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## INTERVIEW WITH NEW TV

August 27, 2006

> Nasrallah’s first interview after the UN-mandated ceasefire of August 14 that effectively ended the 34-day war with Israel was widely heralded as a frank admission that Hezbollah had made a terrible mistake in capturing two IDF soldiers and killing eight others on the morning of July 12, 2006. Overshadowed by this apparent (and later substantially qualified) mea culpa, however, were a series of responses given by Nasrallah to questions posed by Maryam al Bassam, a reporter for the Lebanon-based New TV station, that seemed to signal some of the potent political difficulties that lay ahead for the country—difficulties greatly exacerbated by the deaths of over 1,000 Lebanese, as well as the estimated $7 to $15 billion worth of damage sustained during the war.1

> Among these points, Nasrallah, while accepting UN Resolution 1701’s deployment of additional UNIFIL forces, as well as its call for Lebanese army control in south Lebanon, made clear that Hezbollah would remain armed in the south and elsewhere, though hidden from view: “No logic,” he tells Bassam, “says Hezbollah can get out of the area south of the Litani River.” In a clear indication to domestic forces that had been privately—and at times publicly—calling for Hezbollah’s disarmament during the war, Nasrallah also warned that the party “could have staged a military coup and taken control of the country” if it had wanted to, but that it essentially chose not to follow this path. To this he added another contentious point: that Hezbollah’s alliance with General Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement implicitly meant the party enjoyed substantial support in the Christian street since, as Nasrallah claimed, Aoun represented “75 percent of the Christians today.” As the FPM was not a part of the Lebanese government, Nasrallah argued further that its absence meant the government was essentially unrepresentative.

> In all these points, Nasrallah lays out the basic contours of a political struggle that would only grow more divisive and dangerous in the coming period. Indeed, three months later, Hezbollah’ and Amal’s cabinet ministers, in addition to one Christian minister, would resign their posts, ostensibly over the process governing the Hariri tribunal, but more than this over the division of political power—both internationally recognized and otherwise—in a country that seemed destined to remain on the fault line of Middle East policy and praxis well into the future.

NEW TV: All of a sudden I found myself face-to-face with the master of all events. They told me the interview would take place now, and the rest would be left to Hezbollah, as usual. How can this take place if I have not yet written the sweetest of words to Al Sayyed [Nasrallah]? I have not sent him the mothers’ letters, which were perfumed with the scent of their martyred sons. Also I have not yet written to him about the days we lived during the war, dreaming of meeting with him. I spent every minute of the 34 days preparing an introduction to al-Sayyed in the hope of meeting him during the war; but here I am face-to-face with him at a time that is described as one of fragile peace. Your Eminence, you are welcome on New TV. I will begin from where I ended. Are we at peace? What about the Israeli exaggeration and some international talk about a second round of war against Lebanon? The latest words on this subject were spoken by Terj Roed-Larsen.2

HN: In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate. First of all, and in the name of the resistance, I would like to thank you as well as the television management and all workers, journalists, and media men in this establishment for the great efforts you made during the war. You, just like other institutions—to be fair to all—were our voice and the voice of the resistance men and steadfast people who want glory, dignity, and loftiness for this country. Of course, any words of thanks to you, and all those who acted in solidarity with the resistance in this war, fall short of what should be said, but they must be said. Thank you.

NEW TV: We consider this a national duty.

HN: God bless you. As for the current or next stage, I do not think there will be a second round, for several reasons which I could address. Larsen’s words seek to sow fear. It is very regrettable that Mr. Larsen’s role is evident.

NEW TV: Who does this role serve?

HN: It clearly serves the Israelis. This is regrettable. I do not know if the Israelis asked him to scare the Lebanese government and people. He sometimes expresses a personal opinion which he thinks may benefit the Israelis. My information, and not only my interpretation, says the purpose of his words was to scare the Lebanese. This is the way I understand things, because certain issues continued to be discussed during the time between the cessation of military activities and the so-called ceasefire, and there were new Israeli conditions. There is an attempt to impose these conditions. For example, deploying international forces on the Lebanese–Syrian border is an Israeli demand. Another example is that, instead of deploying in the south, UNIFIL is required to be stationed at the airport and ports. This is also an Israeli demand. There is a host of Israeli demands that were not achieved over the past stage. Currently, pressure is being exercised on the Lebanese government to get it to succumb to these demands.

Currently there is no war, but there is exaggerated talk about a new war or second round, so that the Lebanese will be frightened and say, “What will keep the specter of war away from us? Will UN troops on the border between Lebanon and Syria do this? That will be alright. Do they want to come to the airport and ports? They are welcome.” This means submission is demanded. I view all that was said in this context. What makes me say Larsen might have coordinated this issue with the Israelis is that, on the second or third day, a Dutch minister came and conveyed a message. I read this in the press. I do not know if that was accurate or not. He conveyed a message from the Israelis and said there is no second round. Who shall we believe? I, of course, believe the Dutch minister, because events confirmed what he conveyed.

First, in the field, the Israelis are daily withdrawing and reducing the number of their soldiers and tanks. By the way, they are present at limited points. This presence is decreasing daily. If they have plans for a second round, they would reinforce their presence in these areas, not reduce it. Second, their evacuees are returning. They also had evacuees in this war. The people of Haifa and the north returned to their cities, towns, settlements, and factories. The head of the enemy government toured these areas. He reassured the people and said the central goal of his government now is rebuilding the north. The one who acts in this way does not plan to start a second round. Third, the internal political situation in the enemy’s entity, including the military situation and the situation of the army and generals, makes me say the overall current Israeli situation and available facts confirm that we are not heading towards a second round.

NEW TV: What about the daily Israeli provocations? There are landing operations and abductions of civilians from their homes. This is in addition to the usual air, sea, and ground violations. Are these meant to prompt you to reply? Why do you not reply? Who do you fear? There is a reason to reply, but why do you not reply?

HN: Since the cessation of military activity—that is, since Monday—we have acted. We of course are not mercenaries, militias, or an armed organization isolated from the people. The people are our people and kinfolk. When the evacuees returned to their villages and towns, our priority became the restoration of the social situation and giving the people time to breathe and feel comfortable. There is also a resolution on the cessation of military activity. We believe that war as an open war ended on Monday. Between the end of war on Monday and the ceasefire—whose time has still not been determined, because certain conditions have been set for it—it was clear that the Israelis were proceeding along two lines. The first meant to provoke us so that we would be dragged into a confrontation. This would depict us as violating Resolution 1701. Of course, there is a big difference.

