or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/
ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).
b. Requesting a 201 File Opening
Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting
a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Main-
tenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the
master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assign-
ment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample
201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field
station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201 in the Head-
quarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the
subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening
is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by
placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN
will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsi-
bility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of
201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.
26
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1

14-00000
SECRET
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER 11I, ANNEX B
15 November 1974
4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER
Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into
his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through
a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must
be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation
procedures.
?
1
Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:
a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and
handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

21. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the
subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.
5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS
The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which
have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which
have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles
on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.
درهم
26.1
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14-00000
SECRET
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974
a. Purging
Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires
discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the
simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take
place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done
periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should
be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:
(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for
the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if
a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the Gissemination number
then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch
cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information
contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is
by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier
forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention
in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized
officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction
over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification
authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained
at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained
in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a
cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location
of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 56(2)).
b. Maintenance Procedures

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order.
In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201
26.2
SECRET
مفيد
۱۰
امنه

14-00000
SECRET
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974
า
dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash
number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents wiil not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are
to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification
into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may
be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards
should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff
einployee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to
the ISC/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be
closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true
name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest
should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material
has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified
to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an
OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and
Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing
to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number)
containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201
should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic docuinent
for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic
document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document
remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document
in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L,
or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will
automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may con-
tain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the
file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-
tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).
26.3
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i

14-00000
L
SECRET
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974
Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be
handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201
dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a
Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.
UNCLASSIFIED
ENTERHAL
USE our
१.
IP/Piles
GC-52
2
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
PARSNITIAL OF DRACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS
OPCEFS
(For gultance see CSEB 70-1-1,
Chapter III, ex.
Volume(a)
of 201-
volume(a)
Bestricted Doester
(Attach Form 2021 to
Dossier)
Fon-Bestricted Dossier
For Split Charge Doesters:
IL
All documents prior to
(date)
12.
forwarded to IP/Piles. All
documents after
12
(date)
retained at
desk.
14
N
610E
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERN
OSE GALY
UNCLASSIFIED
28.4
SECRET

14-00000
2
SECRET
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974
6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES
A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any
period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk
officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer.
Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Account-
ability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.
10:
CONFIDENTIAL
(theo glitod fas
NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY
1000
TLBE
This is to cotify you that sccountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited
below has been transferred to you by:
Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files,
Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.
PROJECT OF MONEST
1-73
2377...
FILE.
DOC. STWO
CONFIDENTIAL
DOC. DATE
CL BY: OSPAT
..
The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action
Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the
201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings
for his component.
7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS
a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the
desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201
Personality File Action Request (Form $31) when the file is opened.
26.5
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14-00000
SECRET
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974
(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge
from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being
returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form
2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by sub-
mitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).
P/PI
OC-52 TUBE 07-6
IP/DCU
G-40 TE ΕΠΑ
CONFIDENTIAL
(Bhen Bailed 201
FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
ACTION DESK: 1.
To restrict a file, complete Section & (signature of R.O. cot
Decessary).
2.
То гевоте a restriction, complete Section B (3.0. signature
necessary).
SECXICY A
RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 73-28)
BY:
COMPONENT:
(...ss
Date:
ROACTE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY)
R.O. No.
Date:
2021.
CONFIDENTIAL
12DT
1.30
7
b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the
personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request
for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier
held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-
routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file
to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The
desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted
dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that
desk by Central Files.
11
26.6
SECRET

14-00000
L
SECRET
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
15 November 1974
?
8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES
The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the
subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the
requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201
file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should
supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by
telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the.
information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge
Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent
by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.
9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION
A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after
appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will
destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and
number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder
will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit
(IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.
10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS
Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names
and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of
interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its
alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening
the 301 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request
(Form $31) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16)
blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate
permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the
201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are
categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.
a. Standard Listings
Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's
interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest
26.7
SECRET
1

14-00000
it
ful & Cala
SECRET
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER JIII, ANNEX B
15 November 1974
:
Desk blocks or the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The
standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number,

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.
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26.8
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(41) 0144758
اله

14-00000
SECRET
DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ΑΝΝEX B
15 November 1974
All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions must be destroyed
upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely
sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.
b. Non-Standard Listings
Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:
(1) Country of location

(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)

(3) Citizenship

(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)

(5) Occupation.
These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example,
a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the
Ol code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or NZ. A 201 personality list could also be
produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915
and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the
United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the Ol code AA.
Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an
Ol code AA. Those personalities with an Of code other than AA and those
with no Ol code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that
persons who have not been assigned an Ol code also be included. Note also
that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific
as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier
covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one
occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice
some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics
and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category
will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings104-10215-10003 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

TO : Chief, WHD
FROM : Chief of Station, Habana
SUBJECT: GENERAL- Administrative
SPECIFIC- Arthur G. VAIVADA

DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-1025
(201-16681)
(223-88/2-139)ocal

SECRET KAPOK
CLASSIFICATION
m Dahlgren

DATE: 7 November 1957

1. Attached herewith is a memorandum prepared by the Subject, dated
29 October 1957, calling the attention of Headquarters to the fact that
his assignment in Habana terminates in June 1958 and setting out his wishes
as to reassignment thereafter.

2. While Vaivada did not include it in his memorandum, in recent
conversations with the case officer he has expressed considerable interest
in the possibility of being assigned under unofficial cover to Spain,
saying that both he and his wife would welcome such an assignment. The
Subject has also said in those conversations that he would not take it
amiss if an opportunity for reassignment outside of the Central America-
Caribbean area were to become open to him at any time prior to June 1958.

3. In the opinion of the Station, Vaivada has done a very good job
here, having been confronted with and overcome a number of difficult
problems and situations during his tour of over three years in Habana.
The Station is happy to recommend that his request for reassignment be
given every consideration.

James R. Palinger
James R. Palinger

Attachments:
Memorandum of Reassignment (4 copies)

Distribution:
- Washington w/att.
2- Files w/att.

4 November 1957

JRP/nin

For Cal 43-26
201-168881

FORM BO
CLASSIFICATION
28-51 و19 م A

SUBJECT: Reassignment - Arthur G. Vaivada
TO : Headquarters Desk
THROUGH: Chief of Station, Havana, Cuba

Havana, Cuba
29 October 1957

1. While at Headquarters in the early part of May 1957, it was verbally
agreed that I return to Cuba for about one year, security permitting.

2. While my operational work in Cuba from August 1954 until February
1957 was concentrated on communist targets in the University of Habana, it
should te pointed out that my duties during that period also involved many
contacts with subversive oppositionist elements. When governmental persecution
increased during February 1957, two of my key agents were lost, one of them
by governmental assassination, so that I was obliged to leave Cuba temporarily
pending clarification of the security factors involved. During my three
months atsence in PEPRIME the local situation deteriorated; and after my
return my position was less favorable than it had been as a newcomer since I
had lost assets but had retained the cumulative security hazards of three years
of cultivation and recruitment efforts. The University was, and still is,
closed. Our communist penetration efforts are continuously harrassed by
official persecution of the target group.

3. Since by June 1958 I shall have spent four years in Cuba, I believe
it appropriate to submit this letter at this time requesting that Headquarters
begin to study the possibilities for reassignment about June 1958, or prior
to that date if necessary. As to future assignments, I have no reservations
or special reçuests. I am willing and prepared to travel to any area
consistent with my qualifications. Generally speaking, and for obvious
security reasons, I am interested in getting out of the Central America-
Caribbean area if possible. It may be recalled that I was denied an Argentine
visa in 1953, for purely technical reasons. This situation may be changed,
and I would not be opposed to a tour in Argentina, Chile, or any of the South
American republics. In this matter, the nature of the new project or
assignment would take precedence with me over personal preferences as to
particular area of assignment.

At To HKHA 4025
7NOV 57

DESENSITIZED
por CX 43-26
201-168881

Reassignment Arthur G. Vaivada
29 October 1957, Page 2

4. Regarding my cover status: I entered Cuba in 1954 under student
cover (Pan American Foundation Scholarship), and as it became increasingly
more difficult to maintain owing to student disturbances, I completed a
course in the writing of free-lance fiction and am thrice published. This
writing has been used as a realistic, stop-gap cover, even after I was
provided with a notional business cover (Public Surveys Institute) cy Head-
quarters. I understand that journalism is considered a weak and time-worn
cover; yet if it is worled at, and financially managed through a PEPRIME
checking account, it not only satisfies local SS probes but it does not have
the inherent disadvantages involved in setting up a full-fledged business
cover. I set this out as a possible suggestion to Headquarters, but have
no insistence as to journalistic over business cover. The notional
business cover provided me has proved satisfactory in a limited sense thus
far, and even utilized as cover for action occasionally, but I would be
uncertain about introducing it in a less "Americanized" country than Cuba.

อง
11837

Arthur C. Vawoda
Arthur G. Vaivada

201-168881
104-10215-10004
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

COOTET

25 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Central Cover Staff
ATTENTION : Charlie Danish
SUBJECT : Ross CROZIER
REFERENCE : SAS Memorandum Dated 14 May 1963

1. Referenced memorandum requested the Subject be provided with
military cover while assigned in the Headquarters area for operational
and credit purposes in the performance of his duties with SAS. It is
understood that your office was reluctant to issue the Subject the
necessary military cover because he was physically located in a DODS
office which was under commercial cover.

2. As indicated verbally on 24 June 1963, SAS will move the
Subject out of the DODS area on 26 June. SAS has also requested suit-
able office or apartment space through the Office of Logistics from
which the Subject will operate in the future. Until this property is
acquired, the Subject will perform his duties from his home. Conse-
quently, it is requested that imediate attention be given to providing
the Subject with the necessary military cover. Refer any questions to
Q. A. LADKER, Jr., SAS/Security, ext. 5909.

Distribution:
Orig & 1 Addressee
1- SAS/Security
SAS/Security:GALadner:ftk - 25 June 1963

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, SAS

SECRET
201-168881

19 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Central Cover Staff
Room 1-B-24 Headquarters Building
SUBJECT : Request for Domestic Cover
Mr. Ross Lester Crozier
REFERENCE : Form 1322, forwarded to your Office,
14 May 1963

1. It is requested that this Office be advised as
to the disposition of our request dated 14 May 1963 for
providing Mr. Ross Lester Crozier appropriate Domestic
Cover.

2. Since security requirements prohibit Mr. Crozier
from being located in the Headquarters Building, he has
been provided an office in the DODS Area. Subject needs
"Cover" as soon as possible, for credit purposes,
employment, etc.

3. Your prompt attention to this matter would be
appreicated.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

cc: DODS
DDP/SAS/PERSONNEL / J. ALBERT HOESERIKCE (19 June (63)
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1- DOPS
1- SAS/Personnel

SECRET
201-168881

SECRET
REQUEST FOR DOMESTIC COVER LIST ENTRY OR CHANGE

SUBMIT THIS FORM IN TRIPLICATE, ENCLOSED IN SEALED ENVELOPE
TO Central Cover Staff DATE
THROUGH:
SUBJECT: Mr Ross Lastex,, Crosion 14 May 1963
ENTRY CHANGE

Inclusion of subject on the Subject is currently included on
Domestic Cover List is requested the Dozestic Cover List. For the
for the reason noted below. When reason noted below, it is requested
notified that cover has been es- that
tablished, subject will be specif- 
ically authorized and instructed to this employee be removed from
conceal his Agency affiliation. the Domestic Cover List.

the following change be made:

REASON
Request subject be provided Military Cover (Army) while assigned in
Headquarters Ares for operational and credit purposes in performance
of his duties with 548.

Note: Subject was formerly under commercial cover at JMHAVE prior
to January 1963.

TYPE COVER COVER (Complete only for new entries)
IN USE

TYPE SUGGESTED
(Specify whether
officiel or non-
official)
IF NO COVER
IN USE

JUSTIFICATION, IF
MON-OFFICIAL COVER
SUCCESTED

APPROVED BY CENTRAL COVER DIVISION
SIGNATURE SIGNATURE REQUESTING OFFICIAL

ORVILLE C. DAWSON
DATE TITLE
Chief, 848/Personnel
FORM 201-16871
7-58 1322 OBSOLETE PACIOUS Caltions. SECRET (36)

SECRET
(When Filled in)
DD/P PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

NAME: CREIER, Ross AGE: :E? April 1963
DOB: 20 June 1922
STATION H23.
AND DUTIES: PRIMARY CAREER CARGER O'T
DD/P UNIT: LESIGNATION:

PRESENT GRADE: GS-12 PRESENT T/O SLOT NA
PROPOSED GRADE: NA NUMBER AND GRADE: NA
CIA TRAINING:

PROPOSED T/O SLOT NA
NUMBER AND GRADE: NA
EDUCATION: Wife: Costa Rican citizen, 203: 15 Mar 1913
Son: D03: Sept 1747.5. Citizen.
LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY: DAU: FOB: 24 June 1951U.S. Citizen
Spanish (Fluent - writing/reading/speaking)
ASSESSED: DATE: TYPE OF POSITION: RESULTS:

EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO CIA (excluding SSU-OSS):
U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, Tech Sgt. (1940-1945: Intelligence BC)) & (April 46 - Apr 49)
Leading man labor, $12.3% per day, US Naval Air Station, Coco Solo, Canal Zone;
(Jan. 1946-April 1946).

SUMMARY OF CIA-SSU-OSS ASSIGNMENTS INCLUDING PREVIOUS GRADES AND DATES:
Contract and career agent since June 1949 - Intelligence assigments in Costa Rica,
Guatemala, and Jubas (Foreign Intelligence with some Psychological Warfare and
Paramilitary) FI mission with Castro's forces in Siem Maestra (April 58).
Hexico City Jan 59 to May 1960; assigned to PPA-PROP From June 60 to Oct 61;
Assigned FCS TE Oct 1 to Jan 1963. (Case Officer on student project involving
propaganda and area intelligence collection & network operation; CO on press
placement and press collection project).

RECOMMENDED BY: CONCURRENCES:

RECOMMENDATION OF CAREER SERVICE BOARD:

FORM NO. 201-16881
MAR $7 965 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (4)

TRAVEL OKLER
SECRET
1. X TDY
-JEOD OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO
PCS SAS-473-63
INVITATIONAL
Mr. Foss L. Crozier
Washington, D. C. 6576 Career Acent
YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRAVEL AND INCUR NECESSARY EXPENSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATIONS, THIS TRAVEL
OR CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION, IF SO DESIGNATED, IS MADE FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL
CONVENIENCE.
From washington, D. C. to RTC for approximately three (3) days Tot and return.

HODE: Air tourist/ce
PURPOSE: Operacional contacts

TRAVEL DURATION
BEGIN / PER DIEM ALLOWANCE AUTOMOBILE ALLOWANCE
END DOMESTIC FOREIGN CENTS PER MI.
NOT TO EXCEED CENTS PER ML
19 Har 63 22 Mar 63 16.00 S MAXIMUM OTHER (See below) COST BY COM- AS MORE
MON CARRIER ADVANTAGEOUS
TO GOVT.
ALLOWANCES AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS WITH REASONS

DEPENDENT TRAVEL AUTHORIZED
HAME DATE OF BIRTH RELATIONENIP
ACCOMPANY TRAVELER
FOLLOW WITHIN & MONTHS
ADVANCE RETURN
COORDINATION
SIGNATURE TITLE & COMPONENT
FORM 540 OBSOLETE
3-59
EDITIONS.
MFG. s-ca
PROCURE TRANSPORTATION BY ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL
TRANSPORTATION REQUEST $100.00
CASH OR OTHER
DISPOSITION OF EFFECTS
AUTHORIZATION
SHIPMENT
NONTEMPORARY
STORAGE
SHIPMENT POA AUTHORIZED
EXCESS BAGGAGE AUTHORIZED
ACCOMPANIED
LES. AND MOOK
UNACCOMPANIED
LBS. AND MODE
ADVANCE OF FUNDS REQUESTED I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE
YER$100.00 ACCOUNTING DUE DATE OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO.
NO 473-63
CHARGE COST CENTER NO.
3132-1000-1000
DATE SIGNATURE OF B&F OFFICER

REQUESTING OFFICIAL
DATE TYPED NAME AND TITLE COMPONENT
VINCENT J, FISTHAN, Chief SAS/Support
SIGNATURE DATE

AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL
TYPED NAME AND TITLE COMPONENT
DESMOND FITZGERALD, Chief SAR
SIGNATURE DATE

SECRET march '63
201-168881
(28-46)

13 kareh 1003
KELOLANDUM CR: Chief, finance Division
Chief, Staff Agent Accounts Sective
THROUGH : Chief, Contract Personnel Division
SUBJECT : Detasiposent of Career Agent -
Harold 3. NORMAYA

This is to advise you that Career Agent Harold E.
MORTR3 reassigned ICS froa JHAVE to the Fashington,
5. C. area on 21 January 1963.

BOARD J.
Chief, /support
DDP/SAS/Personnel/John H. Martin/ket (13 Mar 63)
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/CPD
1 - SAS/Pers

201-168881
104-10215-10018 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

INDEX: YES
NO 2.41813
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
201-261813
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☑ RET. TO BRANCH

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, RI/AN, WH 7, RF 2

R
C SECRET 2000172 IN 83496 R
0 P DIR CITE MEXI 5444 C/S COMMENT: *DID NOT DESIRE COLD STREET 0
Y REDWOOD LCIMPROVE SPOT APPROACH TO BAKULIN Y
REF DIR 45798

1. SINCE REF STATION HAS TRIED SOPT CANDIDATES FOR
PLAUSIBLE ACCESS VALENTIN VASILYEVICH BAKULIN WHOSE OVERT ACTIVITY
IS PRINCIPALLY THAT OF SUPPLYING PROPAGANDA FILMS TO INTERESTED R
I LOCAL GROUPS. C
C
O 2. SOURCE SEYMOUR D. TRINNICH, POSSIBLE ACCESS ASSET IS ARTURO P
Y CARRILLO ESPARZA D.POB 3 JULY 1940 MEXICO CITY. Y
CARRILLO IS GRADUATE STUDENT UNAM FACULTY SCIENCES, COMPLETING !!!
DOCTORATE THEORETICAL PHYSICS, IS MEMBER OF COMMITTEE WHICH
OPERATES CINE CLUB, APPEARS SPEAK AUTHORITATIVELY RE FINANCING AND
FILM PROCUREMENT, CLUB HAS GOTTEN FILMS IN PAST FROM SOVEMB.
(REQUEST HQS TRACES AND INITIATION POA, HAVE NO LOCAL TRACES.)

R
I
C 3. REQUEST TRACES ALSO ON CARRILLO'S GIRL FRIEND CYNTHIA
O CHLEBICKI, U.S. NATIONAL, UNAM MASTER'S DEGREE STUDENT, GRADUATE P
Y OF UNIV ILLINOIS, HOME ADDRESS 11 EAST 151 ST, HARVEY, ILL.. Y
(NO MEXI TRACES.)

4. INDEX.
SECRET

GROUP 1
FORM
4-43 1389 OBSOLETE
PREVIOUS
RI COPY
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWN-
GRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.
RI COPY
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.
(35)
104-10215-10035
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT J. F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

REPORT COVER SOLELY

CONTROLLED DISSEM

MRSAVE
23 February 1963

CRYPT

ASSET
Source:
Faras. 1-1: former Panamanian Charge in Habana, now in Paris,
who was approached by men working with, Affairs Commission,
employee; and it is said that they have been quite successful in
shipping medicines to Cuba including ship ments to prisoners in
Cuban jails.

Faras. 5 and 6: on or about 20 September obtained the
information because it was addressed to Line of Miami, who is
related to who is a very good friend of

Also attached under cover of this report are the following items
of information of potential interest:

a. Bulletin No. 2 of the National Medical Station in the
Frente Interna Anti-Comunista. It is not known how
received this information. It is believed that this/information
dates to about June or July 1962.

