
CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH
UFGA - 8381

AMTRUNK/1 in turn may be expected to keep AMCAPE/1 fully informed. There is no KUBARK control over AMTRUNK/1 or AMCAPE/1

B. This operation has a very high "flap potential" if any AMTRUNK agents are picked up by the opposition in Cuba. Not only will KUBARK stand to suffer, but ODACID will be tied directly in to the operation, as may also QKFLOWAGE, by whom AMTRUNK/1 is employed, and AMCAPE/1 and his newspaper, The latter could prove to be most embarrassing and should be fully recognized as a possibility, if not a probability, in the event any of the AMTRUNK team fall into Castro's hands.

C. The security of this operation has certain questionable aspects. At least six people were told about the operation in varying degrees prior to the time the team was safehoused. Two of the agents, AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, did not satisfactorily resolve the question of their security during LCFLUTTER tests. It is believed that AMICE/27 is withholding information of an unknown nature from his KUBARK contacts. An undercurrent of friction has recently developed between AMICE/14 and AMTRUNK/3 which manifested itself in a fistfight on 29 March. This was precipitated by AMTRUNK/3 who called AMICE/14 the Cuban term for a homosexual, the ultimate insult to a Cuban. This in turn gives rise to the question whether AMICE/14, with a possible history of homosexual activity (see UFGA-8411), has made such an approach to AMTRUNK/3.

D. The commitments made to AMICE/27 or which AMICE/27 claims were made to him are a matter of concern to the Station. This is an area over which future misunderstanding or aggravation might easily develop.

E. The Phase I landing point appears highly risky. It is within five miles of a cruise missile site radar, and in an area frequently patrolled by sea.

F. This operation appears possibly competitive with AMLEO/3 operations aimed also at penetrating high military levels for the same purposes. Given the lack of control in the AMTRUNK operation, the possibility of the two operations crossing or targetting on the same individual will be present.

3. In examining the strengths of the AMTRUNK operation, the AMTRUNK group as a whole represents superior agent materiel. Three of the four have been outstanding in training. They appear to have a number of fairly well placed contacts on the inside whom they expect to be able to call on for assistance. Although they have been out of direct touch with a number of these contacts for periods ranging up to two years, this is frequently the case in this type of operation. The objective of the operation is worthwhile.

4. Based on the attached operational review and the advantages and disadvantages outlined above, it is the recommendation of JMWAVE Station that this operation be terminated at the earliest possible moment. Since this operation originated at the Headquarters level, it is requested that Headquarters advise e JMWAVE as to its decision. In the meantime, training and planning will continue. If Headquarters' decision is to continue with the operation at this time, operational plans for Phase I and Phase II will be submitted as formulated.

END OF MESSAGE

PROJECT ANTRUNK OPERATIONAL REVIEW

I. STATUS REPORT ON TRAINING AND PROCESSING, 4-31 MARCH.

The AMTRUNK Team, consisting of AMICE/27, AMICE/14, AMTRUNK/2, and AMTRUNK/3 were safehoused on 4 March 1963 at Safesite #164 on Plantation Key. Andrew S. PARMERS, KUROAR instructor from headquarters, was already at the training site when the team was brought there by the two case officers, Irving N. PEGGINS and Hobart J. VANDEBORN. PARMERS remained at the safesite until 16 March during which time he conducted training in clandestine methods and techniques. This training included security, cover and compartmentation, clandestine communications, agent spotting, selection, recruitment and management, and operational planning and reporting. The training included group discussion and participation in a series of appropriate operational situations, several problems, and daily physical training. During this two week period, either PEGGINS or VANDEBORN visited the safesite every day, spending an average of two or three hours with the group in operational discussions and processing. During the week of 18 thru 23 March, both case officers spent a majority of the time with the group, debriefing them in detail on their operational contacts, working out operational details of their infiltration, and continuing their training on an informal basis. The week of 25 through 30 March was spent in PM-type training with emphasis on compass and map reading, including two night problems, and on weapons familiarization and firing. During the period under discussion the AMTRUNK group were all LCFLUTTERED, were assessed by the KUROAR assessment team, were given an initial series of immunizations, were issued clothing, were processed for alias documentation, were processed for disguises, and were further processed on cover and finance problems. The results of the LCFLUTTER examinations were sent to headquarters under cover of UFGA-8111, on 13 March 1963. Based on DIR 26430, no further LCFLUTTER is planned at the present time. Transmitted as attachment "A" to this dispatch is PARMERS report on his training of the AMTRUNK group, transmitted as attachment "B" are the results of the assessments of the AMTRUNK group, and transmitted as attachment "C" is the training report for the week of 25 March.

II. AMTRUNK MISSION OBJECTIVE

The project AMTRUNK Mission objective is to overthrow the existing Cuban government by means of a conspiracy among high level military and civilian leaders of the government culminating in a coup d'etat which will oust both Castro and

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the Communists from power. A secondary and subordinate mission is to determine the climate prevailing among the populace in Havana for organizing resistance elements capable of either passive or active sabotage. This secondary mission is exploratory in nature only, through the first phases of the project. In order to accomplish the foregoing missions, the operation has been split into two initial phases, which will.be compartmented from each other. Phase One involves the black infiltration of AMTRUNK/2 and 3 on the north coast of Havana province. These two individuals plan to go into Havana for a period of approximately two weeks, and then exfiltrate black from the same point at which they infiltrated. Phase Two, involving AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, will consist of black infiltration through the keys area on the north coast of Matanzas. These two individuals will likewise go into Havana for a period of several weeks and then exfiltrate black. These two phases are discussed in detail in following paragraphs. Phase One and Phase Two are preliminary infiltrations designed to set up infiltration/exfiltration routes and to make initial contacts among certain select high level military figures in Havana. The following paragraphs discussing these phases are not designed to be operational plans. Detailed operational plans for each phase will be forwarded as developed.

III. PHASE I.

A. AMTRUNK Personnel

1. AMTRUNK/2 is a (21) year old Cuban who is mature for his years, and in some degree experienced in clandestine operations. He attended Catholic Social Universit in Havana for two years, majoring in Social Studies. Prior to Fidel's takeover A/2 was allied to student elements of the Partido Autentico which upheld the constitution of 1940. He supported the revolution against Batista till it became apparent that Castro had cast his lot for a Communist regime. During his university years from 1959 to 1961 he was actively engaged in supporting anti-Castro groups with weapons and materials. Following the Playa Giron invasioná great many in the Havana underground were rolled up but A/2 avoided compromise. He continued in this work through 1961 and finally left Cuba via air in January 1962. Although A/2 does not consider himself an ally of KUBARK he has been cooperative throughout his/training. He is a pensive individual who displays good judgement. His present attitude towards KUBARK appears to be one of "wait and see". In the meanwhile, he is conscientiously applying himself in preparation for his mission.

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14
2. AMTRUNK/3, a 22 year old Cuban, in contrast to A/2, is volatile, immature and impulsive. On the other hand he is quite loyal to A/2 and his quick wit is appealing to his fellow team members. He worked under A/2 in the underground as an action type, principally engaging in sabotage. His underground work began while he was in secondary school when in 1958 he supported the revolution against Batista. In late 1960 he sided with the counter-revolutionaries and began full time anti-Castro activities. After the crack down following the Bay of Pigs invasion he avoided detection and continued to engage in underground activities. Finally when the situation became hopeless he left Cuba by air for Miami in August 1962. While A/3 has performed satisfactorily in his training up to date, his performance falls far short of the other three members. A/3 feels KUBARK should only function as support for this operation and should not interfere in the actual plans of the operation. Fortunately his role in this operation is comparatively minor and he appears willing to comply with whatever A/2 decides. Nevertheless, direct control of A/3 offers problems in the future,

B. TASKS

1. Conduct black infiltration landing at Punta La Jijira
and establish contact with the farm manager at A/3's father's farm in the Galera section.

2. Through contacts of A/3 obtain transportation for A/2 to Guanaba or Havana.

3. Although not definite, A/3 may remain at his father's farm and train assets in maritime reception and clandestine communications. Having completed this he would then be ex-filtrated at Punta Jijira.

4. A/2 will go to Havana and obtain safehouse and operational support through his contacts.

5. A/2 will contact and develop two potential assets with high level connections within the Rebel Army.

6. A/2 will train support and operational assets in clandestine communications as well as arrange for transportation for his exfiltration..

7. Exfiltration of A/2 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido

C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS
:
1. The tentative date for the infiltration of A/2 and 3 at Punta La Jijira is 18 May 1963. The infiltrees will make their way to A/3's father's farm one kilometer from the coast and from there A/2 will be provided with transportation to go to Guanabo or Havana.

2. The exfiltration of A/3 will occur three days after his infiltration. This arrangment, as yet, is not definite.

3. The exfiltration of A/2 is tentatively planned for 31 May 1963 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido. A/3 feels that Puerto Escondido would afford a more secure point for exfiltration but that a reconnaisance of the area would be necessary before final decision is reached. Prearranged telegram signal would indicate his preference.

4. The above dates fall within a favorable moon phase for maritime operations. In addition the infil-exfil schedule will allow for an extra margin beyond the 10 days which A/2 considers the minimum acceptable period of time to make his contacts..

D. OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA

1. Following the successful infiltration of A/2 and 3 the 24 two men will work their way to aufarm owned jointly by A/3's father and Santos SUAREZ located 1 kilometer from the point of infiltration. 06 They will make contact with the manager of the farm named (Pedro CRUZ.) CRUZ) is (35 35 to 40 40 years years of age, is married and has an elementary school education. He has no record of underground activity. A/3 will depend upon CRUZ to make the following contacts in order to obtain transportation to Guanaboor Havana:

a. Roman HERNANDEZ lives a few kilometers away in Sierra del Arzobispo HERNANDEZ owns a small farm and a 08 butcher shop in the area and also owns a truck. He is 37 to 40 years of age, married with six or seven children. He was jailed for a brief period in the past for counter-revolutionary activities.

b. If CRUZ is unsuccessful in getting Kruck he contact Augusto MACHIN who operates a farm next ed to 4/3's father's farm. He is 45-50 Years old, married, no children, wife's name is Alicia) He was the mayor of Santa Cruz del Norte in 1954. He owns a jeep.

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Another contact of A/3 is Ramon CALZADILLE) age 21, single, 8th grade education. He provided support in the form of food and safehousing to underground workers in the past. His home address is Corojo #1, Cotorro, Havana. He owns a butcher) shop in the Cotorro) section of Havana. Subject will be contacted by A/3 if he needs to be safehoused in Havana.

2. The following assets would be contacted by A/2 after arriving in Havana. They will be contacted in the order listed. Their function will be to provide safehouses and vehicles for A/2.

a. Elsa Maria NEGRIN, 25 years of age, born in Havana. A/2 first met her when she was a student at the University of Havana majoring in Social Sciences. Presently she lives with her aunt in Havana and A/2 has maintained correspondence with her. She has helped previously in providing safehousing for the underground. She also has a car.

b. Pedro ro IGLESIAS Betancourt, age 55 55) born in Havana. He is physician who lives and practices (medicine) in Havana.IGLESIAS has helped A/2 in underground activities previously. He has a brother, two daughters and a son now residing in the U.S. His daughters live in' New Jersey and were last seen by A/2 about six months ago. Subject was a member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano an anti-Batista group, and was a professor of medicine at the University of Havana up until 1961 when he resigned. IGLESIAS is also a close friend of (Elsa NEGRIN)

c. Sergio . MENDEZ age about (50) born in Cienfuegos, a former Senator (1954) as well as the former head of the 08 Railroad system in Cuba. Subject was originally a member of the Autentico Party and claimed, to be a KUBARK confidante during Castro's takeover. MENDEZ has an apartment and two cars and has previously helped A/2 in underground activities. He has a daughter who works for the government but is not sympathetic to the regime. The husband of this daughter, however, works for Che Guevara A/2 has maintained correspondence with (MENDEZ

d. Isabel MENOCOL), age about 35 born in Havana, single. Subject is an English teacher who runs a small private 08(tutoring school in English in Havana. She was A/2's English teacher and offered support to the underground. MENOCOL lives by herself, has an automobile and is a close friend of A/2 and his wife.

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e. Gloria BAMCIALLA) age (23-24) born in Havana, single, mother and father deceased. She attended the University of Havana and Villanova from 1959 to 1960, She became a close friend of A/2 during their student days in Havana,odshe has no record of underground work. She lives in Guanabo Beach) during the summer. A/2 felt he might attempt to contact her if she was living at of Guanabo Beach in order to safehouse A/3 there if necessary

3. The following two operational assets will be contacted by A/2 after he is safehoused in Havana. Their function will be to spot Army officers disaffected with the Castro Regime.

a. Jorge VALS) age late 30s early 405) married. Subject holds the rank of Captain in the Rebel Army but is not presently on active duty. He was a friend of Castro's during the revolution and A/2 claims he still maintains some contact with Fidel. He also claims VALS has been working in a limited fashion against Fidel and was originally associated with the MRR and Monte Cristo groups. VALS primary interest has been trying to organize his friends within the Rebel Army against Fidel. A/2 feels VALS is a very discreet individual who has not been identified as an anti-Castro organizer by of. the G-2. A/2 claims to be a close friend of (VALS) and trusts him completely. A/2 saw and talked to (ALS) in (1962) prior to his flying out of PBRUMEN as a refugee

. Jose DUARTE Oropesa) age early (40) served in the U.S. Army during World War II. According to A/2, 58 DUARTE was made commander of the 5th Military District by Camilio Cienfuegos Following the disappearance of 06 Cienfuegos (DUARTE was removed from the post and presently lives on an Army pension as well as royalties from property confiscated by the government. He said DUARTE started working against Castro within the_MRP under Manuel RAY. For a timehe was the military of secretary of the MRP and became quite involved in plotting against Fidel. 06A/2 also stated that it was rumored at the time that DUARTE was working for the MRP that he was also a KUBARK agent. Eventually 06 DUARTE was placed on a G-2 suspect list, but according to A/2 (DUARTE was able to evade detection. Subject has good connections within the Rebel Army and revolutionary government. A/2 trusts this individual and has confidence in him as a potential operational lead in spite of conflicting reports which mention DUARTE as an opportunist.

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c. A/2 may also attempt to contact the following operational asset if he has an opportunity to make contact..

(Lester RODRIGUEZ) age (late 30s early 40s, married, former member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano. He fought with Raul Castro in the Sierra Cristobal Area. Following the Castro takeover he served as head of Jo8 one of the military zones within Havana province. Eventually he was given desser assignments and A/2 thinks hears now working in INRA in Oriente Province. He claims RODRIGUEZ assisted his underground group during 1961 by supplying trucks for transporting weapons and materials.

E. COVER AND COMMUNICATIONS

1. Cover

A/2 will be issued documentation claiming he is an employee of a local brewery in Havana. A/3 on the other hand will be issued documentation as a bus driver within the city of Havana. Both will also be issued drivers licenses and additional items such as immunization certificates, Cuban receipts, etc. The two men will also be outfitted with disguises.

2. Communications

Primary communications will be established through an SW system. Both men will be given SW instruction and will be issued accommodation addresses in Miami. This instruction and these addresses in turn will be passed on to the recruited assets in PBRUMEN for use as the operation develops. Pre-arranged signals will also be devised for use by the team via telegram to indicate their progress and confirm their place and time of exfiltration. Both members will also be given an OWVL system to provide them with quick instructions in case of an emergency.

F. OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY EVALUATION

1. The operational aspects of Phase I portrays a mission which has considerable potential but also considerable risk. The area of infiltration is within five miles of a cruise missile site and its accompanying radar. In addition boat patrols are known to work this portion of the coast at frequent intervals. Once infiltrated the team will not have to travel far before their first contact. However, A/3 is leary of staying at his 24 father's farm for any length of time and he does not want his 24 father to know of his presence in Cuba. For this reason the farm will not be able to serve as a safehouse. A/2 plans on leaving the farm the same day he lands. This presents the problem of what to do with A/3. On approach is to take A/3

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to Guanabo or Havana and safehouse him. This, however, may jeopardize the operation because A/3 lacks the maturity and patience necessary to stay put while A/2 goes about his business. He may take advantage of his visit to Havana to undertake a clandestine assignment on his own. When A/2 and 3 step ashore in Cuba, control will vanish. Fortunately A/2 has a sufficient resource of judgement to go about his business compétently. Unfortunately A/3 gives no such indication. For this reason an attempt will be made to steer A/3 towards developing assets around his father's farm with maritime reception capabilities.
24

2. A/2, on the other hand, appears to have a sufficient numbe of supporting assets to provide for his safety while in Havana However, he has not seef VALS and (DUARTE for over a year. In addition both men are presently outside of the Cuban Army organization and this position may dampen their effectiveness in recruiting within the Army. Station reports of DUARTE conflict with A/2's evaluation of this man. While there is no evidence to verify that (DUARTE is pro-regime, there has been a recent report on him from AMLEO/3 which claims (DUARTE is an opportunist who might work for the highest bidder. A/2's rebuttal to these remarks is that DUARTER DUARTE Kas assisted him in the past and when the chips were down he continued to aid him in his underground activities. This still leaves a question mark next to the worth of DUARTE Which unfortunately can only be resolved by direct contact between him and A/2. There are other security implications which should be discussed in this evaluation. Both A/2 and A/3 cannot be considered truly security conscious. While safehoused A/2 wrote a letter to a contact in Miami which was to be transmitted by his case officer. The letter gave an indication that A/2 was seeking contacts in Havana and conveyed the impression that a trip was in the offing. A/2 has written several other letters not seen by his C Os which might have given the same impression. A/3 on the other hand talked quite freely about his operation to four friends in New York prior to coming to Miami and being safehoused He explained that he was joining AMICE/27 and AMTRUNK/2 on an operation that would take them first to Miami and then to Cuba. Once there they would go to his father's farm and begin to make contacts. A/3 also stated that a man named DUARTE would be one of their contacts. This loose talk coupled with A/3's attitude that KUBARK exists only to serve him makes him a marginal candidate for this operation. However, if A/3 is exfiltrated three days after his entry into Cuba, the operation will gain his usefulness and eliminate some of the risk he presents.

- १ -

3. The above evaluation stresses the operational and security weeknesses in this operation. In contrast to these weaknesses are the positive considerations of this mission. A/2 has the intelligence, competence, and confidence to approach and recruit two assets with the potential for developing anti-regime operations at a high level within the Cuban Army. The results which these anti-regime activities can accomplish is a matter for conjecture but it appears that they carry potential. Nevertheless, if the operation continues, it will bear close watching in terms of security and control for these factors will jeopardize the operation as well as KUBARK's position if not properly contained.

IV. PHASE II

A. AMTRUNK PERSONNEL

1. AMICE/27, senior member of the AMTRUNK group, is a 41 year old PBRUMEN citizen from a wealthy high class family. His father, now deceased, was a prominent individual in law and politics and was at one time a senator. A/27 himself graduated from law school in Habana and was a practising lawyer. In 1959 he became legal adviser to Camilio Cienfuegos. Following the disappearance of Cienfuegos in October 1959, A/27 began to engage in counter-revolutionary activities. In May 1961, at which time he held the position of Under-Secretary of Public Works, he felt that his underground activities had come to the attention of the government and he took refuge along with his wife in the Venezuelan Embassy. He was given safe conduct from the Embassy to PBPRIME in late 1961. Subject is intelligent, articulate, and highly motivated. He has some experience in counter-revolutionary activities and has demonstrated an excellent capacity for learning clandestine techniques. He has a very large ego, and aristocratic pride, is very sensitive, and is quick to take offense, He is frank to state that he has a low opinion of KUBARK, that he is not a a KUBARK agent and he deeply resents any implication that he is working for KUBARK. He states that he is working for the overthrow of the present regime in his own country and that he will accept KUBARK aid and advice but will not accept KUBARK control. His attitude although not hostile, is frequently critical, and he presents a difficult handling problem.

2. AMICE/14 is a 26 year old Cuban citizen who is also a law graduate of the University of Havana. He has been involved much of his adult life in clandestine activities. Subject arrived by small boat in June 1961 in PBPRIME.He is highly motivated, is intelligent and objective, and has a very highly developed security consciousness, developed from his counter-revolutionary experiences. From January to July 1961 he made four, black infiltration/exfiltration trips to and from Cubaland PBPRIME, and has an excellent knowledge of the northern Matanzas area. He is easy to work

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with and has evidenced little of the hostilities or anti-KUBARK feelings shown by AMICE/278

3. AMTRUNK/4. Subject is a 49 year old fisherman from the Cardenas area who took refuge in PBPRIME in February 1963. He had previously assisted A/14 in infils and exfils and will be used as a maritime guide.

B. TASKS

1. Make preliminary black maritime infiltration by small boat onto Cinco Leguas Key (AMS Map 4085 III) to contact individuals who formerly assisted AMICE/14 in infil-exfil operations.

2. Through contacts on Cinco Leguas Key, organize a ratline into the mainland, including making arrangements for transportation into Havana.

3. Through the mechanism established above, move to Havana and obtain safehousing and operational support.

4. Make all necessary arrangements for subsequent exfiltration and future infiltrations.

5. Approach and recruit two key individuals with contacts among important military figures.

6. Establish internal and external communications.

7. Exfiltrate from Phase II.

C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS

It is tentatively planned to infiltrate AMICE/27, AMICE/14, and AMTRUNK/4 into the Cinco Leguas Keys area on or about 23 April. Subjects will take a small boat with silent motor into the Keys area and remain in the area for approximately three days, during which time they will remain black, keep the boat hidden in the mangroves, and contact individuals known to them on Cinco Leguas. They will make arrangements with contacts at that point to re-activate contacts of AMICE/14 on the mainland at Casualidad (Map 4085 III, Grid Square 1747) and contacts in the town of Marti and Cardenas. Plans will be worked out at this time with these contacts for a second infiltration in the latter part of May, at which time AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 will again go into Cinco Leguas and expect to be passed on through these contacts to Havana. Subjects will exfiltrate by small boat on or about 26 April and will be met by the parent craft in open water to the north of Cayo Cruz del Padre (Map sheet 4085 IV).

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D. OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA

1. Cayo Cinco Leguas. This key is used for production of charcoal and salt. Residents are reported solidly anti-Communist. A/14 has two contacts here that he used previously Gar Lezcano06
for infils and exfils. One is Tango" Gar Lezcano is a brother of Eustiquiano Garcia Lezcano (201-307338) 06 whom A/14 wanted to use as a guide in this operation, but who was already being utilized elsewhere The other contact is the owner of the Salina (salt drying beds) A/14 has not yet been able to recall this individual's name.

2. Finca Casualidad. This area is directly south of Cinco Leguas, on the mainland. Key contacts here are Antonio Garcia) (not related to Tango, above) and (Pablo Lopez) both of whom have small farms in the area.

3. Town of Marti. Contact here is"Perico" LNU. Subject is about 50 years old, is employed by INRA and has a jeep which was used previously by A/14 for operational purposes.

4. City of Cardenas. Contact is Pedro Barbi, owner of the Bate Marino restaurant. Subject is a close friend of A/14 who assisted him previously with transportation for maritime receptions Barbie) would be used to take A/14 and A/27 to Havana. Owns a car.

5. City of Matanzas. A-14 has a friend here named Carlos Pedraza who also assisted A/14 in underground activities in 1961. Subject is (60years old, married, and is a forman 08 of public works in the city. Subject has a son (Carlos) now in New York City Pedraza will be contacted for transportation to Havana. Owns a car.

6. Varadero. "Fifo" Pineiro) owns a car and was formerly a close friend of A/14. Subject was formerly active in the underground and might be used by A/14 in the event he could not use Barbi) or (Pedraza) for obtaining transportation. Pineiro is the brother of the communist Manolo Pineiro, aka "Barba Roja", but is reported to be anti-communist himself.

