## 7

## THE FIRST UNDERSTANDING
WITH ISRAEL

August 27, 1993

> The summer of 1993 saw a dramatic series of regional developments that would deeply affect Hezbollah in the coming years. Most notably, and just days before Nasrallah gave this interview to As-Safir’s Ibrahim al-Amine and George Bakassini, the PLO and Israel finalized the groundbreaking Declaration of Principles at Oslo1—prompting renewed speculation that a Lebanese–Israeli peace treaty of some kind might be closer at hand than previously thought.

> Of great significance, too, was the first so-called “Understanding” which had emerged from the carnage of a concerted Israeli military assault between July 25 and July 31, mainly in south Lebanon, codenamed “Operation Accountability.” That offensive had come after a Hezbollah attack, which killed several IDF soldiers within the “security zone” in the south, prompting an Israeli retaliation against the villages out of which Hezbollah guerrillas were operating. The party promptly launched Katyusha rockets into northern Israel, mainly at civilian areas, with Nasrallah declaring that Hezbollah “consider[s] [itself] to be in a state of open warfare with this enemy.”

> After seven days of combined land, air, and sea attacks, Israel had wreaked havoc across a substantial stretch of territory, but had not been able to stop the rocket fire, as its military had earlier predicted it would do. In all, 80 villages lay in ruin, approximately 6,000 homes had been destroyed, and more than 140 Lebanese civilians were dead. Nearly 250,000 refugees from the south, mainly Shiites, streamed towards Beirut, in a replay of earlier mass exoduses after the Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982. In Israel, two civilians had been killed and 24 injured by Hezbollah rockets.

> The unwritten 1993 “Understanding” that ended the fighting was, perhaps not surprisingly, vigorously disputed almost from its inception—as had been a similarly unwritten 1992 agreement brokered after a smaller flare-up of hostilities in the south. But the stage had been set for what would, in 1996, finally become a written agreement, with Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and the United States as signatories. Hezbollah, the Understandings effectively said, would refrain from rocket attacks into Israel if Israel refrained from attacks on Lebanese cities, towns, and villages. Fighting amongst combatants could therefore continue, but within boundaries—within the “rules of the game.” “The Katyusha [rocket] bombardment,” Nasrallah says pointedly, “has led to a new formula based on mutual forced displacement, mutual destruction, and equal terror. This formula was imposed by the Katyusha.”

AS-SAFIR: Let’s start with the negotiations. Whenever the date of the next round nears, a new wave of optimism permeates the atmosphere. Maybe this time around, the optimism is stronger than ever. Do you believe that there is anything new in the negotiations, and do you expect new developments in the next round? And how do you interpret the latest Israeli aggression in this context?2

HN: Regardless of all the forms of optimism spread in the previous periods, there were no advances in the ninth and tenth rounds, especially on the Lebanese and Syrian tracks, while the Palestinian track is mired in political complications. One of the most important reasons behind the latest Israeli aggression on Lebanon in the Seven-Day War may be that the Israelis arrived at a dead end in the negotiations, and were unable to solve certain issues through political negotiations. So they used the military operation to weaken the Lebanese situation and the Arab attitudes by overturning some of the strong cards in the hand of the Arab negotiator.

America will try to employ the latest aggression in the eleventh round, and the Israeli operation will leave its marks on the next round, but this remains dependent on the perseverance and fortitude of the Arab attitude. Will the Arab negotiator offer rewards and gains to Israel for the recent aggression? So far we have seen nothing new. Even the statements we heard yesterday from the enemy Prime Minister Rabin aren’t new.3 They were just an announcement of an old suggestion that had already been put before the Lebanese officials—whether they admitted their knowledge of it or not. The suggestion has been on the table for a while, and was discussed through mediators, and rejected as far as I know.

Rabin rephrased an old proposal and did not come up with anything new. According to our assessment of the overall situation, we do not believe that any important advances will take place in the eleventh round, especially as the Israelis are still intransigent. The problems facing the negotiators will remain the same in the coming rounds, because of the Israeli unwillingness to present compromises, while the Arab negotiators have come to the end of the [list of proposed] compromises that they could present. The American pressure is not new, and will continue.

AS-SAFIR: Was what Rabin said yesterday discussed [immediately] after the recent war, [or] during the contacts made by the United States before arriving at what was called the ceasefire agreement?

