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## CIVIL WAR AND RESISTANCE

March 11, 1986

> While this interview, carried by the Emirati newspaper Al-Khaleej, was not his first, it positioned Nasrallah as a key figure in Hezbollah for a wider regional audience eager to learn more about the party that had just played such a critical role the previous year in prompting Israel’s first major withdrawal under fire from Lebanese territory. Fluent in both the military and political aspects of the rapidly deteriorating internal situation in Lebanon, Nasrallah demonstrates what would serve as the hallmarks of his later speeches and interviews—especially after he assumed the post of secretary-general in 1992: a clear delineation of Hezbollah’s position on the multitude of problems facing the country, combined with enough nuance to leave rivals and enemies alike questioning the party’s next move.

> On one key issue, however—that of Israel—there is little ambiguity. “Our strategy,” he says, “is to build a future for ourselves through confrontation with the Zionist enemy.” Seeking to avoid internal competition and enmity that might drain Hezbollah’s resources from this central concern, Nasrallah makes it clear that the party would exercise pragmatism in the domestic scene, no matter its “unconditional” doctrinal allegiance to Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini, but that resistance activities would constitute Hezbollah’s non-negotiable priority, potentially in perpetuity.

AL-KHALEEJ: The situation in the south, especially after the Israeli enemy expanded beyond the security zone under the pretext of searching for the two prisoners which you had abducted, is still the focus of much attention. How do you view what has happened, and is happening, in this domain, and what are the details of the events that took place during and after the recent invasion?1

HN: Israel does not lack pretexts when it decides to attack; on the battlefield, it seems that the recent military operation had two objectives:

First: To search for their detainees; in this attack, Israel followed a new military procedure which is to drop its fighters down beyond the occupied zone on roads used by the mujahidin.2 The enemy launched this operation less than 45 minutes after we abducted the two Israeli officers, which indicates that the intention of expanding their attack was already in the offing.

Second: They wanted to teach us a lesson, namely, that anybody who even considers launching an operation against Israel would invite a violent response. This places many obstacles in the resistance’s path, since any plans for such daring operations in the future would require a great deal of equipment, and appropriate and large-scale measures to be put into place.

In fact, Israel gave up expecting to achieve results in the areas under its occupation; added to that [there were] the hard battles it fought with the mujahidin in frontline villages where there were high concentrations of Muslim fighters. Moreover, Israel incurred heavy human and material losses as a result of its ferocious reaction; they suffered a number of killed and wounded and much of their equipment, tanks and military vehicles were burned. Our losses on the other hand were much more modest, which compelled Israel to use even more violence. It destroyed people’s homes, burned a number of them, killed or arrested a large number of citizens, and looted their belongings. After a few days of this, it realized that it would not be able to find the prisoners and that to continue in such a manner would be very costly at all levels. It therefore thought of withdrawing, since staying in the villages it had occupied would only give the resistance more opportunities to target the occupying troops.

Prior to the latest Israeli military expansion, the mujahidin had to walk for dozens of hours inside the frontier zone to be able to hit an Israeli post or set an ambush; now, after this latest invasion, the enemy has moved much closer to the resistance’s guns. Indeed, the invading Israeli troops were clearly terrified by the situation, and this left them no choice but to retreat in the direction of the occupied territories.3

AL-KHALEEJ: Do you have precise numbers for your losses?

HN: We do not differentiate between martyred mujahidin; the political context is not important when the issue of martyrdom is concerned. Five men fell from among our brethren in the Amal Movement4 and Hezbollah, and two were executed by the enemy after their arrest; according to some information, they were buried alive after they were accused of being part of the group that had planned the operation. Four civilians were also martyred, and there were a number of wounded. There was also widespread looting and destruction; a large number of citizens were displaced, and many others detained in public squares for hours, and beaten, tortured and abused. At the beginning, Israel tried to play an obvious game: it differentiated between homes that belonged to the Amal Movement and those that belonged to Hezbollah. But this game was soon thwarted, and the enemy was forced to go back to treating everyone with the same severity.5

AL-KHALEEJ: Since we are on the topic of Hezbollah and the Amal Movement, we would like to know if rumors regarding a potentially widespread conflict between you two in the south and elsewhere are true, especially given that [these rumors] come on the heels of a wave of statements and innuendos in this direction.

HN: I would like to be brief on this particular subject. Many political currents are active on the scene in Lebanon, and the Amal Movement is one of them, as are other Islamic movements. The Movement had considerable political appeal—for example, I and many of my colleagues in Hezbollah were members of Amal before the Israeli invasion. The political issue surfaced after the disappearance of Sayyed Mousa al-Sadr,6 due to a difference in vision, work, and other elements; but the problem remained confined to Amal and the Muslim scene until the [Israeli] invasion of 1982.7 This changed everything, and all the political movements became simple zeroes in the face of the very challenging Israeli number. Iranian revolutionary guards arrived in the Bekaa upon the orders of Imam al-Khomeini,8 and the faithful were of the opinion that a revolutionary and Islamist current should be established to adequately confront the new challenge facing Lebanon. This current was to have a clear Islamist political vision, and operate through a consistent ideology based on the principles and political line of Imam al-Khomeini, and according to the principle of wilayat al-faqih in which we believe.9 This is how Hezbollah came to be.

