## 14

## “A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION IS
A VICTORY FOR THE RESISTANCE”

February 16, 2000

> Only weeks before a climactic meeting between US President Bill Clinton and Hafez al-Assad in Geneva, to finalize what would have effectively been a three-country peace agreement, Nasrallah placidly told one of the most revered, pro-government dailies in the Arab world, Egypt’s Al-Ahram, that “we carry on with our normal lives, here in Lebanon, where we have our own institutions and parliamentarians, and where we intend to be more engaged in the country’s political life.” Insisting that “Israel will remain, in our minds and plans, an illegitimate, illegal, aberrant, and cancerous entity,” Nasrallah reiterates that “normalization” will be resisted, but acknowledges, in effect, that violence would no longer be a modus vivendi for the party in the future. In claiming an important victory in preventing Israel’s wider territorial ambitions in Lebanon, he also provides a harbinger of sorts for the second intifada, which was only months away, suggesting that “the experience we went through could be a good example for the Palestinian people, especially when they compare the results of the final status talks with those achieved by Lebanon and Syria thanks to their steadfast attitude, over many years, until they achieved their national objectives.”

AL-AHRAM: How did the name “Hezbollah” come about, and does it mean that all those who do not belong to it are from the Devil’s prty?

HN: God gave this name to the people who obey Him and his Messenger, and since we claim to be among this group of people, we believe we have the right to use this name. However, this does not mean that we never make mistakes, and never fail or lose.

AL-AHRAM: What do you think about recent developments including the Israeli shelling of civilian installations?

HN: What the Israeli enemy has done recently is launch revenge operations;1 now that the measures they put in place to stop the resistance’s operations have failed, they are incapable of confronting the fighters in south Lebanon. They do not dare launch ground operations either, because they would incur many casualties if they did; they therefore bombard the area from the air to wreak vengeance on Lebanon and its people. We were very sorry to hear Barak2 threaten Lebanon and the resistance while still in Cairo, and then repeat those same threats the next day in Amman.

AL-AHRAM: When we asked about that, they told us that Barak’s statement came as an answer to the last question, posed in Hebrew, at the press conference given by [Egyptian] President [Hosni] Mubarak and Barak. Anyway, no one attracted the president’s attention, and Egypt has already strongly rejected Israel’s aggression and condemned it in front of the whole world.

HN: In any case, the Israelis tried to impose a new fait accompli on the ground, to safeguard the occupation in the south, by targeting Lebanon’s infrastructure. In the past, when they shelled our civilians, we retaliated by shelling their settlements in order to protect our civilians; now they are shelling our infrastructure to protect the occupation troops. What is the aim behind this latest move? The Israelis want to maintain their army in the south, but do not want the resistance to fire on it; they are actually saying that if we do, they would simply destroy Lebanon’s infrastructure. They also want the resistance to become the guardians of the occupation, in the future, which is an illogical proposition. We see it as our natural right to fire Katyushas at their settlements in response to their recent bombardment of our electricity grids. Before they launched their latest air raids, Barak went personally to the north, met with the settlers’ representatives, and asked them to go down to the shelters; and according to my information 70 per cent of them where evacuated from the area, and 30,000 Zionists were either displaced or went into hiding ahead of the resistance’s counterattack.

Thanks to the publicity campaign that accompanied their recent operations, we are now pursuing two objectives: first, to foil the fait accompli that they are trying to impose on the ground. Israel says that it wants to protect its troops by targeting Lebanon’s infrastructure, and that this bombardment is their way of applying pressure on the resistance to stop their operations. We said in response that our operations would continue, because they are the right tool to foil their ‘troop protection vs. the bombardment of installations’ plan. Based on that, on the very day that followed the Israeli operations, we shelled the occupying troops and killed a number of them and their Lebanese agents. We did the same on Thursday against Antoine Lahd’s troops, and yet again today, Friday, killing one Israeli and wounding three others. Some sources say that two Israelis have died. To put an end to these attacks, we are determined to continue mounting operations, regardless of the measures the enemy chooses to put in place, or the pressures it chooses to exert. I do not believe that Lebanon’s government and people would accept that the occupation stays, unmolested, on its territory; as Lebanese, therefore, we have no other choice but to expel the occupiers from our country.

