driven by his secretary whom he introduced. As during the first meeting, she remained outside in the car. Our meeting lasted until 12:00 noon.

2. First, Dr. MIRO handed me a note in longhand listing the topics discussed with me on 5 October. These points are:

    a. Groups conducting propaganda, etc. with Agency support should receive their support and be coordinated through the Council.

    b. A propaganda campaign should be waned by the Council aimed at:

        (1) Cuba, via a long wave radio station in Key West.

        (2) Cubans in Miami and other U. S. areas by:

            (a) Subsidising Diario de las Americas.

            (5) Contracting for time on radio stations.

        (3) Latin America, with a plan such as the "Operacion Grieta."

    c. Underground Activities.

        (1) Provision of monthly funds to Council for procuring Cuban pesos to send to the seven-odd resistance groups in Cuba through reliable channels (such as previously sent through the Italian Embassy).

(2) Commando action as outlined in plan presented to me on 6 October.

3. Commando Plan

Then Dr. MIRO handed me a plan (in English) for clandestine action prepared by his military collaborators, whom he named as Colonel Manuel VARELA Castro, an officer of the Academy, Captain Enrique DESPAIGNE, and Colonel (fan) MONTEAGUDO. He slated that they were of the BARQUIN group and had been prisoners.

With respect to the plan for clandestine operations in Cuba, he stated that 300 men could be counted upon for commando action, part of them here, part in Cuba. Ho reiterated that a commando operation was essential to holster morale among the anti-Castro cloments In Cuba atrd in exile sa well as to conduct sabotage that would further weaken Cuban economy and the Communist regime. He said that for this operation V. 5. help would be necessary in groviding weapons, armino, demolitions, equipmont, and funds. He proposed that if this plan was considered to have merit, that I arrange to have someone meet with his military men to work out the details. After all preparations had been made and matoriel provided, etc, the operation would be purely a Cuban affair. (NOTE: Plan turned over to Thorageen at our ne eting at 13:30 on 6 October for transmission.)

4. Request for Arms, etc. to send to Escambray

Dr.MIRO renmarked that over a month ago he had made a request to Clark for arma for the anti-Castro insurgents in the Escambray, but to date had heard nothing relative to the request. He commented wryly. "I aok but never hear an answer." He said that the lighterso there should be supported. Dr. MIRC stated that he had a boat (provided by us) and a means for delivery of the arme. Cavaldo RAMIREZ is chief of the Escambray group.
COMMENT: Has anything been done about this request?

5. Information on Arms Heceived by Castro Regimo

Ur. MIRO handed ine a lone report which he said was brought to him by the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba when the latter came to the U. 5. at the time of President PROTOILIO visit. "He paid the Ambassador would not divulge the source of the information but commented, "You will know."
* Report turned over to Thompson on 6 October.

Dr. MIRO said there was no way to determine the accuracy of the figures given of planes, guns, etc, received from the Soviet bloc (and haly and Canada) but even if the figures were exaggerated 100 per ceat, they would still be impressive.

Ho added that Castro is daily becoming stronger militarily with weapons and with a large militia of close to 300,000 being trained to use them while the economy continues to deteriorate. Ferhaps only half the militia would be effective. But that is siseable. Thus, he said, the longer the delay in positive military action to overthrow Castro, the greater will be the task. We must act soon, vigorously and effectively, to insure victory. Another defeat would be disastrous and would make Cubans, Latin Americans and others believo Castro to be invincibi, Then would come accommodations and even worse, the traplanting of Castro-backed regimes in the hormisphere. And the U. S. would sufier worst of all, being diacredited for defeat and "gullt of interiorence." "in the UN na nation would stand boside the U. S."

6. Proposal that Connell go to Cuba with Commando Group and Establish a Coverament on Cuban soil

Dr. MIRO then declared that he was convinced that Castro would never be overthrown by all the propagania, the sabotage, commando raide, guerrilla activities, rupture of diplomatic relations and deteriorating ocononly, and that it was inconceivable to establish a government-irexite for nothing would come of it, that the only soluiton for defeating the Castro regime was for the Revolutionary Conacil to go to Cuba and estab- lish a goverament cu Cuban soll, ask recognition by all friendly countries and military assistance of its pricipal ally, the U. S., and that the U.S. be ready to intervene immediately with its Forces. This would all have to take place in a matter of 48 hours, otherwise it would fail. I recognise that this is a bold plan, but boldness is necessary. There will be many risko, many may be killed. As for myself, I don't care if I die. I have loat all my personal possessions and my son is a prisoner," he reiterated that all roust be well prepared in advance, there must be no vaciliation, everything must procood rapidly. First, a cocinando raid in force to eeixa a place of Cuban territory, preferably near Guantanamo, and lonia- diately the members of the Council go ashore, proclaim a provisional government, broadcast by radio to all nations an appeal for recognition (and cables prepared in advance would also be sent out), request U. S. assistance, and the U. 5. should furaish euch assistance at once in ade- quate strength to easure victory.

Belore such an action in undertaken, the enemy srast しゅ softened by propaganda, sabotage, raido, underground action, and the mass of the people of Cuba musi be prepared to accept the provisionai government through propaganda, increased knowledge of the Council and its unifying efforts.

Dr. MIRO asked the what I thought of into project; did i think that Castro could be overthrown in any other way. I admitted that strong military action appeared necessary. I stated further tiet of course his plan would have to be studied at the highest government levels. He proposed that he might elaborate a plan with his military collaboratora, and I suggested that he do this so that it might be examined and considered.

Dr. MIRO declared that he was convinced that thie Communist degger in the side of the States could only be eradicated by such action, that the U.S. Is and will be blamed for ail anti-Castro promazanda, sabotage, etc. and that enemy states will denounce it for latervention In Cube, but that if the V. 5. goes to the aid of a friendly revolutionary regimo established in the country and helps it defeat the Soviet-backed Communist regime, all friendly governments will applaud.

"I have no personal politicei ambitions, declared MIEC. "I merely am trying to chair the Council, whose mission is to snily the anti-Castro elements inside and outside of Cuba. If the team isn't con- sidered effective, then change the pitcher. But I believe the Council must establish itself on Cuban soil, and 2002. Time is against us." Thuunta del Este agreement will backfire ayalust the U. S. if Castro is allowed. to remain in Cuba. In a year, after the politicsa of the countries re- ceiving U. 5. all have gotten their hands on U. S. gold, they will say, "Thanks to Castro, vre got this. And they will spend it as in the past with no benefits to the social and economic welfare of the people."

7. Views about the Judges and Lawyera

I queried Dr. AilRO as to his views relative to the podges and lawyers and their future status. He said he hoped that they could all reunite and that they could be given assistance as in the past. He do- clared that Dr. ALABAU was not qualified to be a justice and that he was daing nothing but making politics and trying to discredit the Comcil and MIRC and VARONA. Dr. MIRO declared that he, as Prime Minister in the early days of the Castro government, had named LABAL to the

Supreme Court, but that now he considered LABAU unfit to hold any judicial position.

8. Members of the Revolutionary Council

Dr. MIRO remarked that he had a meeting of the Council an 10 October. I asked what elements now composed it and what he pro- posed to add. He named the following as presently in the Consejo:

Rescato
30 de Noviembre
MAR
Accion Democratica
20 de Mayo
AAA Independiente
MDC
Montecristi

Ho said he had invited to join:

MRP
Unidad Revolucionaria

and awaited their reply.

He would also like to have the Workers, Students, and the Professionals (Doctors, Lawyers, etc.) come into the Council. He be- lieves Batistianos and Comunistas and elements unwilling to cooperato should be excluded, but that all other groups should be brought together under the Council,

Ho contends that all anti-Castro activities, except clandestine and military, should be coordinated by members of the Council, but that the excepted activities should be known caly to him (MIRO).

9. Probable Argentine Rupture of Relations with Cuba

Dr. MIRO declared that he believed fınıminent the Argentine rupture of relations with Cuba. He said the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba (Julio AMOEDO) was ordered to return to Havana (he had been vacationing in the U. S. after FRONDIZI's visit); that VILLANUEVA, a Secretary of the Argentine Embassy in Cuba was coming to see MIRO today; and further that he (MIRC) had received a phone call last night

from a Spaniard (Nicanor FERNANDEZ) in Buenos Aires, urging MIRO to go to Buenos Aires to arouse anti-Castro sentiment of the people, Inasmuch as some Argentine action against Cuba appeared imminent. (FERNANDEZ said he had already written MIRC a letter.) MINO says, "Of course, I cannot go. I have the Consejo meeting on the 10th. Furthermore, I am going to New York on October 11th or 12th for the SIP. (Socloded Interamericana de Prensa) meeting and have been allotted 12 ininutes to address the meeting."

10. MIRO to attend Homage to LACERDA (Brasilian who Precipitated QUADROS' resignation) on October 15

Dr. MIRO sald he planned to remain in New York City (after 11 and 12 October SIP mooting) until October 15th to attend the hornago for LACERDA, the Governor of Guanabera province in Brasil, MIRO probably will stay at the Park Chambore Hotel, but will advise Clark of his location.

I cominented that I would probably remain in Washington next week in view of his plans, but that I might go to New York City to meet with him; if so, I would get in touch with him and arrange a meeting time and place through Clark.

11. Propaganda Cominission

I asked Dr. MIRO about his ideas on the future organization and structure of the Propaganda Comnilesion. He stated that it is out- aide the Consejo and not under his direct control, although the Council accountant has been passing funds to it. He said CARRILLO had resigned as head of Propaganda and that he would like CONTE AGUERO to handie it. He claimed that MESTRE had not done anything with propaganda.

12. MIRO's Views Relative to Supreme Court Justice or PRIO being Recognised as Head of a Provisional Government

I asked Dr. MIRO if he believed that there were many anti- Castro Cubans (both in and out of Cuba) who lavored PRIC, or the head of the Supreme Court to be the provisional president if a government were to be established on Cuban soil. Dr. MIRC declared that the revolution is a fact, and that practically nobody wants to go back to any former regime. The people in Cuba would resist any such possibility. He do-

nounced FRIC's activities against the Council and its efforts to unify the anti-Castro elements. fie said that the people should be given an opportunity to elect thoir chief of state after Castro's overthrow and roestablishment of order in the island.

13. Cliices of Council (Consejo Revolucionario)

When questioned about his business and private telephones. MIRO said, "The business phone is also in my house. I have no office except in my house, but that phone is always busy (JEfferson 2-4680). So use the other phone (JEfforson 4-2751) when you wish to call me. "

"I need to have a small office somewhere away from my home because all the activities there are driving my wife crazy. I want to find something modest so that no accusation can be inade of ostentation - merely a room for myself, one for my secretary, and one for meetinge. of the Council, atc. The FRD had a place but at that place also was the press, the refugee center, etc. it would not be satisfactory. The FRD is now practically dead. It was the forerunner of the Consojo as the unifying agency of the anti-Castro resistance, "

14. MIRO. Views on Coordinating the Activities of Other Exilo Groupe

After Dr. MIRC reiterated his view that he should be tho channel for funds and coordinating the activities of groups outside the Consejo such as the Students, FORD (Labor), etc., I said that I under- stood that some of those elements were unwilling to function under the Consejo; and that in view of that situation, did he consider that an. Activity Committee might be organized with a delegate from each of these groups and under the chairmanship of a member of the Consejo. This would serve to coordinato thoir activities, give them a tie-in with the Consejo, yot not make them subservient to it. Dr. MIRO replied that this would merely set up another Consejo outside of and parallel to the existing Consejo. I did not pursue this further, not having enough background of these organisations to be able to discuss the matter effectively.

15. Telephone Conversation with MIRO on 7 October

Before my departure from Miami for Washington on 7 October, I telephaned to Dr. MIRO from the airport. He appreciated the call and asked if I had seen in the morning paper the action taken yesterday by

tho ALABAU Lawyers' group in proclaiming Julio CARCERAN (one of the chief justices in exile) as "President of Cuba at Var." He ex- pressed his indignation at this unilateral "political" move by ALADAU and his adhorents among the exiled lawyers and judges. He added his best wishes to tre and reminded me that he would probably go to New York on October 11th or 12th for the SIP (Sociedad Interamericana de Pronsa) moeting. I replied that I would appreciate if he would contact Clark after his arrival to give his location in New York City, and that Clark might have a request from me for an appointment with him, this seemed desirable. I suggested that in future phone conversations I would be known as JUANITO. He agreed with pleasure that this would be a good proceduro. I wished hin Codspeed and he replied likewise to me.

16. Comment

During these first two meetings I ondeavored to establish myself favorably with Dr. MIKO and therebre refrained from bringing up detalls of budget or opposition to any of his specific proposals. I listened, asked various questions, and he talked at length.

In future meetings, after I have gained further background and.. bave more policy guidance, I shall be able to discuss with him specifie Issues and endeavor to reach agreements or compromises, as may be required.
104-10227-10153 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

26 September 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Report on Cuban Operations for Period 1-15 September 61

This is the second summary report of activities in Cuban operations, and covers the period 1-15 September 1961. This report will consist of a breakdown of such operations into the principal categories of activity.

A. FI-CI Activity

1. Reporting to Headquarters. There was a total of twenty-eight reports received during the period, and they consisted of the following: Nine from reverse, fifteen from debriefings conducted in the Miami area, two via the open mail, and two reports via diplomatic courier. Additionally, eleven CI reports are passed to the FBI, and 1,017 CI name checks were processed for FBI.

2. Agent Activities and Developments

a. There was a total of eighteen agents within Cuba at the beginning of the reporting period and twenty-four by the period’s close.

b. Comment: of the seven agents dispatched legally during the period, one agent was a revuresee. These agents should provide increased coverage of anti-Castro groups, activities at the airport and new entrants into the diplomatic community.

c. Four agents were recruited and two agents were terminated during the period.

d. In cooperation with the German desk, we have initiated an operation to debrief Cuban sailors who pass through the area. Clearances have been obtained for two Cubans who will act as coordinators for the operation.

e. AVCELT-1, a Uruguayan diplomat, has been recruited and has agreed to act as a courier for the intel net in Cuba. The agent is currently on his way to Cuba via boat.

f. ANVOT-34, the principal agent/VT operator, using signal plan OGAKIK, returned to Cuba via legal means on 9 September and was once again in radio communication with us as of 10 September. He is in contact with ANWRBH-1, the principal agent of what remains of our intelligence net in Cuba.

g. Control of the CGARIR W/T Communication link was passed to WAVE from Headquarters effective 14 September.

h. AMPALM-I was dispatched to Geneva to attempt to recruit Raul CASTRO Bonilla, Minister of the National Bank of Cuba, who is presently attending the Sugar conference in Switzerland.

i. Jesus LOPEZ Guerrara, Cuban airline pilot who is disaffected with the Castro regime, is in contact with the Madrid station and has agreed to cooperate and remain in place.

j. Arrangements are being made for a technical surveillance of the charge office in the Cuban Embassy, Montevideo.

B. Propaganda Activity

1. Major Efforts

a. Operation Bolivar. Designed to place sixty student/ agents of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) exile group in universities throughout the Western Hemisphere. Progress: Three in place and twenty-one are processing.

b. Operation Virgen del Cobre. Designed to exploit the 8 September anniversary of the Cuban patron saint as a day of mourning expressing opposition to Castro’s attacks upon the church, religious freedom, and Cuban freedom. Progress: All local and Western Hemisphere assets alerted for the 8 September campaign. Sixty-five thousand pieces of propaganda were distributed for mailing throughout Latin America. The Cruzada Fentaina Cobena (CFC) Miami’s group sent eight cables and 110 letters in the Latin American area. Through the joint efforts of the CFC and Catholica, mass and benediction services were held before 25,000 people in the Miami stadium. It was said to be a huge success.

c. After the recent Castro executions, an amnesty campaign was initiated on behalf of political and military prisoners in Cuba. Progress: One hundred and eight cables and 220 letters were sent to Latin America by the Cuban affiliate groups.

2. Broadcasts

a. The Avance newspaper sponsored twenty-four thirty minute programs over WLOD, Miami, targeted against northern Havana and Matanzas provinces on general anti-Castro themes. Seven broadcasts one and one half hours daily over short and medium wave.

b. We support a Cuban exile group producing a weekly thirty minute tape for distribution to a number of Caribbean basin stations, and a weekly fifteen minute tape for distribution through LAAB channels to Central and South American stations. At present some seventy stations participate in this operation.

c. WAVE has assumed contact role with local offices of Swan and radio broadcaster Luis CORTE Aguero through cutout.

d. Beginning 11 September, Luis CONTE Aguero began short wave broadcasts of thirty minutes daily on five frequencies beamed to all Central and South America and Caribbean basin.

e. Maritime broadcasts were cancelled for period for vessel maintenance. An electronic engineer has been hired and construction of TV intrusion equipment has begun. This equipment will be used on the maritime broadcast and be targeted against the Havana area.

f. Cuban Freedom Committee funded and directed two hours daily over WGBS, Miami, and six hours daily over WKWF, Key West.

3. Leaflets/Pamphlets. Production and distribution throughout the Western Hemisphere by sources:

a. Cuban exile groups:
1) DRE - 10,000
2) CPC - 15,000
3) FORD - 20,000

b. WAVE printed 4,000 Grandes Mentiras (Big Lies) as first of a series.

4. Periodicals

a. Avance, weekly newspaper: Two editions, 40,300 WH circulation.

b. Information newsletter, weekly: Two editions, 4,540 circulation.

c. DRE Trinchera: One edition, 2,500 WH circulation.

d. APJ Bulletin: Two editions, 16,000 WH circulation.

e. CNC Bulletin: One edition, 5,000 WH circulation.

f. FORD Bulletin: One edition, 5,000 WH circulation.

g. El Mundo, weekly newspaper: 3,000 per week in Dominican Republic.

MEMOFOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLAN)
SUBJECT: REPORT ON CUBAN OPERATIONS : 1-15 SEPT OF 1961

b. Bohemia Libre, weekly magazine of over 170,000 WH circulation.

5. Tours and Travel - Cuban Group Representation

a. DRE. Two tours covering Brasil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile.

b. CFC. Two tours covering Chile, Bolivia, Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and Panama.

c. Ferique MOISSA. To Rio medical congress.

d. Arrangements are in process to send a small variety troupe to Mexico for propaganda values. The performance will be filmed on 16 km for subsequent general use throughout Latin America.

e. Arrangements were made with the State Department by WH/4/Security for the facilitation of re-entry into the United States of long-term Cuban assets dispatched on propaganda tours of Central and South America.