HN: As I remember, this suggestion was around during and after the aggression. But it is on the table, and it concerns the security [zone] as it aims to disarm the resistance and implement the necessary procedures with the security belt as an experiment. If it succeeded, then the discussion would start about security arrangements at the level of the borders. We announced back then that this offer contains a trap, because if the [Lebanese] government agrees to stop the operations of the resistance in this form with the occupation still there, then it is handing Israel a huge victory on the one hand, and another gain on the other, as this would plunge Lebanon into civil war, because we would never accept this. Israel knows our attitude, and knows that this suggestion will cause divisions among the Lebanese, because some of the Lebanese will not agree to stop the resistance while there is occupation. The hidden purpose of the Israeli suggestion is to cause strife inside the south between the government and the resistance. But ultimately, Israel will not implement the terms that it is talking about, because it won’t abandon the card represented by its occupation in Lebanon. It will not withdraw without imposing a peace agreement on Lebanon.

AS-SAFIR: After the aggression, you spoke about reports that point to a political scandal that borders on treason. Did you mean this matter?

HN: I believe that this issue was discussed as part of the analyses, but what are important in this issue are the documents and data. There is an important question: Did the officials in Lebanon have prior knowledge of the Israeli operation? The evidence shows that some of those in authority knew, but we haven’t raised this issue so far and we don’t want to do so right now. But there are efforts to clarify this matter.

I believe that in any country, if rulers knew of an [impending] aggression but didn’t warn the people or the resistance, which they say is a legitimate right, and thus left the resistance and the people prey to a surprise attack from the enemy that, had we not been naturally cautious, caused greater losses—if this is so, then the legal and correct classification of this enters the realm of treason; much more so if the matter goes beyond the extent of prior knowledge to what is being reported as agreements and coordination.

AS-SAFIR: When the aggression ended, much talk was expended on a solution to reach a ceasefire, and about a signed written agreement dealing with the issue of the missiles and the status of the resistance. What is Hezbollah’s story about what happened?

HN: During the aggression we established political contacts with the official religious and political leaderships, and we ignored all the sensitivities and personal problems. We also contacted our brothers in Damascus, because the index of the strength in the political attitude pointed to Syria. We were anxious during the Seven-Day War to give them an image of the field, political, and popular situation, because this has major effects on attitudes. Here, the differences emerged between us and some of the “others” because there is a major difference between reporting the situation by saying that people are complaining, the country is under threat of dividing, and chaos will rule Beirut, and saying that there is incomparable fortitude in the south, high morale, popular cooperation between the Christians and the Muslims, and people largely understanding and helping each other. There wasn’t a single slap [i.e. disruptive event] in the Southern Suburb or Beirut, and there was an unprecedented state of internal cohesion. But some politicians with certain political backgrounds can present the image in a way that serves their interests.

We went to Damascus at the time when Israel was starting to reduce its goals from the elimination of Hezbollah and the Islamic Resistance to the disarmament of Hezbollah, then to freezing the operations of the resistance—which implies a recognition of the resistance’s right to keep its arms, but in return for freezing its operations. Then, finally, came [the proposal] preventing the Katyusha rockets from targeting Israeli civilians in the settlements in northern Israel. From here I enter into the issue of the communications that took place. After the Israelis downgraded their goals to this extent, they [still] weren’t able to achieve them militarily. The air force and the artillery were bombarding all the valleys and points from which the Katyushas were being fired; but despite our lack of fortifications and bunkers, the missile barrage never stopped until the seventh day of the operation. This means that the Israelis, who possess the strongest military force in the region, were not able to stop the Katyusha bombardment of the settlements militarily. This is not so much a military defeat as a military scandal, given Israel’s military capabilities.

Here the communications started, with the center point being Damascus. The Americans were the mediators, and on the other side were the Israelis. The discussion with us went as follows: the Israeli operation was a result of the perseverance of the resistance, the political situation in the country, Syria’s attitude, and Iran’s help. There are many elements that the Israelis want to be rid of. There were some discussions about an exit from the situation, and about whether there can be any solution for the issue of the missiles. This was the question directed at us. No one told us that there was a deal or an agreement, or that we should discuss it; the question (about the missiles) was the only thing told to us.

