## 4

## AFTER THE ASSASSINATION

February 27, 1992

> This interview, conducted by the prominent Lebanese journalist Ibrahim al-Amine and published in the Lebanese leftist daily newspaper As-Safir, came just eleven days after Mussawi was killed, and shortly after Nasrallah was elected secretary-general of Hezbollah. Significantly, he goes to some length to present himself as far less extremist and far more rational in his calculations than some—in particular Hezbollah’s traditional domestic opponents, the Christians—had suggested. Apparently, however, his efforts were unconvincing—at least as far as the US was concerned: according to one secret 1992 CIA assessment,1 US analysts viewed Nasrallah’s ascendancy as a boost for the radicals in Hezbollah, potentially increasing the threat of global Hezbollah operations directly targeting US interests. For the domestic Lebanese audience, however, his words provided an important degree of clarity as to the immediate ambitions of what was, largely as a result of a joint Syrian–Iranian modus vivendi, the only remaining armed political party after the end of the civil war.

AS-SAFIR: We noticed, before the martyrdom of Sayyed Abbas Mussawi,2 that Hezbollah had adopted a new policy regarding various issues in Lebanon, such as avoiding bloody internal conflicts, giving priority to resistance activities in the south, and opening up to non-Muslim groups. Today you confirm that you will be following Sayyed Mussawi’s path. Could you tell us about the policy that you plan to pursue at this particular point in time, especially regarding other groups in the country?

HN: The path pursued by the martyred Sayyed was not his own personal policy, but that of Hezbollah’s leadership. This path does not shift or change, neither before nor after one secretary-general goes and the new one comes. Over the past few years, we were in the process of establishing ourselves—because, as is well known, Hezbollah is a jihadi3 movement created in the wake of the Israeli invasion of 1982. The main basis upon which the movement was established was that of resistance against occupation.

During the first few years of our existence, we were in the process of establishing our movement, and sought first to complete the building of our infrastructure. It was therefore very natural for an entity still involved in its own construction, forming its own identity, and affirming its presence, not to be sufficiently able to take steps towards others. I mean by this, building relations with other groups, opening up to them, forming coalitions, and other such initiatives. People first have to affirm their own existence before starting to build relationships, coalitions, and policies that depend on it. Also during that period, a seditious atmosphere prevailed between us and our brethren in the Amal Movement, and this kept us all rather occupied.4 Hezbollah’s entire leadership was determined to get out of this predicament, and reach an agreement that would put an end to this conflict one way or another. The first such agreement between the two groups was signed by His Eminence the martyred Sayyed, may God rest his soul, and the second [in 1990] was signed by the former secretary-general, Sheikh Subhi Tufeili, which underlines the fact that the issue does not depend on differences of opinion between individuals in the party. They all pursue the same path, which depends on the circumstances prevailing at the time.

After the conflict between us and our brethren in Amal ended, the attention of Hezbollah’s leadership once again turned towards escalating the resistance [against Israel], and taking steps towards other groups in the country; it was also time to start attending to the people’s problems. Sayyed Abbas’s personal belief in this path, coupled with a similar conviction by Hezbollah’s leadership and the coinciding accession of the martyred Sayyed to the general secretariat of the party, placed him at the forefront of this policy. Undoubtedly the martyred Sayyed’s distinguished personality and his character attributes helped ensure a good performance. I am sure that observers noticed the shift that had taken place, as well as secretary-general Sayyed Abbas Mussawi’s laudable activities. I can tell you in all confidence that, after his martyrdom, nothing changed at all—neither in the direction we are taking, the path we are pursuing, our spirituality, nor on the level of our performance. All that has changed is that one person, who occupied an essential position within the Islamic community, was martyred, and it is now incumbent upon us to continue the journey. We will follow the same methods, pursue the same path, and strive to maintain the same high level of performance—whether at the level of the resistance, in taking steps towards other forces and sects in Lebanon, or in attending to the state of deprivation from which the people are suffering. As I said before, we are determined to stay the course and pursue the same path.