Our second objective is to protect Lebanon’s infrastructure and population. Based on that, we believe that it is in Lebanon’s national interest, and the interest of the resistance, that we restrain ourselves while reserving the right to respond when we see fit. We believe that Israel’s main intention was to provoke Hezbollah into responding violently, and that our self-restraint destabilized their entire plan. Although we will not use our Katyushas at this time, we reserve the right to respond at a time and in a manner of our own choosing; all options are still on the table. Settlers in the north should expect our revenge to come at any moment. I also believe that the position we took will keep Israel in a constant state of anxiety, because they know that our operations will continue as long its occupation troops are still on our territory.

Regardless of their intellectual, religious or political affiliations, Lebanon’s government, people, and army have expressed their support for the resistance, and for putting an end to the occupation. Lebanon has no problem regarding this issue, because it is not only the resistance’s right to fight occupation, but also the right of the Lebanese people. This was made evident in July 1993, in 1996, in the June attack of a few months ago, and in this recent attack.

Last Monday, Israel said that the ball was now in our court; but now that Hezbollah has exercised self-restraint, including the operations it carried out in the occupied territories, the ball is now in the Israeli court again. Israel has to decide in which direction it wants the region to go: Does it want the conflict in the south to remain subject to the rules of the April Understanding,3 or does it want those rules to change? In any case, we are ready for all eventualities.

AL-AHRAM: In light of what took place at the April Understanding committee meeting today, Friday, do you expect Israel to carry out an operation, or operations, now that the ball is once again in its court? Will the reactions and counter-reactions persist, and is this what is required at this point?

HN: First, Israeli negotiators did not take part in the April Understanding talks, and therefore it is not correct to say that they withdrew from them; they actually arrived late, and did not even go into the hall where the meeting was taking place. They behaved in a very arrogant and dismissive manner at a time when the [monitoring] committee was meeting to condemn their aggression against Lebanon. They wanted to impose their conditions and control the meeting’s proceedings, even its general atmosphere. But one should not view the situation as [one in which] one party strikes, the other responds, and vice versa: people should realize that Israel occupies Lebanese territory, and that Lebanon is trying to end this occupation and recuperate what belongs to it. There is no need for us to go over the details, or the rules of the game, all over again.

Israeli extremists, like the deputy defense minister,4 say that we violated their national territory; we believe, however, that the territory they are talking about is occupied Palestine. Their real land is Ethiopia, as far as the Falashas are concerned,5 and Russia, as far as the Russian émigrés are concerned, and there will be a time when these people will really feel nostalgia for their original homeland. Israel’s deputy defense minister told the press that the Israeli people thought that if they just said a few words, launched a few military operations, and changed the rules of the game, they would be able to prevent their soldiers from suffering additional casualties and be able to solve Israel’s problems by diplomatic means. This opinion differs fundamentally from what Barak, Sharon, and Mofaz stated earlier—for after Sharon, Mofaz, and a number of other ministers announced the demise of the April Understanding, they have now changed their tone and are saying that they want to keep the April Understanding as it is. This change in attitude has undoubtedly come about as a reaction to the resistance’s operations and the steadfastness of the Lebanese position.

Accusations to the effect that Hezbollah has violated the April Understanding are unfair and incorrect, and a ploy to boost the morale of the Israeli soldiers who, in the past few days, have suffered considerable casualties. Today, Friday, they admitted the death of 19 Israelis in 1999 when, in fact, there were eight Israelis dead and 20 wounded in the past 15 days alone. Saying that Hezbollah has violated the April Understanding is just an excuse for Israel to do that itself. All Hezbollah’s operations were carried out within the boundaries of the April Understanding, and nothing whatsoever outside it. Let me reiterate that, at the end of the day, Israel has no choice but to get out of Lebanon.

AL-AHRAM: When is it the right time to reduce the intensity of the resistance’s operations, and when is it the time to go full speed ahead?