Attachments:
Misc. Medical Info.
Headquarters attn & atts. b/w

File

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
CONTROLLED DISSEM

-2-

b. Copy of a letter signed by Cmdte Rene A for the
Executive Council of the National Inst. of Surger of
the Ministry of Health, dated 6 June addressed to
Regino BOTTI, President of JUCEPLAN requesting an
approval for the expenditure of $20,000.00 for the
purchase of raw color film from Czechoslovakia. This
film to be used at the national Universities and in
Cuban scientific institutions. Received from about
mid-July from an unidentified correspondent.

c. of Antonio TOLEDO Zetacia (A12 829 419)
who was in the third year at the Medical School, University
of Habana, Report dated 21 August.

d. Translation of a commentary by Virgilio FRAJO Nunez,
leader of the Cuban medical class Habana on 18 August
1962. It was submitted in translated form by
on 26 August. Though this appears to be an interesting
commentary there does not appear to be anything new or
startling in the information.

e. Listing of medical and professional personnel in Habana
which was received through the diplomatic pouch,
Pouch turned over to for duplication, It
provided translations. Envelope had return address
Colegio Teresiano Calle 17 No. 1051 Vedado, Habana.
Addressed to Eduardo ROCO, PO Box 1495. No WAVE traces
on ROCO. Source of this information is not known. It is
believed that the names under this attachment should be
indexed for the Field. No indication of meaning of A,C
and B, but believe they stand for A- Anti-Communist,
B-Neutral and C- Communist.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
CONTROLLED DISSEM
201-662237
14-00000
104-10215-10128
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: BARNES, WINIFRED C.
DOD FILE 08 97 44

INCLUSIVE DATES:
CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:


DATE DATE
RECEIVED RETURNED REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME) SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFI
NOT REVIEWED BY HSC

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

---

14-00000
L

DATE : 28 February 1967
F-8-97-44
CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)
Miami Office
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO : Director, Domestic Contact Service
SUBJECT: BARNES, Winfred Clark
FILE NO: 496 289 A-89744

1. Reference is made to your request for security checks on the subject
person as a source of intelligence information.
2. This is to inform you that the necessary checks have been completed with
the following results:
a. X No additional information has been obtained, except for such
biographic information as indicated below or in the attachment.
b. Information has been received that Subject was investigated with
favorable results in
c. Certain information has been received and appears in the attach-
ment which your Division will wish to consider in determining
the extent and level of your use of Subject.
3. It is to be noted that our checks were made on the basis of the identifying
information you furnished or in an attachment to this memorandum. Should it be dis-
closed that this information is erroneous or that Subject is known by a different
name, this Division should be notified immediately.

STEVEN L. KUEN
Attachment: Chief, Personnel Security Division
State Passport Report

APPROVED

FORM 1124a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS CONFIDENTIAL
EDITIONS GROCP (9-47)

---

14-00000
L
CONFIDENTIAL

BARNES, Winfred Clark 11 January 1967
#496 289

On January 1967 a passport file of Winfred Clark BARNES was
reviewed at the Passport Office, Department of State. The following
is a summary of the information contained thereins
Date of Birth: 1 ilay 1912 at Gatesville, Texas; verified by
birth certificate

Fathers Shaw Andrew BARNES; Date of Birth: 8 May 1882 at Kennedy,
Texas, current residence not given.
Mther: Velma Elizabeth HARRIS; Date of Birth: 8 March 1888 at....
Thelaza, Texas; current residence not given.

PASSPORT ISSUED: At Miami, Florida on 27 January 1966, #G755310, for
a period of four weeks to visit Mexico, Guatemala,
Costa Rica, Peru, Columbia, Venezuela, Argentina, and
Brazil for the purpose of tourism.
Permanent address: 5350 Southwest 76th Street
Miami, Florida
Mailing address: International Petroleum Company, Ltd
396 Alhambra Circle
Coral Gables, Florida
Occupationt Director
Spouse: Lois Enquist BARNES; Date of Birth: 8 Marcy 1915
at New Haven, Connecticut; current residence
not given; Wed: 17 February 1945; no information
on whether or not marriage has been terminated.

PASSPORT ISSUED: At Miami, Florida on 27 February 1961, #B10331, for a
period of varying from one day to three weeks to visit
Bermuda, Bahamas, Jemica, Trinidad, British Guiana,
Guadeloupe, Barbados and Suriname for the purpose of
business.
RENEWED: At Miami, Florida on 12 May 1964, for a
period of ten days to visit Peru, Columbia,
and other South American countries for the
purpose of business
SUBJECT's first passport was issued at Washington, D. C.
on 21 February 1957, #328617, for a period of indefinite
tire, to visit Bermuda, Hehamas, Haiti, Trinidad, Jamica,
Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama, Nicaragua,
CONFIDENTIAL

---

14-00000
L
'CONFIOC
#496 289
and Cuatemala for the purpose of business
RENEWED: At Havana, Cuba on 2 separate occasions:
13 February 1959 and 5 June 1959, for a period of
approximately two on both renewal forms, countries
to visit and purpose of visit not given.

EAG/nch

APPROVED
CONFIDENTIAL
-2-

---

14-00000
6 December 1966
:
ΣΑΚI FIELD OFFICE

CLEICHAUP
SUBJECT
Ad Hoc Clearance
PEFERENCE
A89744

WINFRED CLARK BARNES
granted ad hoc clearance thr
Security checke vill be completed.
Security Division bea
TROIAL, TROPIE
Security Maleon ricer
SECURITY
Thorne: pat
GROUP I
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNTRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
:
C-O-N-P-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
SECURITY MESSAGE F 1150

---

14-00000
16 ΝΟΥ 1966
1. SUBJECT'S LAST NAME
BARNES,
2. ALIASES
miazni (Gleichaif)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 14 November 1966
BIOGRAPHIC DATA
FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME
Winfred Clark
A-897449
NO.
3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
'1 May 1912, Gatesville, Техав
4. SEX S. CITIZENSHIP
M
6. FULL NAME OF SPOUSE, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, CITIZENSHIP
RESIDENCES (Including No., and Street, Zone, R.F.D., etc.)
COMPLETE ADDRESS
7.
FROM TO
Present
5350 Southwest 76th Street
Miami, Florida
US
5.
FROM TO
1964 1966
136284
EMPLOYMENT
NAME OF EMPLOYER
Esso-Inter-America Inc.
1
COMPLETE ADDRESS
Coral Gables, Florida
1961 1964
International Petroleum Co.
Coral Gables, Florida
1960 :
Esso Standard Oil S.A., Ltd
Coral Gables, Florida
1959
Esso Standard Oil (Cuba Div)
1957
Esso Standard Oil, S.A.
Havana, Cuba
1927 1955
Humble Oil Company
EDUCATION (High school, college, graduate work, etc.)
PROM TO
NAME OF SCHOOL
DEGREE OR MAJOR
٢٠٠
1925 1929
Pearsall High School
Pearsall, Texas
1930 1933
University of Texas
Austin, Texas
1955
University of Pittsburg (15 session).
10. ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION, INCLUDING FULL NAME. CITIZENSHIP DATA ON PARENTS AND CHILDREN.
FORM 180 USE PREVIOUS
MFG. 4-6
EDITIONS
CONTINUED
CONTINUED
CONTINUED
16 NOV 1966
CONTINUED
(4-43)

---

14-00000
L
MR. WINFRED
CLARK
BARNES
5350 Southwest 75th Street
Miami, Florida
BUSINESS
Subject is General Manager and in Cuba Division at:
S000049 - Esso Standard Oil SA, Havana, Cuba
Subject is now with:
A136284
DIRECTOR!
Esso Inter-America Inc., Coral Gables, Florida
INACTIVE
DATE
14 AUG 1953
INITIALS
BCS
ACTIVATED
0897
DATE 12-13-1066
INITIALS
re

---

14-00000
D
CO-N-F-I-D-E N-T-I-A-L
8-97-Husontel
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Miemi Office
SUBJECT:
Executive Leadership Conferences on
Public Affairs
1 May 1967

1. On Friday, 28 April 1967, the business executives attending
the Conferences for Business Executives on. Federal Government
Operations, conducted by The Brookings Institution, were briefed by
ranking Agency officials.
2. I have attached for your information biographic information
on the executives from your area who were present.

Attachments: a/s
cc: Control w/atts
JRM:mg
James Mauyshet
JAMES R. MURPHY
Director, Domestic Contact Service
L
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

---

14-00000
L
A89744 Winfred
WINFRED C. BARNES
Director
Esso Inter-America Inc.
Mr. Barnes attended the University of Texas.

He began his career with Humble Oil & Refining Company, where he
held various marketing positions before serving in the U. S. Army
from 1942 to 1946. He rejoined Humble as a District Sales Super-
visor at Corpus Christi, Texas, and later held the positions of District
Manager, Assistant Division Manager, and Marketing Manager in
several of Humble's marketing areas. He transferred to Esso Standard
Oil, S.A. in Havana as Marketing Manager in 1937, and was General
Manager - Cuba Division at the time of the loss of that operation in
1960. Upon his relocation in Coral Gables, Florida in 1960, he became
Eastern Region Manager for Esso Standard Oil, S.A. Limited. Mr. Barnes
joined International Petroleum Company, Ltd. as Marketing Coordinator
in 1961 and was elected a Director of that company in 1964. Today he
is a Director of Esso Inter-America Inc., with responsibility for
petroleum marketing, public relations, government relations, and
operations in the Caribbean and Chile.

---

14-00000
INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to on unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
COUNTRY
Cuba
SUBJECT
REPORT NO.
Attitude of Segundo Cevallos,
Key Official of National Bank
DATE DISTR.
00-B-3.168,138
6 Oct 60
NO. PAGES
One
REFERENCES
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
SOURCE:
Sep 60 and earlier
1.
2.
-Havana/Sep 60
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
US national, graduate engineer, en official on the staff of a large
oil company.
Source has had years of experience in company operations outside the US
and has been located in Cuba for many years. [Source is normally available
for reinterrogation should this report generate additional requirements.)
!
In Sep 60 I talked to an old friend who was president of one of the US-owned
tire companies recently interevened by the Castro regima. My friend
stated that he had recently contacted Segundo Cevallos, one of the
top officials of the Rational Bank, in comection with obtaining approval
for some of the company's US technicians to take their furniture and
appliances out of Cuba. Cevallos said, "I don't want those technicians
to leave. We need then." At this, the rubber company official stated
that it was too late and that the technicians had already gone.

Cevallos then wade the statement that he was very much concerned about
the flight of technicians of all kinds from Cuba. He said that the
revolution had been fought to give Cuba & more highly developed industry,
but that the technicians were leaving and industry was being seriously
effected.
3. Cevallos then said, "Something is wrong. The revolution has gotten off
the track somewhere." He then added, "I have got to talk to 'Che' about
this."
4. Cevallos is a man of about 60-63 years, and has a very important position,
in that he is in charge of granting foreign exchange. Hy friend said
that Cevallos is a very pleasant individual but seems to be a theorist,
a professorial type who obviously has had little or no business experience.
He has a background as a writer and philosopher, and apparently is
extremely naive as evidenced by his comment that he would talk to "Che"
Guevara about how the revolution had gotten off the track.
-end-
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI AEC
INFORMATION REPORT
4
INFORMATION REPORT
NOFORN
NO DISSEM ABROAD
LIMITED
LIMITED: Dissemination limited to full-time employees of CIA, AEC and FBI: and, within State and Defense, to the intelligence components, other
offices producing NIS elements, and higher echlons with their immediate supporting staffs, Not to be disseminated to consultants, external projects or
reserve personnel on short term active duty (excepting individuals who are normally full-time employees of CIA, AEC, FBI, State or Defenes) unless the
written permission of the originating office has been obtained through the Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA.

---

14-00,000:
:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws. Title
18. U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or ravelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
C-O-N-F-I-D-H-H-Y-I-A-L
COUNTRY
Cuba
SUBJECT
REPORT NO.
Anti-Castro Attitude of ICP Personnel DATE DISTR.
00-B-3,168,139
6 Oct 60
NO. PAGES
Two
REFERENCES
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
SOURCE:
Sep 60 and earlier
Havana/8ep 60 and earlier
1.
2.
3.
5.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
US national, graduate engineer, an official on the staff of a large
oil company.
Source has had years of experience in company operations outside the
US and has been located in Cuba for many years. (Source is normally
available for reinterrogation should this report generate additional
requirements.)
As of Sep 60 there appear to be some significant developments occurring
axong personnel of the staff of the Caban Petroleum Institute. The
Institute has cosasndeered a building of Reso Standard Oil SA for
use as headquarters, and is currently engaged in mixing the personnel
of all three intervened oil companies in the new headquarters.

The shuffling around of personnel has further losered the morale of
the petroleva industry employees, and I have been told that 95% are
strongly in favor of the companies and against the Castro regime.

Since ICP established its new offices, indoctrination sessions of employees
have been scheduled on a twice-a-week basis. The first session was
bald recently and was concerned with the "Colored Problem of the World".
The gist of the remarks of the conference leader was that Cubans were
of Spanish ethnic origin, and because of the close ties of Spaniards
and the Hoors for so many hundreds of years it had to be realized that
all Cubana had colored blood, and should not make a distinction and
should have no prejudices concerning people with colored blood.

The second indoctrination session was headed by an overt Communist fron
the Texas Company. He delivered the straight Party Line, anti-US,
anti-imperialist, anti-sonopoly, "The Soviet Union is the great hope
of the world for peace", and only Communist ideology will survive, etc.
He also stated that, "The Declaration of Havana of Fidel Castro will
be our doctrine," and said that it was desired to obtain the signatures
of the whole population of Cuba to show that everyone was behind this
doctrine. He then said in response to a question regarding what would
happen to those who did not sign, "You are either for us or against us."
6. At this, one of the office girls who had been a strong Fidelista got up
and remarked that such comments reminded her of the Batista days, and she
strongly disapproved of any pressure tactics.
C-O-N-F-I-D-K-H-T-1-A-L
STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI AEC 67
INFORMATION REPORT
NOFORN
:
INFORMATION REPORT
NO DISSEM ABROAD
LIMITED
LIMITED: Dissemination limited to full-time employees of CIA, AEC and FBI: and, within State and Defense, to the intelligence components, other
offices producing NIS elements, and higher echlons with their immediate supporting staffs. Not to be disseminated to consultants, external projects or
reserve personnel on short term active duty (excepting individuals who are normally full-time employees of CIA, AEC, FBI, State or Defense) unless the
written permission of the originating office has been obtained through the Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA..

---

14-00000
7.
8.
9.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-1-A-L
2-
00-B-3,168,139
One of the male office employees then stood and stated that he agreed
heartily with her, and added that it was not the intent of the revolu-
tion to "get into this sort of business." He then asked, "Why are we
getting all this Communist propaganda and why do we not hear anything about
Jose Marti?" His comments were greeted with applause.

A third zaployee stood up and calked for 45 minutes. He really laid it
on the line concerning the way the revolution had failed the people of
Cuba, and had leaned far too much toward Communism. The conference
leader did not interrupt and following the conclusion of the employee's
remarks did not even ansver. He merely said, "That is all", got up
and walked out. However, the next scheduled indoctrination session
was cancelled.

Although mixing the employees of the three companies was doce deliberately
to break up a feeling of trust among employees who knew each other, and
to introduce a feeling of fear concerning strangers, there has been close
cooperation on the technical level between employees of at lesat two
refineries. For example, technicians at Esso and Shell recently collaborated
in shutting down the refineries without real justification, allegedly
because of Hurricane Donna. When the word got out that the refineries
were shutting down, ICP officials rushed in and protested vigorously that
there was no danger, and that the action should
not be taken. The
technicians then said, "Well, it is too late now," and they kept the
refineries shut down for three full days. Both Shell and Esso technicians
concerned enjoyed this minor act of sabotage hugely.
10. They also cooperated in dealying action when they were ordered to start
the cat plant. LPG is needed badly, so the technicians decided to keep
the unit shut down. ICP officials screamed that it was unnecessary
and ordered them to start, but the technicians said that it was not
practical because it was too difficult, and possibly dangerous, to stop
and start the unit. They said that the shortage of catalysts made it
impossible to figure on keeping the unit going, and so it was not the
right thing to do to start it at all. Consequently they have been able
to keep the cat units shut down completely since the storm.
3
11. One of the top Shell engineers who has participated in such actions
is going to attempt to skip the country as a test, because many other
technicians of the oil companies are desperate to flee Cuba and are
trying to arrange ways and means to do so.
-end-
HOFD RH
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
HO DISSIM ABROAD

Tangu
e-547
ngung
ge
LIMITED

---

14-00000
INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT
CENTRAL. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States: within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18. U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
COUNTRY
Cuba
REPORT NO.
SUBJECT
Desire of Oil Industry Technicians
to Flee Cuba/Effect on Production
DATĖ DISTR.
00-A-3,168,137
29 Sijat 60
NO. PAGES
Two
REFERENCES
DATE OF
INFO.
Sep 60 and carlier
PLACE &
Havana/Sep 60 and earlier
DATE ACQ.
SOURCE:
1.
2.
3.
4.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
US national, graduate engineer, an official on the staff of a large
oil company.
Source has had years of experience in company operations outside the US
and has been located in Cuba for many years. [Source is normally
available for reinterrogation should this report generate additional
requirements.)
i
A real body-blow could be given the Castro regime if a few selected
technicians in the oil refineries skipped the country. As an example,
at the Esso refinery there are four technicians whose loss would have
a very severe effect on the production of the refinery. These sen are
all young, extremely intelligent, well trained, and are completely
loyal to the company. They have served immediately below the super-
Intendent and the assistant superintendent. These four would be given
immediate jobs in the US, because of their outstanding backgrounde, if
they were able to get out of Cuba.

The top figure of the four is Leon Hequin Maya, who is a specialist in
the Processing Department, one of the most important functions in the
plant. This departmant's responsibilities deal with the physical processing
of the product from crude to the finished material.

Hequin is 32 years old, married, no children, but expecting a child in
Dec 60. He is a graduate of Auburn University, with a degree in chemical
er mechanical engineering. He is a Cuban national, I believe of the
Jewish faith. He is about 5'10", weighs about 160 lbs, has close cropped
black hair, and is a very personable, intelligent young man. He is a
very good leader, and was definitely one of the men on their way up
in the company..
Hequin already has been branded a counterrevolutionary in an official Acta,
and has been taken out of the plant and put into the office. Apparently
the regime wanted to get him away from the production line for fear of
possible sabotage, and also wanted to utilize his undoubted talent and
knowledge of the industry in headquarters.
5. Hequin is extremely eager to get out of Cuba, but he does not have a
police exit permit, and since he has been branded counterrevolutionary
he is afraid he would not get his passport back if he presented it for
a police permit.
STATE ARMY NAVY C-O-N-F-I-DI-N-T-I-A-L
AIR
FB1
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
INFORMATION REPORT
NOFORN
AEC
PCT SOU
INFORMATION REPORT
NO DISSEM ABROAD
LIMITED
LIMITED: Dissemination limited to full-time employees of CIA, AEC and FBI: and, within State and Defense, to the intelligence components, other
offices producing NIS elements, and higher echlons with their immediate supporting staffs. Not to be disseminated to consultants, external projects or
---

14-00000
CIA INTERHAL USE ONLY
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-H-T-I-A-L
-2-

६.
7.
8.
Another outstanding young man is Eequin's assistant, Jose Ramon Alvarez,
about 31. He is a graduate of Auburu University and is a top flight
engineer. Since Alvarez is single, he says that he will wait until
the others get out of Cuba. He also wants to hang back to be able
to do some sabotage before he makes his departure. He believes that
he will be able to get out on his own.