When the Israelis conducted the landing in Buday there was no international reaction, and since they were the ones who violated the resolution, there was no international reaction.3 The Americans and many Western countries did not speak up. The UN reaction was very subdued. The whole world remained silent. In contrast, if a much smaller violation is committed by us in response to an attack, the whole international community will raise a hue and cry and say: These people seek war and do not want peace, calm, or stability for Lebanon. Consequently, this reaction might then open the door for a renewed discussion of Bush’s attempt to issue a second resolution on the resistance weapons, and other similar things. We, for more than one reason, said, let us exercise self-restraint at this stage, and not be provoked. It was clear that the Israelis were trying to drag us into a certain confrontation.

The second track on which the Israelis worked was that the resolution—and this is one of our reservations about the resolution—gave them the right to act under the pretext of self-defense. Their idea is that when the war stops and the evacuees do not return, the displaced will remain outside their houses, and this will put pressure on the resistance to accept new conditions. At the same time, the Israelis will take their time to carry out some security operations. True, it was a landing operation, but its aim was related to security. They wanted to kidnap or kill a leading Hezbollah figure.

The first landing operation after Monday—that is, after the end of the war—was carried out in Buday, but it did not achieve its aim, which was killing or kidnapping the leading Hezbollah figure. The second point is that the landing operation commander, who was a high-ranking officer in the Israeli paratrooper and special forces, was killed.

NEW TV: They said some resistance men were also martyred.

HN: No, there were no martyrs. A young man was slightly wounded. The clash took place at close range, and our men took them by surprise. The officer was therefore killed during the first moments of the clash, and not later. When this loss and this failure occurred, they stopped their landing operations. I have no knowledge of any landing operations after the Buday landing. What stopped the landings were the failures and the losses of the Israeli side, not the international denunciations, which were never issued. What stopped them were their failures and their losses. They failed to achieve their goal and lost.

The Israelis are still present around some towns. They try to enter a house at night, or cut the road between one village and another, or kidnap civilians. This has to do with our policy for the current stage. Actually, we want the government to assume its responsibility at this stage. Is it not the government that says it is the one which wants to protect the citizens? […]

NEW TV: What about the Shebaa Farms?

HN: Shebaa Farms are another issue. This is one of the outstanding issues related to national rights. When we expressed reservations about Resolution 1701, we said this resolution did not give Lebanon its national rights or the minimum of its national demands. With the exception of the issue of Shebaa Farms, which is a special one, and in connection with the recent war, we will consider it our right to fight Israel in any position it occupies. As for when and how to fight it, this is up to the resistance command.

NEW TV: How will Hezbollah perform in the presence of the Lebanese army and UNIFIL troops?

HN: […] I said during the war that we trust the army and its command. It is obvious that the main and primary task of an army that goes to the border area upon a cabinet decision is defending the homeland. We will facilitate the work of the army and extend all support and backing to it. We said this in the media and communicated it to the army command. We will refrain from doing anything that will embarrass the army. When the army is fully deployed on the border, it will be in charge of confronting any ground violation, but in response to a political decision. It will assume this responsibility. The resistance will support the army …

NEW TV: Kofi Annan yesterday defined the task of this [UNIFIL] force. He said its task is not to disarm Hezbollah.

HN: This is because all the US pressure was in this direction. As you know, at first there was no talk about the UNIFIL or reinforcing it. There was much talk about a multinational force under Chapter Seven [of the United Nations Charter]. The task of the multinational force under Chapter Seven—a force we rejected and considered to be an occupation force—was not protecting Lebanon against any Israeli aggression, but striking at, disarming, and terminating the resistance. This means doing what Israel could not do. The task of UNIFIL today is not disarming the resistance. As long as this is not its task, and as long as its main task is backing the Lebanese army—and we approve of and support the role played by the Lebanese army—I do not think there will be any problem at all in the area south of the [Litani] river, and all areas where the army or UNIFIL are deployed.

NEW TV: What if something happens in the south—like an Israeli provocation—that requires Hezbollah’s intervention, although the army is there? Will the army also defend the country?

HN: The army’s duty, as defined by the Council of Ministers, is to defend the homeland, protect citizens, their properties, and means of living, and to preserve security. The people used to go and tour the entire south even before 12 July. Did anyone see a person wearing a military uniform or carrying a Kalashnikov or wireless radio? There was nothing of the sort. The young people in the south are the people of the south. I recall that, in the negotiations that took place here, some said the Israeli occupation army should withdraw behind the Blue Line,4 and Hezbollah should withdraw north of the Litani River. I used to tell them that I understood that the Israeli army should withdraw behind the Blue Line, because it is first and foremost a regular army, as well as a foreign occupation force, and must leave our territories. I asked them to tell me how Hezbollah could withdraw from the area south of the river. The people of Ayta were resisting in Ayta, and the people of Bint Jbeil were resisting in Bint Jbeil. The same applies to the people of al-Khiam, al-Tayyibah, Mays, and all towns that fought.5 I do not want to continue naming towns, as I may remember some and forget others, and they will then blame me. All the young men who fought on the front, and even rear lines in the area south of the river, are the people of these areas. They were not recruited from other areas. Can I tell the people of Ayta: the Israelis could not force you out of your town, but I will do so because a political agreement has been reached? Can I ask the people of Ayta to live in Nabatieh? The people of Hezbollah are the people of the region. No logic says Hezbollah can get out of the area south of the Litani River.

By the way, there is a funny thing. I do not know if there will be a chance to talk about this in this discussion. I am one of the people who believed before the war that Israel had [positive] points that could be discussed, although it is an enemy. I once said I respect my enemy for such things as caring for its prisoners and dead. One of the things we suspected in the past was that the Israeli media was credible. For example, when we carried out operations before 2000, and even limited operations afterwards, the young men used to say, for example, that they had killed six Israeli soldiers [in an operation]; but the Israelis would say only two had been killed. We said our men might have miscalculated the number, as the Israelis usually admitted the number of their killed soldiers. In this war, I discovered that the Israeli is a big liar in all that he says, talks about, and claims, and tells a lot of lies. This is proved by the fact that [Amir] Peretz, [Ehud] Olmert, [Tzipi] Livni and all Israeli officials throughout the past period said and continue to say, “We will not allow Hezbollah to return to south Lebanon.”6 Has Hezbollah left south Lebanon in order to say you will not allow it to return? Hezbollah is present north and south of the river. True, you carried out landing operations and reached hilltops here and there, but Hezbollah was still in the border villages. We have not left south Lebanon or the areas south of the Litani River to wait for permission from anybody to return to the areas south of the river. We are present there. The army’s duty is therefore to protect people. Very frankly speaking, we will not be responsible when the army assumes responsibility.

NEW TV: It is said for some reason that the Lebanese army overlooks Hezbollah’s practices.

HN: Let us be clear. The Lebanese army’s duty is not to disarm the resistance or gather information about the resistance’s weapons.