7. Havana

a. Adolfina (Suarez) More) Subject is single and lives with her mother. Is friend of AMICE/27 (possibly mistress) and can be used as safehouse keeper. Subject is sister of Rafael (Suarez) More), a Commandante inthe Navy) who, according to A/27, was at one time (chief of naval of operations His present assignment or location is unknown.

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b. Manuel (Garcia) Sanchez Is a close friend of A714 and is uncle of (A/14's wife? Can be used for operational support, a car, and safehousekeeping. Was formerly a Lt. in Oriente under Calixto Garcia but no longer in army. A/1.4 believes he is now an adminstrator of some type of industry in Havana.

c. Maria Josefa (Isalgue) Subject is aunt of A/14 and can be used as safehouse keeper. She is single, lives alone except for ten cats. Does not have a car. Was formerly a teacher but now has a pension and does not work.

d. Gonzalo (Lopez) de la Torre, Subject is a relative of A/27 and can be called on for ops support or safehousing. Subject has a car, is married, no children, is in his sixties.

(Bebo (Orozco) To be recruited by "A/14 as his principal agent in Havana. Subject and A/14 previously worked together in the underground. 06 rozco) was in the Sierra with Castro and also fought in Camaguey. He resigned from the army in February 1959, although he has maintained many contacts within the army. Was one time active in the Movimiento Democratico Martiano and was a friend of (Capt. Bernardo Corrales) who was shot by Castro in Pinar del Rio. Subject came to PBPRIME in April 1961 with A/14 to obtain arms and remained there 10 days, infiltrating back into Cuba without his absence having been known to the authorities. Was responsible for safehousekeeping (Vargas Gomez) 06 for nearly one month when authorities were searching for him. Will be used for intel collection and spotting on defectable army officers. He is also known to A/27, but not well. A/14 was last in touch with Orozco by letter about two months ago.

f. Ramon (Guin) Diaz. Subject to be recruited by A/27 as principal agent. Would be used for operational intelligence and spotting among disaffected army officers.. Would be kept entirely compartmented from Orozco) 06 Guin is an army Comandante, now managing a large INRA farm complex outside of Havana. He is known to A/27 and A/14, both of whom believe he can be contacted safely. He is anti-Communist and is one of the group of Camilo Cienfuegos officers contacted by A/27 in early 1961 to join in an overthrow of the government.

co-defendait-In CUBELA treeb - UN present.

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g. Target personalities who are suspected of being dis-affected and on whom A/27 and A/14 will attempt to gather information in Havana are as follows:

Comandante "Macho" Parra
1.
2.
3.
4.
Cdte. Oscar Guerra
Jose Pinares
Capt. FNU Lawton
" Manuel Avila
5.
6.
7..
8.
Cmdte. Rene de los Santos
Pedro Miret
Capt. Juan Nuiry
9. Cmdte. Rafael Suarez More
10. Capt. Fernando Fernandez Superville.
11. Capt. FNU Guerra Matos
12. Capt. Sandy Olivares
13. " Jose Fernandez Alvarez

These names have all been checked through JMWAVE RI and in most cases also with AMLEO/3. In a majority of cases there appears to be some evidence to indicate the subjects may be disaffected. In the case of Jose Pinares however, it would appear that he is completely loyal to the regime. This information was passed on to A/27 and A/14. RI files were negative on Avila and Lawton.

E. COVER AND COMMUNICATIONS

AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 will live black during their entire stay in Cuba. They will be equipped with alias documentation and with disguises. Both of them have previously lived in the Havana area and know the city well. They will be trained in Secret Writing (SW) and will plan to train at least two and possible three agents in Havana in SW, prior to their own exfiltration. In addition, it24 February 1967

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Estimate of Damage Which Could Accrue to CIA Miami Through Prosecution of the Rolando Masferrer Haitian Invasion Group

1. The decision by the Justice Department to seek a Grand Jury indictment against Rolando Masferrer and certain of his associates is a potentially explosive matter which could result in extensive damage to CIA activities in Miami. Recent adverse publicity on the national scene and in the Miami area have added substantially to the already sizeable embarrassment potential. Some of the main sectors of danger to CIA equities are described below.

2. Basic national publicity regarding student and foundation topics have already attracted attention of the local press to the CIA in general. Usually any reference to CIA covert activities leads the press to check files for references to any such activities locally. However, before this action could be taken, the story regarding the Pan American Foundation and the University of Miami broke, and the press immediately concentrated on this topic. The CIA Chief of Station learned through personal press contacts that this was partly a matter of luck and partly because of the friendly and cooperative attitude of these press contacts. Although several editorials highly critical of CIA have been published and the replay of wire service stories has been given much space, as yet there has been no local follow-up aimed at putting CIA or the CIA Station on the spot. However, the situation remains delicate, since, even with much good will, local newsmen cannot afford to let themselves be scooped by outsiders concerning stories in their own back yard.

3. Any new story, such as the 22 February story in Paris Journal Tribune on suspected CIA connection with recruitment of Cuban pilots for the Congo, the possible results of inquiry made on 21 February by three students connected with the University of Miami newspaper The Hurricane, or further revelations concerning the Pan American Foundation, could easily trigger publicity with an inevitable focus on the South Campus of the University of Miami and on the Miami Station cover firm.

4. As has been the case for the past six years, Dr. Henry King Stanford, President) and Dr. Eugene Others, Vice President and Treasurer) of the University of Miami,) have extended their fullest cooperation concerning the Miami Station and overall CIA interests and it is antic- ipated they will continue to do so. However, we believe there is a practical limit to the amount of pressure they could stand from their trustees) and from certain public quarters if there is a flood of publicity regarding CIA activities allegedly centered in or controlled from the Zenith Technical Enterprises Inc.), or its accused succesor, the Holman Corporation. In such a situation arises, it is conceivable that Dr. Stanford) would feel impelled to take some action aimed at disassociating the University of Miami) from any contact with the Holman Corporation. Since the Holman Corporation is ostensibly the tenant of the University of Miami) although on Federal property, the resulting action might involve a request for the termination of the tenancy agreement.

5. Even if the above circumstances did not exist, we would remain concerned regarding the possible effects of the prosecution of the Masferrer group. Although no Station agents or persons with whom the Miami Station has contractual arrangements are among the persons arrested or those who will be prosecuted, it will be very easy for the defense to drag CIA Miami into the case. The defense has only to obtain testimony (true or perjured) from one of the defendants, or to summon as defense witness one or more disaffected former agents of the CIA Station, in order to begin a chain reaction surfacing much detail and rumor concerning CIA operations against the Cuban target. Given the sizeable reduction of infiltration and Covert Action agents during the past year, a general feeling of frustration and lack of support for Cuban freedom attributed to passive U.S. policy and reduction of support in all sectors, the long standing animosity of certain exile circles against U.S. Government, notably CIA, and the evaluation that CIA now is the most vulnerable of Federal Agencies confronting them, exiles will be tempted to see an attack against CIA as accomplishing several purposes, that is, gaining acquittal, blackening CIA, and exerting pressure on the U.S. Government for a policy change.104-10104-10172

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DISPATCH

TO: Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: TYPIC
Contact Report - IDEN *A

ACTION REQUIRED-REFERENCES
ACTION REQ: See Para 4

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO- ACTION ACCOM-
POSED PLISHED

[X] MARKED FOR INDEXING attachment
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED
HEADQUARTERS DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
ABSTRACT
MICROFILM

1. IDEN A, a wealthy and prominent New Orleans businessman,
was recommended to JMWAVE and made available by Headquarters. He
had been cleared by Headquarters for JMWAVE use under date of 15
December 1962 in DIR-05291.

2. IDEN A was initially contacted for JMWAVE by Eli A.
SACHTSCHALE, who was introduced to him by the New Orleans KUJUMP
office on 27 December 1962. The JMWAVE cover situation was discussed
with IDEN A by SACHTSCHALE and IDEN A's assistance was requested.
IDEN A was first enlisted as the President of YOCOUGH, a JMWAVE cover
company. Also cleared and used as officers of YOCOUGH are IDEN D
and IDEN E. Although cleared and witting, these individuals are
contacted only when their signatures on YOCOUGH documents are re-
quired, all contact normally being with IDEN A. IDEN A also per-
mits use of his own company as a funding mechanism for YOCOUGH. He
has acted as a spotter for JMWAVE and has recommended several other
businessmen who are being used by JMWAVE. He has also made available
several oil companies in which he owns interests for use in back-
stopping cover of JMWAVE operational vessels. It is known that he
is used by Headquarters for several JBECHO activities IDEN A is
contacted several times each month by JMWAVE.

3. IDEN A has met Rufus E. MANGROLL and Colin R. HOWGRIND as
well as Eli A. SACHTSCHALE. He knows YOCOUGH, YOAFT and the JMWAVE
operational vessel IDEN B. He knows that Miami attorney IDEN C
participates in JMWAVE activities. So far as is known, he knows
no other JMWAVE personnel or assets.

4. It is requested that a 201 number be assigned IDEN A and
that it be made known to JMWAVE.

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

ATTACHMENT;
Identities u/s/c

DATE TYPED
12 May 65
DATE DISPATCHED
MAY 19 1965

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - C/WH/C w/att
u/s/c
CROSS REFERENCE TO
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-21422
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
201-

UNDER SEPARATE COVER
TO: UFGA-21422

IDENTITIES

IDEN A: Alfred J. *Moran
DPOB: Not available
Res: 8422 South Claybourne Avenue
New Orleans, Louisiana
Bus: 909 South Broad Street
New Orleans, Louisiana

IDEN B: M/V BARB
IDEN C: James Costello
IDEN D: Glean E. Magnuson
IDEN E: Robert T. Nieset
104-10104-10262

UNCLASSIFIED
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SECRET

FROM: E/BC
DATE 20 DEC 1967
TO: AC/EURBC
RECEIVED 20 Dec 67
COMMENTS 06C67-2367
TO: Office of General Counsel John Greaney
COMMENTS 1-3: Perm conversation - incidentally, din Thiet under State cover with my comps [??]

SECRET
Passed oral info To Mr Kossack That FBI Was given report in London fr. MI-5 Gout Garrison in Russell Foundation, on 2 Jan 1968
file

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of General Counsel
ATTENTION : Mr. John Greaney
SUBJECT : James Garrison

1. Per our conversation in the environs of the DD/P's office on 19 December, we have just received from [London] Station ascrap of information on Subject's activities. [MI-5, the British Security Service, has provided the following in a report on Americans who are in correspondence with the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation:

"Jim Garrison, District Attorney, Orleans, Louisiana
A secret and reliable source has reported that the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation has been in touch with Jim Garrison. Our source states that the initiative in this contact appears to have come from the Foundation and the purpose of it seems to be to persuade Garrison to write an article about the late President Kennedy's assassination which presumably the Foundation could use in some way."

2. [MI-5 has also passed this information to the Legal 24 Attache (FBI representative) in [London.] I would stress that [MI-5's source is very sensitive and request that this office be advised in advance if any executive action is to be taken on the basis of the above information.

Philip R. Fendig
AC/EURBC
14-00000
104-10104-10271
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JMWAVE COVER FACILY

A. NAME                  : Ace Marine Survey, Inc.

OFFICE ADDRESS        : Room 214, 2525 S.W. 3rd Street, Miami, Florida

MAILING ADDRESS       : P. O. Box 1337, Main Post Office, Miami, Florida

LOCATION                : Office of Attorney Norman S. Pallot

B. TYPE OF FACILITY: This is a Florida Corporation established by and
                       under the control of JMWAVE and certified to do
                       business in Florida. Ace Marine Survey, Inc. was
                       formerly known as Ace Cartography Company, a
                       corporation which had been certified to do business
                       in Florida on 11 July 1962. This Corporation was
                       amended on 4 November 1966 to its new name, Ace
                       Marine Survey, Inc.

                       The President of the Corporation is Alfred J.
                       Moran of New Orleans, Louisiana. Mr. Moran is a
                       very prominent businessman in the New Orleans
                       area. He is head of Kalvar and has investments
                       in a variety of businesses which include many oil
                       interests. He is known to Headquarters represen-
                       tatives particularly in Logistics.

C. OSTENSIBLE BUSINESS: Ace Marine Survey, Inc., is engaged primarily
                       in marine research including the study of marine
                       life and testing of marine equipment. However,
                       its general provisions permit it to perform almost
                       any corporate function.

D. USE                   : JMWAVE use of the Corporation is to provide cover
                       for a maritime vessel, the M/V SONORA. The Corpora-
                       tion provides status cover and payrolling of the
                       agents assigned to the M/V SONORA and the safe area
                       or berthing site from which the vessel operates in
                       the performance of its ostensible business.

E. FUNDING               : Method - This account is funded through the Bank
                       and Hall covert account at the First National
                       Bank of Miami by the following method: A check
                       in the total amount of the deposits is drawn on
                       this account. A credit ticket is obtained by our
                       cleared contact from the cash vault. This credit
                       ticket together with the appropriate deposit slips
                       for the various corporations is then turned over
                       to a teller, where it is combined with all other
                       transactions which are processed by that particular
                       teller on the given business day. Since the number
                       of transactions handled by a given teller may go
                       as high as 250 to 300 there is slight chance of
                       the deposits being attributed to the particular
                       credit ticket which accompanied these deposits.

                       Overt Attribution or Source - [Offshore Navigation
                       Company, 3503 Fern Street, New Orleans, Louisiana

SECRET

---

14-00000
SECRET

F. TAX STATUS            : This is a profit-making corporation and has met
                       Federal and State requirements as follows:

                       1) Corporation Federal Income Tax Returns.
                       2) Federal Withholding and Unemployment Taxes.
                       3) Florida State Unemployment Tax.
                       4) Florida Corporation Report and Tax Return.
                       5) Florida Intangible Property Tax Return.

G. AGENT IDENTIFICATION: The Corporation was providing status cover
                       and payrolling for 10 Cubans as of 31 January
                       1967.

H. ASSESSMENT OF VULNERABILITY:

                       1. Maritime Branch Assessment dated 6 March 1967:
                       This cover company should be affected little by
                       a flap. However, because of the berthing location
                       within largely tourist or recreation areas, its
                       commercial activity has been noted.

                       2. Cover Branch Assessment dated 6 March 1967:
                       A successor to Ace Cartography Company, Ace Marine
                       Survey, Inc., is currently used in connection with
                       the leasing of a waterfront berthing site for the
                       berthing of M/V SONORA, which is registered under
                       this firm. The firm also provides cover and serves
                       as well as the vehicle for payrolling the agent crew.

                       Ace Marine Survey, Inc., is engaged in the field of
                       marine research, including the study of marine life
                       as well as the testing of marine equipment.

                       In view of the current limited use of this cover,
                       the likelihood of exposure is considerably reduced.
                       However, if such an exposure did occur, it is felt
                       that the damage to either WOFACT or the officers
                       of Ace Marine Survey, Inc., would be of no great
                       import. The major likely "injury" that would be
                       sustained would be the denial of further use of the
                       berthing site and the need for re-naming/re-register-
                       ing the M/V SONORA.

                       In order to add depth and lend further substance
                       to the cover story, the officers of a legitimate
                       firm, Offshore Navigation Company, New Orleans,
                       Louisiana, which is engaged in marine research and
                       off-shore oil exploration activities, have agreed
                       to backstop the activities of Ace Marine Survey, Inc.
                       and to recognize the latter firm as a client.

SECRET

---

14-00000
SECRET

JMWAVE COVER FACILITY

CORESS                  : Ceres Enterprises, Inc.
                       Suite 1409 Biscayne Building, 19 West Flagler Street,
                       Miami, Florida 33101

ADDRESS                 : P. O. Box 5045, Main Post Office, Miami, Fla. 33101

FACILITY: Office of Attorneys George E. Brown and Thomas B. Duff

                       This corporation was established in Florida and
                       certified to do business on 10 March 1964. It was
                       established by and is under the control of JMWAVE.

                       The President of this corporation is Mr. Richard W.
                       Freeman, who is the retired Chairman of the Board
                       of Delta Airlines. He is also the principal owner
                       of the Coca-Cola Bottling Company in New Orleans.
                       In addition he has many other varied interests
                       including investments in oil ventures. He is ex-
                       tremely prominent in the New Orleans civic and
                       social structure.

BUSINESS: This corporation was established ostensibly to
                       maintain and operate boats for all types of marine
                       research.

                       : This corporation provided cover for maritime
                       vessels, the M/V BARB and the M/V JADE, and served
                       as the status and payroll mechanism for the agents
                       employed by this corporation.

                       Method
                       - This account is funded through the Bank
                       and Hall covert account at The First National
                       Bank of Miami by the following method: A check
                       in the total amount of the deposits is drawn on
                       this account. A credit ticket is obtained by our
                       cleared contact from the cash vault. This credit
                       ticket together with the appropriate deposit slips
                       for the various corporations is then turned over
                       to a teller, where it is combined with all other
                       transactions which are processed by that particular
                       teller on the given business day. Since the number
                       of transactions handled by a given teller may go
                       as high as 250 to 300 there is slight chance of
                       the deposits being attributed to the particular
                       credit ticket which accompanied those deposits.

                       Overt Attribution or Source - [Peterman & Peterman
                       Associates, P. O. Box 8103, Main Post Office,
                       Chicago, Illinois

SECRET

---

14-00000

ONCORD

SECRET

TAX STATUS            : This is a corporation for profit. It has met
                       federal and state tax requirements as follows:

                       1) Corporation Federal Income Tax Return

                       2) Federal Withholding and Unemployment Taxes

                       3) Florida State Unemployment Taxes

                       4) Florida Corporation Report and Tax Return

                       5) Florida Intangible Property Tax Return

AGENT IDENTIFICATION: None at this time.

ASSESSMENT OF VULNERABILITY:

1. Maritime Branch Assessment dated 6 March 1967 - The cover
   mechanism established by the Ceres Enterprises, Inc. was very
   secure during the period of its operation and remained so
   until the loss of one of its agents who was captured in Cuba.
   This made it necessary to terminate the activities of this
   corporation and transfer its activities to another entity.
   This was accomplished without any unusual events or actual
   public exposure. If any should occur at this late date, the
   damage would be minimal.

2. Cover Branch Assessment dated 6 March 1967 - This corporation
   is currently inactive and will become legally dormant after
   three years. It was placed in this status due to an operational
   flap which could have exposed the corporation. The last active
   tax return was filed at the tax year ending March 31, 1966.
   An additional tax return will be filed for the past tax year
   which will indicate no financial transactions.

   Its assets and activities were transferred to other JMWAVE
   entities. This corporation was established to provide cover
   for a Maritime Branch vessel and status and payroll cover for
   the agents assigned to it. The corporation is inactive and
   will be allowed to remain so. It was placed in this status
   due to a flap wherein an agent was captured in Cuba who had
   knowledge of this vessel and its ownership. There was no
   public exposure in the Miami area. However, because of the
   past incident the corporation should not be used in the future
   under its current name. While in use the corporation served
   very satisfactorily for the purpose for which it was established.
14-00000
104-10105-10271
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

UNCLASSIFIED IN NAL CONFICATIAL SECRET
ONLY
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Seymour R. Bolten EXTENSION NO. 7520
2 E 14 DATE 19 September 1974

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and DATE OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
building) RECEIVED FORWARDED INITIALS to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Mr. John Morrison
OGC 7 D 01 9/19/74 1. Attached is an ad-
vance informal copy of our
proposed security deletions
and revisions of the Hunt
galley proof. Please note
that this list has not yet
been reviewed by Mr. Blee
and is, therefore, still
subject to change.
2. The DDO panel that
reviewed the Hunt manuscript
has designated items, numbered
12, 14, 19, 21, 24 and 25, as
"hard core," by which we mean
that the Agency should insist
on their deletion or revision
and be prepared to obtain an
injunction and engage in
litigation should Hunt refuse
to cooperate.

Sasvoive
Seymour R. Bolten
SAB/DDO

CIA HISTUIMICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

C10
:
FORM USE PREVIOUS SECRET CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL. UNCLASSIFIED
3-62 FORMS USE ONLY

14-00000
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Manuscript and Galley Proof of Undercover:
Memoirs of an American Agent by E. Howard Hunt

NOTES: A. Pages and lines underlined
and appearing at the begin-
ning of the items below
refer to the galley proof.

B. Corresponding page and line
listings as they appear in
the manuscript are provided
in brackets at the end of
each item.

3
member
1. Rage 57, line, 6 from bottom of page; the name "Henry
Pleasants Mr. Pleasants retired under cover and his past
relationship should not be exposed. It is also recommended
that efforts be made to have the name "John Richardson" also
removed from the same sentence containing Mr. (Pleasants name.
(Page 96, line 17.)

2. Page 59, line 38 beginning with "However" and ending
on page 60, line 2 with "milieu". Rutherford T. "Pinky" Walsh
retired under cover and his CIA relationship should not bald
exposed. His assignment in Paris under student cover/is
similarly classified. The description of this activity just
a couple of pages before the author gratuitously mentions the
advisene
lack of an agreement between the Agency and the French barring (DA)
unilateral operations in France) (Item 4 below) is potentially
an additionally damaging blow to liaison relationships. (Page
100, lines 10-14.)

2
CONFIDENTIAL
CII
5/mc

14-00000

3. Page 63, line 21; the name "Frank Holcomb"
Mr. Holcomb retired under cover and his past relationship
with the CIA should not be exposed. It is additionally
recommended that the entire paragraph wherein Mr. Holcomb's
name appears (lines 21-24) should be deleted because it ac-
knowledges CIA operations in support of anti-communist political
operations in Italy. (page 105, lines 18-21.)

4. Page 63, line 30 beginning with "By" and ending with V.A.
"arrangement" on line 33, page 63. It is recommended that this
passage be deleted since its inclusion not only is not pertinent
2Yto the narrative but it unnecessarily jars, liaison with the
British and is an implied insult to the French/liaison services.
(page 106, lines 4-7.)

5. Page 66 beginning with "Finis" on line 24 and ending
with "world" on line 27. This passage describes a specific CIA
operation which resulted in the production and distribution of
an animated cartoon based on George Orwell's Animal Farm.
(Page 111, lines 6-9.)

6. Page 68, the pseudonym "John F. Rittenhouse" on line 34.
The author's original CIA pseudonym was classified, and even
though compromised, never appeared in the press and still exists
on various currently classified documents. (page 114, line 23.)

7. Page 71, beginning with "Spanish" on line 28 and ending
with "America" on line 20, page 72, and including the footnotes
on pages 71 and 72. This passage should be deleted because it
describes the Agency's role in subsidizing, producing and dis-
24 tributing "El Campesino's" book, Life and Death in the USSR.
121 [lines 1-16,
(pages 120 (lines 4-20, including footnote]
including footnote.))

8. Page 72 beginning with "Eudocia" on line 21 and ending
with "Scribner's" on line 32. This should be deleted because
it describes the Agency's role in the translation, publishing 24
and distribution of Eudocio Ravines' book, The Yenan Way. It
also describes William Buckley's role in that operation as a
CIA officer. (Page 121, lines 17-23 and page 122, lines 1-6.)

9. Page 73 beginning with "Mexican" on line 5 through
"Rivera" on line 8. This should be deleted because it not only
describes sources and methods but also identifies a specific
CIA operation. (Page 122, lines 19-21 and page 123, line 1.)

2
012
4/mc

14-00000
CO FIDENTIAL
U.A.
10. Page 73 beginning with "Communism" on line 14 and
ending with "reputation" on line 15. This passage could serve
to identify a former asset in Mexico who is still living. (Page
123, lines 7-8.)

VA
11. Page 73 beginning with "cover" on line 17 through
"legend" on line 19. This should be deleted because it identifies.
a CIA-sponsored cover arrangement in Bangkok. Furthermore, thig
particular type of cover, the movie industry, has figured in
earlier unfavorable publicity to CIA in other Southeast Asian
countries and thus serves to further render suspect the use of
such cover in still other areas. (Page 123, lines 10-12.)

