## 9

## THE APRIL UNDERSTANDING

April 30, 1996

> Supported by a joint willingness on the part of Israel and Syria to negotiate, the verbal “Understanding” of 1993 generally held in Lebanon, at least in the sense that the country did not again incur another massive attack by its neighbor. However, as Hezbollah operations against Israeli forces and the SLA1 within and around the “security zone” intensified in March 1996—perhaps as a means of signifying Assad’s dismay over the US-led Sharm al-Sheikh anti-terrorism conference of that month—the situation quickly began to unravel as Israel sought to retaliate widely, both inside and outside of the zone. Although the sequence of causality and blame is difficult to reconstruct in the absence of a written agreement, US peace negotiator Dennis Ross, in his 2004 post-mortem, The Missing Peace, acknowledges that Israeli fire into civilian areas of Lebanon served as the catalyst for the first Hezbollah rocket fire into northern Israel. He reiterates his particular interpretation, however, that the terms of the 1993 Understanding permitted such Israeli action, and that Hezbollah, in any event, had begun to “show far less concern than previously about actually shooting rather than staging attacks from Lebanese civilian areas.”2

> Israel’s “Grapes of Wrath” campaign, which followed on April 11, ended sixteen days later with 165 Lebanese civilians killed and 401 wounded, and with widespread damage to civilian infrastructure including highways, bridges, and electrical stations. Sixty-two Israeli civilians were wounded in Israel as a result of Hezbollah rocket fire. Although there were far fewer refugees than in 1993, the Israeli shelling of a UN compound at Qana on April 18, which killed 106 Lebanese villagers, dealt a similarly powerful moral blow to Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres’s claim to be merely trying to end “Hezbollah terror.”3 More of a blow than Qana, however, was the fact that Peres and the IDF were forced to admit that their enemy was simply not going to run out of rockets, contrary to earlier assessments. In other words, if the IDF campaign continued without a large-scale, sustained ground operation, Hezbollah attacks on targets within Israel would likely continue well beyond the Israeli elections in late May.

> Given all this, the US was forced to change its course from supporting Israel’s campaign to intervening in the hope of achieving a ceasefire that might simultaneously end the carnage and bolster Peres’s increasingly precarious position before voting actually started. (A Labour victory was seen by the Clinton administration as vital for moving the peace process forward.)

> Apparently undeterred by its weakened bargaining position, however, the initial US proposal sought to end attacks on Israeli and Lebanese civilians, but also called for Hezbollah to be disarmed. If no attacks took place during a six-month period, Israel would then agree to begin discussions on a full withdrawal from Lebanon.

> The maximalist US proposal was roundly rejected by the Lebanese government, Hezbollah, and Syria. Instead, the dynamics of the situation, which had turned so strongly against the US and Israel, shortly resulted in a far different, written agreement, promoted by the French—“The April Understanding.”4 Most significantly, the Understanding affirmed the legitimacy of Hezbollah’s military operations in Lebanon, greatly restricted attacks on Lebanese civilians by the Israelis, and placed a modest prohibition on Hezbollah attacks launched directly from civilian areas.

> In a surprising turn, though, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher immediately undermined the agreed language by delivering a “side letter” to Peres, which read: “The United States understands that the prohibition refers not only to the firing of weapons, but also to the use of these areas by armed groups as bases from which to carry out attacks.” Of course, while a new negotiation over what precisely constituted a “base” might have been joined, no such effort was made. Instead, Israel had language that the original parties had not agreed upon that gave it a far freer hand in the future to fire again into civilian areas in Lebanon—thereby potentially incurring Hezbollah rocket attacks into Israel.

> Still, the Understanding itself stood as a remarkable document, especially in relation to US policy in the Middle East. Having designated Hezbollah by name as an enemy of the peace process by Executive Order in 1995, the Clinton administration now recognized—though not in name—the inherent right of Hezbollah to carry out attacks within Lebanon, regardless of any preconditions or the immediate needs of the peace process.

> Not surprisingly, for Hezbollah—as Nasrallah makes clear in this interview with the Lebanese daily As-Safir—the Understanding represented a crucial victory, perhaps on a par with the party’s improved standing among the Lebanese after it had withstood and responded to massive Israeli firepower during the sixteen-day Grapes of Wrath campaign.

AS-SAFIR: Some say that this confrontation is the result of a clash between two attempts to bring the situation to a head. On the one hand, there is the American– Israeli desire to implement the Sharm al-Sheikh resolutions,5 plant the seeds of a security arrangement in the area, and take advantage of the military agreement with Turkey, among other [things]. On the other hand, there is a desire on the part of Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran to put to the test the coalition that saw the light in Sharm al-Sheikh, break the isolation imposed on them, and bring down Shimon Peres. In your opinion, what brought all this about?

HN: Regarding the first part of your question—the Israeli–American wish to escalate the situation—it is a fact and a foregone conclusion, especially after the summit conference of Sharm al-Sheikh, which complicated the search for an Arab and international cover for targeting resistance movements in the region, which they call terrorist organizations. All of us in the region know that it is precisely this refusal to provide cover for an attack on the region, and the targeting of its resistance movements, that prevented Syria and Lebanon from taking part in this conference. Thus, as soon as it obtained the necessary cover from Sharm al-Sheikh, Israel launched wide-ranging operations against the region’s resistance movements. The targeted organizations are those movements that carry out high-level jihadist operations against Israel—namely Hamas, Islamic Jihad in Palestine, and Hezbollah in Lebanon, although we do not want to minimize the efforts of other smaller groups.