Of course, I was party to this issue, and the question was directed at me. I answered that if there was nothing that could affect the operations of the resistance or its movements, and if the issue only concerned the missiles, then it was easy to solve. There is nothing new in this [situation], as we have been announcing for the past two years that our purpose is not to bombard the settlements but to carry out operations inside the occupied [Lebanese] territory. But when our people, towns, cities, and villages are being bombarded, then it is our right to use all the weapons available to us to stop the aggression. This is our policy, and we have never started firing Katyusha missiles at the settlements. Even Rabin himself always used to say that Hezbollah doesn’t start bombarding the settlements, but it only does so in response to [Israel’s] military actions.4 This is known, and the formula is simple: let the aggression on Lebanon stop, along with the bombing of the civilians, and we will stop firing missiles.5 Thus, the reason for bombarding the settlements is removed. We have no problem in this regard. We were told that this was fine, so let us start specifying dates for the ceasefire. We replied that we weren’t the ones that started the war. He who started the war must end it; for our part, as soon as we hear that the aggression will stop at a specific hour, then this means that at that time the firing of the Katyusha missiles will stop. If the aggression continues, then the Katyusha bombardment will continue. Then we returned to Lebanon. On Saturday, we heard that the Israelis had announced that the ceasefire would take effect at six [p.m.], and the aggression stopped along with the bombardment.

AS-SAFIR: Did you evaluate the results of the Katyusha policy that you had followed?

HN: Before the end of the aggression, some of the officials started to evaluate the Katyusha policy to determine whether it was wrong and hurried, or correct, and tried to discover its achievements. I believe that this issue is one of the controversial points on the [political] scene.

After what happened, our belief in the correctness of this policy increased, despite what some are trying to suggest. Of course, we are talking about the policy which states that the purpose is not to fire Katyusha rockets, but that if our villages and towns are bombarded then the settlements of northern Israel will not be safe from the same treatment. We still believe that this policy produced something very important, which we all felt after the Shihine operation.6 In the past, whenever the resistance used to carry out an operation against the Lahd army7 and killed one of its members, the bombardments started against Nabatieh, Bara Sheet,8 and the other towns, and the same happened whenever a bomb went off. The knee-jerk reaction to retaliate against any operation by the resistance was for the Israelis and the Lahd army to bombard the villages [of south Lebanon] and kill civilians. But we notice that after the Shihine operation, which led to results of this magnitude, not a single shell was fired at any southern village, and the Israeli enemy seemed confused. It responded by holding a meeting for the war cabinet, then attacked Jenta9 and an anti-aircraft site in the Bekaa valley. But they didn’t attack civilians—rather, they only tried to attack military sites that they thought belonged to Hezbollah.

Why didn’t the Israelis bombard the southern villages following these losses and this operation, which was applauded by all? In case you ever visit the three presidents or any of the officials,10 I want an answer to this question. Our answer is clear: because the Israelis know that bombarding civilians will bring a resumption of the bombardment of the settlements in northern Palestine. As the bombardment of civilians is tiresome for our people, it is tiresome for others as well, and they can’t handle it as well as we can.

The Katyusha bombardment has led to a new formula based on mutual forced displacement, mutual destruction, and equal terror. This formula was imposed by the Katyusha, and not the operations of the resistance in the border belt. There is a very sensitive topic for the Israelis right now—namely the security of their settlements in northern Palestine. If the settlements are bombarded again, then Rabin will be forced to stand in front of all his people and all [Israel’s] political forces to answer the question: What did the seven-day operation achieve? This is why Rabin understands that there is a new formula. This formula was not imposed by the Israelis, but for the first time by the resistance because, in the past, the settlements were not bombarded, while since 1985 the villages of the south and western Bekaa have been under bombardment. The rule of the game used to be that we got bombarded while the settlements remained safe. The enemy destroys Maydun, Yatir, and Kafra while we are only allowed to move in the security zone.11 But the resistance imposed a new formula through the Katyusha. Thus we say that we are committed to a new rule, one which was founded by us. I therefore believe that the experience of the war proved that this policy is wise and correct, and should reap benefits since it is not right for us to protect the enemy’s weak points. We must fortify our strengths and apply pressure on the Israelis at their weak points to alleviate the suffering of our people. This is what we recently achieved.

We stopped the bombardment with the missiles. That is all that happened on our side. But regarding what took place among the others, according to our information it is certain that in the first day after the ceasefire, communications took place with Syrian officials, who assured us that there were no deals or agreements, and that the whole issue was within the boundary of stopping the [Israeli] aggression in return for stopping the Katyushas. I had issued a statement two days before the end of the operation in which I spoke these same words, because the only way to halt the Katyushas was to stop the aggression against our people.

