## 16

## THE SECOND INTIFADA

October 5, 2000

> Nasrallah’s interview with the Kuwaiti daily newspaper Al-Rai Al-Aam came less than a week after the start of what would fast become known as the Second Intifada. Expressing his wholehearted solidarity with the Palestinians, Nasrallah also provided a hint of what was to come five days later—the spectacular abduction of three Israeli soldiers (who had in fact died during the operation) in the disputed Shebaa Farms, after several months of relative calm along the border following Israel’s withdrawal from south Lebanon. “Some Arab rulers,” he says, “have placed before us two possible options: either war or normalization with and submission to the enemy. We are saying, on the other hand, that we have more than two options available to us; there are many others to choose from, besides war with the enemy.” Ten days later, Nasrallah would further assert Hezbollah’s use of carefully planned, asymmetrical operations, designed to apply a moderate and relatively calculable level of pressure on Israel, by the kidnapping of retired Israeli Colonel Elhanan Tannenbaum from the city of Dubai.1

> Both moves, however, came just before Barak and Arafat were set to hold a high-profile summit in Egypt with US President Bill Clinton, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and King Abdullah II of Jordan. Accordingly, the two abductions were cited by Hezbollah’s opponents both in the region and in the US as yet a further example of the party’s main—some argued patently non- or even anti-Lebanese—goal of consistently seeking to disrupt the soon-to-be-moribund Israeli–Palestinian peace process. The operations also came in the wake of the Lebanese Maronite Catholic Church’s official call for the withdrawal of the tens of thousands of Syrian troops still effectively occupying Lebanon, and so may have been additionally designed as a domestic assertion of power by a party that had become Syria’s most powerful military ally, and potential negotiating card, in Lebanon. Either way, the “bleeding wounds,” as they would come to be described, of Lebanese prisoners in Israeli detention, the continued occupation (it was argued) of Shebaa Farms, and other Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty, were positioned at the forefront of Nasrallah’s rhetoric—a reflection of the fact that an important segment of the Lebanese public continued to believe that violent operations against Israel were legitimate and, perhaps more than this, strategically necessary even though the UN had certified the Israeli withdrawal.

AL-RAI AL-AAM: The confrontation in the occupied Palestinian territories has resulted in over 50 martyrs, and 1,000 injured, and looks more like a real war. What does it mean for you? Is it an attempt [by Israel] to tame the Palestinians by fire, and submit them to the conditions of the settlement, or a bloody requiem for this settlement?

HN: What is taking place in occupied Palestine today is, to say the least, a real and large-scale intifada, and bloody confrontations are taking place with whatever means the dispossessed Palestinian people have at their disposal.2 As to what the outcome would mean, and how each side factors in the consequences, there is of course a difference between the two sides. On the Israeli side, you could say that they are trying to tame the Palestinian people by fire, since they want Palestinians to submit to their dictates. The Palestinians are forbidden to protest, or even demonstrate, against Ariel Sharon’s violation of their most sacred shrines, or the outcome of the Israeli–Palestinian negotiations, and Israel only knows how to oppress and tame.3

On the Palestinian side, they are trying, I believe, to take advantage of popular anger, past and present confrontations, and the challenge that the Palestinian people have thrown to the Israelis on the negotiating table. These Palestinian young men of 16, 17 and 18 years of age, who have gone onto the streets and who are probably not affiliated to any organization or party, or trained and directed by anyone, are the true expression of the Palestinian people’s feelings. In my opinion, the Palestinians are currently at a very sensitive stage as far as their future is concerned, due to two important developments: the first is the way the negotiations are proceeding, and particularly the fact that they have not even secured their minimum requirements. Prisoners are still in jail, the Palestinian state is not yet established, refugees are still living in exile, Jerusalem is lost or about to be, there is no light at the end of the tunnel—and, if anything, the recent talks at Camp David have reconfirmed these facts. The best that these negotiations can achieve is a Palestinian state that lacks sovereignty, has no army, borders Israel on all sides, [has] its economy under total Israeli control, lives on foreign assistance, and is made up of several strips of non-contiguous territory.4 Jerusalem will be lost, and neither the West Bank nor the Gaza Strip will be totally under Palestinian control, which only means more desperation.

The second development is the flip-side of the first. The victory achieved by Lebanon has given the Palestinians hope that their resistance will eventually succeed in expelling the Zionists from of the Gaza Strip, so that it becomes completely ours, and allowing us to force Israel out of the West Bank and East Jerusalem—the minimum conditions on which all Palestinians agree. However, while some Palestinians say that Palestine extends from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River, others believe that it consists only of the territories occupied in 1967. The Palestinian people have tried the intifada option in the past,5 and found that they could impose their will on the world; today they are attempting to do just that.

