## 6

## “HEZBOLLAH IS NOT AN IRANIAN
COMMUNITY IN LEBANON”

September 11, 1992

> This interview with the Lebanese, pan-Arab magazine Al-Watan Al-Arabi came as the party was well on its way towards winning an impressive presence in the soon-to-be constituted national parliament, with twelve seats out of 128 in all. Although Nasrallah stresses that resistance operations and an overall culture of resistance would still be Hezbollah’s primary concerns in the future, he also makes clear that both can only survive on the basis of broad public support. However, he qualifies, while competing for democratic political power may be a necessity, Lebanon’s current political system can only be engaged to a limited extent, given the persistence of formal and informal sectarianism.

> Of course, to a certain degree his argument is self-serving: Shiites were believed to hold a plurality in Lebanon’s sectarian score-sheet. A deconfessionalized system closer to one-person, one-vote would most likely extend Shiite power and influence, perhaps even as far as the presidency or the premiership, reserved by tradition for a Maronite and a Sunni, respectively. Nasrallah attempts to defuse this issue by saying, “The aim is to establish a balance between rights and responsibilities, make ability the yardstick for promotion, and lay down the foundations of a suitable infrastructure headed by competent people.” Why, he continues, “insist on appointing only a Maronite at the head of the Central Bank? What is the logic behind it? The most competent person for the job, and for establishing civil and economic peace in the country, could be a Greek Orthodox, a Druze, an Alawite, or someone from any other minority.”

> Elsewhere, Nasrallah goes to some length in stressing Hezbollah’s focus on national concerns, downplaying the question of Iranian influence that is explicit, though still somewhat ambiguous, in the party’s adherence to wilayat al-faqih.1 But stressing the specificity of any Islamic project—and therefore the limitations of such a project in Lebanon—proves somewhat unconvincing for Nasrallah’s interlocutor, just as it would for later interviewers who, along with some Lebanese, would continue to express concern over Hezbollah’s ultimate direction.

AL-WATAN AL-ARABI: Did the results recently achieved by Hezbollah in several electoral districts surprise you? Were they up to your expectations? And why did you doubt your results, as Deputy Albert Mansour, who spoke about an armed occupation of the Baalbek barracks, mentioned?2

HN: One of the reasons we took part in the parliamentary elections was our confidence in the size of our public support, our popular base, and our credibility with the people.3 Let me give you a brief summary of what happened in the Bekaa. The area is divided into three electoral districts: Baalbek-al-Hermel, Zahle, and the Western Bekaa-Rachaya.4 The results of the Baalbekal-Hermel elections came as no surprise to us; they were natural and expected. We would have been surprised had the opposite happened because, as you all know, Hezbollah has a very strong popular base in the area.5 No one can deny that, especially in view of Hezbollah’s long history of resistance, services, and cultural activities; granting the citizens what the authorities have failed to deliver; and the long tenure of the area’s deputies in parliament. The people expressed their appreciation through popular rallies before the elections, and through the festival in Ras al-Ain Square, held under the slogan “Loyalty and acclamation for the list of the resistance.”6 The popular enthusiasm displayed in Baalbek al-Hermel towards Hezbollah can be mustered by no other political party or personality. These masses assured us of victory even before the ballot boxes were open, which explains our confidence that our electoral list would win. As for the incidents that are supposed to have happened, we did not hear about any challenges, problems, or remarks of this nature before vote-counting began. We can go into the details and say that the challenges and accusations started six hours after vote-counting began, and it became obvious, based on the preliminary results, that our party had won.

This is when the tumult started and rumors surfaced about an armed presence during the daytime. If these incidents really took place, why did no one mention anything about them on the day? The people of Baalbekal-Hermel participated en masse in the elections because of their conviction; and the army, internal security services and journalists, who do not follow our orders, were present everywhere. The journalists were there, as were delegates from other lists, and no one except for President al-Husseini’s delegate7 noticed any armed presence. All these claims and pretences were therefore just an attempt to cover up failure; we will leave it to the people of Baalbek, and other concerned parties who witnessed the election process, to judge for themselves. Furthermore, official sources, such as the Ministry of the Interior and others, have confirmed what I am telling you.