HN: The importance of the resistance in south Lebanon comes from the fact that it is an effective and serious movement, that it has earnest intentions, and has caused the occupation to bleed profusely. Barely three months after Israel invaded and occupied large areas of Lebanon, we were able to expel the Israeli troops from the capital, the suburbs, Mount Lebanon, Sidon, Tyre, Nabatieh, and the western Bekaa, and force them to hide behind the hills known now as the frontier zone. This came as the result of resistance operations rather than diplomatic or political endeavors, and culminated in the Israeli people putting pressure on their government to withdraw, and in the latter doing just that.

From that time on, and in spite of the difficulties that Lebanon has experienced—difficulties that ended only with the signature of the Taif Agreement6—the resistance started substantially regaining its vigor. It currently relies on operations rather than on launching Katyushas, which are a weapon of choice for targeting specific objectives. This is why we do not consider launching Katyushas to be part of the resistance’s operations, but only a defensive measure. Ground operations, on the other hand, depend on circumstances; we do not tell the resistance “Do this or do that,” because if we did it would no longer be serious and effective. So far, our resistance in south Lebanon has been both serious and effective precisely because it is genuine and produces high-quality results that put the Israelis under pressure. In this context, an opinion poll, published the day before yesterday, Wednesday, revealed that 83 percent of Israelis support withdrawal from Lebanon, which means that the Israeli public now wants to leave Lebanon as a direct result of the resistance’s activities.

AL-AHRAM: Barak said that Israel would withdraw next July from Lebanon. Are your recent operations therefore just a tactical maneuver, given that you have not carried out any operations in the past five months?

HN: It is clear that Barak, as the result of pressure brought to bear on him by the resistance, now wants to withdraw from Lebanon according to his own conditions, and wants to punish it for resisting; this is what we are afraid of, and need to prepare for. The responsibility falls here on the shoulders of the Arab governments and the international community: if the enemy wants to leave, then he should do so without destroying the country in the process.

AL-AHRAM: Is the current position of the resistance a strategic position, or is it a tactical one to help advance the negotiations on the Syrian track—especially given that the resistance has not carried out any operations in the past five months, and that the Israelis have said that they will withdraw come next July, or even earlier than that? Why did the resistance not execute these operations at a more opportune time, when the rewards could have been greater?

HN: If we had carried out operations, they would have said that Hezbollah is working on Iran’s orders to foil the Israeli–Syrian negotiations; and if we ceased our operations, they would have said that Hezbollah did so upon orders from Syria to facilitate the negotiations. On the other hand, if the negotiations stalled, and we carried out operations, they would have said that Syria was putting pressure on Israel to accept its conditions. This is all mere imagination, and those who think this way do not know what is really taking place in south Lebanon, what the resistance is all about, what is its identity or the extent of its willpower. I would like you all to read what Shaul Mofaz wrote, [saying that] the resistance’s operations have increased but that their own casualties have decreased, thanks to the measures they had put in place against it. This means that, far from decreasing, the operations of the resistance have actually increased, from the point of view of setting traps and planting explosive devises, more than anytime before, as demonstrated by the martyrdom of many of our fighters in the past five months while trying, with their minds and blood, to circumvent the enemy’s measures. We executed operations while the negotiations were going on, the only difference being that we did not achieve all that we were aiming for, due to the measures that the enemy had put in place. But once we succeeded in circumventing these measures, we started hitting the target.

I have to say, in all honesty, that the Syrians did not talk to us before they went to the negotiations or afterwards, and never shared any information with us about them. Syria has it own principled, steady, and public position; [it] really knows what the resistance and its operations in south Lebanon are all about, and has full confidence in its wisdom and intellect.

There are people in the Arab world who do not believe that there are young men in Lebanon who have taken it upon themselves honestly and truly to end the occupation and liberate the occupied Lebanese territories without having regional or international ulterior motives. These young men believe that ending the occupations is a sacred duty tightly linked to their religion, prayers, and fasting, and to the thereafter; this is what the resistance in south Lebanon is all about.