NEW TV: How will the army act if it sees armed Hezbollah fighters or military equipment, although Hezbollah is invisible in the south and even Israel cannot see it? There are fears.

HN: No, there is no reason for any fear in this regard, whether the army is there or not; this, however, becomes certain in the presence of the army. I took measures before the army’s deployment in the border area. These measures said that there should be no armed manifestations at all. One of the reasons for the success of our resistance, its popularity, and its acceptance by the people, is that it avoids armed manifestations, and does not show off in mobilization, fighting, preparedness, presence, or even the burial of martyrs. Have you seen a gun or a rifle at the funeral of any martyr? There has been nothing of the sort. This is our policy. This has become a commitment on our part towards the Lebanese army and government. There is a tacit agreement that we, south of the river, avoid armed manifestations. Suppose the army finds a person carrying a weapon on a road or in a town; the army’s natural right and duty will be to confiscate the weapon and apply the law to him. We have accepted this, because this is in line with the policy we adopted before July 12. Now we have underscored this as a commitment. There is something on which we agreed, and let this be very clear. Some may go and talk. They can say whatever they want. We will not comment on every word that is said. Part of what is said does not take into consideration the morale of the resistance men, the people of the south, or the feelings of the resistance masses. But at this extraordinary and critical stage we are ignoring what is said in the same way as we are ignoring many other things. There is a very clear thing on which we agree. It is the Lebanese army, as Kofi Annan said about UNIFIL. I told some officials here to speak like Kofi Annan. Kofi Annan says it is not the job of UNIFIL to disarm the resistance. What about the army? It is not the task of the Lebanese army to disarm the resistance or spy on its weapons or plans. Is it the task of the army to spy on us, raid us, and confiscate things? Never. This issue has been decisively settled, and it is over.

NEW TV: What will be your position on the Shebaa Farms? Hezbollah considers these farms Lebanese territory that is occupied by Israel, and Hezbollah’s resistance law applies to it.

HN: Not only Hezbollah’s law. In accordance with international law, and regardless of UN opinion about the Shebaa Farms, I said at the negotiating table—and before that, on the eve of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon—that it is the responsibility, duty, and right of the resistance to fight and liberate any land the Lebanese state or government considers to be occupied Lebanese land. Therefore, I told them at the dialogue table: if you really want to liberate the Shebaa Farms, let us see how we can cooperate together to do so. If you want to get rid of the Shebaa Farms issue in order to get rid of us and our weapons, you can follow another path other than asking the United Nations to recognize the farms as Lebanese, and other than continuing to hold the Syrians responsible for not giving us documents or signatures. The Lebanese government can meet and say that the Shebaa Farms are not Lebanese.

NEW TV: But until it meets…

HN: No, they cannot do such a thing. The government and the Chamber of Deputies said that this is Lebanese territory. Can they change their mind? This is not something that can be tampered with in this way. Let us talk about the official Lebanon, and not Hezbollah. Let us talk about the current Lebanese government. If someone from the March 14 or February 14 forces7 comes up to say the Shebaa Farms are not Lebanese, he is free to say what he wants. The current Lebanese government, the Chamber of Deputies, and the Lebanese presidency consider the Shebaa Farms Lebanese. This is then Lebanese land under occupation. If it remains occupied, the right of resistance will continue to exist. But how can the resistance exercise this right? This is up to the resistance. We must not present assurances in this regard, nor say we are heading towards a large problem. I want to be realistic in this regard. Even during the past period, if you recall, we did not carry out operations every week, every two weeks, or every month. We used to carry out an operation once every several months. We called them reminder operations. Now we will wait for some time, while reserving our natural right to exercise resistance if certain developments take place. But we can wait and tell others: please do what you can, especially since the UN secretary-general is also concerned. There is a clause in Resolution 1701 that opens a door for discussion, although it does not solve the problem. Also, the Lebanese government has great international friendships; let us see what they can do. But this does not mean the resistance is committed to the cessation of operations, or to relinquishing its right of resistance as long as even an inch of Lebanese land is under occupation.

NEW TV: Some in Lebanon may ask if Hezbollah has not learned from this recent experience. Allow us to ask your Eminence a question that goes back to July 12. Would you have done what you did if you had known in advance what the Israeli reaction would be? There are 1 million Lebanese evacuees, huge destruction, economic losses, over 1,000 martyrs, and many wounded. It was a big disaster for Lebanon. Now you say you cannot surrender, and say operations will not completely stop. Do you not go back to that date to remember the scene, and know that any operation, particularly in the Shebaa Farms, may cost Lebanon what the last aggression cost it?

HN: There are two points in what you say. The first is that, regardless of one’s decision, no one whose land is occupied can give security assurances to the Israelis. He cannot tell them: be reassured, and continue to occupy the land, because we are not going to do anything. This is wrong. The least I can say about this is that it is wrong on the national level. Therefore, Hezbollah will neither now nor in the future be ready to make a commitment to anyone. This discussion also took place in the negotiations during the war. There was talk about respect for the Blue Line. We respect this line, but as a resistance I cannot make a commitment to the Israelis and Americans and say this issue is over. I will not make such commitments as long as there is land under occupation. As for the way we act, this is another issue. Therefore, the Shebaa Farms is an occupied land, and was so from 2000 to 2006. How did we act in this regard? This is a clear point. The second part of the question …

NEW TV: But how did Israel act? You have kidnapped soldiers before…

HN: This leads to the second part of the question. Although the second part of the question is in itself a whole subject, it may not be much related to the next stage, but it can always be discussed. Whoever says that the cause of the war is the two prisoners is mistaken. Things might have been unclear during the first and second days of the war, but—as noted in Seymour Hersh’s article8 and the detailed statements by [Muhammed] Haykal, and as indicated by more than one respectable journalist in the world, more than one respectable newspaper in the United States, Britain, and Europe, and by some Lebanese political leaders who are following the developments—it became certain that the issue was not related to the two prisoners. As to whether the capture of the two was an excuse or not, I will talk about that later. The issue is that there was a war plan and a big military decision taken by the US and Israel. If they did not implement it on July 12, they would have implemented it in August, September or October.

NEW TV: This means you fell into the trap.

HN: No, we did not fall into the trap. The Israeli side is the one which fell into the trap, not us. I will tell you the difference.

NEW TV: We should not give the world an excuse to stand against us.

HN: All the facts that were later collected confirmed that the military operation—or rather, the large-scale war—was timed to be carried out at the end of September or early October. There are several reasons for this. Some of these reasons are related to tourism in Palestine; they are not concerned about tourism in Lebanon. They did not think of October to allow us to benefit from the tourism season in Lebanon. The tourist season in Israel is much more important than the tourist season in Lebanon. But they know that if they start such a war on the basis of general rather than accurate information about Hezbollah’s missile capabilities, their tourist season will barely be hit. They will therefore benefit the tourist season.