There remains the issue of election-rigging. Here I should say that delegates from other currents and lists were present, and saw the ballot boxes being opened and closed, and made sure that they were empty. Voting then started, followed by a vote count undertaken by the same people who had supervised the elections; results were registered, and then signed by the delegates. Where and how did the rigging occur? On the other hand, we have proof that people from other lists did attempt to rig the elections, but we chose not to raise the issue. Challenging the election results six hours after vote-counting had started is no more than an attempt by President al-Husseini and his list to extricate themselves from the results. Not only have we won, but our list is way ahead of the others; the difference in the number of votes, between the lowest number on our list and the highest number polled by the head of the rival list, is in the thousands.

AL-WATAN AL-ARABI: Why did Hezbollah not achieve the same results in the western Bekaa and Rachaya, against the list of the Interior Minister General Sami al-Khateeb,8 in spite of your strong mobilization power and [social] services in the area?

HN: There is a large sectarian variety in the districts of Zahle and the western Bekaa, and we ran independently for the Shia seat in both these districts. We faced a very tough list in Zahle, and two very tough ones in the western Bekaa, and still our candidates received a relatively high number of votes given that they were running independently. We did not expect them to receive a large number of votes, since they were running against candidates who usually benefit from the votes of various local groups; still, the difference between them was not so great. The results in both Zahle and the western Bekaa, as far as I am concerned, were very natural and logical considering that we did not participate based on the assumption that we were definitely going to win. We ran in response to our popular base, which put its trust in our candidates in spite of running independently.

AL-WATAN AL-ARABI: Do you expect a similar scenario to the one in Baalbek to take place in the south? And will your electoral rivalry with the leader of the Amal Movement, Nabih Berri, be a fight to the finish?9

HN: The situation is different in the south. I cannot say that the south shelters the resistance, because the Bekaa shelters the resistance and remains its main source of energy. The south, however, is the battleground of the resistance, its area of confrontation, the place where various political differences are resolved, and an area laden with past tragedies. Hezbollah and Amal are therefore compelled to run there side by side, and as a unified force, due to various considerations relevant to Islam and national aspirations, and to liberation and unity. The two parties should therefore approach the elections while bearing in mind the importance of unity and the need to avoid falling into the trap of apportioning power, as well as the number of seats each can win. We agreed with Mr. Nabih Berri to run on a unified list in the south.

AL-WATAN AL-ARABI: Why did you decide suddenly to play the local political game and be part of the deal-making, the bazaar-like atmosphere, and the buying and selling deals that take place there? Are you getting used to the system, which you at first refused to recognize, based on instructions you received from outside?

HN: In reality, we were, and will always be, the party of the resistance that [operates] from Lebanon in reaction to occupation and daily aggression. Any party, movement or faction that abandons resistance under any pretext, and for any reason, is giving up on a sacred duty. Our participation in the elections and entry into the National Assembly do not alter the fact that we are a resistance party; we shall, in fact, work to turn the whole of Lebanon into a country of resistance, and the state into a state of resistance. In the past, a number of state officials promised that if negotiations did not lead to the liberation of the land, the entire population, and the state itself, would be transformed into a resistance force. We said before, and are saying again now, that negotiations will not succeed, and that it is now time to act on that promise.

This is as far as the resistance is concerned. As for the domestic situation, we feel that paying attention to it is a responsibility that we cannot abandon. There is a dialectical link, here, between the resistance and the internal situation in Lebanon, because for the resistance to survive there should be a community that adopts it and adopts the resistance fighter. This means that, in order to remain steadfast, that fighter needs to secure all the support he needs politically, security-wise, culturally, and economically—and [he needs to] be provided with the means of livelihood. The battle therefore also takes place on the domestic front. Regardless of the resistance, however, there are internal issues that are important to the people in the political and economic spheres, and in their daily lives. In Islam, the act of serving the people and God’s families, rescuing the oppressed, saving the distressed, and stretching out one’s hand to the weak and the dispossessed, are a huge part of the faith. These [actions] are mentioned in the Quran, and we want to encourage them anew.