I do not agree with calls, from some quarters and by some of our brothers, for the resistance to cease its operations until the April Understanding [monitoring] committee has held its meeting. Our brethren should be allowed to go on killing Israeli soldiers, any time they choose, regardless of whether the Understanding Committee is holding a meeting or not, because the Understanding is intended to protect civilians, not Israeli soldiers.

AL-AHRAM: In spite of the resistance’s legitimacy, does Hezbollah take into consideration, when making decisions, the suffering of the people as the result of Israeli targeting of civilian and economic installations?

HN: We have no other choice. The only alternative is for our territory to remain under Israeli occupation, and for Israel to impose its conditions on us. It is the fate of the Lebanese people to resist and endure the burden of this resistance; the Israelis cannot last for long in this situation. I am not claiming, however, that we have a balance of power or military parity on the ground, but I do know that this kind of warfare is very costly to the Israelis; and although I do not want to issue threats, allow us to work rather than talk.

AL-AHRAM: Do you have a vision of a future settlement? Could the door be open for such an eventuality?

HN: Of course, the door could be open, and the proof is the meeting held in Washington between the Syrians and Israelis around the negotiating table, at a time when no one expected such a meeting to take place—especially at this particular time and in this manner.7 We do take into consideration international efforts to find a solution in the region, and determine our plans and movements with this possibility in mind. We actually estimate that a peaceful resolution is a victory for the resistance and its logic. The experience we went through could be a good example for the Palestinian people, especially when they compare the results of the final status talks with those achieved by Lebanon and Syria thanks to their steadfast attitude, over many years, until they achieved their national objectives.

At the same time, we carry on with our normal lives, here in Lebanon, where we have our own institutions and parliamentarians, and where we intend to be more engaged in the country’s political life. Israel will remain, in our minds and plans, an illegitimate, illegal, aberrant, and cancerous entity, which we therefore cannot recognize. We will instead work with others to combat normalization with it, because fighting normalization will impede its development into a regional superpower. Just as the wars of 1973 and 1982, the impact of the Lebanese resistance and of Israel’s failure to occupy Lebanon [have together led] to the demise of the military aspect of the Greater Israel plan, combating normalization would lead to the demise of the political, economic, and cultural aspects of the Greater Israel plan.8

As for the future of the armed struggle, we had better leave that subject aside for now because, regardless of whether my answer to your question is positive or negative, keeping such matters secret is in Lebanon’s best interest.

AL-AHRAM: Why is Hezbollah alone on the battlefield, and what do you tell those who say that Hezbollah evolved out of the Amal Movement?

HN: Lebanon’s demands are clear: they want the restitution of their occupied territories; the repatriation of the Palestinian refugees, which is as important; and compensation for Lebanon. In its current social configuration, and given the nature of its problems, Lebanon cannot accommodate the Palestinian refugees on its territory. Hezbollah’s rejection of the option of settling the Palestinians in Lebanon is not politically or ideologically motivated, but rather based on a sincere belief that settling the Palestinians in Lebanon, Syria or Jordan would mean the total abandonment of Palestine, [which] is neither acceptable nor logical. What we are saying is that it is not enough to reject the option of settling the Palestinians in Lebanon: we should also reject their displacement and exile all over the world. The only acceptable option for us is their return to their homeland and the restitution of their rights.

In 1982, when the Islamic Resistance first started its activities, Lebanese parties already active in the field had chosen various descriptive names for themselves—for example, leftist parties were known collectively as the National Resistance Front; and when the Amal Movement was still carrying out resistance operations, it was known under the name Lebanese Resistance Cohorts. When there were internal problems, the Amal Movement insisted on saying that it was the one carrying out the resistance operations. Given that these names were descriptive of operations against the Israeli enemy, Imam al-Sadr9 used the name Lebanese Resistance Cohorts in reference to operations against the occupation. For more than one-and-a-half years, however, Hezbollah carried out operations without claiming responsibility for them, whether as Amal or as the Islamic Resistance Movement (i.e. Hezbollah), because it did not seek political or media attention; it was this anonymity that had, for a time, provided protection for the party’s fighters. But when it became clear that this group was different from all the others, the Islamic Resistance made its existence publicly known in 1982.