AS-SAFIR: In its first comment on the assassination of Sayyed Abbas Mussawi, Israel predicted that the incident would have long-term repercussions.

HN: The Israeli enemy has not thus far been able, in spite of its advanced intelligence capabilities, to understand Hezbollah’s identity and make-up, or fathom the nature of the challenge facing it. The enemy is perhaps trying to draw lessons from its experience in previous wars and engagements with some Palestinian factions, and gauge the situation accordingly. It is also clear, based on published statements by the enemy’s leaders, analyses in the Israeli press, and [statements by] Western commentators, that their main objective was to deal Hezbollah a fatal blow. They assumed that by killing the secretary-general in this manner, they would lower morale among the leaders and members of Hezbollah, and create a state of confusion and bewilderment, which in turn would incapacitate the party. Added to that is the failed military operation that they launched against Kafra and Yater,5 the obvious objective of which was to go into the two villages, take control of a number of hilltops, destroy the homes of the mujahidin, and kill as many of them as possible. The idea was that, if this military operation succeeded and they managed to enter the two villages, a state of panic would ensue in the south and in all areas in which the resistance is present. In other words, taken together, these actions would [they thought] accelerate the collapse of Hezbollah, the backbone of the resistance.

It seems that the Israelis were relying on a certain piece of press or intelligence information to the effect that there are different factions within Hezbollah, and that Sayyed Abbas Mussawi had become secretary-general a year ago as a result of a compromise deal between them. They thought that if they hit Sayyed Abbas, they would deal a blow to the person at the heart of this compromise, and as a result the conflict between the various factions, themselves still in shock at the incident, would increase, further weaken Hezbollah, and cause it to unravel. We, of course, believe that the Israeli enemy has not achieved any of its objectives through this assassination except for one—namely, the removal from the scene of a personality of the caliber of Sayyed Abbas Mussawi. What they have done, in fact, is awaken that very scene, put it on the alert, sharpened its awareness, increased its determination, unified it even further, caused it to rally round the resistance, and increased its enmity towards Israel in a manner that Abbas Mussawi himself could not have done during his lifetime.

AS-SAFIR: Don’t you think that what happened could have been avoided if the right measures had been put into place? Did something go wrong in this respect?

HN: Our brother Abbas, may God be pleased with him, and our brethren in general, were very determined not to allow any security measures to constitute a barrier between them and the people. They considered their presence in certain areas, their appearance at a number of occasions, and opportunities to address the nation, as necessary steps even if they involve a certain amount of risk and sacrifice. The martyrdom of Sayyed Abbas will undoubtedly teach the present leadership a lesson and highlight the importance of taking additional security precautions.

When we were just a small jihadi group fighting the Israeli enemy, we were able to hide underground whenever we read in the papers that there was reason for us to disappear; that was only possible when we were just a small jihadi group. But we soon became a movement as large as this, and started viewing our project as non-partisan and non-factional, and as one that operates at the level of the entire Lebanese nation and people. We had also urged the Lebanese people to resist Israel and harbor enmity towards it, as the main present and genuine danger to all; and this made it impossible for us to do our job from the underground, as other military and security services are able to do. Appearing among our people, families, and supporters is essential, especially at an occasion such as the martyrdom of the Sheikh of all martyrs, Sheikh Ragheb Harb, in Jibi Sheet,6 which Sayyed wanted very much to attend personally. In any case, we are trying our best to strike a balance between being able to be present among the people as often as possible and taking the necessary security measures, which with God’s help will eliminate such threats towards our leaders.

AS-SAFIR: This question has additional aspects. The arrest was announced in Egypt of a spy network working for Israel that has branches in a number of Arab countries, including Lebanon. To your knowledge, is there a network that could have provided information about Sayyed Abbas Mussawi’s movements? And did he receive any warnings in the past regarding the possibility of his being the target of an assassination attempt?