The Israeli enemy, in cooperation with Yasser Arafat, the head of the Palestine National Authority, has launched brutal attacks—though we cannot say fatal—against Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine,6 and they have yet to target the resistance in Lebanon. This American–Israeli decision enjoys some hard-earned cover and support from Sharm al-Sheikh, and their operations were timed to take place prior to the Israeli parliamentary elections, so that Shimon Perez can use them to boost his chances in the elections, as proof that he is a man of war, peace, and security.

What I want to say is that the desire for war is purely American–Israeli in nature, because on the other side of the equation neither the Lebanese resistance, Syria nor Iran have any desire to take part in it. The war we are keen to fight is the guerrilla war the Islamic Resistance is waging in the occupied territories. In our opinion, this guerrilla war is far more important and effective, and has more impact on the enemy and its plans and morale, than this recent despicable tit-for-tat war.

The war we want is the kind that makes the enemy bleed slowly, puts it under pressure, and forces it to leave our country. So it is incorrect to say that the resistance, Syria, or anyone else involved in Lebanon, had any desire to take part in such a war or bring the situation to a head.

AS-SAFIR: What are Israel’s objectives in launching such a war?

HN: In fact everyone knows what these objectives are, and none of us can add anything new at this point. The objective of the operation is mainly to target the resistance’s military infrastructure, isolate it popularly and politically, and eventually get rid of it once and for all: this is what the meeting in Sharm al-Sheikh was all about. However, for the enemy to say after the fact that these were not his objectives is a repetition of what took place in the so-called Operation Accountability, which started with very bombastic and wide-ranging objectives and ended with the July Understanding.7 We believe that this was indeed the main objective of the operation, based on what they themselves declared in the early days of the war. By targeting the resistance the way they did, they hoped to damage its infrastructure, paralyze its movement in the south and in the western Bekaa, and stop the launching of Katyusha rockets, which we launch only in response to their own attacks. Their ultimate aim is to use these operations to foster disquiet among the [Lebanese] people, and force them to turn against the resistance and blame it for all that has befallen them. They hoped the operations would also put pressure on the Lebanese authorities, given that they probably have their own calculations that might or might not be similar to those of the resistance. This pressure, added to the strikes that the military infrastructure of the resistance would sustain, was supposed to bring about the demise of the resistance, or to escalate the situation to a point at which Lebanon would completely surrender to Israel.

They hoped that the successful achievement of this objective would lead to the political isolation of Lebanon, force it to surrender, isolate it and impose on it a separate peace treaty, and thus complete the isolation of Syria. This would enable Peres and the Americans to conclude a settlement based on their own aspirations in the area; and if at some point in the future Syria wished to join in, it would be welcome—but only on Israel’s conditions. If not, it would remain isolated in the region.

From the military point of view, Israel launched early today, Thursday, an air raid on a location in Baalbek by the name of Tallet al-Kayal, based on the belief that it contained warehouses and that a large number of mujahidin were inside. It also shelled a number of buildings in Bousoir, also on the assumption that there were weapons and Hezbollah’s mujahidin inside; and on the heart of the Southern Suburb of Beirut, believing that it was actually targeting Hezbollah’s leadership headquarters. The aim of the first strike was not to stop the Katyushas, but to strike at Hezbollah’s military infrastructure and paralyze its resistance activities. In response to your question, I would say that we were able, on that first day, to absorb the initial strike, because Tallet al-Kayyal is not a military base, there were no mujahidin inside, and no one was killed. The buildings they struck in Bousoir were empty, and the location they shelled in the Southern Suburb is the home of ordinary people who are not even members of Hezbollah, let alone part of its leadership. Although it is true that in the area where the house is located there are various leadership headquarters, and the headquarters of the general secretariat are adjacent or just opposite the targeted building, the fact remains that they struck a building that belongs to ordinary people.8

What was their first strike, then? Useless. And usually the side that loses the first strikes gets bogged down in the “routine” of the war. Naturally, Hezbollah’s leadership took the necessary precautions and placed the resistance on the highest level of alert. In fact, July 1993 was a very good lesson for us as far as confronting this kind of aggression is concerned, because we pinpointed our strengths and weaknesses at the beginning of the war, and were therefore ready when the confrontation came.

Going back to the Israelis themselves, in my opinion they did not estimate correctly how much time the operation would require, and even the information they had proved to be wrong, as they themselves have since admitted. They might have expected the operation to confound Hezbollah and make it lose the ability to act; they thought that their concentrated and intense air strikes, and filling the skies with military aircraft, would prevent the mujahidin from firing Katyushas from here or there, and put an end to the rocket-launching. They believed that the resistance owns a limited number of rockets, and that on the first, second, or fifth day they would run out. The fact that they take this factor into account at all is not an indication of Israeli military strength, because those who believe that the firing of Katyushas will end only when there are no more left to launch are not depending on their own strength, but on the weakness of their enemy. All Israel’s assumptions were wrong (…)

AS-SAFIR: Could one divide this war into stages, both politically and on the ground?