In fact, the name Islamic Resistance refers to the military operations that Hezbollah’s fighters carry out against the Israeli occupation. It is worth mentioning here that we draw a distinction between the Islamic Resistance and the National Resistance Front—namely, the fact that one refers to the fighters’ religious affiliation and the other to their sectarian affiliation. When we speak about the Islamic Resistance, we are actually referring to the fighters’ intellectual and ideological, rather than sectarian identity. What compels these fighters to go south and resist is their faith in God, in judgment day, in answering God’s summons to fight the occupiers, and in the expectation of going to paradise. When you ask some young men to go and defend their country, they will tell you “Why should we? Our country has done nothing for us.” There are also those who loot, pillage, and commit other such acts, and when you tell them to go and defend the Arabs, they will tell you: “The Arabs are trying to further their narrow regional interests.” What I am trying to say is that they tried for years to motivate the people using purely nationalistic and popular language, but failed to forge mujahidin like those currently fighting in Lebanon. It is impossible for people to imagine that there are young men who have no aircraft, missiles or tanks, and live in the wild, and yet wage war against the strongest army in the Middle East. The only dogma that could inspire such devotion is Islam. Given that Islam is its motivator, it is therefore only natural for this resistance movement to give itself a name that fits it to a tee.

Ever since the movement’s inception, the name “Islamic Resistance” has never had a sectarian connotation or referred to anyone in particular in this country. The Islamic Resistance does not only fight to defend Muslims, or Muslim areas, but rather all of Lebanon: its villages and citizens, be they Muslims or Christians. We have gone well beyond this issue in Lebanon. A more important issue for Lebanon is all the talk about growing fears regarding the increasing power of Hezbollah because of its armed resistance, when, in reality, the situation on the ground does not justify those fears. One could say that Hezbollah is able to defeat Israel and achieve victory, or that it could very well play a role in the political equation of the region. However, when we deal with the Lebanese domestic equation, we inevitably have to take into consideration Lebanon’s contradictions and particular calculations. Those who speak about such fears therefore know that they are exaggerating quite a bit, and that their fears are not justified.

Before 1982, a number of Hezbollah’s leaders and cadres belonged to the Amal Movement, and another group were members of other Islamic organizations of various names and shapes, including student associations and committees. But there was no central body to unite all these movements under a single umbrella. When the Israelis invaded Lebanon in 1982, a disagreement took place within the Amal Movement regarding the manner in which this invasion had to be dealt with; as a result, we decided to split from Amal. We joined ranks with the other leaders and cadres who were not in Amal, and together started a new movement to confront occupation and expel it from Lebanon. We chose the path of jihad and did not care at all about holding conferences, issuing founding statements, or even finding a name for our new movement.

As for the name “Islamic Resistance”, it came about only one-and-a-half years later, and it is therefore not accurate to say that Hezbollah was born and formed from within the Amal Movement, or that it emerged from under its cloak.

AL-AHRAM: What is the nature of your relationship with Syria and Iran?

HN: We are a Lebanese Islamic jihadist movement that has its own cause, ideology, and plans, as well as its own leadership and elected cadres; and Syria is a sister country, and a friend, with whom we share a common fate. We say that very earnestly, not to placate the Syrians but to state a fact, because our hopes are pinned on the unity of purpose among the Arabs and the common fate of the entire Islamic nation. At a time when the rest of our Arab brothers are busy pursuing their own interests, our friendship, brotherly relations, mutual trust, cooperation, and exchange of views with Syria are as strong as ever. But in the pursuit of the national and popular interests, Hezbollah makes its decisions alone and as it sees fit, and Israel’s portrayal of Hezbollah as a Syrian tool is completely wrong.