Second, they needed to complete their arrangements and preparations. They were preparing for war at the end of September or early October. The Israelis were planning to start the war at that time, with or without an excuse. They had US approval in this regard, and some European states would be put in the picture—if they were not already in the picture. It might also obtain some Arab cover by that time, or in advance. I will stop here, and not say more than this. On that day, when Israel launches the war, it will win the world’s blessings, as this war will be part of the war on terrorism. None will then ask the Israelis why they attacked Lebanon; they do not need an excuse. Even if they want an excuse on that day, they could simply carry out accurate assassinations like those carried out by the Rafeh network.9 They can bring six or seven Katyushas and place them at night in a valley in the south, and then fire them at the northern settlements.

NEW TV: But they can distinguish between Hezbollah’s Katyushas and…

HN: Since they are the ones doing this, they can use this as an excuse. See how we did not fall into the trap. When we moved to carry out the capture operation—and I will soon speak about our assessment, as I do not hesitate to say things frankly, the way they happened—something happened that we did not intend. We were preparing for a clean capture operation. The operation was not decided on the spur of the moment. We prepared for it for five or six months, and we were waiting for a group [of Israeli soldiers]. We had set up our ambush, and were waiting. Civilian vehicles used to pass by our ambush, but we left them unharmed because we did not want civilians—although civilians might be military men dressed like civilians. We were waiting for a military vehicle. Two such vehicles came, and a clash erupted. We wanted to carry out a clean operation, but the field dictated otherwise, as a number of the enemy soldiers were killed or wounded. We took two prisoners. The Israelis in that area carried out a quick operation in the field. They sent a tank to chase our men. The tank rolled through a field and hit a big mine. It was not actually a mine—they call it nasfiyah, in which there were hundreds of kilograms of explosives. It was there, but had nothing to do with the war or operation. The tank was destroyed, and four soldiers were killed. The situation became difficult and intolerable for them, as they had eight killed, three or four wounded, and two prisoners. We cannot control the way things eventually develop.

NEW TV: You are enlarging the issue militarily to show us that you did not fall into the trap, and that their losses were large. But your Eminence said—and now you repeat—that this was going to happen in all cases.

HN: But I will continue to say exactly what happened.

NEW TV: But this could have happened without giving them an excuse. Our position might have been safer in front of the international community, Kofi Annan, Rice, and the young people who were working.

HN: Let us talk about the difference between the two pictures. On the first day, the Israelis were confused about their reaction. At night they contacted the Americans, and then they met and made a decision. The war began on the second day. This means they decided on July 12 to do then what they had wanted to do in October. But there is a big difference between doing it now and [later]. First, the October plan depended on the element of surprise. If the October plan was the one implemented, it would not be known whether we would continue to exist in order to be blamed, or blame others. The October plan was supposed to be implemented when the country was in a state of calm, and the situation was normal in the south, in the suburbs, in the Bekaa, and in all areas where Hezbollah is present. People would be living their normal lives. According to the plan, the Israelis would all of a sudden strongly attack the border area and carry out landing operations in the Litani River area. They would control the area south of the Litani River, and strike at the resistance and all its missile capability. While mounting a ground offensive, the Israeli planes would pound the Southern Suburb, all of the south, all of the Baalbek-al-Hermel area, and Hezbollah’s centers, houses of Hezbollah leaders, officials, and members. They would thus destroy the command, communications, administration, and control networks. Their assessment was that Hezbollah would be completely finished within 48 hours, and that whoever stayed alive would be taken to a new Guantánamo. That was the idea, and that was what was planned, and exposed by more than one foreign journalist.

NEW TV: Were foreigners the only ones who knew about this?

HN: No, these were the ones who exposed it. I do not know who had knowledge of it.

NEW TV: Were there any Lebanese elements with such knowledge?

HN: Let us focus on the foreigners. The idea was: this is what we will do, and within 48 hours after occupying the area south of the river, we will have thus delivered a blow to the resistance by destroying the centers and the houses of the leaders and officials, and even the houses of the young members. We would have thus dismantled the party, and whoever remains alive—a person with some young men or some equipment—will be limited to individual action that cannot change the course of the war. This was the plan. What took place on July 12 cost the Israelis the element of surprise after the capturing, and after there were deaths and injuries. We took the necessary precautions; we evacuated the area, and we were on standby and at the ready. We were ready for the war when it started. The element of surprise was therefore lost.

Second, the timing that the Israelis set for the war was no longer valid, and the war started at a time that they did not want. The timing of the operation foiled the main plan that they had prepared. We waged a war today, and we would have waged a war in October, but the war in October would have had conditions that would have been much harsher and more difficult, because the Israelis would have been the ones to set the time, prepare for the war, and use the element of surprise; whereas in July, the field situation and our performance changed the whole affair. We thus carried out the confrontation, we remained steadfast, we fought, and we ended the war in the manner it ended.

There remains a part of your question that I want to clarify—namely, we are a group, not an individual. I am not the one who takes the decision to carry out the capturing operation. The group has a political leadership and a military command. There are no less than 15 individuals involved in such a decision. These 15 individuals, be they political or military elements, have long political and jihad experience, and have been the leaders of the resistance from 1982 until 2006. We have thorough knowledge of the Israelis, and of how they think about and deal with issues. Based on all past experience, we carried out operations that were much more important than the July 12 capturing operation, and these operations resulted in much bigger losses on the Israeli side, but did not lead to a war of this scale. Very clearly—and I want to say this to you and the viewers, because it has caused controversy—we did not have a 1 percent probability that the capturing operation would have led to a war on this scale. If someone asks: Why did you not have a 1 percent probability? We respond that the logic of the way things have been since 1982 and judging by Israelis’ actions, based on the resistance’s experience over the past decades, and our analysis of the Israelis, led us to believe that it was not possible at all, especially at this time, because they have a tourist season just as we do, and have their own conditions, just as we do. It would not have been possible for a reaction to a capturing operation to be on this scale. I am not referring to the Israelis alone, but to experience throughout history.

NEW TV: Had this been a reaction, UN Resolution 1701 would have included a paragraph binding Hezbollah to release the two soldiers immediately, and this did not happen.

HN: I am saying that throughout the history of war, no state has ever waged war on another state because two soldiers were captured, or three or four soldiers were killed. War was never waged for this reason. You ask me now: If there was even a 1 percent chance that the July 11 [as stated] capturing operation would have led to a war like the one that happened, would you have done it? I would say no, absolutely not, for humanitarian, moral, social, security, military, and political reasons. I would not agree to it, and neither would Hezbollah, the prisoners in Israeli prisons, nor the families of the prisoners. This is absolute. What happened is not an issue of a reaction to a capturing operation.

