## 5

## VICTORY AT THE POLLS

August 25, 1992

> Two days after winning eight seats in the rolling parliamentary elections held in the areas in and around the Bekaa Valley, Nasrallah spoke with An-Nahar newspaper, a decidedly secular daily whose columnists and editorials were generally critical of the party. His approach appears to be one of both confidence and caution—perhaps not surprising, given that the party’s domination of the Baalbek-al-Hermel1 district, as well as locations beyond, had come as a rude awakening for some of the traditional purveyors of sectarian political power in Lebanon.

> Indeed, Hezbollah’s unexpectedly strong showing, a mere 50 days after Nasrallah had announced that the party would indeed participate in Lebanon’s first post-civil war elections, was of particular concern, not so much for the Christians as for Shiite stalwarts like Speaker of the Parliament Hussein al-Husseini, who would soon resign his post, and to a lesser extent for Amal. Buoyed by the success of several of the party’s Maronite, Catholic, and Sunni candidates in Bekaa, Nasrallah makes clear that Hezbollah would henceforth vie for democratic political power in Lebanon—and, more than this, could mobilize a constituency that might just “[pull] the carpet from under the others’ feet.”

AN-NAHAR: How do you evaluate the electoral process so far, and how do you view your victory?

HN: We can say that they went reasonably well from the procedural point of view; problems arise, in one ballot box or the other, in elections anywhere in the world. The fact remains that, in general, the electoral process that just took place was very important, and the number of problems was very small and far less than what we expected for a country holding elections on the heels of a 17-year war.

Of course, in the beginning we had a problem with the Election Law and submitted a complaint in this regard; but on the day of the elections, our delegates did not register any fundamental or important remarks on the ballot boxes. Delegates for various candidates made a strong showing, and displayed a high degree of awareness regarding the significance of the electoral process—especially since most of them were new to the scene. They were especially concerned about ballot boxes being empty before voting started, and checked the identity of each voter; delegates, especially our own, were given ample opportunity to control the scene. In the end, we believe that the process went well, and as it should have; and the few incidents that happened in certain areas could have happened in the best of elections in any country. I would like to say here that I am speaking only about the elections that have so far taken place; I cannot judge, as of now, elections that will take place later.

In response to the second part of your question, I would say that our victory in the electoral district of Baalbek-al-Hermel did not come as a surprise to us; it was natural and expected. Before the elections I met with a number of officials who asked me, “Do you expect your list to win?” I answered, “For sure.” They then asked, “Would you be guaranteed of victory if you fill the two remaining Shiite seats on your list?” I said, “I am absolutely certain that our entire list would win.”2 Our victory and success in the Baalbek-al-Hermel district are both natural and expected; what was surprising, however, was the failure of one of the candidates on our list.

This [our victory] certainty comes from our experience in the region, the services we offer, and the nature of the relationship between our brethren there and people from various sects and groups. I would like to say, in this context, that we kept two Shiite seats on our list vacant because we wanted to avoid a conflict with President Hussein al-Husseini.3 We entered into a competition between electoral lists only, and considered that leaving two seats vacant would keep the door open for President al-Husseini to return to the National Assembly. I tell you frankly, the numbers support what I am saying: if we had presented a closed and complete list to the public, it would have won in its entirety, and pulled the carpet from under the others’ feet.

As for the districts of Zahle4 and the Western Bekaa, we nominated two candidates there in response to popular demand on the part of our supporters and backers, and of the martyrs’ families. These two regions have given a large number of martyrs for the liberation of the country, and we were bound to respond positively to their demands. We ran independently in these two districts against strong lists, and still were serious rivals, and those who follow the numbers closely can attest to this fact. I tell you frankly, our candidates’ victory in these two districts was neither a forgone conclusion nor expected; we took part in order to give expression to the people’s endorsement of our policies and path. The fact that our two candidates received such a high number of votes is an expression of the wide popular will behind this path. We would not be surprised if the final results reveal that our friends—especially those against whom we ran for the two Shiite seats—have won in these two districts, because this could very well happen given the nature of the elections in these two districts.

AN-NAHAR: Were there efforts, before the elections, to form a coalition between yourselves and President al-Husseini?

HN: Of course. There were attempts through intermediaries to form a coalition of sorts, but President al-Husseini has particular issues with that idea, and when these issues prevented the formation of a coalition, he chose to run on one of the lists and we chose to run on another. But we decided to keep our list open out of respect for President al-Husseini’s role and status.

AN-NAHAR: Some say that the elections were rigged in the Bekaa, especially in Baalbek-al-Hermel. What do you say to that?

HN: There were many rumors concerning the presence of armed men and a military siege of the Baalbek brigade. I believe that the high voter turnout in Baalbek-al-Hermel—which, according to the numbers, is the highest ever—means that our people have gone to vote in strength because there is a general tendency in this particular area to take part in electoral processes.

I think that the delegates of those who talk about election-rigging were present on the ground alongside the army, the security forces, and the media, and I do not believe that delegates of other lists running against our own saw any armed presence, except for delegates of Mr. al-Husseini’s list. Neither the people, the army, nor journalists saw any of that. Why? We issued a simple statement today, in response to claims regarding the electoral process, in which we said: “[W]e will not say anything ourselves, but leave it to the Lebanese people who took part in the elections, to the citizens of Baalbekal-Hermel, and to the relevant loyal authorities to say their word on the matter.”