As for our relations with Iran, the Islamic Republic of Iran is a country we deeply respect, and believe to be a genuine and true Islamic state with no links to any of the world’s powers, and a wonderful example of an Islamic regime, especially in comparison to other Islamic countries. When the Islamic Revolution achieved victory in Iran, it took a decision to help the Palestinian people in their fight to regain their Israeli-occupied land. The Islamic Republic of Iran is a strong state that stands on the side of the Arabs, against Zionist and other ambitions in the region. After the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, our relationship with it started developing fast. Thus, in spite of being occupied fighting a war that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had imposed on it, Iran was the only country in the world that sent armed troops to fight the Israeli occupation, on the side of Syria and Lebanon. When it became clear that the situation in Lebanon would not assume regional proportions, the Iranian troops went back home, leaving behind a few Revolutionary Guards to help train and morally motivate the Lebanese fighters against the occupation.10 This was of tremendous help to the resistance in regaining its self-confidence after its morale had almost plummeted to the ground, as the result of all the talk about our entering into the Israeli era without the chance of ever leaving it. Since that time, Iran has supported us politically and stood at the Lebanese government and people’s side; and although Iran might disagree with the Lebanese government over certain issues, it will always be at its side, and on Syria’s side, in the confrontation with the Israeli enemy.

However, to say that the relationship between Hezbollah and the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran is that of master and servant is wrong: Iran does not interfere at all in our internal affairs, and pursues its own policies regarding the Lebanese government. For example, at a time when we were opposed to [Premier] Rafik Hariri’s government,11 the latter had very good relations with Iran and paid several visits to Tehran. It was in Iran’s interest, as a state, to have good relations with the Hariri government, and this by no means meant that we had to support that government. We are not like those parties that have relationships with other countries and act accordingly; when I oppose the government, I do so based purely on local Lebanese considerations that have to do with the economy, foreign policy, financial affairs, or other such issues.

I would also like to tell you that Iran’s support for Lebanon and Syria is based on ideological and intellectual considerations, rather than on political interest. For example, Iran received several messages from the United States, through Japan, Switzerland, and other European parties, asking for two things: that it keep silent about the peace settlement in the region, even if it opposed it, and that it end its support for resistance activities in the region—by which, of course, they mean Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad. In return, the Americans would bring about a détente in Iranian–American relations, stop the activities of the Iranian opposition group, Mujahidin Khalq, lift the economic sanctions on Iran, recognize Iran’s regional role in Central Asia, and solve the problem of the three disputed islands.12 Does Iran have bigger or more important political interests than that? Will it ever receive a better offer? I believe the answer is no.

Iran cannot keep silent regarding the peace settlement issue, because—on the very first day the Revolution assumed power, on February 11, 1979—it took a clear position in favor of Palestine and Jerusalem. It will not back out of it now, because it sees it as a religious and ideological duty to support jihadist movements.

AL-AHRAM: Did you try, one way or another, directly or indirectly, to forge a relationship with Egypt?

HN: Above all, such a relationship would depend on the extent to which Egypt has a role to play in south Lebanon. Let me say first that Hezbollah has its own clear policies and firm position regarding the Israeli occupation and the need to confront it—not only as far as its foreign policy is concerned, but also in its relations with other political power-centers in the country. The closer various parties come to those policies, the closer will be the relationship Hezbollah will forge with them; in fact, Hezbollah sees it as its duty to forge close ties with these parties. I would like Egypt to play a role in south Lebanon, and shoulder a considerable national responsibility. Although I do not wish to interfere in Egypt’s internal affairs, or in its policies and problems, from 1982 until today Lebanon’s problems have made it feel all alone and abandoned to its fate. We are not asking Egypt to position missiles, artillery or military barracks against Israel; we did not even ask the Syrians, who support us, to do that. The Lebanese people have various other needs that Egypt could fulfill. Lebanon does not feel that Egypt is ready to play such a role, and no negotiations have so far taken place between us and any Egyptian official party. No one in Egypt tried to talk to us, and I cannot remember if contacts with Egypt ever took place at all.