6. Other Activities. Headquarters representative met with Rojas Santamarina, and discussed his plan for MAITOR project, i.e., establishment of phantom cells inside Cuba through medics of propaganda chain letters. Headquarters is studying the idea with a view to possible trial-run on a small scale.

C. Political Action Activity

1. CRC. A meeting was held 9 September with Dr. Miro Cardona at which time he was advised by higher authority that our Government regards the CRC as the control point of contact in its dealing with the Cuban exile and underground activity. A basic administrative budget will be allocated, and it will be in the neighborhood of a million dollars per year. All other allocations of money will be on the basis of specific projects submitted by the Council and approved by the United States. The Cuban Council will continue to broaden its base allowing entry of all substantial exile groups not identified with Batista or with

Communism. Groups not willing to work with the Council will be dealt with bilaterally (the United States and the group involved), but Dr. Miro will be kept informed of these activities. Such information will be kept in the strictest secrecy by Dr. Miro and his specially appointed assistant. If this arrangement should prove insecure, such contacts will terminate, All problems arising from Council activities will be discussed between the CEC and the Bureau of ARA of State Department. Dr. Miro will maintain his contact with the White House for cases wherein he considers such contact to be urgently necessary.

2. Additional Political Developments. After high level United States consideration and decision, Dr. Miro was informed, at a meeting on 16 September, that the responsibility for the organization and plans for exile Cuban jurists and Lawyers would be his. In addition, to the future funding "salaries" of the existing ALABAU organization, $5,000 per month would be provided Dr. Miro or his designee retroactive to 1 August to support Dr. Miro’s election of Lawyers to whom he has a long outstanding commitment. It was emphasized that this transfer of responsibility must be accomplished harmoniously, without adverse press reaction, or support of this work would be withdrawn. Col. Wendell Johnson was hired and will be placed in contact with Dr. Miro prior to 1 October. He will function as the day-to-day contact between Dr. Miro and this Agency and the United States Government. It was made clear to Dr. Miro that his demand for responsibility as exclusive channel to the other professional groups, i.e., students and labor, was rejected. He was told that any proposals he might wish to make in the student and labor fields would be welcomed as promoting harmony and eventual unity of Cuban exile anti-Castro elements.

D. Paramilitary Activity

1. Maritime Activity

a. Eight vessels, four Agency owned and four Cuban owned, are available to support this activity. Of the eight vessels, five were operational and three were undergoing repairs during the period. The principal activity during the period revolved around preparation and support of operation YEABAC, to be implemented 16 September.

b. The LCI, BARBARA-J, is now awaiting additional engineering and electrical work at the Jan Juan Drydock Company. Delay has been caused by the lack of priority and the induction of several Navy ships requiring urgent repairs.

c. Captain TIRADO has spotted a complete crew for the BARBARA J and crew names and biographic date have been submitted to Headquarters for clearance.

d. The Cover and Commercial staff is engaged in providing for the ships registration, name change, and cover mechanism to allow for future funding and operation.

2. Agent Activities and Developments

a. There was a total of forty-two !!! assets involved in activities during the period. Inside Cuba there are two agents, a principal agent and a radio operator. Externally, there were forty agent assets composed of thirty-five FI types and five radio operators.

b. Approval was granted for the passage of BS-6 radio gear complete with signal plan, pads and crystals into Cuba via AMELESS-3 channels which utilize a foreign diplomatic courier.

c. Approval was granted for the conduct of operation STIKE, an exfiltration operation to be implemented 21 September.

d. On 9 September seven ANMARIE agents were terminated leaving a total of thirty in the group.

e. The internal PA/VT operator ENRIQUE using signal plan MUTLOX reports that his group has been operating a clandestine radio broadcast since 12 September (Radio

Training

Libertad) on 40 meter band from 1300 to 1315 local time on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays. We are attempting to verify this claim, and an announcement will be made over Voice of America as to the existence of the broadcasts.

E. Training

1. Agents trained by close of period 15 September

a. Total number of agents trained: 15
b. Total number of agents in training: 26

2. FI-CI

a. Agents trained in 3N: 2
b. Agents trained in tradecraft: 4

3. PA-PROP

a. Agents trained in exit/prop: 4
b. Agents in training in exit/prop: 9 (Includes two W/T radops.)

c. Agents ready for training: 12

4. Paramilitary

a. Agents in training: 17

b. Type of training: Small boat handling, reception, reconnaissance techniques.

F. Communications - Agent Type

1. Messages. VT: 15 total - 12 received, 3 sent by WAVE.

G. Support

1. Hoops

a. WAVE. Nineteen staff agents were processed at Headquarters and dispatched PCS to WAVE bringing the total of PCS personnel to 23 at the close of the period. The renovation of new offices at WAVE is complete.

b. RTO. Now has responsibility for relaying all traffic to and from WAVE and crypto relay responsibility for all BAR traffic. The Office of Communications has received their approved T/O for RT and have commenced personnel actions on approximately fifty personnel assigned at this installation.

c. The transfer of JEVIC to the Office of Logistics

1) Mr. Glee Laney, WH/4/Logistics, is now at AFIO for the purpose of adjusting the inventory pending arrangements to be made to transfer all MI material held by AFIO to Supply Division, Office of Logistics.

2) The Fleming staff, Office of Logistics, has acted as coordinator in matters pertaining to personnel, finance, cover and security, the majority of which have been or will be settled shortly.

3) Present plans contemplate the release of JEVIC to the Office of Logistics on 1 October 1961.

d. All materiel at JEVIC has been inventoried and prepared for shipment. Although the intended carrier, the ship JOHAN, arrived at JEVIC on 13 September, loading was delayed due to the presence of foreign shipping in the area. It is anticipated that loading will commence on or about 18 September and will be completed within four days.

e. MBARR. A draft of a lease agreement for the MBARR property has been prepared and forwarded to the owner of the real estate for final approval.

2. Finance

a. Answers have been received from various sources regarding our queries for new Cuban pesos. Two sources are in the process of procuring pesos in the amount of $10,000 U.S. dollars.

b. The funding for JANSK is in process. Mr. Fall, WH/4/Finance, is at WAVE to establish a commercial set of records for maintenance by the field office.

c. Total FY 1962 obligations through 15 September for Cuban operations are $4,675,933.00. Of this total, $1,674,775.00 represents payments for the maintenance of the CRC and payments for dependants of the strike force through September.

There is a special intelligence annex to this report, "Counter revolutionary Activities in Cuba," for the period 1-15 September, issued separately.

J. C. KING
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

DDP/WH/4/Plans:W.R.Dinsmore,bh (27 September 1961)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/OPC
1 - A/DDP/A
1 - C/WTD
1 - WH/COP3
1 - C/WH/A
2 - WH/4/Plans
104-10227-10271 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

In Reply. Please Refer to File No.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CONFIDENTIAL
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
February 25, 1963

ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

On February 21, 1963, a confidential informant,
who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised
that he had learned that Carlos Alejos, Guatemalan Ambassador
to the United States, had contacted Miguel Ydigoras-Fuentes
for the purpose of advising him that Jose Miro Cardona,
President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, an organization
opposed to Fidel Castro, Cuban Prime Minister, had apologized
for not keeping an appointment he had been granted with
Ydigoras-Fuentes. Cardona stated that he had been extremely
impressed with what Ydigoras-Fuentes had done for Cuba and
told Alejos that those individuals who had said that Ydigoras-
Fuentes had to be removed had already been expelled from
Cardona's group. Ydigoras-Fuentes commented that the
meeting Cardona had missed was a meeting of all important
Cuban leaders who went to Guatemala to sign an agreement.
Alejos indicated that Cardona wished to see Ydigoras-Fuentes
in order to relieve any misunderstanding and Ydigoras-Fuentes
agreed to see Cardona anytime he would come to Guatemala.
He instructed Alejos to issue Cardona a visa at his request.

The position of Carlos Alejos was verified through
the "Diplomatic List" dated November, 1962, published by the
United States Department of State.

Miguel Ydigoras-Fuentes is the President of
Guatemala.

This document contains neither
recommendations nor conclusions of
the FBI. It is the property of
the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be
distributed outside your agency.

COPY
CONFIDENTIAL / GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
104-10228-10045
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DATE: 10 OCT 62
TO: DIRECTOR
FROM: KINGSTON
ACTION: TFW 10
INFO: DDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, SAO, FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7, S/C 2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE: SECRET

ROUTING: [BLANK]

IN 37423

DIR INFO WAVE CITE KNGS 0208
GYROSE AMBUD
REF A DIR 40852 (GA84508)
B KNGS 0202 (IN. 22688)

1. COS BELIEVES HIS REF B APPRAISAL JAMAICAN POLITICAL CLIMATE RE ESTABLISHMENT AMBUD DELEGATION HERE CORRECT. JAMAICAN GOVT WANTS NOT BE OVERTLY INVOLVED IN COLD WAR AND OUT OF CONCERN FOR SAFETY LARGE JAMAICAN COMMUNITY CUBA WILL MAKE STRENUOUS EFFORT TO STAY OUT. HOWEVER THEY WILL HELP COVERTLY WHEREVER POSSIBLE. ANY ATTEMPT INVOLVE JAMAICAN GOVT AGAINST ITS WILL AT THIS TIME WOULD RESULT IN NET LOSS OF COOPERATION NOW AND IN FUTURE. STATION REGARDS INCREASING COOPERATION OF RUABBE SERVICE IN CUBAN OBJECTIVES OF CONSIDERABLE VALUE.
2. IF HQS BELIEVES AMBUD REP SHOULD VISIT JAMAICA TO TEST POLITICAL CLIMATE IN GOVT, STATION WOULD CONCUR HOST RELUCTANTLY IN [ILLEGIBLE] WITH FRANK (DIAT) SILVEIRA DURING CARIBBEAN GAMES WHOM GOVT WANTED TO THROW OUT FOR HIS STATEMENTS TO PRESS ABOUT PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT ANBUD REPRESENTATION HERE. IN ANY EVENT STATION WOULD INSIST NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS PRECEDE JAMAICAN GOVT RULING. SHOULD GOVT REJECT ANBUD FOLLOWING ADVANCE PUBLICITY THIS COULD BE MAJOR VICTORY FOR CUBAN CONSULATE, SHOT IN ARM TO FACING. "FRIENDS OF CUBA COMMITTEE".

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE: SECRET

IN 37423 KNGS 0208:

(COMPRISING LOCAL COMMUNISTS AND RAS TAFARIS), AND GIFT TO BUDDING NEW COMMUNIST FRONT "SOCIALIST PARTY OF JAMAICA".

3. SINCE STATION COULD NOT PLAUSIBLY DENY RESPONSIBILITY FOR AMBUD TO RUABBE AND GOVT OPPOSED TO USE OF JAMAICA FOR COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY PURPOSE AGAINST CUBA, COS BELIEVES IT ADVANTAGEOUS TO KUBARK AND ODYOKE FOR AMBUD STAY OUT OF JAMAICA UNTIL SENTIMENT CHANGES.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: SUBJ KINGS CONCURRENCE, SUGGESTED WAVE SEND AMEJO REP TO TEST LOCAL GOVT CLIMATE FOR PROPOSED DELEG AND REPORT RESPONSE AMBUD/1.104-10228-10076 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

U. K. Liaison file
See: LOND 5956 (IN 27353), 29 March 1961
LOND 5963 (IN 28181), 31 March 1961

(Extra sensitive cables to be opened by
Chief, WH/A/PA only.
14-00000
104-10228-10083
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Oma. T. Baith Fal
UNIT.ME/A/PA
EXT 8715
DATE 19 April 1961

TO . BOOK MESSAGE
FROM, DIRECTOR
CONF WH 5
INFO.
1749
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
S-E-C-R-E-T

ri files in beatict
int ping, required
Pa
ROUTING

APR 20 03202 61
DEFERRED
ROUTINE
OUT 9771.3
1713
CITE DIR
35831
3383

DCI, D/DCI, DOP, COP, ADDP/A, CA 2, CA/PMG, CA/PRG, CA/PROP
EE 4, FE 5, NE 4, AF 4, WE 4, S/C, SR
LISTCO
TOPTS ALL STATIONS AND DASES INFO 

1. FYI, SKNIOR KUDOVE OFFICIALS ONLY, A STRIKE FORCE OF CUBAN REVOLUTIONARIES
HUGERINI 1200, INVADED CUBA BY SEA 17 APRIL AT COCHINOS BAY, LAS VILLAS PROVINCE.

AFTER THREE INITIAL BEACH HEADS MERE SEOURED, AGAINST LITTLE OPPOSITION, THE GOC
SUCCEEDED IN ESTABLISHING AIR SUPERIORITY USING T-33 JET TRAINERS AND MIG-8. pol
BY 18 APRIL UP TO 12 SOVIET-BUILT TARKS WERE BROUGHT INTO ACTION.

2. THE REBELS LOST ONE BEACH HEAD ON 17 APRIL AND THEIR REMAINING FOOTHOLD
ON 19 APRIL. THIS WAS PRIMARILY DUE TO THREE FACTORS:
(A) IEABILITY TO RESUFFLY WITH PROP A/C IN FACE OF ENEMY JET AIR.
SUPERIORITY.

(B) INABILITY TO WITHSTAND HEAVY TANK ABBAULAT ON A BEACH COMBAT ZONE.
(C) OVERWHELMING ENEMY MAN POWER.

3. THIS STRIKE FORCE WAS THE MAIN REBEL EFFORT DURING THE PERIOD 16-20
APRIL

4. NO RELIABLE DATA THIS DATE RE RENKL WOUNDED, CAPTURED, OR KILLED. PRACH
HEAD MAS COMPLETELY OVERRUN BUT LOCAL TEMATH SUCH THAT INDIVIDUALS OR SMALL
GROUPS MAY HAVE INFILTRATED INLAND.
Nane required

5. 000 POLICE ACTION, INCLUDING ARREST OF THOUSANDS, EFFECTIVELY PREVENIRD
CIVILIAN ACTION IN SUPPORT INVASION.

BELEASING OFFICE
COORDINATING OPE
6-8-C-R-X-T
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
Copy Ne.
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS FROHIBITED.

14-00000
ORIG
UNIT
EXT
DATE
10
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
S-E-C-R-E-T
No Voive
11 th copy s indiad
ROUTING
1
2
FROM, DIRECTOR
Branch our findes indicated
E siren orel
Marked
Nowe required
CONF
INFO,
Signature:
DEFERRED
ROUTINE
TO
INFO
-2-
CITE DIR
6. FULL DETAILS BOT AVAILABLE. PSYCH CUIDANCE WILL FOLLOW.
END OF MESSAGE
RI COPY
OUT 97713
35831.
:
4
claroDrain
Tect for m
RICHARD M. BISSELL
DDP
RELEASING OFFICER
de
Jocking
WH/C/CA oberst in So
COORDINATING OFFICERS
S-E-C-R-E-T
C. KING
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
F 1369 REP
Ver
Σε
1.
Copy No.
14-00000
4
ORIG
UNIT
EXT
DATE
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO.
ROUTING
3
6
TO
No CA Mocuro Vaise. Destroy.
RI to the copy me indicated
FROM, DIRECTOR
Branch rogor fich as indicairo
RE Indsted firee's one):
Marked
None required
CONF:
Signature:
-3-
INFO
:
10
DEFERRED
ROUTINE
OUT 97713
OUT 97713
CITE DIR 35831
INFO
ABIJ
35831
ACCR
ADDI
ALGI
AMMA
ANCH
ANKA
ASUN
ATHE
BAGH
BANG
BEIR
BELG
BRLN
BERN
BOGO
BOMB
BONN
BRAZ
BRUS
CAIR
CALC
CAPT
CARA
TRUJ
COLO
CNRY
LISB
COPE
DKAR
DAMA:
DARE
DJAK
FPAN
GUAT
HAGU
HELS
HONG
HULA
ISTA
JIOD
KABU
KAMP
KAHI
KIAN
KHAR
KUAL
s
KUWA
LAGS
LAPA
LEOP
LIMA
LOND
LUXE
:
1
MADR
MANA
MANI
MELB
EXI
MOGA
MNRV
• MONT
MUNI
NOBI
NEWD
ΟΤΙΑ
PAGY
: PARI
PENH-
PRIN
به
PRET
QUIT
RABA
RNGO
BEYK
R100
ROME
SAIG
SLBY
SANJ.
JUAN
SAGO.
SALV
SEOU
SING
STOC
TAMI
THAR
TEGO
TEHE
TOKY
TPLI
TNIS
VIEN
VETN
WELL
YAQU
L
RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
S-E-C-R-E-T
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
Copy No.
F1359 REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
104-10228-10419 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET

19-1111-2514
ROUTING
1
4
2
5
3
6
DAI: 374
16 DEC 61
TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : PANAMA CITY
RE Filing (check one):
ACTION: BELL 10
No CS Record Value. Destroy.
RI ile this copy as indicated
INFO : WH 5, S/C 2
RE Indexing (chec: one):
Dranch copy filed as indicated
Marked
None required
Bignature:

DEC 16 22122:61

ROUTINE

IN 39471
DIR INFO WAVE CITE PACY 7273
JMZIP/KUCAGE

1. REQUEST POA FOR VICENTE HERRERO DIAZ, CUBAN NATIONAL BORN
LA HABANA 22 SEPTEMBER 1915. FATHER CRESCENCIO HERRERO HERNANDEZ,
SHANISH BORN NOW DECEASED. MOTHER EUGENIA DEAZ DIAZ SPANISH BORN HOM
LIVING CUBA. IN CUBA WORKED IN RADIO AND TELEVISION PROJUCTION,
PUBLICITY RESEARCH FIELDS. FRIEND OF CONTE AGUERO AND MEMBER HIS.
FRENTE ANTICOMUNISTA.

2. IN PANAMA HAS WORKED AT MARKET AND AUDIEN
RICOP
RESEARCH,
PRODUCED NOW DEFUNCT MONTHLY MAGAZINE HUMANIDAD. IS ONE OF FIFTEEN
MEMBERS OF LOCAL CONS NO REVOLUCIONARIO CHAPTER WITH TITLE COORDINADOR
AUXILIAR. PRODUCED AND BROADCASTS LOCAL CONSEJO DAILY HALF HOUR
RADIO PROGRAM ON RADIO MIRAMAR.