12. Page 73 beginning with "planned" on line 22 through
"authentic" on line 5 of page 74 and including the footnote on
page 74. This should be deleted because it describes a specific
operation involving the forgery of a page of the Shanghai Post,
and also includes descriptions of sources and methods. (Page 123,
lines 15-23 and all of page 124 including footnote.)

13. Page 77 beginning with "technical" on line 19 through
"station" on line 21. This should be deleted because it describes
and authenticates a CIA operation. (Page 131, lines 2-4.)

14. Page 80 beginning with "surreptitious-entry" on line 9
through "Embassy" on line 12, page 82. This should be deleted
because it describes a specific, sensitive operation as well aszy
sensitive sources and methods including the acquisition of code
materials). (Page 136, line 3 through page 139, line 20.)

15. Page 86 beginning with "Greek" on line 18 through
"countries" on line 20. This should be deleted because it
identifies a specific operation and the foreign assets involved
in its support. (Page 147, lines 6-8.)

16. Page 95 beginning with "quasi-military" on line 11
through "East" on line 16. This should be deleted because it
describes various cover and support facilities used in Far East
Asian countries. (Page 163, lines 6-11.)

17. Page 95 beginning with "Hong Kong" on line 16 through
"Branch" on line 19. This should be deleted because it describes
an operation conducted jointly with a liaison service in Hong
Kong targetted against mainland China and as such is not only
damaging to current American detente efforts but is particularly
menacing to Hong Kong authorities in view of their proximity and
susceptibility to potential Chinese retaliatory pressures.
163, lines 11-14.)
substitute
(Page

" HK we non no
ent preative
CONFIDEN Reprudent
3/mc
C13

14-00000.
Hatiyi
to hel
through
18. Page 99 beginning with "disrupting" on line 5
"display" on line 27 and including the footnote on page 99. zy
This passage describes specific CIA operations in Tokyo targetted
against China and as such are not only damaging to current detente
efforts but are also disruptive to liaison relationships with
the Japanese .7 (Page 169 line 23 through page 170, line 22,
including footnote.)
"returned" on line 10. This should be deleted because it deithas
CORE
19. Page 102 beginning with "Despite" on line through
a and CIA operation
カグ/materials. (Page 175, lines 10-15.)
20.
Page 105 beginning with "wiretap" on Mne 6 through cauti
20
"surreptitious-entry" on line 7. Ought to be deleted since it Lit
refers to sensitive Agency sources and methods. (Page 181,
lines 2-3.)
fict
repho
21. Page 108 beginning with "tap" on line 17 through
with various operational proposals, activities including a
recruitment of an identifiable individual, as well as with
sensitive methods of operation, e.g., surveillance teams.
(Page 187, lines 6-24 through page 188, lines 1-15.)
"Embassy" on line 7, page 109. This passage deals intermittently dif
22. Page 109 beginning with "FBI" on line 21 through
"station" on line 26. The "Ramirez" operation. Describes an
operation which began with the FBI's spotting of a possible
Soviet intelligence agent. Since this information was then
turned over to the Agency, a question arises/concerning the
need to seek the FBI's prior comments. (Page 189, lines 6-11.)

23. Page 111 beginning with "The" on line 22 through
"triumvirate" on line 23. It would seem that an effort ought
to be made to have this passage deleted of changed since its
damage potential to liaison relationships wit With the Uruguayan
services is considerable, and it does jeopardize the current
careers and livelihoods of the Agency's contacts. who are re-
ferred to by date and position and thus, are Mentifiable.
(Page 192, lines 21-22.)
2 958

24.
Page 115 beginning with "I" on line 23 through
"department" on line 35. This passage should be deleted
because it describes Agency methods of operation acquisi-
tion and passage of information to and from a liaison service
as well as an overall Agency program of operational activities zy
within Uruguay involving the monitoring of forty-two telephone
lines". Page 200, lines 6-18)
---
love
CONFIDENTIAL
4/c
:
14

14-00000
CONFIDENTIA..
25. Page 116 beginning with "technical" on line 10
NOT IN
through "secrets" on line 29. This passage should be deleted PITSSAGL
because it describes a sensitive operation conducted (jointly)
with a liaison (Uruguayan) service (which involved code materials materials
(Page 201, lines 12-23 and page 202, lines 1-9.)
24
26. Page 122 beginning with "The" on line 8 through
"Djilas" on line 9. This passage should be deleted because it
attests to the Agency's subsidization of publication/of Djilas'
book. In addition an effort ought to be made to have the author
remove or appropriately alter the rest of the paragraph wherein
he refers to an Agency news service located in "Washington's
National Press Building". (Page 211, line 4.)
27.
Page 122 beginning with "from" through "Gaines" on
line 31. It is recommended that OGC's attention be called to
interpretations. (Page 212, lines 4-5.)
this passage in order that they be made aware of its possible Lax CE
28.
16464
Page 123 beginning with "Soon" on line 12 through
"Madrid" on line 35. This passage deals with the author's work
on several "Peter Ward" books and, later, his assignment to
Madrid. It is recommended that OGC's/attention be called to
this passage. (Page 212, last line through page 213, lines 1-23.)

29. Page 126 beginning with "Chief" on last line through
"officers" on page 127, line 5. This passage should be deleted
because it specifies the classified activities of a CIA officer,
Roger Goiran 03, His assignments in Tehran and Brussels), as well
as his involvement in the compilation of a classified "encyclopedic
study" are unwarranted disclosures of Agency methods. (Page 219,
lines 8-13.)

30. Page 130 beginning with "Free" on line 20 through "CIA"
on line 21. This phrase should be deleted because it could serve
to affect the life of one of the principals of the Free Cuba
Committee, Mrs. Marieda Bourgin, gin, a former witting contact, who
is now employed by the State Department. (Page 225, lines 10-11.)

31. Page 150, all of lines 14 through 16. It would appear
that this description of the author's contact with Dr. Barney
Malloy of CIA is very unfair to the latter. It implies that
Hunt had a special relationship with Dr. Malloy and an effort
ought to be made by OGC to have the author rewrite this version
in order to reflect Dr. Malloy's true role in this affair.
Page 260, lines 22-23 through page 261, lines 1-2.)
CONFIDENTIAL
3
BR
C15

14-00000-
(
CONFIDENTIAC
---
i.e., a
32. Page 220, lines 5 through 10. This passage concern-
ing the use of CIA alias documentation by Hunt and others in-
cludes loose language which implies that still another set of
documents was prepared by the CIA for Hunt's use
set of documents which was not mentioned during the recent
Congressional "Watergate hearings". As such this is misleading
and could serve to create additional difficulties for the Agency.
It is recommended that the OGC make an effort to have the author
rewrite this paragraph in order that this potentially damaging
language be removed from his manuscript. (Page 387, lines 4-9.)

alled "old"
to description of
Locuments.
6
CONFIDENTIA
016
104-10105-10277
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
OGC 74-1755

SECRET

30 September 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with E. Howard Hunt Re His Memoirs, "Undercover"

1. On 28 September 1974 Ray Rocca, Deputy Chief/CI Staff,
and I met in the DCD Washington Field Office with E. Howard Hunt,
his attorney William A. Snyder, Jr., and Snyder's associate
Thomas W. Coons. As the meeting began, Hunt asked if it was
being tape-recorded; I assured him that it was not. He said he did
not care; but that, if it were to be recorded, he would like to know.
We then embarked upon the review according to the plan under which
we would demand the deletion of three items as classified and then
proceed to the remaining 29 items, only if Hunt was cooperative on
the first three. He and his lawyers appeared very cooperative, and
accordingly, the meeting continued to cover all 32 items.

2. Changes were agreed to in the items set forth in paragraphs
12, 14, and 25 of the CI Staff memorandum of 19 September 1974.
These appear at pages 73, 80-83, and 115 of the galley proof and
concern the fabrication of the Shanghai post for a Mexican operation,
the entry into the Guatemalan Embassy in Mexico City, and the joint
CIA-Uruguayan telephone monitoring operation. The wording of the
agreed changes is as shown on the attached copies of the pertinent
pages of the galley proof. Essentially, these changes disguise the
identity of the fabricated newspaper and remove a reference to
journalists as agents; delete the word "Guatemalan" to make the
entered embassy non-specific; and delete the reference to listening
posts and telephone monitoring to make that paragraph refer in more
general terms to our ability to cover targets without referring to the
use of electronic surveillance.

SECRET
E-2 IMPDET
CL BY 058473

SECRET

3. We then proceeded to the 29 items which we would like to
see modified but which we could not consider classified. We made
this clear to Hunt and went through them one by one, discussing our
concern with each. Hunt contended that most of these items should
not be considered sensitive since they had been publicized extensively;
in some cases confirmed in testimony; and, in the case of other
items, the principals involved were dead. However, he agreed to
changes in the items referred to in paragraphs 1, 3, 17, and 32 of
the CI Staff memorandum of 19 September. These involve the deletions
of the names of Henry Pleasants and Frank Holcomb, both now
retired under cover; a direct reference to joint operations with the
British in Hong Kong against China; and the wording of his reference
to CIA alias documentation used by the Watergate burglars. The
language of this last item will be changed so that it no longer leaves
the impression that the documentation was prepared by the Agency
for this operation.

4. When we had finished, Hunt and his lawyers emphasized
as they had mentioned earlier in the meeting that it might be very
difficult to get the publisher to agree to changes in the unclassified
items. Mr. Snyder offered to present all of the items to the publisher
for change without distinguishing between the classified and unclassi-
fied items. He said he would do this without implying they were all
classified. I felt it necessary to turn down his offer because of the
risk of the publisher being unwilling to accept that many changes
with the result that we would have to go back to him on the three
classified items, thus presenting a situation similar to our retraction
of previously demanded deletions in the Marchetti book. I think
there would be some danger of the publisher using this in his adver-
tising and through reviewers for publicity purposes.

5. As we were leaving, Hunt showed me what was described
as a "comfort letter." This was a letter written by him to the
publishers on 17 May 1974 at the publisher's request which said
that in his opinion nothing in the manuscript violated any agreement
between himself and the CIA, nor would subject him to prosecution
under the espionage laws. As the meeting was ending, Hunt expressed
his hope that no publicity would be given to it and that the Agency
would not issue any kind of a press release. In view of the Director's
decision that we shall issue a press release, I took pains to persuade
Hunt that public acknowledgment of the fact that we had reviewed his

SECRET

manuscript would be in his interest as well as ours. He had referred
more than once during the meeting to the need to avoid the appearance
of "a bear hug"; in other words, collusion or cooperation between him
and the Agency, leaving an inference that the book was designed to be
a whitewash of CIA. In view of this, it was easy to convince Hunt
that an Agency press release would be in his interest. I would note
here, however, that both Mr. Rocca and I felt that Hunt and his
lawyers were genuinely cooperative and that a press release which
is too harsh or denigrates the book or Hunt's motives might be unfair
and considered by him to be in bad faith. Hunt appears to retain
admiration and respect for the Agency and seems convinced that
nothing in his book will harm our operations or personnel.

JOHN D. MORRISON, JR.
Acting General Counsel

Attachments

cc: Acting DDO
SAB/DDO
DC/CI Staff
O/Security
Asst. to DCI
Mr. Walter Pforzheimer
C/CCS
OGC:JDM:sin
Original OGC Subj: PUBLICATIONS
1 Chrono

SECRET
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10105-10290
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM: CHIEF, COVER & COMMERCIAL STAFF
TO : ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL
TITLE : MR. E. HOWARD HUNT ALIAS BIRTH CERITIFICATE
DATE: 11/02/1973
PAGES : 7
SUBJECTS : TOURIST CARD
JFK ASSASSINATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1A 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 06/21/04
COMMENTS : JFK37 : F10 : 20040112-1033571

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED 104-10105-10290

SECRET
2 November 1973
Ogo 73 2074

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting General Counsel

SUBJECT: Mr. E. Howard Hunt - Alias Birth Certificate

1. On 30 October 1973 I saw Mr. John S. Warner, Acting
General Counsel, to discuss two outstanding requests from the Special
Prosecutor's office in regard to U.S. passports which had been issued
to E. Howard Hunt and a MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD on Mr.
Robert Bennett's session with the U. S. Prosecutor Silbert in July 1972.
I handed Mr. Warner a memorandum listing the type, number and dates
of the 2 passports which Mr. Hunt was issued between 1950 and 1970.
In reviewing the information in this memorandum, I mentioned Mr. Hunt's
tour in Spain in the middle 1960's and the fact that I had been instructed
not to include Mr. Hunt and his activities in my inspection of the Madrid
Station in 1965. I also mentioned to Mr. Warner that I remembered two
discussions with Mr. Skip Dunn late in 1972 during which he inquired of
me whether CIA had ever issued an alias passport to Mr. Hunt. I said
that as I recalled, CIA did not initiate the issuance of a U. S. alias passport,
but that Mr. Hunt did have in his possession an alias travel document.
This came as a surprise to Mr. Warner. He had not been previously
aware that Mr. Hunt possessed a U.S. international travel document in
alias. As a result he called Mr. John Richards, Office of the IG, and
asked whether Mr. Richards was aware of this and whether Mr. Dunn's
reports provided this information. After an interval, Mr. Richards
called back and told Mr. Warner that I had provided information to Mr.
Dunn that Mr. Hunt had a tourist card in alias. According to Mr. Richards,
Mr. Dunn's memorandum quoted me as saying that my information came
from an " A-1 source." At that moment, I could not recall having made
such a statement.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY
059770

SECRET

SECRET

2. Upon my return from Mr. Warner's office, I consulted with
Mr. James W. Franklin, Chief, Official Cover Branch, CCS, with whom
I had discussed Mr. Dunn's inquiry in late 1972. I asked Mr. Franklin
whether he could refresh my memory. This he did immediately. He
reminded me that a newspaper article (Tab A) had appeared claiming
that one of the Watergate 5 had carried a U. S. passport in the name of
Edward Hamilton. This newspaper article had been seen by Mr. Robert
Johnson, Deputy Director of the U. S. Passport Office, who had had the
U.S. Passport Office files examined with negative results. Mr. Johnson
then determined from the FBI that the document involved was not a U. S.
passport in the name of Edward Hamilton but a tourist card in that name.
I then remembered that because the information came from the FBI via
Mr. Johnson, I had not identified the source of my information. I
immediately called Mr. Warner and advised him of the foregoing.

3. Later in the afternoon of 30 October 1973 Mr. Franklin
came to my office with a number of documents. They consisted of a form
memorandum signed by me which was addressed to Mr. Hunt dated 29 June.
1970 (Tab B), a list of names numbering from 1 through 154, representing
true names (Tab C), and a second listing similarly numbered, representing
aliases (Tab D). Number 63 on the true name list reads E. Howard Hunt
and on the alias list, Edward Joseph Hamilton. Mr. Franklin explained
which I had forgotten -- that we had obtained from TSD this list of outstanding
alias birth certificates issued by TSD in an attempt to recall--if possible--
as many of these documents, or to determine what had happened to them.
(Most of these alias birth certificates were issued in connection with the
Bay of Pigs Operation.) The memorandum was never forwarded to Mr. Hunt
because by June 1970, he had been retired for 3 months. This memorandum
had not been included in Mr. Hunt's cover file but had been kept with the
working papers pertaining to the action trying to recall as many of the
outstanding alias birth certificates as possible. As a result, the repeated
reviews of Mr. Hunt's cover file had not yielded the information that an
alias birth certificate had been issued to him. 97 of the 154 aliases were
not previously recorded in the CCS central index and the indexing after the
acquisition of the list had been overlooked. The surfacing of these documents
at this time occurred because in re discussing Mr. Hunt's possession of an
international travel document in alias reminded Mr. Franklin of the 1970 CCS
exercise of recouping outstanding alias birth certificates. Discussions on the
same subject in December 1972 simply did not result in the same memory
association.

-2-
SECRET

S

4. In the late afternoon of 30 October 1973 Mr. Franklin and
I saw Mr. Warner, reported the foregoing facts to him, showed him
the documents, and agreed that we would ask Mr. Johnson to check
the Passport Office files once more to confirm that no U.S. passport
in the name of Edward Joseph Hamilton had ever been issued to Mr.
Hunt. The result of Mr. Johnson's check is still outstanding at the
time of this writing.

4 Atts:
A: News Article
B: 29 June 70 Form Memo to Hunt
C: True Name Listing
D: Alias Name Listing

ERICH W. ISENSTEAD
Chief, Cover & Commercial Staff

cc: IG via DDO
3
SECRET

1. AASAL, Glon 6175
2. SHERWOOD, John 11007
3. ADKINS, Matt 47-336
4. ADERHOLT, Harry Clay
5. RAGONA, Ferruggia R
6. BARAKAUSKAS, Algio
7. BROWN, James H.47479 12
8. SPEED, Horace III 8435
9. Amthrill (Crypto Kari Barreto
10. ROSENBAUER, William A.13915
11. SEWARD, Major William A. Jr.
12. BEALE, W. H.42-33
13. BENAS, Alis PR
14. BECERT, Jerome F.PK-12571
15. ERICKSON, Poul/4317
16. KINAMDER, James F.N
17. BARQUIN, Casimiro7797
18. BECKER, Alexanderp
19. BYZEK, Stophen Joe K-3097
20. BURKE, Paul J.7997
21. BRADFTELD, Tony Edward 42-338
22. SHERWOOD, John 11057
23. ELBERG, Robert L.2219
24. SHACKLEY, Theodore 67877
25. BRANTLEY, Herbert
26. BURKE, Paul J.
27. BLAIR, William 9121
28. CUNNINGHAM, James Allen Jr.
29. CHAS, Peter-

30. BARTLEY, Cletus Winton
31. CAREY, William David 4874
32. CARTER, William R.
33. CROCE, Andrew 4647
34. FLORES, Thomas J.
35. DAIGA, Janis T-421
36. DALEY, V. J.N/
37. CHIPMAN, Harold E.167.
38. DILLON, John 2.9540
39. DE GARDER, Constantine
40. DEICONS, William H.14465
41. DALY, Vincent S.1122
42. DUBOIS, Rone 2.9514
43. ZGAN, Frank J.FE
44. ENTERS, Rudolf A.10015
45. EDWARDS, William Monroe Jr.
46. Hone
47. HEATH, Donald R.
48. FUCHS, Robert H./
49. FRANKLIN, Lucian V. Jr.
50. FLICK, Charles E./765

51. Foto Peter 48-300
52. G7, Charles
53. C Greano, Aubrey
54. DRUCOLAT, Pedro Gonzalez Wh
55. GOUDIL, Cecil M101416
56. TISLER, Franticck 16173
57. GREET, Bill
58. GRAHAM, Barbara 9898
59. Howard
60. Kone
61. HAWKINS, Jack
62. HORI, Rufus 4. Jr.11749
63. HILDALGO, Barncy
64. HEWITT, Thomas 7.9922

65. HECHT, Elmer Edward152159.
66. IWASKIW, Andrijk
67. JENCSOK, Stephen
68. JANCHUK, Nicholas NK
69. JAROSZEWICZ, Sigmund E
70. JAUNZEMIS, Uldis WR
71. JOANSON, Ivar K 7428
72. JASUKOW, NikolaiWR.
73. KYKR, Benjamin Franklin
74. KAFUSTA, Peter/9178
75. KARKLINS, Zigurdsp
76. KRYZAMIVSKY, Myron
77. KOCELA, Paulkh
78. KAPPES, G.
79. KURTZ, Waiter MA
80. KIDA, Jack 10/30
81. KENNEDY, John W.77
82. KRUTYHOLOWA, Walter W
83. KREGZDYS, Joseph 25-105

84. LAMBERGS, Joha

85. LEE, Watson Hwa Shen10560
86. MAYERFELD, Ernest 5854
87. KLEIN, Theodore 6570
88. LOFUSZAUSKY, Myroslaw 47-50
89. LUPU, Andrei Kicolae
90. Unknown
91. MAHONEY, Philip J.48-536
92. CHIPMAN, Harold E.7168
93. MASLOVSKY, Sorge T-855
94. MARTINEZ, Ruben
95. SMITH, Haviland Jr.4593
96. MOORE, Andrew F.PK 25-5
97. MARSAK, Frank-2994
98. KRIESHELD, George R
99. MULANE, Corrald J. 25
Denial Susan doue Latorre TSD. 68

TRUE
107.
BARQUIN, Casimiro7777
TRUE
108.
MORALES David S.3643

109.
NEWMASTER, Harry Richard
110.
NASARENKO, Michael
111.
PIEPER, Harry C. 3-12-23
112.
PHILLIPS, William D.2610
113.
GREENE, Harris
114.
PASLAWSKY, Nicholas
115. PAWLYSZYN, Myroslaw
116.
FRANK, Maryado 40/
117. MOORE, Robert Butler 4271
118.
PRIBANYEC, Janos
119. None

120. RASTENIS, Jonas
121.
REYNOLDS, Malcolm Eugene/0ン??
122.
RAUS, Juri
123.
RIKAND, EnnoN
124.
AMLFO-3 (Crypt) Ni
125. RATCLIFF, Richard
126.
REEVES, John M. Jr.1069녜

127. REYNOLDS, Robert E.A.

128. RUCKER, Lucian O. Jr.107%4

129. SULLIVAN, Dennis B.5-3591

130.
STAROSTENKO, Henry
131.
IMLER, Norman C.8052
132.
SLEEPER, Gordon/10
133. None
134. None

135.
GONZALO, QUESADA Jr.
136.
SAGER, John 4192
-N-12-2

137.
SMITH, Edmund Gambrill.-48-338
L
138. SLENYS, Lindas K.
139.
SOLNZEFF, Henry/
140.
SOLER, Eva Diana
141.
SATINSKAS, Henry
142.
STEVENS, George A.
143.
WALLIN, Jack
144.
TASHEFF, Mary/1184

145.
AIMAN, James Henry W. 49-
146.
STOIAKEN, Nicholas P.1127
147.
TALLEY, Ulo/
148.
TURK, Leo L
149.
THOMAS,, Edward
150.
None
151. TRIANOSKY, Harry 347
152. VINING, James L.25-557-1
153. VAN COURTNEY, Donald
154. HARVEY, William K.r.C. 2375
155. BULIK, Joseph 3714
156.
WILL, Kenneth John 48-3
157.
SHORTALL, John W. Jr.14859
158. WATTS, Roy Furniss 25-3011
159. MERTZ, Richard
160.
None
161. ZANKIN, Myroslaw/
162.
ALAGAZE-1/(Crypt)

LODY GEYSKIRMI
1
C
R.C.74272/ACKS?, Gerald
45-555 20 די זקן, Glennon Edward(21860) 74こに。

1426
46875 NS3. FORDANO, John Non-425
174265. FROST, Frank
45-33855. FRYLTK, Robert Peter
Cla106) 45-33856. GERGARO, Charles Herry
113, Paul Rodger
48-3554. AVEY, Matt (21CGO)
パンフ45-705. ASHBOP, Howard Clay
NR6. AUDISTO, Mario
NS7. BARKTR, Algis
48-3788. BARNAUD, James Winston
18435-NR9. BARMER, Andrew Frank
M10. DARRETO, John Raymond
13915-21. BATER, William John
12. BAUGH, William James
45-37813. BELT, William Henry
NAL, BENTON, Alan
NRIS. SERUCK, Karl Donald -
14317NRI6. BERGETIO!!, David Bjorn
P-16817. BERGSO!!, Willisa Kinander
7/518. 18. BERTELLI, Charles Angelor
NAIS. REST, Alexander

(RC) K-307720 (T/BINSWANGER, Stanley Joo
17321. PORDEN, Paul Thomas Aquinas
BRADLEY, Thomas Edward
267 23. PREITHEIM, John Albert-
BRICK, Robert Lee
22.
2219 222.
15871725. BRICKHAM, Tad S. -
A/26,
BRIGGS, Herb
2-1734/8-22027. BROOKE, Paul Gregory'
841 N.28. BRUTON, Willian Emmott
110-29. CANTBELL, James Alan Tr
530530. CARNEY, Peter-

57. GENISMAN, Aubrey Lyle
50. GONZALEZ, Pedro Francisco
25.211/59. CUDING MARGAIN, Carlos
HABER, Frantisek 16183
3-154161. HAIR, William Mark
45-338
5557
7424
14162
62. HALLY, Roberta Shirley
N63 HAMILTON, Edward Joseph
NRG. HARRISON, Louise
MR65. HASKINS, John Martin
1174766. HEBERTEN, Roger Andrew ARMY
992767. HILLARY, Bernard Horman
18
IC
uf 68. "HODONICKI, Thomas Mark99
48.93670. HURLLY, Edward Elmar K-2156
MR71. IRVING, Andrew
№72. JACOBS, Stephan
NA73. JAMES, Nicholas
N174. JARECKI, Stanley
MA75. JETFRIES, Uldis 4
74.2876. JENKINS, Ivar
NATI. JUDD, Nicholas
((-21) (3101/18.
48033832. BOUTECK, Cletus Winton
33. CLINE, William David
1433734. CONPAD, WILLIAM Robert
5-165635. CROWE, Andrew Paul 447
303736. CURBELO, Eduardo
T-42137/DAILY, James
~! 38. DEKANSKI, Vincent Joseph
716839. DELAINE, William Alan
95400 40. DELLAFIORE, James Earl
NAL. DE LONG, Constantinc

KAKAK, Benjamin Franklin48-355
79. KARLQUIST, Paul-1007
N/80. KASARIAN, Zigurds
ARSI. KELLY, Kyron
M82. KENDALL, Paul
NA83. KEROUVER, George Michael/
N8L KERKSICK, Kalter of
85. KIMEY, Jack Anthony
i10
801 86.
KINSLOW, John William
8097
87.
KOLA, Walter
83. KOSTIK, Joseph
RC-25-10
N
N890. LANSING, John
10.5509217) LEE, Watson liwa Shen ARNY
M93. LETTER, Richard Ernest-
MART, Charles Edward
96. WPJ, Andrei Nicolae
M98. MAGLIE, Philip Joseph 48-3
13.
DRAKOS, Victor Samuel
9.5644.
DIBOTS, Rene E. ARMY
1570 95. LOVE, Myron
47-857
K-11685-
65-M-45.
EIGLSC!!, Frank Joseph
18016
MRLO.
ELFMONT, Rudolf Albert
10333 9767 LYONS, George H..
ARMY
スンストリー47.
47.
ELLEGOR, William Monroer
48.
EVANS, Arthur Hall
NA99. MALABRE, Howland Edward
7168
火.25550. FILECCIA, Robert H.
549, FARON, Charles Andrew
556148-7851. FITSALES, Lucian Charles
25-557103. MASCHGAN, Andrew Frank
C-2994104. MASON, Frank
:
N106. MOGAVIN, Gerrald, Joseph

44.
D
45.
E

46.
W

47.
48.