Regarding the other leaderships in the country, and the deals that they made or the communications and promises that they issued, this is an issue we weren’t a party to, and we are completely innocent of it, if anything happened. We do not possess accurate information in this regard. We heard the reports, but we do not possess information that confirms that there were written pledges offered by Lebanese officials.

AS-SAFIR: In your opinion, what are the effects of the so-called ceasefire agreement on the eleventh round of negotiations? In other words, did the recent Shihine operation aim [to undermine] the next round?

HN: This question suggests a wider one: is the resistance aimed at liberation or damaging the negotiations? We consider that the Americans and Israelis have dodged the issue of the existence of occupied lands, and that the resistance against the occupation is a legal right for any people. They [the Americans and the Israelis] treat the resistance as if it aims to sabotage the peace process, and that is why they call for taking stances against the Resistance. I read in the newspaper commentaries that the purpose behind the [Shihine] operation was to send local and regional messages. This is inaccurate, because the resistance existed before the negotiations, and will continue if they fail, because the resistance is linked to the occupation. As long as there is occupation, there is resistance. There were no [peace] negotiations when we started the resistance for it to be said that we started the resistance to sabotage the peace process in the region. No, we resist the occupation, which started in 1982. In 1985, a great victory was achieved when the Israelis were forced to withdraw. From 1985 until today, the Islamic Resistance has not stopped. Its actions are continuous, and are not subject to any temporal or political constraints. A day before the start of the seventh round of negotiations, or during the round, the Ahmadiyeh operation took place, and resulted in the deaths of five Israelis and the wounding of five others. This caused a stormy round of negotiations with the Lebanese delegation, and all the discussion turned to the issue of the resistance. At that time, many commented that the purpose behind the operation was to sabotage the round, so I confirmed back then that, even though we are in these certain positions, a small group of resistance fighters could be inside the security belt setting up an ambush for the enemy, or planting a roadside bomb, and I would know nothing of this, as it is a routine day’s work for us. The operations of the resistance are not seasonal or political. This is the daily work of our brothers, and the top official in the resistance might not be aware of it.

The Ahmadiyeh bomb could have gone off while a patrol from the Lahd army was passing, but it so happened that it struck an Israeli patrol that day. The bomb might explode and kill only one Israeli, as we don’t control the target. We possess the initiative to decide whether or not to attack this target, but we can’t force the Israelis to pass at a specific time in a specific place instead of the Lahd army, as this is linked to their tactics. Even the Shihine operation came in the context of the resistance confirming that its operations would continue as usual. Before the Shihine operation, we had carried out ten operations since the end of the aggression, which contradicts the analyses that pointed out that the purpose behind the Shihine operation was to refute talk about the existence of a certain deal restraining the resistance’s operations. But the uniqueness of the Shihine operation concerns its size, and the enormous scale of the Israeli losses. In reality, there is no relationship between the operations of the resistance and the rounds [of negotiation]; the operations are only linked to the issue of the occupation.

AS-SAFIR: Washington and Israel are saying that [the Shihine operation] shows that the dimensions of the resistance in Lebanon are not local but regional, with links to Iran. This has once again caused confusion about the nature of Iran’s view of the situation in Lebanon, through its relationship with Syria. So what is the truth of Iran’s relationship with Syria regarding Lebanon, or with Lebanon through Syria?

HN: There are two parts to this question. The first concerns Iran’s relationship with the resistance, and the second concerns how to deal with this situation. It has always been said that the resistance in Lebanon has a certain regional dimension, with some meaning Iran, others meaning Syria and Iran, and yet others meaning Syria, each according to his political background. As far as the Iranian issue is concerned, before there came to be an Islamic Republic in Iran, Imam Khomeini was still a revolutionary against the Shah’s regime, and he demanded that the Shah’s regime end its relationship with Israel and cut off all its oil supplies and economic relations. He also used to call upon the Iranian people to support the Palestinian organizations that were fighting Israel. Thus he expressed some very great opinions on this issue. But the issue of endorsing the resistance is a matter that pertains to Muslims in general, and Shiites specifically, and it bears no relation to Iran being an Islamic republic. It pertains to our ideology, and to religious clerics and references.