In the final analysis, I believe that each party has its own calculations and objectives, and that regardless of whether or not Israel succeeds in curbing the intifada, the fact that it exists at all, coupled with the events of the past few days and current incidents on the ground, is very significant and important. It sends a very clear message to all concerned, and has the potential to affect the whole situation in Palestine.

AL-RAI AL-AAM: The agreed ceasefire has not held, and American–Israeli–Palestinian contacts took place a few days ago in Paris. What can we expect from these contacts, and will we see a truce that allows an intermittent war to continue?

HN: We have seen this kind of warfare before during the so-called intifada of the Holy Sanctuary Tunnel, when the Israelis tried to dig a tunnel under the Sanctuary and provoked an angry response by the Palestinians. The ensuing confrontations led to the martyrdom of many Palestinians, and the wounding of several others, before the situation was contained through security arrangements and the like.

No doubt the American administration will do its utmost, seeking the help of various international parties and of Arabs capable of exerting the required amount of pressure on the Palestinians, to put an end to the intifada. They believe that its consequences would be very dangerous for the Israeli–American settlement plan, which they hope to impose on the Palestinians.

On the other hand, the options available to Arafat are clear, and he obviously wants to improve his negotiating position. But we also have to watch his current state of mind, because this level of confrontation can have a negative impact on the negotiators, and on those who are willing to offer further concessions. I do not know how he will calculate, what the talks in Paris will amount to, or whether they will succeed in calming down the [Palestinian] street and containing the situation. What I do believe, however, is that things will be more complicated than before.

AL-RAI AL-AAM: Can we say that the intifada, in its present state, started where the Lebanese victory left off?

HN: I always thought that an intifada would break out right after the victory in south Lebanon, as both a reaction to it and a consequence of it, and that this victory will change the rules of the conflict. But very intense efforts were at the time underway to prevent the intifada from breaking out, as demonstrated by the American call to hold talks at Camp David. These talks went on for months behind closed doors, and witnessed relentless efforts to reach an agreement of sorts, as if they were telling the Palestinians, “Wait a while longer—the negotiations will produce some sort of result.”

The hurry to hold the Camp David talks, out of the blue and without prior preparation, was due to Lebanon’s victory and to the fear that a large-scale intifada would break out in Palestine. But the talks produced no final agreement, and a number of issues remained unresolved—not because Arafat did not offer enough concessions, but because the Israelis have a bottom line beyond which they are not willing to go. They tried to improve Arafat’s image as much as they could, and introduce him as the “steadfast hero” who defends the interests of the people of Palestine, but in vain. For it was later revealed, and confirmed a few days ago at the press conference held by Presidents Hosni Mubarak and Bashar al-Assad,6 that Arafat had agreed to cede East Jerusalem’s Jewish Quarter and al-Buraq Wall to Israel, and that the latter had rejected the offer because it wanted more.

This means that the person they were trying to portray as a hero had clearly ceded parts of East Jerusalem that were occupied in 1967, after already having ceded West Jerusalem at Oslo.7 In spite of all this, there was no final agreement because Israel wanted certain things that even Arafat could not afford to give, or even contemplate giving; this is why the intifada broke out.

Sharon’s visit to the Holy Sanctuary is responsible for igniting the fire that had been smoldering under the surface for several months; in this sense, the intifada is the result of the victory achieved in Lebanon, for it feeds on its spirit and draws inspiration from it. Even if the Paris talks had succeeded in calming the situation down, it would have been just a temporary truce before the ultimate explosion. This is exactly what had happened in the first intifada, which was not a series of ongoing daily incidents, but rather a swell of activities that continually ebbed and flowed.

AL-RAI AL-AAM: President Mubarak’s words gave the impression that the division of Jerusalem was acceptable. Does President Assad’s silence indicate an implicit acceptance?

HN: Egypt’s position is not surprising for, as we all know, Arafat coordinates his position with Egypt’s. As to the Syrians, I do not think there is any change in their position. Their position regarding Jerusalem, and Arafat’s policies in general, is clear, and I do not think that Mubarak’s words, in Assad’s presence, indicate a new shift in Syria’s position.

AL-RAI AL-AAM: Calls for an Arab summit meeting to discuss developments in the occupied territories are multiplying. Do you believe that any such summit can extricate itself from the settlement framework, and what do you expect to come out of it?

HN: Any Arab summit held now would inevitably be confined to the settlement’s framework, and would only seek to improve the Arab negotiating position. At the same time, any Arab gathering, or coordination, is always beneficial.

AL-RAI AL-AAM: Hezbollah has called on Arab countries that have relations with Israel to sever them. Do you think the current political climate would allow such a thing to happen?

HN: This is a sort of confrontation. Some Arab rulers have placed before us two possible options: either war, or normalization with and submission to the enemy. We are saying, on the other hand, that we have more than two options available to us; there are many others to choose from, besides war with the enemy.

