## 11

## ON CONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL

March 29, 1998

> Ever since the first major IDF withdrawal under fire in 1985, successive Israeli governments had premised any further territorial withdrawals in Lebanon on a series of demands and tests that invariably emphasized ending Hezbollah’s increasingly effective military operations in south Lebanon—as well as ending, once and for all, its armed presence in the whole of the country.

> The following interview, conducted by the Lebanese newspaper Al-Moharrer and headlined, “Nasrallah: No political rewards for the enemy in return for the occupation,” came shortly after Israeli Premier Benjamin Netanyahu had belatedly announced that his country would finally recognize and implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 425, almost 20 years after its issuance following the first Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Netanyahu’s “offer,” however, was little different from past Israeli statements: withdrawal from the 1000 square km “security zone” in south Lebanon would be conditional, despite the fact that 425 plainly called upon Israel “immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory.”1 As Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai made clear to one Arab newspaper in January 1998, the actual implementation of 425 would only come after a crackdown on terrorism, which effectively meant disarming Hezbollah; ceasing attacks against Israeli forces and their proxy, the SLA;2 establishing neighborly relations on both sides of the border; and cooperation being joined between the IDF and Lebanon on terrorism generally in the region. As Israeli scholar Daniel Sobelmen would later point out, “In effect, there was nothing fundamentally new in Mordechai’s statement.”3

> What was new about Netanyahu’s “acceptance” of 425, however, was that it highlighted the growing opposition within Israel to the IDF’s continued occupation of and control over south Lebanon. As Nasrallah would repeatedly claim, Hezbollah’s military operations, now filmed and viewed in Israel and the Occupied Territories, were having a powerful effect on public opinion and, he argued, IDF morale—in the process improving Lebanon’s bargaining position amid continued movement towards a regional settlement of the Arab–Israeli conflict. Two years later, when Israeli forces finally withdrew unconditionally, Nasrallah would claim that, despite the terrible toll in lives and property damage, the logic of violent resistance to Israel had indeed bettered Lebanon’s overall position, much as he and other Hezbollah leaders had long claimed it would.

> But Netanyahu’s move also represented a renewed attempt at promoting a “Lebanon first” approach to the Arab–Israeli conflict as a whole. The strategy shrewdly sought to remove the link between the Lebanese–Israeli and Syrian–Israeli negotiating tracks—thereby diminishing Syria’s ability to use Hezbollah and Lebanon as a bargaining chip, or a bleeding wound, in regaining the Golan Heights. Syria, of course, had little choice but to reject the proposal, but even so, “Lebanon first” placed the Syrians in a serious dilemma: by potentially accepting to disarm Hezbollah, Damascus would deprive themselves of the one military instrument they were able to exercise against Israel; by refusing to do so, they appeared to be uncompromising and, in the eyes of many in Washington, to be backing a terrorist organization.

> Perhaps more importantly, though, from the standpoint of Hezbollah, Netanyahu’s dual-track approach—acceptance of 425 on the one hand, and a “Lebanon First” push on the other—also threatened to undermine popular support for the resistance, especially among those Lebanese who saw their own immediate, national needs as far more pressing than those of Syria. Although Israel’s various conditions, as well as Syria’s grip on the country as a whole, certainly eased his task, Nasrallah’s public stance against any sort of compromise would only become more precarious in the coming two years, as Syria itself increasingly moved towards a final settlement with Israel—one presumably premised on the end of Hezbollah’s militancy.

AL-MOHARRER: Foreign political circles are putting forward suggestions of implementing Resolution 425, which states that Israel must withdraw from the occupied Lebanese south. These plans are connected to security arrangements whose implementation is requested in two stages: A: deployment of United Nations forces between Lebanon and Israel in the occupied territories, and B: disarmament of Hezbollah. The first question is: Do you believe that Israel is serious in its suggestions, or does it aim to shift attention away from its actions and arouse internal controversy in Lebanon? The second question is: What is your attitude towards this suggestion in both of its stages? In your opinion, is there any connection between the Resolution’s implementation and any Lebanese or international security arrangements? And what are the limitations of these arrangements?