HN: We could divide the unfolding events into two stages—before and after the massacres took place. From the Israeli military standpoint, however, nothing encourages us to speak about stages.

AS-SAFIR: We finally come to the recent agreement. Can you give us an estimate, from the resistance’s point of view, of the gains and losses, and of the restrictions that this Understanding places on the resistance’s activities?

HN: We could say, first of all, that the fact that this Understanding exists at all means that most of Israel’s objectives behind the operation—to be on the safe side I do not say all of them—failed the moment Israel accepted the agreement. Striking Hezbollah has failed; ending the resistance by military means has failed; isolating Lebanon and leading it on its own from war straight to the negotiating table is over; the isolation of Syria is over; and even the portrayal of the Lebanese resistance as terrorists is over. The whole world now accepts the fact that the war in Lebanon is between Israel and resistance fighters defending their territory. When we read the text of the Understanding, we therefore arrive at the conclusion that the situation is effectively over.

I do not know whether you have noticed, but Israel’s Foreign Minister Ehud Barak, the Chief of Staff Amnon Shahak,9 and Peres denied in the past two days that Israel’s objective was to disarm and deal a blow to Hezbollah, and impose a separate peace on Lebanon. Records of press conferences held in the first two days of war still exist, and you can go and have a look. It is normal for each side to view the Understanding from its own perspective, and to consider it a great feat of success. Similarly, if one side or the other wants to escape from applying its main terms, it could claim that a secret imperative allows it to do what the Understanding does not.

Here is the official Arabic-language translation of the Understanding, although the English-language version is the main one. I would like to say at the outset that we took part in writing the terms of the Understanding, although we have nothing to do with the text itself. Based on that, we see this Understanding as an agreement between the Lebanese government and the government of the Israeli entity.

The Understanding says the following: first, “Armed groups in Lebanon will not carry out attacks by Katyusha rockets or by any kind of weapon into Israel” (although we have reservations about the wording of this text, this provision was also included in the July Understanding); second, “Israel and those cooperating with it will not fire any kind of weapon at civilians or civilian targets in Lebanon”. The phrase “and those cooperating with it” was not included in the July Understanding, and was added to this one. This agreement is more comprehensive than the July Understanding, and more to the advantage of Lebanon and its people. Why do I say this? I say it because the first agreement focuses on preventing the shelling of towns and villages, which means that if they strike a van carrying students to school, they can say that it is not a village, but a road. The same goes for a group of farmers working their field, because the Israelis can say that the field is not a village or an inhabited area. We have here two central points, civilians, and civilian targets that include vehicles on roads, ambulances and nonmilitary installations (factories, electricity grids, and so on).

These two provisions therefore forbid the resistance from launching Katyushas and other such weapons into the occupied Palestinian territories, and forbid the Israeli enemy from shelling civilians and civilian targets. These two provisions, the main ones in the Understanding, are bolstered by the paragraph that says, “Beyond this, the two parties commit to ensuring that under no circumstances will civilians be the target of attack, and that civilian populated areas and industrial and electrical installations will not be used as launching grounds for attacks.” This means that, when they launch an attack, the resistance, the Israelis, and Lahd’s militia10 should ensure that civilians are not targeted—and the “and” here means that both sides are bound by it. In other words, we not only have to desist from launching rockets from inhabited areas, but both the Israelis and Lahd’s fighters cannot place artillery or rocket launchers in the heart of Marjayoun [in south Lebanon] or Kiryat Shmona [in northern Israel].11

There is some disagreement surrounding the wording of the provision relating to the launching of attacks, and the translation that the Israelis have adopted does not have either the term “to launch” or “the launching.” It just said “Katyusha rocket launch sites,”12 and made the life of the Lebanese easier; even those who used the term “the launching” when talking about the issue, admitted later that “to launch” was the right word. Another provision states, “Without violating this understanding, nothing herein shall preclude any party from exercising the right of self-defense.” Shahak is trying here to confound the issue by saying that if occupation troops in the frontier zone are the target of a military operation, he has the right to retaliate by striking Hezbollah anywhere. Although the provision starts with the [phrase] “Without violating the Understanding,” this is a violation of the Understanding, because although it allows for the right of self-defense, it is only subject to the terms of the first three provisions. What he calls “self-defense” we do not recognize as such, because an occupier has no right of self-defense; all he is required to do is withdraw. If he wishes to defend himself, he should only do it within the context of this Understanding.

If we want to evaluate the pros and cons of these provisions, and the concomitant establishment of a monitoring group, we can talk here about two objectives. First, these provisions do not constrain anyone in the resistance—resistance activities will continue, and [their] freedom of movement is maintained, as far as liberating the occupied territories is concerned. We can consider the provision that forbids the launching of attacks from within inhabited areas as being a constraining factor, but I would like you to know that we voluntarily imposed this condition on ourselves years ago. We committed ourselves from the very beginning not to use inhabited areas for launching missiles, or any other such purpose, because these villages are after all are our own. We cannot play the pretend game and say that a Japanese army came to fight in south Lebanon; we are Lebanese, our resistance fighters are Lebanese young men who hail from these same villages, and therefore care more about their families and their children than does the resistance—which itself cares a great deal. Nothing in the Understanding prevents us going to war, or resisting, to liberate our land, which means that the right to resist to free one’s occupied land is guaranteed and unequivocal.