100. MALO OFF, Sorge.
T-85
W101. MARKSCHATT, Ruben
16704

:
14-00000
104-10105-10290 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
1. ASALIC, Cundaris
2. AASAL, Glen (103
3. SHERWOOD, Jen 11007
4. ADKINS, Matt 47-336
5. ADERHOLT, Harry lay
6. RAGONA, Ferruzcia R
7. DARAKAUSKAS, Al
8. BROWN, James 4.47177 1
9. SPEED, Horace 1118435
10. Anthrill-1 (Crypto Kauri Barreto
11. ROSENBAUER, William A.13915
12. SRWARD, Major William A. Jr.N
13. BEALE, W. 11.48-336
14. BENAS, Alis
15. BECERT, Jerome F.- 12571
16. ERICESOX, Poul/4317
17. KINANCER, James F.
18. BARQUIN, Casimiro77??
19. BECKER, Alexanderpl
20. BYZEK, Stophen Joo K-3097
21. BURKE, Paul J.7997
22. BRADFIELD, Tony Edward 47-338
23. SHERWOOD, John
24. ELBERG, Robert L.2-19
25. SHACKLEY, Theodore 6777
26. BRANTLEY, Herbert
27. BURKE, Paul 3.8497
28 BLAIR, William 9121
29. CUNNINGHAM, James Allen Jr.
30. CHAS, Peter-
32. BARTLEY, Clethus Winton47-
33. CAREY, William David 1274
34. CARTER, William R./4/
35. CRCCE, Andrew 4541
36. FLORES, Thomas J.
0337. DAIGA, Janis T-1421
38. DALEY, V. J.N/
39. CHIPMAN, Harold E..
40. DILLON, John 2.9540
41. DE GARDER, Constantine
42. DEICONS, William F.12465
43. DALY, Vincent S.11227
44. DUBOIS, Rono 3.9514
45. ECAN, Frank J.
46. EXTERS, Rudolf A.1001
47. EDWARDS, William Monroe Jr.
.: 48. Fone
49. SHEATH, Donald
50. FUCIES, Robert H.
51. FRANKLIN, Lucian V. Jr.
52. FLICK, Charles E.
53. VIMA, P420
55. Peter 48-3
57. Greano, Aubre
58. CCLAT, Poore Gonzalez
59. GOUT, Cecil 1014/6/
60. TISLAR, Frantisek 10173
61. GEET, Bill
62. GRAHAM, Barbera 9918
63. Ioward 91088
65.
66. HOR, Rufus 4. Jr.11749
67. KILDALGO, Barncy of
68. HEWITT, Thomas 9922
70. HECHT, Elmer Edward155-215
71. IWASKIW, Andrijk
72. JENCSOK, Stephen
73. JANCHUK, Kicholas
74. JAROSZEWICZ, Sigmund E
75. JAUNZEMIS, ULANK
76. JOANSON, Ivar 7428
78. YR, Benjamin Franklin 3
79. KAPUSTA, Peter197
80. KARKLINS, 21gurds
81. FRYZAINSY, Myron
82. KCCELA, Paul W
83. KAPPES, G. (en)
84. KURTZ, Kaiter
85. KIDA, Jack 3/3
86. KENNEDY, John W.7
87. KRUTYHOLOWA, Walter
88. KREGZDYS, Joseph-93-5-1
90. LAMBERGS, Jo:
92. LEE, Watson Hwa Shen10580
93. MAYERFELD, Ernest 5854
94. KLEIN, T:cocore 70
95. LOFUSZAUSKY, KATOSlow 47-5
96. LUPU, Andrei Nicolao///
97. Unknown
98. MAMONEY, Philip 1.48-331
99 CHIRMAN, Harold 1.7168
100. NASLOVSKY, Sorgo T-85
101. MARTINEZ, Rubon
102. SMITH, Haviland Ur.45
103. MOORE, Andrew
1045 NARSAK, Frank
105. KRIESHELD, George R
106. MULANE, Gorrale 2
Denial Susan For Latorre) TSW. 6:
10-
03

14-00000
107. BARQUIN, Casimiro/
108.
TRUE
MORALES David S.3643
TRUE
151. (ΑΙΜΑΝ, James Henry
Henry: 48
152.
STOIAKEN, Nicholas P.11
110. NEWMASTER, Harry Richard
153. TALLEY, Ulo
:
111.
NASARENKO, Michael
154. TURK, Leo L.
112.
PIEPER, Harry C. 3-12-253
113.
PHILLIPS, William D.2010
156.
(THOMAS, Edward
114.
GREENE, Harris
157. None V
115.
PASLAWSKY, Nicholas
116.
PAWLYSZYN, Myroslaw
117.
FRANK, Maryado 2:1
i
118.
MOORE, Robert Butler 27
158. TRIANOSKY, Harry 349
159. VINING, James L.55-557
160. VAN COURTNEY, Donald
161. HARVEY, William K...
119.
PRIBANYEC, Janos
162. BULIK, Joseph 3724
120.
None
03
163. WILL, Kenneth John 47-33
164. SHORTALL, John W. JrJ48
121.
RASTENIS, Jonas.
165. WATTS, Roy Furniss 25-301,
122.
REYNOLDS, Malcolm Eugene/0??
166.
MERTZ, Richards01
123.
RAUS, Juri154
167.
None.
124. RIKAND, Ennow
168.
ZANKIN, Myroslaw
125.
AMLFO-3 (Crypt) Ni?.
12603 RATCLIFF, Richard
127. REEVES, John M. Jr.10691
:
129.93 REYNOLDS, Robert E.
-
169. ALAGAZE-1/(Crypt)
LODYOEYSKILOM

131.03(RUCKER, Lucian O. Jr.10704
AIP
:
:
:
133.03(SULLIVAN, Dennis B-3591
136. STAROSTENKO, Henry
13793 IMLER, Norman C. 8052
138. SLEEPER, Gordon
139. None✓
140. None/
14123 GONZALO, QUESADA JI
: 142. SAGER, John 4192
N-12-2
143. SMITH, Edmund Gambrill.-48-338
144.
SLENYS, Lindas K.
5.03 SOLNZEFF, Henry
146.
147.
148.
SOLER, Eva Diana
SATINSKAS, Henry
STEVENS, George A.
149. WALLIN, Jack,
150. (TASHEFF, Mary/1184
03

14-00000

R.c.74 27
/ACKS?, Cerald
16615 NS3. For Jonn-425
45-558 2.1 Glenmon Edward2102601742. FROST, Frank
13.R!!, Paul Rodger
,
146
45-3
*-31855. FRYLTK, Robert Peter
48-3554. AVEY, Matt (2106060) 10.60)/45-77556. CERCARO, Charles Henry-5557
ピン7348-7505. ASHBO, Howard ClaST. GENTS, Aubrey Isic 9924
NL6. AUDISTO, Mario
NS7. BARKER, Algis
48-3588. BARNAUD, James Winston
07
1843579. BAPMP, Andrew Frank
N-10. DARREMO, John Raymond
13915-21. BATTE 1. BAKER, William John
12. BAUGH, William James
95-7813. BELT, William Henry
NAIL, BENTON, Alan
•
14317NRIC. BERGETIO!!, David Bjorn✓✓✓
P-16817. BERGSO!!, Willisn Kinander
17/518. (BERTELLI, Charles Angelo
NK19. FEST, Alexander✓
(RC) K-37720 (T/BINSWANGER, Stanley Joo
-173-8921. PORDEN, Paul Thomas Aquinas
BRADLEY, Thomas Edward-
NRIS. BERUCE, Karl Donald -
22.
1067 23. PREITHEIM, John Albert
2017. BRICK, Robert Led
871225. BRICKHAM, Tad S.07.
M-26, BRIGGS, Herb
50. GONZALEZ, Pedro Francisco
25.211/59. CUDIIC-MARGAIN, Carlos
ラー154161. MAIF, William Hark
Heo. HABER, Frantisek 161835
•
Nio3. RANILTON, Edward Joserin
NRE. HARRISON, Louisa
:
1414
R65. HASKINS, John Martia
1174766. FEBERTEN, Roger AndION ARMY
992767. HILLARY, Bernard Horman
uf 68. FODONICKI, Thomas Mark
748293670.
HURLEY, Edward Elmer
PR71. IRVING, Andrew
72. JACOBS, Stephan
73. JAMES, Nicholas
MA74. JARECKI, Stanley
MA75. JEFTRIES, Uldis 4
74.2$76. TIJENKINS, Ivar
N77. JUDD, Nicholas
(C-21)
-1734/8-120 27. BRCONE, Paul Gregory
841728. BRUTON, Willian Emmott
9781
5365 --29. CAMPBELL, James Alan Jr.✓
50530. CARNEY, Peter
48033832. BOLTECK, Cletus Wintor(28)
33. CLINE, William David
1433134. CONPAD, WILLIAM Robert
•
ラー165635. CROWE, Andrew Prul47
303736. CUPBELO, Eduardo
T-421 37/DAILEY, James
N
38.
Joseph
-
716539. DETAINE, William Alan
95400 40. DELLAFIORE, James Earl
DE LONG, Constantino✓✓✓
48-33642. DONATE, William Henry2f65
23. DRAKOS, Victor Samuel
9.5644.13 DUBOTS, Rene E) ARMY
K-11655- 5-N-45. SIGLSC!!, Frank Joseph
CARLO ELFORT, Rudolf Albert
スンスンパー47. ELIECOR, William Monroe
48. EVANS, Arthur Hall ✓
1549, FARON, Charles Andrewy
2550. FILECCIA, Robert H.
4
به
90
K-2156
(3/01/18. BACKYAK, Benjamin Franklin 48-3
79. KARLOUIST,
Pauly-1065
N/60. KASARIAN, Zigurds
81. KELL, yron
82. KENDALL, Paul
83. ROVER, George Michael/
84. KERASICK, Walter THAN
85.
KIMEY, Jack Anthony
801 86.
87.
FINSLCW, John William
KOLA, Waiter
07
N
i10
SC9
83. KOSTIK, Joseph KC-2.5-.
N890. LANSING, John
10.5509217LE, Watson iwa Shen) BARNY
93. LEITATA, Richard Ernest 57-5
وشتMART, Charles Edward
ESTE PL95. LOWE, Myron
47-157
196. LWPJ, Andrei Nicolae
103339765) YOS, George H..
ARMY
MK98. MAGIJE, Philip Joseph 48-
99. MALAERE, Howland Edward-6
100. MALCEOFF, Sorge.
T-8.
W101. MARESCIATT, Ruben 16202
459 3102. MARSAL, Far
Lauren
1218-77551. FITSALES, Lucian Charles 25.557103. MASCEGAN, Andrew Frank
15765/13052T ET FLICK, FLICKR 3 Charles E
3

14-00000
-3-
4.
107.
ALIAS
07 1197
MENICUCCI. Andrew Robert-
3647108. MIRANDA, Diego S.
NK110. NACHBRUNN, Harry Richard
ALIAS
48-335151. STEVENS, James Henry
152.
None
153.
None
154.
TANIER, Lester Lewis
P111.
NASH, Mike
07
N
112.
113.
PANOCK, Harry Charles
PAPPS, William David
3-134-63348-358156.
TOGGITT, Edward J.
$610
N157. TORREY, Erasmus
MX114.
PARKER, Carl Frank ✓
349158.
TRABAN, Gregorio R.
116.
PAULSON, Marty
NA117.
118.
WA119.
POLING, Janos
115. PASTOR, Nick
PEVER, Laura Jean 4021
POLACEK, Henry Franklin 1271
NS120. RAHILL, Richard Kent
NRXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
21. RANALLO, Jonas
122. RATCLIFF, Matthew Edward16739
N-113159.
160.
(PL)K-2395161.
VALCHIN, James Louis
WALKER, William07
VAN CHADDE, Donald
N-122162.
48-338163.
164.
14856 NR-165.
166.
N№167.
25-157123. REED, Juri
168.
124. REESE, Eno
169.
WELK, Joseph Reinhold
WIDEGREN, Keith J.
تم
WILLEMS, Brenton Walī
WISHFORD, Roy Furniss
WOLF, Frederick Morri
WONG, Lam
ZEAMÁN, Myron
ZIMMER, Paul R.
MA125. REEse, Joseph Anthony
७
NA126.
RESTELLER, Richard Lawrence!
Lawrence/3315
127.
ROBERTS, John Martin Jr
061
129.
ROGERS, Robert E.
N
3. ROTTUM, Lowell Owen drit
M133. SAKIN, Edmond Abel 425-3541
N35
136.. SEALE, Henry
137. SEALY, Robert Ruben 8652
11635138. SELFE, Gordon Dale ARMV
SHALER, Floyd A
140. SHIPLEY, Charles Joseph
SHOWCROFT, Richard E.
SIMPSON, John 7DEF : 4192-
139.
141.
122142.
3143
44.
145.
SNYDER, Gene
146.
None
SIROTA, Edward G.
SLATER, Lawrence
K-5371
37/3
147. SORENSON, Henry
148. STANDARD, George Adam ✓
149. STATEN, Samuel Addison 71184 R.97

14-00000
46615 NS3. FORDA, Jorn 425
R.c.7427./ACKS?, Gerald
45-558 2. יזה, Cleanon Edward210元60) 7426. FROST, Frank
1406
45-77855. FRYLINK, Robert Peter
7
13.ANCE, Paul Rodger
48-3554. AV, Matt (2160) 145-77556. GELCARO, Charles Henry
45-3
5557
1-76348-7505. SHOP, Howard Cla106) 57. GENISA, Aubrey Lylic-7424
i
:
NL6. AUDISTO, Mario
53. GONZALEZ, Pedro Francisco
:
NS7. BARKER, Algis
8435-NR9. BARKER, Andrew Frank
48-3788. BARNAUD, James Winston
Winston (Hiero.
25..211159.
HABER, Frantisek 16183~
GUDINO-KARGAIN, Carlos 1414
--
ラー154161. HAIF, William Hark
:
62.
7
/
M10. DARREMO, John Raymond
11391.5-10. BATTER, Killian John
N
12. RAUGH, William James
90-77813. BELT, William Henry
NAL, BENTON, Alan
•
•
N15. ЗЕRUCK, Karl Donald -
14317NRIC. BERGETIO!!, David Bjorn
P-16817. BERGSO!!, Willisn Kinander
17
7/518. BERTELLI, Charles Angelo
•
NAIS. PEST, Alexander
(RC) K-301720 (T/BINSWANGER, Stanley Joo
-1731-8921. BORDEN, Paul Thomas Aquinas
22. BRADLEY, Thomas Edward
NEC7 23. PREITHEIM, John Albert
201721. BRICK, Robert Lee ✓
81125 DRICKHAM, Tad S. -
M-26, BRIGGS, Herb
FALLY, Roberta Shiricy
Ni63. HAMILTON, Edward Joseph
NREL. HARRISON, Louisa
65. HASKINS, John Martin
ARMY
992767. HILLARY, Bernard Horman
Uf68. "HODONICKI, Thomas Mark 9
4893870. HURLEY, Edward Elmar
NR71. IRVING, Andrew
N№72. JACOBS, Stephan...
NR13. JAMES, Nicholas
NAS. JETFRIES, Uldis 4
NA74. JARECKI, Stanley -
74.2876.TIJENKINS, Ivar
NA77. JUDD, Nicholas
...
K-2156
(C-27) (3101) 78. KACKYAK, Benjamin Franklin 48-3
KARLOUIST, Paul-196
43033832. BOUTICK, Cletus Winter(2)
33. CLINE, William David
1433734. CONPAD, WILLIAM Robert
•
ラー165635. CROWE, Andrew Paul47
33736. CUPBELO, Eduardo
T-42137 LD/DAILEY, James
38. DERANSKI, Vincent Joseph
Alan
716839. DETAINE, William
95400 40. DELLAFIORE, James Earl
41. DE LONG, Constantine
79.
N/80.
KASARIAN, Zigurds
ARSI. KELLY, Myron
MA32.
KENDALL, Paul
83. KEROVER, George Michael
L
80186.
KERASICK, Walter
M85. KIMEY, Jack Anthony1016
KINSLCW, John WilliamSC9
KOLA, Waiter
N
87.
83. KOSTIK, Joseph RC-2.5~.
N890. LANSING, John
محامية
10.5569217 LEE, Watson liwa Shen) ARMY
48-33642. DONAIRE, William Henry/2445
13. DRAKOS, Victor Samuel
9.5644. DUBOTS, Rene E.JARMY
C-11655-N-45. EGLSO!!, Frank Joseph
MRLO. ELFMONT, Rudolf Albert
スンスン47. ELLECOR, William Monroe
48. EVANS, Arthur Hall
8,649, FARON, Charles Andrew✓
C. 2535 50. FILECCIA, Robert H.
556148-7851. FITSARES, Lucian Charles
15765/13052T ET FLICK, FLICKR 3 Charles E.
M93. LEITNER, Richard Ernest
MART, Charles Edward
1570 95. LOWE, Syron
47-857
196. LWPJ, Andrei Nicolae
10333 9765 LYONS, George H..
ARMY
MK98. MAGLIE, Philip Josaph
48-
99. MALAERE, Howland Edward
100. MALOFOFF, Sorge.
T-8
N101.
MARKSCHATT, Ruben
16204
454 3102.
MARSAL, Farl
C-2994104.
MASON, Frank
105.
N106.
MCADAN, Georgo Thomas
MOGAVIN, Gerrald, Joseph
2.5

14-00000

1. ASALIS, Cundaris
2. AASAL, Glen 6175
کے
3. SHERWOOD, John 11007
4. ADKINS, Matt 47-336
5. ADERHOLT, Harry Clay کے
6. RAGONA, Ferruggia R
7. BARAKAUSKAS, Algio
8. BROWN, James W. 47437
474321
9. SPEED, Horace III
III 8435
5.
5. YEMA, P742-
55. For Pote: 48-35
5. GO, Charles 1.3857
57. C Greano, Aubre
58. DIOCOLAT, Pedro Gonzalez
66. TISLAR, Frantisck 10/73
5. GOUDI, Cecil Mario14/02/
62. GRAHAM, Barbara 789 8
E
91088
10. Anthrill-1 (Crypto Kavi Barreto 61. GREEN, 111/9 5-1567
11. ROSENBAUER, William A.13915
12. SEWARD, Major William A. Jr.N
13. BEALE, W. H.48-336
14. BENAS, Alis PK
15. BECERT, Jerome F. - 12571
16. ERICKSON, Poul14317
17. KINANDER, James F.PI
18. BARQUIN, Casimiro7777
19. BECKER, Alexander
20. BYZEK, Stophen Joe K-3097
21. BURKE, Paul J.7997
22. BRADFTEID, Tony Edward 48-338
23. SHERWOOD, John117
24. ELBERG, Robert L.2219
25. SHACKLEY, Theodore 6777
26. BRANTLEY, Herbert
27. BURKE, Paul J.8497
28. BLAIR, William 9121
29. CUNNINGHAM, James Allen Jr.
30. CHAS, Peter
32. BARTLEY, Cletus Winton47-
33. CAREY, William David 4774
34. CARTER, William R./
35. CROCE, Andrew 4647
36. FLORES, Thomas J.シン
37. DAIGA, Janis
38. DALEY, V. J.N/
T-4.21
39. CHIPMAN, Harold E.108
40. DILLON, John 2.9740
41. DE GARDER, Constantine
42. DEICONS, William F.1446GY
43. DALY, Vincent S.112
44. DUBOIS, Rone 8.9564
45. ECAN, Frank J.
46. ENTERS, Rudolf A.1001%
47. EDWARDS, William Monroe Jr.
48. Mone
49. HEATH, Donald R.✓
50. FUCHS, Robert H./
51. FRANKLIN, Lucian V. Jr.
52. FLICK, Charlos, E. 765
✓
63. Ioward
64. Kone
65. HAWKINS, Jack
66. HORI, Rufus 4. Jr.11749
67. HILDALGO, Barncy
68. HEWITT, Thomas 2.9922
70. HECHT, Elmer Edward 15-215
71. IWASKIW, Andrijk
72.
73.
74.
JENCSOK, Stephen
JANCHUK, Hicholas NA
JAROSZEWICZ, Sigmund 3.PK
75. JAUNZEMIS, Uldis WR
76.
JOANSON, Iva:7428
77. JASUKOW, Nikolaiwk.
48-33678. KYKER, Benjamin Franklin 31/1
79. KAPUSTA, Peter/9.178
80. KARKLINS, Zigurdsp
81. KRYZAMINSKY, Myron
82. KCCELA, Paulk
83. KAPPES, G. George
81.. KURTZ, Waiter MA
85. KIDA, Jack 12/3
86. KENNEDY, John W.
87. KRUTYTHOLOWA, Walter W
88. KREGZDYS, Joseph, 25-10
90. LAMBERGS, John
92. LEE, Watson Hwa Shen10560
93. MAYERFELD, Ernest 5854
94. KLEIN, Thcodore 1570
95. LOFUSZAUSKY, Kroslaw
96. LUPU, Andrei Nicolae 1/1/
97. Unknown
47-6
98. MAMONEY, Philip J.48-3EY
99. CHIPMAN, Harold E.7168
100. MASLOVSKY, Sorge T-855
101. MARTINEZ, Rubon/ 104.
102. SMITH, Haviland Jr.4593
3.PK 25-
103. MOORE, Andrew F.
104. MARSAK, Frank-2994
105. KRIESHELD, George R
106. MULANE, Corrald JMK 2.
Denial hasan de Latorre TSD. 6
10.