The party started developing and growing by virtue of the Islamic Resistance’s confrontation with Israel, and it was therefore only natural to see developing on the Islamic scene in general—and in particular the Shia scene—an entity called the Amal Movement and a current called Hezbollah. Our disagreement with Amal revolves around the vision, methodology and the fundamental, serious need to unconditionally follow al-Khomeini’s leadership. We believe, however, that our relationship with the Amal Movement should be based on a dialogue that aims at crystallizing a common vision and at finding a way of dealing with one another as brothers; we reject the notion of a potential conflict between us, regardless of whether it is political or non-political. At the same time, this does not mean that there is no rivalry between us, for both of us claim to work in order to further the interests of Islam and the Muslims. Therefore, let there be competition between us, in both the political and military spheres, for the sake of the wretched in Lebanon.

On the domestic front, and concerning the rumored potential armed conflict between us, we say that we have already overcome this [situation] and will undoubtedly be able to overcome it again in the future. In the past, the psychological and military situation lent itself to a potential armed clash, but the people in charge and the Iranian government managed to contain the situation.10 Any talk now about a future clash is nothing but a fanciful dream on the part of the enemy [Israel].

AL-KHALEEJ: However, from time to time abductions do take place and threats are exchanged between you; there is also the fact that the Amal Movement is preventing Hezbollah from deploying in the south, especially in the liberated areas.11

HN: Arrests and bans on weapons12 do occur from time to time, but our brothers are dealing with this issue with patience and in a spirit of brotherhood. These problems are being solved immediately as and where they occur, to prevent them from spreading further afield.

AL-KHALEEJ: Your conflict with the Communist Party has recently come to light in a bloody and violent manner; does anything in particular stand behind it, or was the page turned after the latest meeting between you?13

HN: Hezbollah is seen as the main player on the Muslim scene in Lebanon, and the rise of the Islamic Resistance could possibly have provoked a number of patriots (…) Such opposition manifested itself in the shape of a campaign against the Islamic case before it became known as such, and spread the word that the Resistance now belongs to one sect in particular [the Shia sect]. Those who closely follow these statements and articles would be aware of the mobilization aspect of this campaign. Furthermore, the Communist Party is blaming us for something we did not do: they are trying to blame the killing of a number of their officials on the Islamists and involve the Iranian embassy in the matter, using various media outlets to do so. They tried on several occasions to use the Noous incident; they first blamed the Amal Movement, then blamed Hezbollah again, and on a third occasion blamed the Islamic al-Tawhid movement.14 What is significant, however, is that judging by the various recent incidents, efforts are underway to mobilize the people against the Islamists.

There is no doubt that the climate created by the Communist Party was responsible for the armed clashes in West Beirut. It is clear that the incident which led to the martyrdom of one of the mujahidin had been planned, as evidenced by the military deployment of the Communists in the area where the clash took place. When shots and rockets were later fired at the Iranian embassy from the Communist Center, the equation totally changed and our response became severe, although we tried to contain the incident and prevent it from spreading to other areas. We are still careful not to be dragged into the quagmire of civil war from which God Almighty has protected us in years past.

Finally, a meeting took place under the auspices of the Iranian embassy, and the incident was resolved. However, we still have one remark to make regarding this incident: we are always very careful to avoid fighting with anyone, and most of all with those with whom we have ideological differences, like the Communists. The methodology according to which we operate does not involve building ourselves our own canton or competing with anyone for positions in the Lebanese state system. Our strategy is to build a future for ourselves through confrontation with the Zionist enemy. Let them therefore leave us be to fight Israel, for we have no ambitions in the liberated areas of the south; the [75km] occupied border zone [with Israel] is a different matter, and should be left to us. We would like to warn, however, that any attack on our mujahidin would be unacceptable and costly, as the incidents that have taken place recently have clearly shown; we also still intend to contain any incident that might occur.

AL-KHALEEJ: The situation in West Beirut is still worrying on account of what has happened and is happening on a daily basis, including clashes, assassinations, explosions, thefts, and violations. How long can this situation continue, how do you explain it, and what do you expect to happen in the future?