As we see on our television screens, Palestinians are today being killed in cold blood, and condemnation, pleas, appeals, and rejection by Arab countries are not enough. All these words have no value in the political world, especially with regard to an enemy that has become addicted to massacres that elicit nothing but Arab condemnation. Arab badmouthing has no value, either, as far as Israel is concerned; what is required right now is for the Arabs to bring pressure to bear on Israel. Those who do not want to go to war against it could at least freeze their relations and cease normalization. When Israel realizes that killing Palestinians would ruin its relations with the Arab countries and bring all their efforts at normalization to an end, it will have no choice but to reconsider its policies.

AL-RAI AL-AAM: How will Hezbollah respond to the Palestinian intifada, and what will be the nature and extent of its assistance to it?

HN: We are committed, in principle, to supporting this intifada and standing side by side with the Palestinian people; but we would rather not talk about the quality and quantity of our assistance to them. One of the best ways we can lend our support to the intifada is by not mentioning how we ought to conduct it.

We have a moral, humanitarian, religious, patriotic, and national duty towards this people, and believe that it is our collective duty to stand by its side; but each one of us should determine the nature and size of his assistance to the intifada, according to his abilities, circumstances, and position.

AL-RAI AL-AAM: Do you think that the situation in south Lebanon will affect what is going on in the occupied Palestinian territories? Is the situation under control, especially in view of the ongoing tensions along the Blue Line8 and the threats by Palestinian officials in Lebanon to “bring on a flood” to save Palestine?

HN: I cannot claim that the situation in south Lebanon is completely under control, and no one in Lebanon can guard the Israeli entity’s borders. The resistance and Lebanese army are the guardians of Lebanon, not Israel.

The situation in the south is open to various possibilities, depending on how the situation will pan out in the next few days and weeks. Until now nothing has happened, though the Israelis are violating Lebanon’s sovereignty by flying their reconnaissance planes and helicopters along the Lebanese coast between Tyre and Naqoura. These violations are tantamount to an attack on Lebanon, and the Lebanese therefore have the right to mount a resistance and defend their country and their sovereignty.

No one can definitely predict how the situation will develop in the south over the next phase—especially if the situation in the Palestinian territories takes a new turn and the Israeli enemy overreaches in its violation of Lebanon’s sovereignty, and resorts to provocative measures.

AL-RAI AL-AAM: How do you explain Israel’s reference to the existence of a Hezbollah infrastructure in the occupied Palestinian territories, and to preparations underway to target Israeli interests around the world? Is it a sign of other things to come?

HN: After liberation, I said to the Lebanese people, in particular, do not believe that our problems with Israel are over; Israel will try to wreak revenge on the Lebanese because they have defeated it, and will try to blame Lebanon and its people for everything that will happen. Some say that we should allay Israel’s fears, but we tell them that nothing can allay Israel’s fears, even if we send the army to the south and remove all the weapons of the resistance; it would still not be enough. The Lebanese have to become spies, inside Palestine, to protect Israel and its interests in the world against any military action; and if it fails to do that, Israel wants to be able to pin the blame on [the Lebanese].

What the Israelis are doing is a part not of their usual scare tactics, but of their preparations to wreak revenge on Lebanon the moment any military activity occurs. If one day an Arab or a Muslim, anywhere in the world, fires a shot at an Israeli embassy in reaction to what he sees happening on television or in the occupied territories, Hezbollah would be blamed—just as Ehud Barak and Shaul Mofaz have said. This is illogical and unacceptable.9

Israeli declarations are among our main indicators, as far as keeping Lebanon and the resistance on the alert is concerned—when the Israelis decide to attack Lebanon, they will not have a shortage of excuses and pretexts.

AL-RAI AL-AAM: You said in an indirect response to the patriarchs’ call for the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon10 that Syria is the only guarantor of civil calm in the country. The Maronite patriarch, Cardinal Mar Nasrallah Sfeir, considered this a veiled threat that either the Syrians stay, or chaos would reign (…)

HN: I was neither making a veiled reference nor responding to anyone. Hezbollah is among those who care about Lebanon’s future, given that it is a Lebanese party that represents a large cross-section of the population. When we speak about existential issues, we have to stop placating one another, and start calling a spade a spade when we talk about facts on the ground.

When some say that what happened in Lebanon was a war between foreign parties, and insist on that point, they mean that those who were fighting were the mere tools, agents, and soldiers of others, and this is unacceptable. We see things in an entirely different light—this is just our point of view, not an unshakable fact. We believe that what really took place were confrontations between various Lebanese parties, during which each of them took advantage of its brothers, friends, and enemies. What led to the war was the intersection of the interests of various political parties and sects in Lebanon with those of parties outside Lebanon. And although we believe that there exists a really serious problem in Lebanon—namely sectarianism—I did not call for the abolition of religious sectarianism, which is the result of sectarianism per se and its impact.