14-00000

TRUE
107.
BARQUIN, Casimiro/?
108.
MORALES David S.3643
151.
152.
110.
NEWMASTER, Harry Richard
153.
TRUE
AIMAN, James Henry W 49
TALLEY, Ulot
STOIAKEN, Nicholas P.11223
111.
:
NASARENKO, Michael
154.
TURK, Leo L.
112.
PIEPER, Harry C. 3-12-23
113.
PHILLIPS, William D.2010
156.
THOMAS, Edward
157.
114.
GREENE, Harris
None✓
115.
PASLAWSKY, Nicholas
158.
TRIANOSKY, Harry 349
116.
PAWLYSZYN, Myroslaw W
159.
VINING, James L.25-557
117.
FRANK, Maryado 2:1
i
160.
VAN COURTNEY, Donaldw
118.
MOORE, Robert Butler 27
161.
HARVEY, William K.л.С.287
119.
PRIBANYEC, Janos
12.
BULIK, Joseph 3704
120.
None
163.
WILL, Kenneth John 47-
164.
SHORTALL, John W. Jr.1485
121.
RASTENIS, Jonas
165.
WATTS, Roy Furniss 25-3011
122.
REYNOLDS, Malcolm Eugene/0??
166. MERTZ, Richard201
123.
RAUS, Juri164
167.
None✓✓✓
124.
RIKAND, Enno Nh
168. ZANKIN, Myroslaw/
125. AMLFO-3 (Crypt) Ni
169.
ALAGAZE-1/(Crypt)
126. RATCLIFF, Richard
127.
REEVES, John M. Jr.10691
129. REYNOLDS, Robert E.
131.
RUCKER, Lucian O. Jr.10% 4
133. SULLIVAN, Dennis B.-5-3591
LODY GEY SKIL MIL
136.
137.
STAROSTENKO, Henry
IMLER, Norman C.8052
138.
SLEEPER, Gordon //
139.
None
140.
None/
:
141.
GONZALO, QUESADA Jr.
: 142.
SAGER, John 4192
-N-122
143. SMITH, Edmund Gambrill.-48-338
144.
SLENYS, Lindas K.A
145.
SOLNZEFF, Henry/
146.
SOLER, Eva Dianank
147.
SATINSKAS, Henry
148.
STEVENS, George A.
149.
WALLIN, Jack
150.
TASHEFF, Mary/1184
14-00000
104-10105-10293 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 OGC 74-1755

SECRET

30 September 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with E. Howard Hunt Re His Memoirs, "Undercover"

1. On 28 September 1974 Ray Rocca, Deputy Chief/CI Staff, and I met in the DCD Washington Field Office with E. Howard Hunt, his attorney William A. Snyder, Jr., and Snyder's associate Thomas W. Coons. As the meeting began, Hunt asked if it was being tape-recorded; I assured him that it was not. He said he did not care; but that, if it were to be recorded, he would like to know. We then embarked upon the review according to the plan under which we would demand the deletion of three items as classified and then proceed to the remaining 29 items, only if Hunt was cooperative on the first three. He and his lawyers appeared very cooperative, and accordingly, the meeting continued to cover all 32 items.

2. Changes were agreed to in the items set forth in paragraphs 12, 14, and 25 of the CI Staff memorandum of 19 September 1974. These appear at pages 73, 80-83, and 115 of the galley proof and concern the fabrication of the Shanghai post for a Mexican operation, the entry into the Guatemalan Embassy in Mexico City, and the joint) CIA-Uruguayan telephone monitoring operation. The wording of the agreed changes is as shown on the attached copies of the pertinent pages of the galley proof. Essentially, these changes disguise the identity of the fabricated newspaper and remove a reference to journalists as agents; delete the word "Guatemalan" to make the entered embassy non-specific; and delete the reference to listening posts and telephone monitoring to make that paragraph refer in more general terms to our ability to cover targets without referring to the use of electronic surveillance.

E-2 IMPDET
CL BY 058473

CI

14-00000

SECRET

3. We then proceeded to the 29 items which we would like to see modified but which we could not consider classified. We made this clear to Hunt and went through them one by one, discussing our concern with each. Hunt contended that most of these items should not be considered sensitive since they had been publicized extensively; in some cases confirmed in testimony; and, in the case of other items, the principals involved were dead. However, he agreed to changes in the items referred to in paragraphs 1, 3, 17, and 32 of the CI Staff memorandum of 19 September. These involve the deletions of the names of Henry Pleasants and Frank Holcomb, both now retired under cover; a direct reference to joint operations with the British in Hong Kong against China; and the wording of his reference to CIA alias documentation used by the Watergate burglars. The language of this last item will be changed so that it no longer leaves the impression that the documentation was prepared by the Agency for this operation.

4. When we had finished, Hunt and his lawyers emphasized as they had mentioned earlier in the meeting that it might be very difficult to get the publisher to agree to changes in the unclassified items. Mr. Snyder offered to present all of the items to the publisher for change without distinguishing between the classified and unclassi- fied items. He said he would do this without implying they were all classified. I felt it necessary to turn down his offer because of the risk of the publisher being unwilling to accept that many changes with the result that we would have to go back to him on the three classified items, thus presenting a situation similar to our retraction of previously demanded deletions in the Marchetti book. I think there would be some danger of the publisher using this in his adver- tising and through reviewers for publicity purposes.

5. As we were leaving, Hunt showed me what was described as a "comfort letter." This was a letter written by him to the publishers on 17 May 1974 at the publisher's request which said that in his opinion nothing in the manuscript violated any agreement between himself and the CIA, nor would subject him to prosecution under the espionage laws. As the meeting was ending, Hunt expressed his hope that no publicity would be given to it and that the Agency would not issue any kind of a press release. In view of the Director's decision that we shall issue a press release, I took pains to persuade Hunt that public acknowledgment of the fact that we had reviewed his

2

SECRET
C3

14-00000

SECRET

manuscript would be in his interest as well as ours. He had referred more than once during the meeting to the need to avoid the appearance of "a bear hug"; in other words, collusion or cooperation between him and the Agency, leaving an inference that the book was designed to be a whitewash of CIA. In view of this, it was easy to convince Hunt that an Agency press release would be in his interest. I would note here, however, that both Mr. Rocca and I felt that Hunt and his lawyers were genuinely cooperative and that a press release which is too harsh or denigrates the book or Hunt's motives might be unfair and considered by him to be in bad faith. Hunt appears to retain admiration and respect for the Agency and seems convinced that nothing in his book will harm our operations or personnel.

JOHN D. MORRISON, JR.
Acting General Counsel

Attachments

cc: Acting DDO
SAB/DDO
DC/CI Staff
O/Security
Asst. to DCI
Mr. Walter Pforzheimer
C/CCS
OGC:JDM:sin
Original OGC Subj: PUBLICATIONS
1 Chrono

3

SECRET
C2
14-00000
104-10106-10300
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Yurily Ivanovich NOSENKO

IDENTIFICATION:
NOSENKO, Yurily Ivanovich, a Soviet
KGB officer who defected in 1964 and
was subsequently involuntarily con-
fined in the U.S. by the Agency for
a period of approximately three years.

BACKGROUND :
NOSENKO first contacted Agency per-
sonnel in Switzerland in June 1962
and subsequently defected in January
1964. NOSENKO was brought to the U.S.
and after a period of relative freedom
he was involuntarily confined in
April 1964. From April 1964 to
August 1965, he was confined at an
Agency controlled site in Clinton,
Maryland. From August 1965 to
October 1967, NOSENKO was confined
at Camp Peary Virginia. In October
1967, he was returned to the Washington
area, given increasing amounts of
freedom until he was given total free-
dom in April 1969. NOSENKO became a
U.S. citizen in April 1974. NOSENKO
was employed by the Agency as a
consultant in March 1969 and continues
under contract to date. His present
salary is $23,500 per year.

APPROVAL :
(1) The legal basis to confine NOSENKO
against his will was discussed by
Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with
the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April
1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the
Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence
Houston, advised the Director of Security
by memorandum that such confinement was
proper (Tab 2).

(2) There are a series of letters from
the DDCI, DCI and others to various
agencies, including the Department of
Justice and the White House, covering
the period 1964 to 1969, evidencing
awareness of these agencies of the
NOSENKO affair (Tab 3).

(3) The conditions of NOSENKO's confine-
ment were established by the Office of
Security (Tabs 4 & 5).

14-00000

RESULTS :
By memorandum dated 2 October 1968,
the Director of Security forwarded
two reports to the DDCI summarizing.
the results of the NOSENKO case to
that date. The reports are voluminous.
One was prepared by the Office of
Security and the other by the FBI.
Both reports conclude that NOSENKO
was a bona fide defector. A draft
memorandum attached to this file,
dated 21 October 1968 and prepared
by the CI Staff, raises question
regarding NOSENKO's bona fides
and challenges the above two reports.

TERMINATION :
NOSENKO Continues under contract to
the Agency. He is brought to Washington,
periodically to consult on matters
germane to his background and experience.
Various reports are available in the
files of the Office of Security which
detail financial aspects of this case.
No final accounting has been made since
the project continues.

COMMENTS :
(1) While the Office of Security files
do document the rationale for the original
confinement of NOSENKO, they do not
document the rationale for his continued
confinement over so long a period of time.
A memorandum dated 5 August 1969 states
that various congressional staff officers
were briefed on NOSENKO and states that
concern for his safety, as well as con-
cern regarding his bona fides, prompted
the prolonged confinement. (See Tab 6)

(2) Office of Security files document
a period in 1969 during which a mail
cover was placed on NOSENKO.

(3) During the above period, NOSENKO
was allowed a pleasure trip to Florida.
During this trip, Agency personnel, with
apparent Headquarters approval, obtained
the services of prostitutes. This
apparently occurred on at least two
occasions.

2

14-00000
FILES :
(C
Office of Security files on NOSENKO
are maintained in the following
locations:

OS/SSD (Contact Mr. Charles Phalen)

OS/SAG (Contact Mr. Bruce Solie)

3

14-00000
OLDIET
EVER PILY
2. April 1964
:
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUSJECT:
Discussion. with Deputy Attorney
General on Nosenko Case

I. Ar Helas, Mr. Houston and Mr. Murphy met with
the Deputy Attorney General and members of his staff to
discuss subject case. Present from Hr. Katzenbach's--
staff were Messrs. Foley, Yeagley and Reis.

2. Mr. Helas explained the Nosenko case briefly
and indicated that shortly we would be faced with what
we at least considered to be two problems on which we
would like the advice of the Department of Justice.
First, we would seeon feel compelled to begin hostile
interrogation of Hosenko in order to arrive at the truth
with respect to his mission for the KGB and we wondered
what the legal position would be in circumstances in
which we detained Nosenko against his will for this pur-
pose. Second, we would have to be ready after determin-
ing that we could obtain no additional information from
Nosenko to deport him. We had thought of taking him to
Germany and transferring him to Soviat custody in Borlin
where this has been done a number of times in the past.
:
3. There was some discussion of whether deportation
to another country might be a consideration. Mr. Halms
explained we would probably face publicity problems in
deporting to a third country of the kind we would en-
counter if he were free in the U. S. Nr. Helms noted
there were many items of information which we and the
FBI realize are of no significance because of the file
holdings we have but which an unscrupulous newspaper man
could use to create mischief. This aspect was then dropped
and it was the consensus that Berlin was probably the best
place.

4. The question of the basis for detention was again
raised and related by Mr. Foley to the conditions under
which Nosenko is in this country. He is hore as an "ex-
clusion and parole case" which means he has not been
admitted and has been paroled to the Agency which is
responsible for him while he is in this country. This
erenrt
EYES ONLY

14-00000
EYES CV
2-
-:
parole can be interpreted to mean parole to a specific
locale which would provide some justification for our
detaining him for questioning. It was then pointed out,
however, that if he said he wished to leave the country
to return to the Soviet Union, technically we would not
be able to detain him further. In this event, we would
be faced with the need to deport his quickly and quietly
and for this purpose the immigration warrant of arrest.
and deportation was was probably the best instrument.

5. Mr. Katzenbach asked Mr. Foley to check into
this and Hr. Foley will in turn contact Mr. Houston.
Mr. Houston will in turn discuss the problem with CIA
Office of Security officials to get the background-of
their liaison with the INS on these matters.

6. Mr. Helas thanked. Mr. Katzenbach for his assistance
and wo departed amid some jovial banter with respect to
"The Spy Who Came in From the Cold" about what we expected
to happen to him when he started to climb over that "wall"
in Berlin.

David E. Murphy
Chief, SR Division
S GALY

14-00000
C/SB
KOLO
OGC 64-0903
MEMORANDUM FOR: : Director of Security
SUBJECT:
3 April 1964
Parole Status of Defectors
:
1. On 2 April 1964 we had a discussion with the Department
of Justice or the status of aliens whose inspection by I&NS is deferred
upon arrival at our request and who are then paroled to this Agency.
It was the position of the Department of Justice that we were responsible
for taking any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole.

2. As you know, a basic parole agreement was executed by the
Attorney General and the DCI on 10 February 1955. After setting up
conditions for authorizing parole in any one case, the agreement states:
"After parole of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency will assume
responsibility for care, supervision and control of a kind and degree it
believes consistent with the internal security needs of the United States
during continuance of their parole status." This means that the
responsible Agency officials must take the minimum action necessary
to protect the internal security needs of the United States. The word
"minimum" is not necessarily a limitation. It merely means that good
judgment must be used as to what kind and degree of action is necessary.

3. The agreement further provides that upon completion of the
parolee's intelligence or operational purposes in the United States or if
internal security reasons so require, the alien will be removed from
this country through arrangements made by the Agency and, in such
case, the Agency will inform the Service in advance of each proposed
departure.
para 1 declassifie Kawrence Ritterstow
by AAL on
CC:DD/P
C/SR
19 Sept 78
چین
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel

14-00000
(January 1975
SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
1. Information that NOSENKO had defected and was in the United
States in February 1964 was known to appropriate agencies and articles
had appeared in the public media.

2. NOSENKO was in the United States under an I&NS parole as
the responsibility of CIA. The FBI was fully advised of the presence of
NOSENKO in the United States and interviewed NOSENKO on several
occasions in March 1964. The United States Intelligence Board was
also formally advised on 12 February 1964 concerning the defection of
NOSENKO. On 14 February 1964, NOSENKO was interviewed by Soviet
in the presence of I&NS and State Department officials
officials/and NOSENKO reaffirmed his previous request for asylum in
the United States.

14-00000
9 OCT 1969
ER-69-5003/1
:
Mr. Raymond F Farrell
Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization
Department of Justice
Washington, DC
Dear Mr. Farrell:
SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
Pursuant to the authority granted under Section 7 of
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended,
I approve and recommend for your approval the entrance
of subject into the United States for permanent residence
since his entry is in the interest of the national security
and assential to the furtherance of the national intelligence
mission. In accordance with previous correspondence in
Section 7 cases, it is understood that you will present this
matter to the Attorney General for his approval.

Since his defection in February 1964, the subject bas
provided valuable information to this Agency and he will
continue to be of value in the future.

Subject has been investigated abroad and here over a
period of five years and has submitted to a technical inter-
rogation. The question of bona fides is a continuing one and
should any information be developed definitely disproving his
bona fides, it shall be made available to your Service and the
Attorney Genaral.
SCOTILI
6300 1
Sxcluded iam auzastic
Gungrading and
declaaslitale

14-00000
Thars are enclosed Forces -125 and background chic,
in suplicate, concerning the subject
incerely,
[s]
Richard Haims
Director
ORIGINA
/s/ H. J. Osborn
8 October 1969
Howard J.. Osors
Dato
Director of Sochrity
Distributions Orig
Signer's copy
DECI
Z
33 Div.
200
03 Filen
SECRET

14-00000
Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO (Aka: Yuri NOSSENKO)
Nicolayev, Ukraine, USSR
Brown Blue/Gray 5ít. 11 inches
:
30 October 1927
Male
Soviet
Divorced
Caucasian

14-00000
BIGORAPHIC DATA
Yaziy Iran
14 October 1927, Zicolayev, Ukrabe, USSA
MARIZAL SZATUSI 1946 - Marriad and divorced Flavia
Float TELE), 1949-arald and
23
1955 - Married Ludmila Faltanovan
KOERETNIKOVA), Jaana
Chata NOSENSO, b
1959; Tamara MOLENKO, bera
13 July 1958, Moscow Poth Uving is 1370)
1942-1945 - Attesdod various USIR Naval
Sensela
PMATIONALITZI
Plavai Intelligente)
The Carminer for Stata Secarity):
Lieutenses in 3358 Hary whis in school an
Zovies
PRESENT AND FAST 1943-1954 - miez Soms333
POLITICAL AFF
LATIORS
:
- Candidata Communist Party
1957-1965 - ander bezmist Party, ISSR
62009 1
Scaled tha
cong ta
dacacsitification

14-00000
SEONET
C
SP-1687
18 JUL 1969
Mr. Raymond F. Farrell
Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization
Department of Justice
DC
Washington, D
Attention: Mr. Frank E. Bartos
Dear Sir:
SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSSENKO
Reference is made to previous correspondence
in this case

Subject continues to be of operational interest
to this Agency. Therefore, it is requested subject's:
parole to this Agency be extended for an additional
period of six (6) months beyond the expiration date of
his stay of 16 August 1969.

Your cooperation in this matter is very much ap-
preciated.

Sincerely,
STCHED
Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)
OS/AAS/LW:es 16 July 1969
NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED FURTHER OR EXHIBITED
TO ANYONE WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
SEPOST
GROUP 1
Excluded ב הרהstematic
dexagrading and
declassificati

14-00000
SUBJECT (Optional)
ROUTING AND RECORD SHET
FROM
Chief, SR. Division
TOOficer designation room number, and
building).
12:
13
14.
15.
DD/OS
FORM
3-62-
610
USE PREVIOUS.
EDITIONS
SECRET
EXTENSION NO.
DATE
577713 February-1964
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
RECEIVED FORWARDED
COMMENTS (Number-each each comment los
to whom Draw aslins across column after eacht comm
10 show from
TOP SECRET-EYES ONLY
BY HAND
EYES ONLY
CONFIDENTIAL.
:-
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000
MEMORANDUM FOR:
TOP SEORET
EYES ONLY
11 February 1954
Mr. McGeorge Sundy
:
SUBJECT:
Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. This saorandia.refers to the State Department
release of 10 February.on subject case and provides addi-
tional background as ound as well as information en his current
status........

2. As a 163 staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly
assigned to the Counterintelligance Directorate of the
XGB in Hoscow but was included in the Soviet delegationA
to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrange-
went which permitted his to carry out intelligence and Y
security functions in Geneva on behalf of the ECB
..
:
3. HOSENKO also attended various sessions of the
Disarmament Conference hold in Genova in 1962. During
the course of these sessions NOSENKO sought contact with
officials of the U. S. Government, informed these officials
that he was affiliated with the Soviet State Security ap-
paratus and volunteered to aid the U. S. Government in
datecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the
U, S. Government. During the course of his contact with
U. S. authorities NOSENKO stated that bis cooperation with.
the U. S. Government originated with his distaste and hatred
for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain
revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official
in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general
admiration of the Azericans with whom he had come in con-
tact within the Soviet Union.

4. In lato January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva,
again masquerading as a member of the Soviet delegation
to the Disaranment Conference. Subject secretly notified
his CIA contacts in the United States concerning his pres-
ence in Geneva and arranged to meet with these contacts..
During a series of sootings NOSENKO provided information
including documents concerning Soviet Stato Security acti-
vities within the USSR SR and abroad and a detailed account
of the XC3 operation against U. S. Professor Barghoora
which NOSENKO said he had personally supervised at the
direction of SEMICHASTNIY, the Chairman of the Committee
for State Security (KG3).
EVES DALY

14-00000
EYES ONLY C
3-
5. During these most recent meetings NOSENKO announced
his desire to leave the USSR permanently and seek his future
in the West. lis claimed his new work in the KGB (First
Deputy Chief of that department charged with the surveillance
and recruitment of American visitors to the USSR) was o...
panding and that he would not do able to visit the West:
with any frequency.. Accordingly, he prepared a request for
political asylus in the United States. He was taken to
Frankfurt, Germany where he is currently undergoing interro-
gation. Plans are now being made to remove his to the U.S.

6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject.
has not been extensive and that we will require additional
thorough interrogation to establish Subject's boaa fides..
It should also be noted that MOSENXO's duties were not con-
cerned with sub substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conference,
and he therefore is not expected to be able to shed much, if
any, light on that area of our interest.

7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was de-
signed to wrock the conference was most carefully considered.
The decision to accept hia was taken on the conviction that
the Soviets would not have chosea such a vulnerable agent
(staff officer of the X53) for this kind of sov۵.
CSR/DEN/jif 0 11 Feb 64
Distribution:
Orig
- Adse
2 cc-
1 cc
1 cc
Acc
-
-
:
SR/CI/K-Day
C/CI
CSR
- DD/OS
Thomas i. Karamessines
Acting Deputy Director
for Plans
IND SEPPET
EYES ONLY

14-00000
CENTR
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
YES UNLI
C_NTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
12 Februaту 1964
NEMORANDUM FOR:
United States Intelligence Board Members
SUBJECT:
Yuzi Ivanovich HOSENKO

1. This memorandna refers to the State Department
Telease of 10 February on subject case and provides addi-
tional background as well as information on his current
status.

2. As a 36B staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly
assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the
Sa in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation
to the Diserament Conference as part of a cover arrange-
sent which permitted dia to carry out intelligence and
security functions in Canova on behalf of the XG3.
2.

3. NOSENKO also attended various sessions of the
Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1962, During the
course of these sessions, HOSENKO sought contact with
officials of the 5. 3. Government, informed these officials:
that he was affiliated with the Soviet State Security ap-
paratus and volunteered zo aid the B. 5, Goverment in
detecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the
B. S. Government. During the course of his contact with
U. S. authorities, NOSEXKO stated that his cooperation wità
the U. S. Government originated with his distaste and hatred
for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain
revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official
in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general
admirations of the Americans with whom he had come in con-
tact within the Soviet Union.
:
:
:
4. In lats January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva,
again masquerading as a zonder of the Soviet delegation
to the Disarmament Conforenco. Subject secretly notified
his CLA contacts in the United States concerning his pres-
ence in Ceneva and arranged to acet with these contacts,
During a series of meetings HOSENKO provided information
including documents concoming Soviet State Security acti-
vities within the USSR and abroad and a detailed account
۵۱۹
101320
EYES ONLY

14-00000
EYES JULY
of the KSB operation against against U. S. Professor Sarzhoorn
which NOSENKO said he had personally supervised at the
direction of SEMICHASTAIY, the Chairman of the Conaittes
for State Security: (KGB).
:
:
:-
:
5. During these most recent seatings NOSENKO announced
his desire to leave the USSR permanently and seek his future
in the dest. He clained his new work in the KGB (First
Deputy Chief of that departaent charged with the surveillance
and recruitment of American visitors to the USSR) was ax-
panding and that he would not be able to visit the Yest
with any frequency. Accordingly, he prepared a request for
political asylum in the United States. He was taken to
Frankfurt, Germany where he is currently undergoing interro-
gation. Plans are now being made to remove him to the U. S.
:-

5. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject
has not been extensive and that we will require additional
*thorough interrogation to establish Subject's bona fides.
It should also be noted that NOSENKO's duties were not con-
carned with substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conference,
and he therefore is net expected to be able to shed much, if
any, light on that area of our interest.