Our second objective is the protection of civilians: before the July Understanding, no one bothered about the Lebanese civilians—neither America, France, Russia, the European Union, the Arab League or the United Nations. It was nobody’s business; we never even heard condemnations of civilian massacres in the south. The resistance used Katyushas in order to put pressure on the Israelis, and tell them that when Lebanese civilians are in danger, your civilians will also be in danger. You might say, and correctly so, that there is no parity in rocket or firepower between the two sides; but issuing threats, forcing Israeli civilians into underground shelters, wounding several of them, and damaging their factories are in themselves pressure factors. Three years after the Understanding was signed,13 Likud accused the Labour Party in Israel of tying the hands of the army, which was in fact true, because at certain times the Israelis did try to avoid civilian casualties, whereas before that point they had never hesitated to strike at entire villages.

The resistance does not have a category of operations known as “launching a Katyusha rocket,” because these launchings are not operations per se, but purely reactive strikes. The resistance attacks a given target, executes a martyrdom operation, and plants an explosive device (…) but it only uses Katyushas to protect civilians and deter the Israelis from attacking them. The July Understanding established the principle that no one in the world can speak anymore about Israeli civilians and ignore Lebanese civilians. We would never approve any formula, no matter the price, that provides security to Israeli civilians in northern Palestine and disregards the security needs of civilians in Lebanon. The Understanding states that both sides want to avoid civilian casualties—and we agree, because we do not attack civilian targets as a matter of principle, and in any case do not need to do so. From this particular point of view, the Understanding is totally in line with our objectives.

We nevertheless asked for guarantees. In the past, we used to say that Israel had violated the Understanding, or vice versa; no one could guarantee this kind of Understanding, and they all said that they were not a party to it—even Syria. Today, however, there is a guarantor and a monitoring group; there is also the United States, which is in fact the same as having two Israels, and there are France, Syria, and Lebanon. Today, this group is required to assume responsibility for any confrontation or violation that takes place, and we state that we will not be the ones to violate this Understanding. We believe that the ability to protect our civilians means a considerable victory for us, and a feat not witnessed in Lebanon for the past ten years.

The protection of our civilians is now guaranteed at the military level, no matter what, which means that if a jihadist detonates the explosive he carries in an Israeli military convoy and kills and wounds dozens of soldiers, the Israelis have no right to respond by targeting civilians in Lebanon. We will be very careful not to violate this very important achievement, and we have no compulsion or obsession whatsoever regarding the use of Katyusha rockets. We can therefore say that this Understanding is a new attempt at ensuring the protection of Lebanese civilians, and that we are bound by it and agree to its terms. As for the movement of the resistance, it remains intact.

AS-SAFIR: When you compare this latest Understanding with the one concluded in July [1993], you notice that Lebanon has a larger role to play in it, such as being part of the monitoring group. Does this not require the drawing of a new, different or more developed formula to reconfigure the relationship between the party and the state, including the government, army, and the security forces, among others? Is it not necessary to place this issue on the agenda of discussions between the party and the state?

HN: We would like to underline the fact that cooperation between Hezbollah and the state of Lebanon, with its various institutions, is a national imperative and a higher priority than this Understanding; in other words, it is not the Understanding itself that makes this cooperation necessary. We have been calling for many years now for such cooperation between Hezbollah and the state, especially after the parliamentary elections and our entry into parliament (although we have been for a long time in the opposition, due to our attitude to various state policies). Our hand has always been extended to the state, and we have never tried to encroach on its domain, whether politically, economically or socially. Like any other movement, party or political force active on the political, social, cultural, intellectual, economic, and humanitarian scenes, our movement is part of this country. We might be different in the sense that we are fighting a resistance war; but there were always several resistance groups in Lebanon working on multiple levels, including direct jihadist and military activities, although Hezbollah today is the only force still active as a resistance movement. We have no problem whatsoever in cooperating, coordinating, and opening ourselves up to the state on all these levels, and we have never been remiss in this domain. The state and its institutions, however, have their own considerations to factor in, and we have resolved not to interfere in them, because we are careful not to get involved in polemics.

Regarding the resistance per se, we are rather sensitive about this subject. The idea that the resistance could be subject to the central authority’s decision-making process is not, in my opinion, in the interest of the state authorities themselves. If you, for example, plant an explosive device today, and it explodes and kills Israelis, America and Israel would blame Hezbollah; but if the resistance is under the authority of the state, the blame would automatically shift to the Lebanese government and army. First, we notice how the Israeli enemy announces his intention, nowadays, to avoid targeting the army—although this army took an honorable stand during the war, and contributed to the defense of the country. As things stand, the Israelis cannot blame the actions of the resistance on the Lebanese army and the state, and the latter has been very clever in washing its hands of us, under the pretext that Hezbollah does not listen to it anyway (…) and this, undoubtedly, decreases the pressure on the political authorities.

Second, the real significance of the resistance lies in its ability to slowly bleed the enemy and put pressure on it, either to force it to withdraw or to gain a bargaining chip in the negotiations. However—in spite of our position, in principle, regarding these negotiations—we have always said that we would not be angry or distressed if Lebanon or Syria uses the pressure the resistance puts on Israel as a bargaining chip in the negotiations.

