## 2

## SHIITE RECONCILIATION

February 3, 1989

> For at least two years, Hezbollah and Amal had been engaged in intermittent conflict across south Lebanon and the suburbs of Beirut. Nasrallah, as a military commander, was involved in a number of early battles, but soon left to pursue further religious study in Qom, Iran.1 By the end of 1988, however, the fighting between the two Shiite parties had intensified, and he returned home to Beirut to reassume his field command. The interview below, published in the pan-Arab newspaper Al-Wahda Al-Islamiya was conducted shortly after Syria and Iran had brokered a four-way ceasefire, known as the Tehran–Damascus Agreement, which, at its second attempt in November 1990, would largely bring intra-Shiite party violence to an end in Lebanon. The development was particularly welcomed by Iran, where a weakened Ayatollah Khomeini (who would die in June 1989) and his more pragmatic potential successor, Hashemi Rafsanjani, were said to have been increasingly disturbed by the Shiite-on-Shiite killing in Lebanon. But it was Damascus that was ultimately most pleased by the Agreement: Syria’s chief ally in Lebanon, Amal, would no longer be directly challenged by Hezbollah’s guns, while Hafez al-Assad’s supremacy over the situation on the ground in Beirut and in the south was recognized and effectively expanded.2

> For Hezbollah, which had fought the Syrian army as well as Amal at certain points during the civil war, the agreement brought official recognition from both. This meant, more importantly, that the ultimate conflict with Israel could now be the focus of its growing capacities. “Allow us to pursue the path of resistance,” Nasrallah tells his interviewer, “and we will not compete with you over anything.”

AL-WAHDA: Can you describe for us the atmosphere of the Damascus negotiations that preceded the conclusion of the recent final Agreement?

HN: The final Agreement concluded by our brethren in Damascus is the result of a two-stage negotiating process. The first stage ended with the trip of Dr. Wilayati to Tehran3 and the announcement of a preliminary agreement on a ceasefire, on putting an end to adverse publicity campaigns, and on pursuing negotiations towards reaching a comprehensive political agreement. The second phase started in the wake of Dr. Wilayati’s return, and lasted until a solution was reached. Bilateral and trilateral meetings were held during this phase, as well as a final quadripartite meeting during which an agreement was signed. After each side presented its own vision of an eventual solution, and each of these visions was discussed at tripartite meetings, continuous and diligent efforts led to an agreement between the two parties, and a Draft Agreement was penned, approved, and then signed by both sides.

AL-WAHDA: Who prepared this Draft?

HN: The referees, Iran and Syria, wrote the provisions of the Agreement.

AL-WAHDA: How?

HN: Based upon the points discussed at the meetings.

AL-WAHDA: Now that this final Agreement has been signed, can we consider this war to be over?

HN: We hope so; from the very beginning, we were of the opinion that only a comprehensive political solution could bring this war to an end, and saw the limited security agreements as nothing but anesthetics to dull the pain. During our meetings with various parties, we were careful to push matters in the direction of a comprehensive solution, and this is what happened with God Almighty’s help. With this Agreement, we can now say that steps towards the putting in place of real solutions have started, and that everything now depends on how seriously they will be implemented. Based on the climate that prevailed at the talks, we believe that intentions are indeed serious, and that the Iranian–Syrian sponsorship of the Agreement is intent on seeing that all the Agreement’s provisions are implemented on the ground, and all obstacles in its path are removed.

AL-WAHDA: What will ensure that this happens?

HN: The next phase of this Agreement provides for the formation of a committee named the Central Coordination Committee, which will comprise two representatives from Hezbollah and two from the Amal Movement. The Committee, which should start its work within 24 hours, is charged with discussing the details and implementing the Agreement within a specific framework.

AL-WAHDA: Is this Committee similar to the Joint Security Committee formed by Hezbollah, Amal, and the Syrians, or is it different?

HN: No, the Committee is at the leadership level, and representatives from both parties who will sit on it have already been designated. If things go as seriously as they are supposed to, we should have entered a phase in which the wound can be healed and everyone can return to the right path. In any case, the mere fact that the bloodshed shall cease is a great achievement for Islam and Shiism in Lebanon; we can now be very optimistic about the future.

AL-WAHDA: You said that the Agreement was concluded under the auspices of the Islamic Republic and Syria; some, however, say that other such agreements were concluded in the past, but failed because they were never implemented. Will this Agreement’s fate be similar to those that preceded it?