A third top flight mechanical engineer, who is extremely eager to leave
Cuba, is Santiago Pardo Suarez del Villar. He is about 35, a graduate
of the University of Havana. Pardo is head of Maintenance and Construction,
and is an extremely intelligent and capable engineer. He is about
5'8", weighs about 170 lbs, and has dark black shair and a moustache.

The fourth is Raul Capote Ortiz, a graduate of Louisiana State University
with the degree in chemical engineering. Capote is one of the top
technicians in the Processing Department. He is married, but I do
not know if he has any children.

HOFORN
-end-
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
NO DISSEM ABROAD
LIMITED

---

14-00000
INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
The material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, T.lic
18. U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to on unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
COUNTRY
Cuba
SUBJECT
REPORT NO
Operations of Refineries/Effect of Use DATE DISTR.
of Soviet Crude Oil/Jet Fuel Production
00-B-3,164,609
23 Aug 60
t
NO. PAGES
Two
REFERENCES
5
4
3
2
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
SOURCE:
Ang 60 and earlier
Havana/Aug 60 and earlier
1.
2.
3.
5.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
US national, graduate engineer, an official on the staff of a large oil
company.
Source has had years of experience in company operations outside the US
and has been located in Cuba for many years. (Source is normally avail-
able for reinterrogation should this report generate additional requirements.)
As of Aug 60 the three major refineries confiscated by the Castro regina
are operating in fairly good shape. Their principal problem is that
the Soviet crude being supplied is very light and they cannot run as
mich volums because gas pressure builds up. The Esso refinery, for
example, has a capacity of 36 thousand bbls per day on heavy crude, but
26 thousand bbis per day is the best they have besa abie to do on the
Soviet crude, and it has been running at a rate of only 20 thousand bbls.
per doy since 20 Jul 60.

The Soviet crude available to date has been compatible with the refineries
and will not damage them, but in addition to not being able to get as
much volume, the rafineries cannot get as much fuel oil because of light
ends. This is true of all three for refineries.

The refinerets were designed for 26 gravity crude which is fairly heavy.
The Soviet crude is 33 gravity, and has caused an imbalance in that
they are now producing more gasoline than is needed. As a consequence,
Cuba is searching desperately for fuel oil. The USSR has said that it
is not in a position to supply fuel oil and so Cuba has turned toward
Mexico, even to the extent of attempting to arrange deals whereby they
will trade gasoline for fuel oil.

The imbalance of gasoline is indicated by the fact that the Cabaiguan
refinary was shut dowa recently because its gasoline storage was completely
filled.

Cuba will reach a critical point about 1 Sep 60. The Esso refinery slowed
down from 26 thousand bble per day to 20 thousand bbls per day because
it had only a 10-day supply of crede. The supply on hand was sufficient
to last only until 14 Ang, but around 11 Aug the refinery was supposed
to receive a shipment of 80 thousand barrels of crude. However, this
is only enough to operate four days.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
1
STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FB1 AEC
5
4
19 SEP 1960
3
2
1
INFORMATION REPORT
-INFORMATION REPORT
NOFORN
NO DISSEM ABROAD
:
LIMITED
LIMITED: Dissemination limited to full-time employees of CIA, AEC and FBI: and, within State and Defense, to the intelligence components, other
ollices producing NIS elements, and higher echions with their immediate supporting staffs. Not to be disseminated to consultants, external projects of
reserve personnel on short teren active duty (excepting individuals who are normally full-time employees of CIA, AEC, FBI, State or Defense) unless the

---

14-00000
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18. U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 774, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to on unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
COUNTRY
Cuba
SUBJECT
REPORT NO.
00-B-3,164,652
Shortage of Lubricating Oil/
Operating Supplies for Refineries/
Ship Bunkerage
DATE DISTR.
NO. PAGES
23 Aug 60
Two
REFERENCES
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
Aug 60
Havana/Aug 60
5
4
2
1
SOURCE:
1.
2.
3.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
US national, graduate engineer, an official on the staff of a large
oil company.
Source has had years of experience in company operations outside the US
and has been located in Cuba for many years. (Source is normally
available for reinterrogation should this report generate additional
requirements.]
As of Aug 60 there is a shortage of lubricating oil in Cuba which will
becoms critical in a fairly short time. Great efforts have been made
by the Castro regime to obtain lubricating oil from US suppliers, and
a vessel, the Mar Carite, has visited a number of US ports attempting
to obtain the oil. However, it has been refused everywhere and had to
raturn to Cubs in ballast. As of 10 Aug 60 it is loading molasses
for delivery to Boston, and will then proceed to Montreal in an attempt
to obtain lubricating oil.
0
A former Esso employee, Frank García, left Cuba on 2 Aug 60 for Mexico
to try to obtain lubricating oil. He is going to visit the Mobile
blending plant, PEMEX, and several others.
Poft. Wallace
Tuba, Okla..
A US national recently employed by ICP to attempt to arrange for the
purchase of necessary supplies and spare parts for the oil industry
has been traveling throughout the SW part of the US, also attempting to
arrange for lubricating oil, but with no success. This individual io
such an unsavory character that it is not beyond the bounds of probablity
that he might "go south" with the funds entrusted to him, which are
considerable.
There are 20 principal types of lubritating oil needed for the total
economy, and the actual status of supply of each is not known. They
may be completely out of some and have six months supply of others.
However, the general story is that there is a "one month supply" of
lubricating oil available.
5. Lubricants for power plants, transportation, and commmications are the
primary concern. They are in critically short supply in diesel lubricants
for engines and heavy equipment, and turbine oil for power plants.
6.
There is no lubricating oil manufactured on the island although the
Castro regime is trying to set up a plant. However, this is a long
range project and takes a lot of time and money..
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI AEC
4
5
4.
3
SEP 1960
2
1
INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT
NOPORN
NO DISSEM ABROAD
LIMITED
LIMITED: Dissemination limited to full-time employses of CIA, AEC and FBI: and, within State and Defense, to the intelligence components, other
offices producing NIS elements, and higher echlons with their immediate supporting staffs. Not to be disseminated to consultants, external projects or
reserve personnel on short term active duty (excepting individuals who are normally full-time employees of CIA, AEC, FBI, State of Defonse) unless the
written permission of the originating office has been obtained through the Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA.

---

14-00000
5
4
3
2
1
INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to on unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-H-T-I-A-L
COUNTRY
Cuba
SUBJECT
REPORT NO.
Friction in New Management of
Esso Refinery
DATE DISTR.
00-B-3,164,653
23 Aug 60
NO. PAGES
One
:
REFERENCES
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
SOURCE:
Aug 60 and earlier
Havana/Aug 60 and earlier
1.
2.
3.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
US national, graduate engineer, an official on the staff of a large
oil company.
Source has had years of experience in company operations outside the
US and has been located in Cuba for many years. [Source is normally
available for reinterrogation should this report generate additional
requirements.]
On 1 Jul 60 the Castro regime intervened the Esso refinery in Cube.
The interventor appointed was Commander Olivio Pino, a career
officer in the Cuban Navy. The aumber two man is (fnu) Guardis,
about 35, a formar marketing analyst in the office of the company.
As of Aug 60 there is evidence of definite friction between Pino and
Guardia.

Commander Pino is an intelligent, affeble, and hospitable parsonality.
He wears a business suit, and to the best of my knowledge has never
worn a barbudo" beard.

Guardia, on the other hand, is a real hard-core Communist, who feels
that Pino is too soft and not revolutionary enough. Guardia wants to
104-10215-10139

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
 
D
ASSISY TO FILC 24.
OLF TO FILE NO.
LC PIDO ACT. ۲۰
STROV SIG.
CLASSIFIED KESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES
21
ROUTING AND/OR
INITIALS SCEN BY
SECRET
6
AEPRODUCTION OF THE COPY PROHIBITED
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIC
T
18
4
۱۹
Vo
ADVANCE COPY
TINE
Y
RID COPY
......
OT 21402 B
SSEM BY 28 Pa
SOD 6
FILE, UR, CS/PO, OT,/ci/ed, OPS FR, WH/C8

SECRET 072354Z CITE JMWAVE 1869 7 JL 65 IN52218
PRIORITY ISOLATION INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR, EGLIN
PBRUXEN KUROAR CHAPPIE RANROD
REF A VAVE 2818 (17001)
3 WAVE 2746 NOT SENT EGLIN CIN 14906)

1. REQUEST TRAINING FOR SIX MAN LEADER GROUP SCHEDULED
ARRIVE ISOLATION 11 JULY AS FOLLOWS: ISOTROPIC SAME GIVEN
AMANCHORS LESS EMPHAIS UDI. ISOLATION STRESS LEADERSHIP TRAINING
AND ROTATE LEADERSHIP ASSIGNMENTS IN FIELD EXERCISES ENCOMPASSING
TRADECRAFT, CACHING, OBSERVATION AND REPORTING, ALL TRAINEES
0
COMPLETED JEWAVE TRAINING AND HAVE OA'S AND RECENT LCFLUTTERS.
2. TRAINEES: 
wach.
if 7:8520
ANLILAC/29 TA IGNACIO (TRAINED AT ISO/ISOT JULY 63)
AMLILAC/33 TA MANUEL (TRAINED AT ISO FEB 64) 741 331
ANSKIRT/! TA PABLO (TRAINED AT ISO JAN 65) 753409
AMHINT/56 TA FRANK CJMUAVE TRAINING ONLY) 332676
AMTRUNK/21 TA LUIS (JMVAVE TRAINING ONLY) 3600063
ANLUNT/2 TA FILIPE (JNWAVE TRAINING ONLY) 334081
AMPOLISH/1 TA SIMON (ISO/ISOT AUG 65) INTERPRETER C10 TO 285-15

SLCRET

14-00000

CLAS ED MESSAGE SECRET IN 52218 PAGE 2/2

BE ASSIGNED.
3. REQUEST AIRLIFT LEADER TEAM TO ISO NIGHT 11 JULY AND
RETURN AMANCHOR GROUP ISO VAVE NIGHT 12 JULY.

SECRET
BT
:
:.

SECRET
14-00000.
104-10215-10146
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

S-E-C-R-E-T

ATTACHMENT #2

TRAINING REPORT

TEAM/GROUP: PBRUMEN II
(211 hours, full-time)
11 July - 13 August 1966
(Date)

Student: FRANK
56

COURSE OBJECTIVE AND CONTENT

This course is designed to train indigenous personnel in paramilitary
resistance activities and intelligence collection operations in denied
areas. Approximately 70% of the student's time is devoted to practical
work and field exercises and 30% to the theoretical aspects essential for
a logical understanding and application of training covered during the
course.

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
* U - Unsatisfactory
Performance is so low in relation to requirements
of the work as to be unequivocally below minimum
standards.

W - Weak
Achieved minimum standards, but less than adequate
(in terms of indigenous personnel participating in
the program).

A - Adequate
Has achieved the basic level required. Satisfactory,
characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient
More than satisfactory. Has acquired a solid
beginner's proficiency. This rating may be
interpreted as representing "average" on our rating
scale.

S - Strong
Exceptional proficiency, characterized by thorough-
ness, initiative, originality, and an exceptional
student understanding and application of paramilitary
resistance activities.

O - Outstanding
Performance is so exceptional in relation to require-
ments of the work and in comparison to the performance
of other students doing similar work as to warrant
special recognition.

* Modification of the Office of Training standard rating scale at the
specific request of JMWAVE.

S-E-C-R-E-T
14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T
FRANK

HOURS   RATING
1. MAP READING (ABILITY TO REPORT LOCATIONS
USING GRID COORDINATES) 12  P

2. NAUTICAL CHARTS   8  P

3. WEAPONRY (U.S. & FOREIGN)  31  P

4. CLANDESTINE MOVEMENT  -  -

5. RESISTANCE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS 20  P

6. AMBUSH TACTICS AND OPERATIONS  24  S

7. RAID TACTICS AND OPERATIONS  24  P

8. CACHING    20  P

9. CLANDESTINE MOVEMENT LINES (E&E)   -  -

10. OBSERVATION AND DEPORTING TECHNIQUES  40  S

11. LEADERSHIP TRAITS AND CAPABILITY  See Comments

12. OPERATIONAL PLANNING ABILITY  See Comments

13. SKETCHING   12  A

14. SABOTAGE (SEE ATTACHED STB REPORT)  -  -

15. TARGET PHOTOGRAPHY   -  -

16. AIR RECEPTION ACTIVITIES  20  P

17. WEAPONS QUALIFICATION
(TEST RESULTS ATTACHED)  Pistol  Non-Applicable
      Rifle  Sharpshooter
      SMG  Sharpshooter

OVERALL PERFORMANCE   RATING LETTER
      P

Rating takes into account trainee's effectiveness, such as performance
in operational skills, tactics, techniques, leadership, planning, teamwork,
motivation and limitations.

2
S-E-C-R-E-T
14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T
FRANK

The ratings above, and narrative comments hereunder, are derived from a
synthesis of all evaluations submitted on each respective trainee by the
instructor staff.

Overall performance ratings of all students in this class were as follows:
WEAK 0 ADEQUATE 0
PROFICIENT 6 STRONG 0 OUTSTANDING 0

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Over-all, FRANK was the most conscientious and hardest working
student in his class. His serious attitude and fine performance warranted
a highly proficient rating.

In preparation of plans, completion of written exercises, and
execution of field problems, he demonstrated a high level of achievement.

During the Ambush Exercise, FRANK had a leadership role during
which he adhered to a detailed plan, exerted good control over the team,
and produced a very successful ambush operation.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

PREPARED BY:    APPROVED AND FORWARDED:

erome M. Greiner   JOSEPH M. HUDACEK  8/30/66
JEROME W. GREINER  Chief Instructor  Date
Project Officer

3
S-E-C-R-E-T
14-00000

FRANK- Frank was the hardest working student of the group. He con-
sistently applied himself to all phases of the training with equal and
great diligence. However, his practical work, which took him a
great deal of time to perform, was always a little sloppy. When
Frank crimped detonators or threw improvised grenades, he was
very shaky. However, he did not seem at all nervous about working
with other hazardous material. He asked many pertinent questions
which contributed to the group's training and always answered test
questions correctly and in detail. He was cooperative and reacted
well to correction. Some supervision was required since the staff
instructors were concerned about his nervousness with detonators.
His overall performance was rated as proficient.

SECRET
104-10215-10188 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

ORIG: W. WAINWRIGHT: tw CLASSIFIED MESSAGE ANLASH
UNIT: SAS/EOB S-E-C-R-E-T 12-62
EXT: 6153 ☐ INDEX ROUTING
DATE: 18 JUNE 1963 ☐ NO INDEX 1
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 2 4
3 5
6
TO: ROME 19 JUH 6 15 572

FROM: DIRECTOR. SIG CEMERRED
CONF: AS 8 X ROUTINE
INFO: DDR, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, WE 4, S/C

TO ROME INFO CITE DIR 48198

KEYWAY PBRUMEN AMWHIP
REF: DIR 44488 (IN 55801)

1. REQUEST SMITHAM ASK AMTHIP FOR DATE HE SENT LETTER TO
"THOMPSON'S FRIEND" IN PBRUMEN. ALSO REMIND HIM TO SAVE COPY OF
LETTER FOR THOMPSON. IF ANWHIP AGREEABLE, OFFER SEND COPY TO
THOMPSON VIA "SECURE CHANNELS".

2. FYI, LETTER IS ACTIVATION EFFORT TO RELUCTANT DRAGON
AGENT NOW PERUMEN, WHO MET PARIS BY THOMPSON AND WALLACE A. GROWERY
LAST SUMMER. AGENT IS GOOD FRIEND AMWHIP WHO WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN
ARRANGING CONTACT.

END OF MESSAGE

Thomas F. Hills WE/4/5. Munger mm
THOMAS THIELE WE/5 William Sing
C/WR/INT AC/SAS/EOB
RELEASING OFFICER 18-19 COORDINATING OFFICERS GROUP AUTHENTICATING
S-E-C-R-E-T Excluded from automatic OFFICER
downgrading and
declassification
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy Na.
204-25225
104-10215-10200 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

21 January 1963
DATE

PREPARATION OF OUTGOING SW MESSAGES
TO: Bill Wainwright
TFW/FI
FROM: PSD/SWB
(Div. or Branch)
(Field Units Use Pseudo)
(Field Units Use Pseudo)
Transmitted herewith is an Outgoing SW Message prepared for:
AMLASH/1
(Cryptonym of Agent)
Message No.: #1
This message is located:

On the side of the paper that has the penciled "X" mark.

It is suggested that the cover letter be placed:

On the reverse side and at right angles to the penciled "X" side.

Make sure the penciled "X" is removed before mailing

William J. Murphy
(Field Units sign in Pseudo)
Form 60-1 (OUT)
SECRET

MEJ 1. QUERIDO CO. MOJ 1 CLARO FERO NO INCLUISTE DIRECCION SEGURA DE
REMI TENTE COMO PROMETISTE A JAIME EN PARIS. NO TE PREOCUPES DEL REMITENTE
DE ESTA CARTA YA QUE NO ES CUBANO Y SE TRAJO LA CARTA A CUBA DE DONDE LA
ENVIO DE UNA MANEPA SEGURA. NECESITAS ALGO O TE PUEDO SERVIR EN ALGO?
AVISAME ACERCA TU PRESENTE POSICION Y POSIBILIDAD DE REGRESAR AL SERVICIO
MILITAR. SI NO REGRESARAS CUALES SON TUS FUTUROS PLANES? TODAVIA ESTAS EN
HOSPITAL FAJARDO? POR FAVOR DAME INFORMACION CON MAS AMPLIOS DETALLES
INCLUYENDO CUANDO OCURRIO, DONDE, CUANTO Y COMO Y DE QUIEN FUE OBTENIDA
INFORMACION ETC. POR EJEMPLO EN MSJ 1 EN INFORME SOBRE CAMPO ENTRENAMIENTO
DE GUERRILLAS DEBIAS HABER DADO NOMBRE, LOCALIDAD DE LA FINCA, POR EJEMPLO
TERMINO MUNICIPAL, CAMINO O CAMINOS DONDE ESTA SITUADA, DISTANCIA DEL
CAMINO Y PUEBLO MAS CERCANO, DE QUIEN Y COMO SE OBTUVO ESTA INFORMACION.
PUEDES VENIR A MEXICO PARA UNA REUNION EN LOS PROXIMOS MESES? SI NO,
QUIZAS OTRO PAIS QUE TU DESEES? TAMBIEN SELECCIONA E INFOPMA EN DETALJE
SOBRE LOS TRES ESCONDITES DISCUTIDOS EN PARIS. DOS PARA CARTAS Y UNO PARA
PAQUETES PEQUENOS. POR FAVOR INFORMAME SOBRE LO SIGUIENTE LO ANTES POSIBLE:
TIENEN LOS SOVIETICOS SUS PROPIAS CLINICAS MEDICAS EN CURA? PUEDES CONFIPMAR
RECIENTES INFORMES QUE GRAN NUMERO DE SOVIETICOS SE HAN ENFERMADO EN
PROPORCIONES EPIDEMICAS? QUE FUE LA ENFERMEDAD? DONDE FUERON HOSPITALIZADOS?
CUANTAS PERSONAS ESTUVIERON ENFERMAS? ERAN CIVILES, MILITARES O AMBOS?
DONDE OCURRIO EPIDEMIA? PUEDES CONFIRMAR LLEGADA DE ENVIOS DE CARNE ΜΑΙΑ
PROCEDENTE DE LA UNION SOVIETICA? SI ESTO ES VERDAD QUE CAUSO QUE SE ECHARA
A PERDER? CUANTA CARNE MALA HABIA? SOBRE ESTO TAMBIEN HAY INFORMES QUE MUCHO
GANADO EN CUBA ESTA INFECTADO EN PROPORCIONES EPIDEMICAS CON FIEBRE AFTOSA
REQUIRIENDO SU DESTRUCCION. SI ES VERDAD, DAME DETALLES INCLUYENDO EL NUMERO
DE GANADO INFECTADO, ORIGEN DE ENFERMEDAD, AREAS DONDE SE HAN REGISTRADO
INFECCIONES, MEDIDAS TOMADAS PARA CONTROLAR ENFERMEDAD. SE ESTA CONTROLANDO