HN: You all know that Israel has succeeded in infiltrating Lebanon to a considerable extent, and that it is active in the south and in other Lebanese areas. Its spy network in Lebanon has undoubtedly helped carry out this operation. Regarding warnings in the past, there was general information that Muslim leaders—especially Hezbollah’s—were on an assassination list. This is still the case, which means that this situation is nothing new for us; every single day, and as far back as the beginning of our activities in 1982, we [have been conscious of being] the target of assassination attempts. People in Lebanon who declare their enmity towards America and Israel, and insist on persevering on the path of jihad under this banner, will become a target. This is the nature of the battle we are engaged in, and any analysis of the situation presupposes and confirms that fact. In spite of this, we insisted on balancing between taking security measures and being present in public. For example, some people believe, as a result of the state of shock produced by the painful assassination of the secretary-general, that the new secretary-general should not attend the funeral for security reasons, and that for that same reason he should not appear on this or that occasion. We cannot perform our duties under such strict conditions, [which means] that we cannot put our secretary-general and our entire leadership in hiding and ask them to address the people through television screens. This does not suit the nature of our movement. As I said before, we have to balance between the stringency of the security measures we adopt and the need for us to maintain a public presence.

AS-SAFIR: According to your information, who launched the Katyusha rockets?7

HN: We have no information in this regard, and cannot point a finger at anyone. The south is an open area, and any group could bring a small number of rockets close to the frontier zone, and launch them from there.

AS-SAFIR: This kind of behavior will produce a reaction that could affect the people (…)

HN (interrupting): … as a resistance activity, it is very elementary, but a very frank one (…) by God; a quiet front without any fighting or shelling (…) or “just a little.” A group of resistance fighters erected a rocket launcher and shelled the occupied territories [Israel] (…) we do not condone this kind of behavior or work in this manner. However, if on the battlefield the enemy attacks, shells, and advances, it is only natural and right for us, and for resistance fighters and defenders, to use all means at our disposal to defend our families, our citizens, and our villages. The situation is always presented as the reverse of what it is: Israeli aggression becomes a reaction while, in reality, the situation is the opposite. The Israelis were the ones to start the shelling, and the Israelis were the ones to attack first, and what took place was a reaction to the Israeli attack. Here, we have a request to the Lebanese government that negotiates, makes contacts, and undertakes political and diplomatic activities; it is illogical for the enemy to tell us “We will not attack only if you stop the Katyushas”—this puts us in a position where we are subject to the enemy’s conditions. We have to work instead towards creating a situation in which the enemy is subject to our conditions. We should tell him: “If you attack us, we will use our Katyushas; if you do not attack us, we will not use our Katyushas. We will, however, keep fighting you as an occupier, using all our tactical options.” We have to turn the situation around; it is not acceptable that the resistance, or anyone fighting for his land, should be defined as the aggressor, while the enemy applies pressure to prevent a counterattack. This is not fair.

AS-SAFIR: Your Eminence’s words have a tone of [self-] justification. Who are they aimed at?

HN: They are aimed at all the politicians who, under pressure, believe the enemy’s claims, accept them, or agree with them, and deal with the situation accordingly. From the practical point of view, experience has proved that we care about the people through our performance in the resistance; and as soon as the Israeli enemy was repelled, and the operation failed, contacts were established between us and the Amal Movement. We know very well what the uncontrolled proliferation of weapons would mean, and the negative effect it could have on the people and the resistance itself. We took the initiative, made the necessary contacts and said: “Come, let us agree on the cancellation of all armed manifestations; there is no need for them and the move will help control the situation on the ground. We achieved a great victory together, so let’s preserve it; we can agree, coordinate our efforts, and help one another mount a resistance.” From the political point of view—and this is what I want to comment on—it is not correct to say that this is not our right; it is. We believe that this is our right. I said, “Come, let us see where the interest of the resistance lies, and where the interest of the people lies.” This is the main difference as far as we are concerned.