As for the [current Lebanese] regime, we believe that its main problem is its sectarian nature; this compels us all to find ways of eliminating this flaw, by which I mean political sectarianism itself and the resulting apportioning of positions in the state administration, in development, and in various [social] services. This has led to major dysfunction, to tragedies, and even to the wars that this country has witnessed. The system is also beset by a mentality of distinction and superiority, which has led in the past to civil war, and might again be the spark that reignites it at any moment.

AL-WATAN AL-ARABI: How can we convince the people that Hezbollah is actually non-sectarian and not trying to enshrine sectarianism; have you not called for an “Islamic State” in Lebanon?

HN: We want to eliminate political sectarianism and lay down the foundations for a system of governance that reflects the people’s aspirations for justice and equality in the [social] services and development sectors. The aim is to establish a balance between rights and responsibilities, to make ability the yardstick for promotion, and to lay down the foundations of a suitable infrastructure headed by competent people. For example, the most competent president of the Central Bank could be someone who is not a Maronite, but rather someone who—thanks to his financial and business acumen—is able to take the country out of the impasse. Why insist on appointing only a Maronite at the head of the Central Bank? What is the logic behind it? The most competent person for the job, and for establishing civil and economic peace in the country, could be a Greek Orthodox, a Druze, an Alawite, or someone from any other minority. The same question could be posed about the Maronite identity of the president of the republic.10 This is why the elimination of political sectarianism, which we are focusing on, is one of our priorities, and we are very serious about it.

Regarding the project of the Islamic Republic, I can assure you that we will never propose this option per se in Lebanon, neither through statements, slogans or speeches. We also said that this sectarian system is unjust and corrupt, and should therefore be replaced by another that reflects the will of the Lebanese people and establishes justice, security, peace and equality. As far as a new system of governance is concerned, a communist could say that Marxism is the best system for the new state; any other ideologue could put forth another philosophy of governance, which he believes would be guaranteed to solve the country’s problems. We are in effect saying to the Lebanese people that if they choose an Islamic system, we would hasten to support it. We believe, based on our Muslim faith, that a system that rests on Islamic principles will be able to solve all Lebanon’s problems, be they legislative, legal, intellectual, spiritual or moral.

We have never proposed the idea of imposing an Islamic Republic on Lebanon by force, and will not do that in the future, because the nature of the Islamic Republic does not lend itself to forceful action. This government would not be able to govern according to Islamic principles, or indeed survive, in the absence of overwhelming popular support. An Islamic government is an ideological entity committed, by virtue of its religious teachings—as well as legislatively and legally—to follow divinely inspired rules; it is moreover not a government of intelligence services, or of political parties, that can impose itself on the people by the force of arms. To be able to exist, an Islamic government presupposes the existence of popular support and strong conviction behind it. We do not deny the fact that it is our wish and desire to see the emergence of an Islamic system, because we are first of all Muslims, and not about to give up on our religious identity.

What others object to, we will not propose in the first place; in other words, we do not want to establish an Islamic government by force. However, we are calling upon the people to join Islam, and saying that Lebanon should be an open space for all. We fully understand that a communist would want a communist state, and a Muslim or Christian would want a state that reflects his own faith or ideology. What we do not understand, however, is someone who wants to impose on others by force, or through violent means, his own beliefs and a governance system of his choice. This we will never do.

AL-WATAN AL-ARABI: Why are you an extension of Iran in Lebanon and a tool in Tehran’s hands? Most experts and specialists believe that Hezbollah is an Iranian tool whose duty is to Islamize Lebanon by force, as has happened in Tunisia and Algeria.11 Even your theoretical infrastructure is a page out of the Iranian Revolution’s textbook, and does not reflect your local credentials.