3. LOCAL TRACES IN PROCESS. WAVE SEND ANY DEROG TRACES PACY AND
DIR.

4. DESIRE USE SUBJ FOR LODAL PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH, MONITORING
AND SUPPORT LOCAL JMRAKE ACTIVITIES.

FORM
1389 a
SECRET
END OF MESSACE

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
14-00000

104-10229-10002	2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
 
VOL VII-CRC

1968
BUDGET
FINANCE
FOLDER 4
RETIRED FILE
DESENSITIZED
per ESA 43-43
RETURN TO RECORDS C
IMMEDIATELY AFTERLI
VOL 2 BOX 2
407154
___

14-00000

FORM 2593

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTICE

THIS FILE HAS BEEN PROCESSED AND RETIRED.  DO NOT
ADD ANY DOCUMENTS TO THIS FOLDER. FORWARD CS 
DOCUMENTS THAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS FOLDER
TO IP/RPU GE-58.

NOTICE

CONFIDENTIAL
(1-13)

14-00000

Unit:  NGratz:f1
EXT.: WH/COG/SA
NGratz:f1
DATE: 19 August 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

25

ROUTING AND/OR INTIALS SEEN ST

S-E-C-R-E-T

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
INDEX
DESTROY
RETURN TO
BRANCH
FILE BID

NO INDEX
INFO:
FILE IN CS FILE NO 19-124-25/65
PILE
rid copy
ve  TRI/AN, WH 8, OGC 2, D04
(classification)
SECRET

to
JMWAVE INFO: JMCOBRA
TYPIC  AMBUD

(date and time filed)
(at)
(reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR

19 0002 AUG 68	257.1.2

1. PER DISCUSSION WITH MARTHA B. DRANGELIS HOS RECOMMENDS
MANUEL (REYES) GARCIA (CASE NO. 122) AND ANGEL (PASTRANA) SANTOS
(CASE NO. 118) TRUST ACCOUNTS ALSO BE TERMINATED.

2. REQUEST BALANCES ON DEPOSIT BE T/A'D HOS FOR TRANSFER
TO MHMUTUAL ACCOUNT.

END OF MESSAGE
01

ABY
L

Wmisa
R.
Paul Eberst
William V. Broe
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER
OGC/MHMUTUAL	D. Fielder (telecon)
19-124-25/65

WH/B&F Ellitte Ceva 12 AUG 1968

WH/COG/SA
CS COPY
David A. Phillips
C/WH/COG

AUTHENTICATING
OFFICES

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
desigssification

COORDINATING OFFICERS
S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
___

14-00000

UNIT:
OPICS.  N. GRATZjgh
EXT: WH/COG/SA
4163
DATE: 30 JULY 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS SEEN BY
BRANCH
FILE ND

INDEX
DESTROY
FILE MALE NO. 19-124-25/65

INFO rid copy ve. WH8, CI/OA KILEN Jelitel

TO: JMWAVE INFO JMCOBRA

TYPIC  AMBUD
date and time fled)

CITE DIRECTOR

31 16 432 JUL 68	2 0867
REF: UFCT-22352*
CONCUR PAYMENT PLAN PROPOSED PARA 3 REF.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG Comment: *Dependent mother dead Brigader advised AMTIKI
of arrival U.S. and requested money held in
trust. Monthly amount has also been paid to
account of dependent father whom mother advises
has been dead since February 1962. JMWAVE
proposes. pay mother $13,125 (75 months at
$175 per month) and turn over remaining
$780.57 in account ($50 per month deposited
for father plus 6 years accrued interest)
to JMWAVE Finance Officer.

CS COPY

WILLIAM V. BROE 12 July.1968
C/WHD
David A. Phillips
C/WH/COG

AZLEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
SECRET
GROUP 1
Lacladde from automatie
downgrading and
desigsausties

AUTHENTH.ATING
OFFICEE

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
OPEN!

14-00000

DISP NO
DATE
7C
FROM
SUBJ
ET TELEPOUCH
- UFGT 22352
29 JULY 1968
- CHIEF, :: DIVISION
- ACT ING CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE
- ARRIVAL IN U.S. OF BRIGADE DEPENDENT FROM CUBA
AND SETTLEMENT OF TRUSTEE ACCOUNT.
ACTION REQUIRED - REQUEST CABLE CONCURRENCE OF JAVAVE's
PLAN IN PARA 3.
1. MRS. CLARA MOLINA CABRERA ARRIVED IN THE UNITED
STATES FROM CUBAN AND CONTACTED AMT IKI-1 BY LETTER DATED 2
JUNE 1968. MRS. MOLINA IS THE MOTHER OF MARIABO SANTOS
MOLINA, KILLED DURING THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION. THE HISTORY
OF THIS CASE IS AS FOLLOWS.
A.. MARIANO DESIGNATED HIS MOTHER AND FATHER, BOTH
IN CUBA AS HIS DEPENDENT SO MARIANO ALSO DESIGNATED CARLOS
FERNANDEZ CAMPOS AS HIS TRUSTEE TO HANDLE ALL MOVIES FOR HIS
DEPENDENTS.
B. AMIIKI-I'S RECORDS SHOW THAT CARLOS FERNANDEZ
CAMPOS VAS PAID AT THE RATE OF $225.00 PER MONTH FROM APRIL
1961 TO APRIL 1962. ACCORDING TO THE RECORD, ALL PAYMENTS
TO CARLOS FERNANDEZ CAMPOS CEASED AT THAT TIME BECAUSE "CARLOS
FERNANDEZ DID NOT ACCOUNT IN A SATISFACTORY MANNER FOR THE
HONEY RECEIVED." AMT IXI-1 OPENED A SAVINGS ACCOUNT IN THE
COCONUT GROVE BANK IN MAY 1962 IN THE NAME OF MARIANO SANTOS
AND/OR JUAN SANTOS (THE FATHER) WITH HIMSELF AS TRUSTEEM
DEPOSITS OF $225.00 PER MONTH WERE MADE TO THIS ACCOUNT FROM MAY
1962 UNT IL SEPTEMBER 1966 WHEN ALL DEPOSITS TO TRUSTEE ACCOUNT S
WERE ORDERED STOPPED BY JMWAVE. TOTAL PAYMENT TO THIS ACCOUNT WAS
$11,925.00 AND WITH THE EARNED INTEREST OF $1,928.57 THE ACCOUNT
PALLANCE AS OF JULY 23, 1968 WAS $13,905.57.
SECRET TELEPOUCH UFGT-22352 PAGE ONE

Exclude:

14-00000

S
L

C
RET TELEPOUCH UF GT 22352 PAGE TWO
C. THE FIRST INFORMATION RECEIVED THAT MARIANO'S
MOTHER MIGHT ARRIVE IN THE IINITED STATES HAS COPY CA
LETTER DATED 14 SEPTEMBER 1967 AND SENT TO MARIANO'S BROTHER
RENE SATOS FROM J.A. MORALES, THE PRESIDENT OF THE 2586
ASSAULT BRIGADE ASSOCIATION. RENE SANTOS LIVES IN HACKENSACK,
N.J. THIS LETTER ACKNOWLEDGED RECEIPT OF A LETTER FROM RENE
REQUEST ING THAT ALL CHECKS FOR HIS NOTHER, CLARA MOLINA,
NOW BEING SENT TO CARLOS FERNANDEZ CAMPOS BE SUSPENDED AND
THAT HIS NOTHER WOULD "WITHIN SEVERAL MONTHS" BE ARRIVING
IN THE UNITED STATES. MORALES LETTER ADVISED RENE TO WRITE
TO THE ANTIKI-I ADDRESS, WHICH HE PROVIDED AND MAKE THE SAME
REQUEST. HE FURTHER ADVISED RENE THAT HE SHOULD PROVIDE THE
AMT IKI-1 ADDRESS ADD IT IONAL BIO DATA ON MARIANO AND HIS MOT HER
AND FATHER.

D. ANT IKI-1 RECEIVED A LETTER DATED 19 SEPTEMBER
1967 FROM RENE SANTOS STATING WHO HE WAS AND THAT HIS MOTHER
CLARA MOLINA WOULD WITHIN SEVERAL MONTHS". BE ARRIVING IN
THE UNITED STATES VIA SPAIN. ENCLOSED WITH THE LETTER WAS A
COPY OF MORALES LETTER (C ABOVE), MARIANO'S BIRTH CERT IF ICAT E
AND PICTURE.
E. ANTIKI-I REPLIED AT JMWAVE'S REQUEST ACKNOWLEDGING
RECIEPT OF RENE'S LETTER AND ENCLOSURES AND ADVISED RENE THAT
PAYMENTS TO THE TRUSTEE, CARLOS FERNANDEZ CAMPOS, HAD BEEN
TERMINATED (NO DATE GIVEN) AND THAT MRS. CLARA MOLINA CABRERA
SHOULD NOT IFY HIS OFFICE BY MAIL UPON HER ARRIVAL IN THE U.S.
F. AMT IKI-I RECEIVED A LETTER FROM MRS. CLARA MOLINA
CABRERA DATED 2 JUNE 1968 STAT ING THAT SHE WAS NOW IN THE
U.S. AND DESIRES TO DISCUSS MARIANOS CASE.
G. AMT IKI-1 REPLIED ASKING MRS. CLARA MOLINA TO
FORWARD ANY DOCUMENTS THAT SHE MIGHT HAVE TO IDENTIFY HER AS
THE MOTHER OF MARIANO SANTOS MOLINA. MRS. MOLINA REPLIED IN
A LETTER DATED 4 JULY 1968 ENCLOSING HER BIRTH CERTIFICATE,
SECRE I TELEPOUCH UFGT 22352 PAGE TWO
E

14-00000

R
ET TELEPOUCH UFGT 22352 PAGE THREE
PHOTOGRAPH AND PASSPORT NUMBER. MRS. MOLINA ALSO INFORMED
AMT IKI-I THAT HER HUSBAND AND THE FATHER OF MARIANO SANTOS
MOLINA HAD DIED 25 FEBRUARY 1962.
2. AMI IKI-1 ON 23 JULY 1968 COMPLETED A BREAKDOWN OF
THE ACCOUNT SHOWING THE AMOUNT IN THE BANK WHICH IS SHOUN
IN PARAGRAPH I B ABOVE, THE AMOUNT PAID TO THE ORIGINAL TRUSTEE
WHICH IS $2,925.00 AND THE AMOUNT DUE MRS. CLARA MOLINA.
SINCE MRS. MOLINA'S HUSBAND DIED PRIOR TO AMT IKI-1 TAKING
OVER AS TRUSTEE, THE PAYMENTS DURING AMT IKI-I'S TRUSTEESHIP
SHOULD HAVE BEEN AT THE RATE OF $175.00 PER MONTH INSTEAD OF
THE $225.08. MAY 1962 THROUGH JULY 1968 (75 MONTHS) AT
$175.00 PER MONTH AMOUNTS TO $ 13,125.00 AND AS NOTED IN
PARAGRAPH I B ABOVE THE ACCOUNT CONTAINS $13,985.57.
3. JMWAVE PLANS TO HAVE AMT IKI-1 WITHDRAW THIS ACCOUNT
AND PURCHASE A CASHIER'S CHECK FOR MRS. MOLINA FOR THE TOTAL
AMOUNT DUE ($13,125.00) AND PASS THE BALANCE OF $780.57.TO
THE JMWAVE FINANCE OFFICER. FOLLOWING THIS AND BEGINNING
WITH THE AUGUST 1968 PAYMENT AMIKI-I WILL FORWARD A CHECK
FOR $175.00 EACH MONTH TO MRS. CLARA MOLINA IN THE SAME
MANNER AS OTHER BRIGADE DEPENDENTS. JMWAVE PLANS TO HAVE
ANT IK 1-1 PROVIDE MRS. MOLINA WITH THE NAME OF THE OR IG INAL
TRUSTEE AND THE AMOUNT PAID TO HIM WITH REGRETS THAT HE CANNOT
ASSIST HER IN THIS MATTER. WE ALSO PALN TO HAVE ANT IX-1
EXPLAIN THE METHOD OF COMPUTING THE $13,125.00 TOTAL ($175.00
PER MONTH FOR 75 MONTHS). WE DO NOT PLAN TO RAISE THE PO INT
OF EARNED INTEREST. WE BELIEVE THAT WOFIRM WOULD HAVE
COMPLETELY FULFILLED ITS OBLIGATION TO MRS. MOLINA BY THE
ABOVE PAYMENT PLUS HER MONTHLY PAYMENTS TO FOLLOW. PLEASE
CONCUR IN THIS PARAGRAPH BY CABLE.
FREDERICK J. INGHURST
SECRET TELEPOUCH UFGT-22352 PAGE THREE

..:
S

.:

S
:
14-00000

C
RET TELEPOUCH UFGI -22352 PAGE FOUR
DISTRIBUTION
VIA TELEPOUCH
1- CHIEF/VHD
1
- M/COG
SECRE I TELEPOUCH UFGT-22352 PAGE FOUR
BT

☑
ب
..
a

14-00000

OPIC: IVITI
UNITI:
EXTI:  ACOG/SA
4163/1325
DATE. 12 JULY 68

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES.
29

SECRET
20
81
24
CONF: WilffeG-8

SECRET

INDEX
DESTROY
NO. INDEX
FILE IN CS FILE NO.
RID COPY
INFO

PILE. VE
②GC-2 RI/AN, MPS/BG-2, CCS-2, CSP
Ing
12.16 162 JUL 68	CITE DIRECTOR (15727

to JIMAVE INFO JMCOBRA

TYPIC AMBUD MHMUTUAL
REP: JMWAVE 3051 (IN 47521)*

PROPOSED GERRITY TRIP TEMPORARILY DELAYED. WILL ADVISE
FIRM DATE.

2
WH/COG Comment: *Re proposed trip Mr. Marvin Evans to
JMWAVE
to review AMTIKI records of AMBUD dependency
cases.

END OF MESSAGE

OGC Mr. Morrisey (telecon)

William V. Broe
C/WHD
COORDINATING OFF Cras

SECRET
AUTHENTICATING
OFFICES

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE 15 C

こい:
د..
___

14-00000
9.00
CAST.
SECRET 1015022 JUL 68 CITE JMWAVE 3051
CITE DIRECTOR (47521
DIRECTOR
TYPIC AMBUD MHMUTUAL

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 14684
SUGGEST ANGUS L. GERRITY TRAVEL AT HIS CONVENIENCE
ANY TIME WEEK OF 15 JULY.  PLEASE ADVISE ARRIVAL TIME
AND IF GERRITY WISHES TO BE MET.

SECRET
BT

(Whem Filled in)
TOTAL COMES
GROUP !
ECLUDED PROT
DECLASIPI
A.AITING AND/OR INITIALIN HY
ISSUED
INDER
AT
A..P.T. 70 FILL N.
FILE RIF  RE  TO
SECRET

:
:
:

:
WHA, RE/AN, OGC, HOS/003, cess,

10 JUL 68IN
11.2
14-00000
OPIQ : N. GRATZ
UNIT:
EXT: WH/COG/SA
4163/1325
DATE: 9 JULY 68

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPІГ
26
OPS
OS

SECRET
Τιν
TC.
ss
INDEX
RETURN TO.
BRANCH
FILEID

DESTROY
RETUCOD TO.
NO INDEX
FILE IN CS PILE NO.

CLASSIFICATION

CONFI
PER
WH/COL8
RID COPY

JMWAVE INFO JMCOBRA
PILE ve  SA COGREG
WH8, RF/AMOUC 2,
(date and time kied)
(ireference number
NANCYE
CITE DIRECTOR
Spiram
felitel
REQUEST ADVISE PRIORITY MOST CONVENIENT DATE FOR ANGUS L.

09 18 552 JUL 68	14684
TYPIC AMBUD MHMUTUAL

Habe wree

GERRITY TRAVEL JMWAVE FOR CONFERENCE WITH FREDERICK L. INGHURST RE

REVIEW ANTIKI FILES. IN VIEW. INGHURST IMMINENT DEPARTURE FROM
STATION GERRITY SUGGESTS CONFERENCE BE ARRANGED ASAP.

END OF MESSAGE

Faul Eoberst
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER
WH/COG/SA  Mr. Ortman (draft)
OGC---Mr. Morrissey (telecon)
COORDINATING OFFICERS
GROUP 1
DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING
UIKES
de lessstheaires
SECRET
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSJING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
:
2

14-00000
1.0.
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES
SOUTING AND/OR INITIALS SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISETINA
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFTED
SECRET
(hen Filled in)
14. WAD
TIN
GROUP I
FED FROM A AUTOMARIC
DECLASSIFICATIO
REPRODUCTIC OF THE COMPHIBITED
ADVANCE COPY
ISSUED
CLOTTED
INDER
CLASIFY TO FILE ND.
R-EF TO FILE NO.
-
FILS
T. TO
WHIRES CICA, MPS/BET
3.12
10
DISSEY BY
ACTION
WH/COG COPY 1110101111110101
SECRET 2421622 JUN 8 CITE JMWAVE 2912  24 Ju:3719
PIKRECT
2R
TPIC AMBUD AITIKI
CEFERENCE: DIRECTOR 10280 APSTRACT
IMORS -
LAST ANTIXI MONTHLY ALCUATING FORHARD VIA T/ 17879

JPICOM FLIGHT 6/25/68.
SECRET
BT

E-T
10-1225
SECRET
* 24 1968

14-00000

ORIG: Gras:f11
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT:  R-1325
DATEL 21 June 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
ROUTIDO AND/OR INITIALE STEN OF

MESSAGE ME
TOTAL COM

S-E-C-R-2-E-1 21
10
-
DESTROY
BRANCH. FILE ID
Tu
INDEX
. FILE NO. 1:0 CS
CONTI
RID COPY  INFO

FILE ve
WH8,86,2
(date and time fied)

(elite)
(reference number)
G.
AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER
!71748)
SECRET
TO T
JHVAVE

(pica)
CME CIRECTOR
21 20 162 Jux 58	101200
TYPIC AMBUD ANTIKI

COPY LAST ANTIKI MONTHLY ACCOUNTING URGENTLY REQUIRED
FOR PROJECT OUTLINE. PLEASE FORWARD IN NEXT JHPIGEON POUCH.
END OF MESSAGE

Oberst
an V. Broe
C/WED

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS

Faulk Bent
David A. Phillips
ME/COG/OPS
S-E-C-R-E-T

CHOUFT
Exluded feen eutamatie
greing end
dostionsies
==

14-00000

SECRET TELEPOUCH
DISP NO- UFGW-7076

FILE NO- 19-124-25/6
DATE - 27 MAY 1968

TO CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

I070 - NONE

FROM - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

SUEJ - CTYPIC/AMBUD/MHMUTUAL AMBUD DEPENDENCY PAYMENTS

ACTION - SEE BELOW
REFS - DIR-00211
1. MHMUTUAL HAS AGREED TO TAKE OVER ADMINISTRATION.
OF THE AMBUD BENEFITS CASES. HOWEVER, PEELING DECISIONS
RELATIVE TO THE NUMBER OF CASES THAT SUBSEQUENTLY WILL BE
TURBED OVER TO BEC, HEADQUARTERS FEELS THERE SHOULD BE NO
CHARGE IN THE PRESENT METHOD OF PAYMENTS /VIA ΑΜΤΙΚΙ/.