AS-SAFIR: This is part of the resistance’s strategy: Will the Islamic Resistance’s activities be confined to liberating the frontier zone, or is the frontier zone an open battlefield through which operations against Israel can be launched?

HN: The long-term strategy of the Islamic Resistance is clear and does not require additional explanation. It involves fighting against Israel and liberating Jerusalem, as well as Imam Khomeini’s proposal—namely, ending Israel as a state. The fact that we are engaged in an existentialist battle with Israel is an honor for us, as is the fact that the Israeli enemy deals with Hezbollah on that basis. We view the Israeli enemy with a different eye—namely, that its very existence in the region poses a constant threat to Lebanon as a whole, even if it withdraws from the frontier zone.

We are not unrealistic. We do not pretend that our military capabilities and the numbers of our mujahidin would be enough to regain Jerusalem; none of us have ever made that claim. We do, however, believe that the resistance has to finish the job it started. It is impossible for us to fight the Israeli enemy through traditional and classical methods, but rather [we must fight] through a war of attrition, whereby we drain its energy, weaken it, then one day force it to withdraw. Some claim that the withdrawal that took place in 1985 came as a result of political pressure and negotiations; this is obviously a misguided notion.8 The amount of losses the enemy incurred, and the fear it lived through, created enormous pressure on the Jews in the occupied territories; they, in turn, put a lot of pressure on their own government and forced it to withdraw. The enemy considered the price it paid on the ground as exceedingly high, and [former Israeli Premier Yitzak] Rabin admitted earlier on that their 1982 invasion was a very big mistake, because it introduced another group onto the battlefield, and created new enemies for Israel.9

AS-SAFIR: We noticed that in the salute you addressed to the fighters, you said that there would not be an internal agreement as long as there are Christians who count on Israel’s support, and as long as there is an outstretched arm towards the enemy; who were you referring to?

HN: There is a priority issue that the Lebanese have to agree on, namely whether the Israeli is an enemy or not. They went to Taif,10 and before that to Lausanne and Geneva, and discussed several issues at length—while the serious and important issue that they should discuss is their position regarding Israel, and in particular whether or not Israel is the enemy of Lebanon and its people.

If we want to find a common denominator between all the Lebanese factions today, we will undoubtedly not find any intellectual, ideological or religious denominators, because there are many such currents in this country. On the domestic front, we might find certain common denominators that bunch a number of groups together, and another bunch of other denominators that bring still other groups together. However, if we really want to find a genuine and realistic common denominator that goes right to the heart of the interests of Lebanon and the Lebanese, and that would really help them face up to future challenges, it would be enmity towards Israel. Is Israel an enemy or not? It is time now to address this issue and decide whether Israel is Lebanon’s enemy, and whether we want to be involved in defending Lebanon against Israel. In the past—and we are speaking here about historical facts, not about security information—certain Lebanese groups from East Beirut dealt with the Israeli enemy, stretched their arms out to it and counted on its support to win the presidency of the republic and build Lebanon according to its measurements.11 These groups’ options were Israeli options in every sense of the word; and instead of standing on the side of their own people’s resistance against the enemy, they collaborated with that enemy against the people. But we do not wish to dwell too long on the past here.

I did not say that there would be no agreement, but that any internal agreement will always be flimsy and weak if the issue of enmity towards Israel is not resolved; and so far, it has not been. In our opinion, the most important common denominator around which the Lebanese could coalesce is that of enmity towards Israel. If the efforts to forge a solid and unified Lebanese position are genuine, this is where we could start. Judging by the people’s stand on the martyrdom of Sayyed Abbas Mussawi and his wife and child—the outpouring of genuine emotion, and condemnations by Lebanese personalities, forces, and parties from all sects—this could be the starting point of this long road ahead. This is where our invitation to the Lebanese people to agree on a common denominator and start on the road ahead comes from.

AS-SAFIR: Have you already taken the initiative to contact some Christian parties in order to arrive at the common denominator for which you are calling?