For example, when the British occupied Iraq in 1920, the religious clerics in Najaf declared a revolution against the English, which developed into the 1920 revolution. Some of the clerics who participated in it later became great religious references—such as Muhsin Al-Hakim, Ayatollah Kashani and others12—who spent a long time in British jails. Thus the issue of fighting the occupation, whether British or Israeli, is linked to our thinking, ideological background, and particular structure, as well as to our references and clerics, whether they are in Najaf, Qom, Karbala, or Jabal Amil.13

Regarding the regional issue and interests, after the regime in Iran became Islamic, it started dealing with the issue of the resistance not on the basis of the regional interests of the state of Iran, but on the basis of the mentality, ideology, and special structure of our clerics and references, which pre-dated the founding of the Islamic regime in Iran, as it had already been in existence in Najaf and elsewhere. This is true even for the great religious cleric, the late Sayyed al-Khoei, as I remember from 1978 when I was in Najaf, when the Israeli attack on Lebanon started. We went as a group of students to Sayyed al-Khoei, and we asked him about his directives to fight this aggression. His answer was that “aggression necessitates defense. If I had had armies and weapons, then I would have sent them to southern Lebanon.”14

The conclusion is that the issue of the resistance and the rejection of the occupation is not related to any regional issue, and is not subject to any political bargaining. This is why the Islamic Republic stands behind the resistance, as everyone knows that the extent of pressure that Iran is under to end its support for the resistance is very great. I have knowledge of significant incentives that were offered to the Islamic Republic to give up this support, but Iran doesn’t do so because the issue is linked to the ideology and mentality of Islam.

Iran has its serious stances on the Lebanese issue. It supports civil peace, the resistance, and internal stability, and it has taken the initiative on more than one unhappy occasion to stop internal crises from escalating. It is true that Iran is against negotiations with Israel, but this doesn’t eliminate Iran’s concern to preserve the strength of the Syrian and Lebanese stances. It thinks about how to support the Arab stances, to prevent Israel from imposing its terms on the Arabs. This is confirmed by Iran’s behavior during the recent Israeli aggression, which is an additional sign that Iran’s goal is to support the Arab stance and not to sabotage the situation. Everyone knows here that if the resistance had regional sponsors that wanted to use it to further political projects, then it could have used the Seven-Day War to draw everyone into a comprehensive war—but this wasn’t done, neither by the resistance nor by Iran, which is accused of benefiting from this resistance to achieve a whole host of regional gains.

AS-SAFIR: Do you believe that the Seven-Day War was a rehearsal for a greater war that is anticipated by the resistance, or was it aimed at reviving the bottlenecked negotiations?

HN: Israel has a set of principles. It wants to dominate the whole region. When the Israeli was weak and dispersed throughout the world, he didn’t give up this dream—so what about today, when he is in a strong position facing a divided and torn Arab and Islamic world, and also when he is supported by the New World Order? Negotiating is an Israeli necessity, and serves their interests because they hope through negotiations to control the whole region for the lowest number of casualties possible. The enemy wants bilateral peace, and is working with the United States to increase the pressure applied on the opposing powers, spearheaded by Syria, to achieve it.

I therefore believe that Israel doesn’t need a comprehensive war, as it is getting what it wants for the lowest number of casualties—even without any casualties at all—and as it is working to offer booby-trapped initiatives to the Arab side, such as Rabin’s offer to Lebanon yesterday, or the offer presented to the Palestinians known as ‘Gaza First’, which will be catastrophic if it comes to pass, because the Palestinian cause will be threatened with extinction.15

Thus, we see that the Seven-Day War was an operation that aimed to apply more pressure and to scare us by targeting principally the resistance card, but this goal has not been achieved. Anyway, the United States has threatened everyone, and especially the Arabs, that the war that took place will be repeated if the negotiations fail.

AS-SAFIR: The Shihine operation has caused an unprecedented quake in the Israeli military apparatus. How do you see the enemy responding to it, especially as there are those who focus on the intelligence–security side more than the direct field situation?

HN: You must read the statements issued by the leaders of the enemy accurately, as they say that they are incapable of repeating the recent aggression every week. They are issuing statements that do not suggest a widespread reaction, but this doesn’t eliminate the possibility of large operations. We are paying attention to all the possibilities.

AS-SAFIR: Talk of harmony between the resistance and the state has resurfaced. Some explain [this] as being linked to the issue of the negotiations. How do you see this issue?

HN: The official who seems most concerned with this issue is [Foreign Minister] Fares Boueiz. We have not ignored this talk, but we tried to acquire explanations as to what is meant by it.