HN: A comprehensive political agreement was never concluded between Iran and Syria in the past regarding the Shia situation.

AL-WAHDA: The agreement concluded under the auspices of Mohtashemi after the [1982 Israeli] invasion…4

Nasrallah [interrupting]: The agreement that was concluded in Syria in the presence of Mohtashemi was under Iranian, not Iranian–Syrian, auspices, and left some unresolved issues; had they been resolved, a solution to the problem would have been guaranteed. What we have now is the first political agreement ever concluded under the auspices of the Islamic Republic, and what took place after the incident in the southern suburbs was simply a security arrangement meant to deal with a number of security-related matters. This Agreement is not only about security.

AL-WAHDA: Could we consider this Agreement as a continuation of the one that was concluded earlier in Damascus?

HN: Some of this Agreement’s provisions are different, because the previous agreement did not include guarantees; this one is an Iranian–Syrian Agreement.

AL-WAHDA: Some say that Syria had participated in a number of agreements that ended in failure in the past, and are betting on the failure of this one too (…)

HN: During the negotiations, the intentions of the Iranians and Syrians suggested that they both had a debt of blood to pay;5 this serious intent is reason enough for optimism. In any case, there is a lot of hope that this Agreement will be implemented, and the guarantees that were given are ones that we respect and appreciate.

AL-WAHDA: The Preliminary Agreement quickly failed,6 and today the people are afraid that this Agreement might meet with the same fate. What guarantees are there to ensure that it will be implemented, and are you at ease with them?

HN: As we said before, the Preliminary Agreement was not implemented in full because it was a security agreement and not part of a comprehensive political agreement; this made it vulnerable to failure. The Preliminary Agreement also did not have a sponsor or a guarantor for the implementation of its provisions. Now, if a problem arises during implementation, the concerned committee will intervene to repair the damage; and if one party or the other drags its feet or causes intentional harm to the Agreement, the committee would ensure that it is being properly implemented. These matters were specified both at the moment of signature and after it.

AL-WAHDA: On the ground?7

HN: Yes. This means that there is a reference authority which the parties can resort to, and this authority will attend to the problem. This is a good omen and a factor that could speed up the implementation process.

AL-WAHDA: Who is this reference authority?

HN: The Quadripartite Committee of leaders, and the body responsible for solving any problem that might arise.

AL-WAHDA: Is it under the leadership of Hezbollah and the Amal Movement?

HN: It is under Iranian–Syrian sponsorship. Representatives from Amal, Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria have formed a Quadripartite Committee; there are also Subsidiary Committees for Beirut, a Coordination Committee, and another Coordination Committee for the south.

AL-WAHDA: What is the role of the Central Committee, then?

HN: It is in charge of discussing the details.

AL-WAHDA: And it has subsidiary committees in various regions?

A: Yes. The Coordination Committee meets and decides on the modes of implementation; it could also form subsidiary committees.

AL-WAHDA: And if a problem arises?

HN: They resort to the Quadripartite Committee.

AL-WAHDA: There is one question we would like you to answer frankly: Do you in Hezbollah see this Agreement as something you wanted and aspired to?

HN [laughing]: Based upon a general evaluation of the Agreement, we estimate that it is a genuine political achievement because it safeguards, first and foremost, the Islamic Resistance. In all our previous statements we have said, and reconfirm [here], that we do not seek power and do not wish to compete with anyone over state positions; our political movement is based on the premise of fighting Israel. Our only concern and interest is to safeguard the core—that is to say, the Islamic Resistance—and we have given many martyrs for this purpose. We suffered many wounded, went through a lot of pain, endured all these difficult situations, and found that there is no harm in agreeing to a number of security measures in order to safeguard what is most important to us, namely the Islamic Resistance and its freedom of operation. That is why the most important provision in the Agreement is the one that regulates the moves of the resistance from a joint operations room. For us, safeguarding the Islamic Resistance is what really matters.

AL-WAHDA: This is, of course, if it is implemented?