HN: Previously, when Sheikh Subhi Tufeili and then Sayyed Abbas Mussawi were secretaries-general, contacts were made with Christian spiritual and political personalities who did not have any meaningful relationship with Israel. When we launched this call, we addressed it to all the Christians; we are ready to maintain contacts with all Christian personalities and groups that have at least no current dealings with the Israeli enemy. This is what we did before, and will be doing in the next few days, God willing.

AS-SAFIR: Who with, and how?

HN: Meetings were held with Christian clergymen under the auspices of our brother, the martyred Sayyed. I remember among them Bishop Khalil Abi Nader from Baalbek, and the Bishop of Tyre, may God rest his soul, who passed away at Christmas. A delegation from Hezbollah also paid a visit to the Bishop of Baalbek, and another delegation from the party’s Political Bureau visited a number of Christian families in the Southern Suburb and West Beirut, to wish them Merry Christmas. The same happened in some areas of the south.

AS-SAFIR: Regarding other parties and forces, such as the Lebanese Forces and the Kataeb…12

HN: I was clear when I said that we have not sought contact with those groups and personalities regarding which there is, so far, no proof that they have ended their dealings with Israel; and we shall not do so in the future.

AS-SAFIR: Does that mean you believe that the Lebanese Forces still have dealings with Israel? Do you still have doubts regarding that matter?

HN: We are convinced of that (…)

AS-SAFIR: And the Kataeb Party?

HN [continuing]: … the proof is that there was a number of abductees in the hands of the Lebanese Forces, whose families had visited them several times before they were taken to the occupied territories, and took them clothes and food, and used to receive letters from them.13 A while later they lost contact with them, only to discover that they were in the occupied territories; their parents received letters from them, written in their own hand, through the Red Cross. Reports by Amnesty International also confirm that fact. Does handing their detainees over to the Israelis mean that they still have dealings with Israel, or that they have ended them?

AS-SAFIR: Your Eminence; allow us to delve into what you said concerning the Christians. You wondered about the possibility of reaching an internal agreement as long as some parties still have dealings with Israel. There are also some Christians who wonder about the possibility of reaching an agreement as long as the party calls for an Islamic Republic, for the cancellation of political pluralism, and for forcing the others to coexist with extremist Islamic ideologies like the Ahlul Thimma14 and others. We have seen an example of this in the southern suburbs, where there was still a limited presence of the Lebanese Forces; but then after 1984 a mass exodus of Christians took place, and the character of the suburbs, which had been a center for Christian–Shia coexistence, totally changed. What can you tell the Christians today? And what guarantees do you offer in return? Categorizing the Christians as agents [of Israel] and nationalists takes us back to an era, prior to 1982, when each side accused the other of treason; and we have seen where this has led us.

HN: When we speak about Christians, we naturally are not talking about all of them, but about those who had dealings with the Israeli enemy. We sometimes also speak about certain Muslims in the south and the western Bekaa,15 who were even more significant Israeli agents and more treacherous and corrupt; and history is witness to that. I will use the question you asked me to elucidate Hezbollah’s vision. In our political statement regarding our vision for the future, we never said that we want to build an Islamic identity through oppression and compulsion at any level. We do not believe in such behavior, because the nature of the issue does not accept it, meaning that we should not build an Islamic government on oppression and compulsion. Any Islamic government anywhere in the world that does not, as a necessary precondition, have a very wide popular base that adopts, defends, and remains loyal to it, cannot succeed. The Islamic government is different from any other government in the world; it is different from a regime that comes to power through a military coup, from a dictatorship, a monarchy, or a tribal regime propped up by the country’s army and intelligence service. Historically, and by virtue of its nature, an Islamic government cannot survive or last if it does not have a wide popular base, or if the nation as a whole does not support it. Based on that, I believe that we are entitled—as is every Lebanese citizen—to aspire to the best project or notion that, in our opinion, would lead to the most just, prosperous, secure, and peaceful society. For proof, you can go to Iran and see for yourselves what is happening there.