ENFERMEDAD EFECTIVAMENTE? HAY ALGUNA INDICACION QUE CARNE INFECTADA SE ESTA
VENDIENDO AL PUBLICO? POR FAVOR RECUERDA CONTESTAR ESTA CARTA LO ANTES
POSIBLE, INCLUYE CONTESTACIONES A TANTAS PREGUNTAS COMO SEA POSIBLE. MAS
IMPORTANTE QUE ESTO ES TENER UNA DIRECCION A LA QUE PODAMOS ESCRIBIRTE Y
DETALLES SOBRE ESCONDITES Y TUS FUTUROS PLANES. SI POR CUALQUIER RAZON NO
DESEAS O NO PUEDES MANTENER CONTACTO REGULAR CONMIGO PARA AYUDAR EN NUESTROS
ESFUERZOS PARA UNA LIBRE CUBA, O SI NO DESEAS TRABAJAR MAS CONMIGO, POR
FAVOR AVISAME DE ESTO TAMBIEN Y YO CONSIDERARE NUESTRO ENLACE POR TERMINADO.
ME GUSTARIA CONTINUAR TRABAJANDO CONTIGO PERO TENGO QUE RECORDARTE QUE SE
REQUIERE REPORTAJE Y CORRESPONDENCIA FRECUENTE Y CONTINUA EN ORDEN DE
OBTENER LA MAXIMA VENTAJA PARA LLEGAR A CUMPLIR NUESTROS OBJETIVOS MUTUOS.
SALUDES Y UN ABRAZO DE TU AMIGO. JAIME. FIN.
104-10216-10000
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

/12/
SECRET
FRP:
STAFF
INFO: UDPD-D, VR, FILE, DORECORD, C/C1-4, C/EPS/EG-2,
CONF: C/LA-8
C/EUR-6, C/LCG/ID, C/PCS, (25/P)
------
80 3951064
PAGE 001
TOT: 0420522 MAR 80
DIRECTOR 627921.
:
i
SECRET
STAFF 0420522 DIRECTOR 627924
TO: PRIORITY MADRID.
2
WNINTEL RY AKULE AMLASH
REF: MADRID 48679 3918232

1. DEPT OF STATE HAS SENT MESSAGE TO CONSULATE AUTHORIZING THE
GRANTING OF VISAS TO AMLASH FAMILY, BUT HAS APPARENTLY ATTACHED A
PROVISO SO LONG AS CONSULAR OFFICER SATISFIED THAT THEY ARE BONA
FIDE VISITORS AND NOT IMMIGRANTS.

2. OFFICER KHO DEBRIEFED APLASH-1 IN MADRID ON 11 JANUARY IS
EXPERIENCED AID SAVVY PROFESSIONAL. HE HAS BEEN INTERVIENING
REFUGEES FOR THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS AND HAS CONSISTENTLY PROVIDED
ACCURATE ASSESSMENTS OF REFUGEE INTENTIONS AND MOTIVATIONS. ANLASH-
1 TOLD THE DEBRIEFER THAT HE ONLY MARTED TO VISIT THE US AAD THAT HE
WANTS AND INTENDS TO SETTLE IN SPAIN, WHERE HE CAN MORE READILY SET
UP A MEDICAL PRACTICE AND BE LESS NEWSWORTHY THAN COULD BE THE CASE
IN THE UNITED STATES. THE DEBRIEFER BELIEVES AMLASH-1 MEANT WHAT
HE SAID.

3. FILE: 201-252234. RVN 4 MAR 00, DRV 090.1. ALL SECRET.>
ORIG: ADC/LA/DPS (PALMER X-9011): AUTH: ADC/LA/OPS (PALMER); COORD:
PCS/LGG/ID (CANTRELL); C/E/IB/S(STOVER); REL: C/E/IB (BERGER); CL
BY 037029.
C
END OF MESSAGE
L.M.
X
i
SECRET
LACOESTATE
RECORD COPY
04MAN80
201-252234
104-10216-10002 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

/12/ SECRET FRP:.........
STAFF
CONF: C/LA-8 INFU: OUPD-D, VR, FILE, DORECORD, DD0-4, C/CI-4.
C/EPS/EG-2, C/EUR-O, C/LCG/10, C/PCS, C/PCSLCG, C/PCS/PGLO, DOU/CO,
(32/P)

80 3620398 PAGE 001
TOT: 0222112 JAN 80 DIRECTOR 583488

SECRET
STAFF 0222112 DIRECTOR 583488
ТО: ІММЕLIATE MADRID.
NINTEL ANLASH

1. LNERGO HAS ADVISED THAT AMLASH/1 (A/1) (IDEN A), CUBAN
ASSET 1903-1905, ARRIVED MADRID 11 DEC 79 AND CONTACTED LINERGO
SOURCE IN U.S. REQUESTING MEETING WITH REACTION REPRESENTATIVE.
ACCORDING LNERGO SOURCE A/1 HAS BEEN CONTACTED BY NUMERUUS MEDIA
REPRESENTATIVES SINCE ARRIVAL MADRID BUT HAS REFJSED GRANT INTER-
VIEN.

2. IDEN 8 TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED DEPART 7 JAN 80 FOR MADRID
TO MEET AND CEBRIEF A/1 AND DETERMINE HIS FUTURE PLANS. LNERGO
HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO PROVIDE BONA-FIDES AND CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS.
WILL ADVISE WHEN RECEIVED.

3. PLS PROVIDE NAME AND TELEPHONE NUMBER IDEN B CAN USE TO
CONTACT STATION ON ARRIVAL MADRID. REQUEST REPLY INMEDIATE.

4. FILE: 201-252234. CADL RV% 2 JAN 2000 DRV D9C.3. ALL
SECRET.>
ORIG: SA/C/LAD (STURBITTS, X-9127, GREEN-3215); COORD: DC/LACO;
DC/LA/OPS; C/EUR/IB; AUTH: DC/LA; C/LA; REL: DC/EUR/S
THOMPSON. CL BY 12180.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

RECORD COPY
02 JAN 79
201-252234
LACOTEL
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DISPATCH
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
TO: Acting Chief of Station, Lata
INFO: Chief, Far East Division
SUBJECT: Visit of Identities
ACTION REQUIRED/REFERENCES: ACTION REQUIRED: VII
REFERENCE: DBA-12821 (25 June 62)

1. OKENVY reports that they were advised by Identity A that his associate, Identity B would be visiting Djakarta in mid-July and that probably he (Identity A) would be summoned by General Jani in the near future to assist in procurement activities for the military.

2. Identity A expressed himself as being willing at the same time to serve ODYOKE without remuneration, on a confidential basis or otherwise, if his services can be of assistance.

3. Identity A has done some dickering with the local attache regarding aeronautical spare parts for which export permits have been difficult to obtain, claiming that he would have no difficulty in obtaining permits if the parts were purchased through his organisation.

4. Identity B has also been in contact with another ODYOKE component since January 62 and therefore cannot be approached by KUBARK.

Attachments:
Idens U.S.C. True Name Pouch
Distributions:
2-Djakarta
23 July 1962

CHESTER D. DALFOLD
FORWARDED herewith

201-41581
DATE TYPED: 23 July 62
DATE DISPATCHED: 27 JUL 1962
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: FEDH-5498
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: -41581
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
ORIGINATING: FE/PIA/ Dexter E. Kelpe
COORDINATING: jdk 5503

FILE: FE/PIA
ROUTING:
RID/AN RBH
ATD/ZIS 
E/PLANT
DESTROY

IDENTITIES U.S.C.
TRUE NAME POUCH Att. to
FHDH-5498

IDENTITY A: Irving Davidson, Public Relations, 1612 K St., F.W.
IDENTITY B: Paul Pesik, formerly employed by the Indonesian Embassy, Washington.

SECRET ES COPY
201-41581
104-10216-10073
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
DISPATCH
Chief of Station, Quito
Chief of Base, Quayaquil
Chief, WH
S-E-C-R-E-T
Report of PBPRIME Citizen on Connections with Ecuadorean Government

Please comment on Subject and his statements

1. The following paragraphs are quoted from an ODENVY report resulting from an interview with Identity. The addressees are requested to comment on the Subject's statements and to send to Headquarters information concerning the Subject's activities in Ecuador bearing on his statements.

A. On August 29, 1960, Identity was interviewed by ODENVY at his request. Identity related that he had just returned from a trip to Ecuador where he had been offered a job to represent that country as an agent in PBPRIME and he was seriously considering this offer. While in Ecuador, he had conferred with four individuals who he believed would run the new government which was to be sworn into office on August 31, 1960. These persons were identified as follows: Jaime Nebot Velasco, Minister of Development, Pedro J. Menendez Gilbert, Mayor of Guayaquil, Ecuador; Luis Noboa, an Ecuadorean businessman; and Enrique Ponce Luque, a Senator and partner of Noboa.

B. According to Identity, the now president of Ecuador, Jose Haria Velasco Ibarra, has been elected to that office for the fourth time and is an aged person. The above-listed individuals will control and operate the Covernment of Ecuador with the approval of Ibarra. As a result of his conferring with the above persons, Identity expressed the belief that Nabot will be the strong in the government. He described these individuals as patriotic with a sincere desire to better the plight of the common man in Ecuador. Identity stated that all of them are definitely pro-PBPRIME and Nebot said that all Identity has to do is tell him what PBPRIME

UNDER SEPARATE COVER

Distributions
2- Quito
1 - Guayaquil

S-E-C-R-E-T
5 Oct 1960
16 OCT 1960
HECH-2393
01-41581
HEMendenhall
sel
3847
ASWisniowski?).

5 OCT
1960
S. M. TERRELL
CONTINUED

desires and the Ecuadorean Goverment will do its best to cooperate with FBPRIME.

C. Identity ese also told thet the Covernment of Ecuador has commenced negotiations with an electronics firma in Dallas, Texas, believed by Identity to be the Continental Electronice Company, for the construction of a 50,000 kilowatt radio station in Guayaquil. This station will be used to combat antigovernment propaganda bemmed into Ecuador from Cuba. Nebot felt that FERIME could make use of this radio station. Identity told Nebot that he believed this could be arranged.

D. It is the opinion of Identity that this is a golden opportunity for PBPRIME to commence cooperation with a new government in a pro-PBPRIME country. He stated that the Ecuadorean Goverment would be most willing for KUBARK to utilize the above radio station; however, it would necessi tate KURARE's paying half of the expenses for its construction. Identity was advised that the information he had given ODENVY would be furnished to KUBARK pursuant to his request. Ha desired to be contacted within a period of ten days if KUBARK is interested in the information he had to offer. Eo further action concerning this matter will be undertaken by ODENVY.

2. ODENVY has previously reported at length on the Identity, a public relations counsel. Identity registered as a purchasing agent for various bureaus of the Republic of Nicaragus on 15 April 1955, on 22 July 1958, he registered as an agent of the Israeli Military Industries, which was controlled by the government of Israel.

3. The Identity appears to be an international businessman with special interest in Latin American Countries. He has previously frequently contacted PBPRIME agencies on subjects be thought appropriate to bring to their atten-tion. A cursory check of his 201 file revealed no derogatory information. Further information can be supplied if the field so requests.

END OF DISPATCH
104-10216-10075

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

TO: Chief of Station, Manila
FROM: Chief, Far East Division
SUBJECT: I. IRVING DAVIDSON
ACTION REQUIRED: None
REFERENCES: FPA-6470, 13 May 1958, Transmittal of MTRAVELIN Tap Transcripts

1. The information obtained in the name check of DAVIDSON reveals that Subject is an aggressive international businessman who would possibly participate in any business proposition for a commission; however, when negotiating with representatives of other countries, Subject usually protects himself by reporting the business proposition to a U.S. Government agency or official. The name check reveals that the relationship between Drew Pearson and MIRAVELIN may have resulted from Subject's personal contact with both men. The information re MIRA ELIN may have reached Pearson through Subject's office associates.

2. The following are the details of the check on Subjects:

a. Subject, a U.S. citizen, born 19 January 1921, is married and maintains his residence and office in Washington, D.C. As reported by KUJUAP, 8 November 1955, Subject shared his office suite in the Hyatt Building with James Farriss, a former ODACID employee, and Jack Northan Anderson and Frederick G. Blumenthal, Washington representatives of PARADE magazine. Frederick G. Blumenthal is a former Drew Pearson leg-man while Anderson continues to work for Pearson.

b. An ODENVY report dated 6 November 1957, stated that Subject filed a registration statement, No. 836, 18 April 1955, with the Foreign Agents Registration Section, Department of Justice. Subject listed as his foreign principal President A. Somosa, Republic of Nicaragua. The nature and purpose of his representing the foreign principal was given as purchasing agent for various bureaus of the Republic of Nicaragua, including the military forces. He also stated that he dealt in general public relations and was self-employed. Another ODENVY report of 18 June 1957 stated that Subject listed his occupation as a Public Relations Counsel and Business Consultant in a report to a local credit bureau. The report indicated that Subject previously spent some time in Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic and is well acquainted with various business and government officials in the above-mentioned locations.

c. On several occasions in the past Subject volunteered information to various government agencies and offered his assistance to the U.S. Government. In an ODENVY report dated 15 September 1950, Subject advised that through a friend, Max Henriquez, who Subject claimed to be a representative for the Dominican Republic to the United Nations, Subject had become acquainted with Vincente Toledano, and was sufficiently close to him to obtain important information concerning activities of the Communist Party in Mexico. Subject offered his assistance to the U.S. Government in this matter. According to a KUJUEP report, submitted by the Office of International Trade, dated 1953, Subject furnished information regarding travel in 1950 between Mexico and the USSR and information on trans-shipments through Mexico.

A Memorandum of 8 November 1955, reported that Subject had approached a KUARK representative on 30 September 1955, at which time he requested guidance and possible financial assistance for a proposed business arrangement with Peter UTHALUNEC, former Yugoslav Assistant Military Attache in Washington, and now Chief of the Foreign Division of PUTNIK, a travel and tourist agency. The proposed business partnership was for the purpose of opening a PUTNIK travel agency in New York City. Subject had not been 1.meested in participating in the travel ani tourist agency in New York City but had suggested to the Yugoslavs that he would act as their public relations expert and publicize Yugoslavia's tourist attractions throughout the U.S. Subject stated he had initially contacted KUBARK for the purpose of obtaining financial backing in exchange for any information that he might be able to obtain through his contacts with the Yugoslavs. Subject was informed by KUPARK representative that KUBARK would neither give him financial assistance nor influence in any way his personal decision in the matter.

d. Also the files reflect that Subject has had contacts with other purchasing agents for foreign countries: In MANA 2217, 19 March 1957, Subject and Isaac Cohen, Israeli purchasing agent in New York, visited icaragua ostensibly to discuss the purchase of Israeli corvettes by the Nicaraguan Government. An ODENVY report dated 31 March 1958, from. a confidential source, stated one Fan Cummings, an international arms dealer, presently has a quantity of guns in bond in the "free trade zone", New York City, and Subject and James Farriss had been attempting to locate buyers for these guns. An ODENVY report dated 31 March 1958,. stated that Abdul Rachman SURIOKUSUD, jakarta, Indonesia, connected with the Indonesian Police Force, had been in the U.S. in the early part of 1956 seeking arms for Indonesia. Due to U.S. regulations, he was unable to obtain arus. At this time Subject interested SURLOKUSURED in purchasing arms from the Dominican Republic. According to source, Subject and SURIOKUSUMO made a trip to the Dominican Republic in June 1956 accompanied by a U.S. arms expert and Enrique Garcia, Jr. who had claimed to be a personal friend of Gen. Rafael L. Trujillo of the Dominican Republic and who is registered with the Foreign Agents Registration Section, listing his foreign principal as the Dominican Republic. It was reported in HMA 0923, 6 August 1956, that Subject had written a letter to the U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua in which he stated the purpose of his recent trip and informed the Ambassador that "other reds were attempting to undercut the arms price as quoted by the Dominican Republic. As reported in ODACID on 6 May 1958, Subject, as representative of the Government of Nicaragua, last year purchased 73 Staghound armored cars from Israel for the GON and also negotiated the subsequent sale of 30 of these vehicles to Cuba. Recently Subject approached U.S. officials in Nicaragua re disposal of 20 of these vehicles to the Quatamalan Government.

e. The only reference to MIRAVELIN reflected in this name check was a KUJUMP report dated 22 April 1957 which stated that a letter, found by a law enforcement officer in February 1957 among MIRAVELIN'S personal effects, seemed to imply that a joint effort was being made by MIRA ELIN and the late Nicaraguan president SOMOZA to open a casino in Nicaragua. This letter dated 27 August 1956 was written on the letterhead of the Nicaraguan Government Agency, Suite 1224, Wyatt Building, Washington, D.C., I. Irving Davidson, 0.5. representative, and stated: "Enclosed are Ex-In bank particulars you asked for. Sam Waugh will cooperate with us 100%. Be sure that Pres. Somoza and only Pres. Somosa designates you 50% partner in the casino. You don't need any partner for the hotel end of the deal at all. You don't want one either. I am sure Pres. Somoza won't care about this. Don't hesitate to ask Somosa anything about anything. I already talked with him and told him that I hope that you would take over this project

with your group and experience. I will then know that Nicaragua will have the nicest, best operated facility in the hemisphere. Give my best regards to Pres. Somoza when you see him. If you don't see him for any reason, you don't have a deal regardless what papers you see or whoever else you may meet. Somoza is a regular guy and our kind of people. He has also been helpful to our people on the other side. Your boy, Irv Davidson."

3. This information has not been cleared for passage to our liaison services.

CHESTER D. DALI

6 October 1958

Distributions:
3 - COS, Manila
1 - RI
1 - FE/PSH
14-00000

104-10216-10148 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING

ACTION

INFO

TO Chief, Special Affairs Staff

FROM Chief of Station, JEWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/Operational Transmittal of Operational Plan for ANTRUNK VII

ACTION REQUIRED: Request Approval

REFERENCES:
A. UFGA-8312, ANTRUNK Op Plan, 1 June 1963
B. UFGA-10436, Amendment of ANTRUNK Op Plan, 31 July 1963
C. UFGA-10933, Op Plan ANTRUNK V, 31 Aug 1963
D. UFGA-12725, Op Plan ANTRUNK VI, 27 Nov 1963
E. UFGA-13138, Amendment to ANTRUNK VI Op Plan, 18 December 1963

Transmitted for approval herewith is the operational plan for ANTRUNK VII. The ANTRUNK team is scheduled for infiltration ca 7 February and for exfiltration 17 February. A live-man team with intermediate Craft will be infiltrated into Northern Matanzas Province from which point the team leader, AMICE-14, and ANTRUNK-13 will proceed into Havana to accomplish the MHAPRON objectives of this operation. Approval to requested at the earliest possible time.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment: Op Plan (3 cys) - E/U

Distribution: S-C/DAS w/atto.