7. The possibility that NOSENXO's defection was de-
signed to wreck the conference was most carefully considered.
The decision to accept biz was taken on the conviction that.
the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agent
(staff officer of the KGB) for this kind of move.

Marshall 5. Cartor
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

14-00000
Nosenko's Account Disputes Charge by Soviet
BY TAD SZULC
WASHINGTON, Feb17
Yuri L Nosenko told a Soviet
Defection Preceded Report
to Swis Polices Police Apparently
Ruling Out Negligence
Embassy inficial at their con
frontation here last Friday that
he left Switzerland on the way
to the United States 28-hour
before his defection was...re
ported by the Russians to the
tall separately with
Swiss authorities: Mr.N Nosenko
This statement by the former Information made, available
Swiss diplomat Had teens per
mitted to talle sepa
Central In
Service. Officials of the State
Department the Cent
talligence Agency and the
Immigration and Naturalization
Service were also present
air Nosenka was described as
having been completely relaxed
during the interview
He. is understood to have told
the Soviet diplomat have told
defected of his own volition
businesslike-conference that he
His statements, it was report
staff officer of the Soviet Com-today has thrownell light without any outside pressures
mittee of State Security, the on the defection
secret police appeared to amountThe Soviet delegation inted did not allay Soviet résent
to a denial of the Soviet charge, Geneva: it was reported told ment against Swiss authorities.
that the Swiss authorities had the Swiss police at 5: Feb. Diplomatic reports reaching the
been negligent in preventing his 5 that Mr. Nosenko was miss- State Department said that So-
defection.g. But fr. Nosenko's state viet diplomats in foreign capi-
Mr. Nosenko, who quit as a ments in the presence of the tals continued-to-register-com-
member of the Soviet delegation Soviet Embassy official are said plaints about alleged negligence
to the Geneva disarmament con-to have shown that his actual arter. Mr. Nosenko's conference
ference Febi was allowed to defection took took place at LPM with the Soviet diplomat
meet with Soviet: diplomat the preceding da
here in the presence of United Thes Soviet delegation
States officials nounced Mr Nosenko's disap-
The State Department an-pearance Fer
nounced at the time, that the The meeting between
confrontation was-taking place Nosenko-and the Soviet Em
in Washingtom at the request of bassy official took place in the
the Soviet Embassy, but no headquarters of the Washing-
other details were made public ton Feld office of the Im
The department said that almigration and Naturalization
196

14-00000
U.S. Lets Swiss
And Red Envoys fle
Talk to Defector
Nosenko Again
Voices Desire
For Asylum
By-Chalmers M Roberts
Soviet secret police de
fector Yuri I Nošenko is
in the United States where
he-was-interviewed yester
day by officials of both the
Russian and Swiss
bassies:
The State Department said
Beach interview lasted less than
an hours and that a Department
official was present each time:
Nosenko reaffirmed his earlier
request, for aslyum. in the
United States and it will be
granted.
State Department spokesman
Richard. I. Phillips, in giving
out. this information, declined
to say where the interviews
took place or to give any de
tails Earlier he had said it
was possible that newsmen
here will be allowed to talk
with-Nosenko
Soviet Kicks up Euss
These developments came
2s the Soviet Union kicked up
a diplomatic fuss over the dis
appearance of Nosenko on
Feb. 4, from Geneva, where
he had been assigned as an
"expert" in the Soviet delega-
tion at the 17-nation disarma-
ment conference. Philipps
said he was "on temporary
duty from KGB. (secret po
lice) headquarters in Mos
cow."
:
Up to yesterday Moscow
had been directing its public
diplomatic wrath at the
Swiss, charging them with
loose security. The provision
for a Swiss diplomat to inter-
view Nosenko was to assure
the Swiss that the United
States had taken part in no
illegal act on their soil.
The Swiss. already had
strongly rejected the Soviet
charges.
On Wednesday. Phillips re
See DEFECTOR, A5, Col. 1
WASH Post
2/15/64

14-00000
See Defector
ported yesterday, a Soviet called in American Ambassa
Embassy messenger: brought ata a dor Foy Kooler and charged
message to the State Depart the United States within
ment asking for information permissible acts in the case
as to the manner in which He stopped short of a kidnap
Nosenko presented him ing charge however Kohler
self to the US authorities replied that von behalf of the
and requested an opportunity United States he rejected any
to interview him The De implication of American wrong
partment agreed to the inter- doin
view with American officials
present and said Nosenko Serious Effects. Hinted
also was agreeable. A reply In Geneva Soviet officials,
about the defection also was including Tsarapkin himse
given to the Soviet Embassy privately spread to the press
Soon-Wednesday in Gen-
eva-Soviet disarmament dele hints of serious consequences
gate Semyon Tsarapkin Soon there were rumors that
gave-newsmen and angry state. Moscow would would pull outils dele
ment aimed at the Swiss and gation, but up to last night no
charging provocative activi, such threat atchad had actually been
ewarerumors
by Sunspecified Western
agents Up-to then Tsarapkin made, according to wore reacin
had been-saying both private ing Washington
ly and publicly that the No
In-public Tsarapkin said only
senkordelection would not af I have nothing to say Lam
fect the the disarmament talks not in the position to tell you
Yesterday the Soviets stepped
up their protest-in-two places, anything
Moscow and Geneva Atesome so far unspecified
In Moscow Soviet Foreign dates Nosenko, who had ap
Minister Andre Gromy to parently crossed from Switzer
:
land to France was flown to
the United States. Its as
sumeches the hands of
the Central Intelligence Agen
cythe normal course for de
Lectors
Officials rere yesterday
were knocking down the idea
that he was a particularly big
fish that he new any atomic
secrets that he knew any
thing About Soviet disarma
up to
ment strategy: Rather, they there had been no word
said, he was a KGR staff offi
cera security man operating last night of the defection on on
as is the Soviet practice, in the Soviet radios or in the
aight compartiment That press though word of mout
would mean be would have reports had spread through
useful and perhaps important the capital
knowledge bi part of the KGB
but probably not much more.
Believed Genuine
It was felt here that Moscow
might have stepped ruo.. its
protest, after- Tsarapkin-had
publicly downgraded the case
in. Geneva. At any rate U.S.
It is assumed here that the
36-year-old Nosenko is a gen-disarmament negotiator Wil-
uine defector though the pos- liam C. Foster and Tsarapkin
sibility of his being a double held another business session
agent has not been overlook in Geneva yesterday at which
ed. It also is, felt-here that they said the case was not dis-
the Soviet protest was no cussed
stronger than could be ex-- It also was noted here that
pected. The request for an the Soviet Communist Party
interview rare but not. un- Central Committee has been
precedented, was granted. in meeting In Moscow all this
hopes of reciprocal treatment; week. But whether the No-
should the occasion arisesenko čase was discussed was
Bioscavispatches said not known
WASIt Pos
2/15/

14-00000

12 May 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, Support Branch
FROM
SUBJECT
Dat
Chief, Operational Support Division
AEFOXTROT
#262622
DDCOS
DOGHOS
ASST/IOS
C
פרס
CATED
C3
C/30
C/SB
그 나다
This memorandumis primarily for the record and will
record the essence of a meeting held on the morning of 12 May
1964, at which the following were present: Messrs. Charles Kane,
Jack Bauman, OS; Dr. Charles Bohrer, Medical Staff; Messrs.
Bagley, Karpovich), McMahon and David Murphy, SR Division.

2. The essence of this meeting was furnished to the Acting.
Chief, Support Branch on 12 May 1964, as follows:

Effective immediately or as soon as practicable, the following
procedures will apply with regard to the handling of the
Subject
(1) Subject will receive a regular diet with modest regulated.
portions. He is to have no dessertor or "trimmings,"
but may have have the necessary silverware with which to
eat properly. (CAUTION--Extreme care should be
exercised with regard to controlling the silverware,
and it it was suggested that at least two of the guards
be required to count the silverware in and out; that..
the silverware be placed on the tray in a manner
where it could be observed before the guards enter
the room, etc.)
:
(2) Arrangements are to be made for the installation of
adequate air-conditioning equipment to insure that a
comfortable temperature is maintained. (It is under-
stood that there is quite a bit of equipment available
through Logistics channels.)
:
(3) Subject is to receive a bath; change of underwear;
change of uniform; and a change of linen for his bed.
ALTS
FILES

14-00000
(4) Subject is to receive a haircut, the shorter the better.
(5) Subject is to receive one cigarette on 12 May 1964.
(NOTE--These changes with regard to the bath, haircut,
cigarette are not to be considered as something to be
done on a regular schedule. We will await specific
instructions from SR Division as to when these items
are to be accomplished in the future.)
(6) Effective immediately, Dr. Bohrer will visit the
Subject only on Tuesday each week.
(7) In addition to the above, it must be emphasized that
our attitude toward the Subject will remain precisely
the same, and our security procedures, including
searches, will continue to be at maximum control.
:
3. It was further ascertained that we will have custody of
the Subject until at least July. It was suggested that perhaps we may
wish to explore some modifications in the assignment of personnel
or schedule of assignments. In addition, the Acting Chief, Support
Branch has suggested that immediate consideration be given to
devising necessary procedures to be followed in the event of an
emergency involving loss of control of the Subject. This should
be discussed immediately with the responsible DFO supervisors
and specific procedures devised, and all guards properly informed
as to their responsibilities in this matter.
Jack M. Bauman
Bauman/ewd(5-12-64)
2
104-10106-10312 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

Yurily Ivanovich NOSENKO

IDENTIFICATION: NOSENKO, Yurily Ivanovich, a Soviet
KGB officer who defected in 1964 and
was subsequently involuntarily con-
fined in the U.S. by the Agency for
a period of approximately three years.

BACKGROUND : NOSENKO first contacted Agency per-
sonnel in Switzerland in June 1962
and subsequently defected in January
1964. NOSENKO was brought to the U.S.
and after a period of relative freedom
he was involuntarily confined in
April 1964. From April 1964 to
August 1965, he was confined at an
Agency controlled site in Clinton,
Maryland. From August 1965 to
October 1967, NOŠENKO was confined
at Camp Peary, Virginia. In October
1967, he was returned to the Washington
area, given increasing amounts of
freedom until he was given total free-
dom in April 1969. NOSENKO became a
U.S. citizen in April 1974. NOSENKO
was employed by the Agency as a
consultant in March 1969 and continues
under contract to date. His present
salary is $23,500 per year.

APPROVAL : (1) The legal basis to confine NOSENKO
against his will was discussed by
Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with
the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April
1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the
Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence
Houston, advised the Director of Security
by memorandum that such confinement was
proper (Tab 2).

(2) There are a series of letters from
the DDCI, DCI and others to various
agencies, including the Department of
Justice and the White House, covering
the period 1964 to 1969, evidencing
awareness of these agencies of the
NOSENKO affair (Tab 3).

(3) The conditions of NOSENKO's confine-
ment were established by the Office of
Security (Tabs 4 & 5).

SECRET

00738

RESULTS : By memorandum dated 2 October 1968,
the Director of Security forwarded
two reports to the DDCI summarizing
the results of the NOSENKO case to
that date. The reports are voluminous.
One was prepared by the Office of
Security and the other by the FBI.
Both reports conclude that NOSENKO
was a bona fide defector. A draft
memorandum attached to this file,
dated 21 October 1968 and prepared
by the CI Staff, raises question
regarding NOSENKO's bona fides
and challenges the above two reports.

TERMINATION : NOSENKO continues under contract to
the Agency. He is brought to Washington
periodically to consult on matters
germane to his background and experience.
Various reports are available in the
files of the Office of Security which
detail financial aspects of this case.
No final accounting has been made since
the project continues.

COMMENTS : (1) While the Office of Security files
do document the rationale for the original
confinement of NOSENKO, they do not
document the rationale for his continued
confinement over so long a period of time.
A memorandum dated 5 August 1969 states
that various congressional staff officers
were briefed on NOSENKO and states that
concern for his safety, as well as con-
cern regarding his bona fides, prompted
the prolonged confinement. (See Tab 6)

(2) Office of Security files document
a period in 1969 during which a mail
cover was placed on NOSENKO.

(3) During the above period, NOSENKO
was allowed a pleasure trip to Florida.
During this trip, Agency personnel, with
apparent Headquarters approval, obtained
the services of prostitutes. This
apparently occurred on at least two
occasions.

SECRET
2
00739

FILES : Office of Security files on NOSENKO
are maintained in the following
locations:

OS/SSD (Contact Mr. Charles Phalen)
OS/SAG (Contact Mr. Bruce Solie)

SECRET
3
00740
14-00000
104-10106-10325

UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: Lit Crim- US v. Leon

FROM: (William H. Godson)
CI/R&A/O

EXTENSION NO. 1592

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) | DATE RECEIVED | DATE FORWARDED | OFFICER'S INITIALS | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
---|---|---|---|---
1. AC/CI/R&A/O | 02 NOV 1977 |  |  |
2.  |  |  |  |
3. AC/CI/R&A | 2 NOV 1977 |  |  |
4.  |  |  |  |
5. C/CI Staff | NOV 3 NOV 1977 |  | 5-6: This note is pursuant to am discussion of the black notebook Deved weeks ago. Yon may wish to talk directely with Bail Gidson), who has revievved the file.
6. OGE. Mr. Jel Sunny |  |  |  |
7.  |  |  |  |
8.  |  |  |  |
9.  |  |  |  |
10.  |  |  |  |
11.  |  |  |  |
12.  |  |  |  |
13.  |  |  |  |
14.  |  |  |  |
15.  |  |  |  |

FORM 3-62 610
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED

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14-00000
SECRET

1 November 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

FROM : (William H. Godson)
CI/R&A/O

SUBJECT : Herbert Itkin File

1. I have reviewed the material in the Herbert Itkin
file which is divided into two main divisions. The first
concerns the details of Itkin's use as an unpaid witting
informant on matters concerning an attempt by Haitian exiles
in 1963 to unseat then President Duvalier. This involved
a large number of contacts with Haitian exiles in New York,
Washington, the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. Itkin
became a legal advisor for a Haitian Government-In-Exile and
put up $15,000 of his "own funds" for this Haitian enterprise.
Bernard E. MONCURE (P) a CI Staff staff agent in New York,
rode piggy-back on Itkin's contacts with the Haitians to make
his own operational contacts within the group. He also
provided a small amount of money to them ($4,300) from CIA
funds. It would seem from information in the file that there
was high-level governmental interest in removing Duvalier
from office in 1963. This information is contained in hand-
written notes which are paraphrased and indicate high-level
interest in the activities of the Haitian exile group. (I
suggest that this material be kept in case there are Freedom
of Information Act requests on CIA activities involving Haiti
in 1962-1963.)

2. The second and bulkier section of material concerns
Itkin's efforts to involve MONCURE and CIA in his attempts to
secure custody of his wife's children from her second marriage.
Itkin had been heavily involved as a lawyer and confidant with
Mafia syndicates and labor unions, particularly the teamsters.
While doing this he had gained a large amount of information
on the Mafia. In March 1963, MONCURE had recruited Itkin for
the FBI for domestic issues while maintaining for CIA the use
of Itkin for foreign intelligence matters. The FBI and the
federal prosecutors in New York starting in 1968 found Itkin
to be a very important witness in a series of criminal indict-
ments starting with New York City Water Commissioner Marcus.

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 019816
SECRET

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SECRET

Itkin and his wife had for a long time been struggling to
maintain custody over her children from her second marriage.
Claiming that she had violated the custody stipulations of
a New York court by moving them more than 50 miles from New
York without his permission, Frederick Hersh, Mrs. Itkin's
former husband, gained custody of the children by means of
a ruling from the British court in 1966. Mrs. Itkin began
legal procedures in New York to regain the children. As
part of their effort they swore affadavits that Mrs. Itkin
had taken the children to England at the request of the CIA.
Itkin embellished on his CIA record by stating that he had
worked for CIA for many years prior to 1963, and insisted
that his original contact had been set up between Harold
Stassen and Allen Dulles in Philadelphia in the summer of
1954. Most of these assertions were fabrications. MONCURE's
CIA relationship was exposed in various legal circles in
New York. The Agency wanted to avoid MONCURE's having to
contradict Mr. and Mrs. Itkins' affadavits in court. The
FBI seemed to have been more interested in protecting Itkin's
reputation as a witness than in protecting MONCURE's reputa-
tion for honesty.

3. MONCURE did not appear in court. The Federal
authorities eventually placed protection around Itkin and
his wife, keeping them on a military reservation, while
he appeared as a star witness in numerous Mafia cases which
led to covictions.

4. One small side issuegis worth noting: (Thomas L.
Roberts, who was a law partner of Itkin) until mid-1961, became
a CIA staff agent under cover in Africa) The many fraudulent
activities of Itkin spread a scintilla of suspicion around
Roberts. The latter was given a polygraph examination in
Frankfurt. He answered questions on his relationship with
Itkin including financial and his few contacts with Marcus
to the satisfaction of his interrogators.

5. Comments: The thrust of the file is mainly defensive.
CIA was reacting to Itkin's tactics to help his wife gain cus-
tody over her children. Itkin's numerous trips to England
and Europe were made on behalf of the FBI, and they were part
of an FBI attempt to gain information on the Mafia. Before
the recruitment of Itkin and his utilization by the FBI, CIA
did pass to the Attorney General in 1963 information on a
Department of Labor official's alleged criminal involvement
with the Mafia, which MONCURE had elicited from Itkin. The
file also refers to MONCURE's continued contact with one Mafia
figure Lenzieri, who was a legal client, as a means of self-
protection as Lenzieri represented a channel back to the Mafia

SECRET

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SECRET

for MONCURE, who was apprehensive of Mafia retaliation because
of his involvement with Itkin.

6. I have talked to Will Kerbe who is presently the
case officer in contact for MONCURE. He says that MONCURE
is in limited law practice and is drawing a pension from
the Agency as well as a contract for services connected with
Golitsyn. There is probably nothing in the file which could
damage MONCURE's security as much of the information
regarding his association with Itkin has already been exposed.
The most recent information in the file is a January 1975
memorandum for the record from Acting Chief, CI, which
states that John K. Greaney, Assistant General Counsel had
learned that Seymour Hersh had learned details of the Itkin-:
MONCURE relationship. It would appear that Mr. Greaney is
the most knowledgeable person in the agency on the legal
aspects of the Itkin case and probably maintains his own
files.

William H. Godson

SECRET
# 14-00000
# 104-10106-10547
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

# CONFIDENTIAL 32814

# 10 April 1963

# Security Division
# Federal Aviation Agency
# Washington 25, D. C

# Attention: Mr. Charles F. Niles
# Subject: HARVEY, WILLIAM K.

# Dear Sir:
# In accordance with existing arrangements made with
# the Federal Aviation Agency and to confirm our oral
# notification, it is requested that your files reflect
# the above-named individual, an employee of this Agency,
# as having been issued Federal Aviation Agency Credential
# Number 4883 on 2 January 1963

# In the event of an inquiry, this information may be
# released to verify the authenticity of this credential.

# Nicholas R. Zubon
# Chief, Building Security Branch
# Office of Security

# FORM
# 10-62 1995
# CONFIDENTIAL
# GROUP 1
# Excluded from automatic
# downgrading and
# declassification
12 December 1967

SUBJECT: SCHLUMBERGER WELL SURVEYING CORPORATION
(See Houma Munitions Dunker - Lease" by Subject firm)

ALLEGATION:

GARRISON has charged
that the burglary of the
Houme munitions bunker was
"CIA-Inspirei." He issued
arrest warrants for Gordon
NOVEL and-Sergio ARCACHA
SITE charging them with
the Houma burglary.

SOURCE:

Enclosure 24 of
CI/R&A remorandum of
7 August 1967.

CIA CONNECTION:

CIA had no connection with the
alleged burglery of the Houma Munitions
Bunker or any connection with the
bunker itself.
However, Pierre SCHLUMBERGER, prezident
of the SCHLUMBERGER CORPORATION, was of
contact interest in 1950 for routine
exploitation as a foreign intelligence
source. The FBI advised they had no objection
to the Agency's interrogating Pierre
SCHLUMBERGER who was an alien. In 1962
DAYSTRON, INC. was acquired by SCHLUMBERGER,
INC. The Agency had a contract with DAY-
STRON for an unclassified item ($49,000
contract for the production of Mark II
limmet mines); Agency interest was classified
Secret. SCHLUMBERGER, LTD. is a Dutch firm
controlled by French nationais. After the
Kerger, it was determined that future relation-
ship with DAYSTRON must be governed by
Agency policy not to place classified contracts
with & foreign firm. In 1963 the same
decision was reaches concerning Agency con-
tracts with Electro-Fechanical Research, Inc.,
*a subsidiary of SCHLUMBERGER, LTD. ENR
dealt in all phases of telemetry. Contact
clearances for other personnel of SCHLUMBERGER
are set out below.

OS INDICES RESULTS:

The SCHLUMBERGER COMPANY was the subject of a nare check in
1947 bec use of a contact request, and it was determine) that there are
mrber of SCHLU PERCER corporations in Latin America which are domi-
nated by French nation:18. SCHLUBERGER has a patented operation for an
oil vell shooting" service which is subscribei to by various oil companies.
The SCHLUMBERGER WELL SURVEYING CORPORATION in Fouston was controlled by
Henri Ceorges DOLL, & French national. Be was of contact interest in
1956 and 1957. Eis wife is the daughter of Conrad SCHLUMBERGER.

139.

In August 1951 the Agency was interested in contacting Professor
Edouard POLDINI, a geophysicist and professor at the University of
Geneva and formerly an employee of the SCHLUMBERGER CORPORATION in
Paris, for operational use. He was to be used as a channel to a Janus
KANTAS who could give information about the fate of the previous employees of
the Jersey Company in Hungary, the production figures and extent of
exploitation of existing oil fields and exploration of new oil fields
together with the names of the officials of the Russian Hungarian Company
who took over the Jersey Company.

In March 1953 the SCHLUMBERGER file reflects that an FBI source
furnished information that one Maurice Henri MARTIN, employed as an
engineer by the SCHLUMBERGER Company, Paris, France, received a letter
dated 27 July 1951 at Moscow from one Biegfried Stefanovitch MOROSOFF,
asking MARTIN for specialized information concerning geophysics. The
letter requested that MARTIN's reply be forwarded to Moscow through an inter-
mediary. From January 1932 until April 1937 MARTIN represented the SCHLUMBERGER
Company in Russia as an engineer, and it was thought that the correspondence
from MOROSOFF may represent a Soviet attempt to resume contact with MARTIN
and develop clandestine relations with him. The FBI conducted an investi-
gation dated June 1953 and determined that Maurice Henri MARTIN resided
at Nod Hill, Wilton, Connecticut and was employed by the SCHLUMBERGER
Well Surveying Co., Ridgefield, Connecticut. Informants advised that
although MARTIN was strongly nationalistic toward France, he gave every
indication of being anti-Russian and there was no evidence of CP activities.

When DAYSTROM, INC. merged with SCHLUMBERGER, LTD., research was
done on the directors and officers of SCHLUMBERGER, LTD. The results
are as follows:

OS indices reflect a record on Dillon ANDERSON, a trustee of
Electro-Mechanical Research, Inc. (a subsidiary of SCHLUMBERGER, LTD.)
who was also a proposed trustee of "NEW DAYSTROM" when it merged with
SCHLUMBERGER. ANDERSON is an attorney from Houston, Texas who was
appointed by President EISENHOWER as an advisor to the National Security
Council from 1953 until 1956. He was considered for a special clearance
in August 1955 but the briefing was not given. He was granted a covert O
clearance in December 1953 and April 1954 for use as a covert associate
on Project LPFUNNEL. J

Pierre SCHLUMBERGER, President and Chief Executive Officer,
SCHLUMBERGER, LTD., Houston, Texas, French citizen, was of contact
interest in 1950.