2. IN VIEW OF THE PROBABILITY THAT BEGOTIATIONS
WITH BEC WILL NOT BE CONCLUDED BEFORE I JULY 1968, THE
JAJAVE FINANCE OFFICER SHOULD CONTINUE TO FUND THE AMBUD
PAYMENTS THROUGH AMTIKI DURING THIS INTERIM PERIOD, FY
1969 FUNDS WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR AS LONG AS
REQUIRED.

3. THIS MATTER HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH AND
CONCURRED IN BY COS, JMCOBRA. PLEASE PASS A COPY OF THIS
MESSAGE TO JMCOBRA.
..ELLEN F. MARGANY

DISTRIBUTION /BY TAPE/
3-COS, JMWAVE

CS COPY

Originated by: Nancye Gratz
Courcinated by: OGC/MINUTUAL (Mr. Block) (telecon)
Released by: C/lt/COG  Paul-Oberst

Distribution:
1. C/WH/COG
2. Wit/COG/OPS
3. Originator
4. WI/COG/ESEC

SECRET TELEPOUCH UFGW-7076 PAGE I
طلب
KB
WHC/CP

19-124-25/6

14-00000
11.74
CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET

(When Filled in)
TOTAL COPIES 300
WH/COG/OPS

/OR INITIALS SEEN BY

GROUP !
3067
3

ARUCTIC OF THE CHILEE
DEUTARIS 004912301
ADVANCE COPY
ISSUED
SLOTTEO
VES
NO
10
DNEY TO PILU PO.
19-12-25/6
DISSEM BY
ACTION
FILE AND DREY TO ICE BRANCH
INFO: PEN

CID COPY
VR. WH OGC2, MPS/BG Z, DDP

DOQUE

ADDP, OSPC,

SECRET 2014252 2014252 MAY CO. LITE JMWAVE 2440

DIRECTOR 20 MAY 68 IN 14464
AMBUD HMUTUAL

AMFI

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 22211
PS DEST

FORWARDED VIA T/M 276343 JMPIGEON FLIGHT 21 MAY IS LIST
ABSTRACT Y
EX
OF AMBUD DEPENDENCY CASES, INCLUDING AMOUNTS PAID, MAILING
ADDRESSES, AND NAMES OF TAUSTEES, REQUESTED IN REF.

SECRET

BT

SECRET
19-124-25/6
20 marl 1968

14-00000

ΤΟ
INFO
FROM
DISPATCH
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

DISPATCH
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING
PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING

X
NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESA
CAN HIDGE INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVET

SUBJECT  TYPIC/AMBUD  

REPIY
Transmittal of Documentation - Dependency Case #3

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REFERENCE: UFGW-7040, 29 April 1968

Raymond K. PANUSES
As requested in reference, attached are the birth
certificates and the marriage certificate relating to AMBUD
Dependency Case #3, Bonito BLANCO Cruz (201-233944).

Attachments:
As stated above, h/w
Distribution:
3 - WH/COG w/atts

ΜΑΥ 15 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER DATE

UFGT-21898 10 May 1968
MOS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICAT CA
SECRET 19-124-25/6
___

14-00000

NANC YE GRATZ:jaf
UNITI.:  EXT!
WH/COG/EXO
7447

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COMES: 
29

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS
OPS A+IOS
CATE. 15 MAY 68
SECRET
-124-276

EW Tic

PP
SS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

DY
46

CONF!
TO
PER:
IMPO
RID COPY
PILE
DESTRO Y
FILE IN CS FILE NO
KR SA COG RES
VR  
WAH, 68, DEC D, PS/BE3 DDP
Iate on time Filed

reference ben
(CIE DIRECTORD 00211 
11 23 41 2
WHIOG B

(classification)
SECRET

JMWAVE

AMBUD MHMUTUAL

1. HQS PROPOSES TURNOVER ADMINISTRATION AMBUD CASES.

TO MHMUTUAL IN NEAR FUTURE, IN ORDER ESTABLISH PAYMENT
MECHANISM JMWAVE IS REQUESTED HAVE ANTIKI PREPARE LIST
DEPENDENTS PRESENTLY PAID, AMOUNTS PAID, AND CURRENT:

MAILING ADDRESSES FOR CHECKS. NAMES OF TRUSTEES SHOULD
ALSO BE INDICATED WHERE APPLICABLE, THIS INFO URGENTLY
*REQUIRED.

2. ABOVE INFO FOR JMWAVE ONLY. WHEN PROCEDURES. PRO-

-
POSED MHMUTUAL HANDLING COMPLETED VILL BE ADVISED. RECOMMEND-
JMWAVE
ATIONS FOR BRIEFING ANTIKI ON CHANGE WILL ALSO BE MADE.

END OF MESSAGE

Whelor's
ADSTRACT

OGC/MR. GREANEY (BY TELECON)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
AUTHENTH.ATING
OFFICEE

Paul Eobent
David A. Phillips
19 124-25/6
3
25/5/68
COORDINATING OFFICERS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

SECRET
GROUP T
Laciudred from automatie
arungrading ang
gesigsautions
(pich)
___

14-00000
DISPATCH
INFO
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
FROM
SUBJECT
Chief of Station, JMWAVE
TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
AMTRIGON-8 (201-283995), AMBUD Case #97
ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Reference: UFGW-7040, 29 April 1968

XX

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN HIDOL INDEXING

MICROFILM
During
1. AMTRIGON-8 was a member of the VILLARO crew.
May 1962 he clandestinely and without authcrization boarded an
infiltration craft moments before its departure on an
operational mission. His absence was not discovered until the
team had infiltrated and moved into its first position,

2. On 8 or 9 June 1962 the infiltration team, including
AMTRIGON-8, became engaged in a firefight with a militia
patrol. AMTRIGON-2, the team leader, reported that AMTRIGON-8
had been wounded and that he assumed AMTRIGON-8 was killed
or perhaps captured. However, no further word has been heard
from AMTRIGON-8 and he is presumed to be dead.

3. Taking into consideration that the disposition of this
case could have an affect on the morale of the other crew
members and their attitude toward WOFIRM, it was decided to
advise the widow of AMTRIGON-8 that he died a hero's death--
while fighting for the liberation of his country and to continue
monthly payments to the widow and children for an indefinite
period. Inclusion of Subject's name on AMBUD Hero & Martyr
rolls was deemed to be the most suitable and expeditious manner
in which to handle such payments.

4. The response to paragraph 2 of reference will be
the subject of a separate dispatch.
Raymond K. Januse
Raymond K. PANUSES

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG
CROSS REFERENCE TO
241-283995
CS COPY
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-30051

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

7124. 10/11
DATE

10 May 1968
HOS FILE NUT BER
201-283995
:
___
14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
11.74
4
ASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES 22
ancy 1.
SECRET
(When Filled In)
CROUPI
ING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
DECLS RE 3H5000707
DEDLARI CATION
REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY
ISSUED
BLOTTED
INDER.
VES NO
5
AT:
DISSEM BY

25
RIFLES,
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 28 19-124-25/6

X-REF.TO FILE NO
ACTION PER FILE KID
LVRTO
INPO:

WHAT CODE
☑ RIP 00B4
WHg cyng MPS/B62

VANE
SEC FET 101341Z MAY 68 CITE JAVAVE 2351
10 08155/
PIRRO.TOR

TYPIC AMDUD

REF: DIRECTOR 97425

AN
PLEASE SEE UPGT-21813 DATED 28 APRIL 68.
PS
SECRET
وات
ABSTRACT X EX
7
14-00000
19
*
NANCYE GRATZ:pid
UNIT! WH/COG/OPS
R9008
7 MAY 1968
MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES
RETURN YO

14/06
38714
OS
2607.

CABLE SECRETARIA DIASIMINATION
25:11
WhIcog
SECRET
RID COPY FILE WIR, CHON,
(classification)
BRANCH
OS

TO
JMWAVE
19
WH8

REF: UFGW 7040*
SECRET

(elite)
(reference number)

Nancye

A494267

PLEASE REPLY REF.

TEND OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENTS: JMWAVE requested to provide additional
information on two AMBUD dependency cases in
order complete BEC documentation.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
DC/WH/COG/OPS

COORDINATING OFFICERS
DAVID A PATILLTbs
C/WH/COG

SECRET
GROUP T
Encluded frem eutanatie
downgrading and
docigaattication.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
:
AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER
COPY NO
:

14-00000

DISPATCH
-
TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMBUD
AMBUD Trust Accounts

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Reference: UFGW-7020, 11 April 1968
FYI

1. ANTIKI-l has advised that he does not envisago any
problems in closing out the trust accounts. However, since
the bank holding the deposits is relatively small, it was
agreed to accomplish the closing out of accounts over a
period of several months. To this end, the accounts pertaining
to cases #116 (Justo MONTES DE OCA Ceballos) and #114
(Francisco FERNANDEZ Cabrera) have already been closed out
and the funds will be transferred to Headquarters in the
near future.

2. Being forwarded under separate cover is the background
information on the ten trust accounts as requested in reference.

MICROFILM
Attachment:
As stated para 2, u/s/c

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG w/att
Rumoud Panuse
Raymond K. PANUSES

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER DATE

UFGT-21810 28 April 1968
WOS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET 19-124-25/6
:

14-00000

DISPATCH
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

70 Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT TYPIC/Operational/AMDUD
Request for Additional Information on The ANBUD Dependency Cases
ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action Required: See Paragraph 1

1
: 1. It is requested that Raymond K. PANUSES rocheck the file
of Miguel Los Santos DELGADO Martinez (Case No. 97) in an effort
to determine the cause and actual date of his death. Headquarters
file does not reflect this information nor the reason why his
dependents are paid under the AMBUD program. In thoso few coses
of former active assets whose dependents are paid by AMTIKI, the
exact date and circumstance of death is necessary for documentation.

2. It is also requested that ANTIKI be queried regarding
certain vital documents which should be in the file of Benito
BLANCO Cruz (Case No. 3). A copy of a letter from the widow,
dated 11 January 1962, indicated that her marriage certificate
and the birth certificates of her children were enclosed with the
letter. It is possible, but unlikely, these documents were over-
looked when the file was recently reviewed. In any event, the
work check sheet used by the documentation team indicates these
documents were missing from the file.
Distribution:
3-COS, JMWAVE

 Ellen F. MARGANY

CROSS REFERENCE TO DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER DATE

7040 WH/COG/OPS

28 AP 19-124-25/6
CLASSIFICATION HOS FILE NUMBER

WH/COG/OPS Nancye Gratz:jaf
ORIGINATING
OFFICE
C/WH/COG/OPS Arthur T. Kanum
4/24/9
David A. Phillips
DATE
C/WH/COG
DISPATCH

22 April 1968
Distribution:
1-RID
1-WH/REG/C
1-WH/COG/OPS
1-Originator

DATE
OFFICER'S NAME
Ext.

COORDINATING
OFFICEE

FORM 53
USE PREVIOUS EDITION

==

14-00000

70
11-00000
DISPATCH
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
MARKED FOR INDEXING

INFO XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIFO DESH
CAN FUDGE INDEFING

Chief of Station, JMWAVE F.J. MICROFILM
FROM
SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Adjustment of Dependency Payments - Third104-10229-10097

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

ORIG: H.F.SWENSON:sm
UNIT: TFW/SA
EXT: 7287
DATE: 14 JANUARY 1963

TO: SAN JOSE (INFO) JMWAVE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: TFW 10
INFO: DDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, WH 7, S/C

TO: SJOS INFO WAVE
GYROSE

REF: A. SJOS 5487 NOT SENT WAVE (IN 48782)
B. SJOS 5486 NOT SENT WAVE (IN 48778)

1. PBRUMEN EXILES MIAMI DRAFTED TWO POLICE PROPOSALS
NEITHER OF WHICH REALISTIC AND NEITHER DISCUSSED OFFICIALLY WITH
KUBARK. ORGANIZATION OF STANDBY PBRUNEN SECURITY FORCES IMPORTANT
BUT NOT URGENT UNTIL MATTER DISCUSSED OFFICIALLY AND FEASIBLE PLANS
MADE. THEREFORE DO NOT WISH ENCOURAGE FURTHER PLANS WHICH MAY
COMPLICATE ORDERLY DEVELOPMENT AND BURN ASSETS.

2. DESPITE ABOVE HQS INTERESTED ASSESSING POTENTIAL
ANY ASSET IN PBRUMEN FOR INFO COLLECTION. REQUEST SJOS ADVISE
DETAILS IDEN REF B ACCESS TO PEOPLE OR DATA OF OPS OR INTEL VALUE,
HIS SECURITY, COMMO AND TENTATIVE CONTACT PLAN.

(END OF MESSAGE)

J.C.KING
C/WII

RELEASING OFFICE: 14.6
17!!/3/COSTA RICA
C/MI/3

COORDINATING OFFICERS:
SECRET

E.A.MARELIUS
C/TFG/FI

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

---

ORIG: II.F.SWENSON:sm
UNIT: TFW/SA
EXT: 7287
DATE: 14 JANUARY 1963

TO: JLWAVE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: TFW 10
INFO: DOP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, WH 7, S/C

TO: WAVE
REF: DIR 10303

IDEN REF B MANUEL PEREZ BORROTO EX-BATISTA POLICE
CAPTAIN NOW CIENFUEGOS.

(END OF MESSAGE)

WH/3/COSTA RICA
C/WH/3

J.C.KING
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER: 14.6

COORDINATING OFFICERS:
SECRET

E.A.MARELIUS
C/TFW/FI

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
14-00000
104-10230-10153
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

ANALYSIS OF DEPOSITS FOR
EXPENSES OUT OF THE
$81,500.00 Budget
INFORM
JULY 1 TO 31, 1962.

14-00000
ANALYSIS OF DEPOSITS FOR EXPENSES OUT
OF THE $81, 500.00 Budget for
the month of
JULY 1962
Annex "I" : Delegations (Special) $ 5,400.00
Annox "II" : Propaganda 20,000.00
Annox "III" : Clandestineness 25,000.00
Annex IV": Judicatura Cubena Democrática 5,000,00
Total Depositss $ 55,400.00
nn.

14-00000
DELEGATIONS (Special)
July 31, 1962.
Annex I
Balance on July 1, 1902. $ 4,104.11
Deposit (For July) 5.400.00
9,504.11
July Expenses (See Annex "I-A") 5.368.23
Balance on July 31, 1962.. $ 4,135.83

NOTE: The July 26, deposit will be considered
in August Report.

nn.

14-00000
DELEGATIONS (Budget) SPECIAL
Annox "I-A
DATE CHECK NO DIORT TOTAL
July 3 Delegation of Brazil -expenses
in June- 10698 $ 150.00
6 Delegation of Mexico -expenses
in June- (to justify) 10712 150.00..
6 Delegation of Costa Rica -expen-
ses in June- (to justify) 10713 175.00
6 Delegation of Panama -expenses
in June- 10714 174.98
"10 Dr. Luis Botifoll-Fare Miami-
New York-Miami- 10731 124.30
10 Delegation of Mexico -expenses
in June- (To justify July) 10738 800.00
10 Delegation of Honduras -expen-
ses in July to justify- 10740 175.00
10 Delegation of Perú -expenses in
July to justify 10741 250.00
10 Delegation of Brazil -expenses
in July to justify- 10742 150.00
10 Delegation of Guatemala -expen-
ses in July to justify- 10743 175.00
10 Delegation of Bolivia -Expenses
in July to justify 10744 125.00
10 Delegation of Colombia -expenses
in July to justify- 10745 300.00
10 Delegation of Santo Domino -ex-
penses in July to justify- 10746 100,00
10 Delegation of Ecuador -expenses
in July to justify- 10747 150.00
"10 Dr. Maximo Sorondo Fare Miami-
Sto. Dominio-žiami- 10753 121.95
"14 Dr. Hanuel Braña -travel expenses
to Caracas- (to justify) 10769 200.00
14 Prank Vias Silveira -travel ex-
penses to Jamaica- (to justify) 10771 $100.00
14 José Valle Sotolongo -travel ex-
penses to Chile-(to justify) 10772 100.00
14 José Julio Fernández travel ex-
penses to Panamá (to justify) 10773 100.00
"17 Francisco J. Ruíz Benítez -Fare
Costa Rica-Miami-Costa Rica (to
justify) 10786 151.00
18 Juan Acrensa expenses in a tra-
vel México-Miami- 10788 85.00
19 Miguel de Leon -Fare Miami-Hana-
gua-Miami- 10791 168.00
19 Pedro Aponte -Fare Miami-Bogotá-
Miami- 10791 180.00
"21 José Julio Fernández -Fare Miami-
Panama Miami- 10801 171.00

(Continue on page No.2)

14-00000
DELEGATIONS (SPECIAL)
Annex "I
Page No.2
DATE CHECK NO. IMPORT TOTAL
July 21 José Alonso Arguelles -Fare Mia-
mi-Tegucigalpasia- 10301 $ 166.00
24 Carlos Cibrian -postage stamps
to deliver packets- (tojustify) 10809 60.00
25 Telephone: FR-4-0884 -Dr. Boti
foll's services- 10819 188.72
25 Dr. Jose I. Rasco -Fare to South
América- (Urusuay, etc.) 10835 548.00
30 Dr. Néstor Carbonell -Fare Mia-
mi-Washington-New York-Miami-
Check No.10288 credited in dif-
ference. 10842 27.28 $5,368,23
TOTAL:- $5.368.23

nn.