REFERENCE TO
DISPATCH

DATE TYPED 28 Jan 64

DESCON SYMBOL AND NUMBER BFGM-13707

HEADQUARTER FILE NUMBER 18-6-64/1

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

14-00000

NIDA

OPERATIONAL PLAN

DESENSITIZED

CRYPTONYM
ANTRUNK VII

2. REFERENCES

A. UFGA-9312, AMTRUNK Operational Plan, 1 June 1963

B. UFGA-10436, Amendment of AMTRUNK Operational Plan, 31 July 1963

C. UFGA-10933, Operational Plan - ANTRUNK V, 31 August 1963

D. UFGA-12725, Operational Plan ANTRUNK VI, 27 November 1963

E. UFGA-13138, Amendment to ANTRUNK VI Operational Plan, 18 December 1963

3. BACKGROUND

Operation ANTRUNK III/IV which was mounted in August 1963 was successful in that the two principals of the team, AMICE-27 and AMICE-14, were able to contact and to recruit two principal agents and several other action agents to lay the groundwork for the MHAPRON objectives of the AMTRUNK operation. One of the two internal P/A's, AMTRUNK-9, was exfiltrated with the four-man ANTRUNK infiltration team for training and operational discussions in the JUWAVE area. In early September, AMTRUNK-9 was re-infiltrated into PBRUMEN in Operation ANTRUNK V, the same operation which exfiltrated AMFAUNAS -1, -3, -13 and -34. In late October AMICE-27 was separated from the clandestine part of the ANTRUNK operation. The original objectives of Operation ANTRUNK VI, postponed from December 1963 to January 1964, were to revitalize and re-direct the efforts of the two internal P/A's toward their primary task, i.e. to spot and recruit among high level figures who are dissatisfied with the Castro regime. In late December, the scope of this mission was altered by the receipt of a commercial telegram in open code from AMTRUNK-9 indicating that he was in grave danger and wished to be exfiltrated. The twin objectives of Operation ANTRUNK VI then became: first, to exfiltrate ANTRUNK-9 and, this accomplished, for AMICE-14 to proceed to Havana for his task of re-channelling AMTRUNK-10's responsibilities. The exfiltration of ANTRUNK-9, who brought with him his entire family consisting of wife, brother-in-law, and three small children, was accomplished on 9 January 1964. The unexpected presence of AMTRUNK-9's family, coupled with reports of increased vigilance in the infiltration area, forced AMICE-14 to exfiltrate the same night without attempting to accomplish the second part of his mission.

SECRET

14-00000
-2-

RYBAT
CLOCRONIZED

4. OBJECTIVES

A. To re-establish personal contact with ANTRUNK-10 and to secure his full cooperation in spotting dissidents within the higher levels of the military for the purpose of organizing a conspiracy against Fidel Castro.

B. To obtain from ANTRUNK-10 operational information on other MHAPRON recruitment targets.

C. To attempt the recruitment of FAR Captain and Cubana pilot Jose Alberto SEMIDEY Isalgue, a frequent personal pilot for Fidel and Raul Castro and an influential figure in civilian and military aviation.

D. Through the ANTRUNK ratline, to transport to Havana and cache a clandestine radio set for the future use of an infiltrated AMTRUNK radio operator. At the same time, to explore with ANTRUNK-10 and other internal contacts the possibility of safehousing and supporting a radio operator in Havana.

5. TASKS

A. The AMTRUNK Intermediate Craft will be towed by the KUBARK mother craft to the DRP at coordinates 221668, AMS Sheet 4085 IV (23° 14' 00" N and 80° 47' 00" W, H. O. 2624).

B. The AMTRUNK IC will then proceed to the vicinity of coordinates 133511, AMS 4085 III. At this point, AMICE-14 and/or ANTRUNK-7 will make contact with either Oscar DIAZ Jabiela-Garcia or his son Antonio DIAZ Torres in Casualidad (17654795, AMS 4085 III). These two individuals are knowledgeable of the fact that the AMTRUNKS may return to the infiltration area although they do not know even the approximate date. Oscar DIAZ and his son Antonio are prepared to activate the ratline consisting of three different taxis, to move AMICE-14 and AMTRUNK-13 into the Havana area. ANTRUNK-7 and -16, the team guides, and AMAGREE-1, the radio operator, will remain with the IC in the mangroves in the vicinity of the infiltration area until the return of AMICE-14 and ANTRUNK-13.

C. Once in Havana, AMICE-14 and ANTRUNK-13 intend to split up and seek refuge in different safehouses. They will maintain contact with each other, however.

D. AMICE-14's primary task vis-a-vis ANTRUNK-10 is to cement the recruitment of AMTRUNK-10 and to obtain his full cooperation to work toward MHAPRON objectives. In addition, AMICE-14 will teach AMTRUNK-10 an OWVL system and leave a receiver with ANTRUNK-10. AMICE-14 also intends to give ANTRUNK-10 a review

SECRET DESENSITIZED
RYBAT

14-00000

SECRET RYBAT
-3-

in the principles of secret writing.

E. Secondary tasks to be accomplished with ANTRUNK-10 are:

(1) To debrief him on his activities since AMICE-14 recruited him in August 1963.

(2) To collect operational information on other possible recruitment targets

(3) To explore the possibilities of accommodating and supporting an infiltrated radio operator.

F. ANTRUNK-13 will attempt the recruitment of Jose Alberto SEMIDEY Isalgue, a close friend of ANTRUNK-13's for 18 years and a first cousin of AMICE-14. The following is a short biographical sketch of SEMIDEY:

Age 37-38 years old. Born in Matanzas, the son of Brig. Gen. Jose SEMIDEY, ex-Comptroller of the National Army and veteran of the Spanish-American War. SEMIDEY studied for one year at Purdue University, Indiana. He and AMTRUNK-13 graduated from the second class of ANACRA Pilot Training School in 1942. SEMIDEY flew for Expreso Aereo Inter-Americano and Cuba Aeropostal for about 11 years before he became Interventor or Administrator for the latter company after the Revolution. After Cuba Aeropostal was absorbed into Cubana, SEMIDEY held various positions of importance in Cubana. He also holds the rank of Captain in the Rebel Air Force and reportedly has made reconnaissance flights and black flights carrying arms and/or agents to and from other Latin American countries. SEMIDEY has a close friendship with Victor PINA Cardoso, the Director of Civil Aviation, and is reportedly close to Raul CASTRO for whom he is a frequent personal pilot. Because of the close former friendship between ANTRUNK-13 and SEMIDEY and because of reports from AMICE-14's family which indicate that SEMIDEY has become disenchanted with the Castro regime, both AMTRUNK-13 and AMICE-14 consider SEMIDEY a prime candidate for recruitment.

G. If SEMIDEY should be out of the country on a flying trip at the time of infiltration, ANTRUNK-13 will attempt to set up contact with Commandante Rene de los SANTOS Ponce, who is reportedly stationed in Las Villas Province with a unit of "Lucha Contra Bandidos", an anti-counterrevolutionary force. ANTRUNK-13 and de los SANTOS are friends from boyhood and, for a period of 6 or 7 years, de los SANTOS worked as an apprentice plumber for ANTRUNK-13's

SECRET DESENSITIZED
DVRAT

14-00000

SECRET
-4-

RYBi..
DESENSITIZED

father and lived in their home. ANTRUNK-13 and de los SANTOS also worked together in the 26th of July underground in Havana.

H. To return through the ratline to the infil/exfil area. Recognition signals will be established with ANTRUNK-7 and -16 and AMAGREE-l who will be waiting with the IC in the mangroves in the vicinity of the lagoon at coordinates 129498, AMS 4085 III.

6. TIMETABLE

The scheduled date for the infiltration of the AMTRUNK team at the DRP is 2200 hours, 7 February 1964. The exfiltration of the five team members with the ANTRUNK IC and rendezvous with the mother craft at the DPP is 2355 hours, 17 February, with an alternate on 18 February. If exfiltration is not successful on either of these dates, the radio operator will be in contact with the base and contingent plans for exfiltration can be set up through this medium.

74 AMTRUNK PERSONNEL

A. See references for biographical information on AMICE-14 and ANTRUNK-7.

B. ANTRUNK-13

ANTRINK-13 is a 42-year-old Cuban citizen who has been a commercial airline pilot for most of his life. He is a high school graduate. In early 1959, AMTRUNK-13 was named Interventor of "Aerovias Q", one of the major Cuban airlines. He defected in December 1960 while still in that post. He is a native of Havana who was active in the 26th of July underground in that city from early 1957. While later in exile in the United States, AMTRUNK-13 made two clandestine flights into the Sierra Maestras during the war against Batista, the last bringing Provisional President Manuel URRUTIA Lleo from Venezuela for his first meeting with Fidel Castro in December 1958.

C. AMAGREE-1, Radio Operator

AMAGREE-1 is a 33-year-old Cuban citizen who has two-college degrees, in education and in journalism. He is native to the province in which the infil/exfil area is located. Until his departure from Cuba in August 1961, AMAGREE-1 was a municipal official in Matanzas Province and was active in the propaganda section of the 30th of November Movement. AMAGREE-1 began his association with KUBARK in April 1963 as a radio operator trainee. As in the case of ANTRUNK-13, this is his first operational mission.

SECREENSITIZED
OUDAT

14-00000

D. ANTRUNK-16, Guide

- 5-
RYB
CEDENSITIZED

AMTRUNK-16 is a 41-year-old single Cuban citizen who, as a commercial fisherman, lived and worked in the infil/ exfil area all of his life. He participated in Operation ANTRUNK VI in December 1963 and his up-to-date knowledge of the infil/exfil area from which he fled in late October 1963, proved invaluable on this mission. While he was still in Cuba, ANTRUNK-16 was a trusted contact for the AMTRUNKS on both Operation III/IV and V.

8. COMMUNICATIONS

A. Primary.

RS-501 with special signal plan with continuous guard. channel. This equipment will remain with the ANTRUNK IC and will not be carried into Havana.

B. Alternates.

(1) OWVL

AMICE-14 will carry a RR-44 receiver with appropriate signal plan on the trip into Havana.

(2) AMICE-14, ANTRUNK-13 and AMAGREE-1 will all have in their possession a S/W system with indicators, materials and accommodation addresses in the JMWAVE area.

C. Case Officer Challenge

To be used to determine whether or not the radio operator, AMAGREE-1, is being controlled by a hostile force. C/O: "Diganos si los barcos de patrulla estar equipados con radar y armas pesadas". ("Tell us if the patrol boats are equipped with radar and heavy armament"). Radio Operator, if free from hostile control, will reply: "En Cuba no hay culebras venenosas". (In Cuba there are no poisonous snakes). Any other response to this question which the radio operator might give would indicate hostile control.

9. COVER

The entire infil/exfiltration using the IC will be black: During the trip to Havana, AMICE-14 and ANTRUNK-13 will devise their own cover stories to fit the individual situation, All five agents will be provided with false documentation.

SECRET
KYBAT DESENSITIZED

14-00000

10. FINANCES

SECRET
RYBAL .-6- DESENSITIZED

The team will carry D5,500.00 of which D1,500.00 will remain with the personnel in the IC. AMICE-14 and AMTRUNK-13 will each take 22,000.00 into Havana.

11. CO TROL

Control over the five members of the ANTRUNK team takes the form of providing or denying them the wherewithal, both financial and material, to engage in clandestine operations against the Castro regime.

12. COMMITMENTS

No commitments have been made to any member of the team other than a broad commitment to continue to pay their salaries in the event they are captured and to continue to provide support to their families for a reasonable period of time in the event of their death.

13. SECURITY

Both AMICE-14 and AMAGREE-1 have bean granted OA's. The other three team members, AMTRUNK-7, -13 and -16, have been granted POA's. All five have been LCFLUTTERed.

14. TRAINING

A. AMICE-14

The earlier training of AMICE-14 has been supplemented with three additional weeks of tradecraft training and he has since received review training in weapons firing, maritime, OWVL and S/W.

B. ANTRUNK-13

Prior to dispatch of Operation ANTRUNK VII, ANTRUNK-13 will have received the following training:

(1) Three weeks of tradecraft training

(2) One week of maritime training

(3) One week of survival training

(4) One week of PM training accenting map and compass and weapons firing

(5) Three half-day sessions in S/W

SECRET
DESENSITE
DVDAT

14-00000

SECRET DVR
-7-
SENSITIZED

C. AMAGREE-1

AMAGREE-1 has received the same training as ANTRUNK-13 above plus basic radio operator training which included the use of medium speed communications gear. AMAGRRE-1. prior to dispatch time, will have received training in a special signal plan with continuous guard channel.

D. ANTRUNK-7

Since AMTRUNK-7's primary function on the AMTRUNK team is as a coastal guide, his formal training has been necessarily limited. He has received extensive maritime and weapons training and three days of instruction in basic tradecraft principles.

E. ANTRUNK-16:

This agent's function on the ANTRUNK team is similar to that of AMTRUNK-7. He will have received PM and maritime training prior to dispatch.

15. DAMAGE REPORT

See Attachment A

16. EQUIPMENT LIST

See Attachment B

SECRET
AITIZED
DVRAT

14-00000

SECRET RYCE ATTACHMENT A
DESENSITIZED
DAMAGE REPORT

A. The damage report for AMICE-14 and AMTRUNK-7 remains the same as was transmitted in Attachment A to Reference D with the addition of Rudolph W. SOSPINE as "Jack".

B. Safehouses and Training Areas Exposed to ANTRUNK-13:

Safehouse #216
Maritime Training Site
Firing Range
Survival Training Site

C. KUBARK Personnel Exposed to ANTRUNK-13:

Irving N. PEGGINS as "Joe Webster"
Reuben A. HANNULA as "Fred Folsom"
Rudolph W. SOSPINE as "Jack"
Andrew S. PARMERS as "Angel Martin", training instructor
Stuart V. KAPRIDNO as "Dewey"
Alton T. PIRNACK as "Larry"
Fletcher K. THENE as "Harry"
Paul V. MENDECINO as "Ted"
Wilfred R. KNEAFSY as "Pete"
Floyd H. RUSANOSKI as "Jack"
Keith D. WINETT as "Jim"
Paul I. NAPOLILLI as "Paul" LCFLUTTER operator

D. Agent Personnel Exposed to ANTRUNK-13:

AMICE-27 by true name
AMICE-14 by true name
AMAGREE-l as "Mario Ramirez"
AKAKA-1 as "Antonio Garcia"
AMTRUNK-7 as "Carlos Menendez"
AMTRUNK-8 as "Tomas Rodriguez"
ANTRUNK-9 as "Jose Lopez"
AMTRUNK-16 as "Juan Gonzalez"
AMPAL-1 as "Joe"
AMSKILL-1 by training alias
AMSWING-2 by training alias
Captain and Crew of "NEPTUNE"

E. Safehouses and Training Areas Exposed to AMAGRKE-1

Safehouse #174
Safehouse #216
Maritime training site
Survival training site
Firing range

SECRET
POSITIZED
AIMIT

14-00000

SECRET
-2-

RYBA.
DESENS

F. KUBARK Personnel Exposed to AMAGREE-1:

Irving N. PEGGINS as "Joe Webster"
Reuben A. HANNULA as "Fred"
Rudolph W. SOSPINE as "Jack"
Andrew S. PARMERS as "Angel Martin" training instructor
Daniel V. GUSSOW as "B111"
Humphrey O. EDDERY as "Ski"
Stuart V. KAPRIDNO as "Dewey"
Alton T. PIRNACK as "Larry"
Fletcher K. THENE as "Harry"
Paul V. MENDECINO as "Ted"
Wilfred R. KNEAFSY as "Pete"
Floyd H. RUSANOWSKI as "Jack"
Paul I. NAPOLILLI as "Paul" LCFLUTTER operator

G. Agent Personnel Exposed to AMAGREE-1:

AMPANIC-14 as "Enrique" training instructor
!AMPAL-1 as "Joe" training instructor
AMSKILL-1 by training alias
training instructor
ANSWING-2
AMLABEL-1 as "Terry"
AMTRUNK-7 as "Carlos Menendez,
AMTRUNK-8 as "Tomas Rodriguez,
ANTRUNK-9 as "Jose Lopez"
AMTRUNK-16 as "Juan Gonzalez"
ANSONIC-las "Juan Sanchez"
AMHINT-48 as "Paco Gonzalez"
AMLITAINT-1 by true name
AMICE-14
AMAKA-1
Captain and Crew of "NEPTUNE"

H. Safehouses and Training Areas Exposed to ANTRUNK-16:

Safehouse #104
Safehouse #216
Maritime Training Site
Firing Range

I. KUBARK Personnel Exposed to ANTRUNK-16:

Irving N. PEGGINS as "Joe"
Reuben A. HANNULA as "Fred"
Stuart V. KAPRIDNO as "Dewey" training instructor
Alton T. PIRNACK as "Larry"
Wilfred F. KNEAFSY as "Pete"
Keith D. WINETT as "Bill" LCFLUTTER operator

SECRET
DESENSITIZED
RYRAT

14-00000

SECRET
- 3-
MAT
DECENSITIZE

J. Agent Personnel Exposed to AMTRUNK-16:

AMICE-14 by true first name and training alias
AMTRUNK-7 by true name
AMTRUNK-8 by true name
AMTRUNK-9 as "Jose Lopez"
AMTRUNK-13 as "Maximo"
AMAGREE-1 as "Mario"
AMAKA-1 as "Antonio"
AMLABEL-1 as "Terry"
Captain and Crew of "NEPTUNE"

SECRET
DESENSITIZED
DVDAT

14-00000

SECRET
RYBAT ATTACHMENT B

DESENSITIZER
EQUIPMENT LIST

Five-man infiltration team (2 infiltrees, 2 guides and radop)

A. Material to be Cached:

B.
4.
1 RT-48 Medium Speed Communications Gear

Personal Weapons and Equipment

1. 5 Belgian Browning 9 mm. Pistols
2.2 K-3 SMGs
3. 2 FAL 7.62 Automatic Rifles
4.200 Rounds 9 mm. Ammo
5. 400 Rounds 45 Cal Ammo
6. 300 Rounds 7.62 Ammo
7. 12 Magazines for 9 mm. Ammo
8. 10 Magazines for 45 Cal Ammo
9.15 Magazines for 7.62 Anno
10. 2 Sten Ammo Carriers
11. 2 BAR Ammo Carriers
12. 5 Ρίstol Belts
13.5 Belt Holsters for 9 mm. Pistols
14. 5 Pr. Suspenders
15. 4 Canteens w/cup and cover
16. 1 Entrenching Tool

::
17. 1 Machete w/scabbard
18.3 Trench or Bowie Knives v/scabbarde
19. 1 Pr. Binoculars
20. 5 Silva Compasses

SECRET
DESENSITIZED

14-00000

SECRET
-2-

IBAT
DESENSITIZED

21. 5 UDT-type Watches

22. 5 Plastic Waterproof Flashlights

23. 5 Backpacks

24. 20 Waterproof Bags

25. 5 Swiss Pocket Knives

28. 5 Zippo Lighters

27. 2 Ketascopes

28. 5 Penlights
брег
29. 10 Plastic or Rubber End Caps for 45 Cal SMO Magazines

30. 8 Hand Grenades

C. Rations

1. 12 Black Concentrated Rations

t
2. : 20 C-Rations (1 box - 3 meais)

3. Assorted Cans Fruit, Meat, Beans, eto,

4. Assorted Packages Rice, Dry Beans, Coffee, etc.

5. 100 Bouillon Cubes

6. 6 Packages Tropical Chocolate Bars

D. Medical Supplies
2

1. 1 Corpsman's First Aid Kit with Morphine Syrettes and Codeine (in metal container)