Charles C. PARLIN, Director of SCHLUMBERGER, LTD., and a member
of the law firm of SHEARMEN, STERLING and WRIGHT, Englewood, New
Jersey, U. S. citizen, was of contact interest in 1962 but was
security disapproved. PARLIN was allegedly the boy friend of Johanna
BEKER who was in contact with known Soviet Agents, ROBERT and JACK
SOBLE. BEKER advised the FBI in 1957 that she received, paid for and
transmitted to Robert SOBLE, OSS information which was given her by
two former OSS employees. She also advised the FBI in 1957 that she

had given a very general outline of her activities to PARLIN ani
it is reliably reported that PARLIN and EMER shared a hotel roon
in Folland in 1957. PARLIN recorrented & Willion bart LANCASTER
for OSS employrent. LANCASTER was a member of the care law firm as
PARLIN and had a long record of Cortunist, front affiliations. PARLIN
in 1956 traveled to Jussia as a member of & delegation under the
sponsorship of the National Council of Churches. De was also the
lawyer for & Swiss & zament industrialist who sola erms to the
Nazis and the Communist countries since that time.

Clark Drouillard GOODMAN, Vice-President of SCHLU-BERGER,
Ltd., Houston, Texas, U. S. citizen, was security disapproved for
use by TED in 1952 and for contact use in 1955 based on his support
of Frofessor Dirk STRUIK, & colleague at FTT, who was indicted on
chere of having been a Communist conspirstor and identified as a
Cormaist Party member. In Farch 1959 the same derogatory information
wis furnished the Contact Office to be considered in determining any
use of GOOD AN. Also, a book written by GOODHAN's wife, Kay Ellen
GOOD AN, was favorably reviewed by the 'DAILY WONER" in 1956.

Jean C. LEGRAND, Vice-President of the SCHLUBERGER WELL
SURVEYING CORPORATION, Pigefield, Connecticut (U. S. citizen,
naturalised Fouston, Texas 1941) was approved for contact use in Kay
1957. Ele file is clear. There is a notation that one Hrs. J. C.
JESSAND, 5319 Fanell Street, Houston, Texas, in Noventer 1944 was
Fresident of the Houston Chapter, France Forever, The Fighting French
Committee in America.

Everett STRAITOR, Sales Manager, Houston Area, SCHLUMBERGER
WELL SURVEYING Corporation, Fouston, Texas, U. S. citizen, was security
proved (CAUTION) for contact use in October 1950. His file is clear.

Daniel SCHIANBERGER, French citizen, archeologist and teacher
t the University of Strasbourg, France in 1955, vis granted sa
over tional approval for use as a contract arent in Kabul in April
1956 but the clear ace vis encelled 20 September 1956. Eis file is
clear. Fowever, in & Tile on Nicholas KAGAK, French financier, and
suspected Soviet agent, which contains detailed study of the inter-
relationships and family connections existing in French firms,
information on Daniel SCEUBERGER is containe¹ therin. Daniel
SCHAU BERGER, & rester of the EU PERCER WELL SURVEYING Corporation,
vas head of the French Archeologicel Deletion in Afghanistan (1948-
1954). An associate of Daniel SCHLUBERGER WAS REoul CURIEL of a wealthy
Jewish banking family in Cairo, Egypt. Raoul and his brother, Henri
CUREN Cortunist chrounds and their mother we cant to Deore
SLME Co lich Soviet ar to Pefected to Pussis. BLATE lived with
the FIER's in Circ. Iso Cilbert PONTECORVO, known Comunist,
relative of the CURIEL family
wus in cont et with Dumento ARIEL,
involved in the Geore DE case. Bruno PONTECORVO, Gilbert's brother,
in the storie scientist wo defected to Russic in 1950, worked for
the Well Surreyin fomor tion, Tulsa, 01hor, from 1940 to 1942 but
it was not own it the SOCU BERGER Well Surveying Corporation is in ny
way connected with the Well Surveying Corporation in Tulse.

SCELUMBERGER end Company and another SCHLUMBERGER subsidiary
Mru, Machine Bull (Competitor of IBK), are connected with Schneider
and Company, 42 rue d'Anjou, Paris. Francois SAAR-DEMICHEL, manager
of Compagnie Internationale de Commerce, represents SCHNEIDER for
the USSR and is a Soviet agent. In September 1961, an investigation
conducted in France disclosed that "everything that takes place in
the Elysee is known in Moscow within 48 hours and the originator of
such intelligence is Francois SAAR-DEMICHEL." Machines Bull is
controlled by General Electric Company of the U. S. and SCHNEIDER
and Company is affiliated with U. S. Westinghouse Corporation
under the name SCHNEIDER-Westinghouse.

The Study in KAGAR's file contains the following additional
information concerning SCHLUMBERGER and Company:

Haurice and Remi SCHLUMEERGER are affiliated with Lazard
Freres and the Worms Bank. Lagard Freres controls SCHNEIDER-
Westinghouse and has a New Orleans Branch Office. Closely associated
with the SCHLUMBERGER's is Charles DOH. DOH was born et Odessa in
1911 and arrived in the United States in 1937 to join the SCHLUMBERGER
Hell Surveying Corporation at Houston, Texas. He became a U. S.
citizen on 6 September 1950. Charles has a brother, Jean, who was
closely associated with Leonard FOURAU, & suspected Soviet agent.
HOUNGU was closely associated with Francois S/AR-DEMICHEL, previously
reatione Soviet agent connected with SCHLUMBERGER and Company.
Charles DOE was approved for Agency contact use in September 1955 es
a member of the SCHLUMBERGER Well Surveying Corporation. His file
is clear.

Roger Robert Henri KENQUET, Executive Vice-President,
SCHLUMBERGER Well Surveying Corporation, Fouston, Texas, was approved
for contact use on a limited basis in October 1950. He had been an
erployee of OSE from 1943 to 1945; was given American citizenship
and the Congressional Vedal of Ponor for his deeds during World War II.

Arthur Henry FPENTROP, an employee of the SCHLUMBERGER WELL
SURVEYING CORPORATION, Ridgefield, Connecticut, was of contact
interest in June 1956. Information concerning his spouse's critical
attitule towerde American customs and institutions and the dominant
osition she exercised over her busband was furnished the contact
office.
104-10107-10085 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

(9064-6237

5 February 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of the General Counsel

VIA : Chief, Central Cover Staff

INFO : Mr. Rocca, CI Staff

SUBJECT : (Thomas Lee Roberts) The Itkin Case

FYI

1. At our meeting on 30 January 1969, certain additional questions were raised relative to the relationship between (Roberts) and Itkin.

29
First, when did (LPGLOBE become aware that Itkin and the
Conestoga Group) had approached (Roberts) with a proposal to represent them in (Africa We were advised in 1966 through case officer meetings with Roberts) that he had been developing some potential cover company business with interests from the United States and England. We were given the name of the Conestoga Group) no later than 27 October 1966. We cannot say that we then knew the individual names of those involved. It was not uncommon for (Roberts) to have discussions with a number of potential clients; when it became apparent that no real business was forthcoming from this group, our interest ceased.

At the 30 January meeting, we were also asked certain 08 questions about (Roberts) financial involvement with the (law firm) he and Itkin has been with prior to (Robert's) association with the Agency.

2. We can add nothing to Roberts) account of January 1968 reflecting that he entered into an agreement with the firm on 31 May 1961 wherein he was authorized leave of absence from 1 June 1961 to 31 May 1963 drawing $100.00 per week for that period.

(EUGENE MILLIGAN
Chief, CCS/GLOBE
104-10107-10087 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

OGC 69-0402

4 March 1969

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. I showed Mr. George Carey his memorandum of 1955
to the Director referring to T. and H., and said we thought
that H. referred to a General Hardin. After considerable
speculation Mr. Carey finally placed T. as being Juan Trippe
and Hardin as an Air Force General who was being placed with
(Pan Am)for operational reasons, primarily technical information
collection. Independently Mrs. Lovejoy had checked with Mr.
Larocque, and he also recalled General Hardin was a man
Mr. Carey was interested in placing with (Pan Am) for operational
reasons.

2. The Air Force Register lists a General Thomas O.
Hardin, Air Force Major General, who retired in 1955, which
would seem to fit in as he is listed as an airline executive.
Mr. Carey had no knowledge whatsoever of the Itkin case, and
we felt it was out of the question that General Hardin is
synonymous with Philip Harbin.

LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel

OGC:LRH:bt
1-C/CI/R&A
1-DCS
2-General Counsel chrono
Subject HERBERT ITKIN
104-10107-10089 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
ROUTING
2
TEL 0 0 0 0 0
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
TELEPOUCH
OGC SUBJ: ITKIN, HERBERT
DISPATCH NUMBER
(FAMU4125
22

INDEX 0. NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO:
0 IP FILES
TO: MELBOURNE CANBERRA

SECRET TELEPOUCH
22
DISP NO: FAMU-4125
E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 034405
FYI
DATE: 16 NOVEMBER 1973
TO: CHIEF OF BASE, MELBOURNE)
CHIEF OF STATION, CANBERRA)
FROM: CHIEF, EAST ASIA DIVISION
SUBJECT: MR. HERBERT ITKIN
FYI ONLY:
RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce
ON NOVEMBER 1973 MR. LESLIE V JARVIS ASIO REP IN WASHINGTON, HAND CARRIED TO HAS A LETTER FROM AUSTRALIAN JUSTICE A. R. MOFF-.
ITT REQUESTING INFORMATION ON THE RELIABILITY OF MR. HERECRT ITKIN
WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS A FORMER CIA AND FEI EMPLOYEE. THE FOLLOWING
PARAGRAPHS ARE THE GIST OF MR. MOFFITT'S LETTER, WHICH WAS ADDRESSED
TO "MR. WILLIAM CROSEY, (SIC) DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:
A. MOFFITT HOLDS A COMMISSION TO INQUIRE INTO THE INFIL-
2 TRATION OF ORGANIZED CRIME INTO NEW SOUTH WALES. IT IS OF SUBSTANTIAL
IMPORTANCE TO HIS INQUIRY THAT HE CONSIDER EVIDENCE GIVEN DURING A
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
CROSS REFERENCE
FILE NUMBER
5-2-5/3

OUTGOING TELEPOUCH
COURT CASE IN ENGLAND IN JULY 1971 BY ITKIN.
B. IN HIS TESTIMONY IN ENGLAND MR. ITKIN CLAIMED TO HAVE.
BEEN RECRUITED BY CIA IN AN "UNEDERCOVER CAPACITY" IN ABOUT 1954. HE
CLAIMED HE WAS WITH THE C.I.A. UNTIL MARCH 1963 AT WHICH TIME BY SOME
ARRANGEMENT HE WORKED FOR BOTH THE FBI AND CIA, UNTIL JANUARY 1968.
с. MOFFITT ASKS FOR INFORMATION ON THE STATUS OF MR. ITKIN
DURING THE YEARS 1964 TO 1969 AND FOR COPIES OF "ANY RELEVANT AFFI-
DAVITS OF PERSONS IN AUTHORITY IN THE FBI OR CIA USED IN PROCEEDINGS
IN USA."
D. MOFFITT NOTED THAT IN THE INTERESTS OF PRIVACY HE ROUT-
ED HIS LETTER VIA THE AUSTRALIAN-DIPLOMATIC POUCH, AND ASKED THAT THE
REPLY BE RETURNED TO HIM BY THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON.
2. MR. MOFFITT'S REQUEST WAS HANDLESD BY THE OFFICE OF GENERAL
COUNCIL COGC} WHO MADE AVAILABLE FOR MR. MOFFITT COPIES OF THREE
AFFIDAVITS CALL OF WHICH IN PUBLIC DOMAING RELEVANT TO HERBERT ITKIN
BAND HIS AFFILIATION WITH THE CIA. OGC CONCLUDED THEIR REPLY BY SAY-
2 ING THAT HERBERT ITKIN FURNISHED INFORMATION TO THE CIA OVER A PERIOD
OF MANY YEARS, BUT THAT HE WAS NOT SENT TO ENGLAND TO COLLECT ANY

DATE:
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FILE NUMBER
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INFORMATION FOR CIA AND HE DID NOT FURNISH THE CIA WITH ANY INFORMA-
TION WHILE HE WAS IN ENGLAND.
3. OGC'S REPLY WAS SENT TO MR. MOFFITT IN THE SAME CHANNELS HIS
REQUEST CAME IN. HQS POUCHING COPIES AFFADAVITS, BOTH LETTERS..
U/S/CO VIA POUCH
E2 IMPDET-H

DATE:DE NOVEMBER 1972
ORIG LANESHER PAK
UNIT: EA/PHE
EXT: 5681/9033
THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, C/EA
RELEASING OFFICER
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
CROSS REFERENCE
COORDINATING OFFICERS
OGC MR. GREANY CIN DRAFT)
CI MR. ROCCA CIN DRAFTI
FILE NUMBER
5-2-5/3
OGC 69-0181
31 January 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Herbert Itkin

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1. A meeting was held on 27 January 1969 with Messrs.
Rocca, Houston, Warner and myself to discuss the ramifications
of the confrontation with the New York FBI office on 17 January.
It was concluded that additional information was required on
(Thomas L. Roberts) and (Robert Delson). I contacted the Director
of Security and requested the security files on these two individuals
and was advised that we could not have the security files but that
Mr. Ward Greene would bring the files to the office and discuss
their contents openly.

2. On 29 January, Mr. Greene brought the security files
on (Roberts) and (Delson) and was most cooperative in explaining
their contents. Attached is a chronological rundown on the
pertinent information on Thomas L. Roberts' affiliation with
the FBI, CIA and Itkin.

3. On 30 January a meeting was held with Messrs. Houston,
Warner, Rocca, and (Eugene Milligan), to discuss
the operational use of Mr. Roberts. Mr. Roberts has been a
Staff Agent of CIA since 28 August 1961. From March 1964 to
November 1964 he spent time in West Africa) writing a monograph
on (West African legal) problems. It should be noted that this
task was performed under a grant from a foundation which was
blown in the MHDOWEL exposures. In November 1964 (Roberts)
was assigned for Cover to the (Radio Corporation of America
legal) staff where he remained until March 1965 and then went
to (Dakar.

4. The facts in the attached chronology are subject to
question since they are the result of (Roberts)' own explanation of
his affiliation with Itkin rather than having been determined from
independent sources. The most critical aspect would appear to
be the knowledge or suspicion that Itkin may have known of
(Roberts)' affiliation with CIA. This knowledge is borne out by
the strange way in which Itkin repeatedly brings (Roberts)' name
into the story which Itkin develops about his CIA affiliations.
One of the questions to be answered by CP GLOBE personnel is
whether or not (Roberts) reported his activities with Itkin in Geneva,
Switzerland, in March 1966. There appears to be no record of
(Roberts)' having explained why he never pursued the Itkin debt or
what his financial contribution was to the law firm of Itkin, Roberts&
and Greenbaum.)

5. Mr. Rocca was advised by Mr. Sam Papich of the FBI
that the New York District Attorney may be considering prosecution
against (Robert for having absconded with funds received from
negligence cases. We do not have sufficient information to evaluate
the likelihood of criminal prosecution. It may be necessary to
discuss this problem with representatives of Mr. Hogan's office.

6. With regard to (Robert Delson) there appear to have been
two operational considerations, one having been a request to use
him with Project DTPILLAR from November 1953 to February
1955, and then a request in 1963 by the Domestic Operations
Division for his use on Project WUBRINY. In March 1964 DO
Division advised Security that (Delson) was not going to be used
on WUBRINY. Mr. Rocca commented that there are some rather
ominous allegations against members of the firm of (Delson, Levin
and Gordon, indicating that one member of the firm was a card-
carrying member of the Communist Party. At the present time
Mr. Rocca is investigating the DTPILLAR use of Mr. (Delson)

Attachment
cc: C/CI/R&A

JOHN K. GREANEY
Assistant General Counsel

7 March 1966 (Roberts received letter from Itkin but his
secretary advised that Roberts' was on vacation
in Austria. Itkin contacted Roberts' in Austria)
and set up meeting in (Geneva, Switzerland)
15 March 1966 Meeting at (Hotel Beau Rivage) in (Geneva)
Present were Itkin and (wife) (Jim Marcus)
(Littman) and (wife) Meeting lasted three days.
No projects get off the ground.

Nov 1966 (Roberts) in New York City, met at (Marcus's)
apartment with Itkin and (Marcus's) father.
Then met Itkin again at a dinner given by
(Mario Brod.)

Nov 1967 (Roberts) again in New York and contacted Itkin.
Had lunch with Itkin and (Brod.) Last time
Roberts) saw or heard of Itkin until he read in
the press about the (Marcus scandal.

THOMAS L. ROBERTS

Nov 1949 (Roberts) volunteered his services to (Boston FBI)
not accepted.

Jan 1950 (Roberts) left United States to study in (Paris)

Nov 1950 From Nov. 1950 until Nov. 1955 reported on
security matters to the Boston FBI' Office,
Labor Youth League.

Aug 1955 Itkin (hired Roberts) to work for Delson, Levin &
Gordon) (Roberts) says he was hired to handle
maritime matters in litigation.)

Nov 1955 (Roberts) moved to New York City.

June 1956 Resumed services of reporting to FBI. Was a
paid informant of New York FBI' office reporting
on the National Lawyers Guild.

Fall 1956 (Roberts) and others submitted profit-sharing plan
to Delson, Levin & Gordon) not accepted.

Apr 1957 (Roberts) resigned from Delson, Levin & Gordon)
to form a new firm, Roberts, Greenbaum & Itkin)
(No mention of financial arrangement of setting
up new firm.)

6 Apr 1961 (Roberts) came to Washington and talked with
Robert Amory about employment with CIA since
Amory had been a former professor of Roberts.
(Roberts) was sent to overt CIA personnel recruiter
and filled out an application for employment with
CIA.

1 June 1961 Roberts took a leave of absence from the (firm of
Roberts, Greenbaum & Itkin) which was to last
from 1 June 1961 through 31 May (1963) (Roberts)

was to receive $100) per week from the firm
while on the leave of absence. (Roberts) did
receive the fo following payments:
(Sept) 1961 $200) Dec 1961 $100)
(10 Jan 1962 ($100) (1 June 1962 $100;)
(18 June) 1962 $500) NOTE:( Roberts)'
received only $1,000) when he should have
received ($10,400)

12 July 1961 FBI advised that (Roberts) was still reporting
to them in New York.

25 July 1961 (Roberts) was given CIA polygraph interview.

Aug 1961 (Roberts) approved by Office of Security for CIA
employment as a Staff Agent.

Sept 1961 FBI advised they had broken off all contact
with Roberts.

24 May 1963 (Roberts) wrote letter to firm) withdrawing his
membership effective 21 May 1963.

May 1965 (Roberts) received a check from Itkin for $2,500
but with the stipulation that Roberts) send $1,250
to England in order to get the money out of
reach of Itkin's first wife.

26 May 1965 (Roberts) arrived in Dakar.)

16 June 1965 (Roberts) sent $500 to Itkin, in England after
asking Itkin about a desk and chair to be sent
to Roberts, in Dakar

10 Nov 1965 (Roberts) forwarded money to Aida Itkin in England.

Jan 1966 Itkin advised Roberts' about the formation of
Conestoga, Ltd.)

Feb 1966 Itkin wrote to Roberts' about Senator Lodge.
14-00000
104-10107-10137 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

OGC 69-0181
31 January 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Herbert Itkin

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1. A meeting was held on 27 January 1969 with Messrs.
Rocca, Houston, Warner and myself to discuss the ramifications
of the confrontation with the New York FBI office on 17 January.
It was concluded that additional information was required on
03 (Thomas L. Roberts) and (Robert Delson). I contacted the Director
of Security and requested the security files on these two individuals
and was advised that we could not have the security files but that
Mr. Ward Greene would bring the files to the office and discuss
their contents openly.

03 2. On 29 January, Mr. Greene brought the security files
on (Roberts) and (Delson) and was most cooperative in explaining
their contents. Attached is a chronological rundown on the
pertinent information on Thomas L. Roberts) affiliation with
the FBI, CIA and Itkin.
03

3. On 30 January, a meeting was held with Messrs. Houston,
Warner, Rocca, and Eugene Milligan), CCS (LP) GLOBE, to discuss
the operational use of Mr. (Robert Roberts). Mr. Roberts has been a
Staff Agent of CIA since 28 August 1961. From March 1964 to
November 1964 he spent time in (West Africa) writing a monograph
on West African legal) problems. It should be noted that this
task was performed under a grant from a foundation which was
blown in the MHDOWEL exposures. In November 1964 (Roberts)
was assigned for Cover to the Radio Corporation of America 24
legal staff where he remained until March 1965 and then went
to Dakar)
12-10

SECRET

14-00000

4. The facts in the attached chronology are subject to
question since they are the result of (Roberts) own explanation of
his affiliation with Itkin rather than having been determined from
independent sources. The most critical aspect would appear to
be the knowledge or suspicion that Itkin may have known of
03 (Roberts) affiliation with CIA.
This knowledge is borne out by
the strange way in which Itkin repeatedly brings Roberts) name
into the story which Itkin develops about his CIA affiliations.
One of the questions to be answered by LED GLOBE personnel is
whether or not (Roberts) reported his activities with Itkin in Geneva,
Switzerland, in March 1966. There appears to be no record of
03(Roberts) having explained why he never pursued the Itkin debt or
what his financial contribution was to the law firm of Itkin, Roberts
and Greenbaum.)

5. Mr. Rocca was advised by Mr. Sam Papich of the FBI
that the New York District Attorney may be considering prosecution
against Roberts) for having absconded with funds received from
negligence cases. We do not have sufficient information to evaluate
the likelihood of criminal prosecution. It may be necessary to
discuss this problem with representatives of Mr. Hogan's office.
06

6. With regard to (Robert Delson) there appear to have been
two operational considerations, one having been a request to use
him with Project DTPILLAR from November 1953 to February
1955, and then a request in 1963 by the Domestic Operations
Division for his use on Project WUBRINY. In March 1964 DO
Division advised Security that Delson) was not going to be used
on WUBRINY. Mr. Rocca commented that there are some rather
ominous allegations against members of the firm of Delson, Levin
and Gordon) indicating that one member of the firm was a card-
carrying member of the Communist Party. At the present time
Mr. Rocca is investigating the DTPILLAR use of Mr. (Delson.)
06

Attachment

JOHN K. GREANEY
Assistant General Counsel
14-00000
104-10107-10180
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
:(
MIBORANDUM FOR: Director of Logistics
SUBJECT
RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce
07-0202
0CM-67-09/
Communications
1 FEB 1957
: Request for Services of Collins Modem Field Service
Engineer

1. The Office of Communications recently purchased two Colline Radio
Company Model TE-216D-160 High Frequency Data Modens at a cost of $20,000
each. These Hodems are specially designed equipment and will be used to
best the feasibility of transmitting Secure (encrypted) Voice over a narrow
band, high frequency, radio circuit. We also intend to determine their
suitability for use in high speed data transmission, and tests by our
Engineering Staff are scheduled to commence in mid-February.

2. Owing to the fact Modeas are very complex in operation requiring
special set-up techniques end adjustment, it would be adventageous to have
a specialist available to assist our personnel and to assure timely completion
of the tests. Accordingly, it is requested that a contract be let with the
Collins Fedio Company for the services of a Field Service Engineer. It is
presently estimated that the services of this Engineer will be required at
24 (Station "D", VTC) for approximately six to eight weeks depending on test
results. The exact date on which the Engineer is needed will be determined
as preliminary installation of the equipment is completed. For planning
purposes, however, ve estimate he will be required on or about 6 March 1967.

3. It is understood from discussions with Collins representatives at
Newport Beach, California, that engineering services of this type cost
approximately $3,000 per month in addition to travel expenses. We recommend
that the services of Moden Field Service Engineer, Mr. (Donald Warren Waycott,) 106
be secured, as he has an Agency TOP SECRET clearance effective 19 May 1965.