14-00000
PROPAGANDA
July 31, 1962
Annex 11
Balance on July 1, 1962. $3,227.39
Deposit (For July) 20,000,00
$3,227.39′
July Expenses (See Annex "II-A") 20.537.13
Balance on July 31, 1962. $ 3,290.26

NOTE: The July 26, deposit will be
considered in August Report.

nn.

14-00000
PROPAGANDA
Amex "II-A"
DATA CIDXCK NO TOTAL
July 1 Budget Expenses 10030 $ 14.530.70 $14,530.70
UNDERGROUND LEAVE
July 23 Stamps for "Cuba en pie de Querra" 10802 650.00
2 To buy a used car 10603 300.00
Impression of 50,000 suplement and
underground leave 10804 1,622.25
23 Naterial for "Cuba en pie de Gue-
rru 10505 160.00
24 Naterial, stamps, etc., 10510 192.88
27 Katerial, stamps, etc. 10631 800.00
30 Frinted material 10844 90.43. 3,815.56
TRAVELSI
July 2 Angel Cofiño -Fare Miami-New York-
Berlin New York-Miami- 10679 $704.62
2 Pascasio Linoras -Fare Miami-New
York-Berlin-New York-Miami- 10679 704.62
10 Dr. José Morell Romero Fare to
Central Amorica- 10732 171.00
10 Dr. Gustavo Ribeaux -Fare to Can-
tral América- 10732 171.00
10 Dr. José Morell Romero -travel
expenses to Contral America- 10733 380.00
10 Dr. Gustavo Ribeaux-travel ex-
penses to Central America- 10734 380,00 2,511.24
RADIO:
July 6 Roberto Espin -radio program wes-
kly 10718 $ 50.00
12 Roberto Espin -radio program wee
kly- 10763 50.00
12 Roberto Espin -radio program woo
kly 10764 4 50.00
12 Roberto Espin -radio program wee-
kly 10765 50.00.
16 W.RU.L. Program (July 9 to August
8) 10780 1,099.75 1,299.75
$ 22,157.25
July 31 LESS: Reimbursmant 1,020,12
Total:- $ 20,537.13

NOTS: The $14,530.70 Budget Expenses correspond:
Review: $13,175.90
Gral. Expa 544.80
Delg. Exp: 310,00
$14.530.70

14-00000

CLANDESTINENESS
July 31, 1962
Balance on July 1, 1962.
Deposit (For July)
July Expenses (Ses Annex "III-A")
Balance on July 31, 1962...
NOTE: The July 26, deposit will be considered
in August 20مزrt.
This balance of $39,500.00 is due to the
fuct that aunts are not given to the -
Organizations until they have justified
the amounts previously handled to them.
Alumex "III"
$33,500.00
25,000.00
$ 58,500.00
19,000.00
$ 39,500.00

nn.

14-00000

nn.
REVOLUTIONARY COMICIL
FINANCE DIRECTONT
"PAULA AD SOGAN.
CLANDESTINESS
JULY 1 TO 31, 1952.
Annex "I-T
DATE CHECK NO. TOTAL
July 3 José Formández Balué M.D.C.- (July,1962) 10707 $ 4,000.00
10 Orlando Rodriguez -30 de Noviembre- (May, 1962) 10757 4,000,00
12 Ricardo Lorio (July, 1962) 10766 1,000,00
14. Raúl Méndez Pires -Rescate- (June, 1962) 10774 4,000.00
18 Pascasio Lineras (April, 1962) 10790 1,000.00
21 Orlando Rodriques -30 de Noviembre (June,62) 10812 4,000.00
21 Gorardo Quesada -A.R.D.- (July, 1962) 10813 1,000.00
TOTAL:- $ 19,000.00

14-00000

JUDICATURA CUBANA DEMOCRATICA
July 31, 1962
Αnnex IV
Balance on July 1, 1962. $ - - - -
Deposit (For July) 5,000,00
$ 5,000.00
July Expenses (Bee Annex "IV-A") 5,000.00
Balance on July 31, 1962.

NOTE: The July 26 deposit will be considered
in August Report..

m.

14-00000
JUDICATURA CUBANA DESOCRATICA
REPORT
July 1902.
Annex "IV-A"
Document "A" Receipt of the amount iven by Consejo
Revolucionario Cubano to "Judicatura -
Cubana Democrática". (Check No.10612) $ 5,000.00
DISBURSE ENTS
Document 1 Alberto Bagos Rojas. $ 147.05
2 Jorge Boza Kasvidal 147.05
3 Francisco Calderin Tostte 147.05
4 Antonio H. Campos Cardenas 147.05
5 Rene Cardenas Abrou 147.05
6 Adolfo. G. Cuevas Rodriguez 147.05
7 Gustavo Dolgado bacullao 147.05
8 Raúl Delgado Poroda 147.05
9 Tomis Diego Robbio 147.05
10 Agustin Elizondo Sorize 147.05
11 Ramiro Ferriandoz Noris 147.05
12 Juan A. García Hornández 147.05
13 Manuel Hernández Hernández 147.05
14 Dolores Herrera Herrera 147.05
15 Néstor Hoed de Beche 147.05
16 Eduardo Le Rivorend Brusone 147.05
17 Miguel F. Marquez de la Cerra 147.05
18 Clara L. Martí Nodal 147.05
19 José Moroll Romero 147.05
20 Manuel E. Navas Aguilar 147.05
21 Tomas G. Oria Ramos: 147.05
22 Roberto Ravelo Fiol 147.05
23 Zenaida Reyes Reyes 147.05
24 Gustavo Ribeaux Figueras 147.05
25 Leoncio Rodríguez Esquivel 147.05
26 José M. Rodriguez Fernandez 147.05
27 Angel Segura Bustamante 147.05
28 Olga Valdés Acosta 147.05
29 Alberto de Córdoba Quesada 147.05
30 Elio Nardo Baen 147.05
4,411.50
OTHERS:
Salary to the typist $ 100.00
Typewriter rent 11.33
Suscription to the Miami Herald 2.17
Suscription to the Hiami News 1.95
Transport expenses and others 31.20
Transport expenses and others 26.68
Office Supplies 71.15
Expenses pamphlet 71.33
Stamps 18.30
Office rent 150.00
Telephone 19.03.

14-00000

JUDICATURA CUBANA DEMOCRATICA
OTHERS: (cont.)
Annox IV-A
Pago Ho,2
Electricity 31.93
Collection of the Revolu-.
tionary Law 10.00
Repair to the air condi-
tioned 45.00 $ 274.26
Total:- $5.001.57

NOTE: Amount in excess: $1.57. It was paid
by Judicatura Cubana to complete the
payments above mentioned.-

nn.
14-00000
104-10231-10042
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

"GARCIA AND PAULA"
TRUST ACCOUNT

14-00000
"GARCIA AND PAULA"
TRUST ACCOUNT

Faid to recruit's dependents
(See Annex 1).	$ 44,225.00

Transferred to Saving Accounts.
(See Annex 2).	52,800.00

Reimbursed to Garcia and Paula.
(See Annex 3)... 	30,150.00

Total deposited in
Trust Account:	$ 127,175.00
===========
Total deposited in Trust Account:	$ 127,175.00
LESS:
Paid to recruit's
dependents (See
Annex 1).	$ 44,225.00

Transferred to Sa-
ving Account (See
Annex 2).	52,800.00	97,025.00

Reimbursed to Gar-
cia and Paula (See
Annex 3).	$ 30,150.00

14-00000
FAID TO RECRUIT'S DEPIRIDENTS	"Annex 1"
ALVAREZ PEYURO, Luis	$ 700.00
ALVAREZ VILARES, Jorge	350.00
ANDREU SANTOS, José	2,625.00
BURUEZO AROCHA, Daniel	175.00
CARMONA CASFcdid, Antonio G.	550.00
CASTILLON SERPA, Sergio	325.00
CONELL AS ANGILADA, Manuel	700.00
CREME CANTER, Humberto	600.00
CUELLAR SOSA, Virginio	525.00
EGOZI BEHAR, José	900.00
ESPINO ALONSO, Sixto F.	450.00
FERNANDEZ PEYDRO, Antonio F.	675.00
FRANCO DUARTE, Pedro	1,225.00
FRANCO DU ARTE, Severiano A.	1,050.00
GARCIA-MENOCAL BRITO, Faisto	2,100.00
COICOCHEA SANCHEZ, Fermin	350.00
CONZALEZ PEREZ, Enrique	1,000.00
COVANTES REYES, Leopoldo	700.00
LOPEZ CASTILLO, José	1,750.00
LOPEZ PEREZ, Miguel E.	3,150.00
LORICA CHAVEZ, Martín	1,625.00
MADRIGAL MENDIGUTIA, Rafael M.	275.00
MAQUEIRA PEREZ, Jose	1,000.00
MIRANDA HERNANDEZ, Luis	600.00
MIRANDA VALLADARES, Alberto	500.00
HORALES DIAZ, Santiago	1,575.00
OJEDA CAMARAZA, Eduardo A.	525.00
OROZCO CRESPO, Clauido	1,400.00
PEREZ LUGONES, Aurelio	450.00
PEREZ MARTIN, Antonio Abol	250.00
PAREZ VIVANCOS, Benigno	1,800,00
RECAREY GARCIA-VIETA, Jorge I.	175.00
REGALADO SANTANA, José	325.00
REY DELGADO, Walter	1,500.00
RODRIGUEZ MENDIGUTIA, Félix F.	1,575.00
HODIRGUEZ MIRABAL, José A.	675.00
RODRIGUEZ PELASZ, José M.	250.00
ROJAS RAMOS, Pablo H.	1,750.00
ROMAN ACEVEDO, Hugo	225.00
SANCHEZ APASCAL, Mario M.	900.00
SOLIS JURADO, Humberto	2,450.00
VARONA ARJONA, Carlos A.	825.00
VEGA GARCIA, Segundo	350.00
VERA ORTIZ, Pedro R.	700.00
VERA ORTIZ, Rubén	2,625,00
Total:-	$44,225.00

14-00000
TRANSFERRED TO SAVING ACCOUNTS	"Amex 2"
ABREU ARAGON, Ernesto	$ 175.00
ASRE PAZO, Sergio	1,350.00
ALONSO ANTUNA, Folix	1,050.00
BOLIVAR FUENTES, Rodolfo de J.	175.00
BRAVO RODRIGUEZ, Carlos I.	700.00
CASILLERO RODRIGUEZ, Hilario	1,800.00
CARSEAS PENARROYA, Kolando J.	1,000.00
CASTRO CUELLO, Fulgencio 0.	225.00
CRITZ BAUTISTA, Tomas	1,125.00
DELGADO FERNANDEZ, Mario	525.00
DELGADO NARANJO, Eugonio M.	250.00
DELGADO SUAREZ, Panfilo I.	525.00
DIAS CABRERA, Adolfo	2,450.00
DIAC HERNANDEZ, Rodolfo	350.00
DOMINGUEZ CADALSO, Atilano	250.00
ESFINO AZCUE, Jorgo	1,575.00
FERNANDEZ DALMAU, Ernesto F.	700.00
FERNANDEZ PEADOMO, Juan de J.	225.00
GARATE NOA, Miguel A.	675.00
GIL ANANDEZ, Fulgencio R.	675.00
GOMEZ OYARZABAL, Hugo	700.00
CONZALES CASTRO, José	2,625.00
GONZALEZ FUENTES, José	350.00
GONZALEZ LANTADA, Rafael	1,625.00
CONCALEZ MORJON, Joso	525.00
GONZALEZ PELEZ, Enrique	1,475.00
HERNANDEZ BEEZ, Armando	2,975.00
LAVANDEIRA TORRIJO, Dilogio R.	900.00
LOPEZ DE LA CRUZ, Juan R.	875.00
MAJUSIRA PEREZ, José	3,400.00
MENENDER RODILL, Arturo L.	1,525.00
MOLE ROSALES, José A.	525.00
MONTOTO GONZALEZ, liilario	350.00
NAVARRETE FERNANDEZ, Natividad	275.00
NAVARRO VEGA, Víctor	700.00
PENTON, ALFONSO, Miguel	2,975.00
PAR PADRON, Francisco	225.00.
QUINTANA BARBON, Ramón L.	525.00
REYES BELLO, Pedro H.	350.00
REYES GARCIA, Manuel	3,150.00
RIVERO QUESADA, Gerardo	2,800.00
RODRIGUEZ ALVAREZ, Orlando	225.00
RODRIGUEZ FERNANDEZ, Alfredo E.	700.00
RODRIGUEZ GONZALEZ, Jacome	175.00
SAMARA LORENZO, Hugo R.	525.00
SANCHEZ MERZEAU, Raul	900.00
SOSA VALDES, Paulino	700.00
TEJERA GUTIERREZ, José N.	225.00
TORRE PITA, Kaúl de la	700.00
TORRES GUERRA, Marcos G.	175.00
TONTES JIMENEZ, Rafael	175.00
TORRES PENA, Fernando O.	500.00
TORRES MENA, Juan F.	175.00
VARONA LEBLANC, Rigoberto	2,975,00
Total:	$ 52,800.00

14-00000

RELGARBIED TO "GARCIA AND PAULA"	"Annex 3"
ABREU ORTA, Juan ?.	$ 175.00
AGUADO MORALES, Alexis P.	175.00
ALVAREZ-FACILO, Rafael	875.00
ARIAS GARCIA, Jezus	525.00
ARNAO GARCIA, Piro	175.00
BACALLAO FORTZ, Valentin	525.00
BAEZ HERITAND, Armando	525.00
BARISTO VALDE, Zwardo	350.00
BLANCO CRUZ, Lenito	250.00
BLANCO NAVARRO, Warmel	1,100.00
BOLIVAR FULLITES, Rodolfo de J.	175.00
BUTTARI CRESPO, Juan J.	350.00
BUTTARI PUIG, Edgardo	350.00
CARTONA CABER, Antonio G.	275.00
CASAÑAS SANCHEZ, Kanuel	675.00
CASTANER LOPEZ, Hodesto	450.00
CASTILLO RIVEño, Reinaldo .	350.00
COMAS KENENDEZ, Arturo F.	675.00
CONTE HERNANDEZ, kamon	225.00
CREME CANTEM, #mberto	2,100.00
CHAVEZ QUERA, Αλέμιο Μ.	225.00
DARIAS SORIANO, Jegoberto	250.00
DELGADO GARCIA, Jesús.	175.00
FACCIO CRUCET, Marcial	600.00
FAJARDO MON PNG, Jose 1.	450.00
FEITIANDEZ MARTHEZ, Ladisls	4نكاوتر
FERRAT MENA, Rawson J.	1,100.00
GARCIA-MENOCAL EMITO, Fausto	350.00
GONZALEZ CASTRO, Joze	525.00
GONZALEZ LAB, Rafael	600.00
COUDIE HONTEVIZ, Kanuel F.	2,800.00
CULTURA CONZALEZ, Luis A.	450.00
JIMENEZ MARTINEZ, Victor J.	675.00
LOPEZ PEREZ, Silvino	525.00
LLUESMA PARETS, Zmesto	225.00
MARTINEZ CASTRO, Luis E.	675.00
MONTERO PEREZ, Rigoberto	225.00
MORALES CRUZ, José	275.00
MORALES DIAZ, Santiago	350.00
MORSE DE LA BARFA, Luis C.	450.00
OTERO HERNANDEZ, Zolando	350.00
PERAZA SOSAn, Hector	600.00
PEREIRA PEKEZ, Edilio	275.00
PEREZ HEIDAICH, Carlos M.	700.00
PREZ MACU, Kanuel de J.	500.00
PINO MAITINAS, Nestor	225.00
FITA CTAIO, Eleuterio	825.00
QUINTANA DE LA TOER, Juan M.	900.00
RANOS SANTIAGO, Reinaldo	350.00
RECAREY GARCIA-VIETA, Jorge I.	175.00
REGALADO SANTANA, Jose	325.00
RODRIGUEZ ALVAREZ, Fario T.	1,000.00
RODRIGUEZ-SANTANA ESTEVEZ, Carlos	350.00

(Continue on page No. 2)

14-00000
RODRIGUEZ CONZALEZ, Roborto	$ 225.00
SERRANO CAMO, Folix T.	450.00
SOPO GRANDA, Edgar	225.00
TEJERA CUTIEREZ, José M.	225.00
VARONA ARJONA, Carlos A.	275.00
ZALORA GARCIA, Pedro O.	500.00
Total:-	$ 30,150.00
14-00000
104-10231-10418 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SEGRET

11 January 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations

SUBJECT: PM. Case Officers in Contact with
Segments of the CRC

a. SIRO CARDONA, President of the CRC - periodic contact
with Mr. Glenn J. Fransworth.

b. CARLOS HEVIA, Naval Advisor - Gordon Campbell and Lloyd
Lindland.

c. HIGINIO DIAZ (Nino), Military Advisor - Eugene Norwinski.

d. HUMBERTO NUNEZ, Military Coordinator of Frente Anti-
Communista Cristiano - Thomas M. Hewitt.

e. JOSE FERNANDEZ BADUE and CUCHO FLEITES, MDC - Thomas Hewitt.

f. CARLOS RODRIGUEZ, 30th Nov Group - Gordon C. Jung. Dick Sarma.es

g. CESAR BARO, MRR - Thomas C. Clines.

h. RAUL MENDEZ PIREZ and EUIS SANCHEZ, Rescate - Thomas Hewitt.

i. ERNESTO D'ESPAIGNE, Military Sector - Eugene Norwinski.

j. OSVALDO SOTO, 20 May - Thomas M. Hewitt.

Farnsww th
GLENN J. FARISWORTH
Chige, PM

SECRET
14-00000
104-10232-10004 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

10 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. MIRO Cardona on 6 October

1. Dr. MIRO arrived about 9:50 a. m. for the meeting we had set at 10:00; again he was driven by his secretary whom he introduced. As during the first meeting, she remained outside in the car. Our meeting lasted until 12:00 noon.

2. First, Dr. MIRO handed me a note in longhand listing the topics discussed with me on 5 October. These points are:
a. Groups conducting propaganda, etc. with Agency support should receive their support and be coordinated through the Council.

b. A propaganda campaign should be waged by the Council aimed at:

(1) Cuba, via a long wave radio station in Key West.

(2) Cubans in Miami and other U. S. areas by:

(a) Subsidizing Diario de las Americas.

(b) Contracting for time on radio stations.

(3) Latin America, with a plan such as the "Operacion Grieta."

c. Underground Activities.

(1) Provision of monthly funds to Council for procuring Cuban pesos to send to the seven-odd resistance groups in Cuba through reliable channels (such as previously sent through the Italian embassy).