2. 5 Individual First Aid Kits

3. 100 Coricidin Pills

4. 100 APC Tablets

5. 100 Water Purification Tablets

6. 100 Vitamin Tablets

7. 100 Acromycin Tablets

SECRET DESENSITIZED
RYRAL

14-00000

BAT
-3-
DECENSITIZED

E. Clothing

1. 5 Sets Fatigue Uniforms, HBT Shirts and Trousers

2. 5 Fatigue Caps

3. 5 Civilian Sport Shirts

4. 5 Prs Civilian Trousers

5. 5 Pr. Civilian Shoes

6..5 Pr. Jump Boots

7. 5 Leather Belts

8. 15 T-Shirts

9. 15 Pr. Undershorts

10.. 15 Pr. Socks

11.5 Pr. Light Gloves

12. 5 Sets Foul Weather Rubber Vatforms

13. 5 Berets

14. 5 Green Ponchos

15. 5 Pr. Insulated Underwear

16. 5 Field Jackets

F. Communications Gear

1.
1 RR-44 Receiver (for OWVL)
2. 1 RS-501 w/Signal Plan (continuous guard channel)

G. Secret Writing Materials

1.
3 Sets S/W Materials with Extra Carbons and Extra Vials of Developer Pills

H. Intermediate Craft

1.. 16' 7" Boston Whaler, "Currituck" Model, Painted Dark Green, Outfitted with Wide-Angle Towing Rig

SECRET
DESENSITIZED
RYBAT

14-00000

SPCRET
4-
RYBAI
DESLISTIZED

2. 2 75 hp Commercial Outboards w/Tool Kit

3. 7 Fiberglass Outboard Fuel Tanks, Capacity 13 Gal. Each
:
6 Horizontal Tanks, Size. 114 x 26 x 12"
1 Vertical Tank, Size 134 x 260 x 10"

4. 5 Flotation Cushions

5. 2 Air Mattresses

6. Extra Propellers and Drive, Shear and Cotter Pins for both Commercial Outboards

7. 5 Black UDT-type Life Preservers

8. 1 Fire Extinguisher (for Gasoline Fires)
2

9.1 12-1b. Anchor

10. 2 Hoses for Transferring Fuel from One Tank to Another (or 3 feet of 3/4 inch Plastic Tubing)

11. 2 Oars, Length 10 feet

12.2 Wooden Push Poles, Length 12 feet, Diameter 21"

18. 1 Plastic Bailing Bucket, 1 foot deep

14. 2 5-Gallon Plastic Jerrycans (for water)

15. 8 Extra Spark Plugs (4) for each Commercial Outboard)

16. 3 Rolls, Non-Shiny Plastic Tape

17. 50 ft. inch Nylon Rope

18. 200 ft. Parachute Cord

19. 1 Small Hammer

20.1 Pr. Pliers

21. 1 Screwdriver

22. 1 Spark Plug Wrench

23. 2 Upright Poles, 33 feet in Length, w/Oarlocks

SECRET
BIMAT
:

14-00000
SECRET
٠٢١٧٥٠٢
...
-5-
24. 1 Ritchie Compass

25. 1 Sheet Camouflage Material, 20' x 10'
26. 1 RB 9.6
27. 1 HRT-7 Beacon
I. Maps
Maritime Charts

2 H.O. 1002
2 H.O. 2624
2 Η.Ο. 0944
Series E723, 3-AMS, 1:50,000
2 ea. Sheets 4085 I 4085 IV
4085 II 4085 III
4084 I 4084 IV
DESENSITIZED
J. Miscellaneous

1. Cleaning Gear for 9 mm Pistol, 4-3 SMG and PAL including RIG Gun Grease

2. 200 ft. Parachute Cord

3. Box of Matches and Waterproof Containers for same

4. 12 Polyethylene Bags
4--Large Enough to Contain FAL
4--Large Enough to Contain Assembled M-3
4 18" Size for Personal Documents, etc.

5. 2 Sheets Infra-Red Paper, 18" x 24"
6. 1 Dynalite
7. 14 Extra Flashlight Batteries

8. 4 Flashlight Bulbs

9. 8 Extra Penlight Batteries

SECRET
DESENSITIZED

14-00000

SECRET
-6-

"BAT
DESENSITIZED

10. 4 Packs Lighter Flints

11. 4 Cans Lighter Fluid

12. 1 Set Parallel Rulers

13. 1 Set Dividers

14. 2 Protractors, Metal

15. 2 Pocket Rulers, Metal

16. 1 Flat Mill File

17. 1 Pocket Carborundum Stone

18. 1 One-Burner Gas Stove--Butane Gas or Similar Type--w/Extra Cylinders of Gas

19. 1 Cooking Pot (at least 8" in Diameter)

20. 5 Knife-Fork-Spoon Sets

21. 2 Messkits

22. Box of Insect Repellent, 48 Small Plastic Bottles

23. 6 Cans Spray Paint, Black

24. 1 Can Saddle Scap
:
25. 1 Package of Sponges

26. Toilet Paper

27. Hand Soap and Detergent

28. Paper Plates

29. Plastic Spoons
Assorted Fishhooks and Line
30.
31. 8 Burlap Bags
i
32. Assorted Empty Cardboard Boxes

SECREENSITIZED
AUDA
104-10216-10159
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

UNCLASSIFIED
ERNAL
ONLY
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

EXTENSION NO
C/TSD/EB
DATE
24 June 1964
TO: (Officer designation, room sumber, ond
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a kne across columa after each comment.)
RECEIVED
FORWARDED

1. C/WH/SA/MOB/PM Bushnell 1.3 X
GH4408 Hdqrs.  phantom scopes are
Made

2. NA/21/30/NS  d's in Joyan-
W w/w distributin

3. Wrt/SA/608/Warncought wil han English rackning

4. dotti

5. leh: 2 hase
tockho
6. loger then for
your utention.

7.
file AMCHINI
8. seems like a foche jabo
tus.
9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.
FORM
3-62
610
USE PREVICUS
EDITIONS
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

SECRET

24 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/WH/SA/MOB/PM

SUBJECT : Improved Sight for 7.62 Belgium (FAL) Rifle

REFERENCE : a) Memo for the Rcd. dated 25 May 64,
Subject: "FAL Silencer/Sights", from
C/WH/SA/MOB/PM

1. In accordance with reference a) the following material
is provided:

a) Three open rear sight hoods for the subject rifle.
b) Three copies of instructions for installing the
sight and zeroing the rifle.
c) Three tool kits containing an adjustment screw
driver and two files.
d) 400 rounds of improved underloaded ammunition with
cream of wheat filler. (Boxes marked with red strip.
These should be substituted for the rounds already
delivered).

2. It must be understood that the limited time available
would not permit more that cursory acceptance testing and the
superiority of this sight over the standard unit has not been
definitely established.

3. The scope and mount requested in reference a) proved
to be an unfeasible development in the time available. A mount
could not be devised which was interchangeable with any FAL
without extensive modification to the weapon.

4. For additional information regarding this matter con-
tact D. J. Hogan or D. R. Dunn on extension 3319.

WALTER L. ERHARDT
Chief
TSD/Engineering Branch

Attachments: As Stated

Distribution:
1- Addressee
1- TSD/SDB
1 - C/TSD
1 EB-81J

SECRET
631
Exchased tres reteafle

14-00000

SNAP-ON SIGHT HOOD FOR
THE 7.62 BELGIUM (FAL) RIFLE

1. The sight hood snaps over the existing rear sight on
the 7.62 Belgium (FAL) rifle. It is designed to raise the rear
sight to compensate for the more curving trajectory of the under-
loaded ammunition and is an open sight for increased night sighting
capability.

2. The sight hood is oriented with the three screws facing
the muzzle end of the rifle (See attached drawings). Press
down on the hood until the ball detent snaps into the peep hole

3. The slot for the existing rear sight is made tight
so that the hood will fit firmly in place. If it fails to fit,
file the existing rear sight as necessary. If the sight fits
the slot but is difficult to snap on and off, or is too loose,
adjust the ball detent by turning the center set screw on the
sight hood.

4. The weapon must be zeroed on a known distance firing
range to determine the sight settings and proper sight picture
for standard and underloaded ammunition when using the hood.
The only adjustments possible are those already on the rifle.
(That is, elevation control using the graduated ramp and windage
control by adjustment of the two locking screws at the base of
the existing rear sight dovetail.)
NOTE: It is very important to hold the rifle the same way each
time so that the relation of the eye to the rear sight
remains constant. The user must determine his own zero
for each rifle and hood combination and maximur effective
range for each ammunition type.
:
3

14-00000

FRONT VIEW

14-00000

L
4
3
2
0
0
REAR VIEW
104-10216-10171

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

10 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Tests of Modified Sights for 7.62 Belgium (FAL) Rifle

REFERENCE: Memo for Red. dated 23 May 64, Subject FAL Silencers/
Sights, from C/ME/SA/EG/DH

1. On 2 June 1964, Mr. Donald R. Dunn, TSD/EB and the
undersigned went to Isolation to test a modified sight and a
telescopic sight developed for the 7.62 Belgium (FAL) Rifle in
answer to reference a). The tests were performed with the assistance
of Mr. James Barb and Mr. Glen Winstead, Isolation.

2. The first tests were conducted with a Williams Peep sight
modified to fit an aluminum block which was mounted in place of the
standard FAL rear sight. The Williams sight has a larger diameter
peep than the FAL sight and has a wider range of elevation settings
as well as more positive control over both elevation and windage.
The main purpose of the test was to establish a point of reference
on the aluminum block to watch the graduations on the Williams
sight and allow the sight to be set visually for the desired range
once the weapon was zeroed.

3. Firing commenced from 100 yards at a silhouette target
using the hood of a jeep as a rest. Both underloaded and full load
rounds were used. Light rain which gradually increased in intensity
during the day served to complicate the procedure. The test
results at ranges from 25 yds. to 130 yds. using the Williams
sight are summarized in Attachment I. Exceedingly erratic results
were obtained throughout the tests and one attempt to duplicate
the 100 yd. zero resulted in a different setting later in the day.

4. A 2X scope of Japanese manufacture equipped with aluminum
mounting rings front and rear to fit the rear gas port and rear
sight mount respectively then tested. The scope was attached to
the rifle with difficulty and attempts to zero it were frustrated
by the inability to determine where the rifle was shooting. The
mounting moved while attempting to adjust the elevation knob and it
was determined that the mount could not be attached firmly enough
to insure in retaining a proper zero. The test with the scope
was aborted.

hash - 1 file

SECRET

5. It is recommended that the scope and mount be discarded
as unfeasible. The Williams sight is acceptable although the
number of clicks per revolution of the knob should be reduced.
Further testing of the underloaded ammunition should be con-
ducted to determine the reasons for the erratic performance.

DANIEL J. HOGAN

cc: C/TSD
C/WH/SA/MCR/FIN (Cal Hicks)
Attachment: As Stated

DDP/TSD/EB/DJH/EC

C/TSD/SDB

SECRET

ATTACHMENT I

2 June 1964

Williams Peep Sight

At 25 yds., reduced loads
Raise sight 60 clicks from bottom
Match ref. line to 4th line from top

At 50 yds., reduced loads
Raise sight 80 clicks from bottom
Match ref. line to 5th line from top

At 73yds., reduced loads
Raise sight 80 to 110 clicks from bottom
Ammunition performance very erratic, wide variance on target

At 100 yds., reduced loads
Raise sight 120 to 160 clicks
1st trial, 160 clicks, little variance
Match ref. line to 9th line from top
2nd trial 3 hrs. later, 120 clicks
Match ref. line to 7th line from top

At 150 yds., reduced loads
Raise sight 230 clicks (1 trial)
Match ref. line to 12.5 line from top

Could not mount telescopic sight properly. Began process of
shooting in scope, found it moved.

At. 100 yds., full loads
Raise sight 4 clicks from bottom

At 150 yds., full loads
Raise sight 8 clicks from bottom.

Intermittant rain throughout tests.
Cases with reduced loads were noted to be blackened at neck
after firing. Suspected to be low pressures not causing
sufficient case expansion to obtain proper seal. This can
contribute to erratic performance. Recommend gas port be turned
to off position to prevent action from opening and allowing
gas leak. Also investigate soft annealing case necks.

SECRET
#SECRET

T/N: Rolando CUBELA Secades

POSITION: Radical Post & Separturent AgFcmdte. Fajardo Hospital

LOCATION: Havana.

COMMO: S/W system, agent sending - #15136 carbon, agent receiving - #56638 pills

ACC Address: agent sending

Srta. Maria Dolores, COMEZ
Apartado 12318, Madrid, Espana

Mr. Humphrey R. Boncavil (this address is to be
P.O. Box 892 used only for rapid
General Post Office, commo)
New York 1, New York

In Nov 1963 Paris Station agreed to following address with Subject: Parents-in-law of UNSNAFU/9 Paris, France. (When letter is received, UNSNAFU/9 will deliver letter to the Station via via UNSNAFU/5)
20 Rue De La Glaciere, Paris 13
Agent signs letters "Ramon"

ACC, Addresses, agent receiving:

Ernestina ACOSTA Gonzalez (Ene" Subjects former
#526, Apartment 8 secretary)
Esquina Calle 25 y H.
(top floor Apt, Tel: 303865)

(Emergency)
Virginia Secades. (Subject's mother)
Calle 38 #122
Esquina Avenida Zoologico
Alturas de Vedado
Havana.

Letters to the ACOSTA address signed "Pepe" will contain S/W. Letters to the ACOSTA address signed "Luis" will be written on S/W carbon and indicate resupply of S/W material.

#SECRET

#SECRET

-2-

NOTE: Subject can receive or send S/W messages out through the AMTRUNK/10 S/W system.

Emergency Commo: If contact cannot be made through above systems, Carlos TEPEDINO in N.Y.C. can probably arrange a means of con tacting Subject.

C/O: Wainwright.

#SECRET
104-10216-10202 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

ORK VILLIAMS/blc
UNIT /IOS
EXT
DATE: AUGIEST 64

[ ] INDEX
[X] NO INDEX
MESSAGE FORM
SECRET
FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-252234

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

250661 13 192

TO PARIS
FROM DIRECTOR
CONE: De/wH/SH 3 INFO DOP,Ve SIC CEL

TO
PARI CITE DIR
INFO
SITIZED 44517
TYPIC YOBITE AMLASH UNSNAFU

REF: PARI 5922 (IN 57147)*

NO IDEN HQS TRACES CANTO.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/SA/COMMENT: *Ref XX RYBAT.

AMLASH-1 fre
201-252234

WH/SA/EOB W. Wainwright (by phone)
WH/SA/INT

WE/3 Roger Pierre (by phone)

Homaso. Thale for Bruce B. Cheever
WILLIAM D. O'RYAN DC/WH/SA
C/WE 201-252234
RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING
24-28 SECRET GROUP 1 OFFICER
Exdaded tramiatie Copy No.
downgrading and
deciamlication

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
14-00000
104-10216-10234
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET
AMLASH-1

1 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Test of Open Sight Hood for 7.62um Belgium (FAL) Rifle
REFERENCE: A) Meno for Red. dated 25 May 1964, Subject: FAL-
Silencers/8ights, from C/WH/SA/MOB/PN
B) Meno for Rcd. dated 10 June 1964, Subject: Tests
of Modified Bights for 7.62 Belgium (FAL) Rifle

1. On 15 and 16 June 1984, the undersigned and Mr. Bob
Ricker, TSD/SDB went to Isolation to test an open sight hood for
the 7.62mm Belgium (FAL) Rifle developed in answer to Ref. A.
The Modified Williams peep sight developed previously in answer
to Ref. A and reported on in Ref. B. proved unsatisfactory to the
requester. The snap-on sight hood was then developed on a quick
reaction basis to be simpler to install and easier to use than
the Williams sight. In addition some improved underloaded 7.62mm
NATO rounds having soft. annealed cases and cream of wheat filler
vere tested for performance. These were developed in hopes of
correcting the erratio azmunition performance, noted a B

2. The open sight hood snaps over the existing rear sight
of the FAL rifle, and in theory makes shooting in poor light or
at night easier. It can be used with either standard factory
loads or the underloaded ammunition in conjunction with the muzzle
attachment silencer. The notch on the rear sight hood is "U" shaped
and raised to compensate for the more curving trajectory of the low
velocity ammunition. The hood is easily detached making the con-
ventional peep sight available any time it is desired.

3. The attached data sheet summarizes the test results. It
was found that some familiarization vas necessary to get used to
the open sight. Under ideal conditions the sight was as easy to
use as the peep sight although it was more difficult to maintain
uniform vertical grouping. The relationship between the eye and
rear sight was found to be very critical. As the tests proceeded
a change was noted in the point of impact vs. point of aim which was
thought to be due to a change in sight picture on the part of the
undersigned.

4. The improved ansunition was found to be quite consistant
in performance. The use of crean of wheat filler to tamp the powder
charge against the primer vas an attempt to get more even ignition
with correspondingly improved accuracy. The expended cartridge
cases vere checked periodically and no evidence vas found of the
soft annealed cases not expanding properly. During the tests the
rifle and ammunition combination instilled a degree of confidence
in the undersigned not present in the previous teste.
SECRET
:
な
صححفرة

14-00000

i
5. Tests were conducted in the evening to determine the degree
of usefulness of the sight in poor light. In this respect a 22
Caliber Hi-Standard pistol with folding shoulder stock and Bushnell
1.3X Phantom scope was tested in comparison. The scope was
equipped with yellow filters to brighten the sight picture for
low light level use. It was the opinion of both test personnel
that the scope vas superior to either the peep sight or open sight
for as long as their was some illumination on the silhouette
targets. Once the light failed the scope was completely useless
although the undersigned could still discern targets with the naked
eye out to 50 yds. All actual shooting was done with the open
sight and some difficulty was experienced in hitting the targets
at ranges of 100 yds, or more even at dusk. The closer targets
could be easily hit up until it became too dark to see them at all.
A large rain cloud moving from behind the firing position gradually
obscured all available light. For the final shooting at 25 yds.
occasional lightning flashes gave only a vague awareness of the
target location. At no time during the night trials was there any
muzzle flash visible from the under loaded azmunition and muzzle
silencer combination. The gas port which was in the off position
during the daylight trials was turned on at night but no flash was
visible at the breech. A fine white cloud of cream of wheat
powder was visible in front of the muzzle at almost full darkness
but could not be seen more than 30 feet avay.

6. Listener trials were conducted the following day to deter-
mine how far away an alert listener could discern the mechanical
noise of the mechanism and that of the round being fired. Mr. Ricker
walked away downwind at an angle of 90 degrees to the line of fire
and stopped to listen every 25 paces. The undersigned fired
single rounds, (hand actuating the pechanism) each time Nr. Ricker
stopped. At 335 paces, or roughly 275 yds., Er. Ricker reported.
he could still hear the mechanisa being actuated, the round being
fired, and the bullet striking a concrete pillar 200 yds. down-
range. However, he stared that he might not have noticed the sound
at that range had he not been listening for it specifically.

7. One of the major causes for concern at the start of the
tests was that the cream of wheat filler might clog the silencer
and render it ineffective. A total of 200 rounds were fired with
the silencer in place and the noise level did seem to be higher at
the finish of the second day. (Round numbers 180 to 200 were the
ones expended during the previously mentioned listener trials).
Inspection of the silencer at a later date revealed considerable
crean of wheat residue in the screening. Sound level measurements
made in the AMF sound lab showed that while the total noise level
vas no higher, the duration was relatively longer. This would
make the silencer seen louder to near by observers but not increase
the range at which it could be heard. However, from a stand-
point of the ability for a listener to discriminate a silencer
being fired from random noise, the longer duration gives him a
better chance to recognize what he hears.
SECRET

14-00000

Thi
8. On 19 June 1964, the undersigned went to the warehouse
at Franconia to try to fit the sight hood to other 7.65mm FAL
rifles. It was suspected that the fit might be a problem when it
would not fit over the rear sights of three FAL rifles at Isolation.
Although it was later determined that the three rifles. vore of a
different lot and may therefore have different tolerances on the
rear sight casting, it was felt that further checking was necessary.
Nine FAL rifles from the same lot as those obtained by WH/SA/MOB/PM
were unpackaged and the sight hood tried on the rear sight. Of
the nine, two were perfect fits and the other seven too thick
for the hood to fit. This created a problem in that the sight
hoods had to fit rifles which for operational reasons could not be
measured before hand to determine the thickness of the rear sight
blade. Providing adjustment in the slot of the sight hood would
have complicated the fixture to the point where it could become
operationally unsuitable. Therefore it was determined that the
best solution was to provide several small files with the hoods.
The peep sight on the rifles, a soft casting, was found to be
quite easy to file. In most cases it would be necessary only to
file several thousandths to obtain a proper fit. This procedure
was explained to C/WH/SA/MOB/FM and he stated that it would be
acceptable.