AL-AHRAM: You spoke about sharing a common fate with Syria at a time when Syria has a particular position on groups with ideologies similar to Hezbollah’s within Syria itself. Is there an ideological rift between you and the Syrians?13

HN: Our Syrian brothers have a particular ability to distinguish between Islamist and non-Islamist groups; they do not judge various parties based on their name. For example, just as the Nationalist Movement comprises several contradictory opinions, formulas, and programs, Islamic movements in different countries have different policies, programs and visions. Based on that, Syria views Hezbollah in a different light. If you look at the map of the Muslim world, you will find that Islamic regimes differ from one another. For example, you cannot see the regime in the Islamic Republic of Iran the same way you do other Islamic regimes, like that of the Taliban in Afghanistan;14 one is democratic, and the other is not. Likewise, you cannot generalize by applying the criteria of one Islamist regime to all the others; our Syrian brethren could have their own views regarding Islamist movements such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood Association. When an Islamist movement says, “My plans, objectives, and priorities are to resist against the Israeli occupation in Palestine,” the Syrians have no problem establishing a genuine relationship with it. We agree with the Syrians on a number of fundamental political and strategic issues with regard to the fate of Lebanon, Syria, and the region as a whole, in spite of the fact that the Arab Baath Socialist Party15 and Hezbollah each have their own different ideologies. I feel a certain affinity with Syria, not only in the political domain, but also on many other levels, including psychologically and emotionally, thanks to our shared interests and fate.

AL-AHRAM: Hezbollah has its own ideas and plans. Where does Hezbollah’s interest lie as far as maintaining, or ending, political sectarianism in Lebanon is concerned?

HN: The situation in Lebanon is complicated to some extent. In theory, we are working to end political sectarianism in Lebanon. The problem is that political sectarianism benefits the Lebanese Christians, based on the fact that the country has a Muslim majority. So, when we call for the abolition of political sectarianism in Lebanon, the first thing that comes to our Christian brothers’ minds is that we are advocating an open democratic system that would automatically lead to Muslim domination of the National Assembly and the state administration. We respect their fears, and feel that it is necessary to deal with various Lebanese domestic issues with a great deal of empathy and understanding; we want to get rid of political sectarianism, which is a backward and tribal system, and replace it with a modern one that would govern the country and preserve internal cohesion. In this context, and to allay the fears of our Christian brothers, we call for the formation of a Higher National Council, as was provided for in the Constitution, with a mission to abolish sectarianism. So far, no one has taken up or discussed this call in any serious way, and all that is taking place right now in this regard is only for press and election sloganeering purposes. We are not calling for the abolition of direct political sectarianism; this could happen at a later stage, and could take up to 30 more years to happen.

AL AHRAM: How about the coordination with Syria?

HN: We coordinate with Syria in the general sense, but we coordinate with no one regarding all that has to do with the resistance and the relevant details of its activities—neither with Syria nor the Lebanese government.16 In this respect, Hezbollah, the Lebanese government, and Syria are in agreement regarding the legitimacy of the resistance against occupation. On the other hand, what takes place in south Lebanon is governed by the terms of the April Understanding, and Hezbollah reiterates its commitment to this Understanding on a regular basis to the Syrian and Lebanese governments. The Lebanese government is not responsible for the actions of the resistance, because we do not coordinate our plans with it; this situation serves the interest of the resistance well, as well as that of the Lebanese government. Had the resistance been under the control of the Lebanese government, it would have been better for it to send the Lebanese army to fight in the south instead of relying on the resistance. In this case, the responsibility for all that took place would have fallen on the shoulders of the Lebanese government. Under the present circumstances, no one can blame the government for the actions of the resistance; furthermore, the situation as it is now makes the resistance more effective, genuine, and fit for the task of liberating the occupied territories.

At the same time, as everyone knows, we are careful not to encroach on the government’s responsibilities or maintain direct contacts with anyone—be it France, Iran or Syria. This is in the best interests of both the country and the resistance. It is also in the interest of the resistance to refrain from direct political contacts; the Lebanese government formulated the April Understanding, and Lebanese delegates at the talks represented the government, not the resistance. It is true, however, that we were consulted regarding the terms of the Understanding, and that we had certain reservations concerning some of the terms that the government had agreed upon. Nevertheless, we agreed to commit to the spirit, if not the terms, of the April Understanding. For example, we do not agree on the term “armed groups,” for we are the most honorable resistance force in the world; we also do not recognize anything by the name of “Israel’s borders,” but rather [recognize the] borders of occupied northern Palestine. In the same vein, as far as we are concerned, the international borders are the Lebanese–Palestinian borders. These were our reservations on the April Understanding.