We want our resistance movement to be effective and vibrant, and in order for it to be so, it has to stay active day in and day out. But if we link the resistance to the political authority of the state, [the state’s directions to it] would be along the lines of: “Young men, there will be no operations today, too many things happening”; or “Young men, tomorrow’s operation would not be helpful on account of the regional situation.” How can the resistance remain effective under such circumstances? We believe that if the resistance depended on the political authority of the state, there would be no resistance on the ground at all, because under such conditions resistance would simply be pro forma—a resistance in name only, staged for publicity purposes, rather than genuine, serious, and effective.

We believe, a priori and as of now, that the highest national interest requires that the resistance be effective, free, and unfettered. There are checks and balances to which the resistance has committed itself for years now. In other words, we do not need anyone to impose restrictions on us, because the Lebanese people are our people, the destroyed homes are our homes, the dispossessed are our families, and we do not want our sons to die in vain. For example, we never carry out indiscriminate martyrdom operations; we have hundreds of would-be martyrs, and I come under pressure, every day, from young men eager to go out on martyrdom operations. I could easily tell any of them: take this explosive device inside the occupied zone, and when you meet two individuals from Lahd’s group, or an Israeli, detonate it. We do not execute operations of this kind; if the operation is not productive and effective, and [doesn’t] cause the enemy to bleed, we cannot legally, religiously, morally or humanely justify giving an explosive device to our brothers and telling them, “Go and become martyrs, no matter how”!

Even when we perform jihad and seek martyrdom, we do so only in order to achieve victory; we seek martyrdom and victory as a great reward for our people and nation, and to this end the resistance saw fit to impose certain restrictions on itself. The survival of the resistance is in the national interest, and I believe that we have put this issue to rest in the past couple of days.

AS-SAFIR: Within the context of your relationship with the state, about which you have just spoken, and the restrictions to which the resistance has committed itself and which were spelled out in the Understanding, do you believe that it is possible to work out a joint policy with the state regarding issues relevant to the frontier zone and its inhabitants?

HN: I have a suggestion to make: Why does the state not form a resistance force of its own? Many occupied countries, for one reason or another, have chosen not to involve their military in the fighting, and have instead formed a popular force of sorts, and have financed, protected, and managed it. Let the state form a popular, not official, resistance force, which it would personally finance and run, and for whose actions it would assume responsibility. If this is what they mean by harmonization, and we like the outcome, we would have no problem with that; we might even tell it, “Come and adopt us, give us weapons, money and political cover.” Our main concern is not whether we are under the jurisdiction of the state or not; it is whether we have a genuine resistance or not.

AS-SAFIR: I have another suggestion: based on what we recently witnessed in Lebanon, generally speaking, and on the actions of the armed resistance, including the minimum level of internal cohesion and mobilization to provide relief, which now exists (…) Is there any chance of opening another door—besides the idea of the armed resistance force—to encourage the inhabitants of the frontier zone to form some kind of resistance group, even something short of an armed resistance? This way, the state would not have to establish an armed group per se, but would compel the inhabitants of the frontier zone to confront Israel with the aim of liberating themselves and rejoining the motherland.

HN: We have gone even further than this. We proposed that no conditions be imposed on the inhabitants of the occupied zone, and called upon the state to shoulder its responsibilities towards this area and its people. We even proposed that those who went too far in normalizing their relations with Israel come back to their homeland. The state is responsible for the people of the frontier zone, even under occupation.

If our party’s humanitarian institutions were able to move freely within the frontier zone, we would have mobilized our efforts and reached the people inside it. As you well know, however, not only are Hezbollah’s fighters not allowed to move freely within that zone, but the area’s inhabitants themselves are not allowed to talk about culture or intellectual matters, and if they do they are incarcerated in Khiam Prison.14 At the end of the day, the state and its institutions are present, and we have always asked them to give priority to the occupied frontier zone until such time as the inhabitants are able to stand fast and do not have to seek employment with the Jews, or the Israeli Administrative Authority. This is the responsibility of the state.

AS-SAFIR: A large majority of the Lebanese people favor giving succor and assistance to the displaced, there is a smaller majority, but a majority nevertheless, that supports the idea of resistance, and a minority that supports Hezbollah itself. These together led to the formation of a large movement, which as a whole reinforced the success of the resistance on the ground, its steadfastness and continuity. It also produced a collective will to provide good quality relief and assistance work. Concomitantly, there were political and diplomatic efforts by the state of Lebanon that contributed, in one way or another, to the military aspect. We are witnessing, therefore, a slew of complementary elements that together produce a positive scenario for Lebanon, of the kind the country has not witnessed in the past 25 years. If Israel’s aim was to isolate the party from its public, in areas where resistance was taking place, then the opposite has happened, and the party is now very much part of Lebanese public life. The party has also become more tolerant, due to the need to reduce people’s suffering; [it] has become less belligerent and more compassionate. How do you assess this general situation in Lebanon, which imposes certain modes of behavior on the party?

HN: I would like to mention two points here: the first is the general point, which refers to before and after the event, and the second refers to the impact of this event, within the context that you yourself have mentioned.