HN: Of course. We are currently evaluating the Agreement, and believe that the provisions that cover security matters will help keep the situation on the ground under control. We said: “Allow us to pursue the path of resistance and we will not compete with you over anything.” The first positive aspect of this Agreement is the preservation of the Islamic Resistance and the escalation of the fight against Israel, whether jointly or separately. The implementation of this Agreement also means that bloodshed will cease—and this, in itself, is an objective very dear to our and our society’s heart. We estimated that what was taking place was going to weaken the resistance and destroy Shia society; this Agreement will safeguard the resistance and, by extension, Shia society. If we achieve nothing but these two positive aspects, we will consider ourselves as having achieved a great deal.

AL-WAHDA: Are there winners and losers in this Agreement?

HN: I think the Agreement was very fair to both sides.

AL-WAHDA: Some say that the Agreement is a political and military endorsement of Hezbollah at the expense of Amal, and Sayyed Mohammad Hussein8 said that the winner in this battle is actually a loser (…)

HN: It would be wrong to say that the Agreement endorsed the political and military survival of Hezbollah at the expense of Amal. It actually endorsed the political and military survival of both sides, and placed controls to bolster the situation on the ground from the political and security points of view. The main winner is the resistance against Israel; and by “resistance” I mean both sides, which makes it a victory for us all. Such controls are mentioned in both the addenda and the details regarding the relationship between Amal and Hezbollah on the ground in the south. This is designed to keep responsibility for security as meaning for security’s sake only, and not for transforming security into an authority.

AL-WAHDA: We need a definitive answer from you to one specific question: Are Hezbollah’s mujahidin and weapons returning to the south, and will the situation really revert back to what it was prior to April 5?9

HN: Based on the Agreement’s provisions, given the guarantees given to us, and the seriousness with which implementation is proceeding, this is what should take place. But to say that this is definite, only God knows that for sure.

AL-WAHDA: If Hezbollah does indeed return to the south, do you, in light of Lubrani’s threats, expect Israel to interfere in order to confound the new-found situation?10

HN: Many [enemies] have been harmed by this Agreement: America, Israel, Israel’s friends in East Beirut, the Iraqi Baath Party, and many others could interfere,11 using all means at their disposal, to thwart the Agreement and impede its implementation. They will use all their power to infiltrate the Islamic and Shia scenes in order to foil the Accord. These parties could rest easy as long as the [civil] war continued, because they knew that it was bound to weaken the resistance and, by extension, the majority of Lebanon’s Muslims. The latter would have scattered and made it easier for others to implement their own plans without any deterrence or opposition. These people were [therefore] very upset by the Accord, because it puts the gun back where it belongs, and will protect this steadfast society; this Agreement could also lead to them actually carrying out some of their threats. In fact, if the south was really strengthened and kept far from a seditious atmosphere, it would be strong enough to confront Israel’s threats. It would also be an honor for the south and the Shia there to see their sons martyred in a confrontation with Israel, rather than with Amal.

AL-WAHDA: You mean that an Israeli intervention is bound to have positive results?

HN: In fact, any intervention on Israel’s part would lead to an escalation in the confrontation and to the forging of even closer ranks.12 We believe that a genuine resistance will incapacitate Israel in the face of its unity, loyalty, and spirit of sacrifice in defense of its land, and the integrity and dignity of its people. This in itself would produce positive results. Over the past few months, Israel has sat there watching and feeling safe in its positions; now, however, it is issuing threats because it wants young Shia men to be killed in Lebanon. All Shiites should wake up to these threats and be ready to confront the original enemy, Israel, as well as overcome all obstacles and grudges, on account of the threat facing the south and the Muslims.

AL-WAHDA: Do you foresee, on your part, an escalation in the number of operations?

HN: If the Agreement is implemented, the mujahidin’s main task in Lebanon would be to bring the resistance back to its original focus, its central issues and sophisticated operations. I also believe that the fight against Israel is the real arena, and the gateway through which everybody can express their pent-up hatred and pain as a result of the [civil] war that was taking place.

AL-WAHDA: People wonder why the Agreement took so long in coming—was it not possible to avoid all these deaths? And how has the Shia community been affected by all [that] has happened?

HN: From the outset, we insisted on reconciliation [between the Shia groups], and our political program called for reconciliation; it was never among our plans to negate the other, but rather to reach an understanding with him. We were and still are ready for any kind of coordination, if not complementarity, and have tried hard, and continuously, to arrive at a comprehensive political agreement. As to why this did not happen earlier, this question should be put to the other side.