AS-SAFIR: But the scope of the country’s plurality and its distribution are different in Iran (…)

HN: There are churches being built and (…)

AS-SAFIR: (…) in also the size of this plurality. By thimmiya they might mean a moral and psychological thimmiya, not necessarily a materialistic one?

HN: Let me help you a little here. For example, there are churches and schools (…) during the war,16 the Christians in Iran fought without there being a general conscription. The Iranian people that volunteered included Christians from all denominations, including Armenians; they all took part in the fighting and gave many martyrs. Before I talk to you about what the Lebanon of tomorrow should look like or anything else, we have to ask, “Will Lebanon remain for the Lebanese or will it escape from their hands?” This essential issue should be our point of departure. Starting a dialogue between Lebanese to plan and agree on the future of this country is very possible, and we are not at all against it. However, there is a saying in our vernacular that says “First the throne, then the etching on the throne”; which means that we have to build the throne first. We see Israel as a danger to us, and do not overestimate the extent of this danger; we see it as it really is and, on the other hand, believe that others are underestimating it. We are saying to the Lebanese, “Come, let us give Lebanon a minimum degree of protection so that the Israeli enemy will not gobble it up; come, let us liberate Lebanon and eliminate the Israeli danger to it and, based on that, we can then solve all impending issues through dialogue.” Experience has shown both Christians and Muslims that civil war leads nowhere.

AS-SAFIR: If Israel implements Resolution 425,17 pulls back to the internationally recognized borders, and the situation returns to what it was prior to 1982, would Hezbollah abide by the Resolution or continue to launch operations against Israel across the Lebanese borders?

HN: Let Israel first withdraw and implement Resolution 425; this is a theoretical issue.

AS-SAFIR: You said before that the battle with Israel is a strategic one. Does this mean that the party will continue launching operations across the borders even if Israel implements Resolution 425?

HN: The responsibility of liberating Palestine is not only the responsibility of the Palestinian people, but also that of the entire Arab and Islamic nation.

AS-SAFIR: The perfect harmony between Hezbollah and Iran’s policies makes it seem like an Iranian community within Lebanon. What are the particularities that make this party acceptable to all Lebanese?

HN: When Hezbollah was established in the wake of the invasion and started its resistance against the occupation, it did not fight and give martyrs for Iran’s sake, in the strict regional sense. It fought for Lebanese territory, defended Lebanese citizens, and confronted an enemy behaving aggressively against the Lebanese people. I would like to ask, if we want to judge whether or not a given party is genuinely Lebanese: Is there a greater or more important yardstick than one’s defense of the land and its people?

We in Lebanon sought to benefit from the experience of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, because it is a pioneering movement, on a global scale, that succeeded in defying the old world order. It also succeeded in building a state, a regime, and an entity outside the framework of compulsory loyalty to either East or West. It gave us many examples from which the Arab and Muslim world could learn.

As to our decision-making process and its links to Iran, we in Hezbollah have a Shura [Council] elected rather than appointed by the General Conference;18 this is proof enough that Hezbollah is an entity unto itself. From the religious point of view, we have a tenet that says that a legitimate leader is a hard-working and religious scholar who enjoys many relevant attributes. These are, among other things, ability, knowledge, a sense of justice, experience, historical awareness, good management skills, and faith (…) when this man assumes the leadership of the Muslims, and is accepted by the majority, he becomes their leader and legal guardian (…). It is from this perspective that we viewed the legitimacy of Imam al-Khomeini’s leadership and guardianship, and now view Sayyed Khameini’s leadership and guardianship and deal with him accordingly.19

AS-SAFIR: Let me go back to the latest Israeli military operation. It is clear that you came under pressure to rein in your resistance movement’s activities as part of a “small deal” to calm the situation down. Are you worried about what is being planned against you? I am speaking of an Israeli withdrawal in return for the head of the Islamic Resistance movement and Hezbollah.