If what is meant is that the resistance should be used for political ends, then we reject it completely, because the resistance would then become a seasonal resistance. Then there are those who say: Now is the time for negotiations, so please ease up with the operations; or, We have heard positive talk from the Americans, so let us stop the resistance for a while, and sit down. We do not agree to this talk at all. I will not discuss the ability of this or that Arab faction to make use of the resistance.

If ‘harmony’ signifies a call for coordination in the performance of the resistance, then we have no problem in discussing this, but only with those concerned—that is to say, those who resist like us, not with those who refuse to resist. But we confirm that we are ready to cooperate and help all the forces that want to resume or intensify their participation in acts of resistance.

AS-SAFIR: Moving to the issue under discussion of the aid to support the fortitude of the south Lebanese, and to compensate [them] for some of their losses. There is a reliance on Hezbollah to acquire lots of aid from Iran for this purpose. You have just returned from a long visit to the Iranian capital, so what were the communications like on this subject?

HN: First, I would like to clarify something—not to detract from the performance of the government and the visits by Prime Minister Rafik Hariri to a number of Arab countries to acquire more aid,16 but to clarify that the figures presented by the governing institutions to the media about the losses are hugely bloated. This might be to acquire more aid, or to terrorize the people through all this mass destruction that came as a reply to the operations of the resistance.

We will think well of them due to our concern over the unity of the internal political front, but the reality of the destruction doesn’t need such bloated figures to erase the effects of the [Israeli] aggression. If there is correct, accurate, and clean management, then the Lebanese state can erase the effects of the aggression with a limited amount of aid from some of the friends and brothers. Concerning Iran, we can say that it is ready to offer aid.

There is a matter that should be noted in this context, which is the way the politicians here deal with issues of this magnitude. I can say with full certainty that most of the political leaderships in Lebanon still behave with an alleyway mentality. We also believe that, if the government is seriously convinced of the necessity of the resistance and of protecting it, then it should delegate the issue of the distribution of the aid to the men of the resistance in the south. It should have depended on the men of the resistance in each town to distribute aid—first because they are trustworthy, as they didn’t ransack the houses during the aggression, since they are self-supplied; and secondly because it would have cemented and deepened the relationship between the men of the resistance and the people in the south—because Israel is trying to sow division between them. But the state didn’t follow this method, and the issue of aid distribution became a means to achieve political and popular gains for this or that party or leader. The Islamic Republic decided to deliver aid to the Lebanese government, as did all the other countries that are sending food, medical, and physical assistance. We completely agreed to this and went along with it, despite the fact that we consider that the Lebanese government should hand over all the assistance to the men of the resistance. The Islamic Republic is continuing to send aid; I believe that a number of planes carrying aid will land soon in Beirut airport, and I hope that it will be distributed justly and without problems.

AS-SAFIR: Is this the whole of the aid?

HN: This is one part of the issue. The other part concerns the initiative we announced, which entails repairing all the houses that were damaged and not completely destroyed. When we announced this initiative we were embarking upon an adventure, because it was difficult to establish the full extent of this venture and its financial cost. I said that if we had to, then we would go to all the countries and contact all the Arab and Islamic communities and clerics to acquire assistance; I was serious about this, because it wasn’t clear to us whether the Islamic Republic was ready to shoulder this burden alone, or if we needed aid from other quarters as well. I believe that the method that we suggested is the best one to be followed, and many voices were heard calling upon the state to follow the same one, instead of quarrelling with the homeowners over estimates of the size and cost of their losses.

Regarding the other side of the issue, which concerns the owners of the houses that were destroyed completely, we will contribute to rebuilding them. Of course, we didn’t commit to rebuilding them completely, because we will contribute alongside the contribution they will be getting from the government to rebuild.17 Regarding the implementation of this initiative, whether through communications with the official authorities in Iran or with some religious clerics and popular organizations, I believe that, God willing, we will implement this initiative and we will fulfill this promise. There was a wager on whether Hezbollah would fulfill its promises or not. So far, in our experience, we have never yet promised and failed to deliver, and I believe that the feeling among the brothers in Hezbollah in the south, Bekaa, and Beirut is that, even if we have to use up all our resources, we will implement this step, no matter the cost.

There is a possibility of opening up new fields of assistance, but this step is still being studied with our brothers in the Islamic Republic. The Islamic Republic will announce any development in this field, whether through us or through the government.