HN: The scene in West Beirut has been internationally, regionally, and locally infiltrated; various political, military, and intelligence parties are operating on the scene, and it is the theatre on which the current political game is being played out. This means that we cannot view what is taking place there as being separate from what is happening in Lebanon and the region as a whole. The situation in West Beirut is in a state of total collapse, and is a reflection of the entire political game; all parties on the scene, therefore, should bear the responsibility for this collapse. All previous security plans have failed, and all future plans are doomed to fail because those in charge of maintaining security are also the ones responsible for this collapse.

We believe that the scene in West Beirut is on the verge of a dangerous political and security explosion, which has so far been lurking like embers under the ash. There are also other possibilities of which I will not speak now, because they are not entirely clear yet.

AL-KHALEEJ: In light of this situation, what is the current state of the refugee camps, and did any of the solutions so far succeed in bridging the gap and ending the bloodshed?15

HN: The wound of the camps is still open, but joint efforts are underway by the Amal Movements and the Palestinians to heal it. They themselves admit, through self-criticism, that what took place was not right from the start, and should therefore be brought to an end. I do not know if the [players in the] political game in the region would want the matter to be reopened or remain closed, but it will probably come to an end. The future will witness a large-scale return by Arafat to West Beirut; it might not involve Arafat in person, but rather a heavy presence of individuals from the second and third tiers.16 This issue, however, should be solved within the context of an agreement between Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian leaders.

AL-KHALEEJ: The situation in Lebanon is passing through a stifling state of stagnation in the wake of the failure of the Tripartite Agreement;17 how do you see the situation on the ground, and what are the possibilities, especially since some are considering a military solution?

HN: For the past ten years, a play produced, directed, and written by America and other concerned regional and international powers, has been acted out in Lebanon. After every battle, even in the absence of a military balance, political leaders insist that a military victory should be a red line. The scenario starts with a battle, then moves on to dialogue, then to a solution being proposed once more and, finally, to a truce. A short time later, the situation explodes again, the game resumes, and the play is played out all over again.

In our estimation, the current situation in Lebanon is not moving in the direction of a military solution; even those who promote such a scenario are not very serious about it. What is actually taking place is an attempt at wasting time until a new round of negotiations can take place, either through independent Maronite parliamentarians or others.18 This would usher in a new game, possibly accompanied by a limited military campaign, or maybe not. We noticed, however, that the tone of voice that followed the abolition of the Tripartite Agreement has abated, which indicates that the climate is now ready for entering once again into the labyrinth of wasted and useless dialogue, to allow the game to continue.

We support a military solution because we do not see a better alternative. Here, it is important to differentiate between the Christians, the Lebanese Forces, and the Kataeb.19 We are ready to start a dialogue with the weak Christians who have been taken for granted, and who desire coexistence and who did not commit crimes against the people. However, dialoguing with Israel’s agents is like dialoguing with Israel itself; it is as absolute a condition as it is regarding Israel.20

The establishment of peace in Lebanon, therefore, can only take place once we extract the black, cancerous gland from Lebanon. We call upon all national and Islamic, political and military forces in Lebanon to opt for a military solution and urge them not to be afraid of the red lines. Experience has shown us that red blood is capable of obliterating red lines, and if the nation chooses to follow this path, Israel and America will find that they are incapable of changing anything in the equation. We hope that all the talk about a military solution on the part of various political leaders is not simply a political card to play with. We would like this scenario to become an established plan, and an option in which future generations will be brought up to believe. These past few years have provided ample proof of that.

AL-KHALEEJ: Assuming, for the sake of argument, that a military solution does take place, what sort of system would you envisage for Lebanon, and can the Islam you propose govern a place so full of contradictions?

HN: From the point of view of ideology and sharia,21 we are required to establish God’s rule over any part of this earth, regardless of particularities and details; this can only happen, however, if the nation adopts this ideology and safeguards it. We would like to allay the fears of those who think that Hezbollah intends to impose Islamic rule by force, and to tell them that we shall not impose Islam; for us, this is a matter of general principle. We are now intent on removing colonialism from this region, doing away with colonial means of information and culture, and making the people understand Islam as it should be understood; a lot of Muslim political terminology has been distorted by colonial interpretations.

We do not believe in multiple Islamic republics; we do believe, however, in a single Islamic world governed by a central government, because we consider all borders throughout the Muslim world as fake and colonialist, and therefore doomed to disappear.

We do not believe in a nation whose borders are 10,452 square kilometers in Lebanon; our project foresees Lebanon as part of the political map of an Islamic world in which specificities would cease to exist, but in which the rights, freedom, and dignity of minorities within it are guaranteed.

Therefore, in order for this project to be realized, priority should be given to removing Israel from the scene, because it was established for the express purpose of dividing and partitioning the Muslim world. We are not only against the partition of Lebanon, but also against the partition of the Muslim world; this explains why we see no alternative to fighting Israel, with all means at our disposal, until it ceases to exist. Then we will attend to following [certain] steps (…)