HN: I followed up on this issue personally, and we were never under pressure. We fought alongside other brethren within the limits of our abilities, and in the context of a defensive strategy, and when the enemy failed to achieve its objectives we saw the wisdom of containing the situation and returning to our usual resistance methods. It might be true that this move coincided with attempts to put pressure on the Lebanese Government and others, but I can say in all confidence that our decision to cease all armed manifestations and contain the situation20 was purely based on our own conviction, and not due to any kind of pressure. We made contact with our brothers in Amal, and agreed to call a meeting of the military Quadripartite Committee in the Sidon area—not to formulate an agreement as such, but to implement a number of measures on which we had agreed earlier.

AS-SAFIR: What about the next phase?

HN: Previously, we were concerned that Hezbollah’s head would be the price to pay for Israel’s withdrawal; we had some information in this regard and some nationalistic ministers confirmed it to us. I, however, believe that the Lebanese Government is incapable of taking a decision of this kind; there are regional and international factors that prevent this from happening.

AS-SAFIR: What are these regional factors—Iran’s position?

HN: Not only Iran; Syria would also not accept that the resistance be targeted. When the [Lebanese] state says that resistance is a legitimate right, it cannot then turn around and target this resistance in return for such a small deal.

AS-SAFIR: How about the Higher Defense Council’s decisions?

HN: If the objective is to ban armed manifestations, then we are committed to prevent such manifestations in areas where the Lebanese army is deployed, and everywhere else. But if the objective is to ban the resistance, even from areas where the army is deployed, then we would disagree on this.

The way we see it, the reverse is true: it is in areas where the army is deployed that there should be resistance. The army is supposed to be an army of resistance, and should therefore reinforce the resistance and allow it to operate from any area, without parading itself, and [with the resistance operating] in full compliance with security-related conditions.

AS-SAFIR: Let us move to the issue of the hostages. Some people said that one of the reasons behind the assassination of Sayyed Mussawi was the fact that the release of the two Israelis, detained by the resistance, was not part of the deal.21 We would like you to elaborate on that and on the issue of the two German hostages.22

HN: Journalists and politicians still insist that Hezbollah has something to do with this hostage issue (…). Let me tell you frankly, the hostages are in the hands of certain groups which have detainees of their own in jails around the world, and are using the only means available to them to get them released. This is also the case with the Germans; Hezbollah has nothing to do with their detention.

AS-SAFIR: Why was the file of the American hostages so hurriedly closed? What was the quid pro quo?

HN: What really helped solve the issue of the American hostages was the release of the fifteen prisoners held in Kuwaiti jails, after the events that took place in Kuwait in the wake of the Iraqi invasion.23 In fact, the group that was holding the American hostages was applying pressure to get prisoners in Kuwait released. Now that this has been accomplished, the group that abducted them has turned its attention to securing the release of prisoners in Israeli jails and bringing back the agents.24 The main objective, however, has now been accomplished.

AS-SAFIR: Regarding the issue of the German hostages, Bonn is urging the Europeans to halt their assistance to Lebanon until the release of the hostages. Do you believe that the issue of assistance really depends on the hostages’ release?

HN: The Americans used to say that they would grant assistance to Lebanon after the release of the American hostages, but look what happened. All the Western hostages were released—the Americans, French and English—and where is this assistance? The issue is linked to the political situation, not the hostage situation; it is also linked to the issue of submission to the American fiat.

AS-SAFIR: What is the latest information you have?

HN: In the past, contacts revolved around dislodging some of the legal obstacles to get the Hamadeh brothers released from prison in Germany.

AS-SAFIR: There is talk about contacts regarding the Israeli prisoners. Do you think that the martyrdom of Sayyed Mussawi has further complicated matters?

HN: We considered the martyrdom of Sayyed Mussawi, his wife and child, as a natural part of our jihadist activities; the incident was expected. We do not function in reaction to given events; we believe in and work for a number of issues, and will continue to believe in and work for them. One of these issues is the release of detainees in enemy hands; this is also Sayyed Mussawi’s testament.

AS-SAFIR: How is Hezbollah’s relationship with Syria?