The general point is that when we talk about “Lebanonization”—i.e. whether Hezbollah is becoming more Lebanese or not—the question that poses itself is, How do we make Hezbollah more Lebanese than it already is? Therein lies the problem: What does the “Lebanonization” of Hezbollah mean? We could ask the question differently: What is non-Lebanese about Hezbollah, and needs to become Lebanese? What then is the yardstick for being Lebanese? We understand it to mean the person, and the degree of his patriotism; but does his being a Muslim detract from his Lebanese identity? Does his being a Christian, or his belonging to a certain religion or political ideology, detract from his being Lebanese? If this is the case, then the patriarchs and bishops—even the secular Christians who assembled at the Vatican and prayed for Lebanon—are providing proof of a non-Lebanese identity. The Christians would therefore qualify as Vatican citizens, not Lebanese citizens, because this is where they went to solve their problems.

It would also mean that the communist, who follows Karl Marx and Lenin’s ideology, is in contradiction with his Lebanese identity; if, in this sense, the communist is not Lebanese, then the nationalist is also not Lebanese. Thus, if we say that being an Islamist does not qualify one to be a Lebanese or a patriot, the principle should also apply to everyone else. Therefore, we do not need to make Hezbollah more Lebanese than it already is. At the same time, we believe that the highest form of patriotism is when one sheds his blood for his country—and we have fought the enemy in Beirut, the western Bekaa, Sidon, Tyre, Nabatieh; and now, in Marjayoun, Bint Jbeil, Mys al-Jabal, Jezzine, and Maroun al-Ras since 1982, and fought for these Lebanese villages until their liberation in 1985. The people recognize this liberation, the pressure on Israel, and the war of attrition as great feats by the resistance.

Can anyone speak about significant Lebanese diplomatic efforts during that period? Lebanese diplomacy at the time was focusing on something else. Are these not Lebanese areas, or are they Syrian or Iranian areas? The areas we are fighting to liberate are purely Lebanese; the individual shedding his blood for his nation, his land, and the restitution of the land, is the most loyal and patriotic individual ever. Given the accusations leveled at Hezbollah, I can easily claim that our Lebanese patriotism is superior, and our identity more genuine, than all other patriots in the country, because we have shown proof of the highest form of loyalty to the land, the motherland, and the people. What is a motherland? It is the land and the people who live on it; it is the harmony and close ties between the people of this land that allow us to form a community.

While we do not speak in Farsi, many Lebanese Christians speak in French. Why do we continue to say that they are Lebanese rather than French citizens? What does “Lebanonization” mean? In the final analysis, it is the mere fact of belonging to the land, the people, the motherland, and history. We are not marginal to the history of this area, rather the contrary; we believe that our scholars in Jabal Amil brought ideology and culture to many Muslim countries.15 If one means the language, then we speak Arabic with a Lebanese accent—what does “Lebanonization” mean then? There is an opportunity for openness, but it has nothing to do with “Lebanonization” or the lack of it. Many Lebanese have turned inward, but being open or closed-up is one thing, and the issue of “Lebanonization” is another.

This is before the event. As for after the event, it is evident to all that the Lebanese people are open towards each other. They share common feelings and values, and therefore have what it takes to from a single, cohesive community in the face of aggression. I do not deny that this will further encourage Hezbollah to be more open, to forge stronger relations with other groups, and to be more forthcoming in interacting with various sectors of the Lebanese population. This would be a factor of assurance, not a founding factor, because the latter already exists.

AS-SAFIR: The composition and status of the monitoring group are rather murky and unclear. Is it military in nature, or not? Will it convene, and does it already have the monitors, or not? Are you aware of its composition? It has an American–Israeli component and a Syrian–Lebanese component, and maybe France will play the role of arbiter. Do you have intimate knowledge regarding its role and performance?

HN: It appears that the negotiations relevant to the adoption of the Understanding did not have enough time to go into the details, which means that it is too soon to ask about such details. But I believe that there is a degree of murkiness even as far as the group’s members are concerned, which is why they took a short cut and said that the monitoring group would meet and set its own modus operandi. I do not think they have done that yet, and I believe there would be several opinions on the matter.

AS-SAFIR: Do you draw a connection between the Understanding and the push to resume negotiations?

HN: The Understanding does not have to lead to the resumption of negotiations, even though the Americans would like this to be the case. The Americans would definitely like bilateral negotiations to resume, however. Israel’s considerations, as far as the negotiations are concerned, are rather complicated now, especially given that they were the ones who suspended them, and not the Syrian and Lebanese; Shimon Peres now has his election campaign to worry about. If a resumption of the negotiations serves Peres’s election campaign, I believe that the Americans and Israelis will try to reconvene them before the elections take place.

AS-SAFIR: Did the party assess the official and public mood in Arab and Muslim countries? If so, what was the result, and what can you do on the public level to forge closer ties with groups from within and outside Islamic circles that expressed support for you? Do you have an idea about what needs to be done?

HN: During the war, we did several assessments of this kind, but I cannot say yet that we have had the opportunity to sit down and calmly review the results. However, now that the war is over, we have a major task on our hands assisting the returning refugees, healing the wounds, and taking part in rebuilding the country.