As far as my culture goes—and my culture may differ from that of others—I believe in God and his will, I believe that even this 1 percent chance did not occur to any of the 15 political and military individuals, despite our deep experience. I believe that there is divine will here, because if there was a 1 percent chance, we would not have carried out the capturing operation; and if we had not carried out the capture, the war would not have happened in July, but would have happened in October.

NEW TV: This is why I asked if you would keep in mind in any future operation the destruction, death, and displacement that Israel has wrought. It is as if Israel is teaching you a lesson and telling you to beware that this will be the price of anything else you do.

HN: Do not view matters from one angle. Today, even when we talk about returning to a second round or something of the sort, when Lebanon—as a state, a people, and the resistance—wants to make any decision, it will take into consideration everything that has happened. We cannot ignore it, and say that we will behave and make decisions as if nothing has happened. I would not be a human if I behaved in such a manner. We are definitely like this, and so are the Israelis. We are always looking at what happened on our side, but we do not see what happened on the Israeli side. Israelis today—not just Olmert and Peres, but anyone who will come in a future Israeli government—will think twice and three times before waging a war with Lebanon, because what took place on the Israeli side is also historic, strategic, and big.

NEW TV: But there is no balance between the level of terror and weapons they used.

HN: You must look at things in relative terms. Ultimately, there is a popular resistance movement in Lebanon fighting the strongest army in the Middle East, and the fourth- or fifth-strongest army in the world—as far as I hear, but I am not sure of this information. There is a debate going on in our country [in which] there is talk of victory, defeat, balance, and the impact of the war on them and us. I say: You do not have to listen to what I say or to what those who love and support the resistance say; I am willing to accept what the Israeli has to say. Let us see what the Israeli generals, politicians, journalists, experts, analysts, and public are saying, in addition to what the reserve soldiers and officers are saying. They are evaluating this experience, and I will accept the conclusion that the Israelis offer.

NEW TV: The Israelis are preoccupied with other scandals. We were surprised to see matters pertaining to other scandals taking precedence over the war.10 I have two questions…

HN: Allow me first to conclude this point. You and the Lebanese must be confident that what happened was already planned for. The fact that it happened in July has averted a situation that would have been a lot worse, had the war been launched in October […]

NEW TV: From a military perspective, could the resistance have withstood the attack any longer, especially after its sources of supply were dried up and weapons could not get to them? Could the siege imposed on you have allowed you to continue if Arabs, the Europeans, and international parties had not arrived at a new international Resolution in the Security Council?

HN: We have assumed since the year 2000 that a day like this would come, but we did not know when. I would be exaggerating if I were to tell you when this day would come. We did not know when this day would arrive, but we knew it would come, because Israel cannot remain silent over its 2000 defeat. The victory of Lebanon and the resistance had strategic repercussions on the entire Zionist entity, and it is the direct cause of the intifada in Palestine, and of the settlement process coming to a standstill. Our evaluation and understanding led us to believe that the day would come when Israel would launch a large-scale attack, and annihilate the resistance that had achieved a historic victory against them in 2000. What took place in 2000 was a great victory, and what took place [recently] is also a great victory. The difference between the two is that, in 2000, the resistance liberated the land, while this victory is even greater than the one in 2000. Why? Because in 2000 someone could have said that there was a resistance that waged guerrilla warfare and a war of attrition, and that the Israelis grew tired after 18 years of it, and left. The resistance can liberate land, but if Israel wants to occupy Lebanon, can the resistance deflect such an attack? This is the new model.

In all the theories that were posed when we discussed defensive strategies, and even during the first days of the war, some people in Lebanon were theorizing and saying, Yes, the resistance can liberate the land as it did in 2000, but it cannot prevent an invasion. I never made the commitment that we could prevent an invasion, but we managed to do so. The resistance withstood the attack, and it fought back. It did not wage a guerrilla war either. I want to clarify this point: it was not a regular army, but [it] was not a guerrilla [army] in the traditional sense, either. It was something in between. It fought special and elite forces. The resistance stood fast here.

We predicted that a war of this scale would happen ever since 2000, but we did not know when exactly, which is why we started preparing ourselves. We prepared ourselves, and assumed that if a war were imposed on us and Lebanon, it would last for months and would be a very harsh and destructive war. We expected that the war that took place would happen one day, but not specifically on July 12.

Based on this, we logically and naturally assumed that, when Israelis waged such a destructive war, they would cut off all supply lines, and isolate areas and towns, which is why we spent the years between 2000 and 2006 preparing ourselves for such a contingency. We made sure that the capabilities we needed for a long war were available to us, and they still are. Anyone who wants to disarm us should know this. We divided our capabilities in a way that would make cutting off the supply lines futile. All of our combat locations are self-sufficient. For 33 days, the Israeli air force bombed every bridge, road, and ferry. Moving from one town to another was impossible. Despite all this, the rockets were being launched from the valleys and from areas and borders at the frontline. They were launched from any point we wished. The young men were able to fight in any location. Our level of preparedness was very high, and was based on the assumption of a long-drawn-out battle.

What Yediot Ahronot published two days ago, to the effect that the ceasefire saved the Israeli army from a greater defeat and disaster, is true, because all the fighting was still being waged by the same young men who had been fighting at the frontlines from day one. When they moved their attack and carried out airdrops into the second frontline, they found that our capabilities there were sound, that our young men were present and safe, and that our command was present and sound as well. They found that the battle had yet to begin for the young men at the second and third lines of defense.

NEW TV: Throughout 33 or 34 days of aggression, to what extent did Israel manage to shake Hezbollah’s military structure? News reports speculated that, if the war had continued, it would have disarmed Hezbollah at the frontlines.

HN: The weapons of Ayta al-Shab11 lasted for 33 days.

NEW TV: Can you give us an idea of your losses? The first line of defense emerged safe and sound. We saw the young men on television screens despite rumors of the injury and martyrdom of Hezbollah cadres. The first and second lines of defense are safe and sound. Can you give us an account of actual losses? Israel said it killed 400, and stated every day that it killed this number of people and destroyed this much. What is the true picture?