14-00000

(2) Commando action as outlined in plan presented to me on 6 October.

3. Commando Plan

Then Dr. MIRO handed me a plan (in English) for clandestine action prepared by his military collaborators, whom he named as Colonel Manuel VARELA Castro, an officer of the Academy, Captain Enrique DESPAIONE, and Colonel (fnu) MONTEAGUDO. He stated that they were of the BAROUDIN group and had been prisoners.

With respect to the plan for clandestine operations in Cuba, he stated that 300 men could be counted upon for commando action, part of them here, part in Cuba. He reiterated that a commando operation was essential to bolster morale among the anti-Castro elements in Cuba and in exile as well as to conduct sabotage that would further weaken Cuban economy and the Communist regime. He said that for this operation U. S. help would be necessary in providing weapons, arms, demolitions, equipment, and funds. He proposed that if this plan was considered to have merit, that I arrange to have someone meet with his military men to work out the details. After all preparations had been made and material provided, etc, the operation would be purely a Cuban affair. (NOTE: Plan turned over to Thompson at our meeting at 15:30 on 6 October for transmission.)

4. Request for Arms, etc. to send to Escambray

Dr.MIRO remarked that over a month ago he had made a request to Clark for arms for the anti-Castro insurgents in the Escambray, but to date had heard nothing relative to the request. He commented wryly, "I ask but never hear an answer." He said that the fighters there should be supported. Dr. MIRO stated that he had a boat (provided by us) and a means for delivery of the arms. Osvaldo RAMIREZ is chief of the Escambray group.
COMMENT: Has anything been done about this request?

5. Information on Arms Received by Castro Regime

Dr. MIRO handed me a long report which he said was brought to him by the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba when the latter came to the U. S. at the time of President FRONDIZI's visit. He said the Ambassador would not divulge the source of the information but commented, "You will know."
*Report turned over to Thompson on 6 October.

14-00000

Dr. MIRO said there was no way to determine the accuracy of the figures given of planes, guns, etc. received from the Soviet bloc (and Italy and Canada) but even if the figures were exaggerated 100 per cent, they would still be impressive.

He added that Castro is daily becoming stronger militarily with weapons and with a large militia of close to 300, 000 being trained to use them while the economy continues to deteriorate. Perhaps only half the militia would be effective. But that is sizeable. Thus, he said, the longer the delay in positive military action to overthrow Castro, the greater will be the task. "We must act soon, vigorously and effectively, to insure victory. Another defeat would be disastrous and would make Cubans, Latin Americans and others believe Castro to be invincible. Then would come accommodations and even worse, the implanting of Castro-backed regimes in the hemisphere. And the U. S. would suffer worst of all, being discredited for defeat and "guilt of interference," "In the UN no nation would stand beside the U. S."

6. Proposal that Council go to Cuba with Commando Group and Establish a Government on Cuban Soil

Dr. MIRO then declared that he was convinced that Castro would never be overthrown by all the propaganda, the sabotage, commando raids, guerrilla activities, rupture of diplomatic relations and deteriorating economy, and that it was inconceivable to establish a government-in-exile for nothing would come of it; that the only solution for defeating the Castro regime was for the Revolutionary Council to go to Cuba and establish a government on Cuban soil, ask recognition by all friendly countries and military assistance of its principal ally, the U. S., and that the U.S. be ready to intervene immediately with its Forces. "This would all have to take place in a matter of 48 hours, otherwise it would fail. I recognise that this is a bold plan, but boldness is necessary. There will be many risks, many may be killed. As for myself, I don't care if I die. I have lost all my personal possessions and my son is a prisoner." He reiterated that all must be well prepared in advance, there must be no vacillation, everything must proceed rapidly. First, a commando raid in force to seize a piece of Cuban territory, preferably near Guantanamo, and immediately the members of the Council go ashore, proclaim a provisional government, broadcast by radio to all nations an appeal for recognition (and cables prepared in advance would also be sent out), request U. S. assistance, and the U. S. should furnish such assistance at once in adequate strength to ensure victory.

14-00000

Before such an action is undertaken, the enemy must be softened by propaganda, sabotage, raids, underground action, and the mass of the people of Cuba must be prepared to accept the provisional government through propaganda, increased knowledge of the Council and its unifying efforts.

Dr. MIRO asked me what I thought of this project; did I think that Castro could be overthrown in any other way. I admitted that strong military action appeared necessary. I stated further that of course his plan would have to be studied at the highest government levels. He proposed that he might elaborate a plan with his military collaborators, and I suggested that he do this so that it might be examined and considered.

Dr. MIRO declared that he was convinced that this Communist dagger in the side of the States could only be eradicated by such action, that the U.S. is and will be blamed for all anti-Castro propaganda, sabotage, etc. and that enemy states will denounce it for intervention in Cuba, but that if the U. S. goes to the aid of a friendly revolutionary regime established in the country and helps it defeat the Soviet-backed Communist regime, all friendly governments will applaud.

"I have no personal political ambitions," declared MIRO, "I merely am trying to chair the Council, whose mission is to unify the anti-Castro elements inside and outside of Cuba. If the team isn't considered effective, then change the pitcher. But I believe the Council must establish itself on Cuban soil, and soon. Time is against us." "The Punta del Este agreement will backfire against the U. S. if Castro is allowed to remain in Cuba. In a year, after the politicos of the countries receiving U. S. aid have gotten their hands on U. S. gold, they will say, 'Thanks to Castro, we got this.' And they will spend it as in the past with no benefits to the social and economic welfare of the people."

7. Views about the Judges and Lawyers

I queried Dr. MIRO as to his views relative to the judges and lawyers and their future status. He said he hoped that they could all reunite and that they could be given assistance as in the past. He declared that Dr. ALABAU was not qualified to be a justice and that he was doing nothing but making politics and trying to discredit the Council and MIRO and VARONA. Dr. MIRO declared that he, as Prime Minister in the early days of the Castro government, had named ALABAU to the

14-00000

Supreme Court, but that now he considered ALABAU unfit to hold any judicial position.

8. Members of the Revolutionary Council

Dr. MIRO remarked that he had a meeting of the Council on 10 October. I asked what elements now composed it and what he proposed to add. He named the following as presently in the Consejo:
Rescate
30 de Noviembre
MRR
Accion Democratica
20 de Mayo
AAA Independiente
MDC
Montecristi

He said he had invited to join:
MRP
Unidad Revolucionaria

and awaited their reply.

He would also like to have the Workers, Students, and the Professionals (Doctors, Lawyers, etc.) come into the Council. He believes Batistianos and Comunistas and elements unwilling to cooperate should be excluded, but that all other groups should be brought together under the Council.

He contends that all anti-Castro activities, except clandestine and military, should be coordinated by members of the Council, but that the excepted activities should be known only to him (MIRO).

9. Probable Argentine Rupture of Relations with Cuba

Dr. MIRO declared that he believed imminent the Argentine rupture of relations with Cuba. He said the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba (Julio AMOEDO) was ordered to return to Havana (he had been vacationing in the U. S. after FRONDIZI's visit); that VILLANUEVA, a Secretary of the Argentine Embassy in Cuba was coming to see MIRO today, and further that he (MIRO) had received a phone call last night

14-00000

from a Spaniard (Nicanor FERNANDEZ) in Buenos Aires, urging MIRO to go to Buenos Aires to arouse anti-Castro sentiment of the people, inasmuch as some Argentine action against Cuba appeared imminent. (FERNANDEZ said he had already written MIRO a letter.) MIRO says, "Of course, I cannot go. I have the Consejo meeting on the 10th. Furthermore, I am going to New York on October 11th or 12th for the SIP (Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa) meeting and have been allotted 12 minutes to address the meeting.".

10. MIRO to attend Homage to LACERDA (Brazilian who Precipitated QUADROS' resignation) on October 15

Dr. MIRO said he planned to remain in New York City (after 11 and 12 October SIP meeting) until October 15th to attend the homage for LACERDA, the Governor of Guanabara province in Brasil. MIRO probably will stay at the Park Chambers Hotel, but will advise Clark of his location.

I commented that I would probably remain in Washington next week in view of his plans, but that I might go to New York City to meet with him; if so, I would get in touch with him and arrange a meeting time and place through Clark.

11. Propaganda Commission

I asked Dr. MIRO about his ideas on the future organization and structure of the Propaganda Commission. He stated that it is outside the Consejo and not under his direct control, although the Council accountant has been passing funds to it. He said CATRILLO had resigned as head of Propaganda and that he would like CONTE AGUERO to handle it. He claimed that MESTRE had not done anything with propaganda.

12. MIRO's Views Relative to Supreme Court Justice or PRIO being Recognized as Head of a Provisional Government

I asked Dr. MIRO if he believed that there were many anti-Castro Cubans (both in and out of Cuba) who favored PRIO, or the head of the Supreme Court to be the provisional president if a government were to be established on Cuban soil. Dr. MIRO declared that the revolution is a fact, and that practically nobody wants to go back to any former regime. The people in Cuba would resist any such possibility. He de-

14-00000

nounced PRIO's activities against the Council and its efforts to unify the anti-Castro elements. He said that the people should be given an opportunity to elect their chief of state after Castro's overthrow and reestablishment of order in the island.

13. Offices of Council (Consejo Revolucionario)

When questioned about his business and private telephones, MIRO said, "The business phone is also in my house. I have no office except in my house, but that phone is always busy (Jefferson 3-4680). So use the other phone (Jefferson 4-2751) when you wish to call me."

"I need to have a small office somewhere away from my home because all the activities there are driving my wife crazy. I want to find something modest so that no accusation can be made of ostentation - merely a room for myself, one for my secretary, and one for meetings of the Council, etc. The FRD had a place but at that place also was the press, the refugee center, etc. It would not be satisfactory. The FRD is now practically dead. It was the forerunner of the Consejo as the unifying agency of the anti-Castro resistance."

14. MIRO's Views on Coordinating the Activities of Other Exile Groups

After Dr. MIRO reiterated his view that he should be the channel for funds and coordinating the activities of groups outside the Consejo such as the Students, FORD (Labor), etc., I said that I understood that some of these elements were unwilling to function under the Consejo; and that in view of that situation, did he consider that an Activity Committee might be organised with a delegate from each of these groups and under the chairmanship of a member of the Consejo. This would serve to coordinate their activities, give them a tie-in with the Consejo, yet not make them subservient to it. Dr. MIRO replied that this would merely set up another Consejo outside of and parallel to the existing Consejo. I did not pursue this further, not having enough background of these organisations to be able to discuss the matter effectively.

15. Telephone Conversation with MIRO on 7. October

Before my departure from Miami for Washington on 7 October, I telephoned to Dr. MIRO from the airport. He appreciated the call and asked if I had seen in the morning paper the action taken yesterday by

14-00000

the ALABAU Lawyers' group in proclaiming Julio CARCERAN (one of the chief justices in exile) as "President of Cuba at War." He expressed his indignation at this unilateral "political" move by ALABAU and his adherents among the exiled lawyers and judges. He added his best wishes to me and reminded me that he would probably go to New York on October 11th or 12th for the SIP (Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa) meeting. I replied that I would appreciate if he would contact Clark after his arrival to give his location in New York City, and that Clark might have a request from me for an appointment with him, if this seemed desirable. I suggested that in future phone conversations I would be known as JUANITO. He agreed with pleasure that this would be a good procedure. I wished him Godspeed and he replied likewise to me.

16. Comment

During these first two meetings I endeavored to establish myself favorably with Dr. MIRO and therefore refrained from bringing up details of budget or opposition to any of his specific proposals. I listened, asked various questions, and he talked at length.

In future meetings, after I have gained further background and have more policy guidance, I shall be able to discuss with him specific issues and endeavor to reach agreements or compromises, as may be required.
104-10232-10018

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

20 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. Miro in New York City on
October 16, 1961

The meeting with Dr. Miro on October 16 was postponed from 10:00 until such time as his audience terminated with Cardinal Spellman. He arrived at my room at about 10:50. He declared that the Cardinal had wept when he learned the details of the suffering of the Cubans at the hands of Castro; declared that the Archbishop of Miami wasn't doing enough for the Cuban refugees; that the U.S. wasn't doing enough for them; that Castro must be overthrown. Miro told the Cardinal that in all Latin America there were going to be organized acts of sympathy for the Cuban sufferers. The Cardinal said he would say a Mass for them on October 17. He invited Miro to see him at any time.

Miro answered my query as to the Lacerda affairs by stating that it was very successful; 2,800 people were inside the auditorium and another 1,000 people outside; that Lacerda had received such applause.

The Inter-American Press Association affairs also had given an opportunity to present the Cuban tragedy. He said that he (Miro) had told how Fidel had shot 31 people in September alone, and other details; had described how Communism was gaining ground day by day; that in Cuba they have installed a powerful radio station broadcasting to Latin America; that ten countries have broken with Cuba, but Argentina has not; that everybody is confused.

He informed me that as for the documents relating to the Cuban plots in Argentina, the Argentine military men came to talk to Verona, and he gave them some documents that have no importance. The officers told Verona textually "We have no confidence in the Argentine Foreign Office;" nevertheless, when they arrived there, they turned over the documents to the Foreign Office. But these documents had no importance; they were merely to demonstrate that there had been an extradition of documents, and that they were originals. The important documents are held by Verona in Miami.

Miro said they also visualized another act involving Lacerda in Miami, but that his "administrative" budget really does not provide for propaganda activities (such as the Current SP and Laceria affairs). I countered that it was considered that his budget was sufficient for him to conduct some propaganda activities; obviously nothing on a major scale - but some things.

SECRET

-2-

Miro declared that internal propaganda and clandestine action in Cuba could not be delayed any longer. I agreed on the necessity, and that it was believed that measures are necessary to foment in Cuba the opposition to Castro. "The people are against him!" declared Miro. "But increase it," I answered. Miro then stated "If this action doesn't stem from the Consejo (CRC) - not as an independent agency, but in close contact with you (the Agency), - what we foment is a complete disorder in Cuba, and afterwards no government can succeed; secondly, if we do not have a central plan, and carry it out well in a more or less limited period of time, there will merely be more shooting of people (prisoners) by Fidel."

"And this is my insistence. Now I am afraid to go to Miami. What am I to tell the people there? What do I converse? Meanwhile the Agency keeps on infiltrating people into Cuba but disconnected from the Council. I was told in my conversation with the President to amplify the membership in the Consejo. I have endeavored to do that. In the Council there are other great organizations - delegates from each of the organizations that ask me for arms, dynamite, things, and I am here powerless. Therefore I must work with you people in order to see how we may hand over arms and a plan of action so they may see that this is not merely an endless series of immature actions." I replied, "Well, I believe that a well-worked-out plan that shows good chances of success will be favorably considered."

"How about arms for the Escambrey?" asked Miro. I replied that it was my understanding that arms for the Escambrey could only be landed on the North Coast, how then would they get to the Escambrey? Miro said that the boat which had made many trips (working for YOU), would have to establish communication and find out when they would pick up the arms; what cannot be done is abandon Osvaldo Ramirez in his situation of anguish because he is the only real regional focus of resistance that there is there, and he has been really left in a desperate situation for three months.

I interposed that there seemed some question about the paper from Ramirez asking for arms, whether it was the real thing. "Perfectly identified," replied Piro, "he assured that it is perfectly identified and requests have come to me through different channels asking for these arms. I am still waiting now for a month and a half. All you have to do is tell us the means of delivery, the people in contact and then deliver to our Cubans the arms, dynamite, fuses. I am still waiting, and criticism (of Cubans against inaction) increases daily."

"All the delegations of revolutionary groups in the Council ask me for arms and means for fighting, but I cannot provide them anything. Meanwhile the Agency is infiltrating people into Cuba without counting on the Consejo for anything. This puts it into an absurd position - merely a "council painted on the wall." I have said, "Look for someone else if I am not considered able to do the job but we must work. I have confidence in the Agency, but I cannot work in this fashion."

SECRET

-3-

"I've asked for money for the clandestine groups. What have they said about that?" Miro asked. I replied that there is a problem of the means of delivery, that the Italian Embassy at present appears undesirable. The Ambassador isn't there. Well, we look for another means; the Argentine anything - those people need money" he countered. "I have to carry out concrete things," he declared. "I'm now like a person in a swimming pool without water." "For three and a half months I've struggled to maintain a revolutionary spirit. My military people are waiting till I arrived and tell them, this must be done, that must be done. Nothing yet! And without any plan, I don't go anywhere; nowhere!

"The other time I went with my eyes closed, through faith. We had a failure and the failure fell upon me. I cannot proceed under such circumstances in no way. I've asked for $50,000 to send in to the underground. The Russians are spending $400,000 in propaganda and have less than the U.S. We shall not compromise the U.S. Tell me the way to send it in. The Council is to aid them, not merely to conduct meetings."

"On that request they haven't replied anything?" he asked. I answered that on this item, I had made known Miro's desire, but that so far nothing had been resolved.

"I'm not complaining," he stated, "but for three months I have been asking for a contact with the authority to resolve. Why? Because I'm getting nowhere. When I return now I shall be asked, "How about it?" and must answer, 'You will have to wait because I have nothing.' And meanwhile the Agency keeps on infiltrating people into Cuba independent of the Consejo. Let us go back. Without being in agreement, I cannot serve you. I have no interest in presiding over a Council that is of no use."

I pointed out that the Council must continue to exist, with him as its president, as the coordinating body of the resistance movement, but that there are certain difficulties in putting the student or labor activities under the direction of the Council; that these groups are now functioning efficiently and that I trusted that he could see the problems of completely changing their control, direction, and coordination. I added that I believed that he should know something of what they are doing and that I believed that should be kept informed.

"I know absolutely nothing," he replied. "What comes to me is from these same individuals. I am not in agreement with that, I'm becoming ridiculous. Under these circumstances I cannot continue. I have planted the problem of the underground, the problem of the collateral organizations (that he would like to have in Council by being their source of support and coordination), of the magistrates, and now you have seen what ALABAU has done (proclaiming GARCERAN as president of exile government), who is working with you people, and you have seen the reaction of the State Department. Now yesterday ALABAU is publishing political denunciations against the Council. I have discussed the matter of the magistrates with the C.I.A., I don't remember the name of the person. A month has passed and the other magistrates (those with ALABAU) haven't been stopped (in their activities) and they haven't had elections as I requested to select another leader."