AL-WAHDA: But who takes responsibility for all that has happened? Is Hezbollah totally innocent of everything that has taken place?

HN: This war was imposed on us; we ran away from it to the south, it moved to Beirut’s southern suburbs;13 we tried to solve it politically, and were left with only the option of self-defense; so we kept this option open and sought reconciliation. We tried our very best to achieve reconciliation, and God was generous to the Shia Muslims by granting them this Accord, even if it has taken some time.

AL-WAHDA: There were previously some stumbling blocks that prevented a solution, and during the celebration in Bourj al-Barajneh Refugee Camp you said that there were three such stumbling blocks: handing over the accused, the security of southern Lebanon, and the resistance. What was it that did away with them?

HN: Continuous negotiations and the insistence on reaching an agreement have contributed a great deal to removing these stumbling blocks; the fact that we were all able to remove them completely is a positive sign and reason for optimism.

AL-WAHDA: It was noticed that the issue of handing over the accused does not figure in the Agreement, although it was the main stumbling block on the path towards a solution. How was this issue resolved?

HN: Within the context of the tripartite meetings that dealt with these issues and proposals. We agreed that the three individuals accused of killing Amal officials and assassinating the martyr Sheikh Ali Kareem should be handed over to the Syrian Arab army; and this is what actually happened.

AL-WAHDA: But isn’t this tantamount to an admission of responsibility by Hezbollah for the killing of the three Amal leaders?

HN: We agreed to hand them over based on the accusations against them, and accepted to hold an investigation. We did not act based on a predetermination that these individuals were “killers”; we refused to hand them over in the past for precisely this reason.

AL-WAHDA: What do you mean by there are names…?

HN: Names [of the killers] were put forward, yes.

AL-WAHDA: By whom? Amal?

HN: We also put names forward, and the issue will be pursued in detail.

AL-WAHDA: And how will the outcome be presented?

HN: The file will be given to those concerned.

AL-WAHDA: What is the outcome of the investigation into the accused?

HN: We accepted that the handover take place, based on the accusations, in order to help the Shia out of the crisis, as part and parcel of the Agreement to end problems among the Shiites. We have no problem with this, and I wish to confirm that we agreed to do so based only on the accusations. The matter is therefore now subject to an investigation.

AL-WAHDA: One of the Agreement’s provisions is not entirely clear: namely the security of the south and the joint operations room. Does it concern only Hezbollah, or others as well?

HN: As a matter of principle, everything that concerns the security of the south applies to everyone.

AL-WAHDA: And security?

HN: Security is Amal’s responsibility. As to the movements of political parties, this matter is left up to Amal and is governed by a different set of principles; Amal is bound by this.

AL-WAHDA: Bound by it? Why isn’t Hezbollah also bound by it, for example?

HN: This provision is binding on both sides; Amal does not have the right to conclude agreements that would take the situation back to what it was prior to 1982.14

AL-WAHDA: Does this refer to the last agreement concluded between Amal and the Palestinians?15

HN: Every agreement should be considered separately. This provision is based on the consideration that security is the responsibility of Amal, but this does not mean that the situation can go back to what it was prior to 1982.

AL-WAHDA: What applies to Hezbollah applies to all the others?

HN: This Agreement is between Amal and Hezbollah, and the issue of other parties is not included because it concerns only Amal and Hezbollah. Other agreements may or may not involve other parties.

AL-WAHDA: What is meant by a “joint operations room”? Will it be under the leadership of Amal, Hezbollah or someone else?

HN: Nothing in the text of the Agreement specifies whether the operations room will be under Amal’s or Hezbollah’s leadership; representatives from both sides are working together.

AL-WAHDA: Should individual operations be dependent upon decisions from the joint operations room?

HN: According to the text, each side has the right to carry out individual operations.

AL-WAHDA: Does provision number 4 regarding the security of the south have anything to do with military activities?

HN: The military activities that are mentioned in the Agreement have to do with the resistance, and issues such as these will be discussed within the context of the Coordination Committee. What is required is an area of operations, and the means by which the mujahidin can access it; all these details will be specified by the Committee.

AL-WAHDA: It will specify the zones [of military operation]?

HN: The military front is open all along the borderline.

AL-WAHDA: For everyone?

HN: This Agreement concerns Hezbollah and Amal, and calls for total freedom of movement for the mujahidin along the line adjacent to the border zone [with Israel]; it is all an area of operations.