HN: Hezbollah’s leaders who are known to the public are all safe, thank God. If the war had been waged in October, matters would not have been so. [The Israelis] were planning to kill people as they slept in their homes, along with their women and children, just as they did with some of our young men in the south on the first day. On the first or second day following the capture, Israel targeted houses whose owners’ only fault—some were not involved at all—was belonging to Hezbollah or supporting it. They destroyed houses while their owners, their wives, and children were still inside. This was their modus operandi during the first days in the south, especially south of the Litani River. Our political, executive, organizational, and media structures are all in good condition, although Al-Manar TV and Al-Nur Radio12 were exposed to more than one raid. Our security and military commanders are safe. Our jihadis, and our military and security leaders, are all safe and sound. I can tell you—for the sake of transparency, and to respond to those who say that this entire war could not possibly have left all of Hezbollah’s cadres unharmed—that we have had martyrs in our ranks. I have not counted the martyrs, because their funerals are being held every few days in the different villages. Those who wish to count them can do so themselves. There is no problem. We are not hiding anyone. These martyrs have families and relatives, and most of them are married with children. I cannot hide the martyrs. Most of the martyrs were fighters who were manning the rocket-launchers, or fighting at the frontlines against tanks, and so on. As for our military cadres, a brother who is an operations officer in the Bint Jbeil region axis, was martyred, in addition to another brother.

NEW TV: Was his death announced?

HN: Of course, and he was given a funeral a few days ago.

NEW TV: What about the undisclosed martyrs?

HN: There is no such thing. There are three Hezbollah officials who were martyred. It might be hard to explain this to the public. We have several organizational levels—the first, second, third, and fourth levels. We have only four organizational levels, and the last level is represented by the mujahidin. No one in the first or second levels was martyred. Three from the third level were martyred, including an operations officer in the Bint Jbeil axis, as well as another brother who is involved in logistics, and a third brother who works at the same organizational level, and was involved in fighting the forces in the field. Three or four young men were town commanders; we have a town commander who fights along with the men in the village, and his martyrdom is a source of pride, not weakness, because it means we have town commanders who do not run away. The town commander and his young men stood fast and fought, and he was martyred. Four or five officials in charge of villages were martyred. These can be called officials serving within Hezbollah’s jihadist formations.

NEW TV: Was the number of rockets launched on Israel the same number made public? In other words, were around 3,000 rockets launched?

HN: The Israelis said that 4,000 rockets were fired. The actual number of rockets is bigger. The biggest number of rockets did not fall on settlements, but on military barracks, bases, posts, soldiers’ assembly locations, and artillery emplacements.

NEW TV: Was 50 percent of your military capacity depleted?

HN: No, much less. I gave a speech and said that we had over 12,000 rockets.13 I am accurate, and I cannot lie, even from a religious point of view. Some say that this is a psychological warfare tactic. We do not lie in psychological war; I do wage psychological war, but I do not lie. When I say there are more than 12,000, this does not mean 13,000 rockets, even though 13,000 is more than 12,000; 20,000 is more than 12,000 and so is 50,000. You can raise the number as high as you want. If I say, for example, that I was born after the Second World War, I will be truthful—yet I was not born immediately after the Second World War, but many years later. It would not be sound for us to declare the exact number of rockets and our military capabilities. Nobody does this. Therefore, calculations based on the 12,000 figure, and that a figure larger than 12,000 means 13,000, are miscalculations.

NEW TV: Are they largely inaccurate or are they close?

HN: They are troubling themselves now with the embargo they are imposing at sea and on the seaports and borders. This is all futile. When we prepared ourselves, we did so on the basis that we were going to face a destructive, harsh, and long war. What we used in the war was therefore only a small part of what we had prepared. This is all I can say. I cannot go into any more detail.

NEW TV: Do you rely on local manufacturing without any help from…

HN: This is a security issue, not a political one. We do not answer security-related questions.

NEW TV: Would you answer a question relating to reconstruction, politics, and some fears expressed, such as the ones voiced in a recent meeting of the March 14 forces.14 The spokesman for those forces, Dori Chamoun, expressed fears and sent you a clear and direct message, asking you if you will establish a Shia state in Lebanon. In the past, such talk would refer to an Islamic state, and the response it received at the time was that no Islamic state would be formed. But nowadays, such a state has been further labeled as a Shia state. Why do you think this happened?

HN: I heard these statements. In the first instance, some people can say that these statements are not new, but old statements repeated; namely, questions asking if we want to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon. We used to reply in detail and in public, in secret and implicitly to all this. I noticed something new in the question. In the past—as you said—they used to say “Islamic state,” but now there is talk of a “Shia Islamic state.” This means that, in the past, this question was intended to intimidate the Christians; but now it appears that their political performance is developing, and they seek to intimidate the Christians and the rest of the non-Shia Muslims.

My response to those who posed this question is the same response as in the past. We do not change our views every other day. We were clear from the first day this issue was placed on the table. We say that we do not impose our options or ideas on anyone. This is a principle for us. In addition, Lebanon is a country with its idiosyncrasies, and is diverse and multiethnic. I do not pay much attention to this terminology, but some people prefer “diverse” to “multiethnic.” Regardless of the terminology, this country cannot take the form of an Islamic state, a Christian state, a Shia Islamic state, a Sunni Islamic State, a Maronite Christian state, or an Orthodox Christian state. In order for this country to be united and solid, and in order for us to be able to build a state in it that is capable of protecting the country, its society, and its people’s rights, and that is capable of serving them and preserving their dignity, there must be consensus.

When the government crisis happened and we called for consensus, those who were calling for consensus at the time stopped doing so. In any event, when we say we want a consensus state in Lebanon, we mean a state that makes all the sects in Lebanon feel represented, protected, and served by the state, which preserves their dignity. This is our discourse and our mentality. When we ran in the municipal and parliamentary elections, and participated in the Lebanese government, it was based on this vision. These fears are baseless. I will tell you what the story is. The whole story is that this is the line of discourse that they adopt with us, because they adopt a different discourse with our friends and allies in accordance with their position. However, when they want to deal with us, and to attack us from this political team, what would they say? “You robbed the state.” They cannot [say] that. They cannot accuse us of looting, of corruption, or of being partners in corruption. They cannot say anything. They cannot accuse us of practicing injustice, killing, starting a civil war, committing internal massacres, collaborating with the Israelis, changing our stripes, switching sides, or flip-flopping. They can’t say that.

The only tune that they have been hounding us with for the past few years is that we want to establish an Islamic state—and now they have recently started referring to it as a Shia Islamic state, as a means of provoking the rest of the Muslims against the Shia and mobilizing Christians against Muslims. This is a purely American tune. I know where they are receiving their directions from: from the US embassy and Ms. Condoleezza Rice.15 All they have to say is that we either want to establish an Islamic state or are an Iranian–Syrian axis, arm, or tool. What else can they say against us?

NEW TV: [Israel] twisted your arm with the civilians.16

HN: No, they did not twist our arm, but they did hurt us, because we are not a mafia or an armed gang. The civilians who were killed are our people; they are not civilians in Mozambique—even though we have humanitarian sentiments towards them. The civilians being killed are our women, children, sons, brothers, and family members. Because the Israelis know that we have feelings, are human, and are genuine in our love for our people, they pressure us with this point. What took place must be an element of reassurance.