HN: For years now, the Israeli enemy has felt that it is drowning in a swamp of blood in south Lebanon and the Bekaa. This has sapped its strength and dealt a blow to its political and military ego. It is now looking for a solution, which it was forced towards by two factors: the resistance, with its continuity, growth, and determination; and the steadfastness of the Lebanese people in all of its factions in the face of occupation and aggression. These two factors are forcing it to discuss a retreat that it has to seek—but it doesn’t want to withdraw without achieving political and military gains, even if they are minimal. Withdrawing without any conditions or terms is a dangerous precedent for Israel, and implies that the mythical army was defeated at the hands of the Lebanese people’s resistance. It would also set an excellent standard for the Palestinian people, as well as others. Thus (…) the Israeli enemy is looking for a way to exit this swamp that would enable it at the same time to achieve whatever gains it can achieve by pitching new formulas for its withdrawal. Of course, there is a new suggestion on the issue of the retreat. Before the resistance’s steadfastness forced it to seek the minimum, the enemy was asking for a peace treaty with Lebanon and a Lebanese commitment to normalize relations. Today it is backtracking from these two demands, not because it respects international legitimacy or human rights, but because of the attrition on the battlefield. [It] found in Resolution 425—which had been long forgotten, and which [it] remembered only 20 years after it was issued—an exit from its crisis. Because it wants to withdraw and at the same time achieve whatever gains it can, it put these terms for the implementation of the Resolution under the guise of “security arrangements”, while hiding many things behind this heading.

However, suggesting the implementation of Resolution 425 today is not just an Israeli maneuver—if we believed this explanation, then we would be ignoring the importance of the pressure applied by the resistance and the steadfastness of the Lebanese in forcing it to remember the Security Council Resolution and bring it out of oblivion 20 years after it was issued. The Israeli enemy is struggling and maneuvering at the same time. If it makes any gains at all, then it will have achieved some of its goals; if it fails, then it will have gained something else connected to improving its image in the eyes of the world. The new suggestion to implement the Resolution gives a different image than the conceited Netanyahu—who knows nothing other than refusal—wants to project. It presents him to the world in the guise of one who wants to withdraw and implement the Security Council Resolution, but is frustrated by Lebanon’s refusal to do so. It is a serious attempt and a devious plot at the same time. If he is not able to impose his terms for withdrawal, then he will at least have polished his image in front of the world.

This is the general situation as it stands. Regarding our attitude towards this suggestion—the withdrawal terms and arrangements—it is clear: we reject completely any formula that talks about security arrangements and terms. We don’t accept that the Israeli enemy should receive any rewards or gains for occupying our land. We call on the Lebanese authorities to present a complaint against the Israeli enemy, and to call for its generals to be brought to trial for their aggression, for the massacres that they committed against our people, and for the rights and freedom that they stole from them. We call upon the Lebanese authorities to explore every avenue in calling for compensations to be paid to our displaced people in the south, who are threatened and whose lands and rights are stolen. I say to everyone: there is a bare minimum of dignity and logic in the face of the occupation, which is not to present the enemy with political rewards in return for its occupation. What I am clearly calling for is an unconditional withdrawal. The enemy has to withdraw or we will keep fighting it until we force it to do so. There are those who believe that Israel’s suggestion entails only withdrawal. If this is so—and I have my reservations about Resolution 425—then let the enemy withdraw without any conditions, and it will thus achieve a common goal for us all.

AL-MOHARRER: Are you a resistance only, or are you also a political party? Is the justification for your existence and activities only the liberation of the south, or will you become part of Lebanese political life?

HN: It is beyond doubt that we are a resistance, and this has been testified to by martyrdom and blood. At the same time, we are a political, social, economic, and cultural movement. Those who know Lebanon well and who have lived inside it know this truth, and touch it. We have members in parliament, and we have political alliances with various factions and movements.4 We also have political attitudes towards all the political, economic, and social developments on the ground.

AL-MOHARRER: Do you consider yourselves a Lebanese party or an Islamic party, in the sense that your activities and goals transcend the borders of Lebanon?

HN: We are an Islamic party because we follow an Islamic ideology. What takes place on the Islamic and Arabic scenes concerns us, because we are part of this world. In this sense, we are an Islamic party. But we are also a Lebanese party regarding our organizational structure. The members of our party are Lebanese, and Lebanon is the home in which we live and for which we fight. Here we must present a clarification: we are a non-sectarian Islamic party, and we are a Lebanese party that is not isolated within the borders of this country.

AL-MOHARRER: What is the nature of your relationship, as a resistance and as a political party, with Iran? Is it an organizational relationship or just a general relationship that stems from your being an Islamic party? Is their any relationship between yourselves and any Islamic organization outside Lebanon?