HN: There are several points to attend to here. Ever since the Prophet, may God’s blessing be upon Him, launched his message, Islam has been around not only as a religion and ritual of faith, but also to organize people’s lives until judgment day. It has the ability to adapt and respond to changes in time and space, as well as to life’s many reversals; it has been the dream of the Muslim people for hundreds of years, and its theory still exists and is still valid. Before the Islamic Revolution in Iran happened, many Muslim scholars and movements adopted this project and worked hard to implement it. In the meantime, the Western and Islamic worlds were awash in foreign-inspired ideologies pouring in from East and West. The most distinct achievement of the Iranian Revolution was its success in shaking up the world, giving a spiritual and moral boost to the already existing ideology, crystallizing it, and awakening the Muslims. It compelled them to re-examine various tenets and theories, and produced an awakening in the Islamic world.

Be assured that every Islamic entity is part of the particular milieu in which it exists; and each milieu, in turn, has its own specificities. Hezbollah is not an Iranian community in Lebanon, and its fighters and mujahidin are not Iranian citizens. What is funny is that, a week ago, the American ambassador in Beirut went about gathering information regarding the resistance fighters in the south, in order to be able to answer the question, “Are they Lebanese or not?” In the meantime, as a Lebanese movement, when we lose a martyr, we are proud of him—we announce his name to the public and hold celebrations and weddings in his honor. These martyrs are the sons of southern towns and villages.

AL-WATAN AL-ARABI: Where are Iranian financial aid, training, and armaments going?12 Your party’s submission to Iran’s policies, calculations, and interests is almost total.

HN: Even at the level of international law and internationally recognized norms, a people whose land is occupied has the right to resist occupation. It also has the right, whenever it needs assistance, to reach out to friends who are ready to lend it the support and assistance it needs to liberate its land.

AL-WATAN AL-ARABI: Why not appeal to Arab parties who are active, have the [necessary] means, are more concerned, and provoke less fear and suspicion in others? What does Iran have to do with Lebanon’s fate?

HN: Iranian assistance is in any case available for Lebanon’s mujahidin, regardless of whether Arab parties are willing to assist them or not. For humanitarian and faith-based reasons, our brothers in Iran consider themselves responsible and are eager to assist any oppressed and dispossessed people in the world; this policy, which the Islamic Republic is now putting into practice, was devised by Imam al-Khomeini. But whenever it was unable to assist an oppressed, defeated or dispossessed people, it was only because it did not have the means or the proper avenues to channel this aid to the intended recipient. I am certain that the Islamic Republic is equally generous to the oppressed Muslim population of Bosnia-Herzegovina, slaughtered on a daily basis as the world watches.13 If this assistance proves insufficient, the reasons would undoubtedly be beyond its control.

AL-WATAN AL-ARABI: Do you think that, because of the existing imbalance of power, your resistance against Israel has converted the south into a scorched earth, and has not succeeded in liberating a single inch of it, especially given that there is no Lebanese consensus over this method of resistance? Why do you insist on burdening Lebanon with more than it can handle? Why resist now while direct negotiations are taking place in Washington?14

HN: From the resistance’s perspective, both the resistance in Lebanon and the future of the region follow the same logic, for since 1982 there have been two competing theories in Lebanon. One theory, which has been around since the day Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, and which still persists, says that the Lebanese people have to tone down and limit their activities to the political and diplomatic spheres, both regionally and internationally. This theory focuses on international efforts underway to pressure Israel to withdraw from Lebanon. Others say, on the other hand, that they would support the resistance option provided it operates within the context of a unified Arab strategy—which is in fact an impossible proposition. Even if we adopt this theory, could this unified Arab strategy, in the aftermath of the 1982 invasion, go to Nabatieh15 without having to pass through Israeli checkpoints? Of course not—for if the Israelis remain in the south, in the Southern Suburb and in the mountains, they would not have withdrawn a single inch.16 If the political–diplomatic route had been any good, we would have regained the Golan Heights, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the 1948 territories by now.17

AL-WATAN AL-ARABI: Then why negotiate in Washington at all? Why are we Lebanese more royalist than the king? Why do you impose mirage-like liberation theories on a badly broken Lebanon, when the Palestinians are thirsting for self-rule, asking for municipal authority, making concessions, and all Arab fronts have quietened down?