The positions taken by General Aoun17 are sound here. When I say that there is a party with such capabilities, and if I have intentions and they want to hold me accountable for these intentions, then they should look back to the day the Syrian forces exited Lebanon. Hezbollah, with its huge military capabilities, and the rest of its allies, who were and still are targeted, could have staged a military coup and taken control of the country. Could we not? We were capable of that and still are. You might say that I am scaring the people here. The problem does not lie here. The problem is that this party, from the very first day, clearly declared that its weapons were pointed at this enemy [Israel]. My weapons are to defend the country, and all Lebanese. My weapons, my blood, my self, my children, and all my beloved are in the service of all the Lebanese, Arabs, Muslims, and the honorable, so that their heads will remain held high.

We did not take any such action—be that before the Syrian withdrawal or after it, or before or after July 12, or even now. Have we ever threatened the Lebanese? Have we ever used these weapons to wage a battle inside Lebanon? Have we ever used our weapons as a source of strength in municipal or parliamentary elections, or to impose certain shares or conditions? Never…

NEW TV: You are saying to them, do not fear Hezbollah, but you are carrying your weapons. How can one not be afraid?

HN: I am carrying my weapons to defend the country…

NEW TV: …whereas they are not armed, I don’t know…

HN: OK, I am carrying my weapons to defend the country which Israel wants to gobble up, and whose waters Israel wants to plunder, and Israel wants to solve its problem—the problem of [Palestinian] refugees’ right of return—at the expense of the country, by permanently settling them in the country which Israel has ambitions to rule within the framework of the new Middle East. Today, Hezbollah, along with its friends and allies, is the first defender of genuine sovereignty, genuine independence, and genuine freedom—and I add to them national dignity, honor, and pride.

This is the function of the weapons. Of course, even when we discussed the matter, I never said we would hold on to the weapons forever. We have always said that there are a number of issues, so let us come and solve them. That is what we were saying at the dialogue table. Let us solve them. A solution can be found for those weapons.

Therefore, let no one make the people afraid of our weapons—and the proof is the performance and the experience. I, as a party, have an experience with the Lebanese which is 10 years, 20 years, or 25 years old—is it not time, is it not time? What must one do to reassure? There are some people, my dear sister, who will not be assured unless we hand over our weapons, relinquish our political line and political thought, and go out with them to some European capital18 and sit down, publicly or secretly—and if we do it publicly, so much the better—with the Israelis and say to them: We have forgotten everything called national dignity, sovereignty, sanctities, displaced people, permanent settlement, Palestinian refugees, national rights, Arab rights…

NEW TV: Incidentally, there are views of various Shia elites, such as Al-Sayyed Ali Al-Amin and Al-Sayyed Hani Fahs.19 They are addressing to you direct messages, your Eminence. I do not know if you see and read them…

HN: Of course.

NEW TV: They have a view which they address to you personally. They have a view which is somewhat different from yours…

HN: With regard to this matter, actually, even we cannot say there is a Shia consensus on it. The split over the issue of the resistance is not a division on a sectarian basis; it is not that the Shia are with the resistance option, and the non-Shia against the resistance option. No. There are Shia who are for the resistance, and there are those who are for other options. The same applies to the Sunni, Christians, and Druze. The division on this matter is a political and national division; it is not a sectarian or a religious division. That is why, if a Shiite comes up with a different view—just as someone from among the Sunni may have a different view—now, can I classify the Sunni [in general] as being against the resistance option? Not at all […]

NEW TV: The prime minister is reported to have said that you were content with the position of renting [housing units], and you asked for the assistance of the Lebanese state. Is such talk true?

HN: In any case, this dossier has created some anxiety in the country. Allow me to say here what is in my heart. For our land to be occupied while the world is watching us, that’s OK. When we carry arms because the state has not liberated our land for us—not Hezbollah’s land or the Shia land or the land of such-and-such a village: no, Lebanese land—take the initiative, fight, and give our blood in order to liberate our land, we are condemned, and we are monopolizing, and I don’t know what. If no one asks about the prisoners in the [Israeli] jails—not their state, not anyone—never mind, let them stay in prison. But if we ask about them, we are adventurers.

We come to the reconstruction. Before the reconstruction, before the war: the deprived areas. Where are the deprived areas today? In the past, it was the Shia areas that were deprived. Now it is not only the Shia areas. Alas, balanced development has resulted in most Lebanese areas being deprived: Akkar, the north, the Kisrawan mountains, the al-Metn areas, and other areas.20 If we come to an area where there is no hospital, the state is indifferent to it; and we build a hospital there. In an area where there is no school, we build a school. In an area where the road is not paved, we pave the road. They say: Oh, you are having a state within the state. Well, make me understand. You are the state: you don’t want to liberate the land; you don’t want to free the prisoners; you don’t want to protect us from being killed or assassinated, or protect us from landings; you don’t want to cure us; you don’t want to feed us; and you don’t want to teach us. You only want taxes from me. What kind of state is that? That the people are silent about such a state is in itself a miracle. People should not remain silent about such a state.

NEW TV: But Hezbollah cannot take over the role of the state?

HN: I am not taking over the role of the state in anything. Let me tell you something…

NEW TV: What you are doing is the work of a state…

HN: Look, we are faced with two options: either we are required to die—die by being killed, or die of hunger, or die as a result of illness—or to be ignorant and hold jobs as shoe-shiners, at best; although ultimately this is not an obscene job, since all jobs are respectable, and so are those who work and perspire in order to earn an honest living. However, that is the level we are allowed to reach. Either we are like this, or we are accused of being outside the state, and [of being] a state within the state. Such logic is rejected. Such logic no longer has any value whatsoever.

Today, I say clearly about reconstruction and other issues, and the state is listening: where we have built a hospital, if the state builds a hospital, we will close our hospital; where we have built a school, if the state builds a school, we will close our school. When I talked about the issue of the resistance—which is more serious than the hospital and the school—when I said to them at the dialogue table, and the other day I said to them in a televised message: build the strong, capable, and just state that protects the Lebanese, and then you will have the right to say that there is no need for the resistance and its weapons. We are not an alternative to the state, but where the state is absent we must be present—we must do so by humanitarian, moral, and patriotic criteria, and not by sectarian and partisan criteria. Humanitarian, moral, and patriotic […]

NEW TV: Your eminence, all the people are asking where are you getting the money from? If you are telling me it is contributions, I do not know how the answer will be taken—and I do not say not seriously, for all your words are serious and true, and your promise is truthful; but contributions do not build homes on such a scale. You have mentioned 15,000 housing units?

HN: Yes.

NEW TV: So, from where?