9. On 24 June 1964, three open sight hoods with accessories
consisting of two files and a small screwdriver were turned over
to C/WH/SA/MOB/PM. In addition, 400 rounds of improved under-
loaded ammunition with cream of wheat filler were provided as a
bf replacement for the original 400 underloaded rounds.

10. On 29 June 1964, it was discovered that a scope was availabl
451 for the 7.62mm Belgium (FAL) Rifle (Sniper Version) and in the Agency
supply system. Steps are being taken to obtain a scope for
evaluation. The results will be forwarded to C/CH/SA/MOB.

DDP/TSD/EB/DJH/EC

cc: C/TSD
C/TH/SA/MOB/PH
DANIEL J. BOGAN
TSD/EB
SECRET

14-00000
RANGE
RAMP SETTING
SIGHT TYPE
STANDARD VELOCITY AMMUNITION, DAYLIGHT:
POINT OF IMPACT
(RELATIVE TO POINT OF AIM)
100 yds.
No. 2
Peep
On
100 yds.
No. 3
Peap
On
100 yds.
No. 2
Open Hood
24" high
100 yds.
No. 8
Open Hood
26" high
EXTREME SPREAD
NO. OF ROUNDS
6844
5
5
க
【
ERLOADED AMMUNITION, OPEN SIGHT HOOD, DAYLIGHT:
POINT OF IMPACT
EXTREME
RANGE
RAMP SETTING
(RELATING TO POINT OF AIM) SPREAD
HORIZONTAL
SPREAD
VERTICAL
SPREAD
NO. OF ROUNDS
41
25 yds. No. 2
3" high
25 yds. No. 6
3" low
1 3/4"
3/4"
--
5
--
50 yds. No. 6
5"
8
:
75 yds.
No. 6
4" loft 4" low
3"
5
100 yds.
Full Elevation
6" loft, 8" low
9"
--
10
:
100 yds.
Full Elevation
On (Diff. Shooter)
5"
13"
5
100 yds.
125 yds.
Full Elevation
No 2
8" left, 8" low
--
--
6"
9"
10
8" loft, 18" low
--
31
125 yds.
Full Elevation
On (Changed sight. Picture)
--
6
20"
8 (2 missed
target)
150 yds.
Jull Elevation
On (Changed Sight Picture)
--
6"
18"
8 (2 missed
target)
Jyds. Pull Elevation
6" low (Changed Sight Pic-
ture)
--
8"
26"
10

14-00000
UNDERIOADED AMMUNITION, OPEN SIGHT HOOD, DUSH:
RANGE
NO. OF ROUNDS NO. OF HITS
300 усв.
10
yds.
10
HORIZONTAL SPREAD VERTICAL SPREAD
REMARKS
15"
85
6
Could ocs target more
clearly through Peep
sight at no rounde
woro fired.
Could soo target very
clearly with 1.3X
scope.
UNDER'OADED AMMUNITION, ALMOST FULL DARK, OPEN SIGHT HOOD:
NO. OF ROUNDIS NO. OF HITS BORIZONTAL SPREAD VERTICAL SPREAD
RANGE
75 yds.
10
25 yds.
10
10
9"
14
"
85"
REMARKS
Poop sight useless
Could see targets out to
200 yds, with filtered
scope at start of
firing, could not se
at; all w/scope at
finishi
τα
POERIOADED AMMUNITION, OPEN BIGHT HOOD, PULLE DARK:
RANGE
35 yds.
NO. OF ROUNDIS
10
NO. OF HITS
REMARKS
5 (scattered) Target in total darkness, rain cloud overhead, inter-
mittant lightning flashes gave a vague awareness of
target location.
#4-00000
104-10216-10238
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

MAPIO
CTION
WHンケア
NFO
P1
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
2.SECRET
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
ADVANCE COPY
IFSUED
COPY
purely
REPRODUCTION CRITER
55- 141
2
10S
PERS AR
PR
LOG CA
TO: UIT
CE SI
SLOTTED
TORED
SEC
VR, FILE, APP INEL-CA CIVERS Cifra FI

S
ECRET 281046Z
AMLASAL
X-Contiilo
DIR CITE MADR 2662 (CROWERY ACTING)
TYPIC AMLASH
REF DIR 73234
20049750

1. RE PARA 2 REF, CIS CONTACT IS LU. MANUEL CANTILLO TOIRAC,
NEW SECOND SECRETARY CUBAN EMBASSY MADRID, WHO REPORTEDLY CONNECTED
CUBAN SECURITY.
2. FYI AT STATION DIRECTION QUJAY | DEVELOPING CLOSE FRIENDSHIP
WITH CANTILLO.
SECRET
↓
Suary "la Oss, Maris Silvestre

SECRET

1
104-10216-10273 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DISPATCH

TO: Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: TYPIC/WHAPRON/ANTRUNK/Operational
ABSTRACT: ANTRUNK Progress Report for Period 1-30 November 1964

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI.

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES:

1. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

A. Preparations were underway in early November to dispatch ANTRUNK-13 to Madrid in mid-November to cement the recruitment of ANTRUNK-19. These plans fell through when the Madrid Station notified Headquarters and WAVE that their workload would not allow sufficient case officer time to handle ANTRUNK-13 in Madrid at this time. FAVE agreed to postpone ANTRUNK-13's trip to Madrid several weeks until Madrid Station's workload abated somewhat.

B. The prospects of finalizing the recruitment of ANTRUNK-19 increased however with the receipt at WAVE of another open letter from ANTRUNK-19, this one mailed from Mexico City in mid-November. In ANTRUNK-19's first letter, mailed from Montreal in mid-October, he suggested using a friend in Mexico City as a cut-out to initiate a channel of communications between himself and ANTRUNK-13. In his second letter, ANTRUNK-19 stated that he had made the necessary arrangements with his friend in Mexico. Although WAVE, Headquarters and MEXI traces on ANTRUNK-19's friend, IDEN A, were fragmentary, Mexico Station stated that IDEN A was well-known to one of its PBRUMEN assets who vouched for IDEN A's loyalties. WAVE intends to send an innocuous letter to ANTRUNK-19 in ANTRUNK-13's handwriting to keep the channel with A-19 alive. ANTRUNK-19 appears eager to see ANTRUNK-13 again and has stated in both letters that he has considerable information to discuss in detail. It is well realized that this open letter channel is far from ideal but it is hoped that in early January 1965 ANTRUNK-13 can re-contact ANTRUNK-19 and provide him with a system of S/W

Attachment: USC
IDEN Sheet
Distribution:
3 - Addressee, w/att. USC

LASH-1 file

DATE TYPED: 10 Dec 64

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-19045

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 19-6-84/3-1

SECRET

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

SECRET UFGA-19045

as well as debrief him thoroughly and levy PI and KHAPRON requirements upon him.

C. In mid-November after the postponement of ANTRUNK-13's Madrid trip, preparations began to launch Operation ANTRUNK X in early December. This operation would attempt to re-organize the ratline to and from Havana and the ANTRUNK infil area for the future use of infiltrated MHAPRON recruiters and other agent assets as necessary. Secondary objectives are to bring into the infil area a cache of weapons and explosives for ANTRUNK-10/AMLASH-1 and to teach a system of S/W to one or more assets in the area. The team is to be composed of the same four individuals who participated in Operation ANTRUNK IX in October 1964: AMAGREE-1, Team Leader; AMAKA-1, Radio Operator; and ANTRUNK-16 and -20, Guides. It was decided to shelve the V-20 as the Intermediate Craft (IC) for this opera- tion and substitute a 17' Johnson boat with twin 75 hp outboard motors which could maneuver through shallower water and which could be more easily camouflaged. The basic reason for this decision was the fact that December through February are the low-water months in the ANTRUNK operational area. During this shallow water season, the heavier, wider V-20 can only be used in the deeper and more heavily-guarded infiltration canals.

D. Through the combined efforts of AMICE-14, the ANTRUNK P/A, and AMAGREE-1 and AMAKA-1, four radio operator candidates, to be trained for future use in PM opera- tions, were recruited during the reporting period.

E. Recruiting for MHAPRON infiltration candidates con- tinued during the reporting period. One prospective infiltree was recruited during the month of November and the case officer was active in assessing and debrief- ing two other candidates. It is hoped that by March 1965 one or more of these candidates will be trained and pre- pared for infiltration for clandestine MHAPRON recruit- ing. In large measure this will depend upon the success of Operation ANTRUNK X in re-organizing the ratline to and from Havana.

F. S/W Message No. 13 was sent to ANTRUNK-11 in response to his Message No. 15 in which he stated that both OWVL receivers were now in his possession. WAVE Message No. 13 to AMTRUNK-11 gave directions for the disposition of the OWVL receivers and the activation of OWVL contact with both ANTRUNK-11 and ANTRUNK-10.

2. INTELLIGENCE REPORTING

None

3. OPERATIONAL EXPENDITURES

Salaries:
AMICE-14 $400.00
AMAGREE-1 300.00
AMAKA-1 250.00
ANTRUNK-13 300.00
ANTRUNK-16 225.00
ANTRUNK-20 200.00
$1,675.00

Mileage (AMICE-14 and AMAGREE-1): $202.40
Household Expenses: 61.97
GRAND TOTAL $1,939.37

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

SECRET UFGA-19045

4. PROJECTED PLANS

Primary tasks to be accomplished are the mounting of Operation ANTRUNK X in early December, the dispatching of ANTRUNK-13 to Madrid to finalize the recruitment of ANTRUNK-19, and the staging of another contingent of MHAPRON recruiters for infiltration in March 1965.

Andrew E. REUTERAN

IDEN A

Dr. Francisco BORGES
M. Escobedo No. 692-16
Mexico 5, D. F.

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO UFGA-19045
IDEN Sheet
14-00000
104-10216-10338
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

W
ONG. W. INWRIGHT/41
LANT/C/PI/TC
EXT. 6153
DATE. 24/MARCH/1965

TO : PARIS
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF: Oclwne 5
INFO: 200 FLEUR; OOP, AinDD, C/WE 3, C/CI:

TO PRITY PARI
DESENSITIZED
INFO
CITE DER
CAT PERUMEN UNSNAFU AMLASH AMWHIP 95504
REF: PARI 9995 (IN 29053)*

1. DO NOT BELIEVE UNSKAPU/9 FIRING IN ITSELF A HAZARD TO
AMLASH/1. HOWEVER, DO FEEL IT NECESSARY ATTEMPT DETERMINE BACKGROUND
TO UNSNAFU/19 STATEMENT THAT U/9 WAS "DIRTY KUBARK AGENT", I.E.
WAS THIS JUST HEATED UNCOMPLIMENTARY EPITHET OR WAS IT BASED ON DSE
KNOWLEDGE MADE AVAILABLE TO U/19. IN EITHER CASE, BELIEVE IT MERITS
RELAY TO ANLASH/1. SUGGEST FOLLOWING: WHEN AMWHIP/1 ARRIVES PARI IN
HEAR FUTURE, ASK HIN ATTEMPT WITH GREAT CAUTION DETERMINE IMPLICATIONS
U/19 ABOVE ACCUSATION. THEN HAVE HIM CALL HIS JEWELER FRIEND IN
HAVANA, JOSE IGLESIAS, OSTENSIBLY ON BUSINESS MATTER AS COVER, AND
RELAY PERTINENT DETAILS OF U/9 INCIDENT AS ROUTINE FRIENDLY GOSSIP.
AMTHIP/1 SHOULD HAVE NO PROBLEM INSURING THAT MUTUAL FRIEND IGLESIAS
WILL RELAY THE NEWS POSTHASTE TO ANLASH/1. BELIEVE THIS SECURE ENOUGH
AND EMINENTLY FASTER AND MORE CERTAIN THAN S/W LETTER.

2. IF AMTHIP/1 FEELS THIS METHOD UNSAFE AT THIS TIMES ANY REASON,
ADVISE SOONEST. XXXXXSOC

3. PLS KEEP HQS CURRENT ALL ASPECTS THIS MATTER.

RELEASING OFFICE
END OF HESSAGE
24-20
SECRETARYBAT
COPY
GROUP 1
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
OFFICE
Copy No

14-00000
JUG
EXT
DATE
TO .
MESSAGE FORM
SECRET/RYBAT
ORENGRE NO
FROM DRECTOR
CON
INFO
10
PAGE TWO
INFO
CITE DER
95504
*WH/C/Comment: UNSNAFU/19 fired in row with UNSNAFU/9. Requested
guidance.

THOMAS F. THIELE
C/WE/INT
OFFICER
C/WH/C/FI
WB/S/C
WE/3
R.P()
WHICICHIPA C.de

POUR 1.
DESPOND FITZGERALD,
C/WH
SECRET/RYBAR
REPRODUCT BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFI NIS PROHIBITED.
ΔΟΤΗΣΕΤICATION
Copy No
104-10216-10397 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

NG. R. H. WEBSTER/01
WI DC/C/FI
J. 6153
ATE 25/JUNE/1965
INCX
NO POER
FILE IN CS FILE NO.

MESSAGE FORM SECRET/RYBAT
ROUTING
Se
2 FE
na
as26 Jun 65 13090
3. ROME
TOM DIRECTOR
ONE DE/WH/5
ORO IN FILE ADDRE C/WE 3 C/CI-C/F12 SIG CEN

ROME
DESENSITIZED
PEAT TYPIC AMLASH
REFS: A. DIR 22113
B. ROME 6642 (IN 98023)
C. ROME 6652 (IN 98586)

INFO CITE
23142
wit ever Mr. Harte properly Doesn't
can't
Mr. Amlash-1
Know that much
about him.

1. BACKGROUND THIS CASE TOO EXTENSIVE TO RELAY. HOWEVER, PLAN HAVEJOSEPH LANGOSCH, WHO BEING ASSIGNED PRAN AS PBRUMEN REGIONAL SER
VISIT ROME TO BRIEF PRESLAND, PROBABLY IN AUGUST.
CASEOPRILE 5
2. NO DEFINITE EVIDENCE AMLASH COMPLEX PART OF DOUBLED OP BUT CERTAINLY AN INSECURE ONE. REF A WAS DESIGNED TO PRESENT CURRENT HQS
THOUGHTS AND INTENTIONS ON OPERATION.

3. INVOLVEMENT AMWHIP/2 RELATIVELY MARGINAL AS HE APPEARS BE ONLY
THOUGHT PROBABLY
5. ON FRINGES OF MAIN GROUP AD-NOW PRIVY TO PLANS. HOWEVER, UNLESS ROME
HAS SPECIFIC OPS PLANS INVOLVING HIM WHICH MUST BE IMPLEMENTED NEAR FUTURE, SUGGEST CONTACT WITH HIM BE MINIMIZED UNTIL LANGOSCH CAN
PROVIDE BACKGROUND.

END OF MESSAGE
C/WH/C/FI
GyyRyan
THOMAS F.THIELE C/WE/INT/
RELEASE OFFICER
WE/4 S. Munger (by phone)

25-34
Amlash-I
COORDINATOR OFFICER
SECRET/RYBAT
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/H
AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER

NOTATUES THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
Copy Mo
14-00000
104-10216-10398
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

MET

15 February 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Meeting with AMLASH-1 in Paris,
31 January to 3 February 1965

1. AMLASH-1 returned from Rome to Paris on 31 Jan 1965
and was set for a very brief meeting the same night by ONTRICH
in order to arrange a meeting for the following day. The
following subjects were discussed at the two meetings on 1 and
2 February 1965:

a. The primary reason for again meeting AMLASH-1
before his planned return to Cuba was to brief him on the
security implications involved in the infiltration and
possible capture of Modesto Orlando Orozco Basulto AKA
Bebo Orozco, who infiltrated into Cuba on 21 Dec 1964.
Orozco, according to his wife, went to Cuba to rescue Jose
Vasquez Kerey and three others who were hiding in the
home of a woman named Gloria Cabrera, who lived at No. 72
27th Street, between N & O, Apartment 3, Vedado, Havana.
Orozco's capture, if he has been captured, presents an
indirect threat to the security of AMLASH-1 and a more
direct threat to the security of AMTRUNK-10 since Orozco
in Jan 1964 exfiltrated through the rat line established
by AMICE-14 (Miguelito). Upon his return to Cuba,
AMLASH-1 will check the above with AMTRUNK-10; and, if
Orozco is under the control of the security service, will
decide and communicate with Miami whether AMLASH-1 and
AMTRUNK-10 believe it necessary to exfiltrate AMTRUNK-10.
AMLASH-1 was briefed to send a letter to UNSNAFU-9 to
indicate whether Orozco has been arrested or whether he is
still in hiding. If the letter to UNSNAFU-9 mentions a
good and pleasant return trip, this will mean that Orozco
is not under the control of the security service. If the
letter talks about a long, tiring trip, this will indicate
that Orozco has been arrested. AMLASH-1 was also requested
to send a report on the above and any complications which
have developed or may develop from Orozco's infiltration.

b. AMLASH-1 suggested that his nom de guerre "Charles,"
which we have been using for the past three years, be
changed to "Gerardo."

SECRET

14-00000
-2-

c. AMLASH-1 was given a resupply of S/W developer
pills and carbon. He planned to take the S/W material
back with him to Havana. AMLASH-1 again reviewed with
UNSNAFU-9 and reminded UNSNAFU-9 to turn over to his Paris
case officer all letters regardless of how received from
AMLASH-1 to either UNSNAFU-9 or letters that may be addressed
to his parents-in-law. AMLASH-1 also agreed to send S/W
out in letters addressed to Juan Ventura (AMUHIP-1's
business partner) in Geneva or Rome. AMWHIP-I was briefed
to inform Ventura that any letters he received from
AMLASH-1 should be immediately air mailed to AMWHIP-1
in New York. Since AMLASH-1 will probably find it
necessary some time not to sign the letters to Ventura
in his true name, AMWHIP-1 was also briefed to inform
Ventura to forward to New York any letter received from
Cuba addressed to him and signed by a person unknown to
him. S/W letters to AMLASH-1 should continue to be
addressed to Ernestina Acosta, Edf. No. 526, Apt. 8,
Esquina Calles 25 y H. In an emergency a letter can also
be sent to AMLASH-1's mother.

d. AMLASH-1 was again debriefed on the cache that had
been put down for him in Matanzas. He repeated what he
had previously reported and attempted to answer most of
the questions in the WAVE cable. A cable on this subject
was sent from Paris to Headquarters, info WAVE, on 2 Feb.
AMLASH-1 was requested to send a message either through
his channel or through AMTRUNK-10's S/W channel reporting
how much of the radio equipment and other material had
been recovered from the cache.

e. AMLASH-1 was asked if he knew of any individual in
Cuba whom he could recruit and who could be inserted into
the Cuban Intelligence Service with the idea of attempting
to get the DGI to assign this man to Caracas, Venezuela.
AMLASH-1 could think of only one possibility, an individual
known as Gustavo Gonzalez. AMLASH-1 has full confidence
in Gustavo and Gustavo has previously been approached on
several occasions by Pinero to work for him. Upon his
return to Cuba AMLASH-1 will check to find out if Gustavo
can still get himself recruited by Pinero and then be
sent on a mission abroad, hopefully to Caracas. (AMWHIP-1,
who also knows Gustavo, will provide the background infor-
mation upon his return to New York.)