HN: Those who follow our party’s political line and its leaders’ statements know full well our position regarding Syria and President Hafez al-Assad; all I can do is reconfirm this position. We see Syria as a genuine support for both Lebanon and the resistance, and we say this not to compliment them—we view Syria as the country most able to lend its support to Lebanon and its people. As far as regional and major issues are concerned, we have asserted that we will stand at Syria’s side as it confronts the dangers that threaten Lebanon, Syria, and the entire region.

AS-SAFIR: In the context of the relationship between Hezbollah and the state, we find that members of Hezbollah refrain from assuming positions in the state’s administration, such as the army, security services, and other departments. You took no part in the allotment of positions, and refused to be part of the 30-member government and the national assembly. Now there is talk of municipal and parliamentary elections. What is your position in this regard?

HN: We have a basic problem with the current regime, for we do not approve of its present formation. We rejected the Taif Agreement, and in a statement released by our Political Bureau we said why this is the case.

We want a formula for governing Lebanon that reflects the will of the Lebanese people, and like any self-respecting country we do not want a formula imposed on the people. The people are well able to elect their own representatives, who will then meet and work on a formula for a new state structure.

The Taif Agreement was transformed into the country’s constitution, and this we cannot accept, especially because it enshrines sectarianism; sectarianism was merely a custom in the past, but after Taif it became enshrined in the constitution.25 The Lebanese have gone backwards instead of forwards. This is precisely why we refuse to take part in a government that has for [its] objective the implementation of the Taif Agreement, which we rejected. We are unimpressed by the status that a ministerial position, a parliamentary seat, or a presidency confers; those who chose the path of martyrdom are naturally not familiar with such phenomena.26

AS-SAFIR: Why not be an opposition from within the government?

HN: Opposition from within the government in its current formation would not be a real opposition, and would produce nothing; it would just exhaust people’s energies.

AS-SAFIR: Where do you want things to go—towards more hiding behind religion? When you refuse sectarianism, and refuse secularism, you are simply reinforcing the fears of others. You seem to want the country to go towards “Islamization”, instead of it taking you towards “Lebanonization.”

HN: Would the Christians put up with what some of them did in Lebanon? Would the Muslims put up with what some of them did? We are calling on everybody to come to the negotiating table to agree on a formula for governing Lebanon, and we are ready to cooperate and interact with any formula on which there will be agreement. We will agree to be part of this formula if it further assists this population’s interests.

No, sectarianism is not the alternative to a secularism that removes religion from the scene—as if Lebanon’s problem right now simply has to do with religious marriage courts, and replacing them by civil courts will further the development of the country. Even in the religious sense, we have many beliefs (…) when Imam Ali was sent to Egypt as governor, he was given Malek al-Ashtari’s covenant.27 This covenant elucidates the notion of non-sectarian political Islam and says, among other things, “Do not rule over them like a savage tiger that sets upon their food, for there are two kinds of people: either a brother to you in religion, or an equal to you in nature.” Islamic non-sectarian ideology believes in a common denominator among people, either religion or humanity.

AS-SAFIR: A Christian, however, does not really want any of that, and it is his right; he has always been here historically, and wants a real partnership in governance. There is pluralism here, and it ought to be respected. The Christian does not want a covenant; he tried that under the Fatimids, and we saw what happened.

HN: One should not judge Islam based on the Fatimids and Mamelukes … look at what the Mamelukes did to the Shia of Jbeil and Keserouan!28 No, one should not judge Islam on that basis.

It seems, from the way the conversation is going, that the Christians want the Muslims to recognize their right to participate in power. The problem was in fact not like that; the Muslims were the ones who demanded the right to participate in power, and while some Christian leaders responded positively, others argued for privileges over each period and comma. At this point, the fact remains that Lebanon is home to all the Lebanese people, and they choose to coexist. Let us, therefore, find out who really represents this people, and then allow them to embark on a dialogue to arrive at the best formula to govern this country.