SECRET

-4-

"The students are continuing their activities. I believe that I have something in my head as a basis for the determination of what should be discussed in the Council with me; and in agreement with you; but these existing circumstances, without any connection, make it so that I cannot continue the clandestine aid. To the first problem, I presented your reply, "We shall see." To the second problem, the collateral organizations - which continues the same as before, the third problem I presented, on arms to send in, nothing. The fourth problem, the propaganda operation "Griseta" that I showed you, nothing." I replied that on the latter I had discussed the matter, that it was, I believe, a suggestion given to him in the Department of State.

"If we don't take propaganda and send arms into Cuba now, it's useless," he declared. "And I cannot remain in silence." I replied that I believed quite a bit of propaganda was being conducted. "Yes, but independent of the Council. I CANNOT REMAIN A PUPPET! They (the Agency) keep on dealing with the MRP, with the Unidad Revolucionario, and they haven't entered into the Council simply because they are in direct contact with the Agency. Thus it appears that none of the problems that I took up with you some twenty days ago have been resolved, and I'll have to take another solution. I want to know the truth if I'm not acceptable. I'll leave and without any scandal whatsoever. I have swallowed all the criticism, in my own house, in silence, as though I were responsible for everything. I cannot continue to do this and be doing nothing. I cannot be a puppet! I have no arms to give."

He reiterated that nothing had been resolved on any of his requests and proposals, and that he couldn't continue thus. That he could quit, go to Puerto Rico as a professor. He added he would want to work with us. He then referred to the acts of Lacerda in New York, which had cost four thousand dollars, plus passage, a ridiculous sum to spend from the Administrative Budget. "We have paid the passage, his living costs here," he said.

"Now I go to Miami where I have to face the organizations grouped into the Council. "Arms for everyone?" "I haven't any. All the organizations freewheeling there which don't want to join together because they are working directly with your people." I said this was unfortunate and asked whether there could not be some form of realizing contacts with them without necessarily channelizing their support and direction through the Council, such as by forming a committee along the lines I had suggested in Miami.

Miro then referred to the agreement reached in the white House meeting with Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Woodvent, with gentlemen of the C.I.A., and with Mr. Hurwitz. First, "That the only thing that is recognized is the Consejo (CRC); Dr. Miro is the person of our confidence and will have an administrative budget which he will control and will report later the expenses of coordination, such that any other expenses, propaganda or clandestine activity, will be paid by the Agency; for the members of the organizations in the Council there will be a contact to assist in working out their solutions; that is to say, that their problems of boats and arms." Another point was that in case there are organizations that do not choose to join the Council, Dr. Miro will be perfectly informed in advance of the matters at hand and will give his

authorization. That is to say, it establishes a unifying control over the

SECRET

-5-

(CRC). I have seven to work with you, with me, with the people who are going to carry out the activities, with the people that I designate. Nothing of that is being done. Then what they want is to work alone."

"I will not continue. I will not continue from the time I return to Miami. I have gone on for five months, struggling. I cannot accept this situation. I have tried to pull together those groups as asked in the White House. I haven't succeeded in grouping any more, because - I want to speak clearly in order to remain good friends always - because you have prevented it. The students haven't joined, not because of no political reason, but merely because you support them directly. Presumably the idea is that in this way the security of this nation is better safeguarded. A Consejo was desired to serve as the coordinating group and to provide a means by which the United States would not appear to be intervening in Cuba. If there is to be a Consejo, it must have all the dignity of a Council."

"When I try to form a Council, grouping all elements together, they don't join because they are talking directly with your people - and there is an office for that purpose in Miami - which deals with all the men who want to work, who want to do things. This is all independent of the Council. And some work for a destruction of the Council. I cannot tolerate this. I have a son who is a prisoner; either I know the plans, and I know the maneuver and the problems that they are going to carry out, or I, when I arrive in Miami, will say, "No," and send word to Washington. Let them do without me. There will be someone who will submit to these things, but not I."

"And of the four items that remedy promised me to resolve, there have not been resolved any, and I find myself in the dark. And I am very sorry. I am not going to compromise the security of this Nation, but neither am I going to compromise the situation of these boys, when they disappeared, lost their lives, etc., I was confronted with "And you are the president of the Council." I cannot remain in this way.."

"I haven't been able to group together anything. I was promised that the magistrates would all incorporate together (into the Council), but that rascal ALABAU is working against the Council and I have reason to believe that he is doing it with Agency support, otherwise how would he pay for his political denunciations." I responded, that I believed this could not be true. He shouted, "I have expressed my position to you, and I want you to get an answer when you can. If these problems that I have set forth do not have an immediate solution, I am not to know and to dispose of relative actions to be taken, then how, in view of my situation, must I do."

He asked about the plan for clandestine sabotage action by commando raid, that he had given us, and what had come of it. I replied that he must realize that the study of such a plan necessarily was slow and must be considered by many. He said he was convinced that there was no intention of accepting such plans, and that while now we discuss such plans, we lose out. "I cannot accept this situation, nor would you."

SECRET

-6-

He then said that he could go ahead and dissolve the Council, and let such organization go ahead and do as it pleased; that he couldn't preside over a meaningless council, that this was not a threat, but he would step out. I reassured him that he was highly esteemed in Washington and it was necessary that he continue as head of the Council. He replied, "But they disregard me."

He reiterated that he had planted four problems, none of which had been resolved; reiterated that he had planted the propaganda problem a long time ago, but that propaganda continues independent of the Council and people are not out like those to the Congreso of Students in Sao Paulo, where they repeat things like parrots which don't go with Latin American audiences.

"I have asked for arms; either give us massive aid, one, two, three million - whatever is necessary, because this is to destroy Communism, and we'll take our plans. And we'll furnish the dead, for we can do no more. We must work in agreement, because now each time that I speak, it's "we shall see, we are going to study," - and nothing happens. No, no, I shall not preside over another Council existing under these circumstances. I have often spent 24 hours without sleeping, trying to pull together the groups, and meantime, problems arise on all sides. Why? Because so long as other groups get support, they won't enter the Council. The MRP is in contact with you and getting arms; now the Unidad Revolucionario. I remain the ridiculous one. Already I've suffered a lot and have a son who is a prisoner. And I've talked a lot during these days, and I keep on being a puppet, but worse than a puppet, because a puppet is moved, but I'm not even moved."

Therefore, I say to you that the groups that want to work with us, you, the chief of that group, and I, we ought to resolve all these questions, for example, with the chief of the military group, because he has pulled together the professional army and the rebel army (elements) and the army of liberation, such as Varela, Botus, Nino and the boys, who have come from the brigade." He declared that SOTUS is a fighter, is willing to return to Cuba, and that he had great confidence in SOTUS.

I assured him that the legalization of SOTUS residence would be arranged, and that Mr. Hurwitz informed me that he believed something could be done for the other three returnees whose names Mr. Miro had given me.

Dr. Miro reiterated that he must speak clearly, that he could not continue thus as a travelling president without having anything to give to his people- nothing to the underground through Council action; nor could he be ignorant of plans which he opposed where Cubans go out to die, and then having their relatives come to him as responsible. He declared, "I don't want to live on a budget, preside over an administrative office, receive people, tell them lies, saying, "We shall see." The men who are

SECRET

-7-

here (in Council) representing organizations must know something of what they are going to do and if they ask for 40 rifles, I must be able to say, "Here they are" - not to give arms directly into their hands - but through a contact for this. Otherwise you people make your plans, and I'll retire from everything. And be assured that never, never will I say a single word against the Agency or the United States, never, nor explain reasons which shouldn't be explained.

"If I cannot have the responsibility that I should have, I shall not lend myself to what may result in a tragedy. None of the problems I have planted have been resolved, not that of the magistrates nor that of the Escambrey, nor the money to the underground, has been resolved, not the plan of propaganda that I gave you. I cannot continue to sit in an office, while you continue operating, as you wish, with my silent consent. You may choose someone else like Dr. Godoy, who is asking for arms. Choose and see whether his name will save Cuba. You are going to create another Fidel, who is nothing."

I reminded him that I had my talks with him only ten days before, not twenty, and that I could talk to no one in Washington until a week ago and had to have many conversations with many people, and that his proposals could not be resolved in such a short time. He returned to the agreement that "plans of action be discussed jointly; that if there were objections, that the objections be discussed. He said there had been no objections so far to discuss; nor objections to propaganda plans. He was to have contact with a representative of C.I.A. to meet with representatives of organizations that want to collaborate, and with Dr. Miro - nothing developed on that he declared that he should have knowledge of the activities of those that don't want to collaborate, and said each day there will be more, because they want to gain the power for themselves, to act on their own account. He said he knows there is a "Jim" and a "Robert" and others that are doing things.

I assured him he must realize that there were many problems involved in his proposals and that time was essential to work them out. I reminded him of his conversation with Mr. Goodwin and the latters' statement to the effect that there could be no thought in the foreseeable future of a military operation against or invasion of Cuba. Miro countered by referring to his conversation with the President on 18 July and his (Miro's) complaint of inactivity. He said the President proposed the recruiting of Cubans in different units of the Army for training so as to utilize them at the opportune time, and that the officers would be invited to our military schools. Miro said he had gathered some of the military together and informed them of this offer, and the next week he was called to discuss the recruiting, which he approved. Then General Hershey went to see him at his house, telling him that Cubans wouldn't be sent to Berlin or any such place but kept in the U.S. available for use later. Miro said, "If there is to be no invasion, then let's utilize the underground, which needs arms and money."

SECRET

-8-

He again repeated, "There must be massive propaganda; secondly arms; we shall furnish the dead, but I need to know "How are we going to die." He commented that he was going to ask that his photograph not be put on the cover of a certain magazine because he didn't know whether he was going to continue; that in the present circumstances he didn't see how he could continue. Again I urged that he must do so, and that I felt certain that we could resolve some of his proposals, probably not to the extent that he desired, but at least in part, but that time was necessary to accomplish this.

He repeated that the Council needs to have some action taken in Cuba, but the Agency keeps on undertaking actions without any connection with the Council. Further, that he must have the means for conducting propaganda, such as outlined in the "Operation Griseta." He asked, so when could I give him some answers. I replied that during the current week I expected to have meetings in which these matters would be discussed in the Department of State, with Mr. Goodwin, with representatives of the Agency, and that I hoped that something would be resolved, but that he must realize that many people are involved in such matters and solutions are not reached quickly. He reiterated that he had to keep telling his organizations "wait a little longer" and that this was becoming embarrassing.

Then he brought up his proposal of having him and the Council go to Cuba, saying "perhaps it would be advantageous that I die in Cuba, that the Council ask recognition from Cuban soil and the military aid of the United States - all to take place within 48 hours." He added, "I have told you of the reaction of Cardinal Spellman, "We have done very badly in the Cuban affair."

I reminded him that despite the urgency that we all recognized in the Cuban situation and its threat to the United States and all the Americas, there are many other world problems - Laos, Berlin, etc., - which also occupy the attention of our government people.

Then I said I wished to take advantage of our meeting to ask him for information relative to his current budget; first, did he believe that there were any people receiving salary from the Council who might also be getting financial aid from H.E.W.. He said, "No, I would never permit that." Then he declared that he had two ways of operating; when he absorbed the personnel of the various organizations into the CRC: either to cut off their salaries suddenly, or to put them to work so that the "nomina" (payroll) grew a little bit because he had to take in certain people, and that he considered his absorbing them was according to the policy of C.I.A. Then he declared that the maximum benefit received by refugees from H.E.W. was $100 per family per month, and that no where here could a family live on a hundred a month. Hence, he did not feel that he could cut off the people on the staffs of the CRC organizations, and send them to the H.E.W. Therefore, they were assigned to the different

SECRET

-9-

SECRET

"The money for the underground is much and contact is doubtful, an excuse. The problem of Cuba costs a lot of money! The people of the Escambray - it's difficult to deliver arms to them? But we are going to run that risk. The arms are going to be lost? Well, risks must be taken." Piro again referred to the groups that didn't want to collaborate with the Council but would collaborate directly with the Agency stating that he had opposed it and still opposed it; that he received a very affectionate letter asking him to try work out all the problems between us and accept a solution, and that a representative would be designated to work with him that I had appeared and he had spent two very pleasant days with me; that I was very understanding; that twenty days had passed of great anxiety. ("Not twenty but ten," I interposed.) He said he figured that probably ha might have arms and hein for the underground and know about plans of action and had felt strengthened. "But" he said, "now I feel knocked down. None of the plans or propaganda proposals have been accepted, none. The firing wall in Cuba continues functioning, 31 dead in 340 days. My resignation has been written long ago, and I am ready to submit it as soon as I return to Miami."

I declared that he must not do that, that be must have patience, that it takes time to resolve these things. He replied that he has been waiting since April and mentioned all the suffering he had gone through, attacks by everyone, mothers of prisoners and dead, the American Press, Fortune, Time, Life, New York Times, etc., all against him along with ALABAU Trelles, and others and that he had supported all of this in silence. He had been asked it it were true that there was no air support and had not answered, "The other time I kept my lips closed with absolute faith, the next time I shall have my eyes open and have many questions. I don't understand how you people can deal with some of these unknown Cubans.

He said, "I've given many proofs of loyalty to you. What they attribute to me the other day in Miami that "there would be an invasion in a few days", that is not true. I have a tape recording of what I said which was "very soon (without mentioning any date) in Cuba there would be unveiled the great Pascuas (resurrection) of the Fatherland. And the press has misinterpreted Pascuas as the Pascua de Navidad (Christmas).

Thus the press comes out with statements attributed to Dr. Miro that the invasion will take place by Christmas, completely a lie and nothing like what I said." I conceded to Dr. Miro that he had suffered a tremendous number of attacks in silence and that the press had over a period of time come out with critical remarks. I asked his if he planned to pass through Washington before returning to Miami and he said he didn't have money for such expenses, that his wife was terribly worried about their son, but that he would have to remain in New York until Wednesday to attend the luncheon for all the editors of the Latin American press, who want to converse with him, to help with propaganda but without costing the U.S. a cent.

SECRET

-10-

commissions within the CRC: finance, propaganda, clandestine, military, organisation, etc. The ones who are no good or don't want to work, he said, he would cut off, but that he couldn't just fire someone suddenly. He then said salaries were small @ $200, $225 per month as an average except for particular individuals, such as his assistant Aragon, a very capable person, and the chiefs of the various organizations who work "full time" and receive $400 each; further that he planned to give each organization approximately $700 per month for their operating expenses, some less, some a little more - (MRR, Rescate, 30 de Nov, 20 de Faye, AAA Independientes, Montecristi).

When I questioned whether the Ponteeristi organization was still in the CRC, he said it was, that only Justo Carillo had dropped out of the CRC but the group remained in and had a new head. He added that he had just had a request from Carillo to provide his (Carillo) with a thousand dollars; that Carillo had photographic copies of some checks that he had paid, to Waldo Frank for propaganda activities against Cuba and that Carillo was asking reimburserent but Miro said he didn't consider he had to give it to Carillo

Returning to the budget, Miro Said, "There are the various employees; there is the item of trips; there are the military people grouped under the military commission - I cannot let them suffer misery. There are no students on the payroll because they are being supported by you (the Agency). And right there a difference is established between those in the Council and those who receive money from the Agency directly, which is more than that received by my people. See how you (the Agency) without intending to, and for reasons of insecurity, are going to destroy the Council." He then stated that he had placed Alvarez Diaz, who had been Minister of Finance, in charge of finance matters because he (Miro) could not be everywhere, and to make certain that no expenses were paid on which they were not in agreement, and which Paula would carry out.

I queried whether Paula would continue as accountant, and Miro said, "certainly, as accountant." He said that everyone has been coming to him (Miro) with all kinds of pleas for money and therefore it was necessary to have Alvarez Diaz in here so that he and Paula might resolve the finance matters. Miro added words of praise for Paula, "It's like I want to have for each section of the Council, like I wanted Conte Aguero to handle propaganda, but since he is receiving money from you (the Agency) he doesn't want to. I have to have someone to take this load off of me; first as in Naval affairs, someone to look for boats, arms, etc."

I asked about Festre for propaganda and Miro replied that Festre is no good, never was of value; that he had been put in charge of the propaganda commission previously and given $48,000 monthly, but had done nothing. Then he launched into a criticism of the Swan propaganda; that it was a shame, handled by Batistianost Fernandes VARELA, a Catholic, Suarez Hernandes, a senator in the epoch of Batista. He named another (sounded

SECRET

-11-

SECRET

like Chau Killer) a bad person and a Batistero. Piro said he had asked that Swan be stopped but, since they work directly, these people are defended. He added wryly that he wished they (the Agency) would defend him (Piro) that way.

He said they (the Agency) had posed the problem five months ago in Miami relative to Joaquin, Sagorio, a Cuban who was working with the Council and has worked magnificently, but then he accepted work with the C.I.A. and continues doing this (and do whatever he pleases) - intelligence, arms, recruiting, etc. - and will have nothing to do with the Council.

Again Miro declared that he had the highest regard for Paula and couldn't dispense with him; had even proposed his name to be the Magistrate of the Tribunal of Accounts in the future government of Cuba. I added my understanding, that Paulo had done an excellent job, particularly mentioning his handling of paying dependents, a meticulous and arduous task. Miro explained that he had never considered replacing Paula but merely needed Alvarez Diaz to handle details with Paula. He said everyone in Miami knows it is Paula who has the money to make payments by check, and that he thought it would be better for the people to get payments in cash and sign a receipt; that sometimes Bowmore might rob Paula and then people will ask "from where does this money come, since the Cubans have no money,"

Then Dr. Miro said he would like to clarify any doubtful questions. I asked whether he had received any other communication from the Escambrey group. He replied that he had not, but that the one had come through the Montecristi group and they continued to ask him for this arms aid. I asked whether any changes or additions had been made in the Council at the October 10th meeting. He replied that the FRP had not answered his invitation because they were working with the Agency, and that the new group, the Union Revolucionario, had replied that they did not, because they have a delegate in Washington who is seeking direct contact with U.S. Government Agencies.

Miro then declared that in order to call a Council meeting, he had to have a press conference or a press release (about calling a CRC meeting) but Prio, ALABAU, and everybody were against all this, and were doubtful whether to come or not to come. "I talked with Conte Aguero and with Arreliano many hours. Arreliano is a fuehrer; if things aren't done as he wants, he won't go along. Moreover, he has a strong anti-American sentiment. I talked to them, but they said, "No." "There were two problems at their lack of confidence in the Government, and my contradictory view that we want to be with them (with U.S.). I would like to have had to call a Council meeting almost by force. Therefore I decided to have no meeting and no press conference, and to come here (to New York City). There was no session //

SECRET

-12-

SECRET

"The Fastistianos are very well organized and also the Frio followers, waiting for me to do something, and I cannot do anything. I'm like St. Lawrence, roasted on one side and fried on the other."