HN: Our relationship with Iran is not organizational in the usual sense. Iran is an Islamic state that believes in Islam and works to implement it. We as an Islamic movement respect any regime that endorses Islam and the struggle with the Israeli enemy, which is our central cause. We in Lebanon live this struggle, and we fight against the occupation. Thus we see in Iran both the state ruled by Islam and the state that supports the Muslims, Arabs, and Palestinians. However, in our relationship with Iran we make a distinction between two positions: that of the regime and that of the religious reference. Our relationship with the regime is one of cooperation, as we have many friends among its cadres and we communicate with them. But the regime doesn’t constitute for us a political and religious reference. Here we are a totally independent movement from the political regime in Iran.

There is another position in Iran, which is that of the religious authority whose high rank and influence provide religiously founded legitimacy to our struggle. Regarding the relationship with other Islamic organizations and movements, we have relationships and agreements with some of them. There is, for example, a relationship with the Islamic movements in Palestine—Hamas and Islamic Jihad—and with the National Islamic Front in Sudan. We also have acquaintance with Islamic movements in Afghanistan. But because of the nature of our arena and the struggle, these relationships are not developed to the level of coordination and alliance. We can certainly say that we share common concerns and empathize with each other.

AL-MOHARRER: If the south was liberated through your own efforts or through external pressure, or both, would you set aside your weapons? [In other words,] when will you set aside your weapons, and what are the subjective conditions for this? Are they Lebanese, Arab or Islamic?

HN: The answer to this question is linked to the whole issue [of] the future of the armed resistance after the Israeli withdrawal, and whether it will continue its operations or not—that is to say, whether or not it will give up its weapons. This is linked to the situation beyond an Israeli withdrawal, and we prefer to talk about it after the withdrawal, not before, for the simple reason that we don’t want to link the withdrawal to this issue or vice versa, so that it won’t become a condition for withdrawal.

AL-MOHARRER: Many of your enemies consider you the dark horse in any project for peace. Do you believe that this is due to the fact that you are an armed party, or to your strategic relationship with Syria?

HN: Both.

AL-MOHARRER: Do you link your patriotic attitude towards liberating south Lebanon to the liberation of the Golan Heights? In other words, are you part of the national Lebanese struggle, or part of a more comprehensive struggle against the Israeli project in the region?

HN: There is a common misunderstanding [here]. Some believe that the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon rejects a withdrawal from the occupied Lebanese south unless it coincides with a withdrawal from the occupied Syrian Golan Heights. This is incorrect. If Israel withdraws tomorrow from Lebanon, do we tell it, you must not do so unless it coincides with a withdrawal from the Golan? Never. President al-Assad has always made it clear that Syria would be very pleased with an Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon. You have of course heard the latest statements issued by the Syrian foreign minister, Farouk al Sharra, where he said that when Israel withdraws from Lebanon, we will organize celebrations, along with Lebanon and Hezbollah.

But there is something that needs clarification. The resistance here is fighting to liberate Lebanese lands. The rest—whether Golan or elsewhere—is part of the hidden file of which we spoke earlier. It is a fact that what is taking place in Golan is occupation, and we believe that its liberation is part of a whole. For us, all of Palestine is occupied territory, and Israel is an illegitimate and illegal occupying and thieving state that enjoys some strength. We must all cooperate today to prevent this thief from taking over all of our region, from placing its hand over all of its resources and holy shrines, and from erasing both its past and its future.

There remains one point: Will the Islamic Resistance fight to liberate Golan or Palestine? We will withhold the answer to this question until a future date, because we don’t like to give a commitment, whether positive or negative, on which Israel will base an attitude.

AL-MOHARRER: Is your attitude towards Israel the same as towards Jews and Judaism, or is it restricted to Israeli aggression or to Israel’s aggressive existence in the first place?

HN: Most assuredly our attitude towards Israel is not an attitude towards Jews or Judaism. Since the West doesn’t want to understand that Hezbollah is anything other than an exact copy of Iran, let us consider Iran’s attitude towards the Jews. They enjoy there all their political, social, and economic rights, for they are citizens, and have representatives in the legislative authority.5 Thus our war is not against Judaism or Jews but against Zionism, which created its racial state in Israel.

Let us [be clear] that Islamic intellectualism and religion have throughout Islamic history never laid the foundation for a hostile attitude against Judaism and Jews. The war between ourselves and Israel is a war against Zionism and its plans, and not against Judaism as a religion or against those who believe in that religion.