4. For any additional information, please contact Mr. (Jeck W. Andrews
on Extension 2045.
°3
Attachment:
Request for Procurement Services

JOHN W. COFFEY
Director of Communications

RET
31N

14-00000
SURJECT: Request for Services of Collins Hoden Field Service
Engineer
CONCURRENCE:

(Signed) RICHARD H. LANSDALE
Office of Ceneral Counsel

Harlon a. Werthell
Director of Security
APPROVAL:

// Dow H. Inter
Director of Personmel
Distribution:
Orig. & 1
-
Addressee w/att.
1 Director of Security w/o att.
-
1
Director of Personnel w/o att,
1- Ceneral Counsel w/o ett.

RET
2
:
1907
3 FEB 1967
Date

1937
Date
10 o'clock DCI's deadline.

Salked to fim Lolis, Deputy Chief
Ground Photo Services Branck, in the absence
of Harry Dan Tuyl. Shere is no photo of
the "bums ir police custody at the scexe
of the assasination" without a credit
at the bottom of the photo it cannot be obtained
from the wire service directl
Mr Collis called Herb Simmons CRS
Document Services Group could arrange for
owe umak in New York (who has State, colove").
to put in a request to Newsweek. Mr.99
Simmons said he Dcould not make a.....
request for
a
co
domestic photo without the
autoronization of of Dr. Dr. Proctor Proctoe but ever. 이
authorization he does not reccommend
this gute as there is no plausible
reason, for a "State" person to be
requesteding this photo: 24

ZIBR
104-10110-10095
FILE

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
TRAVEL BRIEFING DATA

NAME: BUSTOS-VIDELA, Charlotte
OFFICE: WH
PHONE: x7811
DEPARTURE DATE: 30 June 1974
STATUS: PCS
DESTINATION(S): Trinidad

FILE NUMBER: 56840
RANK OR GRADE: GS-14
COVER: STATE INTEGREE
DEPENDENTS BRIEFED: YES NO

AREA: PREVIOUS TRAVEL yes
AREA: COVER: YEARS
AREA: COVER: YEARS
AREA: COVER: YEARS

EXPERIENCED TRAVEL: Formal briefing waived YES NO

RISK OF CAPTURE TRAVEL BRIEFING:
CATEGORY: A X B C D

SPECIAL BRIEFING PROBLEM:
TYPE: CIA VON A-Z
WHO'S WHO IN CIA
HIJACKING NOTICE
OTHER

SECURITY APPROVAL FOR TRAVEL VERIFIED IN SUBJECT FILE: YES NO
SECURITY APPROVAL FOR TRAVEL BASED ON FILE REVIEW BY BRIEFING OFFICER: YES NO
SECURITY FILE AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW BEFORE BRIEFING: YES NO

EMERGENCY CONTACTS (met on arrival, phone no., alternate action to make contact)
SECURITY REGULATIONS (operational talk, documents, indigenous employee hazards)
TRAVEL PRECAUTIONS (recognition overseas, camera, black market, currency exchange)
PERSONAL AFFAIRS (charge accounts, traffic tickets, litigation, neighbors)
PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE (limitations, home address, shop talk)
PERSONAL CONDUCT (morals, drinking, representative americans)
ASSOCIATION WITH FOREIGNERS (overseas briefing, phase out on return)
HOSTILE AUDIO SURVEILLANCE (microphones, shop talk at home-hotels, report to security)
COVER PROBLEMS (adequacy, request for briefing on arrival, family knowledge)
RESPONSIBILITY ABROAD (local customs, traditions, religion, responsibility for dependents)
OTHER:

✓ TRAVELING w/spouse

REFERRED BACK TO CENTRAL COVER: YES NO

EMERG.DES.- SPOUSE - IF NOT POSSIDIE THEM PARENTS.

DATE BRIEFED: 6/18/74 BY:
SECURITY OFFICER

FORM 11-72 1987 EDITIONS ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
104-10110-10242 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

18 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Support Branch

FROM : Mr. Ramon R. Hart

SUBJECT : Manuel F. ARTIME Buesa
#210 838

1. The first phase of the audio surveillance of the
Subject at the SAS safehouse in Bethesda has been completed.
The Subject left Washington, D. C., on 13 July 1963. The
owner of the listening post, Mr. Fred CHROMASTKA,
moved out of his house, bag, baggage, and furniture, on
12 July 1963 enroute to an overseas PCS assignment.

2. Mr. Charles MATT, the case officer in this case, has
advised that the Subject, along with a Cuban companion, Mr.
Rafael Aurelio QUINTERO Ibarbia (#252 529), will return to
Washington, D. C., to be billeted in the Bethesda safehouse on
Monday, 29 July 1963. Mr. MATT has fervently requested audio
coverage of the downstairs bar and telephone and the main floor
living room at this house in order to monitor the Subject's
conversations with QUINTERO during the absence of SAS case
officers.

3. The case was assigned to the District Field Office,
and Special Agent Cond 6. SEFISIER was designated as responsible
agent. It is Agent TITTER plan to place microphones in the
downstairs bar and the main floor living room and a tap on the
telephone and string all the wires to a crawl space over the
garage. In that latter space, which will be kept locked, he will
set up two regular AC-operated tape recorders to be actuated by
the two VOR's obtained from Franconia and paid for by SAS. Un-
beknown to the Subject and his companion, a case officer will
have to service this equipment whenever an opportunity presents
itself.

SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Page Two
#210 838

SECRET

4. The cover story to be used by Agent STER during
the installation is that he is working on the house at the
request of the leasor, Washington real estate agent, Mr.
Cuando DEEREST (38867). Mr. Sh supposedly maintains
the house for a New York lawyer in order to billet the latter's
transient clients. Case Officer MATT has engaged a maid to
clean up the house Mondays and Thursdays; however, she can be
told to stay away if Agent WSTER needs to do work there on
those days. It was also discreetly requested by the undersigned
of Case Officer MATT not to kibbitz too much while the techni-
cians are making the installation.

5. It is expected that the audio results of this type
of coverage will be superior to the results of the previous
"radio" phase. The only complication will be in servicing the
recorders on a timely basis.

Ramon R. Hart

cc: #252 529

1lg

SECRET
104-10110-10243 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

18 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Support Branch
FROM : Mr. Ramon R. Hart
SUBJECT : Manuel F. ARTIME Buesa
 #210 838

1. The first phase of the audio surveillance of the
Subject at the SAS safehouse in Bethesda has been completed.
The Subject left Washington, D. C., on 13 July 1963. The
owner of the listening post, Mr. Fred C. THOMAS, Jr.moved out of his house, bag, baggage, and furniture, on
12 July 1963 enroute to an overseas PCS assignment.

2. Mr. Charles MATT, the case officer in this case, has
advised that the Subject, along with a Cuban companion, Mr.
Rafael Aurelio QUINTERO Ibarbia (#252 529), will return to
Washington, D. C., to be billeted in the Bethesda safehouse on
Monday, 29 July 1963. Mr. MATT has fervently requested audio
coverage of the downstairs bar and telephone and the main floor
living room at this house in order to monitor the Subject's
conversations with QUINTERO during the absence of SAS case
officers.

3. The case was assigned to the District Field Office,
and Special Agent Harold G. TITSLER was designated as responsible
agent. It is Agent TITTSLER's plan to place microphones in the
downstairs bar and the main floor living room and a tap on the
telephone and string all the wires to a crawl space over the
garage. In that latter space, which will be kept locked, he will
set up two regular AC-operated tape recorders to be actuated by
the two VOR's obtained from Franconia and paid for by SAS. Un-
beknown to the Subject and his companion, a case officer will
have to service this equipment whenever an opportunity presents
itself.

DESITOS
ADDS/50S
ASST/EGS
TECH
CIS BUL
A&TS
FILES
252529
RETURN TO CIA
Base Only
Lroduc

Page Two
#210 838

SECRET

4. The cover story to be used by Agent (TITTSLER during
the installation is that he is working on the house at the
request of the leasor, Washington real estate agent, Mr. R. V.
Cortlandt HEREST (DI°7-8865) Mr. HERBST supposedly maintains
the house for a New York lawyer in order to billet the latter's
transient clients. Case Officer MATT has engaged a maid to
clean up the house Mondays and Thursdays; however, she can be
told to stay away if Agent (TITTSLER needs to do work there on
those days. It was also discreetly requested by the undersigned
of Case Officer MATT not to kibbitz too much while the techni-
cians are making the installation.

5. It is expected that the audio results of this type
of coverage will be superior to the results of the previous
"radio" phase. The only complication will be in servicing the
recorders on a timely basis.

cc: #252 529
11g
Ramon R. Hart

SECRET
14-00000*
104-10110-10245
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Support Branch
DATE: 1 July 1963
FROM : Mr. Ramon R. Hart
SUBJECT : Manuel F. ARTIME Buesa
#210 838

1. On 24 June 1963, Mr. Charles Matt, SAS/MOB/PM, extension
6488, was referred to me by the SAS Security Officer, Mr. George
Ladner, and visited me in Room 4 E 21 to request some operational
support beginning 1 July 1963. Mr. Matt advised that two leaders
of the Cuban Exile Group were coming to Washington, D. C., on that
latter date to confer with CIA and other Government officials,
including probably Robert F. Kennedy, the Attorney General, concern-
ing the "new program" for the exiles.

2. Mr. Matt explained that a covert site (#302 922) located
at 9218 Aldershot Drive, Bethesda, Maryland, had recently been
procured to billet these exiles and to serve as the meeting place
for these sensitive discussions to take place. Mr. Matt said that
SAS is vitally interested in what these two exiles say to each other
when the U. S. Government officials have departed after a day's
discussions. He, therefore, requested that microphones be concealed
in the house to monitor their comments.

3. Mr. Matt said that the two men would arrive on 1 July and
would be in Washington at the house for about a week or ten days.
The audio coverage was requested for this entire time. Mr. Matt
also said that the house would be retained for several more months
and that the two exiles would return to Washington several more
times in that period and that an audio surveillance would probably
be requested for these latter visits also.

4. Mr. George Ladner supplied the true name of the leader of
the two men, the captioned Subject. Having been informed by Mr.
Matt that the covert site was a private dwelling place in an
expensive neighborhood, I assumed that there would be only two
methods of making an audio penetration of the premises:

SECRET
RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

14-00000
Page Two
#210 838
SECRET

(a.) Concealing a tape recorder in the attic, base-
ment, or garage, and using a voice-operated
relay to actuate the recorder.

(b.) With the use of directories, search the
environs of the safehouse for the purpose
of locating a potential listening post where
radio transmissions could be monitored.

5. After checking with Mr. Joseph Langan, Acting Chief,
Operational Support Division, I assigned the case to the District
Field Office and directed some agents to case the house and the
neighborhood to determine which method of penetration should be
used. Mr. John Cryer was designated responsible agent at the
District Field Office, and after a quick survey, he reported that
the concealment and servicing of a tape recorder on the premises
would be impossible and that the only method would be the use of
a transmitter and a nearby listening post.

6. Using the directories in SRS, I ran the names of all the
residents of the houses within a quarter-mile of the_covert site
through SRD Indices and found one Fred C. Thomas, Jr.) (#57 328),
of 9127 McDonald Drive, Bethesda, Maryland, to be a Staff employee.
Through telephone information, I located Mr. Thomas at the Langley
Headquarters Building and personally contacted him the first thing
in the morning of 25 June 1963. I indicated to Mr. Thomas the fact
that there was a safehouse in his neighborhood which we wanted to
"bug" and that he was the only Staff employee who lived within range
of our covert transmitters. I asked him if it would be too much of
an imposition on him for us to set up a listening post in his house.
Mr. Thomas explained that he was scheduled to depart for Karachi, 10
Pakistan on a PCS assignment in approximately a month but that he
would be glad to make his home available as a listening post. He
confided that his primary mission in Karachi was to be the audio
penetration of the Communist Chinese Embassy and so he would look
forward to the next week's operations in his home as valuable
training. The next step I took was to set up a meeting among
George Ladner, Charles Matt, Sam Halpern, Executive Officer of SAS,
and myself in Mr. Halpern's Office. I advised Mr. Halpern that the

SECRET

14-00000
Page Three
#210 838
SECRET

audio surveillance appeared to be technically feasible since I
had located a possible listening post. However, I admitted
to him that, even though the Office of Security has the "charter"
to conduct the surveillance, TSD controls the necessary expensive
equipment; Mr. Halpern must arrange for TSD to transfer this
equipment to the Office of Security. Mr. Halpern declared that
the procurement of the necessary equipment should pose no problem
after he would make a few telephone calls. I then returned to
my office and made out a list of the equipment which I felt
would be necessary, and awaited advice from him as to whom to
contact in TSD to obtain it.

7. After checking with Mr. (H. T. Bent of the Audio Opera-
tions Branch of TSD as to appropriate equipment and after check-
ing through the specifications in the "Audio Manual" of TSD,
I selected the following:

Two voice-operated relays, QSC-2, $2,200.00
$1,100 each
Two Transmitter Radios, FM, 130 - 140 550.00
MCS, SRT-6H, @ $275 each
Two Battery Packs, 130 hrs. ops., : 50.00
UWB-7, $25 each
Two Battery "A", 1.5 volts, Burgess 2F 1.08
$. 54 each
One Battery "B", 45 volts, Burgess A-30 1.87
$1.87 each
TOTAL $2,802.95

8. About Noon on 25 June, I received a telephone call from
Mr. John W. McBee, extension 2481, of TSD, who told me that every-
thing had been laid on by SAS for me to obtain from TSD any

SECRET

14-00000
Page Four
#210 838

SECRET

equipment necessary for this operation. Mr. McBee directed that
I fill out a Form #88 and have the technicians hand carry it to
the Franconia Depot in order to obtain the equipment. The use of
the Form #88 disturbed me in this matter because I had assumed
from Mr. Halpern that he would arrange it so that TSD would turn
over the equipment to us without charge to anyone. The use of
the Form #88 implies that a division is allocating funds for the
purchase of equipment. However, I filled out the Form #88,
listing the above equipment, and walked it down to SAS, where I
gave it to Charles Matt to have signed. The form, bearing the
SAS Cost Center #3132-5455-3400, was completed and returned to
me within an hour, whereupon I gave it to DFO Agent Stan Lach,
who drove with it immediately to the Franconia Depot. I called
ahead to Bob Woods and Charlie Beall of the T & I Shop at Franconia
and requested that they give a little briefing concerning the
operation of this equipment to Mr. Lach and Mr. Cryer, who was to
meet Mr. Lach there. Neither Cryer nor Lach had ever had any
experience with any of the pieces of equipment on the list. Mr.
Woods and Mr. Beall were quite cooperative in this request.

9. Several problems kept appearing and disappearing while
the DFO technicians were transporting, installing, and testing
the equipment. One problem was the payment of the equipment. I,
received a telephone call from Mr. Dayton S. ("Doc") Barrows of
TSD, informing me that SAS had reneged on paying the $2,802.95 for
the equipment, but that if I would tell him what equipment we
wanted, he might be able to arrange to lend it to us. I told Mr.
Barrows that as far as I knew, we had indeed obtained the equipment
with the Form #88, but that if we needed anything else, I would
contact him. Another problem which appeared was the rumor that
it was not two Cuban exiles who would be residing in the safehouse,
but only the captioned Subject and a Spanish speaking Staff employee.
If the rumor were actually true, it would seem that an audio
surveillance of the safehouse would not be necessary. I called
Charles Matt for an explanation, and he informed me that Senor
Artime was going to be the only person living in the house after
each day's discussions were completed no Staff employee would
be living with him. I asked Mr. Matt to whom Senor Artime would be

SECRET
:

14-00000
Page Five
#210 838
SECRET
!
!
holding the conversations which we were to record. He replied
that he was interested in any visitors which the Subject might
receive and any telephone calls which he might make. I suggested
that possibly a telephone tap might be sufficient under these
circumstances. Mr. Matt disagreed and still requested a micro-
phone installation to cover the whole house if possible.

10. In addition to the equipment obtained from TSD, the DFO
agents took their own SRR-4 tuneable receiver and the SRR-4 charged
to the WFO. These receivers would be used in the listening post to
pick up the radiations from the two SRT-6H transmitters. It was
suggested to the DFO agents to borrow the two WFO transceivers to
be used to communicate during the installation between the listening
post and the safehouse; however, the agents chose not to use them
and relied solely on telephonic communications. The "A" and "B"
batteries picked up at Franconia were to be used in the SRR-4
receiver so that checks could be made from an automobile to see
just how far the radiations extended around the transmitters. A
report on the area covered by the transmitters was requested of
the DFO agents.

11. The first test of the SRT-6H from the safehouse to the
listening post was a failure. Its 50 milliwatt output, ordinarily
good for a quarter mile, wasn't sufficient to reach the receiver,
2/10th's of a mile away. Its failure was blamed partly on the
distance, partly on the brick construction of the listening post,
and partly on the hilly contours of the housing development, which
deflected the 135 megacycle, line-of-sight radiations.

12. When this disheartening news arrived, I immediately
telephoned Mr. Barrows of TSD and requested a pair of the more
powerful 150 milliwatt SRT-7 transmitters. I telephoned Mr.
Barrows rather than filling out another Form #88 to avoid a
possible furor within SAS. Mr. Barrows consented to loan two of
these transmitters with their proper receivers on a hand receipt
to us, and Stan Lach was dispatched to Franconia to pick them up.
An opportunity to test it on 28 June 1963 was thwarted because
Mr. Thomas was having foreign visitors in for cocktails
that afternoon. But the equipment was installed and tested the
next day, Saturday, 29 June, and appeared to work satisfactorily.

SECRET

14-00000
Page Six
#210 838
SECRET

13. At 1330 hours on 1 July 1963, Mr. Cryer telephoned Head-
quarters to announce that one SRT-7 transmitter had been installed
in the ceiling over, the bar bar and telephone I telephone in the basement of the
safehouse and that the SRR-1 receiver was picking up the trans-
missions satisfactorily, in Mr. Thomas' Thomas's basement. The QSC-2-voice-
operated relay was also satisfactorily actuating the Ampex tape
recorder when conversations began to take place in the safehouse.
The AC-powered FM transmitter is crystal controlled to operate
at a frequency of 157.4 megacycles in the VHF Band. Its operating
range is supposed to be approximately one mile.

14. The DFO agents also fitted the transmitter with a hidden
switch which would enable the case officers to turn the transmitter.
off when they are present at the house holding the sensitive dis-
cussions and to turn it on when they leave...
.".

15. Mr. Thomas and his wife have consented to do most of the
operating of the tape recorder themselves in their own basement.
With the use of the voice-operated relay, the monitoring will be
almost 100% automatic anyway. No more than one visit a day by a
field office agent should be necessary to pick up the day's take
and to make minor adjustments, 3, repairs, or corrections to the
receiver, actuator, and recorder. Mr. Thomas Jis well-known to his
friends as a "hi-fi bug", and the presence of the new equipment in
his basement would not raise the eyebrows on on any of his visitorg
some of whom are expected to be foreign dignitaries
will be going to Katachi under Department of State cover
-
Mr. Thomas

#57 328
Ramon R. Hart

SECRET
# 104-10110-10328
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

## NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT
OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

**TO:** CHIEF RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
**FROM:** CHIEF OPERATING COMPONENT

**DATE:** 7 August 1962
**ESTABLISHED FOR:** (INCE: TORING)
**FILE NO:** 5190
**10 CARD NO:** B165617

**REF:** Formal Request for Covers Form 1322 Dated 31 Jul 62

**MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED**
U.S. Army Elemont, Joint Operations Group (8739)32

*   **BLOCK RECORDS:** (OPMEMO 20-800-11)

    *   a. TEMPORARILY FOR \_\_\_\_ DAYS, EFFECTIVE \_\_\_\_\_
    *   X b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE 7 August 1902

*   NA SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3. (HB 20-800-2)
*   X ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED. (HB 20-661-1)
*   X SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (R 240-250)
*   X SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (R 240-250)
*   REMARKS:
    \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

COPY TO CPD/OP.
SECRET
FORM 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
104-10110-10340
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT
OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE
August 1962
ESTABLISHED FOR

TO: X CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
(Check)
ATTN:
REF:

CHIEF OPERATING COMPONENT
MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED
U.S. Army Joint Operations Group (8739)

BLOCK RECORDS
(ОРМЕМО 20-800-11)
AD CARD NO:

TEMPORARILY FOR
DAYS, EFFECTIVE
CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE 7 August 192

SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-15)

SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

X SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

REMARKS

COPY TO CPD/OP

DISTRIBUTION: OSD/OS PSD/OS ADPD/COMPTE

FORM 1551 (OBSOLETE)
SECRET
104-10110-10433
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT J. F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

FILE NO. 2067
DATE 23 Ly 1961

SYNOPSIS

Live address established at (5611 Jason Street, 10
Cheverly, Maryland, on 17 May 1951. Householder and
all adult members of his family were briefed. House-
holder notified local Post Office (Chaverly) that SUB-
JECT was residing with him and also redissted local
Post Office to notify (Hyattuville) Post Office. Western
Union telegram forwarded on 18 May 1961 for Gladys G.
DANBRUNT.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

REPORT NO. 1256
3/PV

14-00000
462067
23 May 1961
CAORCERRAL
At Cheverly, Maryland:

On 17 May 1961, a live address was established for Gladys
G. DANBRUNT at 611 Jason Street, Cheverly) Maryland, through the
cooparation of Dr. (Edward A.) and (Anne B. SALLOCM) householder at
that address.

On the same date, Mrs. (SALLOCM) her daughter, (Patricia) and
zon, (George), vero briefei to the affect that they should accept
any cables, letters, telegrams or telephone calls for Mrs. DANBRUNT.
In the event any inquiries vero received concerning Mrs. DANBRUNT,
they were to advise that Mrs. DANBRUNT was residing with them but
that she vas not available at the ment. They were to determine
who was calling and the purpose of the call. If the call was from
the cable or telegraph office, Mrs. (SALLOCM) or Patricia vas to call
back later as Mrs. DAMBRUNT and receive the message and request
delivery of the written cable or telegram. In the event the inquiry
was from any other source, they were to contact the Reporting Agent
indiately.

Tha sana individuals were further briefed, in general, as to
why Mire. DANBRUNT vas cxposedly residing with them and why she was
expecting some form of communication. They were informed that Mrs.
DANTHONY vas the mother of Eustace H. DANBRUNT, who was being held
a prisoner by a foreign government. The mother has sent a cable
to her son asking how he is, whether he needs anything, inquiring
if there is anything she can do for him, and asking him to please
communicate with her. She is now awaiting and expecting some form
of reply from him.

On the following day, 18 May 1961, Dr. (SALLOOM) vas contacted.
The above information had been related to him by Mrs. SALLOCM) at
the request of the Raporting Agent. Dr. (SALLOOM) was requested to
notify the Cheverly and the Hyattsville) Post Offices that Mrs.
DANBRUNT vas residing at his home and any mail received for her
should be delivered to his address.

On 22 May 1961, Dr. (SALLCCM) again contacted and he advised
that he had personally called the Postalstress at the Cheverly) Post
Office reprding delivery of M. MART's wall and had roquested
-1-

100
17/
162 067

her, in turn, to notify the Hyattsville) Post Office.

Dr. GALICOM) is a well-known (Washington dentist). He maintained
an office at 810 "K" Street, N.E) for a muwer of years until he
vas drafted into military service. He served in the Army as aden-
tist) and woon his release, as a Lieutenant Colonel, be re-opened
his private practice with an office at (1035 "r" Street, H.W.) For
a mwber of youre he was on the Staff of Georgetown University as)
en instructor of dentistry in the Georgetown Dental School) Не
bea resided in Choyarly) Maryland for at least the past twenty