I asked whether the Council was looked upon too much as a political entity rather than a unifying medium. Miro replied, "Those people (Prio, Alabau, etc.) want to obstruct the ones who are fighting Castro through the medium of the Council. They are divided into two groups: (1) Politicians: Prio, Alonso Pujol; those that want to be the directors) (2) The groups that want to act within Cuba who don't want to join CRC but rather to deal directly with you people in order to have the power tomorrow in Cuba; people only of action, but not of common sense and who cannot mean much to the future of Cuba; they would cause another era like that of Fidel, who is nothing but a student. That is extremely dangerous. You give these people the means and if one of them overthrows Fidel he is the one who assumes power. He may be a good man of action but only 24 or 25 years old and not one who can orient Cuba in the way of democracy. After reaching 40, people think differently. Fighters are capable of carrying out the action you give them to do, but not to govern."

Dr. Miro continued to dwell on his concern as to the future if these young fighters are given a free hand to do as they please; that care must be taken as to who is supported; that those people are the ones who don't want to work with us; that the AP hopes that it will be the one who will lead tomorrow in Cuba, that chaos of the future will be something to which you the U.S. has contributed by supporting such elements.

Dr. Miro commented in further detail his views and again harped on the manner of using funds to avoid being like the ostrich. "Everyone knows where the money is coming from and to have to be careful of the form. Everyone does not know of you, but of where the help is coming from"

"We are the politicos of the war against Castro," affirmed Dr. Miro. Let a military man function as chief of staff as long as the military action against Castro continues, but then the civil action must be carried out by non-military men,"

He added that during the softening-up action against Castro, we must take good care of the manner in which the action is taken to avoid exposing the U.S. support; and that he considered that the collateral, independent groups were not safeguarding it; so we are losing the men as you (U.S. Agencies) deal with each of those groups. And we must not lose, we must win.

SECRET

-13-

SECRET

I told Dr. Miro that I was anxious to work out some manner of linking these groups with Dr. Miro and the Council, without having to channel direction and funds through Dr. Miro, since these groups are now functioning well under existing arrangements.

Dr. Miro a-id he would be pleased to meet with them outside of the Council, and they may continue to function as collateral organizations independently; but that they realize that they have one direction. Dr. Piro added that like the independent magistrates with their attitude - they are injuring the Council.

Dr. Miro commented that he wanted the magistrates to have an election and select their leader according to the results of a vote. He reiterated that all the collateral organisations must operate within the orbit of the Council; and that he would be glad to discuss with them their opinions Just as he14-00000
104-10232-10019

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DISPATCH

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO
FROM
Chief, WH Division

JMZIP/Operational - Contact with Dr. MIRO Cardona

ACTION RESVIRED REFERENCES

LIABSFICATION.
SECRET

Mil

PROCESSING

ACVN

MARKED FINCERING
X NO INDEXING, MIAJIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED
HEADQUARTERS W
CAN JIKA INLESING
ABSTRACT
MICROFILM

For your information, transmitted herewith is a report of contact with
subject written by Theodore F. PASSAVOY, and a memo of WH/4 comments,

(END OF DISPATCH)

Attachment 1

:

Copy in AMBUD Ful
LA

DATE TYPED
19 Oct 61

CROSS REFERENCE TO
DATE CASPA
20007100

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGW-606

CLASSIFICATION
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

SECRET
19-124-25

:

:

14-00000
A

SEORET

10 Octobor 1961
:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. MIRO Cardona on 6 October

1. Dr. MIRO arrived about 9:50 a. m. for the meeting we had
set at 10:00; again he was driven by his secretary whom he introduced.
As during the first meeting, che remained outside in the car. Cur
meeting lasted until 12:00 noon.

2. First, Dr. MIRO handed me a note in longhand listing the
topico discussed with me on 5 October. These points are:

a. Groupe conducting propaganda, etc. with Agency support
should receive their support and be coordinated through the Council.

b. A propaganda campaign should he waged by the Council
aimed at:

(1) Cuba, via a long wave radio station in Key West.

(2) Cubans in Miami and other U. S. areas by:

(a) Subsidizing Diario de las Americas.

(b) Contracting for time on radio stations.

(3) Latin America, with a plan such as the Operacion
Grieta,"

c. Underground Activities.

(1) Provision of monthly funde to Council for procuring
Cuban ревоos to send to the seven-odd resistance
groupe in Cuba through reliable channels (such as
previously sent through the Italian Embassy).

:

14-00000

SECRET

(2) Commando action as outlined in plan presented
to me on 6 October,

3. Commando Plan

Then Dr. MIRO handed me a plan (in English) for clandestine
action prepared by his military collaborators, whom he named as
Colonel Manuel VARELA Castro, an officer of the Academy, Captain
Enrique DESPAIGNE, and Colonel (inu) MONTEAGUDO, He stated
that they were of the BARQUIN group and had been prisoners.

With respect to the plan for clandestine operations in Cuba,
he stated that 300 men could be counted upon for commando action, part
of them hore, part in Cuba. He reiterated that a commando operation
was essential to bolster morale among the anti-Castro elements in Cuba
and in exilo as well as to conduct sabotage that would further weakon
Cuban economy and the Communist regime. He said that for this operation
U. S. help would be necessary in providing weapons, ammo, demolitions,
equipment, and funds. He proposed that if this plan was considered to
have merit, that I arrange to have someone meet with his military men
to work out the details. After all preparations had been made and
material provided, etc. the operation would be purely a Cuban affair.
(NOTE: Plan turned over to Thompson at our ne eting at 15:30 on
6 October for transmission.)

4. Request for Arms, etc. to send to Eacambray

Dr.MIRO remarked that over a month ago he had made a requost
to Clark for arms for the anti-Castro insurgents in the Escambray, but
to date had heard nothing relative to the request. He commented wryly,
"I ask but never hear an answer." He said that the fighters there should
be supported. Dr. MIKO stated that he had a boat (provided by us) and
a means for delivery of the arms. Osvaldo RAMIREZ is chief of the
Eecambray group.
COMMENT: Has anything been done about this request?

5. Information on Arms Received by Castro Regime

*
Dr. MIRO handed me a long report which he said was brought
to him by the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba when the latter came to the
U. S. at the time of Fresident FRONDIZI's visit. He said the Ambassador
would not divulge the source of the information but commented, "You will
know."
* Report turned over to Thompson on 6 October.
:
:
2

14-00000
!

Suomit

Dr. MIRO said there was no way to determine the accuracy
of the figures given of planes, guns, etc. received from the Soviet bloc
(and Baly and Canada) but even if the figures were exaggerated 100 por
cent, they would still be impressive.

He added that Castro is daily becoming stronger militarily
with weapons and with a large militia of close to 300, 000 being trained
to use them while the economy continues to detericrate. Perhaps only
half the militia would be effective. But that is siseable. Thus, he said,
the langer the delay in positive military action to overthrow Castro, the
greater will be the task. "We must act soon, vigorously and effectively,
to Insure victory. Another defeat would be disastrous and would make
Cubane, Latin Americane and others bolteve Castro to be invincible.
Then would come accommodationa and even worse, the implanting of
Castro-backed regimes in the hemisphere. And the U. S. would suffer
worst of all, being discredited for defeat and "guilt of interference. "
"In the UN no nation would stand beside the U. 5, "

6. Proposal that Council go to Cuba with Commando Group and
Establish a Government on Cuban Soll

This would all have
Dr. MIRO then declared that he was convinced that Castro
would never be overthrown by all the propaganda, the sabotage, commando
raids, guerrilla activities, rupture of diplomatic relations and deteriorating
economy, ard that it was inconceivable to establish a government-inexile
for nothing would come of it, that the only solution for defeating the
Castro regime was for the Revolutionary Council to go to Cuba and estab-
ilch a government on Cuban soil, aak recognition by all friendly countries
and military assistance of its principal ally, the U. S., and that the U.S.
be ready to intervene immediately with its Forces.
to take place in a matter of 48 hours, otherwise it would fall. I recognise
that this is a bold plan, but boldness is necessary. There will be many
rieke, many may be killed. As for myself, I don't care if I die. I have
loat all my personal possessions and my son is a prisoner." He reiterated
that all must be well prepared in advance, there must be no vacillation,
overything must proceed rapidly. First, a commando raid in force to
ceizo a piece of Cuban territory, preferably near Cuantanamo, and imnie-
diately the members of the Council go ashore, proclaim a provisional
government, broadcast by radio to all nations an appeal for recognition
(and cables prepared in advance would also be sent out), request U. 3.
assistance, and the U. S. should furnish such assistance at once in ade-
quate strength to ensure victory.
3

14-00000

SECRET

Before such an action is undertaken, the enemy muat be
softened by propaganda, sabotage, raids, underground action, and the
mass of the people of Cuba must be prepared to accept the provisional
government through propaganda, increased knowledge of the Council
and its unifying efforts.

Dr. WIRO asked me what I thought of this project; did I think
that Castro could be overthrown in any other way. I admitted that
strong military action appeared necessary. I stated further that
of course his plan would have to be studied at the highest government
levele. He proposed that he inight elaborate a pian with his militar y
collaborators, and I suggested that he do this so that it might be examined
and considered.

Dr. MIRO dcclared that he was convinced that this Communist
daggor in the side of the States could only be eradicated by such action,
that the U.S. is and will be blamed for all anti-Castro propaganda,
sabotage, etc. and that enemy states will denounce it for intervention
in Cuba, but that if the U. 8. goes to the aid of a friendly revolutionary
regirne established in the country and helps it defeat the Soviet-backed
Communist regime, all friendly governments will applaud.

"I have no personal political ambitions, declared MIRO.
"I merely am trying to chair the Council, whose mission is to unify the
anti-Castro elements inside and outside of Cuba. If the team isn't con-
sidered effective, then change the pitcher. But I believe the Council must
establish itself on Cuban eoil, and soon. Time is against us. ""The unta
del Este agreement will backfire against the U. S. if Castro is allowed
to remain in Cuba. in a year, after the politicos of the countries re-
ceiving U. S. aid have gotten their hands on U. 8. gold, they will say,
Tharke to Castro, we got this. And they will spend it as in the past
with no benefits to the social and economic welfare of the people."

7. Views about the Judges and Lawyera

I queried Dr. MIRO as to his views relative to the judges and
lawyers and their future status. tHe said he hoped that they could all
reunite and that they could be given assistance as in the past. He de-
elared that Dr. ALABAU was not qualified to be a justice and that he was
doing nothing but making politics and trying to discredit the Council
and MIRC and VARONA. Dr. MIRO declared that he, as Prime Ministor
in the early days of the Castro goverurnent, had named LABAU to the
A

14-00000

SEGHET

Supreme Court, but that now he considered ALABAU unfit to hold any
judicial position.

8. Members of the Revolutionary Council

Dr. MIRO remarked that he had a meeting of the Council on
10 October. I asked what elements now composed it and what he pro-
posed to add. He named the following as presently in the Consejo:

Rescate
30 de Noviembre
MRR
Accion Democratica
20 de Mayo
AAA Independiente
MDC
Montecristi

He said he had invited to join:

MRP
Unidad Revolucionaria

and awaited their reply.

He would also like to have the Workers, Students, and the
Professionals (Doctors, Lawyers, etc.) come into the Council. He be-
lieves Batistianos and Comunistas and elements unwilling to cooperato
should be excluded, but that all other groups should be brought together
under the Council.

He contends that all anti-Castro activities, except clandestine
and military, should be coordinated by members of the Council, but that
the excepted activities should be known only to hius (MIRO).

9. Probabie Argentine Rupture of Relations with Cuba

Dr. MIRO declared that he believed imminent the Argentine
rupture of relations with Cuba. He said the Argentine Ambassador to
Cuba (Julio AMOEDO) was ordered to return to Havana (he had been
vacationing in the U. S. after FRONDIZI's visit); that VILLANUEVA, a
Secretary of the Argentins Embassy in Cuba was coming to see MIRO
today; and further that he (MIRO) had received a phone call last night
1

14-00000
!
T
from a Spaniard (Nicanor FERNANDEZ) in Buenos Aires, urging MIRO
to go to Buenos Aires to arouse anti-Castro sentiment of the people,
Inasmuch as some Argentine action against Cuba appeared imminent.
(FERNANDEZ said he had alroady written MIRC a letter.) MIRO says,
"Of course, I cannot go. I have the Consejo meeting on the 10th.
Furthermore, I am going to New York on October 11th or 12th for the
SIP (Socieded Interamericana de Prensa) meeting and have been allotted
12 minutes to address the mooting."

10. MIRO to attend Homage to LACERDA (Brazilian who
Precipitated QUADROS' resignation) on October 15

Dr. MIRO said he planned to remain in New York City (after
11 and 12 October SIP meeting) until October 15th to attend the homage
for LACERDA, the Governor of Guanabara province in Brazil. MIRO
probably will stay at the Park Chambers Hotel, but will advise Clark
of his location.

I commented that I would probably remain in Washington next
week in view of his plans, but that I might go to New York City to meet
with him; if so, I would get in touch with him and arrange a meeting
timo and place through Clark.

11. Fropaganda Commission

I asked Dr. MIRO about his ideas on the future organization
and structure of the Propaganda Commission. He stated that it is out-
side the Consejo and not under his direct control, although the Council
accountant has been passing funds to it. He said CAR RILLO had rosigned
as head of Propaganda and that he would like CONTE AGUERO to handle
it. He claimed that MESTRE had not done anything with propaganda.

12. MIRO's Views Relative to Supreme Court Justice or PRIO
being Recognized as Head of a Provisional Government

I asked Dr. MIRO if he believed that there were many anti-
Castro Cubans (both in and out of Cuba) who favored PRIO, or the head
of the Supreme Court to be the provisional president if a government were
to be established on Cuban soil. Dr. MIRO declared that the revolution
is a fact, and that practically nobody wants to go back to any former
regime. The people in Cuba would resist any such possibility. He de-
6

14-00000

S
nounced PRIO's activities against the Council and its efforts to unify
the anti-Castro elements. He said that the people should be given an
opportunity to clect their chief of state after Castro's overthrow and
reestablishment of order in the island.

13. Offices of Council (Consejo Revolucionario)

When questioned about his business and private telephonos,
MIRO said, "The business phone is also in my house. I have no office
except in my house, but that phone is always busy (JEfforson 2-4680).
So use the other phone (Jefferson 4-2751) when you wish to call me. "

"I need to have a small office somewhere away from my home
because all the activities there are driving my wife erasy. I want to
find something modest so that no accusation can be made of ostentation -
merely a room for myself, one for my socretary, and one for meetings.
of the Council, etc. The FRD had a place but at that piace also was the
press, the refugee center, etc. It would not be satisfactory. The FRD
le now practically dead. It was the forerunner of the Consejo as the
unifying agency of the anti-Castro resistance."

14. MIRO's Views on Coordinating the Activities of Other Exile
Groups

After Dr. MIRO reiterated his view that he should be the
channel for funds and coordinating the activities of groups outside the
Consejo such as the Students, FORD (Labor), etc., I said that I under-
stood that some of these elements were unwilling to function under the
Consejo; and that in view of that situation, did he consider that an
Activity Committee might be organised with a delegate from each of
these groups and under the chairmanship of a member of the Consejo.
This would serve to coordinate their activities, give them a tie-in with
the Consejo, yet not make them subservient to it. Dr. MIRO replied
that this would merely set up another Consejo outside of and parallel to
the existing Consejo. I did not pursue this further, not having enough
background of these organisations to be able to discass the matter
effectively.

15. Telephone Conversation with MIRO on 7 October

Before my departure from Miami for Washington on 7 October,
I telephoned to Dr. MIRO from the airport. He appreciated the call and
asked if I had seen in the morning paper the action taken yesterday by
7
مد

14-00000

SECRET
1
the ALABAU Lawyers' group in proclaiming Julio CARCERAN (one
of the chief justices in exile) as "President of Cuba at War." He ex-
pressed his indignation at this unilateral "political" move by ALABAU
and his adherents among the exiled lawyers and judges. He added his
best wishes to rms and reminded me that he would probably go to New
York on October 11th or 12th for the SIP (Sociedad Interamericana do
Prensa) meeting. I replied that I would appreciate if he would contact
Clark after his arrival to give his location in New York City, and that
Clark might have a roquest from me for an appointment with him, if
this seemed desirable. I suggested that in future phone conversations
I would be known as JUANITO. He agreed with pleasure that this would
be a good procedure. I wished him Godspeed and he replied likewise
to me.

16. Comment

During these first two meetings I endeavored to establish
myself favorably with Dr. MIRO and therebre refrained from bringing
up details of budget or opposition to any of his specific proposals.
I listened, asked various questions, and he talked at length.

In future meetings, after I have gained further background and
have more policy guidance, I shall be able to discuss with him specific
issues and endeavor to reach agreements or compromises, as may be
required.
8
104-10234-10007
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CLAづち
TS' FILE NO.
FILE BIDO ACT. TO BRANCH
DESTROY OSIS.
FLOM
Rome
:
ACTION
احب
FIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES
SECRET
C
24
1
REPPODUCTION PROHIBITED
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
ARE
MO
FE
128
ADVANCE COPY
UNIT
RID COPY
ACA
TIME/ABY
105
SLOTTED
INFO
CWE-3
FILE, VR, De/WH/C-5, C/CF, C/FI-2, C/FE-3, C/RF/SD, C/CA-20

SECRET 1117552
DIR LISH INFO WAVE NILA (POUCH) CITE ROME 9301
DESENSITIZEDWAY/TYPIC/DELORRY
11 MAR 66 73315

1. DELORRY (D) ARRIVED ITALY 9 MARCH, ROME 12 MARCH. RETURNING
FROM HOME 15 MARCH TO SUBMIT DETAILED REPORT.

2. ETA CUBA ABOUT 1 APRIL. AT SUGGESTION FIDEL (F) GIVING DINNER
PARTY FOR HIM SOON THEREAFTER.
?
:
3. D SAYS ANNIE DE QUENDOZ (6) (NO STA TRACES) VIFE (BUT GETTING