As is well known, Hezbollah is not part of the establishment of power, and has therefore nothing to do with the army, the security forces, or editors-in-chief. We were there only as voters, and the ballot boxes were opened and closed in front of all the other candidates’ delegates, and the same goes for the vote count. How and where did the rigging take place, then? Why did they contest the elections six hours after the vote-counting process had begun? If the elections were indeed rigged, something would have surfaced at the ballot box. The reasons behind this challenge are clear and known to all; we will say no more about this.

AN-NAHAR: Some called for the cancellation of the elections in the Bekaa; what is your opinion about that?

HN: We do not think that the elections will be cancelled. We do expect, however, as well as presume, the spirit of sacrifice and loyalty to the greater good, and to those who stand behind it, to be far larger than what we have witnessed so far. Sacrificing the entire electoral process for personal gain, and to raise one’s own morale, only make us hold on to the electoral process even more. Any challenge to the elections should be made legally; and since we have our own delegates as well, we will be able to discuss these incidents wherever they occurred. It is not normal for one person to stand there, claim that there was rigging and cheating, and demand the cancellation of the entire electoral process. As I said before, we do not think that the government would cancel the elections.

AN-NAHAR: What if this actually happens?

HN: Then we would decide what our position should be in light of the circumstances.

AN-NAHAR: Does this mean you do not have a position ready for such an eventuality?

HN: We might have, but there is no need to announce it now. We are following every word as it is spoken, and every action as it is done.

AN-NAHAR: Are you not afraid that the Algerian experience would be repeated here?5

HN: There is a big difference between Lebanon and Algeria. The problem with the regime in Algeria is that the Islamists took over parliament and occupied more than two-thirds of its seats; this would have allowed them to change the shape of the country. In Lebanon, the country’s make-up, its pluralistic nature, and the distribution of parliamentary seats, are not conducive to something along the lines of what happened in Algeria. I therefore believe that our party’s participation in the National Assembly, regardless of the number of seats we eventually obtain, should not scare the people here like it did the Algerian regime. The reaction to our victory should therefore not be similar to what happened there. Our participation in the National Assembly would happen through true and loyal young people who have good experience, are ready for sacrifice, and therefore could not be bought or sold. They would not bend under pressures or seek their own personal interests at the expense of the people and the country.

Our participation in the National Assembly will give us the added strength to assume our important and essential position in Lebanon’s political life. One should therefore not view Hezbollah’s victory the same way as the Islamist victory in Algeria.

AN-NAHAR: What would your position be if the authorities cancel the election process?

HN: This is also part of the whole issue. I do not expect the authorities to cancel the elections. Did anything new happen to justify the cancellation of the electoral process, of the entire project of elections, and waste all the important reasons behind [the elections] and all the relevant evaluations and analyses that went into it? Is it because a number of personalities on Mr. al-Husseini’s list did not win? Does this new development justify wasting an entire process for which so much effort has been exerted? Would all those boycotts and declarations go with the wind just because a group of people were not lucky enough to win in one of the districts? If this happens, it would be one of the most bizarre aspects of Lebanese politics!

AN-NAHAR: What would your next political move be if you do not win seats in the National Assembly? And would this mean that you would transform yourselves from a military into a political party?

HN: We submitted an electoral program earlier based on action, not electoral propaganda. Our parliamentarians will take it to the National Assembly and try as hard as possible to see it implemented. They will do their best even if their courage and steadfastness put them under a lot of pressure and expose them to danger. Our brethren and our leaders are well known for their constancy and for caring about the people’s problems, even if this leads to their martyrdom, as happened with His Eminence the secretary-general and master of all the Islamic Resistance’s martyrs, Sayyed Abbas al-Mussawi.6

We were never a military party or militia; we put ourselves forward as a jihadi movement to confront the ongoing occupation and the aggression on our people and land. Our participation in the National Assembly does not detract whatsoever from our being a resistance movement, because the call to duty and the reasons that compel some individuals, or an entire people, to resist against continued occupation, are still valid.

AN-NAHAR: What are your expectations regarding your candidates in the southern suburbs of Beirut? And what do you say regarding the electoral battle in the south?

HN: As far as the southern suburbs of Beirut are concerned, we attach a lot of hope to our chances for victory, and I think that the picture there will become clearer this week. As for the south, we agreed with our brother, Nabih Berri,7 and with our brethren in the Amal Movement, to participate in the elections in the south on a joint list, which would include candidates from the party, the Movement, and other forces and personalities.8

AN-NAHAR: The issue of the elections in the Bekaa had many ramifications. How do you view the situation, especially in light of President al-Husseini’s resignation?

HN: In the course of our conversation, I expressed my astonishment at what has happened. We expected the will and choice of the people to be met with a degree of reason, with a democratic spirit, and with a readiness to sacrifice one’s moral satisfaction, and personal interests, for the sake of the nation as a whole. However, now that this has happened, we hope and count on our ability to deal with it using the same psychological methods that led us to the situation we are in at present. I believe that all efforts will now go in that direction, and hope that, with God’s help, things will continue to proceed normally, which is what we are noticing from the general atmosphere and statements made by a number of officials.