NEW TV: What is important to the people is that the money is honest, clean, pure, and without political conditions—and I repeat: without political conditions…

NEW TV: It is that which arouses fears.

HN: There are no political conditions, as demonstrated…

NEW TV: If we are getting assistance from Iran, for instance, how do I know if tomorrow Iran will put conditions on us? The conditions will not be placed only on Hezbollah, they will be placed on Lebanon.

HN: Now Iran is accused of financing and arming Hezbollah.

NEW TV: It is accused; is that not true?

HN: It is accused. Regardless of whether that accusation is right or wrong, it is argued that it is owed a favor, and therefore it can now impose conditions more than if it had rebuilt some homes in the Southern Suburb, south Lebanon, the Bekaa or the north. With regard to this matter, I would like to be very reassuring. I say: the money that is spent, and the existing resistance, and all the aspects of the strength that are now available, will not be subject to any conditions that are not connected with the national interest. That is categorical and definite. I and my brothers do not take money, arms, or support with conditions attached from anyone.

NEW TV: We have not felt that your eminence…

HN: Of course, in any case, Iran, with regard to what you asked about the bridges, the Iranian ambassador yesterday announced that they—now with regard to the bridges, most of the volunteering quarters are personal, in addition to the associations—the Iranians are committed to rebuilding the roads, all the roads that have been destroyed, rebuilding the schools, rebuilding places of worship—mosques and churches—and rebuilding the hospitals. They considered that to be the minimum level of assistance that they would take upon themselves. It is possible that an Iranian team will come here and coordinate with the state, the municipalities, and the various quarters, and begin to rebuild on this level. They have promised to do that. More than that, the ambassador also announced that the vice-president of the Islamic Republic of Iran is coming next week to meet with the Lebanese officials to see how Iran can give support in other fields.

NEW TV: All that has been announced. Can you tell us about what is not announced? When Hezbollah produces a box of money and begins to pay in dollars, why in dollars?

HN: Let others do the same. Look, there are others—now what do we want with others. Let it go. Let others do the same, and they are welcome…

NEW TV: [Some Lebanese] want assurances, at least?

HN: What assurances? Tell me. We’ll solve it tonight. Look, the fact is that in Lebanon everyone wants reassurance. Everyone wants reassurance. Today in Lebanon, any political party, any movement, any sect, any quarter, any group that says it is targeted, I will say to it: We are targeted more than you are. Well, you say you are targeted by Hezbollah, and that is not true, and that you are targeted by Syria, OK, and by Iran—but where is Iran? Iran is far away. We are targeted by the United States, Israel, and all their allies in the world. What happened in July was not an Israeli war on Lebanon. It was a world war on Lebanon, a world war on the resistance. Well, you are worried; we are worried. Am I ashamed to say I am worried? You want assurances, and we want assurances. The solution is not that I go along with you as you want; nor is it that you go along with me as I want. That is why, when we went to the national dialogue, we stated a phrase: “A strong, capable, and just state.” Ghassan Tueni added the word “resisting.”21 It was not I who added it. “The resisting and reassuring.” Great? Then I talked at the dialogue table, and now I will repeat it. I said to them, If we want to build a capable, strong, just, resisting, and reassuring state, the way to it is a national unity government. I answer all those who send me messages and questions in the media these days. You want to implement the Taif Agreement?22 Who implements the Taif Agreement? One of the most important conditions for implementing the Taif Agreement is a national unity government. Where is the national unity government? If all the governments that have been formed from the time of the Taif Agreement to the present are not national unity governments, then come and form a national unity government, so as to implement the Taif Agreement.

After such a harsh and destructive war, why do we not form a national unity government in Lebanon? If we want to reconstruct Lebanon, do we not need a national unity government? Well, let us form a national unity government. The answer is: No, no. Why not? It was said at the dialogue table: We have the highest regard for the Free Patriotic Movement. You are proposing a national unity government so as to bring Syria’s allies into the government. Well, first of all, we are in the government. At the minimum level, we and Amal are Syria’s allies. Are we ashamed of it? We are not ashamed. Syria’s allies are present in the government. Yet I told them, don’t bother about Syria’s allies. We will talk to them, and they will listen to us, and we will say to them: Stay outside the government now. Let the FPM into the government. I am today surprised that voices have emerged saying that the Christians have been excluded, are neutralized, and have no share in decision-making. Who is responsible for that?

It is said that delegations come from around world and meet with Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, and Prime Minister Fouad Siniora—with the Sunni Muslim and the Shia Muslim; it is they who are running the country, and who are making the decisions; and it is they who are the face of the country. Was this matter not raised within the Christian community? Great. That is a great flaw, but who is responsible for it? Those who are responsible for it are those who have obstructed the presidency, those who are preventing delegations from going to President Lahoud when they visit Lebanon.23 Some people are prevented from visiting President Lahoud. Those who bear responsibility are those who put aside those who represent 75 percent of the Christians, and who did not agree to have them in the government except on conditions that annul them. Today, let us form a national unity government.

NEW TV: Are you going back to the dialogue with all that you are saying? Perhaps now the dialogue has another importance…

HN: That is why I am surprised today—I will answer your question—that for 15 years they have been talking about Christian frustration: What has changed now? The Christians who had participated in previous governments, did they not represent at least 25 percent of the Christians? Were they really completely without representation? No, they had representation. Some of them were elected, and had won a high percentage of votes in their electoral districts. They say that a majority of the Christians were excluded from and neutralized in the political equation. Now, what’s the situation? Now the result of the elections is that there are quarters that represent 75 percent of the Christians. Now it will be said that their popularity has increased or decreased. Why has your popularity increased?

Well, let us take the election results. [The Free Patriotic Movement] represent 75 percent of the Christians, today they are outside the government. Why do we not hear talk about Christian frustration? In order to tackle the Christian frustration or activate Christian representation, the solution does not lie in [the fact] that we bring a Christian to the government or the presidency who does not represent the 75 percent of the excluded. We have to be fair. Today my message to the Lebanese—our talk today is all Lebanese—is that he who wants to implement the Taif Agreement, he who wants to solve internal problems, he who wants everyone in the country to be reassured, he who seriously wants to build a state and a project for a state—[who doesn’t want] to have a dictatorship—who wants to build the project of a real state, let him form a national unity government…

NEW TV: I thank you, your Eminence, and thank you for granting this exclusive interview to New TV. I apologize to all the colleagues who wanted to sit down with you…

HN: Who wanted to be ahead of you?

NEW TV: But by chance I was in the television building, and I came here. All that time—as I said in the introduction—I was dreaming to sit down with you and see you, and to be reassured about you. I reiterate my apology to all my colleagues who could not see you, and, God willing, we will be able to see you again in an expanded meeting. Thank you.

HN: You are welcome.