We said that this problem does indeed exist, so let us discuss it. I never went to war against political sectarianism, nor demanded its abolition; all I said was, let us get together and discuss the issue in view of either reaching a solution or learning how to live with it. We should therefore forget any notion of going to war against either political sectarianism or total secularism; these are the words of a wise and responsible official who wants to solve existing issues without erecting obstacles between the Lebanese people. I am sure that this issue is linked to the Syrian presence in Lebanon, and relevant documents are there to prove it. There were no Syrians in Lebanon before civil war broke out; they came into the country because of the civil war, and their presence here is therefore an outcome of intra-Lebanese issues.11

The Syrians, who are now here in Lebanon, were the main catalyst in bringing stability to the country; the political agreement was the second catalyst. Furthermore, a political agreement without a force to maintain security in the country is not conducive to stability; we have seen many agreements come and go, but they have all quickly failed, just like the Tripartite Agreement did.12 The consolidation of civil calm needs the presence of a strong force that imposes security in the country under a general political umbrella, and this is what the Syrian troops have done in Lebanon. I neither made veiled threats nor exaggerated the situation; we simply need more time. We have wasted a lot of time in the past ten years—and are still wasting it—hurling accusations at each other, without ever sitting down face to face.

At present the Syrian forces are the guarantors of Lebanon’s security; as for the Lebanese army, its past and present leaderships have exerted a lot of effort to build it along national lines, and keep it as such; but this also requires additional time, because the process is still incomplete.

Let me ask frankly, had the Syrian troops and the Lebanese national army not intervened to contain the incidents in al-Dinniye13 and their sectarian ramifications, who would have guaranteed the survival of the state’s institutions in the face of such a challenge? Officials who head these institutions were not to blame for this situation, but were to blame for the real problem we inherited—namely sectarianism.

In order to take advantage of the time that the Syrian military presence—which provides Lebanon with a security and political blanket—is affording us, I called for the initiation of a dialogue among the various parties in the country. In the past, we talked with the sound of explosions ringing in our ears, and therefore had to travel to Lausanne, Geneva or Damascus to be able to do that. Now these explosions have ceased, and the Lebanese people are demonstrating many very good intentions. They reject civil war, preferring to solve their problems through dialogue, [and] Lebanon has now a real state and real institutions, and has held national elections with fewer people boycotting them. There are thus many positive signs on which to capitalize and start a dialogue, with the aim of reaching an understanding on how best to build our country.

AL-RAI AL-AAM: Some have raised the issue that the weaker party—namely the Christians—say that civil calm is doing very well, while the stronger party—the Muslims—say that civil calm is under threat, and that the Syrian presence is therefore still essential. What is your opinion about that, and how do you view calls for the Syrian army to leave Lebanon?

HN: I never said anything about giving guarantees to the Muslims or Christians. I spoke, rather, about guarantees for a nation and its people, without exception, and about preventing everyone from going back to war. We are not afraid of going back to war per se; what we are afraid of is Israeli agents provoking an incident, here or there, by targeting Christians and Muslims, and playing on their religious and sectarian instincts, thus taking us back to the atmosphere that led us into war.

Now that Israel has withdrawn from the country, we Lebanese have to ponder the fact that there were foreign agents among the Muslims and the Christians in the country. The resistance and the state have reassured everyone on this account, but certain Christian groups raised havoc regarding what took place in south Lebanon, and made references to security enforced through militias, and various violations. Not a single drop of blood has been spilled.

If the Syrians withdraw from Lebanon and problems occur here or there, there will be voices raised. What I am telling you is that there are people working hard to push the Syrians out of Lebanon and stir up divisions among the Lebanese. One does not need large specialized organizations to do that; a small “security network” capable of provoking a number of incidents that appeal to hardcore sectarian fanaticism in the country would be sufficient. This would thrust Lebanon’s unresolved problems once again to the fore, amid a total lack of security and stability in the country, and the only solution would then be the dispatch of international peacekeeping forces to the country. In other words, the objective is to restart the civil war in Lebanon, and turn the country into another Kosovo; the only solution would then be the presence of an international force and the imposition of tutelage over it. The strong Lebanon that had allied itself to Syria and defeated Israel would no longer exist.

I want to call even upon those who want Syrian troops to be withdrawn from Lebanon to ponder carefully the post-withdrawal phase. We should avoid going back to infighting at all costs; for although we did take part in it, we never allowed ourselves to be sucked in. What do they want with us, for us, and from us? We have to calculate very carefully, away from raw emotions and complaints; we cannot deal with complaints by continually raising the bar, for at some point this bar will no longer exist.