AL-WAHDA: The zone specified is all along the borderline?

HN: No—it is not specified, but includes the entire occupied zone stretching from Lwaiza to Naqoura.16

AL-WAHDA: Provision number 5 calls for the return of the situation to what it was prior to April 5. What does prior to April 5 mean?

HN: The return of the scholars, the exiles, and the mujahidin (…) the return of cultural activities and prayer halls; all these are considered cultural, political, and media activities. Everything that is incompatible with the security of the south will be delineated by the Coordination Committee.

AL-WAHDA: Would the freedom of political and cultural activities depend on the approval of the Central Committee?

HN: No—and the provision relevant to political and cultural activities is clear on that.

AL-WAHDA: Is there a guarantee against returning once again to a situation where demonstrations are fired upon, for example?

HN: This is part of the Agreement. Upholding these guarantees, coupled with serious follow-up [on any issues that should arise], is among the responsibilities of the Quadripartite Committee; this Committee is also responsible for repairing any damage17 that could lead to a lack of serious implementation.

AL-WAHDA: There is talk about the Lebanese army deploying in the South?

HN: This does not contradict the provisions of the Agreement; we have no problem with an army ready to fight Israel.

AL-WAHDA: How true are rumors circulated by the Lebanese News Agency, to the effect that the southern suburbs are to be considered a part of Beirut, regardless of whether the Syrians assume control over the city’s boundaries or relinquish their posts?18

HN: A security agreement relevant to the status of the southern suburbs, and signed within the context of the Quadripartite Committee, will be implemented once again.

AL-WAHDA: What is this agreement?

HN: It specifies the number of offices and divides the southern suburbs into two security zones. One security zone would be under the control of the Syrians and the Lebanese internal security forces, with each side allowed a specific number of non-military offices; the second security zone would run along the line of contact where both sides are present,19 and will also be subject to a specific set of rules.

AL-WAHDA: How?

HN: Before the situation deteriorated, the Quadripartite Committee had already started to meet, and at the last such meeting it looked into ways of delineating which zones should fall under Amal’s control, and which should fall under Hezbollah’s. This exercise did not achieve its objectives at the time, and should now be restarted.

AL-WAHDA: […] How do you categorize the martyrs who fell in that battle?

HN: Had it not been for these martyrs, our presence would not have been safeguarded and this Agreement, which protects the resistance, would not have been possible. We named these martyrs “martyrs for the defense of the Islamic Resistance,” because without them we would not have concluded a comprehensive agreement such as this one.

AL-WAHDA: If regional circumstances change, could this Accord be violated or annulled even by Syria and Iran?

HN: What is now required is for this Accord to be implemented; if circumstances change, they should be dealt with in a manner that safeguards the Shia community and the resistance.

AL-WAHDA: And if, God forbid, this Accord is not implemented?

HN: If it is not implemented we might go back to the climate of [civil] war that prevailed in the past, and chances for a solution would become minimal. I believe that the Muslims and the Shia have here a historic opportunity that should not be wasted. The Shia, the Shia constituency, their leaders and institutions should view this as a historic opportunity capable of extricating the Shia Muslims from the most dangerous predicament in their history.

AL-WAHDA: How does Hezbollah view the next phase that will follow the Agreement?

HN: We are optimistic. In the future, the return of the Islamist scene, and in particular the Shia scene, will undoubtedly create a very positive atmosphere throughout Lebanon, and foil numerous attempts at preserving privileges and executing schemes at the Muslims’ expense.20 There is talk in political circles about explosions, but so far it is only talk; it is also true that there are signs it could happen again, but this is not the first time that people have talked about explosions. The future is one of war [against Israel], not settlement; the line that Arafat is pursuing will only lead him to a closed door,21 and the day will come when warfare and the elimination of Israel will be the only options.

Based on these facts, the region is not proceeding towards a settlement, due to the fact that the problem is not in toppling leaderships [opposed to Israel’s existence]; rather, it is Israel’s hegemony, obstinacy, and historic unlimited cupidity. This is where Imam al-Khomeini’s words ring most true, namely that “Jerusalem and Palestine will not be regained with political games but with guns.” We believe that gambling on a settlement with Israel would never bring integrity and dignity to the Muslims; the only option open to everyone is that of resistance.