AL-AHRAM: What kind of budget do you have, and what are your sources of income?

HN: The figures one reads in the media are incorrect; it is not true that we receive between $100 million and $150 million per annum.17 We have several sources of income. There is first our social obligation to the families of the martyrs and the wounded, and this expense is shouldered by a semi-official Iranian organization that attends to the families of martyrs, prisoners, and the wounded. A non-Iranian organization assumes responsibility for reconstruction and rehabilitation work, such as the rebuilding of bridges and destroyed areas.18 Hezbollah’s second source of financing—i.e. the political aspect—comes from donations from inside and outside Lebanon, while the third source is the Khoms and Zakat19 that come to us from the four Muslim denominations. Although the Khoms is limited to profit from war, in the Jaafari denomination, it could also be part of the profit from trade; in this context, various Shia religious authorities have given us special permission to receive Khoms in aid to the resistance.

Without a doubt, this particular source of financing solves a very big problem for us from the point of view of the mujahidin’s daily expenses and weapon purchases, which are not Iranian, but bought on the open market. Anyone can purchase the weapons we have in our possession, as long as they have the right amount of money. It is not worth endangering any particular country by exposing it to accusations of arming the Islamic Resistance, although such an accusation should rather be a source of honor.

AL-AHRAM: Some people believe that Hezbollah is confronting the world without any means of ensuring its eventual victory. It is well known that Shia ideology urges taqiyya,20 and warns against getting involved in something without first ensuring that the elements for success are actually there. At the same time, there are international and regional factors that support the theory of an eventual peaceful settlement in the Middle East. What would you say to those who believe that your current actions are not based on clear religious justification?

HN: Taqiyya in our Shia dogma signifies the desire to preserve our own specificities and religious teachings when we live in an Islamic community. If, however, our attempts to preserve our specificities would lead to sedition, infighting, and warfare among Muslims, then we should practice taqiyya, to help us protect our specificities without the need to flaunt them to the world. The Shia have practiced taqiyya since the Umayyad and Abbasid eras, and up to the Mameluke and Ottoman eras.21 Shiism is not an inward-looking sect, and while taqiyya’s rightful place is within national, popular, and Islamic communities, it is not suited for places where there is colonialism or occupation. For example, when the British invaded Iraq, Shia everywhere were required to do jihad in defense of Iraq, on the side of the Ottoman Empire, which was oppressing them and putting them in jail. All religious texts endorse the principle of Muslims going to war in defense of Muslim lands, even without the Caliph’s or the Imam’s permission. Muslims are also allowed to use any means at their disposal, for there are no conditions regarding weapons to use or troop numbers when a country is under threat.

On the other hand, when Hezbollah started its resistance activities in the early 1980s, Israel was occupying large parts of Lebanon, and American and multinational troops were present on Lebanese soil. Lebanon’s political regime was pro-Israel, Israel appointed the president of the republic and the prime minister, and the Lebanese army was loyal to that pro-Israel regime. At the same time, part of the Lebanese community was collaborating with Israel militarily and politically, which meant that our situation was much more difficult than it is now. The international situation was not much better than it is now either; nor was the state of the Arabs.

In spite of all these difficulties, the resistance has achieved several considerable victories over the past 17 years. Some people ignore important factors that we believe have brought us this victory—namely that God is the final arbiter in this world, and that his will always prevails. In the Quran, God promises the mujahidin victory if they do jihad and go to war, and they are doing exactly that. Ever since we started the resistance in 1982, and up to today, we rely on the fact that God will grant us victory if we obey him. Only God can grant the young men of the resistance peace of mind, and although we have no missiles or aircraft to shell Tel Aviv with, the Israelis live in constant fear of our operations.

You want to know the future. Well, I do not see the United States or Israel in the region. Israel does not have the necessary means of survival in this region for more than a few decades, and those who live long enough will be witness to that.