The assessments revealed a generally positive public and official reaction, which at times was even excellent. If we first consider the official reaction, we can safely say that it was good, as was the attitude of the Arab foreign ministers who condemned Israel and issued a good statement in this regard. In fact, we did not expect such a reaction on their part, and this is a good omen. We heard many good statements coming from various countries around the world, including a condemnation of Israel by the United Nations, in spite of American efforts to prevent it, or at least compel them to condemn both sides—i.e. the killer and the victim—and this is also a good omen. In any case, official reactions were in general positive, of a high caliber, and much better than what we had in July [1993].

AS-SAFIR: Better than what Sharm al-Sheikh predicted?

HN: Certainly, we consider this to be one of the important results of this war, although it was not in itself one of our aims, given that we were not the ones who started the war. This is why I speak about results and not about objectives. Among the most important results is the fact that Sharm al-Sheikh has no longer any taste, color or odor, and the little that is left of it lacks vigor and spirit.

What they really wanted, even at the official level, was to isolate Syria and Lebanon because they had boycotted Sharm al-Sheikh. What happened, however, was that foreign ministers from around the world gathered in Damascus and on the Damascus–Beirut road. Furthermore, leaders of important nations were in touch with President Assad by phone, which means that this war has proved that it is impossible to decide on this region’s fate without Syria and Lebanon. Even if they hold 1,000 Sharm al-Sheikhs, they will still not be able to decide the fate of this region without us.

On the public level, the reaction in Lebanon was excellent. If we said today that we have a strong-willed people in Lebanon, and a resisting and proud population, it would not be just a compliment to them. Some individuals confer on the people certain adjectives in order to rouse and rally them; today, however, when we use those same adjectives, we do not only mean to rouse and rally them but also to call them by their rightful name.

Regarding the Arab people, and based on the information we received, we believe that there was a high level of understanding of what is at stake, even among those who did not take part in the demonstrations. As you well know, some Arab countries do not even allow their citizens to demonstrate, and the same can be said about the Islamic world. I can also say that the media, even the foreign [media], played a major role in carrying a vivid image of what was really taking place in Lebanon.

We have all seen the large and spontaneous demonstrations and the positive popular attitude in Turkey, which has a military pact with Israel, as well as in Egypt, which is supposed to have a, by now, long-standing peace treaty and a normalization of relations with Israel. I also believe that watching all these positive reactions, in Lebanon and throughout the world, including at the official level, compelled Israel to halt the operations that had done so much harm to Shimon Peres, to the Labour Party, to the regional settlement plan,16 and to American aspirations in the region. America and Israel arrived at the conclusion that pursuing their military activities would only increase the harm already done to their strategic aspirations in the region. Had it not been for this high positive level of public and official reaction, America and Israel would not have wanted so badly to put the issue to rest.

AS-SAFIR: The confrontation produced a number of clear results—namely the severe blow dealt to Sharm al-Sheikh, which makes it difficult for it to continue as it had started. There is also the presence of the French in the settlement, which, for the first time in ten years, breaks America’s role as sole broker in the region. Do you believe that France’s presence is temporary, and will end at a later stage, when the [regional] settlement issue is on the table once again? There is another unexpected result: Peres’s particular view of the Middle East was dealt a severe blow, and he is now forced to back down from his once lofty ambitions. My question is, How do you assess the role of France and the chances for its role to survive? And [has] a decision been taken to find a formula for it to continue, or to give it the right support that would allow it to remain effective and active? I believe that without local support, France would not be able to continue playing a role. My second question is, What will be the fate of the moribund Middle East Initiative, as they announced it in Sharm al-Sheikh, from the economic and security points of view?

HN: Since the very first day, we were among those who said, during our talks in Damascus and Beirut, that the larger the number of guarantor countries [to the Understanding], the better. It is in the interest of Lebanon, Syria, and the people of the region to break America’s unilateral role. We can discuss the history of those other countries, but breaking America’s unilateral role is in itself a worthy objective, regardless of the balance of power between the countries that have recently entered into the fray, and the extent to which they care about Lebanon’s, or the Arabs’, interests. This is why we asked that France play a role, and that the European Union be present or send a representative. We even asked for Russia to be part of the monitoring group—because the larger the number of guarantors, the more advantageous is the situation for the Lebanese people. The European Union—if we put aside Britain’s remarks—has insisted that France be present, and I believe that this is how France ultimately became part of the monitoring group, and why Russia was excluded.

The French have to realize, in the final analysis, that the only way they can exercise their role is by being equitable, and that if they stand on the side of Syria, Lebanon, and the Arab counties they will end up playing an increasingly larger role. If they prove to be fair and balanced, they will be able to maintain their role in the region, regardless of the fact that the Israelis do not want France to play a role, and had even insulted their foreign minister in the past. [It] was the obstinate insistence of the foreign minister that allowed him to continue his diplomatic drive in the region. France, however, ought to be aware that only Syria, Lebanon, and the Arab countries can endorse and boost its role in the region, and that this is why they expect its position to be balanced and impartial. The fact that America is no longer the sole broker should at the very least reduce the pressure and the siege that Israel imposes on the region.

AS-SAFIR: What about the negotiations?