1. AMLASH-1 reported on the upcoming FEU elections
on 10 February 1965. AMLASH-1 stated that Crombet, the
president of the Communist Youth, will become the new

SECRET

14-00000

-3-
2.
president and that his man, Laparo Mora, would be one of
the vice-presidents. (A cable on this subject was sent
to Headquarters from Paris.)

g. AMLASH-1 was requested to check with Fizzolo
regarding the precautions being taken to prevent sabotage
of the locmotives being shipped from France to Cuba;
specifically, how carefully do they check the placement
of the seals, are they special seals or regular load
seals, are there going to be any additional checks once
the locomotives reach Cuba, will they drain the oil and
lubricants from the factory to the port, and do they run
the locomotives under their own power or are they towed.
AMLASH-1 agreed to attempt to develop answers to the above
requirements and pass the information to his contact in
the Paris Station. AMLASH-1 also agreed to attempt to find
out and pass to the Paris Station through UNSNAFU-9 the
names of the Cuban techs training at La Rochelle.

h. In a general discussion regarding the persons with
whom AMLASH-1 had been in contact either personally or
through letters, AMLASH-1 mentioned Alfredo Portela.
AMLASH-1 stated he had received a letter from Portela and
had in turn written to Portela. He considers Portela a
friend which was the only reason for writing to him.

i. AMLASH-1 was debriefed on Cuban Intelligence
Service personnel. A cable on this subject was sent from
Paris to Headquarters.

j. A cable was sent from Paris to Headquarters
suggesting WAVE send a S/W letter to ANTRUNK-10 stating:
"Este tranquilo. Carlos regresa pronto."

k. AMLASH-1 was asked for information on the fol-
lowing persons:

(1) Samuel Gonzalez Rodriguez-Planes. AMLASH-1
reports he is a member of the Ameijeiras group and
is a good and brave man.

(2) Antonio Lusson y Batlle, Chief of Operations
of the General Staff of the Occidental Army.
AMLASH-1 reports Lisson is an independent and rare
type individual who keeps to himself and doesn't
involve himself in political matters. AMLASH-1 has
heard nothing bad about Lusson.

SECRET

14-00000
15000
-4-
;
:
اربره ها
(3) Cndte. Raul Diaz Arguelles, Chief of
Artillery of the Occidental Army.

(4) Elpidio Baez Bigo. According to AMLASH-1,
Baez is a trusted Fidelman.

(5) Luis Manuel Cantillo Toirac. Assigned to
the Cuban Embassy in Madrid and one of the security
people. He was formerly assigned to Brazil, is young
and has for several years been with Pinero and the
Cuban IS.

(6) Enrique Oltuski Osacki. Oltuski is a close
friend of Faustino Perez and his stock with the regime
rises or falls as does that of Faustino..

(7) Sergio Tollon. Code clerk in the Embassy in
Paris. Tolyon is staying in Paris at the request of
Ambassador Carrillo.

1. Gastro enteritis, water pollution and unsanitary
conditions. AMLASH-1 states there are no real problems,
although the scarcity and lack of a balanced diet do
cause some problems. The purification of water has been
a problem which probably has been the cause of some of the
sickness in the country.

n. AMLASH-1 did not believe that Aragones had invited
hin to fly back to Havana with him in order to get him
back because of any serious security matter. AMLASH-1
did state that Aragones was concerned that AMLASH-1 may not
return to Cuba. Since Aragones cleared AMLASH-1 for his
trip abroad, he is in a way responsible that AMLASH-1 does
not defect and returns to Cuba. AMLASH-1 feels Aragones
does not want any problems with Fidel in case AMLASH-1
decides to stay out.

n. AMLASH-1 was unable to provide any information on
the political developments in Cuba in mid-November and
December since he had been out of the country since early
November. AMLASH-1 was asked to check on the problems
between the opposing factions in the Cuban leadership and
explained the issues, the background and personalities
involved,

o. Soviet advise or influence in political and economic
matters creates resentment among the middle and higher level
Cuban officials. Basically, the Soviets are not respected.
SECRET

14-00000
طا لست.
-5-

p. Rank of Cuban officials under Fidel in teras of
their influence in making national policy. Roul is still
the heir apparent to Fidel. Next to Raul is Che Guevara.
After that, no other official, according to AMLASH-1, has
any great influence in the making of Cuban national policy.
President Dorticos' relationship with Fidel is good since
he is a hard and serious worker, has good administrative
ability and is able to work within the general outline laid
down by Fidel. Raul Castro has some political influence
and control in Oriente where he has placed his men in
positions of influence, but only Fidel personally has any
political influence in the rest of Cuba. Even within the
military Fidel selects and appoints high army officers.
Che Guevara is still strong in the economic field and
has not suffered a decline in his influence and authority
because of his earlier policy of industrialization.
Guevara restricts himself to the economic field and plays
a very small role in the political field. He is serious
and very hard worker, one of the few, according to AMLASH-1,
who has worked seven days a week without leave since the
revolution, Emilio Aragones holds an important position
as the organizational secretary of the PURS. He is the
official who was always at the office of the National
Directorate of the Party and has contact with all the
officials in the regime. He plays an important coordinating
role. Faure Chomon has been accused of organizing former
13th of Harch Revolutionary Directorate people, but,
according to AMLASH-1, this probably based on the fact that
Chomon always gives jobs in the ministry he heads to DR
people. Because of this Chomon today controls to a large
degree the Ministry of Transportation. Of all the ministries,
the DR's stronghold is in the Ministry of Transportation.
Other DR people who continue to hold important positions
in the regime are Alberto Mora, Ambassador Carrillo and
Jose Naranjo.

q. AMLASH-1 and AMWHIP-1 were unable to develop any
specifics, but from their conversations with Ambassador
Carrillo got the impression that Carrillo would prefer and
welcome a transfer from the Embassy in Paris to the
Embassy. in Madrid.

r. According to Emilio Aragones, Anibal Escalante
is being considered for a job outside Cuba. The job will
probably be in the commercial/economic field, but a
decision had not been made as of November 1964 as to
location.
L
SECRET
أحمد الثوم

4-00000
A
7.
SECRET
-6-

8.
AMLASH-1 again reported that he feels Orlando
Blanco, Consul of the Cuban Embassy in Bern, is
approachable since he is unhappy with the Cuban regime.
AMLASH-1 also feels that Enrique Rodriguez Loeches,
Cuban Ambassador in Pabat, is approachable if approached
and developed by the right person. Marina Garcia Gonzalez
assigned to the commercial section of the Cuban Embassy
in Rabat, AMLASH-1 feels is also approachable and feels
money can be used as an inducement. Ambassador Carrillo,
AMLASH-1 feels, if the proper person developed him, could
probably be compromised with Fidel. He is a character
and could easily be entangled according to AMLASH-1 in
a compromising situation, Ambassador Carrillo is a close
friend of Lucy Echevarria.

2. AMLASH-1 was also asked information on a long list
of other requirements on Cuba. On many he was unable to pro-
vide information and cables were sent to Headquarters on the
requirements on which he did provide information.

cc:
File:
WH/EA/EOB
WHISAL MOB
AMLASH-1 201
Internal Op
SECRET
Nestor D. Sanchez
WH/SA/AMWORLD
P
#DELETED#
14-00000
104-10217-10000
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CATAL

10 May 1963
!
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

G
1. On 29 April 1963 Dorothe Matlack, Domestic Exploitation
Section, ACS, telephoned to the affect that a banker named Clemard
Joseph Charles had left Haiti six days earlier and had just arrived
in New York. A friend of Charles, named Joseph Dryer, 109 Lakewood
Avenue, West Palm Beach, Florida, had written to General Delmar,
former CG Antilles Command, recommending Charles as a man of great
interest to the US Government in view of the events in Haiti. Charles
was described as President of the Banque Commerciale, Port au Prince,
Haiti, who is in President Duvalier's favor. Mrs. Matlack mentioned
that she had alerted Col. Farn Kail in Weed to contact Dryer in
order to obtain more background information and assessment on
Charles.

2. On 1 May 63 Mrs. Matlack advised that Charles was staying at
the Park Sheraton Hotel, New York, and that he had telephoned her
since her name had been supplied to him by Dryer. Charles considered
her to be his point of contact in Washington. According to Mrs. Matlack,
Charles had appointments to see Vice President Johnson, Senator Keating,
and Congressman Rogers (Florida). However, Charles was willing to talk
to representatives of Mrs. Matlack's office. Mrs. Matlack stated that
the Haitian Desk men in AID were ready to go to New York to talk to
Charles and invited CIA to accompany him. Charles speaks very little
English and a fluency in French was therefore required for the inter-
view. Mrs. Matlack stated that she might be able to obtain a French
linguist from First Army, Governor's Island, but he would not be an
intelligence officer. It was decided that James Balog, New York
Office, who has a knowledge of the French language would accompany
the ACSI representatives under Army cover. It was also arranged that
Balog would meet the ACSI representative (Captain Rogers) at the Park
Sheraton Hotel where Charles was staying.

3. On 2 May 63 Mrs. Matlack reported that Col. Kail had interviewed
Mr. Dryer in West Palm Beach. Dryer had appointed Charles as Director
of his bank in Haiti. Charles, according to Dryer, formerly had no
political ambitions but in view of the current political situation in
Haiti, Charles now thinks that he may some day be President. Dryer
described Charles as well-connected, politically and financially, on
both sides of the fence in Haiti. He is also a good friend of President
Duvalier. Dryer had given Charles letters of introduction to Senator
Keating and to other officials in Washington. Charles wanted to see
President Kennedy and indeed had gone to the White House to arrange
for an appointment. He was well received by the President's appoint-
ment secretary and invited to dinner that evening with the appointment
#DELETED#

14-00000
SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES	-2-

secretary. Through a misunderstanding, however, Charles did not
attend the dinner but went to New York instead.

4. Charles is travelling, according to Dryer, with a Texas
geologist named de Behrenschmidt. de Behrenschmidt is associated
with Charles in a business venture in Haiti and is trying to arrange
a meeting for Charles with Vice President Johnson.

5. On 3 May 63 Jim Balog telephoned to advise that he had had a
five-hour session the previous day with Charles and that he had
obtained both personality data and views by Charles on what the
United States should do in the current Haitian situation. Balog
advised that he was transcribing this information to Washington.
Upon arrival, copies of the teletypes were transmitted to ACSI
(Mrs. Matlack), WI Division, and the Latin American Branch.

6. On 6 May 63 Mayo Stuntz, Support Branch, advised that WI
Division wished to speak to Charles and Balog was being tasked to arrange
an appointment. Mrs. Matlack telephoned at approximately 1725 to
advise that she had just received a telephone call from Mrs. de
Mohrenschildt calling for assistance in obtaining hotel reservations in
Washington. Upon being told that we had no special means of obtain-
ing reservations, Mrs. Matlack stated that she would check with the
State Department Protocol Office to determine which hotels would
admit negro guests. Mrs. Matlock finally made reservations at the
Algonquin Hotel. A check with Jim Balog revealed that he had arranged
for Charles to meet the WI representative in the lobby of the Willard
Hotel, Washington, D.C., at 12:00 noon on 7 May. Attempts to reach
Mrs. Matlock that afternoon were unsuccessful. At 0850, 7 May, a
call was made to Mrs. Matlack to confirm that Charles would be in
Washington on that day and that arrangements had been made for a
meeting with an Agency representative for 12:00 noon. Mrs. Matlock
reported that both Mrs. de Mohrenschildt and Charles had called her
that previous evening to confirm a 12:00 luncheon appointment with
her. Mrs. Matlack was concerned that CIA and Army would not be
working at cross purposes. She had received authorization from
ACSI to meet Charles at lunch and felt that it would not be politic
for her to withdraw from her appointment since Army considered her
the point of contact with Charles. Mayo Stuntz informed WI Division
of the conflict and pressed on the suggestion that the WI Division
representative might meet Charles during Mrs. Matlack's lunch and that
Mrs. Matlack offered to withdraw shortly thereafter. The WI repre-
sentative declined the offer and requested that a meeting later in
the afternoon be arranged. Mrs. Matlock believed that due to con-
flicting instructions, she had been placed in the middle in the
situation from which she could not gracefully withdraw and requested
that someone accompany her.
#DELETED#

14-0000
DENTIAL

-3-

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

7. I met Mrs. Matlack in the lobby of the Hotel Willard shortly
before noon, and a few minutes later, Mr. Charles arrived, accompanied
by Mr. and Mrs. de Mohrenschildt. We lunched in the restaurant in
the hotel. Mr. de Mohrenschildt mentioned that he had been born in
Baku, Russia, but during the Bolshevik Revolution had been taken to
Poland as a small child. He had spent approximately 30 years in
Poland prior to World War II and had served in the Polish Army.
He also mentioned that he had been a member of an ICA Team to Yugo-
slavia in 1957 and while in Belgrade had met Gavalla who was visiting
Belgrade at the time. He had spoken to Gavalla and was invited to
visit Poland, which invitation he had accepted. He lives in in Dallas,
Texas. He has a PhD. in geology and has had some teaching experience.
Mrs. de Mohrenschildt was born in Paris, France. Her father was
Russian and her mother French, and she is now or has been a fashion
designer. Mr. de Mohrenschildt mentioned that he has known Charles
for sometime and that he is a partner with him in a sisal business
in Haiti.

8. Both Charles and de Mohrenschildt were anxious to arrange
meetings with government officials in Washington. I mentioned to
Charles that a meeting had been arranged for him at 1415 and that a
Mr. Green would meet him in the lobby. At 1410 Mrs. Matlack, Mr. and
Mrs. de Mohrenschildt and I departed and Charles remained in the
lobby waiting for contact.

9. In the course of the luncheon conversation, Charles had
mentioned to Mrs. Matlack that he desired to see a Mr. Weiss, AID, to
discuss US aid to Haiti. Later that afternoon Mrs. Matlack called to
state that she had called the State Department to pass along Charles'
request. Mr. Zegarald (State) had called her back to pass on the
Haitian Desk man's extreme displeasure that anyone in the United States
Government should be in official contact with Charles. The desk man
considered Charles to be close to the Duvalier Government, to have
been involved in several shady financial dealings, and in general, to
be an undesirable character. Mrs. Matlack asked whether the Agency
had any interest in Charles which would dictate further contact with
Charles.

10. Mayo Stuntz checked with WI Division and determined that as
a result of the meeting with Charles, the ID/P Haitian Desk had no
further plans to contact him. I told Mrs. Matlack that our interest
seemed to have been satisfied and that I believed we should disengage
ourselves as gracefully as possible.
#DELETED#

14-0

-4-

11. Wayne Nelson, DD/P Coordinator, called on 7 May to inquire
concerning our involvement in the Charles case. He stated that ACSI
had called him earlier that day to assure him that ACSI had no direct
interest in Charles and that it was acting as an intermediary at the
request of General Delmar who had passed the lead to General Pitch.
ACSI was concerned that due to the mix up in appointments to see
Charles, charges might later be made that ACSI had interferred or
had obstructed CLA contact with Charles. I explained to Nelson what
had happened and he later called back to state that ACSI was completely
satisfied in the way the matter had been handled.

12. On 8 May Mrs. Matlack telephoned to advise that the Operational
Branch of ACBI was discussing the Charles case with DD/P to determine
future course of action. She was still somewhat concerned over her own
position in the case since Charles considered her to be the focal point
in Washington. I reiterated to her that the matter was one for either
the State Department or the operational elements to handle and that
we preferred to disengage ourselves. Mrs. Matlock mentioned that a
dispatch had been received to the effect that a cousin of Charles was
prominently mentioned as a successor to Duvalier should the latter
be overthrown. She was of the opinion that the US government should
continue to "play ball" with Charles as a future asset in Haitian
affairs.

A. F. CZAJKOWSKI

Distribution:
Orig - C/WEF
1 - New York Office
1 - Support (Stuntz)
1 - LA Branch
1 - Index (Control)
1 - Dep/Coll chrono

AFCzajkowski: acr
14-00000

104-10217-10185 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

X

REASON

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATIC CLASSIFIED MESE. OT ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN

SECRET ans 5

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PPOSITE 4 8

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY 3 35 PER

( ACTION UNIT WHY -240 FILE, VR RI/AN, EURG, Ci/OPS, cl/ca, Fl

ACTION NO. C. 078 Z

(SECRET 301720Z MARX CITE MADRID 13428

CTOR

(DIREFECT INFO WH/MIAMI MADR 30295724

TYPIC QUANTUM 201-269349

1. QUANTUM-57 PROVIDED STATION WITH NOTE DATED

( 6 OCTOBER 70 FROM LAZARO GUTIERREZ MENOYO, IN

C

CUBAN PRISON, TO ADDRESSEE WHOSE IDENTITY Q-57 CHOSE NOT

REVEAL. WRITER'S FATHER, DR. ZABALETA GUTIERREZ

(WHO STILL CUBA, ARRANGED FOR NOTE TO BE SMUGGLED OUT

C CUBA. MAIN PURPOSE OF NOTE WAS TO ATTEMPT ESTABLISH

REGULAR COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL BETWEEN WRITER, VIA ADDRESSEE

(AND HIS FATHER, AND PEDRO M. DIAZ, 1251 NORTHWEST 30 STREET,

MIAMI, FLORIDA.

2. ON BASIS ABOVE, GUTIERREZ APPEARS TO BE ELOY

(GUTIERREZ MENOYO (201-269349) ON WHOM FILE NO

LONGER HELD AT STATION. PLEASE ADVISE IF ASSUMPTION CORRECT,

INCLUDING TRACES ON DIAZ.

3. DILE 201-269349. GP-1

SECRET

EOLMYUDED

33 ROFE 30 mar 71

201-269349

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED SECRET GROUP 1 5

(When Filled In) EXCLUDED FROM AU DOMSGRADING fro 2 6

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOT TED DECLASIFICATION REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED 3 7

4 8

BY: AT:

Z

8 PER

ACTION UNIT WH 8 INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR 6, FI, CI/OPS, 11/10 2

ACTION NO. 751

SECRET 051617Z APR 71 CITE WH/MIAMI/10963

MADRID INFO DIRECT OR wmimy

OTYPIC QUANTUM 5.AP IN 304300

REF MADRID 13428 (1 299724)

D

ジ

1. BEL IEVE STATION ASSUMPTION CITED PARA 2 REF CORRECT.

2. AMOTS UNABLE IDENTIFY PEDROM. DIAZ. STAT ION FILES

CONTAIN CARD REFERENCE TO ONE PEDRO MANUEL DIAZ, CUBAN

CITIZEN RESIDING 124 SW 18TH COURT, MIAMI, FLORIDA, WHO WAS MEMBER

OF ISLE OF PINES ASSOCIATION I EXILE. DOI: JAN 63). THIS MAY BE

DIAZ OF REF IN VIEW OF FACT THAT ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO

AT ISLE OF PINES PRISON.

3. FILE 201-269349. GP-1

SECRET

AN R

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PS

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DES HPD

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CS COPY 5 APR 71

SECRET 201-269349

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L

SECRET

For Subject's (201-269549) role in coordinated U. 3. Army clandestine

operation F/C/15-63, please see 201-269895.

SECRET F: 201-269349

14-00000

1

C

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 12 OCTOBER 1971

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: NOEL SALAS SANTOS

FBI FILE NO: 105-7548 (MIAMI)

...

14-00000

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 6 MAY 1971

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SURJECT: CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEWARK)

DATE: 26 FEBRUARY 1971

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: ANTONIO MATEU RODRIGUEZ

FBI FILE NO: 105-19301 (MIAMI)

14-00000

L

5. ANALYST 14-

SECRET

(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. 4- DATE

4. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATIO

5. DATE PROCESSED 10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

6. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE 13. TRANSFERRED TO

RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

GUTIERREZ MENOYO, ELOY