HN: Ours is another theory, one that contradicts that of diplomatic chivalry and international forums: it advocates going to war against the enemy. They said that those who advocate this are insane; we said in response, let us try—the sane can talk politics and the insane can fight. Be certain that the theory of the sane will not bear fruit, but that of the insane—the mujahidin, the martyrs and suicide bombers—has already caused the enemy to bleed, and has doubled the number of its dead and wounded. The bleeding within the Zionist entity has added public pressure on the enemy’s government, and put in front of it two clear options: either it remains in the south and suffers additional human losses, or withdraws. This is why it has already withdrawn back to the frontier zone.

Experience and common sense have shown that the theory of resistance is still valid, and that the other logic has failed and should therefore not be counted on anymore. Some might then say, “Why is your front the only one open?”; and I would tell them that the front should remain open as long as the land is still occupied. We have to continue to make the enemy bleed. The resistance has another aim—namely, to awaken the region’s masses. This means that the resistance has two interim objectives: the first is to keep the enemy bleeding through guerrilla warfare against its military patrols and positions, and to cover its entire body with wounds; the other is to awaken the masses.

In 1983 the resistance started with 200 mujahidin, and now, in 1992, there are thousands of them. Do you think the miraculous intifada within the occupied territories18 would have been possible if not for the resistance in Lebanon? The leaders of the intifada themselves say that they found revolutionary inspiration and were able to overcome the obstacle of fear, thanks to suicide operations in Lebanon. This is why we believe that it would be wrong to close down our front until another one opens up, so that we can then become a part of it; the right thing to say is that our front should remain open so that other fronts can also open. We are counting on the day when the will of the people is manifest to all.

In my estimation, a war of attrition rather than a classical war is liable to destroy the Zionist entity; this war might be ongoing even while negotiations are underway, or reconciliation is in the offing. I believe, based on our insight into the enemy’s mentality—whether it is Shamir- or Rabin-inspired,19 and given its revolutionary dreams and plans20—that [Israel] will give the Arabs too little in comparison with what the negotiators hope to achieve. I do not think anyone in the world can impose reconciliation and normalization on the people of the region; America could impose certain regimes on the area—even reconciliation with Israel—but not normalization.

AL-WATAN AL-ARABI: Could we say that, given its activities in Lebanon, Hezbollah is one of the outcomes of a political and strategic understanding between Iran and Syria?

HN: Hezbollah is in fact the outcome of a self-propelled movement launched in the wake of the Israeli invasion of 1982. This means that it is the outcome of the will and decision of a group of Lebanese people who were inspired by Khomeini’s ideology, and who took advantage of the climate created by the Islamic Revolution, and Syrian support, to launch a resistance movement against occupation.

AL-WATAN AL-ARABI: A Western information source speaks about indirect negotiations taking place, at a hotel in Paris, between your party and Israel regarding the prisoner, Ron Arad,21 and the possibility of exchanging him for some of your own prisoners and hostages in Israeli prison camps.