HN: The Understanding necessarily has to lead to specific negotiations, but the fact that the French have succeeded in achieving an important step forward does not mean that other steps will follow. The United States wants to continue holding on to the peace negotiations file, and will not allow anyone else to play a role; it has already distanced Russia, which it recognizes as a sponsor, and I do not think that it would allow France or anyone else to take part in the negotiations.

I have already said that this operation has caused a great deal of political, cultural, and psychological harm, as well [harm to] security, to the New Middle East Initiative, and therefore Shimon Peres will have to wait a long time—much longer than anticipated—to see his dream realized. I cannot say, however, that this plan has completely failed, only that it has suffered a considerable setback.

AS-SAFIR: How does Hezbollah define the role of Syria and Iran in the recent war?

HN: Although it is true that the Lebanese government took part in the negotiations, we know—and they know—very well that the real strong negotiator, the one that cool-headedly, courageously and expertly managed the negotiations, was President Assad. He knew all that was going on in the region, and was able to calculate the precise losses and gains. The results achieved by this agreement are above all due to the role and efforts of President Assad, who maintained an ongoing and direct dialogue with the parties. We also know that he always has defended Lebanon and supported the resistance, [and always will,] and this makes him in the end not a mediator but a full party to the negotiations.17

The role Syria played has helped Lebanon a great deal in confronting this aggression and its fallout, whether through its contacts with Arab countries or by employing its relationships abroad and within the Arab League. We cannot deny the fact that Syria has used all its political and diplomatic clout and experience in support of Lebanon’s political and diplomatic efforts. Iran also placed its entire weight behind Lebanon, and used its contacts with the Europeans, the Russians, and all other countries that could potentially have an impact on the situation.

It is this political and moral support by Syria and Iran that have allowed Lebanon to feel that it is not alone or abandoned, and that there are those who speak its language and act the same way it does.

AS-SAFIR: Returning to the domestic situation, and in particular to preparations underway by Hezbollah to give assistance to the returnees and provide them with relief services, the state undoubtedly has a role to play—but what role will the party play in this domain?

HN: We have mobilized all our institutions in the south, including doctors, clinics, engineers, tractors, and reconstruction tools, and they are now ready. First of all, roads that were cut by the Israelis have to be repaired. As for damaged houses, our young men are supposed to have contacted their owners and proposed that each family rent a house in the same village, or in a nearby one, and that we will pay rent for a six-month period, until their own homes have been rebuilt. If at this point the rebuilding is not over, we will pay their rent for another full year, because we do not want our people to live in tents.

We shall soon embark on a large-scale rebuilding campaign, as we did in July [1993], and in the next few hours I will receive a comprehensive estimate of the overall amount of damage in various villages.

AS-SAFIR: Today, the party is in a position to use its regional and international clout domestically, and this could provoke some local sensitivities. How do you demonstrate your new clout locally, without stirring up domestic sensitivities?

HN: It is undoubtedly a difficult and complicated operation. Usually, people who wield a lot of power in the country have no choice but to put up with various sensitivities, even if they do not stir things up themselves, which is why we are very careful. Official Lebanese assessments of what happened differ, but an assessment of official and public opinion in Syria shows that most consider it a major victory. There are those who complain when we talk about losses; in fact, we call them sacrifices rather than losses, for what is the alternative? The alternative to the loss of an electricity grid, or a number of houses, could be the loss of the entire country. It is therefore not a matter of Katyushas or explosives; the Israelis ultimately want to submit Lebanon to their will politically, economically, and in matters of security. Lebanon, therefore, has two choices: either it surrenders and submits to Israel’s will, and this will lead to immeasurable losses at all levels; or it resists and offers sacrifices, no matter how big, since these would be nothing compared to the great feat that would be achieved by Lebanon if it manages to stay out from under Israel’s thumb.

We believe that what happened was a great victory, and that it was above all a victory for the Lebanese people—for Lebanon, Syria, the Arabs, and Muslims. It is a victory that we consider a lesson and an example to all those at the receiving end of Israel’s and America’s belligerence. We do not deal, however, with this wonderful victory with a sectarian mindset, and do not consider it a reason for rejoicing, but see it as a gloomy occasion; Israel did not achieve its objectives.

People could say that we have failed to achieve tangible results. We did not have objectives to achieve, however, but rather clear principles regarding the need to pursue our resistance, protect civilians, and not submit to Israel’s dictates—and we have achieved that. The pictures of children whose heads were severed and whose bodies were torn to pieces do not leave our mind, and never will; we are not people who forget easily.

We believe that what we have here is a victory, and intend to preserve it. To this end we are prepared to tolerate, to a certain degree, those who take advantage of the situation locally, even at our expense—to tolerate some of the complications and doubts that will come our way, and deal with them realistically, objectively, and carefully. Armed with this spirit, we believe that we will be able, as much as possible, to create a new balance between our new influence and local sensitivities. One of the assessments, which I believe to be true, shows that had the Israelis been able to stop the Katyusha rockets after three, four, or sixteen days, Warren Christopher would not have come to the region. Political, diplomatic, and popular efforts have succeeded in setting the stage and creating the right atmosphere for both Israel’s military failure and the resistance’s military resilience. However, we want to go beyond that and reiterate that our aim, above all, is to preserve this patriotic spirit, rather than claim our share and our gains from this war. In any case, we did not take part in this war to reap advantages or score electoral points; this achievement in itself was our sole objective.