HN: There is no link whatsoever between the issue of the hostages and that of the prisoners. Hezbollah has absolutely nothing to do with the foreign hostages who were in Lebanon, whether the West believes it or not.22 The party has announced more than once that it did not detain them; nor did it have anything to do with the ensuing negotiations, no matter whether the West wishes to believe it or not. This is therefore not my problem, although for us this is clearly an important issue. As far as the Israeli prisoners are concerned, we are indeed holding a number of them, and indirect negotiations have actually taken place, because we believe that it is our legitimate, brotherly, and moral responsibility to secure the release of prisoners held in Israeli jails, without any sectarian, partisan or factional prejudice. There have also been some positive developments, since a number of prisoners were released. But the process stopped at the issue of pilot Ron Arad, about whom we have no information whatsoever, since he is not in our custody, and we therefore know nothing about his fate.

We have nothing to do with the negotiations surrounding the fate of the pilot, but we do have two Israeli prisoners in custody, as well as a group of soldiers from Lahd’s army,23 and are trying to arrange an exchange through a third party. The same principles according to which the foreign hostages held in Lebanon were released should be applied to our own hostages in Khiam24 and other prisons inside Israel.

AL-WATAN AL-ARABI: Why have you evacuated the Sheikh Abdullah barracks in Baalbek at this particular point in time, and handed it over to the Lebanese army? Does it have anything to do with Secretary Baker’s visit to the city of Zahle?25

HN: Handing over the barracks is part of Hezbollah policy. When we took over the Sheikh Abdullah barracks we did so in a peaceful manner, through a popular demonstration at the head of which were women, children, and senior citizens, while the young men remained at the very back. This happened at a time when [President] Amine Gemayel was preparing to use the Lebanese army against large numbers of Lebanese citizens, both in the mountains and in Beirut’s Southern Suburb.26 When we advanced and marched to the barracks, the army left and Hezbollah elements went in. As the civil war was still raging, we found it necessary to deploy in military positions and barracks, along supply routes, and in areas of contact.

When the Taif Agreement was signed,27 we opposed its political provisions but acquiesced to the ones relevant to security. We said that we were in favor of peace and of turning over a new leaf on the civil war. Many were expecting a bloody conflict to ensue between the Lebanese army and Hezbollah in the southern suburb, Iqlim al-Tuffah,28 and Baalbek; these people obviously do not know our policies well enough. We said repeatedly that civil war in Lebanon would not produce any results, and seventeen years of it have if anything complicated the sectarian situation in the country. Dialogue, coexistence, agreement, and understanding are the only options open to the Lebanese people; war does not serve Lebanon’s interests in any way, and has repercussions that go well beyond the country and its people. Based on that, we have always responded positively, and without pressure, to all calls and initiatives designed to reinforce civil peace in the country. We were surprised when the governmental delegation proposed the cancellation of all contacts, and I am sure that we are the ones who have the most difficulty with this premise. The moment the state decided to reclaim its property, in the name of reinforcing civil peace, we therefore handed the Sheikh Abdullah barracks over to them without any pressure.

AL-WATAN AL-ARABI: What do you think about the establishment of the Shia protectorate in the south of Iraq?29 Will it be enough to bring Saddam down or not?

HN: The establishment of the American protectorate in southern Iraq is a form of sedition; it is a kind of sedition difficult to categorize. Part of the problem is that the Shia in the south—especially in the al-Ahwar region—are being bombed and murdered in the midst of total international silence. On one side, there are people trying to intervene to save the population of these regions from a real social catastrophe; and on the other, there is this silence and this indifference. This went on until the Americans, who know how to seize opportunities to further their own interests, started talking about an American protectorate in the south—but they would not be able to hide the real long-term objectives of their game. Why did their conscience suddenly awaken? I do not think that it is a matter of conscience; the Iraqi air force has been shelling Kurdish villages with chemical weapons for years, without a single word out of Washington.30 What is happening now has nothing to do with moral principles, conscience or human values; Bush simply needs to achieve an election coup, and the Shia protectorate would tighten the noose around the Iraqi regime’s neck. And though this will not bring down the regime, it will lead to the division and dismemberment of Iraq. I am one of those who oppose American intervention in Iraq’s internal affairs; I would like to see an Arab or Islamic protectorate in southern Iraq, not an American enclave.